Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 60 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appearance | Leibniz | Holz I 128 In itself/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: their relationship with Leibniz is a dialectical one. It again corresponds exactly to the scheme of the "Overlapping General": The in-itself is the genre of itself (!), The in-itself, and its opposite, of the phenomenon. See also "the overarching general". I 129 This does not mean the fact that the phenomenon is always the appearance of an in-itself (which is the meaning of the word). KantVsLeibniz: for then the phenomenon could still be different from that whose appearance it is, and hence no knowledge of the object is possible. (This is how Kant sees the relationship). >Thing in itself/Kant. LeibnizVsKant: Leibniz insists that the phenomenon is the same as the in-itself, which manifests itself in the phenomenon. >Phenomena/Leibniz. The world does this in perception. This it how it duplicates itself in two respects. 1. As a whole, however, from a different perspective 2. It appears spatially as the dissociation of the various substances, 3. It appears as a temporal succession of different perceptions. The system of perceptions is "well-founded," because it is nothing but the self-restraining activity of the original power of the in-itself. The difference between the in-itself and the appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and principle of its difference. >Totality/Leibniz. --- I 130 Hence the phenomenon is not standing out from the in-itself, but a kind of the same, and as such something quite real. Appearance/world/Leibniz: the world always appears only insofar as it is expressed as being-such of a single monad. Phenomenality/Leibniz: the way in which the thing-to-be-expressed is contained in the expressed. Every expression is a phenomenon. It is well founded because, the in-itself, the phenomenon is identical with it and establishes it as a appearing in-itself. The phenomenon is not opposed to reality (VsKant), but precisely its specific mode of being in the process of universal representation. Therefore, all perceptions in all individual substances must correspond to one another. >Perception/Leibniz. --- I 131 Unity/Leibniz: only in this way can all the different monads perceive one and the same appearance. This is the "harmony universal" (universal harmony, see above) in process form, in which all appearances are linked, because they are appearances of the same in-itself. Phenomenon/Representation/Leibniz: that means, however, that all beings are phenomenal. (Just as it is at the same time in-itself). Since representation with Leibniz is a universal and general process, every being must be a phenomenon for every other being. >Unity/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Association | Deacon | I 96 Associations/Deacon: a) Index-like level/character-like: (correlation stimulus/response, noise/object, signal/object): here there are competing sets of overlapping associative relations. These are translated into mutually reinforcing semantic categories at the higher, symbolic level. b) Symbolic level: here there are relations between the symbols which do not exist at the level of the index-like relations: e.g. categories of meaning, syntactic differences, etc. At this level the stimuli do not compete with each other as they do at the character-like level. >Symbols/Deacon. This explains why, for example, animals that have reached the symbolic level learn faster. The novel associations between characters (not only between a character and an object) lead to a network with two predominant types of association: a) one opposite many b) many opposite one. >Symbolic Reference/Deacon; >Symbolic Learning/Deacon; >Icon/Deacon; >Learning/Deacon. I 97 Memory/Deacon: each character-like association (stimulus/response) is now supported at the symbolic level by a large number of other character-like associations, because they are all encoded in memory in various ways. >Memory. Together, they are much more protected against erasure because the external relations to objects are now relatively less important. Associative learning/Deacon: this explains why we are learning relatively easy a large amount of words. Brain: stores and finds character-like and symbolically associated information in the same way. This is shown by experiments with electrical stimuli, which were set at the same time as the occurrence of words. I 98 Animal: Experiments with monkeys (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978(1);1980(2) and Savage-Rumbaugh 1986(3)) showed that new vocabulary was learned more quickly if the animals were able to have symbolic associations. We can call that the symbolic threshold. >Animals, >Animal language. I 266 Associations/language/Deacon: the recursive embedding of partial sentences creates in an economic way a hierarchy of associations. I 267 In the brain, the operations for organizing these combinatorial relations are located in the prefrontal cortex. >Brain/Deacon. I 277 Language/Brain: In humans, the cerebellum is probably much more involved in the analysis of sounds. This can be very important for the formation of word associations. The cerebellum is very fast in the formation of predictions. Linking to the cerebellum is, for example, beneficial for fast conjugations that are used in the formation of sentences. >Language/Deacon. 1. Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1978). Symbolization, language and chimpanzees: A theoretcal reevaluation based on initial language acquisition processes in four young Pan troglodytes. Brain and Language 6, 265. 2. Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1980). Reference: The linguistic essential. Science 210. 922-925. 3. Savage-Rumbaugh (1986). Ape Language: From Conditioned Response to Symbol. New York: Columbia University Press. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Behavior | Corr | Corr I 365 Behavior/Corr: [there is] a more fundamental aspect of the BIS (Behavioural Inhibition System; >Terminology/Corr), namely that it is sensitive to goal conflict (e.g., approach-avoidance; e.g., an animal will approach a threat only if there is some possibility of a rewarding outcome, such as food). However, threats (as opposed to primary punishment itself) are only one source of aversion. Revised RST (>Reinforcement Sensivity Theory/Corr) argues that, in principle, approach-approach and avoidance-avoidance conflicts also involve activation of the same system and have essentially the same effects as the classic approach-avoidance. The aversive element resides in the possibility of making a mistake, thus we typically spend time weighing up all the possibilities, and searching for potential downsides to each decision. >Anxiety/Corr. Corr I 366 BAS/Behavioral Approach System: it may be assumed that the BAS is more complex than conventionally thought – and, indeed, may be more complex than either the FFFS or the BIS.6 I (Corr 2008a)(6) developed the concept of sub-goal scaffolding, which reflects the separate, though overlapping, stages of BAS behaviour, Corr I 367 consisting in a series of appetitively-motivated sub-goals. Sub-goal scaffolding reflects the fact that, in order to move along the temporo-spatial gradient to the final primary biological reinforcer, it is necessary to engage a number of distinct processes. Complex approach behaviour entails a series of behavioural processes, some of which oppose each other. Such behaviour often demands restraint and planning, but, especially at the final point of capture of the biological reinforcer, impulsivity is more appropriate. (…)’Impulsivity’ may not be the most appropriate name for the personality dimension that reflects BAS processes (Franken and Muris 2006(1); Smillie, Jackson and Dalgleish 2006)(2). There is evidence that, at the psychometric level, the BAS is multidimensional. For example, the Carver and White (1994)(3) BIS/BAS scales measure three aspects of BAS: Reward Responsiveness, Drive and Fun-Seeking – these scales have good psychometric properties in both adolescents and adults (e.g., Caci, Deschaux and Baylé 2007(4); Cooper, Gomez and Aucute 2007(5)). >Drives/Corr, >Anxiety/fear/Corr. Corr I 368 Extraversion/CorrVsEysenck: in the revised RST (>Reinforcement SensivityTheory/Corr) we have to assume that Eysenck’s Extraversion factor reflects the balance of reward and punishment systems (a central assumption in RST) for a viable explanation as to why Extraversion and arousal are so often associated in experimental studies of personality. 1. Franken, I. H. A. and Muris, P. 2006. Gray’s impulsivity dimension: a distinction between Reward Sensitivity versus Rash Impulsiveness, Personality and Individual Differences 40: 1337–47 2. Smillie, L. D., Jackson, C. J. and Dalgleish, L. I. 2006. Conceptual distinctions among Carver and White’s (1994) BAS scales: a reward-reactivity versus trait impulsivity perspective, Personality and Individual Differences 40: 1039–50 3. Carver, C. S. and White, T. L. 1994. Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective responses to impending reward and punishment: the BIS/BAS scales, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67: 319–33 4. Caci, H., Deschaux, O. and Baylé, F. J. 2007. Psychometric properties of the French versions of the BIS/BAS and the SPSRQ, Personality and Individual Differences 42: 987–98 5. Cooper, A., Gomez, R. and Aucute, H. 2007. The Behavioural Inhibition System and Behavioural Approach System (BIS/BAS) scales: measurement and structural invariance across adults and adolescents, Personality and Individual Differences 43: 295–305 6. Corr, P. J. 2008a. Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST): Introduction, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 1–43. Cambridge University Press Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Consensus | Waldron | Gaus I 91 Consensus/agreement/liberalism/Waldron: One may emphasize the idea of an ‘overlapping consensus’ – a variety of justificatory paths from disparate philosophical premises to a plateau of liberal principles. (This is Rawls’s view (...).) Another may opt for a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach, emphasizing justificatory premises that all members of a pluralist society may be presumed to accept, whatever the differences in their ethics or world view. And the phrase ‘may be presumed to accept’ may be glossed in various ways, ranging from the idea of universally accessible reasons and reasoning to some fairly aggressive account of basic human interests, like the survivalist account developed by Hobbes (1991)(1). >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Waldron. 