# Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Donkey Sentences Kamp Cresswell 172
Geach's Donkey/If-Sentence/Cresswell: E.g. (25) When a man has a donkey, he beats it.
Problem: (25) has two indeterminate noun phrases.
Kamp: (1983, 279)(1) has an example with only one indeterminate noun phrase. E.g.
(26) When Pedro has a donkey, he beats it.
Undefined: a donkey - defined: Pedro.
Tradition/Problem: the phrase a donkey must be represented by an existence quantifier: (Ex) (donkey(x u ...).
But the obvious interpretation of (26) is
(27) (x)((donkey x u Pedro has x)> Pedro beats x).
Kamp: there are cases where the quantifier can be changed from the existence to the universal quantifier. If it does not bind a variable in the consequence, we have as a logical equivalence:
I 173
(28) (x) (Fx> P) ≡ (ExFx> P). Solution/Kamp: Kamp analyzes undetermined phrases (descriptions) as predicates (see above). And the universal quantification becomes part of the meaning of "if". (P. 288-90)(1).
LewisVsKamp/Cresswell: (Lewis 1975a(2), S 11)(2) that is fine for most natural meanings of (26), but there is a problem:
(29) Sometimes when Pedro has a donkey, Pedro beats it.
Seems to mean that there is at least one donkey that Pedro has and which is beaten by him.
Solution/Lewis: the role of "if" is merely to restrict the noun. That is, (29) has the meaning that (22) would have if we had ∃ instead of ∀.
>Quantification, >Existential quantification, >Universal quantification, >branched quantifiers, >Quantifiers.

1. Kamp, H. & Rohrer, C.(1983): Tense in texts. Meaning, use and interpretation of language 250, 269.
2. Lewis, D. (1975a): Adverbs of Quantification. In: Edward L. Keenan (Ed.), Formal Semantics of Natural Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–15.

Kamp I
Kamp
From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy)

Explanation Flusser I 11
Explanation/Interpretation/Flusser: For example, a cloud is explained by pointing to its causes, a book is interpreted by pointing out its meaning. Cf. >Natural meaning, >Non-natural meaning, >Interpretation, >Signs, >Symptoms.
You can humanize everything. It is not possible to speak of the same phenomena when other aspects come to the fore. An interpreted cloud is not that of a meteorologist, an interpreted book has nothing to do with literature.
>Description levels, >Levels/order.

