Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Abstractness Wright I 226 f
Abstract/Purely Abstract Objects/Dummett: (Frege:" logical objects "): Dummett: nothing more than reflections of certain linguistic expressions, analogous to the proper names of objects whose meaning, however, cannot be presented as being our ability to identify objects as their carriers. Wright: could be read as nominalism (i.e. ​​that there are no abstract objects). But that is not Dummett's view. Dummett precisely does not deny that there are singular terms that ostensibly refer to abstract objects, but have reference indeed. They even play a semantic role! Example "largest prime number": empty singular term, but the mere meaning ensures that it plays a semantic role! Dummett: seems to think here that there is no question about whether Platonism or Nominalism provides the better approach according to which the question is decided whether abstract objects exist. (>Numbers).
---
I 227f
Abstract/Morality/Ethics/Wright: that matches our approach to discourse of morality well: the cause of moral realism is not really confined to the question whether moral discourse is capable of truth, or not. If the "capacity for truth" is affirmed, there are still a number of realism-relevant questions. ---
I 223 ff
It is also not in dispute that we use abstract singular terms in an intelligent manner. Wright: There is no linguistically unmediated cognitive contact with abstract objects.
Frege (Platonist) asserts quite correctly, that doubts about the reality of the reference to abstract objects do not contain any rational sense. (Wright: This is minimalism regarding reference).
---
I 242
Abstract Singular Terms/Wright: it is impossible that they influence the thinking of someone who does not know what they are.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Ethics Bostrom I 257
Ethics/morals/morality/superintelligence//Bostrom: No ethical theory commands majority support among philosophers, so most philosophers must be wrong. ((s)VsBostrom: It is not a question of applause as to which theory is correct.)
I 369
Majorities in ethics/Bostrom: A recent canvass of professional philosophers found the percentage of respondents who “accept or leans toward” various positions. On normative ethics, the results were deontology 25.9%; - consequentialism 23.6%; - virtue ethics 18.2%.
On metaethics, results were
moral realism 56.4%; - moral anti-realism 27.7%.
On moral judgment:
cognitivism 65.7%; - non-cognitivism 17.0% (Bourget and Chalmers 2009(1))
>Norms/normativity/superintelligence/Bostrom, >Ethics/superintelligence/Yudkowsky.
Morality models:
I 259
Coherent Extrapolated Volition/CEV/Yudkowsky: Our coherent extrapolated volition is our wish if we knew more, thought faster, were more the people we wished we were, had grown up farther together; where the extrapolation converges rather than diverges, where our wishes cohere rather than interfere; extrapolated as we wish that extrapolated, interpreted as we wish that interpreted. >Ethics/superintelligence/Yudkowsky.
I 266
VsCEV/Bostrom: instead: Moral rightness/MR/Bostrom: (…) build an AI with the goal of doing what is morally right, relying on the AI’s superior cognitive capacities to figure out just which actions fit that description. We can call this proposal “moral rightness” (MR). The idea is that we humans have an imperfect understanding of what is right and wrong (…)
((s)VsBostrom: This delegates human responsibility and ultimately assumes that human decisions are only provisional until non-human decisions are made.)
I 267
BostromVsYudkowsky: MR would do away with various free parameters in CEV, such as the degree of coherence among extrapolated volitions that is required for the AI to act on the result, the ease with which a majority can overrule dissenting minorities, and the nature of the social environment within which our extrapolated selves are to be supposed to have “grown up farther together.” BostromVsMR: Problem: 1. MR would also appear to have some disadvantages. It relies on the notion of “morally right,” a notoriously difficult concept (…).
I 268
2. (…) [MR] might not give us what we want or what we would choose if we were brighter and better informed. Solution/Bostrom: Goal for AI:
MP: Among the actions that are morally permissible for the AI, take one that humanity’s CEV would prefer. However, if some part of this instruction has no well-specified meaning, or if we are radically confused about its meaning, or if moral realism is false, or if we acted morally impermissibly in creating an AI with this goal, then undergo a controlled shutdown.(*) Follow the intended meaning of this instruction.
I 373 (Annotation)
*Moral permissibility/Bostrom: When the AI evaluates the moral permissibility of our act of creating the AI, it should interpret permissibility in its objective sense. In one ordinary sense of “morally permissible,” a doctor acts morally permissibly when she prescribes a drug she believes will cure her patient - even if the patient, unbeknownst to the doctor, is allergic to the drug and dies as a result. Focusing on objective moral permissibility takes advantage of the presumably superior epistemic position of the AI. ((s)VsBostrom: The last sentence (severability) is circular, especially when there are no longer individuals in decision-making positions who could object to it.
>Goals/superintelligence/Bostrom.
I 312
Def Common good principle/Bostrom: Superintelligence should be developed only for the benefit of all of humanity and in the service of widely shared ethical ideals.
I 380
This formulation is intended to be read so as to include a prescription that the well-being of nonhuman animals and other sentient beings (including digital minds) that exist or may come to exist be given due consideration. It is not meant to be read as a license for one AI developer to substitute his or her own moral intuitions for those of the wider moral community.