1. Hobbes, Thomas (1991 [1651]) Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Counterfactual Dependence | Bigelow | I 315 Counterfactual dependence/causes/Bigelow/Pargetter: the connection between both is narrow but complicated. It goes back to Lewis 1973b(1), Cause. Lewis: analysis as causation is a special case of counterfactual dependence. Logical form: a sequence of propositions. >Propositions, >Counterfactual conditional. I 317 Counterfactual dependence/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: here relations of consequences of propositions are considered, no forces. >Forces. It is important that these occur only between separate events. >Events, >Causality. It is wider than the definition of the cause of Lewis, for three reasons: 1. It may also consist between propositions which do not concern events, e.g. concerning the number of rats and cats. 2. Overlapping events can also be included here. I 318 E.g. Composite events often depend on their components in a counterfactual manner. E.g. Jaegwon Kim: if I had not written a double r, I would not have written "Harry". (Kim 1973)(2). 3. There is a difference in whether to tell which of these events are happening or whether one of these events happens. It may be true that these counterfactual conditionals are true C1 would happen> would e1 happen C2 would happen> would e2 happen And yet the following are not true C1 would not happen> would e1 not happen C2 would not happen> e2 would not happen Causation/Lewis: is then not given, but nevertheless counterfactual dependency. For example, it may be that a person hears a sound in an experiment, although none is produced. I 319 Cause/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.B.: one can still say here that the sounds that actually reach the ear are the cause of the sensation (no illusion) although Lewis' condition is actually not fulfilled. This shows that we rather rely on the concept of counterfactual dependence than on concept of the causation, as Lewis has defined it. Counterfactual dependence/physics/science/Bigelow/Pargetter. E.g. Boyles law: (gas pressure depends on volume and temperature): provides an infinite number of counterfactual dependencies. Similar: E.g. Perception Psychology, Biology. I 320 As well: for example, in the process of concluding counterfactual dependence between conclusion and premisses. E.g. Act according to beliefs and desires. E.g. Functionalism. Cf. >Functionalism. 1. Lewis, D.K. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70. pp.556-67. 2. Kim, J. (1973). Causes and counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophy 70. pp.570-2. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Distribution | Lyons | I 72 Def Distribution/Linguistics/Lyons: each linguistic unit has a characteristic distribution, namely the set of contexts in which it can stand. >Context. Distribution equivalent: two expressions can be in the same context. Correspondingly distribution-complementary or distribution-overlapping. If two units are at least partially distribution equivalent, they cannot contrast with each other. I 145 Distribution/Grammar/Lyons: We can take distribution as a starting point for a grammatical description: expressions have meaning when they are used in an appropriate context. >Expressions/Lyons, >Grammar, >Meaning. I 147 Distribution analysis/grammar/Lyons: a list would not be the most direct description of a text: in a sufficiently large language sample there will be a considerable overlap in the distribution of different words. >Lists. Distribution classes: Classes of words that can be used for each other in a sentence. Example "I drink beer": liquor, milk, water... and so forth. >Word classes, cf. >P. Gärdenfors. General/formal: e.g. we assume a material corpus of 17 "sentences": ab,ar,,pr,qab,dpb,aca,pca,pcp,qar,daca,dacp,dacqa,dacdp,acqp,acdp. Letters: stand here for words. I 148 Problem: we still have no distinction between "grammatically correct" and "meaningful" (useful). >Meaningful/meaningless, >Acceptability/Lyons. In our example, a and p have certain contexts in common (namely -r,pc-, dac-), b and r (a-,qa) and d and q (dac-a,-aca, ac-p) c: is unique in its distribution (a-a,p-c,p-p,qa-a,da-a,da-p), because no other word can be found in the same context as c. X: we now merge a and p in the class CX and insert this class name everywhere where either a or p occur. Sentences that differ only in that o is where the other sentence has a are thus grouped into a class. ((s) "disjunctive"): Xb,Xr,(ar,pr), qXb,dXb,XcX, (aca, pca, pcp), qXr, qXcX,dXcX (daca,dacp), dXcqX,dXcdX,qXcdX,XcdX,XcqX,XcdX,XcdX. Y: we set Y for b and r, Z: for d and q. Then we get 1. XY, (Xb,Xr) 2. ZXY (qXb, qXr, dXb) 3. XcX, 4. ZXcX (qXcX, dXcX) 5. ZXcZX (dXcqX, dXcdX, qXcdX) 6. XcZX (XcqX, XcdX). N.B.: with this we can capture the 17 sentences of our corpus through six structural formulas. (c is a one-membered class). They specify which consequences of word classes are acceptable. The consequences are linear. (see below). Grammatically correct: are sentences in our example, that result from these structure rules. This is only achieved by the fact that the sentences that occur are regarded as links in a superset of 48 sentences. (The number 48 is obtained by applying the syntagmatic length formulas to each of the six sentence types and adding the results). I 149 Generative/generative grammar/Lyons: the "grammar" in our example is generative in that it assigns a certain structural description to each sentence that appears in the "sample", for example pr is a sentence with the structure XY, pcda is a sentence with the structure XcZY, etc. >Generative Grammar. Grammar/Lyons: as it is understood here, it is nothing else than the description of the sentences of a language as combinations of words and word groups due to their affiliation to distribution classes. It is a kind of "algebra" in which the variables are the word classes and the constants or the values assumed by the variables in certain sentences are the individual words. >Grammar, cf. >Syntax. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Diversity (Politics) | Waldron | Gaus I 90 Diversity/society/toleration/pluralism/liberalism/Waldron: (...) by elaborating and defending liberal principles and liberal solutions to the problems of social life (…), we seem to be taking sides in the midst of cultural and ethical plurality. Toleration/Locke/Waldron: (...) part of the Lockean defence of religious toleration is built up on religious foundations: ‘The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion,’ says Locke, ‘is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light’ (1983(1): 25). >Toleration/Locke. Problem/Waldron: Maybe you cannot see what is really important about toleration except from a perspective that invokes particular values and particular philosophical conceptions. Gaus I 91 Hobbes: Another may opt for a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach, emphasizing justificatory premises that all members of a pluralist society may be presumed to accept, whatever the differences in their ethics or world view. And the phrase ‘may be presumed to accept’ may be glossed in various ways, ranging from the idea of universally accessible reasons and reasoning to some fairly aggressive account of basic human interests, like the survivalist account developed by Hobbes (1991)(2). >Toleration/Waldron. Gaus I 94 Individualism/Rawls/SandelVsRawls/Communitarianism/Waldron: (...) the individualism of Rawls’s thin theory drew criticism from communitarian philosophers, who repudiated the implicit assumption that individual plans of life are chosen by persons unencumbered by prior commitments and allegiances. Those who thought of themselves as essentially members of a particular family or community or people might find it hard to accept a theory of justice oriented at foundational level to the well-being of persons conceived as liberated from all such attachments (Sandel, 1982)(1). Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993(3): 4). Gaus I 95 Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron. Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2 , … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1 , and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2 , and so on. Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical Gaus I 96 importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke, Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron, >Overlapping consensus/Rawls. 1. Locke, John (1983 [1689]) A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James H. Tully. Indianapolis: Hackett. 2. Hobbes, Thomas (1991 [1651]) Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Environment | AI Research | Norvig I 401 Environment/planning/real world/representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: algorithms for planning (…) extend both the representation language and the way the planner interacts with the environment. >Planning/Norvig, >Agents/Norvig. New: [we now have] a) actions with duration and b) plans that are organized hierarchically. Hierarchy: Hierarchy also lends itself to efficient plan construction because the planner can solve a problem at an abstract level before delving into details 1st approach: “plan first, schedule later”: (…) we divide the overall problem into a planning phase in which actions are selected, with some ordering constraints, to meet the goals of the problem, and a later scheduling phase, in which temporal information is added to the plan to ensure that it meets resource and deadline constraints. Norvig I 404 Critical path: Mathematically speaking, critical-path problems are easy to solve because they are defined as a conjunction of linear inequalities on the start and end times. When we introduce resource constraints, the resulting constraints on start and end times become more complicated. Norvig I 405 Scheduling: The “cannot overlap” constraint is a disjunction of two linear inequalities, one for each possible ordering. The introduction of disjunctions turns out to make scheduling with resource constraints NP-hard. >NP-Problems. Non-overlapping: [when we assume non-overlapping] every scheduling problem can be solved by a non-overlapping sequence that avoids all resource conflicts, provided that each action is feasible by itself. If a scheduling problem is proving very difficult, however, it may not be a good idea to solve it this way - it may be better to reconsider the actions and constraints, in case that leads to a much easier scheduling problem. Thus, it makes sense to integrate planning and scheduling by taking into account durations and overlaps during the construction of a partial-order plan. Heuristics: partial-order planners can detect resource constraint violations in much the same way they detect conflicts with causal links. Heuristics can be devised to estimate the total completion time of a plan. This is currently an active area of research (see below). Norvig I 406 Real world planning: AI systems will probably have to do what humans appear to do: plan at higher levels of abstraction. A reasonable plan for the Hawaii vacation might be “Go to San Francisco airport (…)” ((s) which might be in a different direction). (…) planning can occur both before and during the execution of the plan (…). Solution: hierarchical decomposition: hierarchical task networks (HTN). Norvig I 407 a high-level plan achieves the goal from a given state if at least one of its implementations achieves the goal from that state. The “at least one” in this definition is crucial - not all implementations need to achieve the goal, because the agent gets Norvig I 408 to decide which implementation it will execute. Thus, the set of possible implementations in HTN planning - each of which may have a different outcome - is not the same as the set of possible outcomes in nondeterministic planning. It can be shown that the right collection of HLAs can result in the time complexity of blind search dropping from exponential in the solution depth to linear in the solution depth, although devising such a collection of HLAs may be a nontrivial task in itself. Norvig I 409 Plan library: The key to HTN planning, then, is the construction of a plan library containing known methods for implementing complex, high-level actions. One method of constructing the library is to learn the methods from problem-solving experience. (>Representation/AI research, >Learning/AI research). Learning/AI: In this way, the agent can become more and more competent over time as new methods are built on top of old methods. One important aspect of this learning process is the ability to generalize the methods that are constructed, eliminating detail that is specific to the problem instance (…). Norvig I 410 Nondeterministic action: problem: downward refinement is much too conservative for a real world environment. See >Terminology/Norvig for “demonic nondeterminism” and “angelic nondeterminism”. Norvig I 411 Reachable sets: The key idea is that the agent can choose which element of the reachable set it ends up in when it executes the HLA; thus, an HLA with multiple refinements is more “powerful” than the same HLA (hig level action) with fewer refinements. The notion of reachable sets yields a straightforward algorithm: search among highlevel plans, looking for one whose reachable set intersects the goal; once that happens, the algorithm can commit to that abstract plan, knowing that it works, and focus on refining the plan further. Norvig I 415 Unknown environment/planning/nondeterministic domains: [problems here are] sensorless planning (also known as conformant planning) for environments with no observations; contingency planning for partially observable and nondeterministic environments; and online planning and replanning for unknown environments. Norvig I 417 Sensorless planning: In classical planning, where the closed-world assumption is made, we would assume that any fluent not mentioned in a state is false, but in sensorless (and partially observable) planning we have to switch to an open-world assumption in which states contain both positive and negative fluents, and if a fluent does not appear, its value is unknown. Thus, the belief state corresponds exactly to the set of possible worlds that satisfy the formula. Norvig I 423 Online replanning: The online agent has a choice of how carefully to monitor the environment. We distinguish three levels: a) Action monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that all the preconditions still hold, b) Plan monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that the remaining plan will still succeed, c) Goal monitoring: before executing an action, the agent checks to see if there is a better set of goals it could be trying to achieve. Norvig I 425 Multi-agent planning: A multibody problem is still a “standard” single-agent problem as long as the relevant sensor information collected by each body can be pooled - either centrally or within each body - to form a common estimate of the world state that then informs the execution of the overall plan; in this case, the multiple bodies act as a single body. When communication constraints make this impossible, we have Norvig I 426 what is sometimes called a decentralized planning problem: (…) the subplan constructed for each body may need to include explicit communicative actions with other bodies. Norvig I 429 Convention: A convention is any constraint on the selection of joint plans. Communication: In the absence of a convention, agents can use communication to achieve common knowledge of a feasible joint plan. Plan recognition: works when a single action (or short sequence of actions) is enough to determine a joint plan unambiguously. Note that communication can work as well with competitive agents as with cooperative ones. Norvig I 430 The most difficult multi-agent problems involve both cooperation with members of one’s own team and competition against members of opposing teams, all without centralized control. Norvig I 431 Time constraints in plans: Planning with time constraints was first dealt with by DEVISER (Vere, 1983(1)). The representation of time in plans was addressed by Allen (1984(2)) and by Dean et al. (1990)(3) in the FORBIN system. NONLIN+ (Tate and Whiter, 1984)(4) and SIPE (Wilkins, 1988(5), 1990(6)) could reason about the allocation of limited resources to various plan steps. Forward state-space search: The two planners SAPA (Do and Kambhampati, 2001)(7) and T4 (Haslum and Geffner, 2001)(8) both used forward state-space search with sophisticated heuristics to handle actions with durations and resources. Human heuristics: An alternative is to use very expressive action languages, but guide them by human-written domain-specific heuristics, as is done by ASPEN (Fukunaga et al., 1997)(9), HSTS (Jonsson et al., 2000)(10), and IxTeT (Ghallab and Laruelle, 1994)(11). Norvig I 432 Hybrid planning-and-scheduling systems: ISIS (Fox et al., 1982(12); Fox, 1990(13)) has been used for job shop scheduling at Westinghouse, GARI (Descotte and Latombe, 1985)(14) planned the machining and construction of mechanical parts, FORBIN was used for factory control, and NONLIN+ was used for naval logistics planning. We chose to present planning and scheduling as two separate problems; (Cushing et al., 2007)(15) show that this can lead to incompleteness on certain problems. Scheduling: The literature on scheduling is presented in a classic survey article (Lawler et al., 1993)(16), a recent book (Pinedo, 2008)(17), and an edited handbook (Blazewicz et al., 2007)(18). Abstraction hierarchy: The ABSTRIPS system (Sacerdoti, 1974)(19) introduced the idea of an abstraction hierarchy, whereby planning at higher levels was permitted to ignore lower-level preconditions of actions in order to derive the general structure of a working plan. Austin Tate’s Ph.D. thesis (1975b) and work by Earl Sacerdoti (1977)(20) developed the basic ideas of HTN planning in its modern form. Many practical planners, including O-PLAN and SIPE, are HTN planners. Yang (1990)(21) discusses properties of actions that make HTN planning efficient. Erol, Hendler, and Nau (1994(22), 1996(23)) present a complete hierarchical decomposition planner as well as a range of complexity results for pure HTN planners. Our presentation of HLAs and angelic semantics is due to Marthi et al. (2007(24), 2008(25)). Kambhampati et al. (1998)(26) have proposed an approach in which decompositions are just another form of plan refinement, similar to the refinements for non-hierarchical partial-order planning. Explanation-based learning: The technique of explanation-based learning (…) has been applied in several systems as a means of generalizing previously computed plans, including SOAR (Laird et al., 1986)(27) and PRODIGY (Carbonell et al., 1989)(28). Case-based planning: An alternative approach is to store previously computed plans in their original form and then reuse them to solve new, similar problems by analogy to the original problem. This is the approach taken by the field called case-based planning (Carbonell, 1983(29); Alterman, 1988(30); Hammond, 1989(31)). Kambhampati (1994)(32) argues that case-based planning should be analyzed as a form of refinement planning and provides a formal foundation for case-based partial-order planning. Norvig I 433 Conformant planning: Goldman and Boddy (1996)(33) introduced the term conformant planning, noting that sensorless plans are often effective even if the agent has sensors. The first moderately efficient conformant planner was Smith and Weld’s (1998)(34) Conformant Graphplan or CGP. Ferraris and Giunchiglia (2000)(35) and Rintanen (1999)(36) independently developed SATPLAN-based conformant planners. Bonet and Geffner (2000)(37) describe a conformant planner based on heuristic search in the space of >belief states (…). Norvig I 434 Reactive planning: In the mid-1980s, pessimism about the slow run times of planning systems led to the proposal of reflex agents called reactive planning systems (Brooks, 1986(38); Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39). PENGI (Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39) could play a (fully observable) video game by using Boolean circuits combined with a “visual” representation of current goals and the agent’s internal state. Policies: “Universal plans” (Schoppers, 1987(40), 1989(41)) were developed as a lookup table method for reactive planning, but turned out to be a rediscovery of the idea of policies that had long been used in Markov decision processes (…). >Open Universe/AI research). 1. Vere, S. A. (1983). Planning in time: Windows and durations for activities and goals. PAMI, 5, 246-267. 2. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123-154. 3. Dean, T., Kanazawa, K., and Shewchuk, J. (1990). Prediction, observation and estimation in planning and control. In 5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Vol. 2, pp. 645-650. 4. Tate, A. and Whiter, A. M. (1984). Planning with multiple resource constraints and an application to a naval planning problem. In Proc. First Conference on AI Applications, pp. 410-416. 5. Wilkins, D. E. (1988). Practical Planning: Extending the AI Planning Paradigm. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Wilkins, D. E. (1990). Can AI planners solve practical problems? Computational Intelligence, 6(4), 232-246. 7. Do, M. B. and Kambhampati, S. (2003). Planning as constraint satisfaction: solving the planning graph by compiling it into CSP. AIJ, 132(2), 151-182. 8. Haslum, P. and Geffner, H. (2001). Heuristic planning with time and resources. In Proc. IJCAI-01 Workshop on Planning with Resources. 9. Fukunaga, A. S., Rabideau, G., Chien, S., and Yan, D. (1997). ASPEN: A framework for automated planning and scheduling of spacecraft control and operations. In Proc. International Symposium on AI, Robotics and Automation in Space, pp. 181-187. 10. Jonsson, A., Morris, P., Muscettola, N., Rajan, K., and Smith, B. (2000). Planning in interplanetary space: Theory and practice. In AIPS-00, pp. 177-186. 11. Ghallab, M. and Laruelle, H. (1994). Representation and control in IxTeT, a temporal planner. In AIPS-94, pp. 61-67. 12. Fox, M. S., Allen, B., and Strohm, G. (1982). Job shop scheduling: An investigation in constraint directed reasoning. In AAAI-82, pp. 155-158. 13. Fox, M. S. (1990). Constraint-guided scheduling: A short history of research at CMU. Computers in Industry, 14(1–3), 79-88 14. Descotte, Y. and Latombe, J.