Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atomism | Quine | II 218 QuineVsRussell: VsLogical Atomism (pro Holism) - connection with observation is more complex. II 107 Atomic Facts/Russell: atomic facts are sense data - QuineVsRussell: they are not atomic but composed. Acquaintance/Russell: acquaintance is certain with sense data, everything else is fallible. II 218 Atomism/QuineVsRussell/Quine: the fundamental difference between Russell's logical atomism and my view is that in my opinion the remaining truths are not somehow composed of or implied by the sentences of observation. Their connection with the observation sentences is more mediated and complex. See also >Atoms/Quine. XIII 14 Def Sensory Atomism/Locke/Hume/Quine: e.g. Locke's "simple ideas", Hume's "simple impressions". This is a mosaic of irreducible sensory bits that can occur repeatedly. Sensibilia/Quine: should therefore again not be considered as atoms, but as types of atoms. Atom/Quine: an atom is then an occurrence (token) of Sensibilia within the experience. Gestalt PsychologyVsSensory Atomism/Form Theory/Quine: thesis: forms tend to come from rough (large) forms (which are not composed of building blocks). XIII 15 Atomism/sensory/Quine: for him again the nature of the neural (neuronal) input speaks. Atom/sensory/Quine: should we then say that they again correspond to types of inputs that then correspond to a receptor? No: Problem: with a number of species one does not get any further here: each person has an unknown and not further interesting number of receptors. Further research would not help the theory here. Perception Atomism/Quine: that would be something one could dream of: a repertory of basic properties. Then properties would be the species. Their occurrences are the atoms. Problem: it was shown that the wavelength of a singular color event does not determine the perceived color, but the respective environment. In addition, it has been found that there are cells which only respond when, for example, a diagonal runs from top left to bottom right, and other cells for corresponding other conditions. XIII 16 Atomism/Technology/Quine: Atomism is important here. Example Halftone in vision/printing: dots and spaces are its atoms. Example television (TV), newspaper printing, etc. Problem: in film there is no limitation of the atoms. On two (b/w) or the basic colors. >Colour/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Endurantism | Lewis | Schwarz I 32 Definition Endurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): Thesis: Things are wholly present (not only in part) at all times, at which they exist (like Aristotelian universals). >Universals. LewisVsEndurantism (instead: Mosaic Theory). Schwarz I 31 Definition Perdurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: the thesis that temporally extended things usually consist of temporal parts. Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truths about our world also about the temporal extent of things, are based on the properties and relationships between spatially extended points. EndurantismVsLewis: since he has nothing to do with mosaic, this is no argument for him. LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: if normal things do not have temporal parts but exist at different times, they cannot be round, nor large, but only round at time t. And that is absurd. Schwarz I 32 Properties/some authors: certainly, not all property are relational like "being remote" - but could they not be time-relational, ignoring this constant dependency? (Haslanger 1989: 123f,[1], Jackson 1994b, 142f,[2] van Inwagen 1990a, 116[3]). Properties/Lewis: (2004.4) At least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not generally a relation to times. Properties/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: one should not relativize the properties, but their instantiations temporally. (Johnston, 1987, §5) E.g. I am now sitting and was sleeping last night. Others: (Haslanger, 1989): Thesis: time specifications (> time) are adverbial modifications of propositions: For example, I am sitting in the present way and am sleeping last night. LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: that makes no big difference. These representatives, too, deny that form properties belong directly, simply, and themselves to the things. Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: the debate has been settled, both are accusing each other to analyze change away. Endurantism: is an instantiation of incompatible properties and has nothing to do with change. Perdurantism: is a timeless instantiation of compatible properties, for example, being straight exactly at t1, being curved at t0, is not a change. Schwarz: both do not correspond to our intuitions. The change is not that important. Cf. >Perdurantism. 1.Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125 — [1994]: “Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 339–359 2. “Metaphysics by Possible Cases”. In [Jackson 1998b] Mind, Method and Conditionals: Selected Essays. London: Routledge 3.“Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Humean World | Humean World: a world without causality - phenomenally like our world. See also David K. Lewis, Humean supervenience, Humean mosaic. |
