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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ambiguity | Montague | Hintikka I 106 Quantification/quantifiers/ambiguity/any/HintikkaVsMontague: on the whole, the Montague semantics show how ambiguity arises through the interplay of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man. (13) John is looking for a dog. >Intensions, >Quantifiers, >Quantification, cf. >Opacity, >Quantification into opaque contexts. HintikkaVsMontague: explains only why certain expressions can be ambiguous, but not which are actually ambiguous. He generally predicts too many ambiguities. For he is not concerned with the grammatical principles, which often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers. >Grammar. Scope/Hintikka: the scope determines the logical order. >Scope, >Narrow/wide scope. Quantifier/Quantification/everyone/he/Montague/Hintikka: E.g. (14) If he makes an effort, he will be happy. (15) If everyone makes an effort, he will be happy. Problem: in English, "if" has precedence with respect to "everyone" so that "everyone" in (15) cannot precede the "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize"). >Pronouns, >Operators. I 107 HintikkaVsMontague: we need additional rules for the order of application of the rules. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Attribution | Peacocke | Avramides I 92 Beliefs/Desires/Attributions/Radical Interpretation/Peacocke/Avramidis: Suppose we could attribute beliefs and desires before the knowledge of the language. In this case, simultaneous attribution of propositional attitudes would still be necessary. >Propositional attitudes, >Thinking without language, >Desires, >Beliefs. But not particular propositional attitudes before language. >Language, >Understanding, >Language use. PeacockeVs "actual language relation": this supposedly needs no semantic vocabulary. >Reference, cf. >Primitive reference, >Semantics. Peacocke later: Gricean intentions cannot be used as evidence for radical interpretation, but that's not VsGrice. >Intentions/Grice, >P. Grice. Peacocke I 78f Propositional Attitudes/Attribution/Peacocke: Problem: instead of one set of propositional attitudes another can also be attributed. Solution/Peacocke: Relation of Closeness/Narrowness. E.g. someone who rearranges something on the table usually does not respond to the compass direction. - The concepts may then have different expressiveness. Important point: if it is a rotating table, the space-relative concepts can change while the table-relative ones remain constant. ((s) The concepts do not change, but their truth values.) More expressive: the space-relative concepts. - Problem: if they are used here, there may be an explanatory gap. >narrow concepts. I 83 We should not attribute any wider concepts if there more narrow ones are available. >Narrow/wide. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| de dicto | Logic Texts | Read III 127 Initial problem: Only real names allow the substitution, which is found in the indistinguishability of the identical. The principle says that Fa as well as a=b may infer Fb from a statement. Cicero accused Catilina, and Cicero was Tullius, so Tullius accused Catilina. >Substitution, >Insertion. Improper names: descriptions: Example: "the greatest Roman orator" and Example: "the number of planets". It's not in the form of Fa, but a much more complex one: " among the Roman orators, there's a greatest, and he accused Catilina." "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is greater than seven". Re III 128 Russell analysed (groundbreaking for analytic philosophy) that these propositions do not contain real names (except 9 and 7). Therefore, they cannot be a permise and conclusion of the principle of indistinguishability of the identical. >Leibniz principle, >Identity, >Indistinguishability, >Logical proper names, >Numbers, >Planets example. Re III 129 QuineVsRussell: with this we only got out of the rain and into the fire. Problem: Range. The analysis consists in replacing an apparent form A (d) in which a description d occurs in a statement A with a statement B that does not contain any component to which d corresponds. >Range, >Scope, >Narrow/wide. Solution: Quine is willing (until further analysis) to accept the modality de dicto, the attribution of modal properties to statements. But true ascriptions de re are quite different. They mean that objects themselves necessarily have properties. And that is essentialism. >Essentialism. Re III 130 Quine: Modality de dicto: Quote - "7" and "9" is now embedded - so that they are protected from the indiscernibiliy principle - statements of the form "necessary A’ be construed as if they were of the form Fa, where a is the statement A and F the predicate ’is necessarily true " - the scope is limited. >de re. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Descriptions | Logic Texts | Read III 127f Improper name/Quine: (= descriptions- only real names allow the substitution that can be found in the indistinguishability of identical. Improper names: lead to more complex form: E.g. "among the Roman orators there is a major one, and he denounced Catiline that". E.g. "Just one number counts the planets and it is more than seven"/Russell: here is only 7 a real name - hence these sentences may not be sentences in a conclusion of the principle of indistinguishability of the identical. >Leibniz principle, >Identity, >Indistinguishability, QuineVs:. problem : range: the marks must be eliminated, so that in the new wording no part corresponds with them. >Range, >Scope, >Narrow/wide. Strobach I 104 Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Stro I N. Strobach Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005 |