-C. (1985). Making compromises among antagonist constraints in a planner. AIJ, 27, 183–217. 15. Cushing,W., Kambhampati, S.,Mausam, and Weld, D. S. (2007). When is temporal planning really temporal? In IJCAI-07. 16. Lawler, E. L., Lenstra, J. K., Kan, A., and Shmoys, D. B. (1993). Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. In Graves, S. C., Zipkin, P. H., and Kan, A. H. G. R. (Eds.), Logistics of Production and Inventory: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Volume 4, pp. 445 - 522. North-Holland. 17. Pinedo, M. (2008). Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems. Springer Verlag. 18. Blazewicz, J., Ecker, K., Pesch, E., Schmidt, G., and Weglarz, J. (2007). Handbook on Scheduling: Models and Methods for Advanced Planning (International Handbooks on Information Systems). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 19. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1974). Planning in a hierarchy of abstraction spaces. AIJ, 5(2), 115–135. 20. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1977). A Structure for Plans and Behavior. Elsevier/North-Holland 21. Yang, Q. (1990). Formalizing planning knowledge for hierarchical planning. Computational Intelligence, 6, 12–24. 22. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1994). HTN planning: Complexity and expressivity. In AAAI-94, pp. 1123–1128. 23. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1996). Complexity results for HTN planning. AIJ, 18(1), 69–93. 24. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2007). Angelic semantics for high-level actions. In ICAPS-07. 25. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2008). Angelic hierarchical planning: Optimal and online algorithms. In ICAPS-08. 26. Kambhampati, S., Mali, A. D., and Srivastava, B. (1998). Hybrid planning for partially hierarchical domains. In AAAI-98, pp. 882–888. 27. Laird, J., Rosenbloom, P. S., and Newell, A. (1986). Chunking in Soar: The anatomy of a general learning mechanism. Machine Learning, 1, 11–46. 28. Carbonell, J. G., Knoblock, C. A., and Minton, S. (1989). PRODIGY: An integrated architecture for planning and learning. Technical report CMU-CS- 89-189, Computer Science Department, Carnegie- Mellon University. 29. Carbonell, J. G. (1983). Derivational analogy and its role in problem solving. In AAAI-83, pp. 64–69. 30. Alterman, R. (1988). Adaptive planning. Cognitive Science, 12, 393–422. 31. Hammond, K. (1989). Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory Task. Academic Press. 32. Kambhampati, S. (1994). Exploiting causal structure to control retrieval and refitting during plan reuse. Computational Intelligence, 10, 213–244 33. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 34. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 35. Smith, D. E. and Weld, D. S. (1998). Conformant Graphplan. In AAAI-98, pp. 889–896. 36. Rintanen, J. (1999). Improvements to the evaluation of quantified Boolean formulae. In IJCAI-99, pp. 1192–1197. 37. Bonet, B. and Geffner, H. (2005). An algorithm better than AO∗? In AAAI-05. 38. Brooks, R. A. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, 2, 14–23. 39. Agre, P. E. and Chapman, D. (1987). Pengi: an implementation of a theory of activity. In IJCAI-87, pp. 268–272. 40. Schoppers, M. J. (1987). Universal plans for reactive robots in unpredictable environments. In IJCAI- 87, pp. 1039–1046. 41. Schoppers, M. J. (1989). In defense of reaction plans as caches. AIMag, 10(4), 51–60. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Environment | Norvig | Norvig I 401 Environment/planning/real world/representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: algorithms for planning (…) extend both the representation language and the way the planner interacts with the environment. >Planning/Norvig, >Agents/Norvig. New: [we now have] a) actions with duration and b) plans that are organized hierarchically. Hierarchy: Hierarchy also lends itself to efficient plan construction because the planner can solve a problem at an abstract level before delving into details 1st approach: “plan first, schedule later”: (…) we divide the overall problem into a planning phase in which actions are selected, with some ordering constraints, to meet the goals of the problem, and a later scheduling phase, in which temporal information is added to the plan to ensure that it meets resource and deadline constraints. Norvig I 404 Critical path: Mathematically speaking, critical-path problems are easy to solve because they are defined as a conjunction of linear inequalities on the start and end times. When we introduce resource constraints, the resulting constraints on start and end times become more complicated. Norvig I 405 Scheduling: The “cannot overlap” constraint is a disjunction of two linear inequalities, one for each possible ordering. The introduction of disjunctions turns out to make scheduling with resource constraints NP-hard. >NP-Problems. Non-overlapping: [when we assume non-overlapping] every scheduling problem can be solved by a non-overlapping sequence that avoids all resource conflicts, provided that each action is feasible by itself. If a scheduling problem is proving very difficult, however, it may not be a good idea to solve it this way - it may be better to reconsider the actions and constraints, in case that leads to a much easier scheduling problem. Thus, it makes sense to integrate planning and scheduling by taking into account durations and overlaps during the construction of a partial-order plan. Heuristics: partial-order planners can detect resource constraint violations in much the same way they detect conflicts with causal links. Heuristics can be devised to estimate the total completion time of a plan. This is currently an active area of research (see below). Norvig I 406 Real world planning: AI systems will probably have to do what humans appear to do: plan at higher levels of abstraction. A reasonable plan for the Hawaii vacation might be “Go to San Francisco airport (…)” ((s) which might be in a different direction). (…) planning can occur both before and during the execution of the plan (…). Solution: hierarchical decomposition: hierarchical task networks (HTN). Norvig I 407 a high-level plan achieves the goal from a given state if at least one of its implementations achieves the goal from that state. The “at least one” in this definition is crucial - not all implementations need to achieve the goal, because the agent gets Norvig I 408 to decide which implementation it will execute. Thus, the set of possible implementations in HTN planning - each of which may have a different outcome - is not the same as the set of possible outcomes in nondeterministic planning. It can be shown that the right collection of HLAs can result in the time complexity of blind search dropping from exponential in the solution depth to linear in the solution depth, although devising such a collection of HLAs may be a nontrivial task in itself. Norvig I 409 Plan library: The key to HTN planning, then, is the construction of a plan library containing known methods for implementing complex, high-level actions. One method of constructing the library is to learn the methods from problem-solving experience. (>Representation/AI research, >Learning/AI research). Learning/AI: In this way, the agent can become more and more competent over time as new methods are built on top of old methods. One important aspect of this learning process is the ability to generalize the methods that are constructed, eliminating detail that is specific to the problem instance (…). Norvig I 410 Nondeterministic action: problem: downward refinement is much too conservative for a real world environment. See >Terminology/Norvig for “demonic nondeterminism” and “angelic nondeterminism”. Norvig I 411 Reachable sets: The key idea is that the agent can choose which element of the reachable set it ends up in when it executes the HLA; thus, an HLA with multiple refinements is more “powerful” than the same HLA (hig level action) with fewer refinements. The notion of reachable sets yields a straightforward algorithm: search among highlevel plans, looking for one whose reachable set intersects the goal; once that happens, the algorithm can commit to that abstract plan, knowing that it works, and focus on refining the plan further. Norvig I 415 Unknown environment/planning/nondeterministic domains: [problems here are] sensorless planning (also known as conformant planning) for environments with no observations; contingency planning for partially observable and nondeterministic environments; and online planning and replanning for unknown environments. Norvig I 417 Sensorless planning: In classical planning, where the closed-world assumption is made, we would assume that any fluent not mentioned in a state is false, but in sensorless (and partially observable) planning we have to switch to an open-world assumption in which states contain both positive and negative fluents, and if a fluent does not appear, its value is unknown. Thus, the belief state corresponds exactly to the set of possible worlds that satisfy the formula. Norvig I 423 Online replanning: The online agent has a choice of how carefully to monitor the environment. We distinguish three levels: a) Action monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that all the preconditions still hold, b) Plan monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that the remaining plan will still succeed, c) Goal monitoring: before executing an action, the agent checks to see if there is a better set of goals it could be trying to achieve. Norvig I 425 Multi-agent planning: A multibody problem is still a “standard” single-agent problem as long as the relevant sensor information collected by each body can be pooled - either centrally or within each body - to form a common estimate of the world state that then informs the execution of the overall plan; in this case, the multiple bodies act as a single body. When communication constraints make this impossible, we have Norvig I 426 what is sometimes called a decentralized planning problem: (…) the subplan constructed for each body may need to include explicit communicative actions with other bodies. Norvig I 429 Convention: A convention is any constraint on the selection of joint plans. Communication: In the absence of a convention, agents can use communication to achieve common knowledge of a feasible joint plan. Plan recognition: works when a single action (or short sequence of actions) is enough to determine a joint plan unambiguously. Note that communication can work as well with competitive agents as with cooperative ones. Norvig I 430 The most difficult multi-agent problems involve both cooperation with members of one’s own team and competition against members of opposing teams, all without centralized control. Norvig I 431 Time constraints in plans: Planning with time constraints was first dealt with by DEVISER (Vere, 1983(1)). The representation of time in plans was addressed