Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Art | Kant | Gadamer I 52 Art/Beauty/Kant/Gadamer: Judging according to an ideal of beauty is (...), as Kant says, not merely a judgment of taste. Gadamer I 53 (...) to be pleasing as a work of art, something must be more than just tasteful and pleasing at the same time. Note: GadamerVsAdorno/GadamerVsJauß: Unfortunately, the Kantian analysis of taste judgement is still being misused for art theory, even by T. W. Adorno's Aesthetic Theory( (Schriften Band 7, S. 22ff.) or by H. R. Jauss (Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik. Frankfurt 1982, S. 29f.). When just now actual beauty seemed to exclude any fixation by concepts of purpose (>Beauty/Kant), then here, conversely, even a beautiful house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, etc. is said to have no ideal, "because these purposes are not sufficiently defined and fixed by their concept, consequently the usefulness is almost as free as with vague beauty". Only of the human form, precisely because it alone is capable of a beauty fixed by a concept of purpose, is there an ideal of beauty! This doctrine, established by Winckelmann and Lessing(1), gains a kind of key position in Kant's foundation of aesthetics. For it is precisely this thesis that shows how little a formal aesthetic of taste (arabesque aesthetics) corresponds to the Kantian idea. >Beauty/Kant. Gadamer I 55 Kant/Gadamer: It is precisely with this classicist distinction between the normal idea and the ideal of beauty that Kant destroys the basis from which the aesthetic of perfection finds its incomparably unique beauty in the perfect meaningfulness of all being. Only now can "art" become an autonomous phenomenon. Its task is no longer the representation of the ideals of nature - but the self-encounter of man in nature and the human-historical world. Kant's proof that the beautiful is pleasing without concept does not prevent us from being fully interested only in the beautiful that appeals to us in a meaningful way. It is precisely the recognition of the concept-lessness ["Begrifflosigkeit"] of taste that leads beyond the aesthetics of mere taste.(2) >Art/Hegel, >Interest/Art/Kant, >Artwork/Kant, >Nature/Kant. Gadamer I 58 Def Art/Kant/Gadamer: Kant's definition of art as the "beautiful idea of a thing" takes this into account, insofar as even the ugly is beautiful in the representation by art. GadamerVsKant: Nevertheless, the true essence of art comes out badly in its contrast to the beauty of nature. If the concept of a thing were only represented beautifully, then this would again only be a matter of a "school-suitable" representation and would only fulfil the indispensable condition of all beauty. KantVsVs: Art, especially according to Kant, is more than a "beautiful representation of a thing"; it is a representation of aesthetic ideas, i.e. of something that is beyond all concept. The concept of genius wants to formulate this insight of Kant. >Genius/Kant. 1. Lessing, Entwürfe zum Laokoon Nr. 20 b; in Lessings Sämtl. Schriften ed. Lach- mann, 1886ff., Bd. 14, S. 415. 2. Kant explicitly says that "the judgement according to an ideal of beauty is not a is merely the judgement of taste".(K. d. U. S. 61). Vgl. dazu meinen Aufsatz Gadamer, Die Stellung der Poesie im Hegel'schen System der Künste( Hegel-Studien 21, (1986). |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Collective Goods | Economic Theories | Rothbard III 1030 Collective goods/Economic theories/Rothbard: Many attempts have been made (…), to salvage the concept of the "collective" good, to provide a seemingly ironclad, scientific justification for government operations. Molinari: Molinari, for example, trying to establish defense as a collective good, asserted: "A police force serves every inhabitant of the district in which it acts, but the mere establishment of a bakery does not appease their hunger." RothbardVsMolinari: But, on the contrary, there is no absolute necessity for a police force to defend every inhabitant of an area or, still more, to give each one the same degree of protection. Furthermore, an absolute pacifist, a believer in total nonviolence, living in the area, would not consider himself protected by, or receiving defense service from, the police. On the contrary, he would consider any police in his area a detriment to him. Hence, defense cannot be considered a "collective good" or "collective want." Similarly for such projects as dams, which cannot be simply assumed to benefit everyone in the area.(1) De Viti De Marco: Antonio De Viti De Marco defined "collective wants" as consisting of two categories: a) wants arising when an individual is not in isolation and b) wants connected with a conflict of interest. RothbardVsDe Viti De Marco: Vs a) The first category, however, is so broad as to encompass most market products. There would be no point, for example, in putting on plays unless a certain number went to see them or in publishing newspapers without a certain wide market. Must all these industries therefore be nationalized and monopolized by the government? Vs b) The second category is presumably meant to apply to defense. This, however, is incorrect. Defense, itself, does not reflect a conflict of interest, but a threat of invasion, against which defense is needed. Furthermore, it is hardly sensible to call "collective" that want which is precisely the least likely to be unanimous, since robbers will hardly desire it!(2) Immaterial goods/service: Other economists write as if defense is necessarily collective because it is an immaterial service, whereas bread, autos, etc., are materially divisible and salable to individuals. RothbardVs: But "immaterial" services to individuals abound in the market. Must concert-giving be monopolized by the state because its services are immaterial? Rothbard III 1031 Samuelson: In recent years, Professor Samuelson has offered his own definition of "collective consumption goods," in a so-called "pure" theory of government expenditures. Def Collective consumption goods/Samuelson: Collective consumption goodss according to Samuelson, are those "which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good." For some reason, these are supposed to be the proper goods (or at least these) for government, rather than the free market, to provide.