Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Bridge Laws Davidson Glüer II 135ff
DavidsonVsFodor: There are no covering laws. - Anomalous monism: anomalous monism is token correspondence, not type-correspondence. - There ist no nomological identity of mental events with physical events. Nevertheless we have token identity. (> Anomalous monism/Davidson).
II 138
Laws/identity theory/Davidson/Glüer: Whether there can be laws regulating type identity, identity of a few tokens or disjunctiveness of the events described: Davidson must show that there can be no nomological type identity: because that would mean that for every intentional predicate M there would be a physical predicate P.
II 139
A corresponding law would be the so-called "bridge law" required for a reduction. According to Davidson, whether such bridge laws can exist is not an empirical question, but can be decided a priori. The individuation procedures of the intentionalist and the physicalist discourse show a fundamental incommensurability. The intentionalistic predicates are essentially inherent in normativity.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Democratic Theory Pateman Brocker I 505
Democratic Theory/Pateman: PatemanVsSchumpeter/PatemanVsSartori: Thesis: The formation of positive attitudes towards democracy is not a question of cognitive competence, but of democratizing a previously undemocratic institutional structure that systematically generates undemocratic attitudes and feelings of individual incompetence: the production of capitalist goods. See Democratic Theory/Schumpeter, Democratic Theory/Sartori.
Democracy/Tradition: However, the sphere of goods production must remain undemocratic to ensure productivity and efficiency. There is therefore no alternative to the democratic status quo that would not endanger democracy itself.
Brocker I 506
PatemanVsTradition: 1 VsSchumpeter: the normative evaluation scale is incorrectly constructed: the concept of a "classical democracy theory" is a myth. (1) The sources are more heterogeneous than traditionally claimed. History of ideas/Pateman: must not be reduced to pure normativity.
Labour/Democratization: 2. PatemanVsSchumpeter: Democratic participation and productivity are not contradictory.
VsPateman: Schumpeter does not reconstruct this in the dynamic aspects of his work. Taking into account Schumpeter's analysis of the importance of leadership, creativity and innovation for capitalism
Brocker I 507
would have improved the persuasiveness of her argument.

1. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge 1970, S. 17.

Gary S. Schaal, “Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolPate I
Carole Pateman
Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change 1971