1. Bourget, David, and Chalmers, David. 2009. “The PhilPapers Surveys.” November. Available at http://philpapers.org/surveys/

Bostrom I
Nick Bostrom
Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017

Moral Realism
Moral Realism Psychological Theories Slater I 164
Moral Realism/psychological theories: is the concept for Piaget’s thesis that young children begin with a heteronomous stage of moral reasoning in which they emphasize obedience to authority and focus more on the outcomes of moral actions than the underlying intent. (Piaget 1932/1965)(1). >Morality/Piaget, >Morality/Kohlberg.

1. Piaget, J. (1932/1965). The moral judgment of the child. New York: Free Press.


Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Morality Piaget Slater I 57
Morality/children/development/Piaget: five-year-old children believe that wrongness of an act depends on how much damage resulted, rather than the intent of the perpetrator. >Cognitive development/Piaget, >Thinking/Piaget, VsPiaget: >Abilities/Klahr, >Context/developmental psychology, >Problem solving/Klahr.

David Klahr, ”Revisiting Piaget. A Perspective from Studies of Children’s Problem-solving Abilities”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications



Slater I 164
Morality/Piaget: Piaget (1932/1965)(1) was the basis for Kohlberg’s work on the development of children’s orientations toward a moral order (Kohlberg 1963/2008)(2). Moral Realism: is the concept for Piaget’s thesis that young children begin with a heteronomous stage of moral reasoning in which they emphasize obedience to authority and focus more on the outcomes of moral actions than the underlying intent.
Heteronomous stage/Piaget: the limitations of children’s moral reasoning at the heteronomous stage are due to a tendency to project one’s own way of reasoning onto others. According to
Piaget, this tendency persists until children gain enough experience with peers that they can appreciate the perspectives of others, as they engage in the social coordination that is necessary to reach mutually agreeable outcomes. As a result, children learn to conceive of morality as a fluid process that is based on negotiations among individuals rather than as a set of fixed rules grounded in adult authority.
Autonomous stage: Between the ages of about 8 and 11, children typically enter an autonomous stage of moral development, in which they critically evaluate moral rules and take into account the perspectives of others when applying the rules. During the autonomous stage, children come to understand that rules are created by people, and can be modified by social agreement.
Piaget: Based on his belief that peer interactions are a particularly important way of learning right and wrong, he set out to observe children in the context of game-playing interactions, and then asked them to reflect on the rules of their games. >Morality/Kohlberg.


1. Piaget, J. (1932/1965). The moral judgment of the child. New York: Free Press.
2. Kohlberg, L. (1963/2008). The development of children’s orientations toward a moral order. I: Sequence in the development of moral thought. Human Development, 51, 8—20.


Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications



Upton I 123
Morality/Piaget/Upton: According to Piaget (1923)(1), understanding of right and wrong reflects increasing sophistication in a child’s thinking processes: children under four years of age have no understanding of morality. Heteronomous morality: Between the ages of four and seven years, children believe that rules and justice are unchangeable and beyond the control of the individual, and they also judge whether an action is right or wrong by its consequences.
Autonomous morality: From seven to ten years of age, children are in transition, showing some features of heteronomous morality and autonomous morality;
Finally, at around the ages often to 12 years, children’s understanding shifts to autonomous morality, recognizing that rules are created by people and that intentions are as important as consequences.
Piaget believed that, in addition to increasing cognitive abilities, moral development relies on peer relationships. Through the give and take of social interactions and playing games, children experience disagreements that have to be solved, and learn to negotiate the rules of a game, which teaches them to recognize that rules are man-made rather than handed down from a greater authority. >Morality/Kohlberg.


