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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Comparisons | Lewis | V 5f Comparison/possible world/similarity/similarity metrics/difference/Lewis: Two possible worlds never differ in only a fact; if at all, then there is immediately an infinite number of differences. Analysis 1: only one most similar world. LewisVs: E.g. Bizet/Verdi: two equally similar worlds: both French/Italian - the next (closest) world does not exist! - Analysis 2: several similar possible worlds. Solution: van Fraassen: Supervaluation: arbitrarily chosen next world. V 21 Comparison/Counter comparison/counterfactual conditional/triple indexing/Lewis: If my yacht had been longer, I would have been happier. - 2nd World j: my yacht is longer than in i (1st World) - 3) every additional world where both is true is closer than one where the yacht is longer, but I am still not happier. - (Always in relation to the 1st World i). >Possible world/Lewis, >Similarity/Lewis, >Similarity metrics/Lewis, >Comparability. Explanation/(s): E.g., The Bizet/Verdi case: They could have been compatriots if a) Bizet had been Italian or b) Verdi had been French. Problem: Which world is closer to our world? Therefore a similarity metric for possible worlds is not achievable. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Modalities | Bigelow | I 101 Modality/Necessity/Possibility/Modal/Montague/Bigelow/Pargetter: Montague is extreme by - Thesis: attributing modal operators (MO) to referents. Bigelow/Pargetter: instead, we can assume functions. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: our strategy will be an intermediate position: we only assign referents to names and open sentences. (Not to the modal operators "possible" and "necessary"). Name/individual constants/BigelowVsTarski: Tarski allowed only things as referents that can occupy a place at a time. We, on the other hand, will also allow Possibilia. Group: Possibilia: Bigelow pro Possibilia - - against: QuineVsPossibilia/TarskiVsPossibilia. Possibilia/Bigelow/Pargetter: Things that are not located anywhere but could have been. They are not universals at first! In the end, however, we will argue that they are universals after all. Definition predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: at the end we will say that predicates refer to sets constructed from universals and possibilia. Modality/Modal Operator/Bigelow/Pargetter: for "possible", "necessary", "likely" we do not introduce referents, but rules. I 290 Necessity/Modality/Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: although we do not define causes with necessary and sufficient conditions, there are connections between causes and necessity. In one sense, the effect is more than just a coincidental consequence. There are two ways that leads causation to modalities. 1. This comes from two terms of "cause", we call them "fat" and "thin" in analogy to Armstrong's "thick" and "thin" single particulars. (Armstrong 1978)(1) a) Definition thin cause/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: is simply the complex of particulars, properties and relations that are causally related to the effect. b) Definition thick cause/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: additionally the external properties, including all force relations. Modality/Necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: comes into play, because there is certainly a necessary connection between thick causes and their effects. This is because a relation cannot exist if its Relata does not exist. Forces/necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: this means that forces must be active. I 291 Cause/effect/necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: this trivial statement explains why causes are necessary for their effects. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can also consider it the rest of all causal interaction when everything else is eliminated. Conversely, if we are the only ones to remove the effect from the interaction, the effect must follow. 2. Necessity/Modality/Causation/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: the second way in which causation leads to modality has more to do with thin causes: We have seen that thin causes are not always sufficient and necessary conditions for an effect. Sometimes, however, thin causes are quite sufficient and necessary for the effect. Modality: comes into play when we modify Lewis' analysis to say that the next possible worlds are where the cause has this or that effect. This is true for most of the causes, and so we also have counterfactual conditionals again. Similarity metrics/similarity/next possible world/most similar/Bigelow/Pargetter: the proximity of possible worlds is determined by the individuals, properties and relations (1st and higher level) they have in common. Similarity metrics/similarity/next possible world/most similar/Bigelow/Pargetter: the greater weight should have properties and relations of a higher level. That is, the next world will generally be the one that has most relations in common. If we then have the thick cause, the effect must also set in (necessity). I 292 Effect/Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: the effect will occur in the majority of the next possible worlds. I 383 Modality/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the hardness of the mathematical "must" is something that has to be foreseen. Science: reveals necessities in nature. But these are only relative, conditional necessities. Natural necessity/natN/Bigelow/Pargetter: is always only relative, a conditional necessity. Absolute necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: only arises from mathematics. I 384 Necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: imposes restrictions. Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: Science also shows us possibilities that we would never have seen without it. Mathematics again plays a key role here. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: derives from mathematics, which cannot be separated from science. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter. Problem: must also be realism in relation to mathematical objects, and thus it becomes platonism. Nominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: as a scientific realist, you can also be a nominalist. However, he must then either reject parts of the mathematics or take a strongly instrumentalistic view. I 385 Quine/Bigelow/Pargetter: was driven away from nominalism by his scientific realism. Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: much of his modal realism was formulated within a nominalist framework. His later preference for universals does not alter the fact that his central theories are based on individuals and sets. Nominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is only committed to antirealist consequences if he nourishes "worldly" presuppositions. Scientific Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: should be a scientific Platonist at the same time. That means he needs mathematical entities and universals Bigelow/Pargetter pro. Combinatorial theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: the world contains a collection of particulars and universals. This also gives us modalities. In this way, we obtain a world book that corresponds to a complex property that either instantiates the world or not. I 386 We call these possible worlds. 1. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Papal Power | Marsilius of Padua | Gaus I 344 Papal power/fullness of power/Marsilius/Kilcullen: An explicit attack on this doctrine [of papal fullness of power] occupies (Marsilius of Padua 1980(1): Il.xxiii—xxvi, after the ground has been well prepared. All coercive power Gaus I 345 comes from the people (the 'legislator') and is entrusted to a ruler who rules in accordance with the law established by the people or by a subordinate legislator authorized by the people (1980(1): 44-9, 61-3). 1) No community can have more than one supreme ruler, who must be the source of all coercive power in the community - otherwise strife will break out (1980(1): This is the first of the four main points of Marsilius's argument against papal fullness of power: unless the pope is the supreme ruler,' pope and clergy can have coercive power only if they derive it from the supreme ruler. 2) The second point is theological: that Christ excluded the clergy from the exercise of coercive rulership (1980(1): 113-40). This rules out the possibility that the pope or any cleric might be the supreme ruler. 3) The third main point is also theological, a rejection of the view of Isidore and most churchmen, that the ruler must punish sin. According to Marsilius God wills that divine law should be enforced by sanctions only in the next world to give every opportunity for repentance (1980: 164; the contrast between 'this world' and 'the next world' was later the basis of Locke's main argument in his Letter of Toleration). Toleration/Marsilius: Marsilius does not advocate toleration: for secular ends the secular ruler may enforce religious uniformity, that is, he may enforce the divine law, but not the divine law as such (1980(1): 136, 175—9). So there is only one supreme ruler, not a member of the clergy, who does not enforce divine law as such and therefore does not coerce in any sense on behalf of the clergy. 4) Fourth, Christ gave Peter no special authority among the apostles, and Peter never was in Rome (1980: The Roman bishop therefore has no special Christappointed role in shepherding the whole Church. From these four points it follows that the doctrine of papal fullness of power is false in all its senses; in particular, the claim that the pope has supreme coercive jurisdiction over all secular rulers is false, for the pope and the clergy have no coercive jurisdiction at all, direct or indirect. Property: As for ownership of property, Marsilius sides with the Franciscans against Pope John XXII's thesis that no one can use consumable property without ownership, and argues that, in accordance with Christ's will, the pope and the clergy should all live in poverty like the Franciscans (1980: 183-4, 196-215; see Tierney, 1997(2): 108-18). Secular power: In the management of the externals of Church life, Marsilius argues that the only source of coercive authority is the secular ruler (if he is a Christian), who decides how many churches and clergy there will be, distributes Church jurisdictions, makes or approves appointments, and enforces canon law (1980(1): 65—6, 254-67), and only he can authorize excommunication (1980: 147-52). Spiritual power: The only sources of doctrinal authority in the Church are the Bible and general councils: he argues that general councils are infallible (1980(1):274-9). OckhamVsMarsilius: (William of Ockham, 1995(3):207-19, opposed Marsilius on this point, and argued that no part of the Church is infallible; see also Kilcullen, 1991(4).) >Papal power/Ockham. Marsilius/Kilcullen: Marsilius does not deny the truth of Christianity, does not deny that Christ gave spiritual powers to the clergy (their 'essential' or 'inseparable' powers, in contrast to the 'non-essential'; 1980: 235-6, 239-40), and does not deny that the clergy are the expert judges and teachers of Christian doctrine. What he denies is that Christ gave the clergy any coercive power and that Christ gave the pope any special power not possessed by other priests. 1. Marsilius of Padua (1980) Defensor Pacis, trans. Alan Gewirth. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 2. Tierney, Brian (1997) The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Chumh Law 1150-1625. Atlanta: Scholars. 