by Allen (1984(2)) and by Dean et al. (1990)(3) in the FORBIN system. NONLIN+ (Tate and Whiter, 1984)(4) and SIPE (Wilkins, 1988(5), 1990(6)) could reason about the allocation of limited resources to various plan steps. Forward state-space search: The two planners SAPA (Do and Kambhampati, 2001)(7) and T4 (Haslum and Geffner, 2001)(8) both used forward state-space search with sophisticated heuristics to handle actions with durations and resources. Human heuristics: An alternative is to use very expressive action languages, but guide them by human-written domain-specific heuristics, as is done by ASPEN (Fukunaga et al., 1997)(9), HSTS (Jonsson et al., 2000)(10), and IxTeT (Ghallab and Laruelle, 1994)(11). Norvig I 432 Hybrid planning-and-scheduling systems: ISIS (Fox et al., 1982(12); Fox, 1990(13)) has been used for job shop scheduling at Westinghouse, GARI (Descotte and Latombe, 1985)(14) planned the machining and construction of mechanical parts, FORBIN was used for factory control, and NONLIN+ was used for naval logistics planning. We chose to present planning and scheduling as two separate problems; (Cushing et al., 2007)(15) show that this can lead to incompleteness on certain problems. Scheduling: The literature on scheduling is presented in a classic survey article (Lawler et al., 1993)(16), a recent book (Pinedo, 2008)(17), and an edited handbook (Blazewicz et al., 2007)(18). Abstraction hierarchy: The ABSTRIPS system (Sacerdoti, 1974)(19) introduced the idea of an abstraction hierarchy, whereby planning at higher levels was permitted to ignore lower-level preconditions of actions in order to derive the general structure of a working plan. Austin Tate’s Ph.D. thesis (1975b) and work by Earl Sacerdoti (1977)(20) developed the basic ideas of HTN planning in its modern form. Many practical planners, including O-PLAN and SIPE, are HTN planners. Yang (1990)(21) discusses properties of actions that make HTN planning efficient. Erol, Hendler, and Nau (1994(22), 1996(23)) present a complete hierarchical decomposition planner as well as a range of complexity results for pure HTN planners. Our presentation of HLAs and angelic semantics is due to Marthi et al. (2007(24), 2008(25)). Kambhampati et al. (1998)(26) have proposed an approach in which decompositions are just another form of plan refinement, similar to the refinements for non-hierarchical partial-order planning. Explanation-based learning: The technique of explanation-based learning (…) has been applied in several systems as a means of generalizing previously computed plans, including SOAR (Laird et al., 1986)(27) and PRODIGY (Carbonell et al., 1989)(28). Case-based planning: An alternative approach is to store previously computed plans in their original form and then reuse them to solve new, similar problems by analogy to the original problem. This is the approach taken by the field called case-based planning (Carbonell, 1983(29); Alterman, 1988(30); Hammond, 1989(31)). Kambhampati (1994)(32) argues that case-based planning should be analyzed as a form of refinement planning and provides a formal foundation for case-based partial-order planning. Norvig I 433 Conformant planning: Goldman and Boddy (1996)(33) introduced the term conformant planning, noting that sensorless plans are often effective even if the agent has sensors. The first moderately efficient conformant planner was Smith and Weld’s (1998)(34) Conformant Graphplan or CGP. Ferraris and Giunchiglia (2000)(35) and Rintanen (1999)(36) independently developed SATPLAN-based conformant planners. Bonet and Geffner (2000)(37) describe a conformant planner based on heuristic search in the space of >belief states (…). Norvig I 434 Reactive planning: In the mid-1980s, pessimism about the slow run times of planning systems led to the proposal of reflex agents called reactive planning systems (Brooks, 1986(38); Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39). PENGI (Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39) could play a (fully observable) video game by using Boolean circuits combined with a “visual” representation of current goals and the agent’s internal state. Policies: “Universal plans” (Schoppers, 1987(40), 1989(41)) were developed as a lookup table method for reactive planning, but turned out to be a rediscovery of the idea of policies that had long been used in Markov decision processes (…). >Open Universe/AI research). 1. Vere, S. A. (1983). Planning in time: Windows and durations for activities and goals. PAMI, 5, 246-267. 2. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123-154. 3. Dean, T., Kanazawa, K., and Shewchuk, J. (1990). Prediction, observation and estimation in planning and control. In 5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Vol. 2, pp. 645-650. 4. Tate, A. and Whiter, A. M. (1984). Planning with multiple resource constraints and an application to a naval planning problem. In Proc. First Conference on AI Applications, pp. 410-416. 5. Wilkins, D. E. (1988). Practical Planning: Extending the AI Planning Paradigm. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Wilkins, D. E. (1990). Can AI planners solve practical problems? Computational Intelligence, 6(4), 232-246. 7. Do, M. B. and Kambhampati, S. (2003). Planning as constraint satisfaction: solving the planning graph by compiling it into CSP. AIJ, 132(2), 151-182. 8. Haslum, P. and Geffner, H. (2001). Heuristic planning with time and resources. In Proc. IJCAI-01 Workshop on Planning with Resources. 9. Fukunaga, A. S., Rabideau, G., Chien, S., and Yan, D. (1997). ASPEN: A framework for automated planning and scheduling of spacecraft control and operations. In Proc. International Symposium on AI, Robotics and Automation in Space, pp. 181-187. 10. Jonsson, A., Morris, P., Muscettola, N., Rajan, K., and Smith, B. (2000). Planning in interplanetary space: Theory and practice. In AIPS-00, pp. 177-186. 11. Ghallab, M. and Laruelle, H. (1994). Representation and control in IxTeT, a temporal planner. In AIPS-94, pp. 61-67. 12. Fox, M. S., Allen, B., and Strohm, G. (1982). Job shop scheduling: An investigation in constraint directed reasoning. In AAAI-82, pp. 155-158. 13. Fox, M. S. (1990). Constraint-guided scheduling: A short history of research at CMU. Computers in Industry, 14(1–3), 79-88 14. Descotte, Y. and Latombe, J.-C. (1985). Making compromises among antagonist constraints in a planner. AIJ, 27, 183–217. 15. Cushing,W., Kambhampati, S.,Mausam, and Weld, D. S. (2007). When is temporal planning really temporal? In IJCAI-07. 16. Lawler, E. L., Lenstra, J. K., Kan, A., and Shmoys, D. B. (1993). Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. In Graves, S. C., Zipkin, P. H., and Kan, A. H. G. R. (Eds.), Logistics of Production and Inventory: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Volume 4, pp. 445 - 522. North-Holland. 17. Pinedo, M. (2008). Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems. Springer Verlag. 18. Blazewicz, J., Ecker, K., Pesch, E., Schmidt, G., and Weglarz, J. (2007). Handbook on Scheduling: Models and Methods for Advanced Planning (International Handbooks on Information Systems). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 19. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1974). Planning in a hierarchy of abstraction spaces. AIJ, 5(2), 115–135. 20. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1977). A Structure for Plans and Behavior. Elsevier/North-Holland 21. Yang, Q. (1990). Formalizing planning knowledge for hierarchical planning. Computational Intelligence, 6, 12–24. 22. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1994). HTN planning: Complexity and expressivity. In AAAI-94, pp. 1123–1128. 23. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1996). Complexity results for HTN planning. AIJ, 18(1), 69–93. 24. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2007). Angelic semantics for high-level actions. In ICAPS-07. 25. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2008). Angelic hierarchical planning: Optimal and online algorithms. In ICAPS-08. 26. Kambhampati, S., Mali, A. D., and Srivastava, B. (1998). Hybrid planning for partially hierarchical domains. In AAAI-98, pp. 882–888. 27. Laird, J., Rosenbloom, P. S., and Newell, A. (1986). Chunking in Soar: The anatomy of a general learning mechanism. Machine Learning, 1, 11–46. 28. Carbonell, J. G., Knoblock, C. A., and Minton, S. (1989). PRODIGY: An integrated architecture for planning and learning. Technical report CMU-CS- 89-189, Computer Science Department, Carnegie- Mellon University. 29. Carbonell, J. G. (1983). Derivational analogy and its role in problem solving. In AAAI-83, pp. 64–69. 30. Alterman, R. (1988). Adaptive planning. Cognitive Science, 12, 393–422. 31. Hammond, K. (1989). Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory Task. Academic Press. 32. Kambhampati, S. (1994). Exploiting causal structure to control retrieval and refitting during plan reuse. Computational Intelligence, 10, 213–244 33. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 34. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 35. Smith, D. E. and Weld, D. S. (1998). Conformant Graphplan. In AAAI-98, pp. 889–896. 36. Rintanen, J. (1999). Improvements to the evaluation of quantified Boolean formulae. In IJCAI-99, pp. 1192–1197. 37. Bonet, B. and Geffner, H. (2005). An algorithm better than AO∗? In AAAI-05. 38. Brooks, R. A. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, 2, 14–23. 39. Agre, P. E. and Chapman, D. (1987). Pengi: an implementation of a theory of activity. In IJCAI-87, pp. 268–272. 40. Schoppers, M. J. (1987). Universal plans for reactive robots in unpredictable environments. In IJCAI- 87, pp. 1039–1046. 41. Schoppers, M. J. (1989). In defense of reaction plans as caches. AIMag, 10(4), 51–60. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Environment | Russell | Norvig I 401 Environment/planning/real world/representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: algorithms for planning (…) extend both the representation language and the way the planner interacts with the environment. >Planning/Norvig, >Agents/Norvig. New: [we now have] a) actions with duration and b) plans that are organized hierarchically. Hierarchy: Hierarchy also lends itself to efficient plan construction because the planner can solve a problem at an abstract level before delving into details 1st approach: “plan first, schedule later”: (…) we divide the overall problem into a planning phase in which actions are selected, with some ordering constraints, to meet the goals of the problem, and a later scheduling phase, in which temporal information is added to the plan to ensure that it meets resource and deadline constraints. Norvig I 404 Critical path: Mathematically speaking, critical-path problems are easy to solve because they are defined as a conjunction of linear inequalities on the start and end times. When we introduce resource constraints, the resulting constraints on start and end times become more complicated. Norvig I 405 Scheduling: The “cannot overlap” constraint is a disjunction of two linear inequalities, one for each possible ordering. The introduction of disjunctions turns out to make scheduling with resource constraints NP-hard. >NP-Problems. Non-overlapping: [when we assume non-overlapping] every scheduling problem can be solved by a non-overlapping sequence that avoids all resource conflicts, provided that each action is feasible by itself. If a scheduling problem is proving very difficult, however, it may not be a good idea to solve it this way - it may be better to reconsider the actions and constraints, in case that leads to a much easier scheduling problem. Thus, it makes sense to integrate planning and scheduling by taking into account durations and overlaps during the construction of a partial-order plan. Heuristics: partial-order planners can detect resource constraint violations in much the same way they detect conflicts with causal links. Heuristics can be devised to estimate the total completion time of a plan. This is currently an active area of research (see below). Norvig I 406 Real world planning: AI systems will probably have to do what humans appear to do: plan at higher levels of abstraction. A reasonable plan for the Hawaii vacation might be “Go to San Francisco airport (…)” ((s) which might be in a different direction). (…) planning can occur both before and during the execution of the plan (…). Solution: hierarchical decomposition: hierarchical task networks (HTN). Norvig I 407 a high-level plan achieves the goal from a given state if at least one of its implementations achieves the goal from that state. The “at least one” in this definition is crucial - not all implementations need to achieve the goal, because the agent gets Norvig I 408 to decide which implementation it will execute. Thus, the set of possible implementations in HTN planning - each of which may have a different outcome - is not the same as the set of possible outcomes in nondeterministic planning. It can be shown that the right collection of HLAs can result in the time complexity of blind search dropping from exponential in the solution depth to linear in the solution depth, although devising such a collection of HLAs may be a nontrivial task in itself. Norvig I 409 Plan library: The key to HTN planning, then, is the construction of a plan library containing known methods for implementing complex, high-level actions. One method of constructing the library is to learn the methods from problem-solving experience. >Representation/AI research, >Learning/AI research. Learning/AI: In this way, the agent can become more and more competent over time as new methods are built on top of old methods. One important aspect of this learning process is the ability to generalize the methods that are constructed, eliminating detail that is specific to the problem instance (…). Norvig I 410 Nondeterministic action: problem: downward refinement is much too conservative for a real world environment. See >Terminology/Norvig for “demonic nondeterminism” and “angelic nondeterminism”. Norvig I 411 Reachable sets: The key idea is that the agent can choose which element of the reachable set it ends up in when it executes the HLA; thus, an HLA with multiple refinements is more “powerful” than the same HLA (hig level action) with fewer refinements. The notion of reachable sets yields a straightforward algorithm: search among highlevel plans, looking for one whose reachable set intersects the goal; once that happens, the algorithm can commit to that abstract plan, knowing that it works, and focus on refining the plan further. Norvig I 415 Unknown environment/planning/nondeterministic domains: [problems here are] sensorless planning (also known as conformant planning) for environments with no observations; contingency planning for partially observable and nondeterministic environments; and online planning and replanning for unknown environments. Norvig I 417 Sensorless planning: In classical planning, where the closed-world assumption is made, we would assume that any fluent not mentioned in a state is false, but in sensorless (and partially observable) planning we have to switch to an open-world assumption in which states contain both positive and negative fluents, and if a fluent does not appear, its value is unknown. Thus, the belief state corresponds exactly to the set of possible worlds that satisfy the formula. Norvig I 423 Online replanning: The online agent has a choice of how carefully to monitor the environment. We distinguish three levels: a) Action monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that all the preconditions still hold, b) Plan monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that the remaining plan will still succeed, c) Goal monitoring: before executing an action, the agent checks to see if there is a better set of goals it could be trying to achieve. Norvig I 425 Multi-agent planning: A multibody problem is still a “standard” single-agent problem as long as the relevant sensor information collected by each body can be pooled - either centrally or within each body - to form a common estimate of the world state that then informs the execution of the overall plan; in this case, the multiple bodies act as a single body. When communication constraints make this impossible, we have Norvig I 426 what is sometimes called a decentralized planning problem: (…) the subplan constructed for each body may need to include explicit communicative actions with other bodies. Norvig I 429 Convention: A convention is any constraint on the selection of joint plans. Communication: In the absence of a convention, agents can use communication to achieve common knowledge of a feasible joint plan. Plan recognition: works when a single action (or short sequence of actions) is enough to determine a joint plan unambiguously. Note that communication can work as well with competitive agents as with cooperative ones. Norvig I 430 The most difficult multi-agent problems involve both cooperation with members of one’s own team and competition against members of opposing teams, all without centralized control. Norvig I 431 Time constraints in plans: Planning with time constraints was first dealt with by DEVISER (Vere, 1983(1)). The representation of time in plans was addressed by Allen (1984(2)) and by Dean et al. (1990)(3) in the FORBIN system. NONLIN+ (Tate and Whiter, 1984)(4) and SIPE (Wilkins, 1988(5), 1990(6)) could reason about the allocation of limited resources to various plan steps. Forward state-space search: The two planners SAPA (Do and Kambhampati, 2001)(7) and T4 (Haslum and Geffner, 2001)(8) both used forward state-space search with sophisticated heuristics to handle actions with durations and resources. Human heuristics: An alternative is to use very expressive action languages, but guide them by human-written domain-specific heuristics, as is done by ASPEN (Fukunaga et al., 1997)(9), HSTS (Jonsson et al., 2000)(10), and IxTeT (Ghallab and Laruelle, 1994)(11). Norvig I 432 Hybrid planning-and-scheduling systems: ISIS (Fox et al., 1982(12); Fox, 1990(13)) has been used for job shop scheduling at Westinghouse, GARI (Descotte and Latombe, 1985)(14) planned the machining and construction of mechanical parts, FORBIN was used for factory control, and NONLIN+ was used for naval logistics planning. We chose to present planning and scheduling as two separate problems; (Cushing et al., 2007)(15) show that this can lead to incompleteness on certain problems. Scheduling: The literature on scheduling is presented in a classic survey article (Lawler et al., 1993)(16), a recent book (Pinedo, 2008)(17), and an edited handbook (Blazewicz et al., 2007)(18). Abstraction hierarchy: The ABSTRIPS system (Sacerdoti, 1974)(19) introduced the idea of an abstraction hierarchy, whereby planning at higher levels was permitted to ignore lower-level preconditions of actions in order to derive the general structure of a working plan. Austin Tate’s Ph.D. thesis (1975b) and work by Earl Sacerdoti (1977)(20) developed the basic ideas of HTN planning in its modern form. Many practical planners, including O-PLAN and SIPE, are HTN planners. Yang (1990)(21) discusses properties of actions that make HTN planning efficient. Erol, Hendler, and Nau (1994(22), 1996(23)) present a complete hierarchical decomposition planner as well as a range of complexity results for pure HTN planners. Our presentation of HLAs and angelic semantics is due to Marthi et al. (2007(24), 2008(25)). Kambhampati et al. (1998)(26) have proposed an approach in which decompositions are just another form of plan refinement, similar to the refinements for non-hierarchical partial-order planning. Explanation-based learning: The technique of explanation-based learning (…) has been applied in several systems as a means of generalizing previously computed plans, including SOAR (Laird et al., 1986)(27) and PRODIGY (Carbonell et al., 1989)(28). Case-based planning: An alternative approach is to store previously computed plans in their original form and then reuse them to solve new, similar problems by analogy to the original problem. This is the approach taken by the field called case-based planning (Carbonell, 1983(29); Alterman, 1988(30); Hammond, 1989(31)). Kambhampati (1994)(32) argues that case-based planning should be analyzed as a form of refinement planning and provides a formal foundation for case-based partial-order planning. Norvig I 433 Conformant planning: Goldman and Boddy (1996)(33) introduced the term conformant planning, noting that sensorless plans are often effective even if the agent has sensors. The first moderately efficient conformant planner was Smith and Weld’s (1998)(34) Conformant Graphplan or CGP. Ferraris and Giunchiglia (2000)(35) and Rintanen (1999)(36) independently developed SATPLAN-based conformant planners. Bonet and Geffner (2000)(37) describe a conformant planner based on heuristic search in the space of >belief states (…). Norvig I 434 Reactive planning: In the mid-1980s, pessimism about the slow run times of planning systems led to the proposal of reflex agents called reactive planning systems (Brooks, 1986(38); Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39). PENGI (Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39) could play a (fully observable) video game by using Boolean circuits combined with a “visual” representation of current goals and the agent’s internal state. Policies: “Universal plans” (Schoppers, 1987(40), 1989(41)) were developed as a lookup table method for reactive planning, but turned out to be a rediscovery of the idea of policies that had long been used in Markov decision processes (…). >Open Universe/AI research). 1. Vere, S. A. (1983). Planning in time: Windows and durations for activities and goals. PAMI, 5, 246-267. 2. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123-154. 3. Dean, T., Kanazawa, K., and Shewchuk, J. (1990). Prediction, observation and estimation in planning and control. In 5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Vol. 2, pp. 645-650. 