Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Appearance Leibniz Holz I 128
In itself/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: their relationship with Leibniz is a dialectical one. It again corresponds exactly to the scheme of the "Overlapping General": The in-itself is the genre of itself (!), The in-itself, and its opposite, of the phenomenon. See also "the overarching general".
---
I 129
This does not mean the fact that the phenomenon is always the appearance of an in-itself (which is the meaning of the word). KantVsLeibniz: for then the phenomenon could still be different from that whose appearance it is, and hence no knowledge of the object is possible. (This is how Kant sees the relationship).
LeibnizVsKant: insists that the phenomenon is the same as the in-itself, which manifests itself in the phenomenon.
The world does this in perception. This it how it duplicates itself in two respects.
1. As a whole, however, from a different perspective
2. It appears spatially as the dissociation of the various substances,
3. It appears as a temporal succession of different perceptions.
The system of perceptions is "well-founded," because it is nothing but the self-restraining activity of the original power of the in-itself.
The difference between the in-itself and the appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and principle of its difference.
---
I 130
Hence the phenomenon is not standing out from the in-itself, but a kind of the same, and as such something quite real. Appearance/world/Leibniz: the world always appears only insofar as it is expressed as being-such of a single monad.
Phenomenality/Leibniz: the way in which the thing-to-be-expressed is contained in the expressed. Every expression is a phenomenon. It is well founded because, the in-itself, the phenomenon is identical with it and establishes it as a appearing in-itself.
The phenomenon is not opposed to reality (VsKant), but precisely its specific mode of being in the process of universal representation.
Therefore, all perceptions in all individual substances must correspond to one another.
---
I 131
Unity/Leibniz: only in this way can all the different monads perceive one and the same appearance. This is the "harmony universal" (universal harmony, see above) in process form, in which all appearances are linked, because they are appearances of the same in-itself.
Phenomenon/Representation/Leibniz: that means, however, that all beings are phenomenal. (Just as it is at the same time in-itself).
Since representation with Leibniz is a universal and general process, every being must be a phenomenon for every other being.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Correspondence Millikan I 107
Correspondence/Correspondence Relation/Millikan: here we are dealing with the relationship between an indicative intentional icon and its real value. 1. Definition: real value is the normal condition for the exertion of the direct eigenfunction of the icon.
2. There are correspondences between transformations on both sides!
3. Each transformation on the page of the icon has a normal condition for the eigenfunction (proper performance) of the corresponding transformation of the real value.
N.B.: this is about a comparison of the transformations of icon and real value, not a correspondence of the elements of icon and real value. ((s)> covariance).
Transformation/Millikan: this is not about "parts" but about invariant and variable aspects ((s) of a whole).
E.g. bee dance: variable: direction - invariant: existence of nectar.
---
I 108
Transformation/Sentence/Millikan: for sentences, the most frequent transformation is substitution or negation. E.g. "Theaitetos swims" Every transformation corresponds to a possible world situation (fact, world affair).
Articulation: a fact, is determined by a group of possible transformations.
---
I 307
Consensus/Millikan: first you have to know something about the objective world, not the world, as we perceive it (sensory world). Consensus/judgment: consensus in judgment is not to respond to the same stimulus with the same reaction. Rarely two people react to the same stimulus with the same choice of words. There is also no agreement on how to divide the world into pieces. Instead, it is a sign that each speaker has contact with the world in its own way, and that it is the same, which is mapped in different ways.
---
I 329
Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to assume that truth is a correspondence with the WORLD. Image/Representation/Putnam: mathematical images are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent.
Problem: a correspondence theory based on the fact that there is a mapping relation between a complete set of true representations and the world is empty.
---
I 330
Solution: there must first be a distinction between images and representations. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely, that an intended interpretation is marked.
Causal theory/Putnam: a causal theory would not help here. For it is just as uncertain whether "cause" clearly refers, as if "cat" clearly refers.
Concept/Sign/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental particular", otherwise every sign merely refers to another sign again.
PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be picked out, either by holding up the sign itself,
E.g.