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| Humean World | Cartwright | I 40 Def Humean world/Lewis/Cartwright: a world that is just like ours, except that there are no causal laws in it. ((s) Therefeore there is no cause!) but all temporal sequences of events, properties, etc., and also laws of association are equal. The question what difference do causal laws make in our world is then put succinctly: is there for each possible world a corresponding Humean world? Cartwright: No, because we are not always able to dispense with causal laws in favor of association. I 41 A Humean world would always be causally homogeneous - if anything increases the probability of something else, it will not be a Humean world. >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Causal laws, >Explanation, >Association, cf. >"Mosaic". |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Humean World | Esfeld | I 297f Humean supervenience/Lewis: the world is a mosaic of local states of particulars (single facts). It is a simple system of external relations of space-time intervals. There is no difference without a distinction in the arrangement of properties - all supervenes on everything - point properties are always intrinsic. >Supervenience, cf. >"Mosaic", >Intrinsic, >Causality, >Causality/Hume, >Causality/Lewis, >Explanation, >Reality, >World/Thinking. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Humean World | Lewis | V IX Humean supervenience/HS/Lewis: Thesis: everything in the world is a large mosaic of local facts - there is a geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal distances between points - at the points we have local qualities, perfectly natural intrinsic properties - everything is an arrangement of qualities (AoQ). Everything supervenes on it. Important argument: there is no distinction without difference. - That does not mean that two possible worlds could not be different without having a difference in the AoQ. Cf. >Causality/Hume. Example 1) possible worlds with Humean supervenience, 2) possible worlds without! - ((s) i.e. Humean supervenience is contingent). Lewis: for our inner sphere of possibilities there is no such distinction. V VII Arrow of time: only in one direction - the Humean supervenience has to consider this asymmetry. - Humean supervenience/(s): does not mean here that causality is denied. --- V X Materialism/Humean supervenience/Lewis: materialism is a metaphysics that is to confirm the truth of known physics. Humean supervenience: it may be that the Humean supervenience is true and all our physics wrong. V 111 Humean supervenience/Coincidence/Lewis: If the Humean supervenience is wrong, there is a fatal counter e.g., which is made by coincidences - then coincidences and coincidence theories do not supervene on facts. Problem: a theory of coincidence is not something that itself may only have a certain chance - (which also says the Principal Principle PP) - an equally likely deviant pattern would lead to an entirely different coincidence theory. Right: chances are contingent because they depend on contingent facts, but not because they depended on a theory of coincidence - then the Humean supervenience is maintained. --- Schwarz I 112 Humean supervenience/Lewis/Schwarz: From description which property exists at point X and which at point y we learn which properties these are, thus in which the laws of nature apply. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Meaning | Aristotle | Danto I 139 Meaning/Aristotle/Danto: all meanings are interdependent. >Holism. PlatoVs. Meaning/Plato: meanings are independent. They constitute a mosaic of primary entities. >Language and thought/Plato, >World/thinking. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Multiculturalism | Kukathas | Gaus I 250 Multiculturalism/Kukathas: How can the many live as one? That is an old question in political theory, and the theorists of nationalism and multiculturalism have, in different ways, tried to offer an answer. Multiculturalism: Although nationalism is an old concept which has been much discussed in the past century (Kedourie, 1967(1); Minogue, 1967(2)), multiculturalism did not appear until the 1960s and 1970s, when it was used to describe a new public policy, first in Canada and then in Australia. In both of these cases, this development marked an explicit movement by federal Gaus I 251 governments away from policies of assimilation of ethnic minorities, and immigrants in particular, toward policies of acceptance and integration of diverse cultures (Lopez, 2000(3): 2—3). The term did not enter the American (or British) lexicon until the 1980s (Glazer, 1997(4): 8). When it did enter American debates, however, it did so in the first instance, in discussions about public education. 'Multiculturalism,' according to Nathan Glazer, 'is just the latest in [a] sequence of terms describing how American society, particularly American education, should respond to diversity' (1997(4): 8). VsAssimilation: Multiculturalism, then, is a term that describes one particular way of responding to ethnic diversity. 