4. Tate, A. and Whiter, A. M. (1984). Planning with multiple resource constraints and an application to a naval planning problem. In Proc. First Conference on AI Applications, pp. 410-416. 5. Wilkins, D. E. (1988). Practical Planning: Extending the AI Planning Paradigm. Morgan Kaufmann. 6. Wilkins, D. E. (1990). Can AI planners solve practical problems? Computational Intelligence, 6(4), 232-246. 7. Do, M. B. and Kambhampati, S. (2003). Planning as constraint satisfaction: solving the planning graph by compiling it into CSP. AIJ, 132(2), 151-182. 8. Haslum, P. and Geffner, H. (2001). Heuristic planning with time and resources. In Proc. IJCAI-01 Workshop on Planning with Resources. 9. Fukunaga, A. S., Rabideau, G., Chien, S., and Yan, D. (1997). ASPEN: A framework for automated planning and scheduling of spacecraft control and operations. In Proc. International Symposium on AI, Robotics and Automation in Space, pp. 181-187. 10. Jonsson, A., Morris, P., Muscettola, N., Rajan, K., and Smith, B. (2000). Planning in interplanetary space: Theory and practice. In AIPS-00, pp. 177-186. 11. Ghallab, M. and Laruelle, H. (1994). Representation and control in IxTeT, a temporal planner. In AIPS-94, pp. 61-67. 12. Fox, M. S., Allen, B., and Strohm, G. (1982). Job shop scheduling: An investigation in constraint directed reasoning. In AAAI-82, pp. 155-158. 13. Fox, M. S. (1990). Constraint-guided scheduling: A short history of research at CMU. Computers in Industry, 14(1–3), 79-88 14. Descotte, Y. and Latombe, J.-C. (1985). Making compromises among antagonist constraints in a planner. AIJ, 27, 183–217. 15. Cushing,W., Kambhampati, S.,Mausam, and Weld, D. S. (2007). When is temporal planning really temporal? In IJCAI-07. 16. Lawler, E. L., Lenstra, J. K., Kan, A., and Shmoys, D. B. (1993). Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. In Graves, S. C., Zipkin, P. H., and Kan, A. H. G. R. (Eds.), Logistics of Production and Inventory: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Volume 4, pp. 445 - 522. North-Holland. 17. Pinedo, M. (2008). Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems. Springer Verlag. 18. Blazewicz, J., Ecker, K., Pesch, E., Schmidt, G., and Weglarz, J. (2007). Handbook on Scheduling: Models and Methods for Advanced Planning (International Handbooks on Information Systems). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 19. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1974). Planning in a hierarchy of abstraction spaces. AIJ, 5(2), 115–135. 20. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1977). A Structure for Plans and Behavior. Elsevier/North-Holland 21. Yang, Q. (1990). Formalizing planning knowledge for hierarchical planning. Computational Intelligence, 6, 12–24. 22. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1994). HTN planning: Complexity and expressivity. In AAAI-94, pp. 1123–1128. 23. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1996). Complexity results for HTN planning. AIJ, 18(1), 69–93. 24. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2007). Angelic semantics for high-level actions. In ICAPS-07. 25. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2008). Angelic hierarchical planning: Optimal and online algorithms. In ICAPS-08. 26. Kambhampati, S., Mali, A. D., and Srivastava, B. (1998). Hybrid planning for partially hierarchical domains. In AAAI-98, pp. 882–888. 27. Laird, J., Rosenbloom, P. S., and Newell, A. (1986). Chunking in Soar: The anatomy of a general learning mechanism. Machine Learning, 1, 11–46. 28. Carbonell, J. G., Knoblock, C. A., and Minton, S. (1989). PRODIGY: An integrated architecture for planning and learning. Technical report CMU-CS- 89-189, Computer Science Department, Carnegie- Mellon University. 29. Carbonell, J. G. (1983). Derivational analogy and its role in problem solving. In AAAI-83, pp. 64–69. 30. Alterman, R. (1988). Adaptive planning. Cognitive Science, 12, 393–422. 31. Hammond, K. (1989). Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory Task. Academic Press. 32. Kambhampati, S. (1994). Exploiting causal structure to control retrieval and refitting during plan reuse. Computational Intelligence, 10, 213–244 33. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 34. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117. 35. Smith, D. E. and Weld, D. S. (1998). Conformant Graphplan. In AAAI-98, pp. 889–896. 36. Rintanen, J. (1999). Improvements to the evaluation of quantified Boolean formulae. In IJCAI-99, pp. 1192–1197. 37. Bonet, B. and Geffner, H. (2005). An algorithm better than AO∗? In AAAI-05. 38. Brooks, R. A. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, 2, 14–23. 39. Agre, P. E. and Chapman, D. (1987). Pengi: an implementation of a theory of activity. In IJCAI-87, pp. 268–272. 40. Schoppers, M. J. (1987). Universal plans for reactive robots in unpredictable environments. In IJCAI- 87, pp. 1039–1046. 41. Schoppers, M. J. (1989). In defense of reaction plans as caches. AIMag, 10(4), 51–60. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Events | Lewis | V 56 Event/Lewis: can consist of parts, so great violations of laws of nature can be distinguished from small ones by the number of parts of complex events, not by "many laws", because always an infinite number of laws are violated when a single one is trespassed - or only one fundamental law violated. V 166 Event: always correspond to >propositions. - Hence we can use propositions here - e.g. O(e) says that an event e exists (happens), which complies with the description - in a set of possible worlds - But the proposition is not identical to the event - Problem: if no other event than e could fulfil the description, you would need rigid descriptions - which almost never exist - E.g. "Death of Socrates" is non-rigid. Solution: it is not about a sentence F(e), which is true in all and only the worlds in which e happens - Solution: We just need propositions that may have expressions in our language, but not necessarily do - If two events do not occur in exactly the same worlds, this means that there are no absolutely necessary links between the individual events - but then we can have a 1:1 connection between the events and the propositions - counterfactual dependence between events is simply a D between propositions - the counterfactual dependence between propositions corresponds to the causal dependence between events. - Causal dependence/Lewis: we then conclude it from the counterfactual dependence of propositions. - The dependence lies in the truth of counterfactual conditionals. - (> Causality/Hume, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. V 196 Definition Event: bigger or smaller classes of possible spatiotemporal regions - more or less connected by similarity. >Similarity/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. V 240 Event/Lewis: E.g. no event: rapidly converging mathematical consequence - is no quick entity - name ultimately uninteresting - probability theory; its events are propositions or sometimes properties - a theory that allows an unlimited number of Boolean operations can lead to unreal events. V 243 Definition Event: property of a spacetime region - always contingent - no event occurs in every possible world - an event happens in exactly one (whole) region - E.g. scattered region: sports championships. - E.g. annual event: not an event - an event does not repeat itself - and does not happen in different space-time regions. - The region of the event is the mereological sum of the regions where it happens - to each event corresponds a property of regions - such a property belongs to exactly one region of each possible world where the event happens - Property: is simply a class here. V 245 Event: two events can happen in the same region (space-time region) - E.g. presence of an electron in an electric field can cause its acceleration. It must be possible that one occurs without the other. Even if some of the laws of nature are violated. For every two events, there is a region in a possible world where one occurs, but not the other. ((s) independence) Two events never necessarily occur at the same time - there are hardly any conditions for eventness - maybe: 1) Regions are individuals that are parts of possible worlds 2) No region is part of various possible worlds - similar to > Montague. V 258 Event/mereology/part/partial event/Essence/Lewis: an event can be part of another. - E.g. movement of the left foot is part of walking. Def essential Part/Event: e is an essential part of f iff. f happens in a region, then also e necessarily in a sub-region that is enclosed in the region (implication of an event). But not necessary: events do not necessarily have their spatiotemporal parts. - E.g. walking could consist of fewer steps. V 259 Part/Whole/Event: Writing of "rry"/"Larry": counterfactual dependence, but not cause/Effect. - They are not causally dependent - nevertheless "rry" can be causally dependent on the writing of "La" - but not of "Larr" (overlapping). - The whole is not the cause of its parts. V 260 Event/mereology/Lewis: Thesis: events do not have a simpler mereology that, for example, chairs. A sum of chairs is not itself a chair, but a conference can be a sum of meetings. >Mereology. E.g. War is the mereological sum of battles - Event/Lewis: should serve as cause and effect - partial event: here the causality is sometimes difficult to determine - Problem: whether a subregion can be determined for a partial event in which it occurs - in simple cases yes. V 261 Non-event/Causal story/Lewis: Non-events cannot be determined as something isolated - they cannot be the cause. Constancy: is not always a non-event! Constancies are needed in causal explanation. >Causal explanation/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Events | Simons | I 129 Event/occurrents/Simons: events or processes are like continuants in time, but with temporal parts. No identity conditions can be specified. Continuants cannot be eliminated. Brutus-events cannot be seperated into individual events without reference to Brutus. I 131 Event/part/mereology/Simons: spatially and temporally extended events may have parts that are neither purely temporal nor purely spatial, e.g. the part of the football match which is attributable to a single player. Range/span/spn(e): a range or span is a spatiotemporal localization. "Being in": means within larger regions. "Covering": means covering exactly the part. Def spread/spr[e]: a spread is an exact space. Def spell/sp[e]: spell refers to an exact time. Atomic: if pan and spread = 0. Connected: two events are connected, if their span (consisting of span and spell) are topologically connected. Def temporal part: the temporal part contains all simultaneously occurring parts of the event (analog spatial part). Def phase: a phase has temporally related part. Def disc: a disc is a phase with duration 0. Def segment: a segment is a spatially related spatial part. Def section: a section is a segment with expansion 0. I 134 Sum/event/mereology/Simon: for sums of events, it is different than for sums of objects: if events are causally isolated, they