COW
Or by holding up a different sign, e.g.
REFERS
Or maybe
CAUSES.
Meaning/Meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the meaning rationalism: in order to mean something, we must know what we mean and namely "know" with a very definite, meaning-rationalist shine on "know":
The relation between the head and the world must be reflected wholly in the head,
((s)> See Leibniz, the "overarching general").
PutnamVs: that would only work if there was a mysterious "direct understanding of forms" ((s) platonistic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again.
---
I 331
Correspondence/to mean/Meaning/References/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: Thesis: the relations between the head and the world are indeed between the head and the world. However, the understanding of these relations does not contribute to the justification of meaning and reference. They do not have to be intended so that one can refer.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Forms of Thinking Leibniz Holz I 68
"Overarching general"/Leibniz/Holz: the truth of reason is the genre which comprises two (and only two) species, namely the truth of reason itself and its opposite, the truths of facts. For the formal logician, this remains a systematic contradiction: Leibniz makes a distinction between necessary and contingent truths. At the same time he comprehends both of them as analytic.
Holz: in fact, the relationship is not formal, but dialectical.
> Josef König: "The Overarching General" as the basic logical figure of Leibniz's metaphysics, necessary for the inexpressable multiplicity of the world, which can nevertheless be subjected to an order of reason.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Logical Form Leibniz Holz I 135
World/Mirror/Leibniz: he uses for this relationship the metaphor of the mirror. Each monad is a living mirror and endowed with inner action that represents the universe according to its perspective.
Mirror/Holz: its essence is to be the appearance of a mirrored in-itself.
But it is also true that the mirrored outside of the mirror exists only "extensively" or as an aggregate of scattered parts.
The unit is made by the mirror! But that is a definite and figurative unity.
In-itself and appearance always exist in the identity of the different, because in the mirror we see the thing itself,...
---
I 136
...unlike in a painting or a photograph. Holz: this results in a strange reciprocal relationship between the logical and the ontological overlap of the links on their respective counterparts.
Representation/Holz: logical: the representation is logically the genre of itself and the depicted. (See "The Overarching General").
Ontological: the reverse is the represented genre of itself and representation.
Entanglement of world and substance in Leibniz.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Totality Leibniz Holz I 73
Totality/whole/outer/outside/Leibniz: because it is one and all (hen kei pan) as such, this supreme general must be conceived outside the series rerum. The world is not a link, but the series itself. ((s) therefore not outside!). Aristotle: thus the whole series is "being itself" (on hê on).
Holz: the absolutely irreducible sentence, the first axiom at all: "The world is all that what is the case". (Wittgenstein).
The connection of all bodies, however, is not itself a body, that is, not extensional (die res extensa, Descartes) but intensional, the structure.
This is the "complete concept". > Hegel: "absolute concept".
Complete concept/Leibniz: the complete concept contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a particular being, it is thus identical with the concept of the world as a whole.
It is only perceptible to an infinite mind.
---
I 74
Identity/Leibniz/Holz: the identity of the finite with itself is formally not to be distinguished from the identity of the infinite whole with itself. Outer/outside/whole/Leibniz: If there was an infinite mind, it would have to be outside the whole to be able to grasp it at the same time. But with this the whole would not be the whole anymore.
It is a priori true that the whole cannot be mapped isotropically.
Hence, the boundary concept of the infinite mind remains a heuristic fiction, a heuristic analogy to the finite mind.
---
Holz I 113
Single/Whole/Identity/Leibniz/Holz: the identity of the individual with the whole and vice versa is based on the distinction between the two! (> Hegel: Reason: the unity of identity and difference). Leibniz: the (definition) immanence of substance in the world and the
(definition) inherence of the world in the individual substance.
Logical form/Holz: the "overarching general":´
---
I 114
The whole has two types: A) the whole itself and
B) the individual, which on the one hand is a kind of whole ((s) by demarcation), and yet its opposite, namely, a part.
