Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Concepts | Meixner | I 153 Name of a term/Meixner: the very term (the name cannot be owned as property). >Names of sentences, >Names of expressions, >Clauses, >Names, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Properties. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Denotation | Geach | I 28 Denotating expression/Russell/Geach: the denotating expression is a general term after the prefix the, one, every, all, some, etc. >Articles, >Quantifiers, >Quantification, >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Predication, >Attribution, >Sentence/Geach. I 93f Denotating expression/Geach: E.g. Robinson made a lot of money by selling it This is no sentence - "it" without antecedent is no denotating expression. But if a word chain does not have a logical role in a particular context, it does not mean that it never has one. - E.g. Jones has a car and Jones daughter drives it. "has a car" is not denotating: "p and Jones' daughter drives it". > Anaphora. Also not: "there is a car ..." for "p" then: p and that is driven by Jones' daughter. Wrong solution: to look for criteria for "real incidents": these can also be of the wrong kind. E.g. "the only one who ever stole a book from Snead ..." I 190f Denotation of sentences/Carnap/Geach: E.g. DES(English) "red" is red, DES(French) "l'eau" is water etc. - for all x, x is true in L ⇔ DES(L) x. Geach: this offers a definition of "true in L" in terms of "denotation in L"- if it is grammatically not a complete sentence, it is nevertheless in the logical sense. It means roughly: "mon crayon est noir" is true in French". Because "DES(English)"Chicago is a large city" is a complete sentence, "DES(English)" is not a relation sign. We cannot ask "what is it what it denotates," as we cannot ask, "what is it that it rains?" >Translation, >Designation. I 204 Denotation/naming/names of expressions/mention/use/Geach: E.g. A. or is a junctor. If this sentence is to be true, then only when the first word is used to denotate that of which the sentence says something. "Or" is only a junctor (E.g. "but" is a junctor or a verb") in special contexts. >Junctor. Therefore "or" is not used autonym in A (it does not denotate itself). The first word in A is no example here. It is a logical subject, so in the sentence it is no junctor, so the sentence A is wrong. ((s) With and without quotation marks that were saved here) - (s) Or can only be used as a connection, when it is mentioned, it is no longer a connection.) >Mention, >Use, >Mention/use, >Description level, >Level/Order. Mention/use/Geach: Is it wrong to say or is a connection? - No. - Is it wrong to say "or" is a connection? - Yes. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Designation | Cresswell | II 119 Naming/Denotation/Cresswell: E.g. the predicate "was so called" is a property of pairs so that it consists, when a is the name of a. - (> inserting). ((s) Name not as a property, but "naming"as a feature of a word-object-pair). See also >denoting position/Quine, >Names of expressions, >Name of a sentence, >Names, >Naming, >Denotation, cf. >Predication. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Knowledge | Logic Texts | Read III 202 Knowledge/Read: from knowledge follows truth. >Truth. --- Sainsbury V 141 Knowledge paradox/unexpected examination/Sainsbury: it does not matter that the students might have expectations which they are not entitled to have. V 143 It is precisely because we believe that we have refused the teacher, and that we have thus taken away the opportunity from her to let the work be written, makes the announcement come true again. Variant: the class knows of the truth of the announcement. Then n can show the class that she cannot know that it is true. Variant: the announcement also contains the fact that the class does not know because of the announcement ... - E.g. A1 "You will not know on the morning in question ..." - questionable principle: "If you know ... then you know, that one knows it. "- N.B.: a paradox occurs only when we have to conclude on W(A1). V 148 Variant: Announcement: A2 either [M and non-WM (If A2, then M)] or [D and non-WD (If A2, then D)] - New: this is self-referential - Problem: then you know on Tuesday (If A2, then D) that A2 is wrong.V V 150 Real knowledge paradox/Sainsbury: A3 W (non-A3) e.g. the man knows that the announcement is wrong -that is how we come to MV 3 (...) inter alia: "What is proved is known". - MV 3: 1. Assumed, A3 2. W (non-A3) (definition of A3) 3. Non-A3 (which is known is true) 4. If A3, then non-A3 - (1-3 combined) 5. Non-A3 (after 4.) 6. Non-W (non A3) (according to 5. + definition of A3) 7. W (non-A3) - (5. + what is proved is known). - 6 and 7 contradict each other. V 160 Locus classicus: Montague/Kaplan. V 155 Believe paradox/Sainsbury: G1 a does not believe what G1 says - if a G1 believes, then he can understand that he says something wrong. - Contains two assumptions: 1) that a can understand that G1 is false, if he believes in it, and true, if he does not believe in it. 2) that a will understand what he can understand - now one can construct through inserting of rationality, self-consciousness, as well as unity and understanding, the paradox analogously to the paradox of knowledge. V 156 Self-consciousness: If G(f), then G[G(f)]. Reasonableness: If G(f) then non-G (non-G). Closure: If G (if f, then y) and G (non-y), then G (non-f). - Although believe does not involve knowledge, one can construct the same paradox. V 160/61 Knowledge/believe/knowledge paradox/Sainsbury: there is a discussion as to whether knowledge or belief should be correctly represented by an operator or a predicate. E.g. Operator: A1 is true. E.g. predicative: it will have to do with names of expressions, rather than with their use. Montague/Kaplan: predicative version, to rule out that operators are to blame. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