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Ethics Bostrom I 257
Ethics/morals/morality/superintelligence//Bostrom: No ethical theory commands majority support among philosophers, so most philosophers must be wrong. ((s)VsBostrom: It is not a question of applause as to which theory is correct.)
I 369
Majorities in ethics/Bostrom: A recent canvass of professional philosophers found the percentage of respondents who “accept or leans toward” various positions. On normative ethics, the results were deontology 25.9%; - consequentialism 23.6%; - virtue ethics 18.2%.
On metaethics, results were
moral realism 56.4%; - moral anti-realism 27.7%.
On moral judgment:
cognitivism 65.7%; - non-cognitivism 17.0% (Bourget and Chalmers 2009(1))
>Norms/normativity/superintelligence/Bostrom, >Ethics/superintelligence/Yudkowsky.
Morality models:
I 259
Coherent Extrapolated Volition/CEV/Yudkowsky: Our coherent extrapolated volition is our wish if we knew more, thought faster, were more the people we wished we were, had grown up farther together; where the extrapolation converges rather than diverges, where our wishes cohere rather than interfere; extrapolated as we wish that extrapolated, interpreted as we wish that interpreted. >Ethics/superintelligence/Yudkowsky.
I 266
VsCEV/Bostrom: instead: Moral rightness/MR/Bostrom: (…) build an AI with the goal of doing what is morally right, relying on the AI’s superior cognitive capacities to figure out just which actions fit that description. We can call this proposal “moral rightness” (MR). The idea is that we humans have an imperfect understanding of what is right and wrong (…)
((s)VsBostrom: This delegates human responsibility and ultimately assumes that human decisions are only provisional until non-human decisions are made.)
I 267
BostromVsYudkowsky: MR would do away with various free parameters in CEV, such as the degree of coherence among extrapolated volitions that is required for the AI to act on the result, the ease with which a majority can overrule dissenting minorities, and the nature of the social environment within which our extrapolated selves are to be supposed to have “grown up farther together.” BostromVsMR: Problem: 1. MR would also appear to have some disadvantages. It relies on the notion of “morally right,” a notoriously difficult concept (…).
I 268
2. (…) [MR] might not give us what we want or what we would choose if we were brighter and better informed. Solution/Bostrom: Goal for AI:
MP: Among the actions that are morally permissible for the AI, take one that humanity’s CEV would prefer. However, if some part of this instruction has no well-specified meaning, or if we are radically confused about its meaning, or if moral realism is false, or if we acted morally impermissibly in creating an AI with this goal, then undergo a controlled shutdown.(*) Follow the intended meaning of this instruction.
I 373 (Annotation)
*Moral permissibility/Bostrom: When the AI evaluates the moral permissibility of our act of creating the AI, it should interpret permissibility in its objective sense. In one ordinary sense of “morally permissible,” a doctor acts morally permissibly when she prescribes a drug she believes will cure her patient - even if the patient, unbeknownst to the doctor, is allergic to the drug and dies as a result. Focusing on objective moral permissibility takes advantage of the presumably superior epistemic position of the AI. ((s)VsBostrom: The last sentence (severability) is circular, especially when there are no longer individuals in decision-making positions who could object to it.
>Goals/superintelligence/Bostrom.
I 312
Def Common good principle/Bostrom: Superintelligence should be developed only for the benefit of all of humanity and in the service of widely shared ethical ideals.
I 380
This formulation is intended to be read so as to include a prescription that the well-being of nonhuman animals and other sentient beings (including digital minds) that exist or may come to exist be given due consideration. It is not meant to be read as a license for one AI developer to substitute his or her own moral intuitions for those of the wider moral community.

1. Bourget, David, and Chalmers, David. 2009. “The PhilPapers Surveys.” November. Available at http://philpapers.org/surveys/

Bostrom I
Nick Bostrom
Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Esfeld I 99ff
Kripke's Wittgenstein: each finite row of examples satisfies an infinite number of possible logical rules - Kripke does not proceed from behavior, but from intention: how do you know yourself that one should say 125, if one intends to act in accordance with one's previous answers? There is nothing mental, which determines the content - with infinite possibilities there is no conceptual content - the term is independent of certain application ---
I 102
Kripke's Wittgenstein: dispositions/Kripke: dispositions do not help because they are also limited - why would the act that you are dispositional be the one that should be done? - Form/KripkeVsAristoteles: same problem: how can one recognize the right "natural characteristics" (normativity problem)? ---
I 105f
Kripke's Wittgenstein/skeptical solution: results can only be obtained in assertibility conditions, no truth conditions: means there are no facts which make statements about meaning come true - Esfeld: solution: social practice is the middle way between skeptical solution (nonfactualism) and direct solution: which tries to find the facts of meaning in the equipment of the world. KripkeVs: one could have addition today and yesterday quaddition. whatever appears correctly in the moment, is correct - current dispositions have always a privileged position - change is not independet from conceptual content: to determine change, this must be established first. See also >Private Language, >Rule Following.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Katz Esfeld I 102
Disposition/Rule/Rule Sequencenes/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: (1982): they do not help because they are also limited. Nor can they solve the problem of normativity: why would the action that one has to dispose to do, the one that one should do if one were to follow the rule? No distinction correct/incorrect.
Kripke: is here further than Quine, who is limited to the behavior (in Word and Object, explicitly referring to Wittgenstein).
---
I 103
Meaning/content: assuming that they are Platonic objects, one only shifts the problem: How can a person grasp these senses? What makes it that a finite sequence of mental acts capture the right meaning? (e.g. addition). Katz: suggests that such Platonic objects (Fregean senses) are themselves finite.
VsKatz: any finite sequence can express more than one such sense. What distinguishes the comprehension of addition from the comprehension of quaddition? See also >Private Language, >Rule Following.

