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The author or concept searched is found in the following 18 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertions | Geach | I 256 Assertion/modus ponens/Ryle: "code style": misleading that p does not have to be asserted! - E.g. "if p, then q; but p, therefore q". Conditional/Ryle: Thesis: antecedent and consequent are no assertions. >Antecedent/consequent. Statements are neither needed nor mentioned in conditionals. >Conditional, >Statement. Ryle: here, the conditional is not a premise that coordinates with "p" as the "code style" suggests, but rather an "inference ticket", a "license for the inference": "p, therefore q". >Logical connectives, >Inference, cf. >Implication, >Conclusion. Solution/Geach: it is about propositions, not assertions. >Propositions. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Barcan-Formula | Bigelow | The Barcan formula (x) Na > N(x)a Barcan formula/BF/Bigelow/Pargetter: VsBarcan: one could argue that the intended interpretations of "necessary" falsifies the barcan formula. E.g. "N" be it logically necessary that "and suppose some of the kinds of atheism are true, according to which everything must be localized spatial-temporally. Then we have (x) (x is spatial) But one could add that a given spatial thing - e.g. a screwdriver - logically impossible could be non-spatial. To put it paradoxically, if this screwdriver had been non-spatial, it would not have been that screwdriver. d N (if the screwdriver ever exists, it is spatial) In general (x) N (if x exists, x is spatial) This has the form (x) Na. --- I 110 Barcan-formula/Bigelow/Pargetter: notes that ((x) NA > N (x)a). That is, if the atheist accepts the Barcan-formula (together with the modus ponens) he is obliged to N (x) a That is, N (Everything is so that if it exists, it is spatial) Problem/VsBarcan/Bigelow/Pargetter. Many atheists would deny this. For the Barcan-formula would fix them on logical impossibility, although they proceed from a contingent fallacy. Barcan-formula/(s): fixes the atheist to the conclusion that God is logically impossible, even if he proceeds from a contingent fact. Barcan-formula/BF/Bigelow/Pargetter: we nevertheless plead for an acceptance of the Barcan-formula for modal realism, if it assumes the strictest interpretation of necessity. >Modalities, >Modal realism, >Realism. But the reason arises only from semantics, not from logic. >Semantics. N.B.: if we set up the semantics for a rejection of the Barcan-formula, we notice that we have to assume the Barcan-formula for this. ((s) question: does this not apply to any assertion of an impossibility of a thing?) Modal Realism/Barcan Formula/BF/Bigelow/Pargetter: modal realism must therefore deny that it is contingent, what things there are. It is merely contingent on what things there are in the actual world, because it is contingent, which world is the actual world. >Possible worlds, >Actual world, >Actuality, >Actualism, >Contingency. Possibilia: since the modal realism accepts Possibilia, it must say "there is a God or God could exist," but which is then, for him, equal with "God exists". And this already from the logical possibility! Because of its own interpretation of "there is". >Possibilia. "There is"/Interpretation/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): can be interpreted differently: for modal realism it means, what is possible, exists also. Barcan-Formula/BF/Bigelow/Pargetter: is an axiom that connects modal operators and quantifiers. >Operators, >Quantifiers. Similarly, Hughes/Cresswell's principle of predication: Principle of Predication/Hughes/Cresswell/Bigelow/Pargetter: Hughes/Cresswell 1968(1), pp. 184-8): (x) (Na v N~a) v (x) (Ma u M~a). Everyday language translation/(s): all things have their properties either necessarily or possibly. Bigelow/Pargetter: that divides all the properties (or conditions) that an object has to fulfill) in two kinds: A) essences B) accidents. Principle of Predication/Hughes/Cresswell/Bigelow/Pargetter: is there to exclude properties that a thing could have essentially, but other things accidentally. >Essence, >Accidents, >Essentialism, >Contingency, >Properties. BigelowVsHughes/Cresswell/BigelowVsCresswell: you should not exclude such features! E.g. the property to be awake in the first hour of the year 1600 is accidental for Descartes, but essentially impossible for other objects. 1. Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M.C. (1968) An introduction to modal logic. London: Methuen. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Conditional | Logic Texts | II 112 Conditional/Hoyningen-Huene: belongs to the object language Conclusion: (logical implication): belongs to the meta level Conditional: is also called (material) implication. - It is a linking of statements. >>Conclusion, >Implication, >Meta language, >Object language. Read III 79 Given that Edmund is a coward, it follows that he is either a coward or - whatever you want. But just from the fact that he is a coward it does not follow that if he is not a coward - whatever you want. III 86f Conditional Clause/Conditional/Truth-Functional/Read: if a conditional clause is treated as truth-functional, there are problems. >paradox of implication. Then the whole sentence is true if the antecedent is false. Conversationalist Defense: such a sentence should not be asserted. >Assertibility. III 92 Jackson: in conditional clauses, the modus ponens comes into play. >modus ponens. III 93 Conditional clauses are not robust (insensitive to additional knowledge) with regard to the falsity of their rear parts. III 94 Assertibility: is applied to the sub-sentences, not only to the whole conditional clause! - If assertibility counts, conditional clauses are no longer truth functional. III 103 The analysis of the possible world deviates from the truth-functional one when the if-clause is false. The fact that Edmund is a coward did not automatically mean that the conditional clause is true. III 105 Similarity analysis: a number of logical principles that are classically valid fails here. E.g., the (Def) Counter-position: that "If B, then not-A" follows from "if A, then not-B". (inter alia IV 41) The similar world in which it rains may very well be one in which it rains only slightly. But the most similar world where it rains heavily cannot be one in which it does not rain. III 220 Conditional clauses: are statements. (Grice) No statements: Stalnaker's question: conditional clause truth-functional? Def truth-functional: 1 counter-example invalidates. >Truth function. Grice: Conditional clauses are statements. StalnakerVsGrice: conditional clauses are not statements. (Pretty radical). - The camps are about equally strong. III 220/21 Conditional Clauses/Conditional/Read: the assertion that they are truth-functional says that a counter-example for the falsity of the conditional clause is not only sufficient but also necessary. - If there is no counter-example, then it is true. - This leads us to believe in sharp cuts in Sorites. >Sorites. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Dialetheism | Priest | Field II 145 Dialethism/Priest/Paradoxa/Field: (Priest 1998): Thesis: the sentence of the liar as well as its negation are both assertable (and also their conjunction). The rules of the logic are weakened (> stronger/weaker; >strength of theories), so that not every assertion can be asserted by this. Most attractive variant: builds on Kleene's trivalent logic. Trivalent logic/Kleene/Priest/Field: Priest assumes here that the valid inferences are those that guarantee "correct assertion". But an assertion is only correct if it has one of the two highest truth values in the truth value table. Curry paradox: is thus excluded, since the only conditional in this language is the material conditional. Material conditional/Field: the material conditional is defined by ~ and v. It does not fully support the modus ponens in the logic of Kleene/Priest. Liar/KleeneVsPriest: (and other "deviant" sentences): have truth-value gaps. But there are no agglomerations of truth values. Deviating Sentence: E.g. Liar sentence, has no truth-value agglomerations but truth-value gaps. Liar/PriestVsKleene: (and other deviating sentences): have, conversely, truth-value agglomerations and no gaps. Problem/Kleene: here one cannot establish an equivalence between "p" and "p" is true! For to assert a truth-value gap in a sentence "A" would be to assert: "~ [true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and this should be equivalent to "~ (A v ~ A)". But one sentence of this form can never be legitimate in Kleene. Truth-value gap/logical form/Field: to assert a truth-value gap in a sentence "A" would mean to assert: "~ [true ("A") v true ("~ A")]" and this should be equivalent to "~ (A v ~ A)". Solution/Priest: if "A" is a deviating sentence, this is then a correct assertion in Priest. Also the assertion of the absence of a truth-value agglomeration in a sentence "A" would be the assertion "~ [(true ("A") u true ("A)"]" which should be equivalent to "~(a u ~A)". Kleene cannot claim this absence for deviant sentences, Priest can do this. |