Fl I
V. Flusser
Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996

Grice Avramides I 26
Grice/Avramidis: Grice view should be understood as a conceptual analysis, not as reductionism. - Not as physicalism. - Grice wants a reconciliation with Frege and Davidson. >Philosophy of mind, >Gottlob Frege, >Donald Davidson, >Paul Grice.
I 42f
Grice/Avramides: Thesis: the problem of sentence meaning (meaning of the whole utterance) takes precedence over the meaning of partial statements. >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning, >Clauses, >Compositionality, >Frege-Principle, >Subsententials.
Statement/Grice: is understood broadly, also signals etc.
Important argument: thus, the analysis ranges in a situation meaning before the timeless meaning (the standard meaning).
>Situation, >Situation/Psychology, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention.
Only so can he equate"x means something" with "S means something (in a situation) with x".
1st Version; ... A response from the listener is induced ...
2nd Version: ... in addition: the listener must recognize the intention of the speaker.
I 44
3rd Version: in addition: the recognition of the speaker's intention must act as a reason for the belief of the listener. Vs: there are still many counterexamples.
I 45
GriceVsGrice: counter-E.g. it is a difference whether I spontaneously frown in a situation or in order to express my displeasure to a person. Important argument: exactly the same information is transmitted, no matter if the speaker has the intention to communicate or not. Then there is no reason to distinguish between natural and non-natural meaning.
>Natural meaning/non-natural meaning.
The difference has to do with what the frowning person can expect the listener to believe - but without intention no meaning - non-natural meaning (without intention) never sufficient for response.
I 46
E.g. thumbscrews mean nothing.
I 67
Grice/Avramides: so far, the analysis is not sufficient for timeless (linguistic meaning. - Only for speaker-meaning. Meaning/Grice: meaning is to be found both outside language and within.
I 68
Timeless meaning/Grice: disjunction of findings and about what people want to achieve with x. - This is also an effect etc. but not a practice. It is not sufficient (because it may have a second meaning), and not necessary (it may have alternatives). - But it is a "procedure in the repertoire".
>Practise, >Language behavior, >Language community, >Convention.
I 111
Reductionist Gricean/Loar: This position risks to accept thinking without language. >Thinking without language.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Grice Millikan I 52
Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are the relations between 1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern
2. their literal use
3. the speaker's intentions.
Stabilization function/Millikan: next chapter thesis: one aspect of the word meaning, the syntactic form is the focused stabilization function.
>Terminology/Millikan.
Literary use/Millikan: the literary use does not correspond to any stabilizing function (see below).
Gricean Intention/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Thesis: the Gricean intentions are not at all what drives language usage and understanding.
>Grice.
Stabilization function/language/Millikan: if speech patterns such as words or syntactic forms have a stabilizing function, then these direct eigenfunctions of reproductively determined families (rfF) are 1st level, of which these patterns are also elements.
Functions: of words etc. are historically acquired by expressing both utterances and reactions of the listener.
Intention/Speaker's intention/N.B.: these functions do not depend on the speaker's intentions!
Direct eigenfunction: has a word token even when it is produced by a parrot. The token is an element of a reproductively determined family in that it has a direct eigenfunction.
>Speaker intention.
Intention/purpose: the intention or purpose provides a derived eigenfunction.
Derived eigenfunction: however, lies above and beyond the direct or stabilizing function. It can be the same as the direct function, but it does not have to be. In any case, it is not its own function of the speech pattern, it is not its eigenfunction.
Stabilization Function/Language/Millikan: although the stabilization function is independent of purpose and speaker's intention, it is not independent of purposes that speakers can have in general.
I 53
Here again there will be a "critical mass" of cases of use.
I 63
Imperative/Millikan: now it is certainly the case that a listener, if asked if the speaker intended to obey the command, will surely immediately answer "yes".
I 64
But that does not mean that he used this belief in obedience. Gricean intentions/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Gricean intentions are thus superfluous. And they also do not help to distinguish unnatural meaning from less interesting things.
In any case, we need not pay attention to Gricean intentions, which are subject only to potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system.
>Intention/Grice, >Intentionality/Grice.
I 65
VsMillikan: one could object that you could have reasons for an action without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: if I stop believing something, I will refrain from certain actions.
Gricean Intentions/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are realised actually inside while one is speaking.
E.g. Millikan: the Sergeant says: "When I say 'stop' the next time, do not stop!"
A similar example is given by Bennett.
Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier did not manage to stop.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Meaning Armstrong I 116
Utterance meaning/Armstrong: The utterance of "John will not come" is a reliable sign that I just think that.
I 117
Meaning: Then meanings are mere abstractions from each of the designated expressions of things. (i.e., B = Ref) But Armstrong: meaning is not the same as reference.
I 117
Theory: utterances of sentences in the communication situation are exactly in the same sense characters as black clouds are a sign of rain. >Natural meaning.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Meaning Grice I 2 ff
Meaning/drawing/photography: the photo with Mr. X in an obvious position with Mrs Y did not mean anything! The drawing with the same object meant something. (>Intention).
I 4
Definition meanings/Grice: "natural meaning": measles, signs and natural signs are detected, not appointed, ther are not plumbable and there is no convention. Definition meanings: meaning are non-natural. Meaning is an expression, a character, an appointment, a convention, a metaphor or unconscious regularities. >Conventions, >Metaphors, >Regularities, >Signs, >Utterances.

II 17
Meaning/Grice: meaning does not follow from intention: e.g. a perpetrator may leave false traces.
I 8
Intention needs an idea about the effect. Listener-meaning: what the other should do in my opinion, cannot deliver the meanings. Deviation needs good reasons.
II 36
Speaker meaning: the speaker meaning may be different for the same sentence. >Speaker meaning.

III 85
Quotation marks are semantically important.
Avramides I 2
Meaning/Grice (1957): new: Avramides: the most remarkable thing about this "new approach" is the unconscious use of the terms intention and belief. Circular: if you wanted to exclude the unwanted cases from the beginning. Prehistory: Stevenson: meaning needs constance - otherwise there is only noise. Solution: the solution are the habits of the speakers.
I 4
Grice/Avramidis: Grice is more interested in understanding how utterances come to their content. Intentions need to be explained in terms of the content, not vice versa: that still leaves the question open how intentions and beliefs come to their content.
I 5
Grice: in the tradition of Austin/Searle, later Wittgenstein: language must be seen in the context of behavior.
I 10
Meaning/Grice/Avramides: thesis: we start with speaker meaning in one situation and provide an analysis in terms of mental states of the speaker and the listener.
I 11
Fundamental: "S means in a situation that p" - thereby Grice has clarified the concept of "meaning" (to mean) sufficiently.