Katz I
Jerrold J. Katz
"The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974

Katz II
Jerrold J. Katz
Jerry Fodor
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Katz III
Jerrold J. Katz
Jerry Fodor
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Katz V
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Liberalism Sandel Brocker I 668
Liberalism/Communitarianism/Sandel: Sandels Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, together with Alasdair MacIntyres After Virtue and Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice, are considered the main work of communitarianism. Sandel, however, is more concerned with a differentiation from John Rawl's liberalism (and his main work Theory of Justice (1975)). SandelVsLiberalism, SandelVsRawls.
Def Liberalismus/Rawls/Rothhaar: Rawls's liberalism is usually characterized in that it postulates a priority of the "right" over the "good", whereby these terms stand for two different possibilities to justify ethical and legal norms at all.
A. Teleology: ethical theories aimed at the good or a successful life (eudaimonia),
Brocker I 669
are usually called teleological. Norms/values: are justified here by the fact that a good or successful life is realized through them.
B. Law/Rightfulness/Ethics/Liberalism: ethical theories, on the other hand that are aimed at the right, are characterized by the fact that norms are to be founded here independently of any idea of a good life. The concept of "right" only makes sense as a counter-concept to a teleological theory of normativity and can only occur where teleological theories have already become questionable. example.
HobbesVsTeleology: Hobbes rejects the idea of a "highest good" himself.
Other (liberal) approaches assume a plurality of conceptions of a good life.
Norms: are usually defined in such theories of the right in relation to the generalizability of rules of action or to the concept of freedom.
State/Liberalism: such theories normally confer on the state the role of guaranteeing, through a legal system, the freedom it needs to pursue its respective notions of good.
Liberalism/Rawls: this is about the priority of the right over the good in a twofold sense: a) at the level of justification, b) at the level of the state and society itself.
SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: criticizes above all the priority of rights at the level of justification: he criticizes the "claim that the principles of justice (...) do not depend on a particular conception of good living (...) to justify them. (1)
Brocker I 676
SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. (2)


1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. x.
2. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge 1996.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Mentalese Fodor Rorty I 269 ff
Rorty: Fodor s image of the internal representations has nothing to do with our mirror of nature that we have accepted. What is crucial is that with regard to Fodor s "Language of thought" the skeptical question of "how exactly do the internal representations represent the reality" cannot be asked! There is no gap.
Newen/Schrenk I 132
Mentalese/language of thought/thought language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: thinking takes place with mental representations. - E.g. fuel gauge, causal connection. - Mentalese: as rich as natural language, but purely internal, symbolic, purely syntactic symbol manipulation - only in connection with propositional attitude - VsFodor: a) regress.
I 133
b) the supporters of the thesis of the prevalence of thought cannot explain the normativity of thinking with the help of social institutions such as the language - c) there are also beliefs without representation: E.g. chess computers: -brute force- then: -I should the queen out of the game early.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Motivation Bostrom I 162
Motivation/superintelligence/Bostrom: Suppose that an AI were designed to have as its final goal that a particular red button inside a command bunker never be pressed. What is essential is that the AI believes that the button will more likely remain unpressed if the AI continuously acts in the principal’s interest than if it rebels. Rewarding: Instead of trying to endow an AI with a final goal that refers to a physical button, one could build an AI that places final value on receiving a stream of “cryptographic reward tokens.”
These would be sequences of numbers serving as keys to ciphers that would have been generated before the AI was created and that would have been built into its motivation system.
I 354
Creating a cipher certain to withstand a superintelligent code-breaker is a nontrivial challenge. For example, traces of random numbers might be left in some observer’s brain or in the microstructure of the random generator, from whence the superintelligence can retrieve them; or, if pseudorandom numbers are used, the superintelligence might guess or discover the seed from which they were generated. Further, the superintelligence could build large quantum computers, or even discover unknown physical phenomena that could be used to construct new kinds of computers. Problem: The AI could wire itself to believe that it had received a reward tokens, but this should not make it wirehead if it is designed to want the reward tokens (as opposed to wanting to be in a state in which it has certain beliefs about the reward tokens).
[Problem: The AI has to develop an idea of a world it is living in: >Environment/AI Research.]
I 176
Motivation selection: -Direct specification: The system is endowed with some directly specified motivation system, which might be consequentialist or involve following a set of rules.
-Domesticity: A motivation system is designed to severely limit the scope of the agent’s ambitions and activities.
-Indirect normativity: could involve rule-based or consequentialist principles, but is distinguished by its reliance on an indirect approach to specifying the rules that are to be followed or the values that are to be pursued. >Values/superintelligence/Bostrom.
-Augmentation: One starts with a system that already has substantially human or benevolent motivations, and enhances its cognitive capacities to make it superintelligent.
>AI takeover/Yudkowski, >Control/superintelligence/Bostrom, >Goals/superintelligence/Omohundro.