Pries I G. Priest Beyond the Limits of Thought Oxford 2001 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Implication | Jackson | Read III 92 Implication/Jackson/Def Robustness: (Jackson) a statement is robust if its assertiveness remains unaffected by the acquisition of information. III 93 The punch line for Jackson: the modus ponens comes into play for conditional sentences. Condition sets are not robust with respect to the falsity of their consequents. >modus ponens, >Conditional, >Implication paradox. III 94 Jackson: Assertiveness is measured by conditional probability. There is a specific convention about conditional propositions: namely, that they are robust with respect to their antecedents, and therefore cannot be claimed in circumstances where it is known that their antecedents are false. ReadVsJackson/ReadVsGrice: both are untenable. The problematic conditional sentences occur in embedded contexts. Example: Either if I was right, you were right, or if you were right, I was right. Assertion and assertiveness: are terms that are applied to complete statements, not to their parts! Conditional sentences are not truth functional. >Truth functions. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Incompleteness | Thiel | I 222 Incompleteness/Thiel: Incompleteness keeps reappearing. The logical rules do not contain all the operations actually performed when closing, nor are the prerequisites for these operations formalized. For example, the order of the premises of a rule is regarded as insignificant. For example, the separation rule is also formulated with reversed premises. >modus ponens. I 223 The usual axiom systems of the logical connectives are complete since Frege. >Completeness, >Axiom systems, >G. Frege, >Junctions. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Innateness | Vollmer | I 19 Innate/innate ideas/innate things/Vollmer: E.g. motion vision, color vision, sense of time, depth perception, so the "ability to interpret two-dimensional retinal images in three dimensions. >Seeing, >Colours. Consistency performances: recognition, form categories (classes, terms), knowledge of human faces, smile and anger facial expression, the optical fixing of a sound source (even if born blind), language ability, need for speaking. >Recognition, >Categorization, >Classification, >Language, >Language acquisition, >Language development. Partly innate: intelligence, musicality, logical structures (e.g. modus ponens, biologically realized by the ability to form certain reflexes), elementary mathematical structures (e.g. group structures and forming invariants). Possibly causal thinking. >Intelligence VollmerVsEmpiricism: most programs are already incorporated at birth and they consistently fit to our environment. >Empiricism. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Logic | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 138 Frege/logic/Hintikka: his logic is considered as the theory of complex sentences - Wittgenstein in contrast: easiest parts of the world - eliminate logical constants - They do not represent. >Logical constants, >Representation. I 205 Logic/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no other author than Wittgenstein has ever had the thought, in the logic it had ultimately no more explanation than what is given to us in experience through the simple objects - all phenomenology is just logic. - HusserlVs - Husserl: possibilities are motivated by background beliefs. --- II 160 Logic/WittgensteinVsFrege: 1. It is rather arbitrary, what we call a sentence - therefore logic means something else in my opinion than in Frege's. 2. VsFrege: All words are equally important - Frege: thesis: "Word", "sentence", "world" are more important. >Sentences, >Words, >World, >Symbols. II 238 Logic/arbitrary/Wittgenstein: the rules of logic are insofar arbitrary that they can be eliminated for greater expressiveness - E.g. sentence of the excluded third (SaD) is invalid - at least "contradiction" is used in different meanings - as well as double negation -. Some authors: "the application is different." WittgensteinVs: one cannot talk independently of a sign from its use. - ((S) Then it is another sign - against see below. >Signs, >Use. II 328 The sentence of the excluded third is universal. II 327 Logic/Wittgenstein: it is not a science, but a calculus - in it you can make inventions, but no discoveries. II 333 Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: one cannot construct a logic for all cases - because one cannot abstract both applications from the application. --- VI 85 Logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Schulte: not we express with the signs what we want - but in the logic the nature of the nature-necessary sign states itself - (6,124). VI 89 Logic/border/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the logic is not given a limit through the use of the language, of course - it is, so to speak, the common framework of "my" and "your" language. VI 118 Logic/Wittgenstein: say/show: logic says nothing, it shows something about necessity - grammatical sentences (about the language) thus fall out of the language game -> training: no speakable rules but blind following. TrainingVsExplanation, instead: Description - (> tell/show: Explanation/Wittgenstein). --- IV 101 Logic/Tractatus: (6.1264) each sentence of logic is a, in characters expressed, modus ponens - (And this cannot be expressed by one sentence). - (> Show/tell: > Ostension/Wittgenstein). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Paradoxes | Nozick | II 276f Achilles/turtle/Carroll/Nozick: logical form: (1) If p then q (2) p. Problem: q is not yet accepted, but it is required that the following will also be accepted explicitly: (3) If (if p then q) and p, then q Regress: the additional assumption (3) (s) in addition to the modus ponens) therefore is: if (1) and (2), q. This then in turn needs an additional premise. >Regress, >Premises. II 277 Solution/tradition: Problem: confusion of premises with inference principles. Then the regress not even begins. >Inference, >Consequence. Solution / Nozick: we need to introduce a premise that has the same shape and all inferences supplies as the other assumptions that are apparently still needed - WittgensteinVs: problems of rule-following, etc. >Zeno, >About Zeno, >Rule following. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Piaget | Schurz | I 192 Piaget/Developmental Theory/Science Theory/Schurz: Piaget thesis: The development of child intelligence is stage-like. It is based on the gradual formation of general logical structural abilities. Once these are formed, they can be applied anywhere in a short time. Before that, the corresponding cognitive tasks are simply not grasped. Piaget thesis: Sensorimotor stage: reached at 2 years of age. Concrete operational stage:reached at about 6-7 years. . Formal operational stage: reached at 13-14 years. Concrete operational stage/Piaget: (6-7) Ex 1. Ability to change perspective, distinguish own from others. Thus transition from egocentric to sociocentric thinking. 2. ability to recognize that certain operations which change the appearance of objects can be undone. (Reversibility). Thus, at the same time: invariant recognition. Two areas: a) invariance of the number of objects. b) Invariance of the quantity of a substance. Verification/Piaget: by test that provide laws of association: Ex change of perspective: mountain landscape that children could walk around. Invariance of number: ex. coins. Invariance of quantity of substance: ex clay ball deformed into a sausage. I 193 Ex core: intelligence development is primarily based on stages development of logical structural abilities. Ex Periphery: at 6-7 years almost all children reach the concrete operational stage. Ex Empirical prediction: almost all children fail it at 6, all can do it at 7. I 194 Test/adequacy/selectivity/Schurz: a test must be adequate for the characteristic being studied. i.e. it must be selective. I.e., they must measure the traits (abilities) and not others at the same time. At the same time, the indicators must be interchangeable. Ex It must not matter for the change of perspective whether it is examined on a mountain landscape or on another form. Indicator/(s): Object within an experiment. VsPiaget/Schurz: It was shown that his hypotheses violated the requirement of interchangeability of indicators: Bsp children presented with a simpler shape than a mountain landscape (a box with four different colored sides) could solve the task at age 4 (instead of age 6-7). Schurz: But that did not mean that one gave away the core of the theory. (according to the Lakatos motto). ((s) i.e. the stages proceeded differently, the assumption of the importance of the logical-structural was maintained. I 195 VsPiaget: it was concluded that his test was not really selective. Solution: the mountain landscape involved hidden variables (hidden difficulties). (BrainerdVsPiaget, Brainerd 1978(1)) 2. VsPiaget: example number test: problem: the children had not understood the linguistic formulation "more coins". New: E.g. The children had to choose pictures with the same number of coins (without language, non verbal): this number test was then already mastered by 4-5 year olds! Kern/Periphery/Schurz: all this was directed only against the periphery! Core/VsPiaget: Example propositional logic. According to Piaget, children with 13-14 years would have to master propositional logic correct conclusions. Problem: modus ponens is actually mastered already with 3 years, modus tollens often not even by adults, thus often never! VsPiaget: Problem: This cannot be fixed by changing a law for indicators or special laws. It directly attacks the core of the theory. Core/VsPiaget: Ex. conservation of the object: I 196 Cognitive principle: (here): Objects that are occluded do not therefore cease to exist. Piaget: this is already mastered after completion of the sensorimotor stage at 2 years. Variant: E.g. dissolving sugar in water: is not even mastered at 6 years: a weak majority answers incorrectly: the sugar is no longer there. Conclusion: VsPiaget: the core must be abandoned. Intelligence/development/alternative theoryVsPiaget: The development of intelligence is not about the formation of general abstract structures, but is based on the development of content-specific and content-bound abilities. (Ausubel, 1978(2), Novak 1980(3), Schurz 1985(4)). >J. Piaget, >VsPiaget. 