1. Piaget, J (1923) Language and Thought of the Child. London: Routledge.

Piag I
J. Piaget
The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012

Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Morals Chalmers I 83
Moral/Aesthetics/Chalmers: it is often said that there is no conceptual connection between physical properties and moral or aesthetic properties. This does not mean, however, that moral and aesthetic properties are as problematic as conscious experiences. 1. Is a possible world conceivable, which is physically indistinguishable from ours, but morally different?
2. Are moral facts not phenomena that impose themselves upon us? We can deny them. This is done by moral antirealists such as Blackburn (1971)(1) and Hare (1984) (2).
---
I 84
Moral/Supervenience/Boyd/Brink/Chalmers: Boyd (1988)(3) and Brink (1989)(4) Thesis: moral facts supervene on natural facts with an a posteriori necessity. That is, they suprvene on the secondary, not the primary, intension of moral concepts. (> Horgan and Timmons, 1992a (5), 1992b (6)).



1. S. Blackburn, Moral realism. IN. J. Casey (Ed) Morality and Moral Reasoning, London 1971.
2. R. M. Hare, Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl.58, 1984: pp. 1-16
3. R. N. Boyd, How to be a moral realist. In G. Syre-McCord (Ed), Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca, NY 1988
4. D. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge 1989.
5. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Troubles for new ware moral sentiments; The "open question argument" revived. Philosophical Papers 1992.
6. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Trouble on moral twin earth: Moral Queerness revived. Synthese 92, 1992: pp. 223-60.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Morals Ancient Philosophy Taureck I 55
Definition Moral Realism/Antiquity/Taureck: accepts "moral facts". (Norms = facts). Considers "aidos" as respect and "dike" as justice and thus as facts.


Taureck I
B. H.F. Taureck
Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995
Roles Wright I 250
Def Wide cosmological role: A content plays a wide cosmological role exactly in the case in which the mention of facts, of which it is composed, may occur at least in certain types of explanation of contingencies, explanations, the ability of which is not only guaranteed by the minimum capacity for truth of discourse. - E.g. thesis: morality plays no wide cosmological role (problem for the moral realism). - How can the specification of any facts contribute to explaining?
I 248
Cosmological role: explanation of meaning/content not by our attitudes.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Terminology Bostrom I 259
CEV/terminology/Bostrom: Ethics/morality/superintelligence/Yudkowsky: Yudkowsky has proposed that a seed AI be given the final goal of carrying out humanity’s “coherent extrapolated volition” (CEV), which he defines as follows:
CEV/Yudkowsky: Our Coherent Extrapolated Volition is our wish if we knew more, thought faster, were more the people we wished we were, had grown up farther together; where the extrapolation converges rather than diverges, where our wishes cohere rather than interfere; extrapolated as we wish that extrapolated, interpreted as we wish that interpreted.
I 266
Moral rightness/MR/Bostrom: (…) build an AI with the goal of doing what is morally right, relying on the AI’s superior cognitive capacities to figure out just which actions fit that description.
I 268
MP: Among the actions that are morally permissible for the AI, take one that humanity’s CEV would prefer. However, if some part of this instruction has no well-specified meaning, or if we are radically confused about its meaning, or if moral realism is false, or if we acted morally impermissibly in creating an AI with this goal, then undergo a controlled shutdown.
I 312
Def Common good principle/Bostrom: Superintelligence should be developed only for the benefit of all of humanity and in the service of widely shared ethical ideals.

Bostrom I
Nick Bostrom
Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017

Values Jonas Brocker I 614
Values/Moral/Jonas: Jonas represents a moral realism for which there is objective value recognition. Axiology is part of his ontology (1. according to which there are values in nature that commit us directly. The "should" is founded "in the being" of nature itself (2). The "call," according to Jonas, comes from the outside, not - as with Kant - from (pure practical) reason (3). The human is consequently "placed under a duty to be, as a mandatary, so to speak, of a will of nature" (4). See Ethics/Jonas, Teleology/Jonas, Being/Jonas.
Brocker I 617
VsJonas: where would the limit be drawn if one wanted to determine the value of a good to be preserved? In insects? In bacteria? In cancer cells? See Duties/Jonas.

1.Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, S. 153
2. Ebenda S. 8
3. Ebenda S. 164, 168-171
4. Hans Jonas, Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung, Frankfurt/M. 1985.


Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Brentano, Fr. Putnam Vs Brentano, Fr. VII 435
"Companions in guilt"-Argument/Justification/Putnam: (Thesis: the question of what is a good explanation or not, what is a good interpretation or not, and what is justified and what is not, are in the same boat). ((s) "Companions in guilt"-Argument/(s): that interpretation, justification and explanation are in the same boat). E.g. Suppose we took the concepts "competence", or "best explanation" or "justification" as undefined basic concepts. Since these are not physicalist concepts, our realism would be no longer of the kind that Harman wants to defend.
Why then not say that Brentano's right and there are irreducible semantic properties? >Irreducibility.
PutnamVsBrentano: if there is nothing wrong about it, then the question why one is not an ethical non-cognitivist becomes a serious question.
Harman/Putnam: would still say, however, that it makes a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago,
VII 436
or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts that decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if >moral realism has to break with Harman (and with Mackie), then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged.
Interpretation/Explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come as deeply from human needs as ethical values.
Putnam: then a critic of me might say (even if he remains moral realist): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument).
Putnam: and this is where I wanted him! That was my main concern in "Vernunft Wahrheit und Geschichte". (Putnam Thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are often not in the same boat" (companions in guilt" argument, cling together, swing together argument: in case of partial relativism total relativism threatens to ensue. PutnamVsHarman)
Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism and not total relativism at the same time.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Dummett, M. Wright Vs Dummett, M. Rorty VI 45
WrightVsDummett/Rorty: it is necessary to say more about the pragmatic use of the terms "realism", "representation" and "agreement" than Dummett. For example, judgments may coincidentally converge for historical reasons. Representation (and thus realism) must be explained by means of a concept that is neither merely logical nor merely sociological. (Rorty pro).
Wright I 225/226
Abstract/"pure abstract objects"/Dummett: (Frege: "logical objects"): Dummett: nothing more than reflections of certain linguistic expressions, analogous to the proper names of objects, whose meaning, however, cannot be represented as consisting in our ability to identify objects as their carriers.
Wright: could be read as Nominalism. (i.e. that there are no abstract objects).
But this is not Dummett's view. Dummett does not deny that there are singular terms that ostensibly refer to abstract objects, but in fact have reference.
I 227
They even play a semantic role! Example the "largest prime number": is an empty singular term, but the mere meaning ensures that it plays a semantic role!
Dummett: seems to think here that there is no question whether Platonism or Nominalism provides the better approach after the question is decided whether abstract objects exist. (> Numbers).
Abstract/Moral/Ethics/Wright: this fits well with our attitude to the discourse of morality: the matter of moral realism is not really exhausted in the question of whether the moral discourse is truthful or not.
If the truth ability is affirmed, there are still a number of questions relevant to realism.
I 228
Identification/WrightVsDummett: it is simply unclear what the "identification" of an object should mean, if the recognition of the truth of an identity statement, which contains a term for the object, is not sufficient! It is also not controversial that we use abstract singular terms in a reasonable way.
Wright: there is no linguistically unmediated cognitive contact with abstract objects. (> Abstractness). Abstract objects can only affect us in this way!
Frege (Platonist) quite rightly claims that doubts about the reality of the reference to abstract objects do not contain any reasonable sense. (Wright: this is minimalism regarding reference).
Realism/Wright: but then there still remain the considerations that force us to assign concrete things an independent role in an independent world.
I 229
Def Minimalism/Wright: is a better name for Dummett's >"Anti-Realism" or >"Nominalism".

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Noncognitivism McDowell Vs Noncognitivism Rorty VI 50
McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity. For them, the same applies as for their Platonic opponents, the moral realists:
VI 51
They toil with the search for an independent position. That be impossible. (McDowellVsMoral realism).

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Universalism Rorty Vs Universalism VI 295
Universalism/Rorty: moral realism: progress: deceptions to behold the moral reality. Moral judgments are made true by something that exists in the outside world (RortyVs). It's about inner essential features of man as man. HistorismVsUniversalism/Rorty: if the talk of the "inner essence" results in something ahistorical, it is at most the ability to endure and inflict pain. All other features are not predetermined. Cf. >Historism.
VI 303
MacKinnonVsUniversalism: "We do not try to express ourselves objectively about it, but we try to put the views of women to bear". (Rorty pro).

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Wright, Cr. Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. VI 40
WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other.
Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive.
RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations.
1) to justify actions, and
2) another obligation to do the right thing.
It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another.
Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed.
Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation."
VI 41
"Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration.
RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given?
E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard.
VI 42
I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart.
VI 42/43
Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property".
Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences.
VI 45
Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input."
VI 46
Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse!
VI 46/47
Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines!
Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner.
What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content).
VI 48
PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale.
VI 48/49
Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it.
Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term.
VI 50
WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell.
McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists:
VI 51
struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral).
Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general".
Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell).
We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion.
Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction.
Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint".
World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution.
VI 52
True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson).
VI 56
PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000