Bostrom I
Nick Bostrom
Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017

Norms Cavell II 192
Norms/Normative/Normativity/Cavell: Normativity is not in the assertions of the philosopher of the everyday language.
II 193
Traditional problems with the concept of normativity stem from the following confusions: 1. the (wrong) idea, descriptive utterances are the opposite of normative utterances.
2. prescriptive utterances are typical examples of normative utterances.
Ad 1. typical of actions is that they can go wrong. But then descriptive statements do not represent the opposite of normative statements, but rather presuppose them. We could not do what we call describing, if the language did not comprehend us with consummation forms that are normative for describing.
Ad. 2. If normative expressions are used to institutionalize rules, then prescriptive utterances are not examples of normative utterances.
II 194
Formulating a norm does not mean to indicate how we should perform an action, but how the action is done! Specifying what we should do is not to institutionalize a norm, but rather presupposes the existence of a norm!
Language/Norms/Cavell: We sometimes invoke standards which our interlocutor does not accept, but we do not try to institutionalize our own norms, nor to express our subjective views.
II 195
There are always different normative possibilities to fulfill the particular normative tasks.

Cavell I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

Cavell I (a)
Stanley Cavell
"Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell I (b)
Stanley Cavell
"Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell I (c)
Stanley Cavell
"The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100
In
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell II
Stanley Cavell
"Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958)
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Norms Bostrom I 258
Norms/normativity/superintelligence/Bostrom: Indirect normativity is a way to answer the challenge presented by the fact that we may not know what we truly want, what is in our interest, or what is morally right or ideal. Instead of making a guess based on our own current understanding (which is probably deeply flawed), we would delegate some of the cognitive work required for value selection to the superintelligence. >Ethics/superintelligence/Bostrom. (…) one could generalize this idea (…):
Def Principle of epistemic deference: A future superintelligence occupies an epistemically superior vantage point: its beliefs are (probably, on most topics) more likely than ours to be true. We should therefore defer to the superintelligence’s opinion whenever feasible.

((s)VsBostrom: (1) Here the tacit assumption is made that moral decisions are subject to progress.
(2) This delegates human responsibility and ultimately assumes that human decisions are only provisional until non-human decisions are made.)

>Ethics/morality/superintelligence/Yudkowsky.
I 259
Ethics/morality/superintelligence/Yudkowsky: Yudkowsky has proposed that a seed AI be given the final goal of carrying out humanity’s “coherent extrapolated volition” (CEV), which he defines as follows: CEV/Yudkowsky: Our Coherent Extrapolated Volition is our wish if we knew more, thought faster, were more the people we wished we were, had grown up farther together; where the extrapolation converges rather than diverges, where our wishes cohere rather than interfere; extrapolated as we wish that extrapolated, interpreted as we wish that interpreted. >Ethics/superintelligence//Bostrom.