'It is a position that rejects assimilation and the "melting pot" image as an imposition of the dominant culture, and instead prefers such metaphors as the "salad bowl" or the "glorious mosaic", in which each ethnic and racial element in the population maintains its distinctiveness' (1997(4): 10). >Diversity/Multiculturalism. 1. Kedourie, Elie (1967) Nationalism. London: Hutchinson. 2. Minogue, Kenneth (1967) Nationalism. Bats ford. London: 3. Lopez, Mark (2000) The Origins of Multiculturalism in Australian Politics. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 4. Glazer, Nathan (1997) We Are All Multiculturalists Now. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Perdurantism | Lewis | Schwarz I 31 Definition Perdurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: the thesis that temporally extended things usually consist of temporal parts. Schwarz I 32 Definition Endurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantismus): Thesis: Things are wholly present (not only in part) at any time they exist (like Aristotelian universals). LewisVsEndurantism (instead: Mosaic theory). Cf. >Endurantism, >Continuants. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Philosophy | James | Diaz-Bone I 139 Philosophy/Pluralism/James: The Philosophy of AND and the SOMETHING: The connections between the elements and the ideas must be just as real as the elements, parts or imagination. Connection: "It is possible that some parts of the world are only loosely linked by the word "and". These parts come and go without affecting the others. There is no single thing that would encircle all the others, even when things are all interrelated. Pluralism: pluralism rejects the decision whether things are absolutely unrelated (absolute pluralism) or all are connected (absolute monism). --- I 140 Pluralism/James: with this his pluralism claimes to grasp the "grayscale" of reality. Philosophy of SOMETHING. Every part of the world is linked to other parts in some respects, in others not. Cf. >"Mosaic", >Humean World, cf. >Pluralism. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Reputation | Zittrain | I 216 Reputation/internet/web search/Zittrain: […] a final piece of the Privacy 2.0 mosaic: the impact of emerging reputation systems. This is both because such systems can greatly impact our privacy and because this book has suggested reputational tools as a way to solve the generative sifting problem at other layers. Search is central to a functioning Web (1), and reputation has I 217 become central to search. If people already know exactly what they are looking for, a network needs only a way of registering and indexing specific sites. […]site. But much of the time we want help in finding something without knowing the exact online destination. Search engines help us navigate the petabytes of publicly posted information online, and for them to work well they must do more than simply identify all pages containing the search terms that we specify. They must rank them in relevance. There are many ways to identify what sites are most relevant. A handful of search engines auction off the top-ranked slots in search results on given terms and determine relevance on the basis of how much the site operators would pay to put their sites in front of searchers. (2) These search engines are not widely used. Most have instead turned to some proxy for reputation. As mentioned earlier, a site popular with others—with lots of inbound links—is considered worthier of a high rank than an unpopular one, and thus search engines can draw upon the behavior of millions of other Web sites as they sort their search results. (3) Sites like Amazon deploy a different I 218 form of ranking, using the “mouse droppings” of customer purchasing and browsing behavior to make recommendations—so they can tell customers that “people who like the Beatles also like the Rolling Stones.” Search engines can also more explicitly invite the public to express its views on the items it ranks, so that users can decide what to view or buy on the basis of others’ opinions. Amazon users can rate and review the items for sale, and subsequent users then rate the first users’ reviews. Sites like Digg and Reddit invite users to vote for stories and articles they like, and tech news site Slashdot employs a rating system so complex that it attracts much academic attention. (4) […]These reputation systems now stand to expand beyond evaluating people’s behavior in discrete transactions or making recommendations on products or content, into rating people more generally. This could happen as an extension of current services—as one’s eBay rating is used to determine I 219 trustworthiness on, say, another peer-to-peer service. I 230 The Harvard Kennedy School’s Joseph Nye has suggested that a site like urban legend debunker snopes.com be instituted for reputation, a place that people would know to check to get the full story when they see something scandalous but decontextu-alized online. (5) 1. Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 201, 202 (2006) (“Since the creation of the first pre-Web Internet search engines in the early 1990s, search engines have become almost as important as e-mail as a primary online activity. Arguably, search engines are among the most important gatekeepers in today’s digitally networked environment.”); Stephen E. Arnold, Google: Search Becomes an Application Platform 1 (2005) (unpublished position paper), available at http://islandia.law.yale.edu/isp/search_papers/arnold.pdf (“Just as calculations were one of the reasons for mainframes, search is one of the reasons why distributed, parallel, commodity-based network systems are the next computing platforms. The smartphone, the desktop computer, the Xbox game machine, and even the mainframe gain greater utility when linked to a computer similar to one built, owned, and operated by Google.”); Memorandum from Deborah Fallows et al., Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, on The Popularity and Importance of Search Engines 3 (2004), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Data_Memo_Searchengines.pdf (“The availability of reliable, easy-to-use search engines has transformed people’s connection to information. For some, search engines are indispensable. Many people deeply rely on search engines to deliver vitally important information to them: 44% of searchers say that all or most of the searches they conduct are for information they absolutely need to find.”). 2. 85. Pay-for-placement has existed from the first days of the Web’s commercialization. See Jeff Pelline, Pay-for-Placement Gets Another Shot, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 19, 1998, http://news.com.com/Pay-for-placement+gets+another+shot/2100-1023_3-208309.html. Until early 2007, Yahoo’s search engine placed the highest bidders’ ads before the most relevant ads. Yahoo, however, switched to ranking based on relevance only, a change driven by significant competitive pressures. See Sara Kehaulani Goo, Yahoo Retools Ad Technology; Ranking System Ends Pay-for-Placement Ads in Search Results, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2007, at D2 (“The whole notion that I can buy my way to the top [of sponsored links] is something we do want to move beyond” (quoting Tim Cadogan, Vice President, Yahoo Search Marketing)). Of course, advertisers routinely pay for placement among sets of sponsored links included alongside search results in search engines like Yahoo and Google. 3. BENKLERYOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 69 (2006).at 76. 4. Id. at 76—80. 5. Posting of Joseph Nye to The Huffington Post, Davos Day 3: Internet Privacy and Reputational Repair Sites, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/davos-day-3-inter-net-pri_b_39750.html (Jan. 26, 2007, 18:14 EST). |
Zittrain I Jonathan Zittrain The Future of the Internet--And How to Stop It New Haven 2009 |
| Software | Lanier | I 13 Software/Lanier: Software is subject to a strict lock-in process. I 17 Definition Lock-in/Lanier: happens when many other programs have been tailored to work with a particular program. >Programming, >Computer languages. I 18 E.g. Lock-in: MIDI, the possibility invented by Dave Smith in the early 1980s to display musical notes by automatically transcribing the keystrokes on a synthesizer digitally. Thus, only mosaic-shaped transitions could be represented, but not continuous transitions. This is how it has remained until today, as MIDI has become the exclusive standard. I 23 For example, lock-in: UNIX; UNIX cannot tell whether a person or a program has pressed the return key. It is an exaggerated belief in discrete, abstract symbols and a lack of believe in temporal, continuous, non-abstract reality. I 28 MIDI: the digital system, which represents people and advertisements in such a way that it is possible to compare them, has a clear resemblance to MIDI. I 25 Xanadu/Software/Nelson, Ted/Lanier: the first draft for a World Wide Web, Ted Nelson's Xanadu, was thinking of a single huge overall file. I 33 UNIX/Lanier: UNIX is characterized by the inability to deal with time as people experience it. I 33 Computer Graphics/Lanier: the digital world looks better than it sounds because a community of digital activists, including people from Xerox Parc (especially Alan Kay), Apple, Adobe and universities (especially Don Knuth at Stanford) protected us from rigid, ugly fonts and other visual elements that we would not have been able to get rid of. >Human Machine Communication. |