(3) VsSamuelson: Samuelson's category has been attacked with due severity. Professor Enke(4), for example, pointed out that most governmental services simply do not fit Samuelson's classification - including highways, libraries, judicial services, police, fire, hospitals, and military protection. In fact, we may go further and state that no goods would ever fit into Samuelson's category of "collective consumption goods." Margolis: [Julius] Margolis(4), for example, while critical of Samuelson, concedes the inclusion of national defense and lighthouses in this category. But "national defense" is surely not an absolute good with only one unit of supply. It consists of specific resources committed in certain definite and concrete ways - and these resources are necessarily scarce. A ring of defense bases around New York, for example, cuts down the amount possibly available around San Francisco. Furthermore, a lighthouse shines over a certain fixed area only. Not only does a ship within the area prevent others from entering the area at the same time, but also the construction of a lighthouse in one Place limits its construction elsewhere. In fact, if a good is really technologically "collective" in Samuelson's sense, it is not a good at all, but a natural condition of human welfare, like air - superabundant to all, and therefore unowned by anyone. Indeed, it is not the lighthouse, but the ocean itself—when the Ianes are not crowded - which is the "collective consumption good," and which therefore remains unowned. Obviously, neither government nor anyone else is normally needed to produce or allocate the ocean.(4) Rothbard III 1032 Tiebout: Charles M. Tiebout(5), conceding that there is no "pure" way to establish an optimum level for government expenditures, tries to salvage such a theory specifically for local government. Realizing that the taxing, and even voting, process precludes voluntary demonstration of consumer choice in the governmental field, he argues that decentralization and freedom of internal migration renders local government expenditures more or less optimal - as we can say that free market expenditures by firms are "optimal"—since the residents can move in and out as they please. Certainly, it is true that the consumer will be better off if he can move readily out of a high-tax, and into a Iow tax, community. But this helps the consumer only to a degree; it does not solve the problem of government expenditures, which remains otherwise the same. There are, indeed, other factors than government entering into a man's choice of residence, and enough People may be attached to a certain geographical area, for one reason or another, to permit a great deal of government depredation before they move. Furthermore, a major problem is that the world's total land area is fixed, and that governments have universally pre-empted all the land and thus universally burden consumers.(5) >Collective goods/Rothbard, >Social goods. 1. Gustave de Molinari, The Society of Tomorrow. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904. Reprinted by Taylor & Francis, 1972. p. 63. On the fallacy of collective goods, see S.R., Ibid., p. 63. On the fallacy of collective goods, see S.R., "Spencer As His Own Critic," Liberty, June, 1904, and Merlin H. Hunter and Harry K. Allen, Principles of Public Finance (New York: Harpers, 1940), p. 22. Molinari had not always believed in the existence of "collective goods," as can be seen from his remarkable "De la production de la sécurité," Journal des Economistes, February 15, 1849 , and Molinari, "Onziéme soirée" in Les soirées de la Rue Saint Lazare (Paris, 1849). 2. Antonio De Viti De Marco, First Principles of Public Finance (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), pp. 37-41. Similar to De Viti's first category is Baumol's attempted criterion of "jointly" financed goods, for a critique of which see Rothbard, "Toward A Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics," pp. 255-60. 3. Paul A. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review ofEconomics and statistics, November, 1954, pp. 387-89. 4. Stephen Enke, "More on the Misuse of Mathematics in Economics: A Rejoinder," Review of Economics and statistics, May, 1955, pp. 131-33 ; Julius Margolis, "A Comment On the Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review of Economics and statistics, November, 19 5 5, pp. 347-49. In his reply to critics, Samuelson, after hastening to deny any possible implication that he wished to confine the sphere of government to collective goods alone, asserts that his category is really a "polar" concept. Goods in the real world are supposed to be only blends of the "polar extremes" of public and private goods. But these concepts, even in Samuelson's own erms, are decidedly not polar, but exhaustive. Either A's consumption of a good diminishes B's possible consumption, or it does not: these two alternatives are mutually exclusive and exhaust the possibilities. In effect, Samuelson has abandoned his category either as a theoretical or as a practical device. Paul A. Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure," Review of Economics and statistics, November, 1955, pp. 350-56. 5. Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, October, 1956, pp. 416 - 24. At one point, Tiebout seems to admit that his theory would be valid only if each person could somehow be "his own municipal government." Ibid., p. 421. In the course of an acute critique of the idea of competition in government, the Colorado Springs Gazette-Telegraph wrote as follows: „Were the taxpayer free to act as a customer, buying only those services he deemed useful to himself and which were priced within his reach, then this competition between governments would be a wonderful thing. But because the taxpayer is not a customer, but only the governed, he is not free to choose. He is only compelled to pay.... With government there is no producer-customer relationship. There is only the relation that always exists between those who rule and those who are ruled. The ruled are never free to refuse the services of the products of the ruler.... Instead of trying to see which government could best serve the governed, each government began to vie with every other government on the basis of its tax collections.... The victim of this competition is always the taxpayer.... The taxpayer is now set upon by the federal, state, school board, county and City governments. Each of these is competing for the last dollar he has.“ (Colorado Springs Gazette-Telegraph, July 16, 1958) |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Collective Goods | Samuelson | Rothbard III 1031 Collective goods/Samuelson/Rothbard: Many attempts have been made (…), to salvage the concept of the "collective" good, to provide a seemingly ironclad, scientific justification for government operations. Samuelson: In recent years, Professor Samuelson has offered his own definition of "collective consumption goods," in a so-called "pure" theory of government expenditures. Def Collective consumption goods/Samuelson: Collective consumption goodss according to Samuelson, are those "which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good." For some reason, these are supposed to be the proper goods (or at least these) for government, rather than the free market, to provide.