| Mention | Geach | I 74 Mention/Use/Geach: for each x: either x is white or x is not white. Mention: for each object x: either the predicate is "white" or its negation is true of x. "True-of": is a simpler term. Therefore, Tarski begins his defintion of truth with it: >Satisfaction. E.g.,"Proxy": at use - quote: at mention. Mention: "... its negation is true of ..". Negation is mentioned. Use of the negation: "x is ~ F" - ((s) Mention/(s): about the negation: "it is true" - likewise: "has a true negation".) ad I 84 Mention/Use/Quote/Geach/(s) E.g. "is an obscene expression" is not an obscene expression. I 195 Meta-language/mention/use/Geach: if p and q are meta-linguistical variables, then "~ p" means: "the negation of p" and not "it is not the case that p". >Meta language, >Variables, >Object language, >Levels/Order, >Use. I 202 Mention/use/names/sentence/Geach: names of expressions are formed by quotation marks - then at the same time mention and use. - Mentioned by the combination of its own with the quotes - used as part of a complex expression. >Quotation marks, >Name of a sentence, >Quote. Mention/Use: both are no contrasting pair. I 225 Mention/Use: E.g. a class or number is specified by mention (not use) of a property. >Classes, >Properties. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Mention | Mates | I 36 Mention /use/Mates: the distinction implies a distinction between names and what they name. >Naming, >Use, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, cf. >Metalanguage, >Object language. Quotes/Mates: their omission means that we do not speak the name of on the subject and. >Quotation marks/Mates, >Quotes. Implicit quotation marks: E.g. the first name of Mrs. Luxewmburg was Rosa. - E.g. a name (description) that contains the object: "Russell’s name". >Names, >Names of expressions, >Names of sentences, >Descriptions. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Metalanguage | Tarski | Skirbekk I 172 Metalanguage/Tarski: only three types of undefined terms: 1st in the logic 2nd in the object language 3rd Names of expressions of the object language.(1) >Basic concepts, >Names of expressions, >Description levels, >Levels, >Object language, >Definitions, >Definability. 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Object Language | Tarski | Horwich I 116 Object language/metalanguage/Tarski: both, object language and metalanguage have only a relative sense! The metalanguage may be the object language (if we examine the concept of truth in the metalanguage). If we want a truth-definition for the metalanguage, we need a new meta-meta-language. >Metalanguage. Semantic concepts should be introduced into the metalanguage by defining only. >Unambiguity, >Introduction. Horwich I 118 Names of the expressions of the object language appear in the metalanguage, but can perhaps be interpreted in the object language.(1) >Names of expressions, >Description levels, >Interpretation. 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Quotation Marks | Mates | I 39 Quotation Marks/Mates: we use them when we want to refer to a particular symbol or expression - then we take them as a name for the symbol in the symbol - e.g. without quotation marks: If j and y are formulas, then (jvy) is a formula. >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Metalanguage, >Object language, >Quotation/disquotation. I 40 Here we insert names of expressions for "φ" and use "ψ" , the values are the expressions themselves. Problem: inserting expressions for "φ" and "ψ" results in the nonsense: e.g. ("F" a "v" F "b") (quotation marks set too tight). Solution: > spelling/Quine, >Names of expressions, >Names of sentences. I 75 Quotes/Mates: e.g. values of the statement "φ" ... with quotation marks. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Redundancy Theory | Meixner | I 89 MeixnerVsRedundancy theory: Compared to the redundancy theory, the standard ontological analysis provides another entity: Ex. Regensburg lies on the Danube here we get three names instead of two: except Regensburg and Danube as third: "lies on": the needed universal. >Universals, >Expressions/Meixner, >Names of expressions. Ontological standard analysis: >Ontology/Meixner, >Ontology/Chisholm. ChisholmVs. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Semantic Ascent | Tarski | Berka I 396/97 Semantics/Tarski: in a narrow sense: Identify, satisfy, define. Theses are relations between expressions and objects. N.B.: semantic concepts are always relative to a language.(1) >Satisfaction/Tarski, >Definitions/Tarski. 1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, VOl. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8 Berka I 526 Semantics/Tarski: Semantic concepts express dependencies between expressions and objects - and therefore characterize categories of expressions or other objects - with "suppositio materialis": they are fixing the mapping between names of expressions and expressions themselves - problem: semantic terms themselves are difficult to define.(2) >Names of expressions, >Names of sentences, >Description levels, >Levels, >Denotation/Tarski. 2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Semantic Closure | Tarski | Skirbekk I 150 Semantically closed/Tarski: is a language it contains the names of the expressions next to each expression. The laws of logic apply. >Expressivity, >Richness, >Names of expressions. Everyday language satisfies these conditions. - Semantically closed languages are inconsistent, that is, one can derive paradoxes in them.