| Descriptions | Prior | I 124 Theory of Descriptions/unicorn/Russell/Prior: a) "the so-and-so φ-s" b) "X thinks that the so-and-so φ-s" in a) and b) the marking has the same meaning whether the object exists or does not exist - in b) the sentence even has the same truth value. >Truth value, >Non-existence, >Thinking, >Thoughts. I 148 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: singular names: "The only thing that φ-s". >Names, >Singular Terms. Geach: this analysis has two parts: a) explicitly predicative use: "x is the only thing that φ-s" b) use as apparent subject: can be explained as an explication of an implicit predicative use: "the only thing that φ-s, ψ-s." >Predication, >"Exactly one". a) as "something that .." b) "If something ..." Prior: thie is a solution for the non-existing. Problem: different scope: a) as part of a complex predicate: "Something is both the only-thing- that-φ-s and not ψ-s.". b) as part of a complex sentence: "It is not the case that ..". Markings: useful: "the φ-re does not exist" not with logically proper name "this". >Scope, >Narrow/wide scope. I 152 Champagne-Example/PriorVsRussell: has overlooked that markings can be used differently : "the man over there," does not speak of something that it is "man" or that it is "over there". - If it is true that he is clever, then even if it is a disguised woman - attribution does not require proper identification - it is only required that it is "the only ...". >Descriptions/Russell. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Index Words | Burge | Frank I 684 Index Words/Indexical Specification/Mental States/Twin Earth/Burge/Bruns: a) the mental states are identified with indexical expressions: e.g. "this is water". (Individuation). b) non-indexically identified: e.g. "water is a liquid". Conclusion: if non-indexical, then they cannot be used to explain behavior, because they do not individuate their content. BurgeVsPutnam: although he does not deal with any beliefs, his argument only works, because he analyzes terms expressing natural kinds like indexical terms. >Indexicality. Frank I, 685 Burge thesis: even in the individuation of non-indexical mental states reference must be made to external objects. "Anti-individualism" (= externalism). Narrow content is not sufficient for individuation, they must rather be defined by "wide content". >Narrow/wide content. Content/Twin Earth/Burge/Bruns: if there is no aluminum on the twin earth, Hermann's conviction that aluminum is a metal has a different content. (DavidsonVs: you can also understand "moon" without ever having seen it). >Content. Neither he nor his doppelganger know the atomic structure of aluminum or twin-earth aluminum. Burge's argument now depends entirely on whether we are ready to attribute convictions about the corresponding light metals to the two. Frank I 707 "Here"/Twin Earth/Burge: I know I am here (differently: on the earth!). My knowledge involves more than the mere knowledge that I know that I am where I am. I have the normal ability to think about my environment. And I have this knowledge, because I perceive my own - and not other imaginable environments. >Twin earth. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Non-Existence | Montague | Hintikka I 103 Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: Montague's semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because in Montague the domain of individuals is assumed to be constant). >Possible worlds, >Identity between worlds, >Individual domain, >Identification, cf. >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation, >Counterpart theory. Individual domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. But there is a problem: Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it, too. ((s) the same unicorn). Cf. >Thought objects, >Belief objects. Range/quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "looks for". >Range, >Quantification, >Narrow/wide range. ((s) That is, that both are looking for unicorns.) Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual?). >Unicorn example. I 103 Existence/W-Question/Unicorn/Hintikka: nevertheless the example (11) shows that the way of reading should not oblige us to accept the existence of unicorns. Cf. >Ontological commitment. Non-existence/epistemic context/intensional/belief/Hintikka: it is obviously possible that two people can look for the same thing, even if it does not exist. Solution: We allow that well-defined individuals do not exist in some worlds. For this, only a slight modification is necessary. Problem: with more complex sentences, all problems come back: I 104 Example: John does not know whether unicorns exist, yet he is looking for a unicorn because Mary is looking for it. Problem: here John must be able to recognize a special unicorn. (Otherwise the sentence that uses "it" would not be true), although he is considering the possible non-existence. >Anaphora, >Index Words, >Indexicality, >Identification. World line/Hintikka: in order to extent the Montague semantics, we must allow more or less unnatural world lines. >World lines, cf. >Four-dimensionalism. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Properties | Stalnaker | I 9 Def property/Stalnaker: a) Def thin/economic definition: a property is a way in which individuals can be grouped b) Def richer/Stalnaker: (more robust): a property is something in relation to which the individuals are grouped. To do this, we identify intrinsic properties with regions of a property-space. >Intrinsicness. Important argument: since the elements of the sets are not identical with the individuals that instantiate the property, this represents the independence of properties from their instantiation. ((s) So Stalnaker believes that properties also exist if they are not instantiated). >Instantiation, >Individuals, >Individuation. I 75 Modal Logic/ML/semantics/extensional/Stalnaker: e.g. property: a property is represented as a singular propositional function which takes an individual as an argument and delivers a proposition as a value. >Propositional functions. Equivalent to this: property: a property is a function that takes a possible world as an argument and delivers a set of individuals as a value. It is therefore intuitively a selection rule for a class of individuals, given the facts and vice versa: a selection selective procedure for a class of individuals is a property of the selected individuals. Cf. >Selection axiom, >Sets, >Set theory. Problem: there is no extensional equivalent to the distinction between referential and purely qualitative properties - unlike with the distinction between essential and accidental ones. >Essential properties, >Accidental properties. Def Referential properties: referential properties are defined in terms of the individuals that they have. Wrong solution: to stipulate that only accidental propositions may be selected for atomic predicates. This does not prevent that essential attributions could be true. It prevents only that they can be expressed. Anti-essentialism/solution: the property must be defined independently of the possible worlds and the individuals. >Essentialism. I 78 Intrinsic Property/bare particular/theory: to identify an intrinsic property we must distinguish possible world-indexed, time-indexed and referential properties from them. These do not correspond to any particular regions in the logical space. >Intrinsicness, >Bare particulars. E.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth. - This is how we can represent anti-essentialism. I 79 Kripke, early: Babe Ruth could have been a billiard ball. Kripke, later: there is a fallacy in that. Stalnaker: one cannot assume that he is actually a billiard ball, because then one could not refer to him as we already did. That is not what it is about (see below). This confuses the limits of what could actually be with the limitations of assumptions about what could counterfactually have been. >Conceivability. Essential property/Kripke/Stalnaker: e.g. Kripke: thesis: names for natural species (natural kind terms) express essential properties. >Natural kinds, >Essence. Names for species are referential terms. Referential: referential means that they are determined by a causal connection. >Causal theory of reference. Natural kinds: natural kinds are not purely linguistic, but restrict the movement in the logical space. Bare particulars: if one allows Babe Ruth to be a billiard ball, then one must also allow it for any other thing - then this solution is uninteresting. I 81 Property/narrow/wide/propositional function: the distinction between 1) narrow P and 2) propositional functions: a propositional function in general is analogous to the distinction between possible individuals and concepts of individuals in general. >Narrow/wide, >Propositional functions. I 94f Physical non-property: a physical non-property is a complex combination of physical properties and relations (see below, e.g. golden mountain). Strong supervenience/Stalnaker: strong supervenience allows complex (composite) physical attributes to be physical properties. >Supervenience. Attribute: an attribute is an easy way of picking out. >Attributes. I 103 Def Property/Stalnaker: properties are simply a way to group individuals. Basic property/Stalnaker: basic properties must provide distinctions between individuals that could otherwise not be explained. Problem: then basic properties cannot supervene on something else. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Scope | Cresswell | I, 179f Scope/Cresswell: E.g. everyone loves someone: a) everyone is such that someone is so that the former loves the second b) someone - someone is so that everyone is so that he, the second named, loves him, the former - game theoretical semantics/CresswellVsHintikka: has brought nothing new, what Kamp/Heim did not already have - game theory: sequence of choice. >Hans Kamp, >Irene Heim, >File change semantics, >Game-theorical semantics. II 48 Scope/description/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: sentences about propositional attitudes can always give descriptions a wide range. That is, to make them rigid. >Narrow/Wide, >Rigidity. II 126 He*/scope/Cresswell: wide scope: then it can also be interpreted as "I". Narrow scope: allows "he", "she" or "it". Gods-example/solution/Cresswell:> - speaker index. >Two omniscient Gods/Cresswell, more authors on >"Two omniscient Gods". II 126 "Now"/scope/Cresswell: analog to the case of "I". Narrow scope: here "now" becomes "then". "Here"/Cresswell: Problem: that "people coordinates" could lead to an infinite list - because of the context dependency. CresswellVs: instead I use (Cresswell, 1973a(1), pp. 110-119.) properties of utterances. II 143 Hob/Cob/Nob-Example/Geach/Cresswell: (Geach 1957(2), 628): Cresswell: needs a quantifier, which is simultaneously inside and outside the scope of the attitude-verb. - Solution/Hill/Kraut: intensional objects as surrogates for individuals and a further quantifier. >Cob/Hob/Nob-case. II 150 Names/scope/Cresswell: normally names have a wider reach than modal operators - this is the "modal objection" VsKripke. KripkeVsVs: (Kripke, 1972(3), p. 279.) 