1. Brainerd, C. (1978). Piaget's Theory of Intelligence. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 2. Ausubel D. et al. (1978). Educational Psychology: A Cognitive View. New York: Holt. 3. Novak, J. (1980) "Eine Alternative zu Piagets Psychologie". In: Jung W. (Hg., 1980) Piaget und die Physikdidaktik. Physica Didactica 7, 17-24. 4. Schurz, G. (1985). "Denken, Sprache und Erziehung: Die aktuelle Piaget-Kontroverse", Zeitschrift für Semiotik, 7, Heft 4 1985, 335-366. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Practical Inference | Kenny | Geach I 285 Practical Inference/Kenny: (A. KIenny 1966(1)). Thesis: Theoretical and practical inference are radically different. Geach: What they have in common is a certain asymmetry between premises and conclusions. >Premises, >Conclusions. 1. A lot of premises provide a single conclusion and cannot be achieved with any of these premises. 2. On the other hand, a set of conclusions follows from a single premise only if each individual conclusion follows from it on its own. Carnap and Kneale have sought technical solutions to this asymmetry. GeachVs: one should leave the asymmetry. Cf. >Asymmetries. It remains in Kenny's approach. If a set of conclusions would always be deducible together, but not individual conclusions...(s) then the set itself could not follow. Practical Inference/Kenny/Geach: I present it in the style of Kenny: From a set of commands Fq, Fr, Fs... one can conclude the conclusion Ft, provided that the phrastic of the conclusion entails the phrastic of a premise and that it is consistent with the phrastic of all other premises. I. e. >Phrastic. t ent q and the conjunction Kt, Kr, Ks... is consistent. Spelling: ent: entails, p ent q = p contains q, q follows q from p, entailment Kpq: Conjunction p u q Cpq Conditional p > q >Entailment. It is about how a wish is consistent with other wishes. This immediately means that no practical conclusion can be drawn from an inconsistent set of commands. When Kq, Kr, Ks... is an inconsistent conjunction and t ent q, then Kt, Kr, Ks... is inconsistent and then Ft is not valid deducible from the set FqFrFs.... >Commands, >Imperatives. Further difference to theoretical inference: practical inference can be cancelled. (>added premises). Geach I 287 Definition Synthetic theorem/Peripathetics/Geach: the principle that if a conclusion t follows from its set of premises P, and if P plus t delivers the conclusion v, then the premises provide P v. Only if the synthetic theorem applies, we get a chain of inferences. That is what we need in theory and practice. Kenny's theory secures the synthetic theorem. Practical Conclusion/Kenny/Geach: it is necessary for a correct conclusion Ft from a set of premises that (the phrasticon t ent the phrasticon v) from one of these fiats (commands) is compatible with the phrastics of all other fiats from the set. We can omit the word "or" if we formulate it in this way: t ent v, KtKpKqKr.... is a consistent conjunction if and only if KtKvKpKr.... is consistent. Proof: with the validity criterion in this practical form: We have to show that from (1) Ft is deducible from Fp, Fq, Fr... and (2) Fv is deducible from Ft, Fp, Fq, Fr... from that follows that (3) Fv is derived from Fp, Fq, Fr..... (1) holds if and only if t ent (one of the phrastic p, q, r...) I 288 and if the conjunction KtKpKqKr.... is consistent. Without losing the general public, it can be said that t ent p. Now (2) will hold if and only if v ent (one of the phrastic t, p, q, r...) and the if conjunction KvKtKpKpKqKr... is consistent. But if v ent t, because t ent p (through (1)), then v ent p. And no matter if v ent t or v ent (one of the phrastics of p, q, r...), v is always ent one of (p, q, r...). Now if KvKtKpKqKr... is a consistent conjunction, then also KvKpKqKr is ... Then v ent (one of p, q, r...) and KvKpKqKr... a consistent conjunction. (3) Q.E.D. holds. Premises/Added/Deleted/Inference/Conclusion/Concluding/Inference/Geach: although the modus ponens becomes invalid by added premises, a conclusion from the modus ponens will remain valid if it does not become invalid by an added premise. Because we do not get any conclusions from inconsistent practical premises. But if p and Cpq are consistent, it is also p and q. So Kpq will be consistent. And q ent cpq. But then Fq is a correct conclusion of Fp and FCpq! Practical Inference/Kenny/Geach: surprising result: in practical closing, the FKpq command is not deductively equivalent to the pair Ep, Eq. But this is not really paradoxical: the equivalence would lead to an absurd result, because for the same reason the set Fp, Fq, Fr... would be deductively equivalent to FKpKqKr... But this latter order could only be fulfilled if it were guaranteed that all our wishes could be fulfilled at the same time. We therefore need further closing rules for practical closure. >Desires, >Will, >Deontic logic. 1. A. Kenny (1966). "Practical Inference" in: Analysis 26,3. 1966. |
Kenn I A. Kenny A New History of Western Philosophy Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Software Agents | AI Research | Norvig I 64 Software Agents/artificial intelligence/Russell/Norvig: agents base their actions on a direct mapping from states to actions. Such agents cannot operate well in environments for which this mapping would be too large to store and would take too long to learn. Goal-based agents, on the other hand, consider future actions and the desirability of their outcomes. Problem-solving agents use atomic representations, (…) that is, states of the world are considered as wholes, with no internal structure visible to the problem-solving algorithms. Norvig I 4 Computer agents are expected to do more: operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist over a prolonged time period, adapt to change, and create and pursue goals. A rational agent is one that acts so as to achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome. Norvig I 235 Knowledge based Agents/logical agents: The central component of a knowledge-based agent is its knowledge base, or KB. A knowledge base is a set of sentences. (Here “sentence” is used as a technical term. It is related but not identical to the sentences of English and other natural languages.) Each sentence is expressed in a language called a knowledge representation language and represents some assertion about the world. Norvig I 240 Semantics: The semantics defines the truth of each sentence with respect to each possible world. Model: instead of “possible world” we need to be more precise and use the term model. Whereas possible worlds might be thought of as (potentially) real environments that the agent might or might not be in, models are mathematical abstractions, each of which simply fixes the truth or falsehood of every relevant sentence. Norvig I 241 Knowledge Base: The KB can be thought of as a set of sentences or as a single sentence that asserts all the individual sentences. The KB is false in models that contradict what the agent knows (…). Norvig I 242 Completeness: an inference algorithm is complete if it can derive any sentence that is entailed. Fortunately, there are complete inference procedures for logics that are sufficiently expressive to handle many knowledge bases. Real world: if [the knowledge base] KB is true in the real world, then any sentence α derived from KB by a sound inference procedure is also true in the real world. So, while an inference process operates on “syntax”—internal physical configurations such as bits in registers or patterns of electrical blips in brains - the process corresponds Norvig I 243 to the real-world relationship whereby some aspect of the real world is the case by virtue of other aspects of the real world being the case. Grounding: grounding [is] the connection between logical reasoning processes and the real environment in which the agent exists. In particular, how do we know that KB is true in the real world? A simple answer is that the agent’s sensors create the connection. Cf. >Semantics, >Syntax; for the philosophical discussion see also >Facts/Wittgenstein, >States of Affairs/Wittgenstein, >Foundation/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 257 Forward chaining: The forward-chaining algorithm (…) determines if a single proposition symbol q - the query - is entailed by a knowledge base of definite clauses. It begins from known facts (positive literals) in the knowledge base. If all the premises of an implication are known, then