Grice III 90
Situation Meaning/Grice: the situation meaning can be expressed and meant but is still wrong.
III 95
Meaning/practice/Grice: the well-known practice of the speaker is not clear for the meaning: the sentence can have other meanings. S may have other means. We need a term like "S has in its repertoire ..."
Newen I 77
Meaning/Grice/Newen/Schrenk: the speaker's intention is crucial. There are five steps: 1. behavior, 2. the psychological theory of needs, etc., 3. the theory of subjective utterance meanings: a) for the listener and b) for speakers, 4. the intersubjective meaning (conventional utterance meaning, VsGrice): has no theory of conventions, and 5. compositionality.
>Compositionality.
Newen I 80
Natural meaning/Grice: e.g. "These spots mean measles": here, there can be no mistake! Otherwise there are other spots. Communication: all meaning in communication is not natural meaning - not natural meaning: here there may be errors.
Schiffer I XIII
Meaning/Grice: (1957)(1): expression meaning in terms of speaker-meaning is ultimately purely psychological.

1. H. P. Grice Meaning. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 66, No. 3. (Jul., 1957), pp. 377-388

Grice I
H. Paul Grice
"Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993

Grice II
H. Paul Grice
"Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle

Grice III
H. Paul Grice
"Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Grice IV
H. Paul Grice
"Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Phenomena Armstrong I 115
Signs/laws of nature: there is no sign for the law of gravity! Phenomena are only circumstantial evidence! ((s) Cf. >Signs, >Symptoms, >Criteria, >Natural Meaning.
I 115
Signified: the signified is always a particulate fact as is the sign. There is no sign for the general! ((s) So not for the validity of the laws of nature!)

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Reason (Justification) Brandom I 813
Justification/Brandom: monologic justification is parasitic to dialogic justification. >Justification, >Score keeping. ---
Newen I 163
Reason/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: inference can be a relationship in the opposite direction - e.g. to expect a thunder when it has flashed before. Cf. >Natural meaning/signs/Armstrong.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Signs Austin I 226
Signs/Symptoms/Austin: a (natural) sign of something can be infallible or unreliable. But only a (artificial) sign of something can be right or wrong. >Symptoms, >Natural meaning/Armstrong.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Grice, P.H. Millikan Vs Grice, P.H. I 3
Speech patterns/language device/terminology/Millikan: by that I mean words, syntactic forms, accentuation, accents, punctuation, etc.
Thesis: such patterns have survived only because stable overt and covert responses of a cooperative partner are also handed down (have prevailed).
Standardization/Millikan: the (voice) pattern exerts its own function only with a partner, but with anyone. Therefore, it must be standardized.
Stabilization/Millikan/(S): (in time) with recurring token resemblance to earlier ones must be given.
Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: two sides of a coin.
Speech patterns/Millikan: can often be used in a parasitic way (diverted use).
I 4
Ex metaphor, sarcasm, lying, irony. Standard: even if they are not being used in a deviating way the pattern may yet fail in use.
Standardization/stabilization: therefore, they are not an "average function", but have to do with a "critical mass" of cases; they form a "center of gravity".
Solution: can not be found by forming an "average" of idiolects.
I 5
Characteristic function/language/meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we therefore do not take the meaning of the speaker as the fundamental concept. Meaningfulness/Millikan: we do not it explain with typical use.
belief/wishes/intention/Millikan: thesis: can be explained without reference to language.

I 51
quotation from Stevenson's "Kidnapped".
I 52
Literature/Millikan: there are more ((S) fine) differences within the literature as many philosophers have opened up. Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are there relations between
1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern
2. its literal use
3. the speaker's intentions.
Stabilizing function/Millikan: thesis of next chapter: an aspect of the meaning of words, of the syntactic form is the focused stabilizing function.
literal use/Millikan: corresponds to no stabilizing function (see below).
Intention according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: Grice's intentions are not what drives usage and understanding.