Bostrom I
Nick Bostrom
Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017

Rule Following Esfeld I 102 ~
Rule Following/Wittgenstein: to believe to follow a rule is not following - therefore one cannot follow a rule privately, because otherwise mere belief would be the same as following.
I 156 ~
Normativity Problem/Kripke's Wittgenstein: how can one detect whether the continuation of the series is correct? - Causality is not enough: Moved problem: what is the proper causality - "real essence" (microstructure): which is the right one? - Aristotle: natural form: how do we recognize them?

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Terminology McGinn I 22
Definition B-term/McGinn: one for which the question is how its former use was possible. Definition DIME/terminology/McGinn: domesticated irreducible mystic elimination -
D: the idea that one must domesticate the term B. - The term presents his subject misleading and exaggerates the ontological peculiarity.
I: theory: the term would be irreducible.
---
I 35
M: stands for Magic - accepts the facts of the concept at face value. ---
I 36
E: Elimination: the B-concepts would not be applicable to the world. ---
I 37
Thesis: the Transcendental Naturalism presents (TN) a neglected alternative to domesticated irreducible mystic elimination. ---
I 65
VsDomesticated irreducible mystic elimination: is imprinted on the problem without solving it. ---
I 39
Definiton CAIM/McGinn: combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings. - According to that a crowd of basic elements obeys given linking principles - E.g. physics, mathematics and linguistics have CAlM (combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings) character. - New things are explained with linking rules. - McGinn: an indispensable, but unsuitable realization process. ---
I 45
Problem: the contents of the modules (subjects) cannot be applied. ---
I 68
Consciousness is not to be explored by CAlM. ---
I 110
FIN-features (fruitfulness, invulnerability, normativity)/terminology/McGinn: fertility, invulnarability, normativity. Connection with semantics, but not with behavior, brain state, etc.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Use Theory McGinn I 120 f
Intention/Use Theory/McGinn: how problematic the first position (1. Position: Are the intended meaning and its correct theory things of the same ontological type?) for the intention is, explains Kripke. McGinn: there has to be, for example, a constitutive connection between intentioned meaning and use, but a simple equation leads to fundamental problems. (> Use Theory/Kripke) - ((s) E.g. you could have meant all the time with addition something else than I have, and have yet been found out the same numbers as I did.) "result ratio": correspond two living beings in all not semantic descriptions (behavior, inner, relation to other things), they must think and intend the same. Nevertheless, the basis of this result ratio contains nothing what could be handled of the FIN-features (FIN - fruitfulness, invulnerability, normativity) captured essence nature of semantic features.
Use theory/McGinn: Meaning is no such thing as the link between use situations.
----
I 124/25
Because of this it is so difficult to articulate the relationships, because the FIN-features (fruitfulness, invulnerability, normativity) are not CAlM products. (CAlM: combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings, See Terminology/McGinn). VsUse Theory/McGinn: problematic in the context of >compositionality.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001