its conclusion is added to the set of known facts. Norvig I 258 It is easy to see that forward chaining is sound: every inference is essentially an application of Modus Ponens. Forward chaining is also complete: every entailed atomic sentence will be derived. The easiest way to see this is to consider the final state of the inferred table (after the algorithm reaches a fixed point where no new inferences are possible). Cf. >Fixed points. Forward chaining is an example of the general concept of data-driven reasoning – that is, reasoning in which the focus of attention starts with the known data. It can be used within an agent to derive conclusions from incoming percepts, often without a specific query in mind. Backward chaining: works backward from the query. If the query q is known to be true, then no work is needed. Otherwise, the algorithm finds those implications in the knowledge base whose conclusion is q. If all the premises of one of those implications can be proved true (by backward chaining), then q is true. Backward chaining is a form of goal-directed reasoning. It is useful for answering specific questions such as “What shall I do now?” and “Where are my keys?” Often, the cost of backward chaining is much less than linear in the size of the knowledge base, because the process touches only relevant facts. Norvig I 275 History: John McCarthy’s paper “Programs with Common Sense” (McCarthy, 1958(1), 1968(2)) promulgated the notion of agents that use logical reasoning to mediate between percepts and actions. Allen Newell’s (1982)(3) article “The Knowledge Level” makes the case that rational agents can be described and analyzed at an abstract level defined by the knowledge they possess rather than the programs they run. The declarative and procedural approaches to AI are analyzed in depth by Boden (1977)(4). The debate was revived by, among others, Brooks (1991)(5) and Nilsson (1991)(6), and continues to this day (Shaparau et al., 2008)(7). Meanwhile, the declarative approach has spread into other areas of computer science such as networking (Loo et al., 2006)(8). Norvig I 278 Current state: The current state of theoretical understanding is summarized by Achlioptas (2009)(9). The satisfiability threshold conjecture states that, for each k, there is a sharp satisfiability threshold rk, such that as the number of variables n→∞, instances below the threshold are satisfiable with probability 1, while those above the threshold are unsatisfiable with probability 1. The conjecture was not quite proved by Friedgut (1999)(10): a sharp threshold exists but its location might depend on n even as n → ∞. Despite significant progress in asymptotic analysis of the threshold location for large k (Achlioptas and Peres, 2004(11); Achlioptas et al., 2007(12)), all that can be proved for k=3 is that it lies in the range [3.52,4.51]. Current theory suggests that a peak in the run time of a SAT solver is not necessarily related to the satisfiability threshold, but instead to a phase transition in the solution distribution and structure of SAT instances. Empirical results due to Coarfa et al. (2003)(13) support this view. In fact, algorithms such as survey propagation (Parisi and Zecchina, 2002(14); Maneva et al., 2007(15)) take advantage of special properties of random SAT instances near the satisfiability threshold and greatly outperform general SAT solvers on such instances. Neural networks: The idea of building agents with propositional logic can be traced back to the seminal paper of McCulloch and Pitts (1943)(16), which initiated the field of neural networks. >Frame problem, >Environment/AI research, >Universe/AI research, >Decisions/AI research, >Uncertainty/AI research. 1. McCarthy, J. (1958). Programs with common sense. In Proc. Symposium on Mechanisation of Thought Processes, Vol. 1, pp. 77–84. 2. McCarthy, J. (1968). Programs with common sense. In Minsky, M. L. (Ed.), Semantic Information Processing, pp. 403–418. MIT Press. 3. Newell, A. (1982). The knowledge level. AIJ, 18(1), 82–127. 4. Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. Basic Books 5. Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. AIJ, 47(1–3), 139–159. 6. Nilsson, N. J. (1991). Logic and artificial intelligence. AIJ, 47(1–3), 31–56. 7. Shaparau, D., Pistore, M., and Traverso, P. (2008). Fusing procedural and declarative planning goals for nondeterministic domains. In AAAI-08. 8. Loo, B. T., Condie, T., Garofalakis, M., Gay, D. E., Hellerstein, J. M., Maniatis, P., Ramakrishnan, R., Roscoe, T., and Stoica, I. (2006). Declarative networking: Language, execution and optimization. In SIGMOD-06. 9. Achlioptas, D. (2009). Random satisfiability. In Biere, A., Heule, M., van Maaren, H., and Walsh, T. (Eds.), Handbook of Satisfiability. IOS Press. 10. Friedgut, E. (1999). Necessary and sufficient conditions for sharp thresholds of graph properties, and the k-SAT problem. J. American Mathematical Society, 12, 1017–1054. 11. Achlioptas, D. and Peres, Y. (2004). The threshold for random k-SAT is 2k log 2−o(k). J. American Mathematical Society, 17(4), 947–973. 12. Achlioptas, D., Naor, A., and Peres, Y. (2007). On the maximum satisfiability of random formulas. JACM, 54(2). 13. Coarfa, C., Demopoulos, D., Aguirre, A., Subramanian, D., and Yardi, M. (2003). Random 3-SAT: The plot thickens. Constraints, 8(3), 243–261. 14. Parisi, M. M. G. and Zecchina, R. (2002). Analytic and algorithmic solution of random satisfiability problems. Science, 297, 812–815. 15. Maneva, E., Mossel, E., and Wainwright, M. J. (2007). A new look at survey propagation and its generalizations. JACM, 54(4). 16. McCulloch, W. S. and Pitts, W. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5, 115–137. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Software Agents | Norvig | Norvig I 64 Software Agents/artificial intelligence/Russell/Norvig: agents base their actions on a direct mapping from states to actions. Such agents cannot operate well in environments for which this mapping would be too large to store and would take too long to learn. Goal-based agents, on the other hand, consider future actions and the desirability of their outcomes. Problem-solving agents use atomic representations, (…) that is, states of the world are considered as wholes, with no internal structure visible to the problem-solving algorithms. Norvig I 4 Computer agents are expected to do more: operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist over a prolonged time period, adapt to change, and create and pursue goals. A rational agent is one that acts so as to achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome. Norvig I 235 Knowledge based Agents/logical agents: The central component of a knowledge-based agent is its knowledge base, or KB. A knowledge base is a set of sentences. (Here “sentence” is used as a technical term. It is related but not identical to the sentences of English and other natural languages.) Each sentence is expressed in a language called a knowledge representation language and represents some assertion about the world. Norvig I 240 Semantics: The semantics defines the truth of each sentence with respect to each possible world. Model: instead of “possible world” we need to be more precise and use the term model. Whereas possible worlds might be thought of as (potentially) real environments that the agent might or might not be in, models are mathematical abstractions, each of which simply fixes the truth or falsehood of every relevant sentence. Norvig I 241 Knowledge Base: The KB can be thought of as a set of sentences or as a single sentence that asserts all the individual sentences. The KB is false in models that contradict what the agent knows (…). Norvig I 242 Completeness: an inference algorithm is complete if it can derive any sentence that is entailed. Fortunately, there are complete inference procedures for logics that are sufficiently expressive to handle many knowledge bases. Real world: if [the knowledge base] KB is true in the real world, then any sentence α derived from KB by a sound inference procedure is also true in the real world. So, while an inference process operates on “syntax”—internal physical configurations such as bits in registers or patterns of electrical blips in brains - the process corresponds Norvig I 243 to the real-world relationship whereby some aspect of the real world is the case by virtue of other aspects of the real world being the case. Grounding: grounding [is] the connection between logical reasoning processes and the real environment in which the agent exists. In particular, how do we know that KB is true in the real world? A simple answer is that the agent’s sensors create the connection. Cf. >Semantics, >Syntax; for the philosophical discussion see also >Facts/Wittgenstein, >States of Affairs/Wittgenstein, >Foundation/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 257 Forward chaining: The forward-chaining algorithm (…) determines if a single proposition symbol q - the query - is entailed by a knowledge base of definite clauses. It begins from known facts (positive literals) in the knowledge base. If all the premises of an implication are known, then its conclusion is added to the set of known facts. Norvig I 258 It is easy to see that forward chaining is sound: every inference is essentially an application of Modus Ponens. Forward chaining is also complete: every entailed atomic sentence will be derived. The easiest way to see this is to consider the final state of the inferred table (after the algorithm reaches a fixed point where no new inferences are possible). Cf. >Fixed points. Forward chaining is an example of the general concept of data-driven reasoning – that is, reasoning in which the focus of attention starts with the known data. It can be used within an agent to derive conclusions from incoming percepts, often without a specific query in mind. Backward chaining: works backward from the query. If the query q is known to be true, then no work is needed. Otherwise, the algorithm finds those implications in the knowledge base whose conclusion is q. If all the premises of one of those implications can be proved true (by backward chaining), then q is true. Backward chaining is a form of goal-directed reasoning. It is useful for answering specific questions such as “What shall I do now?” and “Where are my keys?” Often, the cost of backward chaining is much less than linear in the size of the knowledge base, because the process touches only relevant facts. Norvig I 275 History: John McCarthy’s paper “Programs with Common Sense” (McCarthy, 1958(1), 1968(2)) promulgated the notion of agents that use logical reasoning to mediate between percepts and actions. Allen Newell’s (1982)(3) article “The Knowledge Level” makes the case that rational agents can be described and analyzed at an abstract level defined by the knowledge they possess rather than the programs they run. The declarative and procedural approaches to AI are analyzed in depth by Boden (1977)(4). The debate was revived by, among others, Brooks (1991)(5) and Nilsson (1991)(6), and continues to this day (Shaparau et al., 2008)(7). Meanwhile, the declarative approach has spread into other areas of computer science such as networking (Loo et al., 2006)(8). Norvig I 278 Current state: The current state of theoretical understanding is summarized by Achlioptas (2009)(9). The satisfiability threshold conjecture states that, for each k, there is a sharp satisfiability threshold rk, such that as the number of variables n→∞, instances below the threshold are satisfiable with probability 1, while those above the threshold are unsatisfiable with probability 1. The conjecture was not quite proved by Friedgut (1999)(10): a sharp threshold exists but its location might depend on n even as n → ∞. Despite significant progress in asymptotic analysis of the threshold location for large k (Achlioptas and Peres, 2004(11); Achlioptas et al., 2007(12)), all that can be proved for k=3 is that it lies in the range [3.52,4.51]. Current theory suggests that a peak in the run time of a SAT solver is not necessarily related to the satisfiability threshold, but instead to a phase transition in the solution distribution and structure of SAT instances. Empirical results due to Coarfa et al. (2003)(13) support this view. In fact, algorithms such as survey propagation (Parisi and Zecchina, 2002(14); Maneva et al., 2007(15)) take advantage of special properties of random SAT instances near the satisfiability threshold and greatly outperform general SAT solvers on such instances. Neural networks: The idea of building agents with propositional logic can be traced back to the seminal paper of McCulloch and Pitts (1943)(16), which initiated the field of neural networks. >Frame problem. 1. McCarthy, J. (1958). Programs with common sense. In Proc. Symposium on Mechanisation of Thought Processes, Vol. 1, pp. 77–84. 2. McCarthy, J. (1968). Programs with common sense. In Minsky, M. L. (Ed.), Semantic Information Processing, pp. 403–418. MIT Press. 3. Newell, A. (1982). The knowledge level. AIJ, 18(1), 82–127. 4. Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. Basic Books 5. Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. AIJ, 47(1–3), 139–159. 6. Nilsson, N. J. (1991). Logic and artificial intelligence. AIJ, 47(1–3), 31–56. 7. Shaparau, D., Pistore, M., and Traverso, P. (2008). Fusing procedural and declarative planning goals for nondeterministic domains. In AAAI-08. 8. Loo, B. T., Condie, T., Garofalakis, M., Gay, D. E., Hellerstein, J. M., Maniatis, P., Ramakrishnan, R., Roscoe, T., and Stoica, I. (2006). Declarative networking: Language, execution and optimization. In SIGMOD-06. 9. Achlioptas, D. (2009). Random satisfiability. In Biere, A., Heule, M., van Maaren, H., and Walsh, T. (Eds.), Handbook of Satisfiability. IOS Press. 10. Friedgut, E. (1999). Necessary and sufficient conditions for sharp thresholds of graph properties, and the k-SAT problem. J. American Mathematical Society, 12, 1017–1054. 11. Achlioptas, D. and Peres, Y. (2004). The threshold for random k-SAT is 2k log 2−o(k). J. American Mathematical Society, 17(4), 947–973. 12. Achlioptas, D., Naor, A., and Peres, Y. (2007). On the maximum satisfiability of random formulas. JACM, 54(2). 13. Coarfa, C., Demopoulos, D., Aguirre, A., Subramanian, D., and Yardi, M. (2003). Random 3-SAT: The plot thickens. Constraints, 8(3), 243–261. 14. Parisi, M. M. G. and Zecchina, R. (2002). Analytic and algorithmic solution of random satisfiability problems. Science, 297, 812–815. 15. Maneva, E., Mossel, E., and Wainwright, M. J. (2007). A new look at survey propagation and its generalizations. JACM, 54(4). 16. McCulloch, W. S. and Pitts, W. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5, 115–137. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Software Agents | Russell | Norvig I 64 Software Agents/artificial intelligence/Russell/Norvig: agents base their actions on a direct mapping from states to actions. Such agents cannot operate well in environments for which this mapping would be too large to store and would take too long to learn. Goal-based agents, on the other hand, consider future actions and the desirability of their outcomes. Problem-solving agents use atomic representations, (…) that is, states of the world are considered as wholes, with no internal structure visible to the problem-solving algorithms. Norvig I 4 Computer agents are expected to do more: operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist over a prolonged time period, adapt to change, and create and pursue goals. A rational agent is one that acts so as to achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome. Norvig I 235 Knowledge based Agents/logical agents: The central component of a knowledge-based agent is its knowledge base, or KB. A knowledge base is a set of sentences. (Here “sentence” is used as a technical term. It is related but not identical to the sentences of English and other natural languages.) Each sentence is expressed in a language called a knowledge representation language and represents some assertion about the world. Norvig I 240 Semantics: The semantics defines the truth of each sentence with respect to each possible world. Model: instead of “possible world” we need to be more precise and use the term model. Whereas possible worlds might be thought of as (potentially) real environments that the agent might or might not be in, models are mathematical abstractions, each of which simply fixes the truth or falsehood of every relevant sentence. Norvig I 241 Knowledge Base: The KB can be thought of as a set of sentences or as a single sentence that asserts all the individual sentences. The KB is false in models that contradict what the agent knows (…). Norvig I 242 Completeness: an inference algorithm is complete if it can derive any sentence that is entailed. Fortunately, there are complete inference procedures for logics that are sufficiently expressive to handle many knowledge bases. Real world: if [the knowledge base] KB is true in the real world, then any sentence α derived from KB by a sound inference procedure is also true in the real world. So, while an inference process operates on “syntax”—internal physical configurations such as bits in registers or patterns of electrical blips in brains - the process corresponds Norvig I 243 to the real-world relationship whereby some aspect of the real world is the case by virtue of other aspects of the real world being the case. Grounding: grounding [is] the connection between logical reasoning processes and the real environment in which the agent exists. In particular, how do we know that KB is true in the real world? A simple answer is that the agent’s sensors create the connection. Cf. >Semantics, >Syntax; for the philosophical discussion see also >Facts/Wittgenstein, >States of Affairs/Wittgenstein, >Foundation/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 257 Forward chaining: The forward-chaining algorithm (…) determines if a single proposition symbol q - the query - is entailed by a knowledge base of definite clauses. It begins from known facts (positive literals) in the knowledge base. If all the premises of an implication are known, then its conclusion is added to the set of known facts. Norvig I 258 It is easy to see that forward chaining is sound: every inference is essentially an application of Modus Ponens. Forward chaining is also complete: every entailed atomic sentence will be derived. The easiest way to see this is to consider the final state of the inferred table (after the algorithm reaches a fixed point where no new inferences are possible). Cf. >Fixed points. Forward chaining is an example of the general concept of data-driven reasoning – that is, reasoning in which the focus of attention starts with the known data. It can be used within an agent to derive conclusions from incoming percepts, often without a specific query in mind. Backward chaining: works backward from the query. If the query q is known to be true, then no work is needed. Otherwise, the algorithm finds those implications in the knowledge base whose conclusion is q. If all the premises of one of those implications can be proved true (by backward chaining), then q is true. Backward chaining is a form of goal-directed reasoning. It is useful for answering specific questions such as “What shall I do now?” and “Where are my keys?” Often, the cost of backward chaining is much less than linear in the size of the knowledge base, because the process touches only relevant facts. Norvig I 275 History: John McCarthy’s paper “Programs with Common Sense” (McCarthy, 1958(1), 1968(2)) promulgated the notion of agents that use logical reasoning to mediate between percepts and actions. Allen Newell’s (1982)(3) article “The Knowledge Level” makes the case that rational agents can be described and analyzed at an abstract level defined by the knowledge they possess rather than the programs they run. The declarative and procedural approaches to AI are analyzed in depth by Boden (1977)(4). The debate was revived by, among others, Brooks (1991)(5) and Nilsson (1991)(6), and continues to this day (Shaparau et al., 2008)(7). Meanwhile, the declarative approach has spread into other areas of computer science such as networking (Loo et al., 2006)(8). Norvig I 278 Current state: The current state of theoretical understanding is summarized by Achlioptas (2009)(9). The satisfiability threshold conjecture states that, for each k, there is a sharp satisfiability threshold rk, such that as the number of variables n→∞, instances below the threshold are satisfiable with probability 1, while those above the threshold are unsatisfiable with probability 1. The conjecture was not quite proved by Friedgut (1999)(10): a sharp threshold exists but its location might depend on n even as n → ∞. Despite significant progress in asymptotic analysis of the threshold location for large k (Achlioptas and Peres, 2004(11); Achlioptas et al., 2007(12)), all that can be proved for k=3 is that it lies in the range [3.52,4.51]. Current theory suggests that a peak in the run time of a SAT solver is not necessarily related to the satisfiability threshold, but instead to a phase transition in the solution distribution and structure of SAT instances. Empirical results due to Coarfa et al. (2003)(13) support this view. In fact, algorithms such as survey propagation (Parisi and Zecchina, 2002(14); Maneva et al., 2007(15)) take advantage of special properties of random SAT instances near the satisfiability threshold and greatly outperform general SAT solvers on such instances. Neural networks: The idea of building agents with propositional logic can be traced back to the seminal paper of McCulloch and Pitts (1943)(16), which initiated the field of neural networks. >Frame problem. 1. McCarthy, J. (1958). Programs with common sense. In Proc. Symposium on Mechanisation of Thought Processes, Vol. 1, pp. 77–84. 2. McCarthy, J. (1968). Programs with common sense. In Minsky, M. L. (Ed.), Semantic Information Processing, pp. 403–418. MIT Press. 3. Newell, A. (1982). The knowledge level. AIJ, 18(1), 82–127. 4. Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. Basic Books 5. Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. AIJ, 47(1–3), 139–159. 6. Nilsson, N. J. (1991). Logic and artificial intelligence. AIJ, 47(1–3), 31–56. 7. Shaparau, D., Pistore, M., and Traverso, P. (2008). Fusing procedural and declarative planning goals for nondeterministic domains. In AAAI-08. 8. Loo, B. T., Condie, T., Garofalakis, M., Gay, D. E., Hellerstein, J. M., Maniatis, P., Ramakrishnan, R., Roscoe, T., and Stoica, I. (2006). Declarative networking: Language, execution and optimization. In SIGMOD-06. 9. Achlioptas, D. (2009). Random satisfiability. In Biere, A., Heule, M., van Maaren, H., and Walsh, T. (Eds.), Handbook of Satisfiability. IOS Press. 10. Friedgut, E. (1999). Necessary and sufficient conditions for sharp thresholds of graph properties, and the k-SAT problem. J. American Mathematical Society, 12, 1017–1054. 11. Achlioptas, D. and Peres, Y. (2004). The threshold for random k-SAT is 2k log 2−o(k). J. American Mathematical Society, 17(4), 947–973. 12. Achlioptas, D., Naor, A., and Peres, Y. (2007). On the maximum satisfiability of random formulas. JACM, 54(2). 13. Coarfa, C., Demopoulos, D., Aguirre, A., Subramanian, D., and Yardi, M. (2003). Random 3-SAT: The plot thickens. Constraints, 8(3), 243–261. 14. Parisi, M. M. G. and Zecchina, R. (2002). Analytic and algorithmic solution of random satisfiability problems. Science, 297, 812–815. 15. Maneva, E., Mossel, E., and Wainwright, M. J. (2007). A new look at survey propagation and its generalizations. JACM, 54(4). 16. McCulloch, W. S. and Pitts, W. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5, 115–137. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Substitution | Thiel | Thiel I 92 Substitution/Thiel: >Substitution rule: if you replace all equal letters with the same correct formula or another letter. >Separation rule: A,A > B >>B (?) So "if, then" are introduced by simple rules, negation of a statement ..+... def "designated formula".... "allocation". >modus ponens, >Introduction. I 95 Some of the formulas formed with the help of the newly added negation sign are not designated formulas. For example, one of the assignments of the formula ~~p > p is the expression (~~1) >1. Its value is calculated according to the tables as (~~1) x 1 = (~2) x 1 = 0 x 1 = 1 The assignment also receives 0 > (~~0) of the formula p > ~~p the value 0 x (~~0) = 0 x (~1) = 0 x 2 = 1. If the value is different from 0, there is no designated formula regarding our table. >Formulas. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Tarski | Field | I 33f Tarski/Field: According to Tarski the following two sentences are a contradiction because he needs quantities for his definition of implication: a) "Snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". b) There are no mathematical entities like quantities. ((s) Therefore, Field must be independent of Tarski.) Solution Field: Implication as a basic concept. >Mathematical entities, >Ontology/Field, >Tarski-scheme. --- II 124 Tarski/Truth: Tarski's truth theory is unlike disquotational truth: only for a fragment. >Disquotationalism/Field. Unrestricted quantifiers and semantic concepts must be excluded. >Quantifiers. Problem: we cannot create infinite conjunctions and disjunctions with that. (Tarski-Truth is not suitable for generalization). >Generalization. DeflationsimVsTarski/QuineVsTarski. >Deflationism. Otherwise, we must give up an explicit definition. Deflationism: uses a generalized version of the truth-schema. TarskiVsDeflationism: pro compositionality. (Also Davidson) >Compositionality. Tarski: needs recursion to characterize e.g."or". >Logical constants. II 125 Composition principle/Field: E.g. A sentence consisting of a one-digit predicate and a referencing name is true, iff the predicate is true of what the name denotes. This goes beyond logical rules because it introduces reference and denotation. >Reference, >Denotation. Tarski: needs this for a satisfying Truth-concept. Deflationism: Reference and danotation is not important for it. >Compositionality). II 141 Truth-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate Truth-theory if we take only all instances of the schema as axioms. - This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens receives the truth. II 142 Deflationism/Tarski/Field. Actually, Tarski's approach is also deflationistic. --- Soames I 477 FieldVsTarski/Soames: Tarski hides speech behavior. Field: Tarski introduces primitive reference, and so on. >language independence. SoamesVsField: his physicalist must reduce every single one of the semantic concepts. - For example, he cannot characterize negation as a symbol by truth, because that would be circular. E.g. he cannot take negation as the basic concept, because then there would be no facts about speakers (no semantic facts about use) that explain the semantic properties. FieldVsTarski: one would have to be able to replace the semantic terms by physical terms. >Semantics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Terminology | Ryle | Geach I 94 Namely rider/Ryle/GeachVsRyle: the namely rider does not help if a sentence does not designate: e.g [The only one who has ever stolen a book of Snead] (namely Robinson) made a lot of money by selling it. We memorize from that: Robinson made a lot of money by selling it. Geach I 255 Assertion/modus ponens/Ryle: "code-style": it is misleading that p does not have to be alleged. E.g. "if p then q, but p, therefore q". Conditional/Ryle: antecedent and consequent are not statements. Statements are neither needed nor mentioned in conditionals. Ryle: here the conditional is not a premise that coordinates with "p", as the "code style" suggests, but rather a "final ticket", a "license for the conclusion": "p", therefore q. Solution/Geach: to take propositions, not allegations. --- Ryle I 58 E.g. semi disopsitional/semi episodicall: "careful", "unswerving", etc. do