I 61
Understanding/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: is a direct perception of what a speech is about (aboutness), not a conclusion from the clauses heard! And certainly not a conclusion on speaker intentions.
I 62
Conviction/Millikan: 1. arises partly from the internal composition of the subject (nerves, interconnection, etc.) but two people with the same interconnections need not have the same beliefs.
I 63
2. not all the internal hardware is in use if you believe something. Belief/having/use/Millikan: I may have a conviction but not use is, Ex I almost never need the conviction that Columbus discovered America, especially not when I'm brushing my teeth.
Discovery/Conviction/Millikan: Ex a mathematician who is awake and looking for a proof and finally finds it: one can not say of him_her that he_she has previously believed it!
Imperative/Millikan: now, it is certainly the case that a listener when asked if the speaker had intended that s_he obeys the command, certainly will immediately answer "yes".
I 64
But that does not mean that s_he has used this belief during obedience. Intentions according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: are therefore superfluous. And they also can not help to distinguish non-natural meaning from less interesting things.
Anyway, we do not need to consider Grice's intentions that are subject the only potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system.
I 65
VsMillikan: it could be argued that one might have reasons for an act without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: when I stop to believe in something, I'll refrain from the corresponding actions.
Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are actually realized inside while speaking.
Ex Millikan: the sergeant says, "the next time I say 'stop' do not stop!"
There is a similar Ex by Bennett.
Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier is not able not to stop.
I 66
Bennett: the conclusion is made in a non-Grice manner. Rationality/Bennett/Millikan: it seems that as a rational person one should not choose "shortcuts". That is, one must not only take account of positive evidence, but also of negative.
((S) The idea is that what has been rationally learned covers what is rationally demanded. But both times it is about speaker intentions, one time past ones, another time present ones).
generally/formally: Ex Suppose John believes
"Usually: if A then B" and also:
"Non- (usually: if A-and-not-C, then B)"
a) "usual: if A then C" and
b) if A and C, then B. Then there are the following possible cases.
1. the only evidence of C comes from the fact that John knows that usually, if A then C. Then he should just move from A to B.
2. John has independent ways to believe C on the basis of evidence. And he encounters A, while he already has evidence of non-C.
I 67
Then, rationally, he should also believe that non-C and not conclude from A to B. 3. John has independent evidence according to which he could know C, but this time he does not know beforehand, whether C.
Question: to be rational, does he have to check beforehand whether C?
Millikan: we assume that he has to.
Problem: if again, that only depends on him believing:
"Usually, if D, then C" etc.
Rationality/Millikan: Problem: the more knowledge one then acquires, the more of an effort one must make to be rational at all. Would it not be better to omit all this verifying?

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Meaning Grice, P.H. Avramides I 10
Meaning/Grice/Avramides: Thesis: We begin with speaker meaning in a situation and deliver an analysis in terms of psychic states of the speaker and listener. We then reconstruct these terms as timeless meaning, word meaning and sentence meaning.
I 11
The following sentence form is assumed as fundamental: "S means in a situation that p". To mean/Avramides: Grice has sufficiently clarified the concept of "meaning".
I 43
Meaning/Speaker-Meaning/Grice: Thesis: "x means something" (in a situation) is roughly equivalent to: "S means something (in a situation) with x". (Grice 1957).
I 46
Non-natural meaning/Grice: thesis: is never sufficient for an utterance to have a tendency to evoke a specific response. The utterance must be produced with a certain intention.
I 95
Def Meaning/Grice/Avramides: Grice's access to meaning is precisely that that thesis meaning is a particular configuration of belief and intentions.
Fod/Lep IV 166
Grice: thesis: meanings are inherited from contents of propositional attitudes.
Meggle I 7
Thesis Grice: x means something (time-independent), S means something with x (time-independent). In explication from "means the same" follows "understands".
I 19
Thesis: The speaker-situational meaning can be explained with recourse to speaker intentions. Time independent meaning and applied meaning can be explained with recourse to the concept of speaker-"situation"-meaning.
Newen/Schrenk I 77
Meaning/Grice/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: the crucial feature is the speaker's subjective meaning (intention). He does not elaborate on the background assumption that this can ultimately be reduced naturalistically to brain states. 5 stages of the treatment of speech behavior:
1. A description of the behaviour of the members of a linguistic community.
2. Psychological theory about the members, attribution of desires, beliefs, etc. thus a theory of propositional attitudes.
I 78
3. Theory of subjective meanings a) for the listener, b) for the speaker. This leads to an interpretative meaning theory. 4. Intersubjective meaning, the so-called conventional meaning of utterance.
Problem: Grice has no theory about conventions.
I 79
5. Sentence meanings of complex sentences are deduced from the meanings of the parts. (>Compositionality).

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Grice: > Meg I
G. Meggle (Hg)
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979