The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Dennett, D. Davidson Vs Dennett, D. Glüer II 136f
Event / Davidson: to have reasons - all propositional attitudes - as opposed to physical events that have physical descriptions. These descriptions of the material world can be in everyday language, just not intentionalist (DavidsonVsDennett) - Micro: to have a reason, Macro: body movements.
Glüer II 139
The individuation process of the intentionalist and the physicalist discourse have a fundamental incommensurability. The intentionalist predicates inherently have essential normativity.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Disposition Theory Kripke Vs Disposition Theory Esfeld I 102
Disposition/Rule/Rule-following/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: Kripke (1982) (S.A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, 1982): Do not help, because they are also limited. They are also unable to solve the Problem of Normativity: Why would the act that one is predisposed to do the same one should do if intending to follow the rule?
No distinction possible between correct/incorrect.
Kripke: He takes it on further than Quine who concentrated on behavior (Quine in Word and Object, explicitly based on Wittgenstein).
I 103
Meaning/Contents: If one assumes that they were platonic objects, the problem is only deferred: How can a person capture these senses? What does it matter that a finite sequence of mental acts grasps the true meaning? (E.g. addition). Katz: Proposes that such platonic objects (Fregean Sense) themselves are finite.
VsKatz: Every finite sequence can express more than one particular sense. What is the difference between both the conception of addition and quaddition?
Form/KripkeVsAristotle: same problem: If you wanted to assume like A. that natural properties are inherent in all physical objects, the question is how to recognize the right ones!
I 104
Grue/Natural Property: N.P. is e.g. "green" contrary to grue. Problem: Every finite number of examples instantiates more than just one natural characteristic. E.g. a table can be brown, and can also have four legs. We may not figure out which aspects a person refers to.
Kripke: Asserts that Wittgenstein himself advocates the skeptical position
I 105
and proposes a skeptical solution, in analogy to Hume’s solution regarding the Problem of Causation.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Disquotation Putnam Vs Disquotation Putnam VII 431
Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism).
Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property.
---
Horwich I 455
Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism").
Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory,
Horwich I 456
and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions.
Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions.
Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise.
Instead:
Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true).
Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994
---
Horwich I XIV
VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme).
Horwich I XVI
Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows.
---
Horwich I 457
Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because:
If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity".
Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game.
RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game.
Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically.
Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities.
---
Williams II 497
Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition.
Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory.
Williams II 502
Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide.
PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion.
M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that?
Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence.
PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use.
Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification.
Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth.
Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Fodor, J. Davidson Vs Fodor, J. I (b) 36
DavidsonVsFodor/Dennett/Kaplan/Stich: I for my part believe that the concepts of the belief, desire, intent, etc. are not suitable for a science of the type of physics. One of the reason for this is that mental states are identified in part on the basis of their causes and effects. The same is true, however, for human behavior. Therefore, I see no chance to offer scientific explanations in terms of it. Not to describe behavior as a law in analogy to physics. Even Jerry Fodor thinks (like Searle) that holism or the indeterminacy of translation constitutes a threat for the realism with respect to the prop. att.s
DavidsonVsFodor: The same error: indeterminacy of translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal.

Glüer II 139
A suitable law would be the so-called "bridge law" required for a reduction. Whether there can be such a bridge laws, according to Davidson is not an empirical question, but can be decided a priori.
Glüer II 135
The individuation procedures of the intentionalist and physicalistic discourse show a general incommensurability. The intentionalist predicates essentially include normativity. Therefore, no bridge laws possible. (> anomalous monism, > have incidents of reasons, not caused).
Anomalous monism/AM: mental incident tokens are as individual each identical with physical incident tokens, but without mental incident types being nomologically identical with the types of physical incidents.
Glüer II 147
Fodor: Mental or physical incidents are covered by different laws, i.e. they have different effects. That means, intentionalist descriptions mark a causally important difference.  DavidsonVsFodor: To say that this difference is ultimately owing to the physical nature is absurd, because the causal relations are description-independent.

Rorty VI 162
Mind/Davidson/Rorty: false concept of the mind: with private states and objects. Source of the harmful dualisms scheme/content, objective/subjective
VI 163
DavidsonVsFodor/Rorty: the scientific nature of psychology turns into a search for internal propositional states that should be independent of the rest of the world.