The ontological correspondence of this logical structure:
Twofold way of being in:
(A) "in the world"
(B) Substance itself as something comprehensive, in which the totality of all other substances, that is, the world, is "contained" as a condition of its own.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Truth Leibniz Holz I 44
Truth of reason/Truth of facts/Leibniz: Truth of reason: certain simple and original ideas, such as those of identity, are immediately seen as modes or forms of our sense-perception as categories of the givenness of beings.
They are not mediated by perception, but are the determinateness of perception itself.
---
Holz I 54
Definition Truth/Leibniz/Holz: truth appears as a statement relation, in which the identity of different things is determined against each other. Definition Experience/Leibniz/Holz: experience is the return of something different to their connection in such a relation.
Discovery of the truth of different things, namely subject and predicate in synthetic sentences of experience. Truth/Leibniz/Holz: truth is not really in the identity of the subject A = A, but in the return of the predication to the identity of a certain predicate with a certain subject in which it is contained, thereby distinguishing the subject from other subjects.
The truth of a proposition states that it can be traced back to an identical proposition (axiom).
---
I 57
Truth/Leibniz: truth appears only mediated, in the medium of its opposite, of appearance (> Appearance/Hegel). Truth of facts/truth of reason/Leibniz: I gain the certainty of the facts, the vérités de fait only by means of their representation on the level of reason - the vérités de raison.
This can show me the material truth but only as the not wrong. (s)
Double negation: is weaker.
In the reversal of the method of proof in truths of facts, the variety of experience and the unity of reason stand opposite to each other like a mirror image.
---
Holz 63
Truth of facts/Leibniz: the truth of facts must exist, if anything should be said at all about the infinite manifoldness, and knowledge should thus be gained.
Truth of reasons/Leibniz: truth of reasons is necessary, their opposite is impossible.
Truth of facts/Leibniz: truth of facts is contingent, their opposite is possible.
Holz: the difference between the two must not be misunderstood, otherwise Russell would be right:
---
I 64/65
Russell: It is nonsense to say of a true proposition that it is not true in the sense of another, apotictically true proposition. ((s), for example, that a truth of reason contradicts a truth of facts). Holz: the difference lies in the argument.
For the proof of truth of facts, we must examine the preceding chain of connections and because of the infinite divisibility of the bodies an infinite number of sentences. This can only do the infinite mind of God.
Truth of reason/Leibniz: is the generic term for truths of reasons and truths of facts!
The truth attribute of both lies in the fact that in the subject concept all its possible predicates are contained. "Praedicatum inest subiecto".
Inclusion of the predicate in the subject: A is contained in Ax or Ax = A + B + ... X.
---
I 66
This inclusion of the predicate is the foundation of truth. This is, according to structure, a reason of reason. Definition truth/Leibniz/Holz: is then the constitution of that state in which identity comes to a being or a fact when it enters into a distinction between subject/predicate/definiendum/definiens.
This state is where the fact appears as the concept of the fact.
Truth is a reflexion relationship.
---
Holz I 68
"Overarching general"/Leibniz/Holz: the truth of reason is the genre which comprises two (and only two) species, namely the truth of reason itself and its opposite, the truths of facts. For the formal logician, this remains a systematic contradiction: Leibniz makes a distinction between necessary and contingent truths. Nevertheless, he comprehends both of them analytically!
Holz: in fact, the relationship is not a formal logical one, but a dialectical one.
> Josef König: "The Overarching General" as the basic logical figure of Leibniz's metaphysics, is necessary for the inexpressable multiplicity of the world, which can nevertheless be subjected to an order of reason.
---
Holz I 73
Complete concept/Leibniz: the complete concept contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a particular being, is thus identical with the concept of the world as a whole. Only perceptible to an infinite mind.
Overarching general: for the infinite mind, the distinction between truths of reason and truths of facts is again invalid. For him, everything is a truth of reason, or, one can say as well, everything is a truth of facts for him!
For the finite mind, however, the truth of reason is the opposite of the truth of facts.
Overarching general: the one involves its opposite.