(1) VsSamuelson: Samuelson's category has been attacked with due severity. St. Enke(2), for example, pointed out that most governmental services simply do not fit Samuelson's classification - including highways, libraries, judicial services, police, fire, hospitals, and military protection. In fact, we may go further and state that no goods would ever fit into Samuelson's category of "collective consumption goods." >Collective goods/Rothbard, >Social goods. 1. Paul A. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review ofEconomics and statistics, November, 1954, pp. 387-89. 2. Stephen Enke, "More on the Misuse of Mathematics in Economics: A Rejoinder," Review of Economics and statistics, May, 1955, pp. 131-33 ; Julius Margolis, "A Comment On the Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review of Economics and statistics, November, 19 5 5, pp. 347-49. In his reply to critics, Samuelson, after hastening to deny any possible implication that he wished to confine the sphere of government to collective goods alone, asserts that his category is really a "polar" concept. Goods in the real world are supposed to be only blends of the "polar extremes" of public and private goods. But these concepts, even in Samuelson's own erms, are decidedly not polar, but exhaustive. Either A's consumption of a good diminishes B's possible consumption, or it does not: these two alternatives are mutually exclusive and exhaust the possibilities. In effect, Samuelson has abandoned his category either as a theoretical or as a practical device. Paul A. Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure," Review of Economics and statistics, November, 1955, pp. 350-56. |
EconSamu I Paul A. Samuelson The foundations of economic analysis Cambridge 1947 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Conventions | Davidson | I 113 Language/Convention/Davidson: conventions and rules do not explain the language. - The language explains the conventions. Glüer II 50 Language/Davidson: two radical consequences: 1. understanding: for understanding it is basically irrelevant which language the speaker speaks. (DavidsonVsTarski). >Understanding. II 51 Each language is accessible through causal relations. 2. It is considered trivial that meaning is conventional. What words and sentences mean is a question of social practice. DavidsonVs: the thesis of the conventional character of language must be abandoned in the radical interpretation! >Radical Interpretation. II 52 Even the idiolect of a nonconformist, freed from all conventions, can in principle be interpreted as long as we can find access to it via causal hypotheses. Conformism facilitates interpretation, but is not a condition of the possibility of understanding. Malapropisms are misused or mispronounced foreign words or technical terms. II 150 Communication/Davidson: is unconventional. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Explanation | Gould | I 321 Explanation/Why-Questions/Gould: evolutionary biology is always concerned with the question "why?" (> Purposes). II 61 Explanation/tradition/Gould: is it not extremely unlikely that haplodiploidism, a prerequisite for the evolution of hymenoter societies, was probably first developed as an adaptation to an almost completely contradictory lifestyle? GouldVsTradition: but this is not unusual at all, but a basic principle that distinguishes evolutionary biology from a common stereotype about science in general. Frequent error: it is a frequent error to assume that the instantaneous usefulness of a property would allow to deduce the reasons for its origin. Origin and current usefulness, however, are two very different subjects. Complex properties are full of possibilities: their conceivable uses are not limited to their original functions. For example, the fish's fins of equilibrium became the driving elements. >Misuse. II 150 Explanation/causality/purpose/Gould: the question "What is it for?" often distracts us from the more earthly but often instructive question: "How is it built?" II 152 We tend to view each structure as if it were created for a specific purpose. II 166 Explanation/causality/causal explanation/chart of knowledge/methods/Gould: a hotly debated topic is the occurrence of transposable elements of DNA, so-called jumping genes. These sequences can repeat themselves and then move independently to other parts of the bacterial chromosome. II 167 Conventional arguments for the existence of DNA repeating itself on average follow traditional Darwinian viewpoints. Primary characteristics of organisms: about 25% of the genetic material cannot be secondary - they must exist in order to secure an advantage for the organisms in the fight for survival. Therefore, we would have to explain the advantage for the supporting body resulting from the DNA, which is repeating itself on average. Wrong answer: if you assume that all functioning genes could only exist in one copy, any possibility of alteration would be blocked. So that must be the reason! Doubling provides the material for evolution. II 168 GouldVs: this is causality in the wrong direction: it cannot move backwards in time, the resulting flexibility cannot be the reason why a doubling of genes occurs in the first place. Future usefulness can only be the beneficial effect of other direct reasons for an immediate advantage. E. g. feathers are excellent for flying, but the ancestors of the birds must have developed them for other reasons, probably to control the temperature as a few feathers on the arms of a reptile do not make it fly. II 169 Definition adaptations/Gould: adaptations are limited exclusively to those structures that have developed because of their current usefulness. Definition exaptations/Gould: we call adaptations structures that have developed for other reasons or without any reason, but are still usable. If the repeating DNA is transposable, why do we need an adaptive explanation at all for it? II 170 It can simply distribute itself from chromosome to chromosome on its own, making copies of itself while "stuck" genes cannot. Solution/Gould: these additional copies must not continue to exist because they are useful, but because the body does not notice them at all! |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Forms of Thinking | Dennett | I 275 Limits/Unger: There must always be a pair of x on both sides of the border; this is required by our conventions. InwagenVsUnger: so much the worse for the conventions! Jackendoff: Candidates on the border are forced into one or the other category. Dennett: a good trick, but not a forced move! Darwin shows us that nature does not need what we say we need to think; nature copes well with gradual variations. I 277 ((s) Limits are necessary for thinking, but not for nature.) General/Particular/Artificial Intelligence/Dennett: Donald Symons(1): there is no "general problem solver", because there are no general problems, only particular problems. >General Problem Solver. I 691 DennettVsSymons: There is also no general wound, but only particular wounds. Nevertheless, there is a general wound healing process. 