Lanier I Jaron Lanier You are not a Gadget. A Manifesto, New York 2010 German Edition: Gadget: Warum die Zukunft uns noch braucht Frankfurt/M. 2012 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Endurantism | Lewis Vs Endurantism | Schwarz I 32 Def Endurantism/Schwarz: (Vs Perdurantism): Thesis: Things are present as a whole (and not in parts) at all times in which they exist (like Aristotelian universalia). LewisVsEnduantism (instead: Mosaic theory). Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truth about our world as well as the temporal expansion of things are based on characteristics and relations between spatial-temporal expanded points. Endurantism VsLewis: This is not argument for him since he is not interested in mosaic theory. LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: If normal things do not have temporal parts, but exist at different times, they can be neither round nor big, but only round in t. And this would be absurd. Characteristics/some authors: surely, not all characteristics are relational like "to be far away", but they can at least be relational in time, although we ignore this perpetual present dependence. (Haslanger 1989(1):123f, Jackson 1994b(2),142f, van Inwagen 1990a(3), 116). Characteristics/Lewis: (2004(4),4) at least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not a general relation to time. Characteristics/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: not only characteristics, but their instantiations should be relativized in the area of time. (Johnston, 1987(5),§5) e.g. I am now sitting, and was sleeping last night. Others: (Haslanger, 1989)(1): Thesis: Time designations (> time/Lewis) are adverbial modifications of propositions, e.g. I am now sitting this way, and was sleeping this way last night. LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: This is not a great difference. These representatives deny as well that form characteristics arrive to the things in a direct, simple way and on their own. Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: The debate has reached a dead end, both parties accuse the other of analyzing transformation away. Endurantism: To instantiate incompatible characteristics has nothing to do with transformation. Perdurantism: Temporal instantiation, e.g. straight for t1, bent for t0, shall not be a transformation. Schwarz: Both goes against our intuition. Transformation is attributed too much importance. Schwarz I 33 Perdurantism/Schwarz: pro: Intrinsic transformation is no problem for presentism since the past is now only fiction, but the following should make temporal parts attractive for the presentist as well: the surrogate four-dimensionalist needs to construct his ersatz times differently. Instead of primitive essences which surface in strictly identical different ersatz times, temporal ersatz parts could be introduced which will form the essences, and on their associated characteristics it will depend on whether it is an ersatz Socrates or not (as an example). Part/LewisVs Endurantism: can also be temporal in everyday's language, e.g. a part of a film or a soccer game. E.g. part of a plan, parts of mathematics: not spatial. It is not even important whether the language accepts such denotations. Temporal would also exist if we could not designate them. 1. Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125 2. Frank Jackson [1994a]: “Armchair Metaphysics”. In John O’Leary Hawthorne und Michaelis Michael (ed.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 23–42. 3. Peter van Inwagen [1990a]: “Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001] 4. D. Lewis [2004a]: “Causation as Influence”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 75–107. 5. Mark Johnston [1987]: “Is There a Problem About Persistence?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol., 61: 107–135 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Gould, St. J. | Dennett Vs Gould, St. J. | I 371 Arch Spandrels/DennettVsGould: Gould: Thesis: the spandrels are so refined that the whole cathedral stands for their sake. GouldVs "pervasive adaptation" DennettVsGould: not so clever and not so often. I 388 Dennett: false juxtaposition of adaptionism with architectural necessity. Minimum surface limits expensive mosaic stones. Exaptation/Gould: thumb of the panda not really a thumb, but it does a good job! " Exaptation/Dennett: according to orthodox Darwinism any adjustment is some form of exaptation. This is trivial, because no function is preserved forever. Strand: GouldVsGradualism: "punctuated equilibrium". Jumps possible Long periods of stability, periods of abrupt changes. But no theory of macromutation. Broken Balance/DennettVsGould: Figure I 392: it depends on how the diagram is drawn: with sloping or horizontal branches (standing and jumping). DennettVsGould: it is known that changes can only be evaluated retrospectively in evolution. Nothing that happens during the sideways movement distinguishes an anagenetical from a kladogenetical process. I 405 DennettVsGould: but the fact that a currently existing group will be the founder of a new species, cannot be important for the intensity of a development. I 409 DennettVsGould: Gould would certainly not regard such a local imperceptible (but fast) transition from mouse to elephant (a few throusand years) as a violation of gradualism, but then he has no evidence in the form of fossil finds for his counter-position to gradualism. I 423 Has Neo-Darwinism ever claimed that evolution is proceeding at a constant speed? DennettVsGould: actually presumes (wrongly) that the majority of the contest of evolution was a lottery! His only clue: he cannot imagine why some of the amazingly bizarre creatures (Burgess) should be better designed than others. I 424 Chance/Evidence/Dennett: E.