Truth/Cognition/Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: This again has the astounding consequence that Leibniz can only speak sensibly of two kinds of truth (truths of facts/truths of reason) when he comprehends the idea of the infinite mind (for which the two coincide) only as a metaphysical auxiliary construction.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Kant Leibniz Vs Kant Frege III 31
Numbers/LeibnizVsKant: Has claimed the provability of the numerical formulas. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4. Assuming that 4 indicates 3 ​​and 1, one can prove it, in a way:
  Definitions:
1st 1 and 1 are 2,
2nd 2 and 1 are 3
3rd 3 and 1 are 4
  Axiom: If a similar number is inserted, the equation remains.
  Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4
  So by axiom: 2 + 2 = 4


Leibniz I 83
Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: Does not take part in the radical philosophy of subject. Like Spinoza prior to him and Hegel after him, he wanted to find a not subjective reason of being which can be expressed in truths of reason [vérités de raison] since Descartes' indispensable reflection on the subject. For this, two principles are sufficient.
1. Principle of contradiction
2. Principle of sufficient reason (can be traced back to the principle of contradiction).
Additionally,since the principle of identity is perceived through the sensory perception, we can ascribe reason -which is presupposed in our thought (the logicality of reason)- to the principles of the objects themselves (so their ontic reality).
as panlogically as Hegel's system.
I 84
In the universe and its parts, logic is existing and embodied like this. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: This is why all relationships between realities - phenomenal as well as metaphysical ones- can be expressed in a logical form.
Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: The world does not seem logical because the subject understands it in the logical form of his/her thought; rather, the logical form of thought is imperative because the world shows itself as being logically created.
Leibniz: The world, however, does not show itself as world but as an additive series, i.e. an aggregate.
I 128
Phenomenon/LeibnizVsKant: Kant's idea that it is separated from the being is not to be applied! Rather, the "mundus intelligibilis" forms the basis for the "mundus sensibilis". The latter is also not a duplication but a "translation".
The phenomenal is the substantial itself but with the conditions of the imagination, for which spaciality and temporality are essential.
In-itself [Ansich]/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: For Leibniz, its relation is dialectical. It corresponds in turn exactly to the schema of the "Übergreifendes Allgemeines":
The in-itself [Ansich] is a category of itself (!), of the in-itself and its opposite, of the appearance. ((s) > „The overarching generality“, >Paradoxes).
I 129
The fact that the appearance is always the appearance of a in-itself (which is the sense of the word) is not meant by it. KantVsLeibniz: Because the appearance could then still differ from the object, for which it is its appearance, and as such knowledge of the object would not be possible. (This is Kant's view of the relationship.)
LeibnizVsKant: Insists that the appearance is the same as the in-itself which shows itself in the appearance.
The world does so in the perception. As such, the world reproduces itself in two ways.
1. as a whole but each time under another perspective
2. the world appears spatially as the disunion of different substances,
3. the world appears temporally as succession of different perceptions.
The system of perceptions is "well-founded" ["wohl begründet"] because it actually is the self-restricting activity of the initial force of the in-itself.
The difference between the in-itself and appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and the principle of its difference.
I 130
This is why the appearance is not unreal in comparison to the in-itself, but a sort of identical form, and as such quite real. Phenomenology/Leibniz: The way in which what needs to be expressed is comprised in the expressed. Everything that is expressed is a phenomenon.It is well-founded because the in-itself, by expressing itself, is the phenomenon. The in-itself is also identical to the phenomenon, and
constitutes the latter implicitly [Ansichseiendes].
The phenomenon is not reality's opposite (Vs Kant), but actually its specific being which is currently creating its universal representation.
This is why all perceptions in each substance need to correspond to each other.

I 133
Motion/Leibniz: Something takes the place of something else.
I 134
The "space" [Raum] is everything that encompasses all these places. For this, there is also no need to accept an "absolute reality" of the space. Space/Time/LeibnizVsKant: The epitome of possible relationships, not as forms of intuition, but as real ontological structures of the materially implicit relationships.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Metaphysical Realism Millikan Vs Metaphysical Realism Millikan I 329
Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to suppose that truth was a correspondence with the WORLD. Projection/representation/Putnam: mathematical projections are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent.
