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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Empiricism | Fodor | IV 191 Empiricism/Fodor/LeporeVsEmpiricism: empiricism cannot show the similarities of the concepts of uncle/aunt, ice/vapor, President/Cleopatra, etc. (they are conceptual). You cannot reduce conceptual relations to relations between observational concepts. >Observation, >Concepts, >World/Thinking, >Language. Network: observational concepts are on the periphery. Theoretical terms are in the center. >Network/Quine. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Explanation | Fraassen | I 23 Explanation/FraassenVsReichenbach: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the demand of hidden variables. I 25 Explanation: if mere regularity makes a macroscopic theory poor, then the same happens to a microscopic one - coincidence: also coincidence can have an explanation. I 39 Explanation/FraassenVsAugustinus: the fleeing of the mouse from the cat must not be explained by perception. But with Darwin: the fleeing mice survive. There is no account by reason. Analogously it applies that the successful sciences survive - without this having to be explained. I 86 Theory/Explanation: For example, one could have two types of mechanics, one for physiologies and one for astronomers. Problem: one cannot explain a complex phenomenon with this - e.g. man who is walking on the moon - if both theories have no common models, a new theory on lunar gravitation must be established - empirical adequacy: requires the integration of these "mini-theories". I 87 Explanation: if we consider some kind of questions to be more important, this is no reason to believe that the theory that explains them is more probable - however, the social situation of the researcher plays a role in the evaluation of theories. >Evaluation. I 93 Explanation/Ernest Nagel: explanation is the organization and classification of our knowledge - FraassenVsFeyerabend: he misunderstood the fact: that this is a function of interests - FraassenVsFeyerabend: then one can stop to research if one believes, what one says - naive view of scientific security - then the scientists ought to swear by an oath that they are looking for explanations -FraassVsFeyerabend: in reality one must always doubt the adequacy. I 97f Explanation/FraassenVsTradition: explanation does not have to be true! a) "we have an explanation" (has to do with acceptance) b) "the theory explains" (without acceptance) - e.g. Newton's theory was wrong nevertheless it explains much. ((s) then a theory cannot be a conjunction of sentences, for then no sentence may be false.) Harman: Explanation leads to acceptance. >Acceptability. Explanation/Fraassen: something does not require that theory coincides with the world as a whole. I 98 One cannot assert the truth of a theory before its explanatory power - Explanation: is not an additional property for empirical adequacy - e.g. "the computer computes" - no one would say "the hammer struck the nail". I 106 Explanation/VsHempel/Morton Beckner: e.g. evolution is not deterministic - e.g. the giraffes's neck is not determined by dietary scarcity - only by the compatibility of genetic and natural selection mechanisms - Putnam: also Newton's explanation is no deduction, but a demonstration of compatibilities. I 110 Definition Explanation/Friedman: S explains P iff P is a consequence S which is "relative" to K and S "reduces" or "unifies" the set of its own consequences relative to K. I 111 Explanation: Problem: Incompleteness: disease explains a rare secondary disease that is triggered by it - but not why this patient is affected. Asymmetry: e.g. length of the shadow: is always in relation with a certain sun position. Causation: only goes in one direction. >Causation, >Equations, >Asymmetry. I 111 Why question: does not occur when the spectrum is explained by the atomic structure. I 124 Explanation: has to do with "why" - to find prominent factors in the causal network. Problem: the network as a whole does not explain typical cases - science, however, describes the network - ((s) therefore science does not equal an explanation. Explanation must at least say that there is a structure that can be described in principle - though never fully.) Cf. >Network/Quine. I 146 Explanation: for evaluating a response to a why question as an explanation, it is not a matter of whether this is true - the evaluation uses only the part of the background information that provides the general theory about these phenomena plus additional information that does not include the facts to be explained - ((s) e.g. framework conditions). >Reference frame. I 155 Explanation/Description/Fractions: explanation and description do not differ in the information - but explanation: is a three-digit relation theory-fact-context - description: is two-digit: theory-fact - Explanation: is an applied science (not pure science). I 205 Explanation/Thomas Aquinas/Fraassen: everything that is explained must be explained by something else. I 206 The premises must contain more than the conclusion - in addition: generalization: e.g. that all magnets attract iron. >Generalization. I 213 Explanation/Fraassen: only observable regularities require explanation. >Regularities, >Observability. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Quine | Fodor | IV 37 Holism/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine represents a meaning holism (MH) but supposedly also a confirmation holism (CH) which equals the >Quine-Duhem Thesis. (>Two Dogmas: phrases do not stand individually before the tribunal). IV 39f PragmatismVsRealism/QuineVsReductionism: verification conditions are not analytically included in statements. Confirmation Holism/Fodor/Lepore: confirmation holism does not have to be a pragmatist, it can also be a realist. This is compatible with the Quine-Duhem thesis (i.e. that sentences are not individually verifiable). Confirmation is not a linguistic matter, but the way the world is (Quine pro realism). Quine: this is a priori equivalent to semantics. Quine pro verificationism: sentence meaning: is a method of verification. Quine-Duhem thesis: is highly consistent with realism. Quine-Duhem thesis: a) any statement can be maintained if appropriate auxiliary hypotheses are provided, b) the requirement that evidence must be a posteriori. Quine-Duhem thesis/Fodor/Lepore: the Quine-Duhem thesis can also be read as: a) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of confirmation or b) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of meaning. IV 2189 Network/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: the only fixed nodes are the observational concepts. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Seeing | Quine | XII 100 Seeing/Vision/QuineVsTradition: it is not about the problem if there is an unconscious two dimensional radiation or a conscious three dimensional perception. - instead: stimuli. Also QuineVsGestalt Psychology: if we have only stimuli, then there is no problem, whether we have a gestalt or atoms. >Gestalt theory, >Perception. XII 100 Seeing/Quine: old mystery: Problem: how to solve the epistemological priority: The retina is irradiated two-dimensionally, yet we see things three dimensional without conscious conclusion. Problem: what should be considered as observation, the unconscious two dimensional or the conscious three dimensional? Tradition: here the conscious had priority. New: now we can drop consciousness because we explain observation through stimuli. This makes old paradoxes about unconscious data and chains of conclusions that would have to be completed too quickly obsolete. Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSense Atomism. QuineVs Gestalt Psychology: no matter if shape or atoms push themselves into the foreground of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input. >Gestalt Psychology. Priority is what is causally closer. QuineVsAntipsychologism. XII 101 Protocol Sentence/Vienna Circle/Quine: there was a debate in the Vienna Circle about what should be considered an observation or protocol sentence: a) Reports on sensory impressions b) Elementary statement about the outside world c) (Neurath): Reports on the relation between perception and reality. Quine: the worst thing was that there was apparently no objective decision. Solution/Quine: we look at them unreservedly in the context of the outside world. Def Observation Sentence/naturalized epistemology/Quine: the sentences that are causally closest to the receptors. Problem: how to measure the distance? Solution: Observation sentences are those that make the least use of stored information in language learning. However, there can be no total independence from stored information. >Holism, >Network/Quine, >Logical particles, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Observation. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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