1. Symons, D. 1992. "On the Use and Misuse od Darwinism in the Study of Human Behavior." In: Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, 1992, pp. 137-62. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Generality | Dennett | I 691 Generality/Particularity/Artificial Intelligence/Dennett: Donald Symons(1): There is no "general problem solver", because there is no general problem, only particular problems. DennettVsSymons: There is no general wound but only particular wounds but there is a general wound healing process. > General Problem Solver. 1. Symons, D. 1992. "On the Use and Misuse od Darwinism in the Study of Human Behavior." In: Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, 1992, pp. 137-62. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Inflation | Hayek | Boudreaux II 73 Inflation/Hayek/Boudreaux:“ Even a very moderate degree of inflation is dangerous because it ties the hands of those responsible for policy by creating a situation in which, every time a problem arises, a little more inflation seems the only easy way out.“(1) >Monetary policy/Hayek. Purchasing power: For a unit of money (say, a dollar) to lose purchasing power is for that unit of money to lose value. And when a unit of money loses value, it takes more units of that money to buy goods and services. In other words, the prices of goods and services bought with that money rise. Money supply: By far the most common cause of inflation is an increase in the supply of money. Solution: The cause of inflation, therefore, is quite simple: excessive growth in the supply of money. Problem: Stopping inflation is likewise simple: quit injecting newly created money into the economy. >Time/Hayek. Monetary policy/time/Hayek: But while stopping inflation is easy in principle (no complex theories must be mastered, and no intricate mathematical problems must be solved), it is often very diffcult to stop in practice. The reason is that control of the money supply is in the hands of government officials. Stopping inflation is made diffcult by politics, not least because it is politics that usually is to blame for starting inflation in the first place. >Monetary policy/Hayek, >Fiat Money, >Gold standard. Boudreaux II 74 Excess capacity: Trouble arises when the truth is revealed that these industries over-expanded. When this revelation occurs, investors and entrepreneurs begin to eliminate what they now see is excess capacity in these over-expanded industries. Efforts to shrink these over-expanded industries, though, inevitably cause hardships. Most notably, unemployment rises as workers are laid off from their jobs in these industries. >Production. Unemployment/politics: During the time that unemployment is unusually high - during the time that it takes for these laid-off workers to find new jobs - political pressure is intense for government to "do something" about this unemployment. Government politics: One of the easiest "somethings" that government can do is to keep the inflation going. Money supply: By continuing to inject new money into the economy, government can for a bit longer prop up prices in the industries that are among the first to get the new money. In Short, by continuing to inflate the money supply, government can postpone the discovery by entrepreneurs and investors that the industries that are among the first to get the new money are in fact over-expanded and burdened with excess production capacity. Monetary policy/politics: The benefit to politicians of continuing to inflate the money supply is that, by delaying the discovery of the need to scale back over-expanded industries, they keep the economy appearing for a while longer to be healthier than it really is. These politicians, therefore, are at less risk of losing their jobs in the next election. Boudreaux II 75 False information: for prices in the over-expanded industries to continue to be read by investors and entrepreneurs as signals that the increased investments in these industries are really not excessive, prices in these industries must rise even faster than before. Prices in these industries must rise at a pace greater than the expected rate of inflation. Central banks: To cause prices in these industries to rise faster than the economy's general rate of inflation, the central bank must quicken the pace at which it injects new money into the economy. If the central bank does so, prices in the industries that are first in line to get newly created money will remain higher than they "should" be relative to prices in other industries. Economy: Entrepreneurs and investors might then continue for the time being to believe that their increased investments in these "first-in-line" industries are justified. Efforts to scale back these industries are postponed. Boudreaux II 76 Inflation: Eventually, however, the faster rate of money injection inevitably results in a faster rate of economy-wide inflation. Prices throughout the economy are now rising at a pace to catch up with the rising prices in those industries that are among the first to receive the newly created money. Information: As a consequence, prices in these "first-in-line" industries stop sending out misinformation. These prices begin to reveal the fact that investments in these industries are indeed excessive - that productive capacity in these industries is too large. Wrong solution: And so the only way the monetary authority can prevent investors from scaling back these industries and from laying off workers is to ramp up even more the rate of monetary expansion. Monetary policy: The monetary authority soon finds itself in a diffcult spot. If it stops inflating the money supply (indeed, even if it simply fails to accelerate the rate of growth in the money supply), the industries that over-expanded because of earlier injections of new money will contract. Unemployment: The resulting rise in unemployment creates political pressures for government to "do something" to raise employment - something other than counseling the public to patiently wait while industries are restructured to be more economically sustainable. Accelerating the rate of inflation is one maneuver the government can take to keep employment high for the present. Boudreaux II 77 Time/information: (…) because monetary expansion does not cause all prices to rise in lock-step with each other, the higher the rate of inflation, the more distorted becomes the pattern of relative prices throughout the economy. >Relative prices. Information: The more out of whack individual prices become relative to each other, the less reliably do these prices guide entrepreneurs, investors, and consumers to make correct economic decisions. Higher rates of inflation, therefore, result in greater misuse (greater “misallocation”) of resources. >Allocation. Time: To cure this problem the monetary authority need only to stop injecting new money into the economy. But the cure isn't instantaneous. Not only does it take some time for people to stop expecting future inflation, but, also, it takes time for workers and resources to shift away from industries that over-expanded because of inflation and toward industries where these workers and resources will be more sustainably employed. Boudreaux II 79 Monetary policy/Problem: The bad effects of more inflation today won't materialize until sometime in the future, when many of today's officials will be out of office. So officials in office today can, by keeping the money supply growing, make the economy appear to be healthier than it really is, while the costs of creating this illusion will be borne only in the future by mostly different officials. 1. Friedrich Hayek (1960). The Constitution of Liberty. In Ronald Hamowy (ed.), The Constitution of Liberty, XVII (Liberty Fund Library, 2011): 465. |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