Problem: a correspondence theory, which is based on a projective relation between a complete collection of true representations and the world is empty.
I 330
Solution: there must first be a distinction between projections and representations. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely that an intended interpretation is identified.
Causal theory/Putnam: would not help here. Because it is equally uncertain whether the "Cause" references unambiguously or the "Cat" references unambiguously.
Concept/signs/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental individual thing", otherwise each sign merely refers to a different sign repeatedly.
PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be singled out, either by holding up the sign itself, Ex
COW
Or by holding up another sign e.g.
REFERENCES
Or maybe
CAUSES.
To mean/meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the rationalism of meaning: in order to mean something, we need to know what we mean, namely "know" it with a very specific clarity informed by rationalism of meaning:
The relation between the head and the world must be reflected in full in the head,
((s)> the "overarching general"/Leibniz).
PutnamVs: That could only work if there was a mysterious "direct capture of the shape" ((s) platonic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again.
I 331
Correspondence/to mean/meaning/reference/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: thesis: the relations between the head and the world are actually between the head and the world. Understanding these relationships contributes nothing to the explanation of meaning and reference. They don't have to be intended in order to make a reference.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Moore, G.E. Prior Vs Moore, G.E. I 21
Correspondence Theory/Prior: now we can handle the fact that truth and falsity are not only applied to propositions, but also to beliefs and assertions. Truth/Belief/Logical Form/Prior:
E.g. "X believes that there will be a nuclear war, and there will be one."
(X believes that) p and p. (Parenthesis).
Falsity:
E.g. "X believes that there will be a nuclear war, but there not will be one."
((s) but = and.)
X believes that p and ~p.
Correspondence Theory: Aquinas' "adaequatio intellectus et rei" goes back to the Jewish Neo-Platonist Isaac Israeli from the 10th century.
Locus classicus of modernity:
Correspondence Theory/Moore: (G. E. Moore, Some main problems of philosophy, New York 1953)
I 22
Example: Suppose a friend falsely believed that he (Moore) went on holiday and says: Moore: We should say, of course, that if this belief is true, then I must have gone on holiday,
and vice versa (conversely):
we should say that if I went, this belief is true, of course.
Prior: so far it is Aristotelian.
Now Moore continues, however, and says:
Although its absence is a necessary and sufficient condition for the belief of his friend to be true, it cannot be what is meant by saying that the belief is true! Because:
Moore: if we say "the belief that I'm gone, is true", we mean that the belief has a specific property that it shares with other true beliefs.
But if we say: "I'm gone", we do not attribute a property to any proposition!
We only express a fact, and this fact could also exist if no one believed that!
Point/Moore: if no one believes it, the belief does not exist, and then this belief must be false, even if I'm away!
((s) then it must not be false, because nothing that does not exist must be anything or have any properties per se.)
PriorVsMoore: he is forced to say that, because he assumes that belief consists in a relation between this belief and a fact. A relation that is not definable, but "familiar".
((s) > "overarching general": if the belief itself consists in a relation between (itself) the belief and a fact, the belief occurs twice. Problem: if it should be defined by this relation. But neither Moore nor Prior say that here. Instead: separating of levels. Belief/Name of the Belief).
Moore: the "name of the belief" is to be: "The belief that I'm gone."
Name of the fact: "I'm gone."
Correspondence/Moore: relation between "the name of the belief and the name of the fact" is what he calls the correspondence.
PriorVsMoore: (he probably discarded it later anyway). this is doubtful in two respects:
1) The reason he indicates for the fact that his absence should be constitutive for the truth of the belief of his friend, is at the same time the reason to say that "the former [was] no sufficient and necessary condition for the latter".
2) But if we corrected this with a truly sufficient condition, this correction would also give us a definition.
I.e. the belief is true if
X believes that p and it is the case that p.
Correspondence would not be more, then. (Simply accordance with the facts).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003