3- William of Ockham (1995) A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade, ed. and trans. John Kilcullen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Kilcullen, John (1991) 'Ockham and infallibility'. The Journal ofRe1igious History, 16: 387-409. Kilcullen, John 2004. „Medieval Politial Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Similarity | Bigelow | I 228 Accessibility/Lewis: Accessibility between possible worlds: their degrees should be understood as degrees of similarity. Similarity/possible worlds/Lewis: here we have to recognize the relevant similarity. More important is the one concerning certain laws! This presupposes laws in the explanation. (Lewis 1979(1),1986a(2) - JacksonVsLewis: Jackson 1977a(3): Causality instead of similarity) Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: Example 3 worlds 1. World u: Darwin asks his father for permission to sail away, receives it and writes his book, of which we have all heard 2. World w: Darwin does not get permission, does not sail away and does not write his book. 3. World e v: Darwin does not get permission to sail away, but still sails off... and his father forgot what he said. Accessibility/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to our semantics (and that of Lewis) the corresponding counterfactual conditional is only true in w, if possible worlds like u are the most accessible of w (next world most similar possible world). Lewis: so u has to be more similar than w v is similar. u and w must be closer to each other. If v and w were closer together, the following counterfactual conditional would be true: If Darwin's father had not given permission, Darwin would not have obeyed and his father would have forgotten. And that is not true in w. So u w is closer than v u is close. --- I 229 Similarity/possible worlds/relevance/Bigelow/Pargetter: what kind of similarity is the relevant one? It cannot be about certain facts (as in this story). That would not be enough. Solution/Lewis: Definition similarity/similarity metrics/possible world/Lewis: by fewer exceptions in a possible world with laws that apply in the other possible world. > Miracles. For example, Darwin: "Miracles" would be the false acoustic transmission of the father's statement and the forgetting through the father. Miracles/Lewis: but also world u could contain miracles: the prehistory is the same as in v, but the father's decision is different, but the causal situation would be the same and the miracle of the other decision would perhaps be just as great as that of erasure of memory and mishearing. --- I 230 Natural Laws/Worlds/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: so it could be that other laws apply there as well. Obey/Laws/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can also say that a world obeys the laws of another possible world to a certain extent. For example, there might be a possible world z that obeys the laws of w better than u? z: assuming there are laws here that make the refuse of the permission probable. Suppose the father has heard of a conflict with France in the sea area. This does not require any change in the laws. Then we would be forced to assume that the following counterfactual conditional is true in w: (according to our semantics and that of Lewis): If Darwin's father had refused, war would have broken out between England and France or there would have been another factor that would have led to rejection. However, it is wrong in w in at least one way of reading. Similarity metrics/relevance/similarity/Lewis: this shows that similarity of laws is not the only relevant factor. Solution/Lewis: Similarity between worlds must be explained a) by similarity in terms of laws, b) by similarity in relation to certain facts. Weighting/Lewis: For example, the same facts over a long period of time have more weight than obeying the same certain laws. But compliance with laws has more weight than certain consistent facts. --- I 231 LewisVsBigelow: VsModal theory. Bigelow/Pargetter: we explain laws by accessibility Lewis: explains accessibility by law. Bigelow/Pargetter: if Lewis is right, our theory is circular. Solution/Lewis: see below BigelowVsVs/BigelowVsLewis: we deny that accessibility must be explained by similarity. The easiest accessible world does not have to be the most similar world! This is shown by the above examples (Darwin's father). But even if it were not the case, it would not refute the modal theory of the laws of nature. Similarity/Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are challenged to construct a better theory than Lewis. 1. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76 2. Lewis, D. K. (1986a) On the plurality of worlds,. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 3. Jackson, F. (1977a) A causal theory of counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosphy 55, pp.3-21 |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Similarity Metrics | Lewis | V 10 Similarity metric/Possible worlds/Po.wo./Similarity/Lewis: order assumption: weak order: whenever two worlds can be accessed from the the world i in question, either one or the other is more similar to world i. - Decreasing or increasing similarity is transitive. - In contrast, partial order: not all couples are distinguishable. >Possible world/Lewis. V 11 Compatibility/Possible world/Lewis: B is compatible with A in world i if an A world is closer to i than any non-B-world. - (Reversal of rather true) - then A were>>would C is true if C follows from A together with auxiliary hypotheses B1...Bn. - E.g. natural laws are compatible or completely incompatible with every assumption - thesis: then laws of nature are generalizations of what we consider to be particularly important. - Then conformity with Laws of Nature should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds - (> Similarity metrics). V 12f Similarity metric/Possible worlds/Lewis: sphere/Similarity sphere: E.g. S sphere around the world i: exists, if any S world is accessible from i and closer than any ~ S world): admitting A: a sphere contains an A world. - Degree: spheres represent degrees (comparative, unlike neighborhood in topology). Compatibility/Compatible/(s): B is compatible with A if there is an A world in the B sphere. - Definition A were>>would C is true if A>C applies in an A permitting sphere around i, if such a sphere exists. >Implication. V 13 Definition Then were A>>would C would be true if AC applied in every A permitting sphere around i ((s) conjunction) - Definition A impossible worlds: >Impossible World. V 42 Similarity metric/Similarity/Possible world/Lewis: It is not about any particular similarity relation that you happen to have in mind. - Problem: if some aspects do not even count, the centering assumption would be violated. - I.e. worlds that differ in an unnoticed aspect, would be identical with the actual world. - Lewis: but such worlds do not exist.