not have anything extra - they are a manner. I 93ff Voluntary/Ryle: the use of "voluntary" is too extended. Laughter cannot be intentional - "Voluntary" is not "responsible" for punctual schoolwork. I 97 Wrong: to define voluntariness as the child of voluntary acts. But being fully committed in the matter with the mind. I 174 f Success words: healing, proving, recognizing, knowledge, observation, can, win, solve, find - these cannot be performed incorrectly. The tendency to disease is different than habit - preference is unlike investment: (you would leave it if you would get the money like this). I 178 Belief/Ryle: belief is a motivational word. Corresponding predicates are: "stubborn", "naive" and "temporarily". These predicates are not extendable to the object but extendable to certain nouns: like e.g. "confidence", "instinct", "habit", "jealousy", "attachment" and "aversion". Knowledge: is an ability word. I 195 Mix-categorical/Ryle: e.g. act obediently, e.g. bird moves south. I 199ff Power words/task words: difference: travel/arrive - treat/heal - grab/hold - search/find - see/catch sight of - listen/hear - aim/meet - the performance here may be accidental. I 245ff Thoughtless speech/Ryle: is not frankness but that which we are most interested in. It is also not a self-explanation and does not contribute to our knowledge. I 248 One cannot answer "How do you know?". I 297 Mix-categorical: is usually partly general, partly hypothetical: e.g. pedantic appearance: many people look like him - not human + pedantry. --- Flor I 261 Definition mix-categorical/Ryle/Flor: statements about the mental states or acts of a person must be in the form of hypothetical sentences or a mixture of hypothetical and categorical sentences - hypothetical: if-then-categorical: reports on events and states. Flor I 267 Defintion theme-neutral/Flor: statements are theme-neutral in which words such as "anything" or "anyone", "someone", or "something" are used. --- Sellars I 53 Defintion mixed-categorical-hypothetical/mix-categorical/Ryle: mixed-categorical are manifestations of associative connections of the word object- and of the word-word type. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Time | Geach | I 303 Time/GeachVsQuine: Vs time cuts, Vs "hours-thick sclices". >four dimensionalism). Space and time are not equal axes - otherwise temperature curves would be the same as "world lines" in the "temperature-time continuum". It is not true that quantifiers can only be applied to four-dimensional space-time points. ((s) This is not what Quine asserts: "Sometimes"/Quine: "there are some points of time...">Logical form/Quine.) I 314 Space/time/Geach: Space and time are radically different: that the expression "between" is used in both, is misleading - spatial order: affects individual objects. - Temporal order: what is ordered here is represented by complex sentences. Geach: in the temporal, ever more complex structures can be built, not in the spatial. - e.g. "x is between (y is over w) and z" makes no sense. I 316 Time/Modal logic/Geach: I am convinced that the basic time determinations "before", "after", etc. belong to the formal logic. I think they have to do with "possible" and "necessary". >Possibility, >Necessity, >Modal logic, >Modalities. One has claimed that a world in which the modus ponens no longer applies can be described as a world in which the time is two-dimensional or the past can be changed. If the basic truths about time are logical, then a differently temporal world would be a chimera. >Space/Geach, >Time, >Spacetime. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analytic Philosophy | Nagel Vs Analytic Philosophy | Frank I 127 NagelVsAnalytical Philosophy: declares many questions pointless. Nagel: that merely shows that these questions are inaccessible to a particular type of treatment which is required by the respectively favored method. We should rather rely on our intuition, which generates the problems than on the theories that want to explain away these intuitions. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 Nagel I 57 Language/NagelVsPrimacy of Language/NagelVsAnalytical Philosophy/Nagel: leads to the devaluation of reason, decay product of analytical philosophy. Turning from Frege. Thinking is often non-linguistical. The most common forms of thinking do not depend on any single language. I 59 We cannot explain reason through naturalistic description of the practical language methods. Because the respects in which language is a vehicle do not allow any naturalistic, psychological or sociological analysis. If language reveals principles of thought, it is not because logic is grammar, but because grammar obeys logic. E.g. there is no language in which the modus ponens is not a logical conclusion or identity is not transitive. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Kleene, St. C. | Priest Vs Kleene, St. C. | Field II 145 Dialethism/Priest/Paradoxes/Field: (Priest 1998): Thesis: the sentence of the liar and its negation are both assertible (and also their conjunction). The rules of logic are attenuated (>stronger/weaker; >strenght of theories), so that not every assertion is assertible. Most attractive variant: builds on Kleene's trivalent logic. Trivalent Logic/Kleene/Priest/Field: Priest assumes here that the valid inferences are those that guarantee "correct assertion". But an assertion is only correct if it has one of the two highest truth values in the truth value table. Curry Paradox: is thus precluded, because the only conditional in this language is the material conditional. Material Conditional/Field: defined by ~ and v. In the logic of Kleene/Priest it does not entirely support the modus ponens. Liar/KleeneVsPriest: (and other "deviating" sentences): have truth value gaps. But there are no truth value clusters. Deviating Sentence: E.g. liar-sentence has no truth value clusters, but truth value gaps. Liar/PriestVsKleene: (and other deviating sentences): conversely have truth value clusters and no gaps. Problem/Kleene: here you cannot establish an equivalence between "p" and ""p"is true"! Because to assert a truth value gap in a sentence "A" would be to say: "~[true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and that should be equivalent to "~(A v ~A)", but a sentence of this form can never be legitimate in Kleene. Truth Value Gap/Logical Form/Field: asserting a truth value gap in a sentence "A" would be to say: "~[true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and that should be equivalent to "~(A v ~A)". Solution/Priest: if "A" is a deviating sentence, then it is a correct assertion as by Priest. The assertion of the absence of a truth value cluster in a sentence "A" would be the assertion "~ [(true ("A") and true ("~A)"]" which should be equivalent to "~(a u ~A)". Kleene cannot assert this absence for deviating sentences, Priest can. |
Pries I G. Priest Beyond the Limits of Thought Oxford 2001 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Piaget, J. | Schurz Vs Piaget, J. | I 194 VsPiaget/Schurz: it was shown that his hypotheses violated the requirement of interchangeability of indicators: For example, children who were presented with a simpler form than a mountain landscape (a box with four differently coloured sides) could solve the problem at the age of 4 (instead of 6-7). Schurz: this did not mean, however, that the core of the theory was revealed. (according to the Lakatos motto). I 195 1. VsPiaget: it was concluded that its test was not really selective. Solution: the mountain landscape involved hidden variables (hidden difficulties). (BrainerdVsPiaget, 1978). 2. VsPiaget: e.g. number test: problem: the children had not understood the linguistic formulation "more coins". New. E.g.: the children should select pictures with the same number of coins (without language, non verbal): this payment test was then already mastered by 4-5 year olds! Core/Periphery/Schurz: all this was directed only against the periphery! Core/VsPiaget: e.g. statement logic. According to Piaget, children of 13-14 years of age should be able to make propositional logic correct statements. Problem: modus ponens is actually controlled at the age of 3, modus tollens often not even by adults, thus often never! VsPiaget: Problem: this cannot be solved by changing a law for indicators or special laws. It directly attacks the core of the theory. Core/VsPiaget: e.g. preservation of the object: I 196 Cognitive Principle: (here): objects that are hidden therefore do not cease to exist. Piaget: this is already mastered after completion of the senso-motoric stage at the age of 2. Variant. For example, dissolving sugar in water: is not even mastered at the age of 6: a weak majority answers incorrectly: the sugar is no longer there. Conclusion: VsPiaget: the core must be abandoned. Intelligence/Development/Alternative TheoryVsPiaget: the development of intelligence is not based on the formation of general abstract structures, but on the development of content-specific and content-related abilities. (Ausubel, 1978, Novak 1980, Schurz 1985). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Popper, K. | Wessel Vs Popper, K. | I 149 Follow-up relationship/logic/sciences/methodology/Wessel: for the scientist it is not decisive whether his theories are consistent! It turns out that successful work with contradictory theories is possible within a certain framework. Frege's life's work is not meaningless either, although Russell revealed its contradictions. Contradiction/relation/conclusion/ex falso quodlibet/EFQ/Popper: one can construct a system in which contradictory statements do not result in any arbitrary statement. But such a system is very weak! Not even the modus ponens remains. I 150 Such a system is useless for drawing conclusions... WesselVsPopper: this is true for his system, but with the systems of the strict follow-up relationship there are systems that are complete and ex falso quodlibet do not apply. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Russell, B. | Wessel Vs Russell, B. | I 14 Ontology/Logic/Psychology/RussellVsLaws of Thought: it is not important that we think in accordance with laws of thought, but that the behavior of things corresponds to them. Russell: what we believe when we believe in the sentence of contradiction is not that our consciousness is constructed this way. We do not believe, for example, that we cannot think at the same time that a tree is a beech and not a beech either. We believe that if the tree is a beech, it cannot be not a beech at the same time. I 15 And even if belief in the sentence of contradiction is a thought, the sentence of contradiction itself is not a thought, but a fact concerning the things of the outside world. If what we believe would not apply to the things of the outside world, then the fact that we are forced to think like this would not guarantee that the sentence of contradiction cannot be wrong (this shows that it cannot be a law of thought). WesselVsRussell: logical laws do not concern the outside world! They do not give us any information about the outside world. The validity results only from the determination of the use of the signs! Of course, such phrases can also be formulated ontologically, but they are not ontological statements. Where else would we have the certainty that they are unrestrictedly valid? We cannot search the world endlessly. I 123 Subjunction/Material Implication/Frege/Wessel: Frege calls it "conditionality". I 123/124 Difference: between the subjunction A > B and a logical conclusion in which the only conclusion rule accepted by Frege is to conclude from A > B and A to B. ((s) modus ponens). Russell/Whitehead/Principia Mathematica(1): took over from Frege. "Essential property" of the implication: what is implied by a true statement is true. Through this property, an implication provides evidence. Def Implication/Russell/Principia Mathematica(1): p > q = def ~ p v q.(Materials Implication). WesselVsRussell: this is just inappropriate and misleading! It is purely formal! Implication/Conclusion/Wessel: the implication has a completely different logical structure than the consequence: Subjunction: > is a two-digit proposition-forming operator and p > q is synonymous with ~p v q. Conclusion (implication): "q follows logically p" or "P implies q" is a statement about statements: "From the statement p follows logically the statement q". "Follows from" is a two-digit predicate - not an operator. Conclusion (also called implication) refers to linguistic structures. Notation l-. Subjunction: > refers to facts. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Tarski, A. | Field Vs Tarski, A. | Brendel I 68 T-Def/FieldVsTarski: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions. (Field 1972). Semantic concepts and especially the W concept should be traceable to physical or logical-mathematical concepts. Tarski/Brendel: advocates for a metalinguistic definition himself that is based only on logical terms, no axiomatic characterization of "truth". (Tarski, "The Establishment of Scientific Semantics"). Bre I 69 FieldVsTarski: E.g. designation: Def Designation/Field: Saying that the name N denotes an object a is the same thing as stipulating that either a is France and N is "France" or a is Germany and N is "Germany"... etc. Problem: here only an extensional equivalence is given, no explanation of what designation (or satisfiability) is. Bre I 70 Explanation/FieldVsTarski/Field: should indicate because of which properties a name refers to a subject. Therefore, Tarski’s theory of truth is not physicalistic. T-Def/FieldVsTarski/Field/Brendel: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions - extensional equivalence is no explanation of what designation or satisfiability is. Field I 33 Implication/Field: is also in simpler contexts sensibly a primitive basic concept: E.g. Someone asserts the two sentences. a) "Snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". b) There are no mathematical entities such as quantities. That does not look as contradictory as Fie I 34 John is a bachelor/John is married FieldVsTarski: according to him, a) and b) together would be a contradiction, because he defines implication with quantities. Tarski does not give the normal meaning of those terms. VsField: you could say, however, that the Tarskian concepts give similar access as the definition of "light is electromagnetic radiation". FieldVsVs: but for implication we do not need such a theoretical approach. This is because it is a logical concept like negation and conjunction. Field II 141 T-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate probability theory if we just take all instances of the schema as axioms. This does not give us the generalizations that we need, for example, so that the modus ponens receives the truth. FieldVsTarski: see above Section 3. 1. Here I showed a solution, but should have explained more. Feferman/Field: Solution: (Feferman 1991) incorporates schema letters together with a rule for substitution. Then the domain expands automatically as the language expands. Feferman: needs this for number theory and set theory. Problem: expanding it to the T-theory, because here we need scheme letters inside and outside of quotation marks. Field: my solution was to introduce an additional rule that allows to go from a scheme with all the letters in quotation marks to a generalization for all sentences. Problem: we also need that for the syntax,... here, an interlinking functor is introduced in (TF) and (TFG). (see above). II 142 TarskiVsField: his variant, however, is purely axiomatic. FieldVsTarski/FefermanVsTarski: Approach with scheme letters instead of pure axioms: Advantages: 1) We have the same advantage as Feferman for the schematic number theory and the schematic set theory: expansions of the language are automatically considered. 2) the use of ""p" is true iff. p" (now as a scheme formula as part of the language rather than as an axiom) seems to grasp the concept of truth better. 3) (most important) is not dependent on a compositional approach to the functioning of the other parts of language. While this is important, it is also not ignored by my approach. FieldVsTarski: an axiomatic theory is hard to come by for belief sentences. Putnam I 91 Correspondence Theory/FieldVsTarski: Tarski’s theory is not suited for the reconstruction of the correspondence theory, because fulfillment (of simple predicates of language) is explained through a list. This list has the form "Electron" refers to electrons "DNS" refers to DNS "Gene" refers to genes. etc. this is similar to (w) "Snow is white" is true iff.... (s)> meaning postulates) Putnam: this similarity is no coincidence, because: Def "True"/Tarski/Putnam: "true" is the zero digit case of fulfillment (i.e. a formula is true if it has no free variables and the zero sequence fulfills it). Def Zero Sequence: converges to 0: E.g. 1; 1/4; 1/9; 1/16: ... Criterion W/Putnam: can be generalized to the criterion F as follows: (F for fulfillment): Def Criterion F/Putnam: (F) an adequate definition of fulfilled in S must generate all instances of the following scheme as theorems: "P(x1...xn) is fulfilled by the sequence y1...yn and only if P(y1...yn). Then we reformulate: "Electron (x)" is fulfilled by y1 iff. y1 is an electron. PutnamVsField: it would have been formulated like this in Tarskian from the start. But that shows that the list Field complained about is determined in its structure by criterion F. This as well as the criterion W are now determined by the formal properties we desired of the concepts of truth and reference, so we would even preserve the criterion F if we interpreted the connectives intuitionistically or quasi intuitionistically. Field’s objection fails. It is right for the realist to define "true" à la Tarski. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
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| Tarski | Field, Hartry | II 3 Truth Theory/Tarski/Field: he did not use any undefined semantic terms. Many say: he thus made the concept of truth suitable for the scientific discourse of his time. FieldVs: Thesis: this is all wrong. In reality, Tarski has managed to trace the concept of truth back to other semantic concepts. II 141 Truth Theory/Tarski: Thesis: We do not get an adequate truth-theory if we only take all instances of the scheme as axioms. This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens gets the truth. FieldVsTarski. Horwich I 358 Truth Definition/Tarski/Field: (Field 1973): Tarski's thesis: truth definition was partly motivated by the desire to support physicalism. |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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