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Fodor, J. Newen Vs Fodor, J. NS I131
Language/Thinking/Newen/Schrenk: two main currents: 1) Thesis of the primacy of language: only beings gifted with language are able to think. The way of thinking is also influenced by the nature of the language: >Sapir-Whorf thesis
2) Thesis of the primacy of thought over language: Fodor, Descartes, Chisholm.
Mentalese/Language of Thoughts/Thought Language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (Literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of the mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs.
NS I 132
Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: Thesis: thinking is designed in a way that it has all the key properties of natural language already (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. E.g. gas gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized through brain states.
Language of the Mind/Mentalese/Fodor: is as rich as a natural language, but it is a purely internal, symbolic representation that is modified only with syntactic symbol manipulation. It is completely characterizable through its character combination options (syntax).
It is only assumed to explain the dealing with propositional attitudes, it plays no role in the more fundamental mental phenomena like sensations, mental images, sensory memories.
VsFodor: a) Recourse: imminent if you want to explain the properties of natural language by assuming a different language.
NS I 133
b) the supporters of the thesis of the primacy of thinking cannot explain the normativity of thought with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) there can also be beliefs without an assignable mental representation. E.g. chess computer. They are nowadays programmed with statistical methods so that there is no fixable representation for the belief e.g. "I should take the queen out of the game early."
Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor still assumes localizable, specifiable representations.
VsFodor: nowadays, neural networks are assumed.
Representation/Today/Newen/Schrenk: pre-conceptual: e.g. spatial orientation, basic cognitive skills.
- -
NS I 160
Conceptual Atomism/Fodor: E.g. "pet fish": typical pet: Dog, typical fish: trout, typical pet fish: Goldfish. I.e. no compositionality. Thesis: the availability of a concept does not depend on the fact that we have other concepts available. In other terms: Thesis: concepts have no structure. ((s) contradiction to the above: Fodor called concepts compositional.
Extension/Predicate/Fodor. Thesis: the extension is determined by which objects cause the utterance of a predicate.
VsFodor: Problem: with poor visibility it is possible to confuse a cow with a horse so that the predicates would become disjunctive: "horse or cow."
NS I 161
Solution/Fodor: the correct case is assumed as the primary case.
VsFodor:
1) the problem of co-extensional concepts. E.g. "King"/"Cardioid" - E.g. "Equilateral"/"Equiangular" (in triangles). 2) The problem of analytic intuitions: even though there is no absolute border between analytic and non-analytic sentences, we have reliable intuitions about this. E.g. the intuition that bachelors are unmarried.
FodorVsVs: does not deny that. But he claims that knowledge of such definitional relations is irrelevant for having a concept!
Concepts/Meaning/Predicate/Literature/Newen/Schrenk: more recent approaches: Margolis/Laurence. Cognitive Science.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Privileged Access McGinn Vs Privileged Access I 118
privileged access: allegedly, we have a unique relationship to the meanings we mean: we know what we mean. (verb of success, you can not wrongly mean something, privileged access). McGinnVsPrivileged access/to mean sth: this is a mistake: it may be that we know something as described in a certain way, without being able to subordinate it to other descriptions. We must abstract from the first person and look at the FIN-features (fruitfulness, invulnerability, normativity) in a more objective manner. Question: how can a system that is put together as we are succeed to have properties that meet the appropriate number of defining characteristics (FIN), and then we can leave mental space for the idea that what so immediately known to us may not even be comprehensible in theoretical terms.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Use Theory McGinn Vs Use Theory I 106
To mean sth./meaning/language/object/usage/McGinn: whoever masters the meaning of a word has never seen the vast majority of the corresponding objects. In addition, the potential use of words is greater than could be explored in the life of a speaker. But in every single situation of the application of the word its intended meaning includes all these objects. That is, there is a property exemplified by the speaker, by virtue of which s_he captures this spacious yet exclusive meaning. The semantic ability thus contains a kind of universality that construes a relationship between the speaker and things that is far beyond the range of personal experience.