- Similarity relations: must be distinguished: a) for explicit judgments - b) for counterfactual judgments. V 150 Revision/Possible world/Similarity metrics/Stalnaker/Lewis: every revision will select the most similar antecedent world. --- Schwarz I 160 Lewis: E.g. a single particle changes its charge: then it behaves differently. - Because a possible world in which not only the charge but also the role were exchanged would be much less similar (> next world). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Similarity Metrics | Nozick | II 174 Similarity Metrics/Similarity/Possible Worlds/Nozick: the measure for the next world must be: what if the antecedent is true. - E.g. alphabetical order on the shelf: is an explanatory, not merely a representative order. - Why are the things there? >Order, >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Explanation. Variant: content arranged, but coincidentally the same order - then the alphabetical order is not an explanation. - ((s) Then the neighborhood is no next world, but an irrelevant world.) II 241 Closure/Nearest World/Similarity Metrics/Nozick: when the condition (3) (believe nothing wrong) Condition (3) "If p would be false, S would not believe it" was to be completed, then, if p implies q, the non-q-situation must not be further away from the actual world than the nearest non-p-world. >Closure, >Omniscience/Nozick, >Real world, >Actuality. NozickVsClosure under known implication: we do not have to know or believe all the consequences of our knowledge. >Logical Omniscience. II 242 Closure/knowledge/Skepticism/Nozick: if our knowledge were closed under known implication, then if p implies q, the non-q-situation must not be further from the actual world than the nearest non possible world. >Brains in a vat, >Skepticism. Problem: when this is a "non-tank" world, then the statement would demand that the world of the skeptic does not exist, that the tank-world is not further away from the actual world, than any other non possible world. Problem: we would believe p, even if it is wrong, then we do not know that p. >Belief, >Knowledge. All conditionals, which say that we believe nothing wrong, would be wrong. >Conditional. Closed: would be the concept of knowledge only if the world of the skeptic might exist, if p were not true. So when our concept of knowledge would be so strong, skepticism would be right. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Concepts. Nozick: but we do not have to accept that. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Similarity Metrics | Bigelow | I 129 Counterfactual Conditional/Valuation/Valuation Function/Valuation Rules/Bigelow/Pargetter: V9 If a = (ß would be > weould be γ) then V (a) is the set of all possible worlds w ε w so that there is a possible world u where β is true and γ is true and every possible world v in which ß is true and γ is false, is less accessible from w than u. ((s) > similarity metrics.) Resemblance/possible worlds/similarity metrics/counterfactual conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: rule V9 states that a counterfactual conditional (β would be > would be γ) is true in a possible world if the next ß-worlds are all γ-worlds. For example, Violet says: "If I were a blackbird, I would sing" this is true in the actual world, because the next worlds where Violet is a blackbird are possible worlds where she sings. Similarity metrics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the possible worlds in which Violet is a blackbird on the tree or on the mailbox can be possibly at the same distance from the actual world. Connection/Possible worlds: the question of whether such "connections" can exist is discussed in connection with the conditionally excluded middle (see above). Complexity/Bigelow/Pargetter: the complexity of V) is due to the desired generality. --- I 130 Resemblance/similarity metrics/counterfactual conditional/proximity/possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: we want a possible world, in which the fore link and back link of the counterfactual conditional are both true, to be closer than one in which only the fore links are true, and the back links are false. --- I 209 Possible World/Variant/Bigelow/Pargetter: we could also specify individuals by describing their position in the course of their existence. Through an infinite sequence of quadruples. There are many variants, including more economical ones. We can combine all the positions of a particle into one function. This is also possible for other properties that we attribute to a particle. So we can combine a particle not only with numbers, but also with whole functions. Function: these functions could describe the changes of the particle. Book/Bigelow/Pargetter: a book for such a described world could be a Hilbert space. But a book is not a world yet! A book for the actual world would consist of two components: 1. a world property, or a maximum specific structural universal 2. to something that instantiates this universal, that is the world itself. This applies to the actual world! Other possible worlds correspond to a universal, but this is not instantiated, so there is no world here. Representation/Bigelow/Pargetter: now the numbers representing these world properties could seem all too abstract. --- I 210 But they are not! They represent the proportions in which the properties of the parts that we have chosen as units are related to each other. Crossworld-relations/world properties/property theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: now it seems as if our theory is making a surprising turn: it seems to provide a measure for the distance between possible worlds that we have been unable to gain so far. And that measure would not be arbitrary! Accessibility: could we get it under control with this? (see below) If the possible worlds contain the same individuals, it is even easy to construct a similarity metrics for them. If the individuals are different, it is more difficult. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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