(1) 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Slingshot Argument | Meixner | I 120f Slingshot Argument/Meixner: all true propositions supposedly express the same state of affairs - solution: the replacement of one name for another, that refers to the same, does not transfer the truth of the proposition. >Names of sentences, >Names of expressions, >Truth, >Truth preservation, >Truth value, >Truth value/Frege. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| States of Affairs | Meixner | I 74f Facts/Meixner: the function expressed by "the opposite of a fact" is also a fact, but not a property. - So not every function is a property. - But every property is a function. >Properties, >Functions, >Function/Meixner, >Ontology. I 125 Fact/Meixner: sum of all facts: fixed under all circumstances ((s) "everything", "everyone": fact in every possible world...). Meixner: but the name of the sum does not fixedly denominate the same thing under all circumstances! >Names of expressions, >Names. I 129 Necessarily real/Meixner: there are necessarily real things, but not with the individuals, but among the facts - actuality is therefore relative to the circumstances. >Circumstances, >Actuality, >Actualism, >Possibility/Mexiner, >Individuals/Meixner, >Necessity, >Reality. I 153 Names: of facts and propositions: that-expressions. >That-sentences. Name of a universal: means the property. Name of the concept: means the concept (it cannot be possessed like a property). >Concepts, cf. >"Doctrine of non-possession". |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| That-Clauses | Meixner | I 153 Name: of facts and propositions: that-expressions. >Expressions/Meixner, >States of affairs, >Propositions, >Names of sentences, >Names of expressions. Name of universals: mean the property. >Universals. Name of a concept: the very concept (cannot be owned like a property). >Terms, >Concepts >Names, >Properties. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Universals | Meixner | Ad I 42 Universals/(s): can apply gradually. Facts: cannot apply gradually. Facts are mutually exclusive, universals are not. >States of affairs, >Facts. I 85 Exemplification: Ability to be at different places at the same time - applies to universals. >Exemplification. I 85 Non-predicative universals/Meixner: non-predicative: no property, no function: type objects/TO: objects! The letter that "looks like A", the logo of the Railroad Company, the Lion, the High C, the book Anna Karenina (not the figure), homo sapiens, carmine red (not crimson). Type objects are differently perceived mentally than predicative universals: differences between individual specimens do not stand out. - This does not apply to the corresponding properties. >Type/Token, >Properties, >Predicates, >Predication. I 86/87 Universals problem: narrow sense: Question whether some entities are abstract - not identical with the question of whether or not some entities are properties, relations, types or not? >Abstractness, >Abstract objects, >Relations. I 149 Def Normal Universal/NU/Meixner: is a finite-digit predicative universal. The results of a complete saturation of NU with entities are facts. >States of affairs, >Facts. Conversely: the results of the extraction of these entities from these facts are those normal universals - just like we differentiate facts as gross we also differentiate normal universals as gross. Coarse: e.g. the property of being an equiangular triangle is identical to the property of being a equilateral triangle. >Coarse-grained/fine-grained. Normal universals are identical if they have the same number of digits and can be saturated by the same entities. I 153 Universal Name: means the property. >Names, >Names of expressions, >Levels/order, >Meaning. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Belnap, Nuel | Kripke Vs Belnap, Nuel | III 341 Substitutional quantification/SQ/Belnap/Dunn: Here an ontology of terms is not even necessary because the quantifiers of metalanguage (m.l.) could also be constructed by substitution! KripkeVsBelnap: This is a case of purely mechanical acquisition of Quine’s criteria for Ontological Commitment/OC: "referential quantifiers carry a OC with it and nothing else." Substitutional ml/Kripke: There are two possible interpretations: It is assumed that substitution quantification have (structurally descriptive) names for the expressions of the object language (o.l.) as substitutes ((s) The names have have the term for which they stand for, not the part). (see below, III 365). Then: a) the interpretation of m.l. is as such that these terms denote those of the o.l. or b) they do not denote. ad a): If they denote, Wallace is right that the difference between substitutional quantification with names of expressions and referential quantification which work through expressions, is negligible. Both quantifiers carry the same amount of ontological commitment. ad b): then the m.l. has indeed no ontological commitment for expressions of the o.l. But what is the justification then to call M a metalanguage of L? How should a theory which is formulated in M say anything about the semantics of L? Then T(x) is also no predicate anymore, filled with the true sentences of L and only them, but rather a form of M, without any interpretation. KripkeVsBelnap: it is only possible to argue this mechanically if one has lost his or her philosophical goals. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
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