1. Cresswell, M. J. (1973). Logics and Languages. London: Methuen. 2. Geach, P. (1957). Mental Acts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 3. Kripke S. A. (1972). Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Scope | Geach | I 118 Range/scope: Tradition: Tmesis, logically indivisible operator: either or: E.g. either both: young and stupid or evil - or either young or stupid and evil. I 144 Range: problem with descriptions, not with names. Description, >Nmae. E.g. it is (logically) chronologically possible that Caesar was the father of Brutus. Description: Caesar = man who not begat Brutus. Then: narrow scope: logical impossibility; the whole sentence is wrong. Wide scope: someone who is described among other things as non-producer of Brutus ... This sentence remains true. >Narrow/wide. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burge, T. | Newen Vs Burge, T. | NS I 129 VsBurge/VsExternalism/Newen/Schrenk: if supervenience, i.e. a close relation between thoughts and brain states, exists, there cannot be an equally close relation between the thoughts and the community. This is because brain states (in contrast to thought content) are determined regardless of the surroundings and the language community. Namely with view to the activation of brain areas. Supervenience/Newen/Schrenk: no difference in content without difference in the brain states, but not vice versa: the same thought can be implemented through different brain states. I.e. one-sided dependence of thought content on the brain states. Terminology: then they say: thought contents supervene on brain states. Burge's thesis is inconsistent with supervenience. Or rather, the following three statements cannot be simultaneously true: 1) thought contents are determined depending on community and surroundings. 2) brain states independent from... 3) Thought contents supervene on brain states. NS I 130 But if thought contents do not supervene on brain states, it becomes difficult to understand how thought contents can be causally effective. VsBurge: E.g. Twin Earth/TE: if Karl was transported to Twin Earth without even noticing anything, he would have other thought contents. Because the objective content of expressions of thoughts would be different. But that would not cause any difference to the behavioral dispositions of Karl. The content change would be causally irrelevant. Externalism/Newen/Schrenk: Two varieties: 1) for the dependence of the content of statements from the surroundings (Putnam) 2) for the dependence of the thought contents from the surroundings (Burge). VsBurge: if he were to be right, we need a second concept of thought contents, namely a subjective content. (Narrow/Wide) narrow content: only considered in the way it is perceived by the subject. Only it is relevant for behavior explanations. Wide content: as the content is usually interpreted in the language community. It is decisive for what I have fixed myself on by utterances. Externalism: Frege: can there be a wide (objective) content of a thought so that you can understand the causal relevance of this entire content or is the causal relevance only to be understood for narrow (subjective) contents? |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Verschiedene Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Chisholm I 169 Herbert HeidelbergerVsChisholm: fails to explain opinions de re with the help of de dicto opinions: Example: Suppose, a table with two objects, a bowl and a basket. I am now asked to take away the more valuable of the two. I think the basket is more valuable. Suppose that I know further that both objects do not have the same value. But contrary to what I thought, in reality the bowl is the more valuable object. Heidelberger: Since I know that the more valuable object is the more valuable object, according to Chisholm's explanation of the opinion de re both of the bowl and of the basket, I must think that this object is the more valuable. But then we would not be able to explain why the basket and not the bowl should be more valuable. Heidelberger: there must be an explanation for one object, which is not applicable to the other object. Chisholm: Heidelberger is right about my earlier theory, but my present one solves the problem: narrow/wide meaning. I 170 The subject perceives the basket and thinks that it is not only the basket but also the more valuable object. "The basket is such that the subject identifies it as a thing of which it thinks it is not only the basket, but also the more valuable object. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| narrow/wide | Russell, B. | Cresswell II 140 Descriptions/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: Thesis: a certain description is in the same syntactic category as a quantifier such as "someone". - Problem: "Someone does not come" does not mean the same as "It is not the case that someone comes". Solution/Russell: different ranges in modal and doxastic contexts: a) (close range) "The person next door lives next door" is logically equivalent to "exactly one person lives next door" and therefore it is necessarily true in a sense. b) (wide range) It is true that the person next door could have lived somewhere else (so it is contingent). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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