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of the randomness. I 426 Cambrian explosion/DennettVsGould: Equally, the suddenness here is no evidence for the randomness. Evolution/DennettVsGould: he is quite right: the paths are continuous, unbroken lineages (to us), but they are not lines of global progress. So what? There are local improvements. Münch III 379 Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears a rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption.(1) 1. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Stalnaker Vs Lewis, D. | Bigelow I 117 StalnakerVsLewis: (1968(1), 1981(2)) defends the conditional proposition of the excluded third against Lewis. Lewis V 183 "hidden property"/LewisVs: "My opponent": thinks that no real probability but a "fake" probability is in play. (see above) E.g. 88%,3%). (s) A "given variation" which then comes into force if c is withdrawn. Lewis: if this is true then it would be okay, then e would be somehow predetermined. It would be so to speak easier for the counterfactual conditional (co.co.). LewisVs: but we still have to accept real probability. Opponent: sounds like Stalnaker if he says: e would have happened either with c or without c. But his position is not the same although he accepts the same disjunction of co.co. and Stalnaker's defenses do not help him. Opponent: thinks that there are two relevant ways how the world could be, one would make a co.co. true, the other way the other. Thus the disjunction is in any case true. StalnakerVs: (Lewis pro): there is only one relevant way of how the world is and it makes none of the co.co. definitely true or false. Ontology/semantics/StalnakerVsLewis: the two co.co. are true or false relative to alternative arbitrary resolutions of a semantic indeterminacy. ((s) Semantic assumptions shall make ontological assumptions superfluous). V 184 What causes that the co.co. does not determine the truth is that different solutions involve different approaches. But any solution makes the one or the other true, the disjunction is certainly true despite the complementary vagueness of the disjoint. This alleged semantic indeterminacy is not a real property in the world. Stalnaker differs with me in a small semantic question, with my opponents in a great ontological question. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.theory/counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you already allow almost any relations as counterpart relation you could also use non-qualitative relationships. (Stalnaker 1987a)(3): then you can reconcile the counterpart with Haecceitism: if you do not stumble against the fact that at Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is false, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always only has one GS per possible world (poss.w.). >Counterpart Theory. Stalnaker/Schwarz: that does not work with qualitative counterpart relation as it is always possible that several things - e.g. in a fully symmetrical world - are exactly equally similar to a third thing in another poss.w.. LewisVsStalnaker: Vs non-qualitative c.p.r.: all truths including the modal truths are to be based on what kind of things exist (in act.wrld. and poss.w.) and which (qualitative) properties they have (> "Mosaic": >Humean World). 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (Hg.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2. Robert C. Stalnaker [1981]: “Indexical Belief”. Synthese, 49. 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R. | Read III 101/102 Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102) According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability. III 108 Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality. Lewis IV 149 Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se. Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones. Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability. Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions. Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation. Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world). Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world! For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs. The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities: The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world. In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.) V 145 Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)(1) Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision). Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive. The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals. LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently. V 148 Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs, 2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency 3. decide if the consequence is true. Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping. V 148/149 LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)(2): then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things - for example in a completely symmetrical world - are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world. LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World). Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured). Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent. Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent. Schwarz I 63 Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991(3),1996(4), Lewis 1986e(5):36). Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, non-semantic knowledge). Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers). Schwarz I 207 "Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, context-dependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions. Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e(5),42 48: for primary, 1969(6), Chapter V: for secondary). Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community. Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar. Note: Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.). Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(7)): primary truth conditions Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a(8),38, 1994b(9),296f). Newer terminology: Def A-Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions Def A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a(10),2004(11), Lewis 2002b(12),Chalmers 1996b(13), 56,65) Def meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(14),173): secondary truth conditions. Def meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intention". Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions. Schwarz I 227 A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined). LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003] 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a] 4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P. Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003] 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Humean Superven. | Esfeld, M. | I 296 Humean Supervenience/Lewis: Thesis: that everything that exists in the world is a large mosaic of local states of single things (single facts), simply a single thing and then another...Geometry exists: simply a system of external relations of space-time distances between single things. Maybe also space-time itself. At the points we have local properties, perfect intrinsic properties, which do not need more than one point to instantiate themselves. In short: an arrangement of properties. That is all. There is no difference without a distinction in the arrangement of properties. Everything else supervenes on it. I 297 Esfeld: this is a rich basis for supervenience. Esfeld: the intrinsic properties are the non-supervenient ones. ((s) non-dependent). There are spatiotemporal relations between the points. These supervene on the distribution of non-relational properties ((s) e.g. mass, size, form). |
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| Vs Endurantism | Lewis, D. | Schw I 31 Def Perdurantism / Schwarz: thesis that temporally extended things usually consist of temporal parts. Schw I 32 Def Endurantism / Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): things are at all times, to which they exist, all (not just partially) present (such as Aristotelian universals). LewisVsEndurantism (instead: mosaic theory). |
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| Humean Superven. | Lewis, D. | V Main Thesis pro Humean Supervenience (HS) (Is already prepared in part 1, as it turns out now). Original passage: "Guide for subjectivists to objective probability". V IX Def Humean Supervenience/Lewis: (in honor of the great denier of necessary connections). Thesis: everything in the world is a great mosaic of local facts, always a small thing and then another. (But it is not part of the thesis that these local facts are mental ones). V 111 Probability/Hume/Lewis: Thesis: a broad Humean approach (doctrine) (which I think is correct), assumes that all facts that exist about the world are certain ("single") facts, or combinations thereof. V 131 ... Solution: if there is a possibility for a Humean Supervenience for chances, as I defended it in this paper, then the solution lies in the other direction: thesis the pre-history chance conditionals (VCK) must trivially supervene by not being contingent at all! V 324 Hume/Lewis: Thesis (neo-Humean thesis): any contingent truth about a world - law, dependency hypothesis, etc. - is somehow valid by virtue of the total history of manifest patterns of facts. Same history, same everything! Problem: this does not yet imply that the dependency hypothesis (DH) applies by virtue of causal factors. V 312 Def Dependency Hypothesis/DH/Lewis: the type of propositions that an actor knows, who knows what depends on him or does not depend on him. They are maximum specified, therefore they cannot differ without conflict, they form a partition ((s) i.e. they do not overlap). 1. The dependency hypothesis is causal in content: the classified worlds together on the basis of their similarity in relation to causal dependence. 2. But also the dependency hypotheses themselves are causally independent of the actions of the actor. Sv I 32 Mosaic/Lewis: thesis: all truths about our world also about the temporal extension of things, are based on the properties and relationships between spatially extended points. |
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