I 120
Wittgenstein: If meaning is simply the usage, there is no sense to speak of fitting. Detecting the meaning happens all at once and certainly something other than the time-extended use." To mean sth./Theory of Utility/McGinn:. Kripke elaborates how problematic this is for meaning sth.
McGinn. there must, for example, be a constitutive connection between intentioned meaning and usage, but a simple equation leads to fundamental problems (Kripke) ((S) Ex all the time you can have meant something else by addition than I have, and have the same numbers.) "relation of order." if two creatures match in all non-semantic descriptions (behavior, interior, relation to other things), they must think and mean the same. Nevertheless, the basis of this relation of order contains nothing that could be handled by the nature of being of semantic features in the handle detected by FIN-features (FIN - fruitfulness, invulnerability, normativity).
I 125
theory of usage/Kripke/McGinn: The reference to the usage of language in the sense of units of characters over time and changing situations gives us no CALM theory, because exactly in this sense, the theory of character can be problematic! (CALM: combinatoric atomism with lawlike mappings). We can not somehow represented the meaning meant as the sum of uses, otherwise the FIN-characteristics were lost. ((S), if characters could mean something else from time to time (and the "sum" form a kind of average should) there could be e.g. no normativity since also the average would change constantly with the sum.)
theory of usage/McGinn: meaning is nothing like the link between situations of usage. Precisely for this reason it is so difficult to articulate the relationships, because the FIN-features are not results of CALM.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996
Wittgenstein Kripke Vs Wittgenstein I 43
E.g.: Wittgenstein: "Moses does not exist" means that "no human being has done this and that".(KripkeVs). Kripke: This is about the difference between reference and meaning: The theory in question is regarded as a theory of the meaning of the name "Moses" and not simply as a theory of his reference.
KripkeVsWittgenstein: In any case I think it is wrong that "Moses exists" actually holds this meaning (that he has done something).
I 70
KripkeVsWittgenstein: However, if the description has the function to rigidly define a reference, it is clear that this is "not" what the sentence "Moses did not exist" means; because in the counterfactual case, for example that no one led the Israelites out of Egypt, we can then ask: Does it ensue that Moses did not exist in such a situation? It seems that it does not ensue. For surely Moses would have been able to spend days more pleasantly.
NS I 39
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: 1. Problem of Infinity: How can a finite number of examples define an infinite number of new cases?
Wrong solution: through meaning
Wrong solution: through disposition
NS I 40
Another pupil obviously has a different disposition, i.e. individual dispositions are not enough. Wittgenstein’s solution: collective dispositions.
KripkeVsWittgenstein: there are no facts (>Problem of Normativity).
2. Problem of Normativity: which facts lay down which is the correct answer?
Kripke: We can establish a new praxis at all times.
New Literature/Newen/Schrenk: Pragmatic solution:
Def Persuasion/New Authors/Newen/Schrenk: To have convictions with a defined meaning you need to take part in social practices and to mutually ascribe convictions with specific meanings. (Solution for Kripke’s Wittgenstein). (Literature. 2-24).

Putnam III 219
Belief/Elisabeth Anscombe: Did once ask Wittgenstein what he would do if one of his friends was believing in faith healing. Would he try to dissuade him? Wittgenstein said yes, not knowing why however. KripkeVsWittgenstein: Classifies it as a distinct proof for Wittgenstein’s relativism.
PutnamVs: Wittgenstein only finds it useless.

Stegmüller IV 35ff
Kripkes Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: The crucial dispositions have been acquired in the past, the difference was already present in the past. KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are actually irrelevant a) When I have a hypothesis regarding my disposition, I still do not know whether it is the right one -
IV 37
b) If we wanted to "let the past rest" and were only asking what we consider to be right at this moment, we lose the term "right".
IV 38
Kripke: Important argument: I have always had the same dispositions! – Disposition/VsKripke: a) it could be an idealization of my praxis KripkeVs: fantastic new assumptions will be necessary VsKripke: b) Idealization "if I had the possibility..." KripkeVs: It requires a function/fact or a table that is independent from the disposition.
IV 39f
KripkeVsWittgenstein: No table it is infinite, it is impossible to have checked everything. To mean, to conceive: no happenings in the consciousness but dispositions, dispositions are not happenings as well.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989