| Institutions | Liberalism | Gaus I 177 Institutions/traditional liberalism/Gaus/Mack: The distinctive feature of political institutions in the liberty tradition is that they authorize the use of force and can legitimately threaten and use force against citizens. Because the scope of legitimate force is so limited, political policies and institutions readily fail to be legitimate. Gaus I 118 Justification: Within the tradition, political institutions that use coercion more extensively must bear an especially heavy burden of justification, one that is too great to justify a state that extensively employs coercion against its citizens. Use of force: One familiar way of conveying the liberty tradition is to say that individual A may rightfully be subject to force by individual or institution C, if and only if that force will prevent A from harming B or will nullify some harm that A has already inflicted upon B. Mill: This formula, deriving from J. S. Mill (1991 [1859])(1), nicely highlights purposes that do not justify the use of force: (a) C’s preventing A from harming himself does not justify C’s forcible intervention. (b) C’s preventing A from acting in some sinful or ignoble way does not justify C’s forcible intervention. (c) C’s preventing A from offending B (in a nonharming way) does not justify C’s forcible intervention. (d) C’s causing A to bestow a benefit upon B does not justify C’s forcible intervention. Problems: As is well known, how such a Millian formulation works itself out depends upon such detailed matters as, for example, how one construes harm and what counts as an imposition of harm. Personal freedom: Members of this tradition ((s) the traditional liberalism) hold that, even though some form of political authority is perhaps necessary and justified, citizens must always be jealous of such power, on their guard against it, be ready to condemn and resist its expansion and misuse. ((s) cf. >Civil Disobedience). 1. Mill, John Stuart (1991) On Liberty. In John Gray, ed., On Liberty and Other Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Knowledge | Stroud | I 30 Knowledge/Stroud: science and everyday life have the same standards for knowledge - True belief is still no knowledge. Knowledge/Stroud thesis: we can know how things appear to us. - (Does not help against Descartes' skepticism). >Skepticism/Stroud, >Skepticism/Descartes, >Appearance/Sellars, >Appearance, >Perception. Descartes/Stroud: Descartes' skepticism, these are his "ideas". - Trying to get behind it, only leads to further representations. >Representation, >René Descartes. I 34 There is no "real knowledge" in contrast to knowledge. >Knowledge, >Certainty. I 61 Knowledge/Stroud: I cannot be described as someone who knows that John will not get hit by a meteorite. - But when John turns up it is right to say I knew he was coming. >Assertibility. I 76 Skepticism/knowledge/Stroud: deep problem: if we realize that our concept of knowledge or of truth leads us to skepticism, we feel that it is incorrect. - Depth: it is not just about knowledge, but about our practice and reflection. >Self-knowledge, >Reflection, >Practice, >Truth. I 110 Skepticism/Detective Example/crime case/Stroud: shows that it is not about greater security. - (As with MooreVsHume) - There is no competing hypothesis. - Rather, it shows a lack (incomplete list). - No misuse of the word "knowledge". >Evidence, >Moore's Hands, >Skepticism/Hume. Skepticism: does not only consider documents (like the detective) but also questions reasons. I 121 Wrong: Because I know that the butler was the perpetrator, I know that the list is complete. (analoge to Moore's hands). I 239 Knowledge/belief/Stroud: difference: true belief can be random, then the fact of belief is not an explanation for knowledge, no theory of knowledge. >Belief, >Causal theory of knowledge. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Possible Worlds | Leibniz | Hintikka I 74 Possible Worlds/VsSemantic of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: Problem: it seems to make the worlds and complete sets of Possibilia absolute ((s) to assume them as self-evident). Possible worlds/Leibniz: Thesis: there is a fixed set of worlds from which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: this is extremely doubtful. Possible worlds/Hintikka: we should rather call it world stories or scenarios. I 75 We can limit the set of worlds to those that are conceivable. >Possible world/Hintikka, >Conceivability. --- Holz I 120 Possible worlds/Leibniz/Pape/Holz: is for Leibniz the negative background of a positive world. The background, by virtue of which the positivity of the one realized world first acquires its justification. Namely, in a comprehensive sense of a logical, ontological and moral justification! The force of the negation is stronger than that of the position. Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: a world is always the totality of everything real and possible, and this possible is the real possible (puissance) of which the real is a selected partial quantity. Possible worlds/LeibnizVsKripke: other possible worlds cannot be worlds of other possibilities (otherwise this (our) world (the actual world) would not be a world, but only a partial quantity). I 122 One must not multiply the world's things by several worlds, for there is no number that is not in this one world, or even in each of its parts. Cf. >Counterpart theory. To introduce another species of existing things is to misuse the concept of existence. World/Leibniz: not the sum of the parts, but their ordered connection. The world is the world law composing the individuals. Order/Leibniz: does not arise from the world, but the world itself is the order, the order is the world-creating one. Now however, due to the a priori necessary principles (see above) no other order than the existing one is to be thought of! Possible worlds/Leibniz: therefore, worlds, which are structurally different from ours, remain undefined in content and unthinkable. They would be mere shadow worlds. It is, however, impossible for a priori thinking to exclude the possibility of such differently ordered worlds. Leibniz: the conceivability of possible worlds is a necessary possibility of thinking. >Necessity/Leibniz, >Thinking/Leibniz. I 122/123 Solution/Leibniz: and these possible worlds would still be formally possible as actual non-worlds even if there were no world at all, but nothing. Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: as worlds, however, they are only possible when they are not nothing. This is due to the fact that the (definition) possible ontological cannot be determined otherwise than as force, which urges to utter. The nothingness of possibility, however, would not be conceivable because it would not be a possibility and thinking is always thinking of at least possible. (If necessary, the possible nothing!) Nothing/Leibniz: that there is nothing is then a possibility among other things. In the infinitesimal sense, the minimization of the possible or a world whose content tends toward zero, whose possibilities mutually cancel each other out. >Minimum/Leibniz. Cf. >Nothingness/Heidegger, >Nonexistence, >Impossible world. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Sense | Dummett | II (b) 72ff Sense/Dummett: The sense is a property of a single sentence, not of the full use of language. I 122 Sense/Capture/DummettVsFrege: The thought is not presented directly to the consciousness - rather grasping the sense: set of skills. I 123 The fact that the glasses are in the other jacket cannot be content of consciousness. I 124 Such examples (glasses) lead to an opposite direction according to which language is explained by thoughts that are considered to be language-independent, and not vice versa (> DummettVsEvans). - Saussure s conception of language as a code will avoid such a declaration - VsFrege: sense of the word is not the same as a part of the thought. EvansVsCompositionality. III (a) 25 Sense/Dummett: from division of states of affairs: 1) where the statement could be misused. 2) where it could be not misused. ad 1) Statement: false - conditional: false - atomic sentence or without truth value. ad 2): statement: true, Conditional: true or without truth value, atomic sentence: true. III (a) 28 Sense/Dummett: entirely determined by one knowing when it has an designated truth value and when a non-designated - finer distinctions only needed in complex sentences with operators. >Truth value/Dummett. III (b) 74 Sense/Dummett: not only through verification method, but understanding what circumstances must be realized. >Circumstances. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Skepticism | Malcolm | Stroud I 89 Skepticism/Ambrose/Malcolm/Stroud: both authors: skepticism cannot be refuted empirically. Alice Ambrose thesis: The skepticism cannot even describe what kind of thing would be proof of a "thing of the outside world". Therefore, the phrase "nobody knows if things exist" cannot be falsified. AmbroseVsSkepticism: skepticism cannot help but be aware of the things it talks about. >A. Ambrose. Stroud I 91 For example, when he says "I know I have three bucks in my pocket" he talks about something possible! ((s) If he thought it was impossible, he would not be a skeptic) - He admits that it is not necessarily false to use the language this way. AmbroseVsMoore: can therefore not show that skepticism misuses the language. VsMoore: argues as if the phrase "no one knows whether hands exist" was a necessary truth. >Moore's Hands. |
Malcolm I Norman Malcolm "Thoughtless Brutes" in: The Nature of Mind, D. M. Rosenthal (Ed), Oxford 1991, pp. 445-461 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Malcolm II N. Malcom Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Understanding | Davidson | Glüer II 121/22 We can understand because we always know what truth is. Glüer II 50 Language/Davidson: 1. understanding: for understanding it is basically irrelevant which language the speaker speaks. (DavidsonVsTarski). Glüer II 51 Each language is accessible through causal relations. 2. It is considered trivial that meaning is conventional. What words and sentences mean is a question of social practice. DavidsonVs: the thesis of the conventional character of language must be abandoned in the radical interpretation! >Radical Interpretation. Glüer II 52 Even the idiolect of a nonconformist, freed from all conventions, can in principle be interpreted as long as we can find access to it via causal hypotheses. Conformism facilitates interpretation, but is not a condition of the possibility of understanding. Malapropisms are misused or mispronounced foreign words or technical terms. Glüer II 150 Communication/Davidson: is unconventional. Horwich I 459 Understanding/Grasping/Wittgenstein/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson and Wittgenstein grasping in all these cases is detecting the inferential relations between sentences and other sentences of the language - E.g. "that is red" and "there are transfinite cardinal numbers": DavidsonVsDummett: here there is no difference. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anthropic Principle | Dennett Vs Anthropic Principle | I 227 DennettVsAnthropic Principle: "Strong Form": misuse of "must", "If physical structures depend on larger molecules, then they must exist, because we exist. Instead properly: It must be the case that: if consciousness ..... depends, then there are in the world such elements, because we have a consciousness. Dennett: it need not be the case that we are there, but since we re here, it must be the case that we evolved from primates. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Carnap, R. | Quine Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VII 151 Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! However, if in the case of the lexicon we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Carnap VII 154 Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate. QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects. Carnap VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations. Lanz I 271 QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! I 272 There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. --- Newen I 123 Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically. I 124 Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap). Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli. Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities: 1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval 2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection. This only applies for occasion sentences. I125 Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers. QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words. Quine I 73 QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way. I 74 Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference: Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet. Quine: theory has primarily to do with records, Carnap: to do with terms. I 466 For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general? I 467 This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas? However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers. Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts. It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form. QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".) Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania." IV 404 Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself). IV 416 QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? V 28 Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities. V 29 Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning. QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences. V 30 Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.) Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role). VII (b) 40 But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. X 127 Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter. Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect: 1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything. 2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation. Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world. Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate. X 133 We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge! XI 99 QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences. XI 129 Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values of the variable. Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values of variables. To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination). XI 130 Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence. XI 138 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference. XI 142 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. XII 69 QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope. Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity. Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G." XII 89 Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).) Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic. XII 91 Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction. Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts. QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement. XII 92 QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities. But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts. CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions. XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession. 2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization. Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed. Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism: XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences. Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts! Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories. pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Leibniz Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 121 Possible World/poss.w./LeibnizVsKripke: Other possible worlds can therefore not be worlds of other possibilities (because then this (our) world (actual world; act.wrld.) would not be a world, but only a subset.) I 122 Objects of the world cannot be increased by several worlds, because there is no number which is in this one world, or more precisely, which even is in each of its parts. To introduce a different category of existing objects would be to misuse the term of existence. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Ordinary Language | Black Vs Ordinary Language | II 207 Everyday language/Austin: Passed the long test of survival of the fittest, finer distinction than theoretically designed artificial languages. II 208 VsOrdinary language, Phil.der/Black: it is intellectually conservative. II 161 VsLanguage/Black: There is a long tradition to rebel against alleged or actual deceptions by language: E.g. Logan Pearsall Smith: "I stood there for a while, thinking about language, about its perfidious meanness and its inappropriateness, about the shamefulness of our vocabulary and how the moralists have spoiled our words by infusing all their hatred of human happiness in the words like in little poison bottles." "Logophobia"/Abhorrence of language/BerkeleyVsLanguage: "most of the knowledge is confusedbvand darkened by the misuse of words; since the words so much oppose understanding, I am determined to make as little use as possible of them and to try to involve them bare and naked in my ideas." II 162 LockeVsLanguage: was so impressed by the errors, the darkness, the mistakes and the confusion which is caused by the bad use of words that he wondered if they contributed more to the improvement or prevention of knowledge. (Essay Book III, Chapter XI Section 4). WhiteheadVsLanguage: it is incomplete and fragmentary, it only represents a transitional stage beyond the monkey mentality. Main risk for philosophy: false confidence in the appropriateness of the language. Wittgenstein: all philosophy is criticism of language. Brigham Young: I long for the time in which the pointing of a finger or a gesture can express every idea without expression. (1854) Swift: (trip to Balnibarbi): ... the project of the second professor was aimed at abolishing all words ... II 163 The smartest followed the new method to express themselves through the things they carry in a bundle on their backs ... III 166 SartreVsLanguage/Black: "disgust": Roquentin tried to retreat into silence. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Ordinary Language | Positivism Vs Ordinary Language | Fodor II 118 PositivismusVsOrdinary Language/PositivismVsOxford: the philosophy of ordinary language has no system. A representation of natural language, which does not specify its formal structure, cannot comprehend the production principles for the syntactic and semantic properties. II 123 FodorVsOrdinary Language: that forces the philosophers of ordinary language to seek refuge more and more with the intuitions. II 124 In particular, he will claim to detect anomalies intuitively and to say that a philosophical problem is solved if anomalies are detected. (Cavell asserts that!). FodorVsCavell: Contradiction: so he thinks that in philosophical practice it is important not to use words wrongly, and at the same time he thinks that he can decide with the help of intuition when a word is misused. Even though it may be clear intuitively when a word is abnormal, it is not enough for philosophical purposes to know that it is abnormal, it may be abnormal for many reasons, some of which are not faulty! E.g. If you accuse a metaphysicist that he uses language wrongly, he will answer rightly: "So what?" Moreover, we cannot demand of a theory of meaning that any expression which is called abnormal by a theoretically untrained speaker is also evaluated as such by the theory. II 125 The theory should rather only determine semantic violations. II 126 FodorVsIntuitions: decisions about unusualness (anomalies) cannot be extrapolated in any way if they are based only on intuitions. Then we have no theory, but only overstretched intuitions. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary LanguageVsFodor: could counter that we have ignored the principle of treating similar cases with similar methods. FodorVsVs: that is beside the point: specifying relevant similarity means precisely to accurately determine the production rules. III 222 Ordinary Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I Statement: "We say..., but we do not say...." ((s) use statements) Type II Statement: The supplementation of type I statements with explanations. Type III Statement: Generalizations. Austin: E.g. we can make a voluntary gift. (Statement about the world). Cavell: conceives this as "substantive mode" for "We say: 'The gift was made voluntarily'". (Statement about the language). Voluntary/RyleVsAustin: expresses that there is something suspicious about the act. We should not have performed the act. Cavell Thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense. III 223 Expressions of native speakers are no findings about what you can say in a language, they are the source of utterances. ((s) data). Also without empiricism we are entitled to any Type I statement that we need to support a Type II statement. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Wittgenstein | Tugendhat Vs Wittgenstein | Pauen I 254 I/TugendhatVsHeidelberger School/Pauen: (1979): has created its own problems with false basic assumptions. Instead: semantic approach: use of the expression "I" in everyday language. What do we mean by the self-attribution of mental states? Tugendhat: "The ego" is a false substantiation of a personal pronoun. An art expression. Tugendhat like Wittgenstein: in reality they are expressive sentences. Wittgenstein: "I feel pain" only replaces "Ouch"! I 255 TugendhatVsWittgenstein: difference between the two: the former expresses knowledge. It can also be denied. The sentence cannot be mistakenly misused. In the case of self-attribution, the possibility of false knowledge is omitted. ((s) Cf. >privileged access, >incorrigibility). I 256 Tugendhat: "Epistemic asymmetry" between self and external attributions. Self-attributions are true exactly when they are also attributed to others. But not vice versa. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Wittgenstein | Newen Vs Wittgenstein | New I 94 Object/Thing/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: the question of what kind the objects of the Tractatus are is still controversial: 1) James Griffin: simple physical particles 2) Hintikka: points in the visual field 3) H. Ishiguro: exemplifications of not further reducable properties 4) Peter Carruthers: everyday objects. Object/Tractatus/NewenVsTractatus/NewenVsWittgenstein/Newen: there are conflicting principles here, one of which must be abandoned I 95 to be able to determine the object level: (i) elementary propositions have the form "Fa", "Rab"... external properties are attributed. (ii) external and internal properties relate to each other like different dimensions, e.g. lengths and colors. (iii) elementary propositions are logically independent. Problem: then the truth value of a sentence "Ga" may depend on that of a sentence "Fa". E.g. a point cannot be red and blue at the same time. Point: but then the sentences are no longer independent. Wittgenstein/VsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Newen: Wittgenstein himself noted this in his 1929 essay Some Remarks on Logical Form. I 98 Elementary Proposition/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: sentences over points in the visual field or physical particles are no elementary propositions there, because they cannot be independent ((s) it must be possible to exclude opposing properties). I 99 Middle Wittgenstein: recognizes a basic structure in dependence that cannot be eliminated. Example "What is blue is not red." Sentence Meaning/PU/Wittgenstein/Newen: the meaning of sentences can therefore not only be guaranteed by the representative relation of names. Representation Theory/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Wittgenstein/Newen: the representation theory must therefore be revised. 100 Middle Wittgenstein/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of characters is determined by the syntactic rules of his language system. VsWittgenstein/Newen: the question of how these syntactic rules are made is not answered here. NS I 35 Rule-Following/Wittgenstein: means acting according to a custom. Without justification or consideration. It is simply the competency of acting in a learned, conventional and natural way. Custom/Convention: customs are not valid because they have been established or agreed, but because usually everybody feels bound by them. This also applies to rules that define the meaning of a linguistic sign. ((s) Rules/(s): thus establish something, but are not determined themselves, but generally agreed and stable.) NS I 36 VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: the vagueness of usages. There are also misuses which would have to be included as meaning constituting. They can be very widely spread. VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: holism of usages: when a single new usage is introduced, the meaning of the expression would have to change. NS I 37 Beetle Example/Private Language/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: the expression "beetle" can have a clear use, even if everyone has a different beetle in their box or if the box is empty! Wittgenstein: even if the thing changed continually. The thing in the box does not belong to the language game. Never even once as a something. (§ 293). Newen/Schrenk: this shows that the meaning of an expression is not defined by the fact that we have a sensation, but by the practice of a community. One person alone cannot give meaning expressions. NS I 38 Newen/SchrenkVsWittgenstein: E.g. Robinson can, however, introduce words for pineapple etc. thanks to a regularity of nature. WittgensteinVsVs/Newen/Schrenk: would argue 1) that Robinson cannot establish customs, because he would not notice if he deviated from them. ((s) Vs: why not? He still has the time sequence.) Then there would be no difference anymore between following and believing to follow. VsVs/Newen/Schrenk: 2) Another objection would be that Robinson can only form categories, because he learned in his community how to make categories. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Semantic Ascent | Quine, W.V.O. | XI 142 Ontology / Carnap / Lauener: (temporarily replaced): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. semantic ascent / QuineVsCarnap: this should not be misused for ontological evasive maneuvers. |
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