cannot form a sum. However, they can be part of a wider whole (they may have an upper limit). Events do not satisfy the full mereology, but the weaker axioms. I 182 Product/events/Simons: problem: the products can exist interrupted. E.g. two objects could alternate between overlapping and separateness, e.g. light spots on a screen, e.g. two bodies share at a time certain members, at others times not. Problem: in the latter case the same product may arise again, but with other elements. >Interrupted Existence. I 183 The change of products requires topological terms. I 182 Coincidence/events: the lack of extensionality allows only one proof of coincidence instead of uniqueness. I 281 Event/reduction/reductionism/Forbes/Simons: events are open to a reduction in such a way as continuants are not, therefore, it is questionable whether there are irreducible truths de re about events ((s) that cannot be traced back to anything else). Essentialism: but as events are also real objects, there should also be essential truth about them. Problem: they are specified by descriptions. Simons: thesis: pro essentialism for events: e.g. the assassination of Franz Ferdinand by principle contains both essentially. E.g. bomb instead of firearm: is a different murder but not with swapped bullets. I 282 It is essential for an event that it is exactly part of those events, of which it is part at this point of time. Different: four-dimensionalism: it does not obey the essentialism. I 305 Event/continuants/Simons: event a: here a formula like "a < b" is complete. Continuants: here we need additionally a time index (with quantification): "ž(Et)[a |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Experience | Peacocke | I 5 Perception/experience/tradition/Peacocke: experience has a content. >Empirical content, >Content On the other hand: Feeling/sensations/tradition: sensation has no content. - E.g. sensation of smallness. It may nevertheless be a certain sensation. >Knowledge, >Thinking, >World/Thinking, >Distinctions. I 16f Experience/PeacockeVsPerception Theory/Tradition: more than just perception: emotional content, not merely representative content: e.g. tilted cube: jumps over, the network of lines looks completely different (perception). On the other hand: e.g. rabbit-duck-head: the line web does not change, therefore the perception theorist could claim that there are two representational components: a) the lines, b) Rabbit/duck >Rabbit-duck-head, >Perception theory/Peacocke. Perception theory: translation variant: the missing property must be introduced in suitable statements. PeacockeVs: this would only provide a priori knowledge, not empirical knowledge, since the postulated type of experience could not be missing. - Vs added terms: these do not have to be available to the clueless, so they do not change the truth or falsity. >Overdetermination of the representational content. Overdetermined: the angle could be changed by appropriate overlapping without changing the picture. I 199 Experience/Peacocke: also non-inferential experience is possible. Doubts: are inferential, always from conclusion. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Extensionality | Simons | Chisholm II 185 Extensionality/Quine: we assume space time points instead of "durable goods". SimonsVsQuine: language without continuants (permanent object) cannot be learned. Chisholm: probably time and modality, but not temporal or modal components: either a) accept phenomena, refuse extensionality or b) reject phenomena, demand extensionality for real lasting objects. >Entia Sukzessiva. SimonsVsChisholm: it is better to accept Aristotle things with unnecessary parts: trees simply consist of matter. This is more evidence than Wittgenstein's atoms. --- Simons I 3 Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore more than one object can be at the same time in the same place. Then we are dealing with continuants. Continuant/Simons: everything which is not an event is a continuant (see below) or everything that can have mass. >Continuants, >Parts. I 11 Extensional Mereology/CEM/extensionality/Simons: a characteristic property of extensional mereology is the relationship "part-of-or-identical-with". This corresponds with "less-than-or-equal" relationship. Overlapping: overlapping can be used as the only fundamental concept. Limiting case: separateness and identity. I 105f Part/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: 1. A whole is sometimes not one of its own parts. 2. Sometimes it is not transitive. 3. The existence of "sum-individuals" is not always guaranteed. That means, that the axioms, for individuals who obey any predicate, are wrong. 4. Identity criteria for individuals who have all parts in common, are wrong. I 106 5. Provides a materialist ontology of four-dimensional objects. Part/Simons: thesis: there is no uniform meaning of "part". I 117 Extensionality/Simons: extensionality is left with the rejection of the proper parts principle: I 28 Proper Parts Principle/strong/strong supporting principle: if x is not part of y, then there is a z which is part of x and which is separated from y. Solution for distinguishing sum (Tib + Tail) and whole (process) Tibbles (cat). >Tibbles-expample. Simons: the coincidence of individuals is temporarily indistinguishable (perceptually). >Superposition: superposition means being at the same time in the same place. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Features | Lyons | I 81 Def marked/feature/linguistics/Lyons: "("positive"): For example, the plural form is often marked by an s, i.e. the s is a positive sign for the plural, while the singular is not marked by a sign but "unmarked, "neutral"). Def unmarked/without feature/linguistics/Lyons: For example, lack of a feature ("neutral") singular form due to absence of the s, while the plural ("positive") is marked by an s (order/distinction). >Order, >Distinctions. Lyons: marked/unmarked: one could also say presence contrasts with absence. General/N.B.: often the unmarked form is of more general significance than the marked one. More general, the members of the pair do not have to be characterized by the presence or absence of a feature: Example "dog"/"bitch": "dog" contains male and female form. This leads to a characteristic form of error: in pleonasm, either a tautology "female bitch" or a contradiction results: "male bitch". I 82 Marked/unmarked: the difference takes place on the paradigmatic level. >Terminology/Lyons. I 167 Grammatical features/subclasses/Lyons: the previous subclasses can then be subdivided finer, i.e. hierarchically: Na > {Na1, Na2} etc. Problem/Lyon(s): due to the hierarchical order there is not always a unique ((s) "way back") within the structure. I 167 Problem/Lyons: 1. this leads to a large number of incoherent word lists and to many multiple occurrences of a word in several lists. >Lists. 2. It complicates the formulation of grammatical rules. >Grammar, >Rules. I 168 Chomsky: in reality this subcategorization of the vocabulary is not strictly hierarchical, but leads to overlapping e.g. proper names {John, Egypt}, inanimate {book, Egypt} etc. Problem/Chomsky: if the subcategorization is expressed by substitution rules, one of the two distinctions must be superior, the other cannot be represented naturally anymore. For example, if first the division into proper names and appellatives (e.g. book, human) is made and then a division into "human"/"non-human", then the only way to establish a rule is by referring this rule to both completely incoherent classes, namely "proper name-human" and "appellative-non-human". Since the lexicon does not contain a list of "human nouns". >Lexicon/Lyons. Chomsky: this gets worse and worse with increasing refinement. Solution/Chomsky: a grammar must not consist exclusively of substitution rules. Chomsky/Lyons: we will not discuss his solution here, since we assume a very simple system. Def Grammatical Feature/Lyons: for nouns. For example, "concrete", "animate", "human", whereby "concrete" must be independent of "animate"/"inanimate". This feaeture is used for classification or "indexing". I 169 E.g. Boy: [Appellative,],[Human],[Masculine]. Notation: square brackets. Lexical substitution rules/replacement: are then formulated in such a way that one can select a word according to features. Lexicon/Lyons: new: we have to abandon the set of rules of the form Na > {boy,...} but the more general form remains valid: X > x I x e X New: X is now the word class that satisfies characterization by features. >Word classes. Lists: Lists of class compositions e.g.[Appellative],[Human],[Masculine] there is no list (order). Grammar/Semantics/Congruence/Lyons: the expressions used for the features e.g. "proper name", "appellative" were called grammatically. I 170 We have not yet departed from the principle that such expressions, when they stand for word classes, are terms for distributional categories. N.B.: this leads us to semantics! >Semantics. Classification: because of features such as "animated", etc., this often contradicts the meaning of words. >Classification. VsContent Grammar/Lyons: this is the reason why most authors have withdrawn from "content grammar". In a language description, the lexicon must contain both grammatical and semantic information for each word. Lyon's thesis: There is often congruence between semantic and grammatical classification. There the grammatical information can be partly taken from the meaning of the word. >Congruence/Lyons, >Grammar/Lyons. I 171 Neutral/Grammar/Lyons: sometimes has to be distinguished from "inanimate": e.g. "The child ate its dinner". |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Functions | Lyons | I 84 Def Functional load/Linguistics/Lyons: For example, many words can be distinguished by the opposition of /p/ and /b/. Therefore, the contrast between these two elements has a high functional load. If only a few words are distinguished by an opposition e.g. wreath and wreathe the functional load is low. Position: depending on the position in the word, the functional load of a certain given contrast can be different. For example, two elements can often contrast at the beginning but rarely at the end of a word. I 85 Importance: of contrast: also depends on whether the words themselves appear in the same context and can contrast or not. Functional load = 0: For example, if A and B are two word classes with complementary distribution and each element of class A differs in its realization from an element of B only in that it has /a/ where the corresponding word of class B has /b/, then the functional load of the contrast between /a/ and /b/ = 0. Functional load: must therefore be calculated for words that have the same or overlapping distribution. Furthermore, not only the grammar (distribution) must be taken into account, but also the quantity of the actual statements made. Importance: of a contrast: also depends on the absolute frequency of occurrence. This shows how difficult it is to accurately measure the functional load. Cf. >Relevance. I 86 However, it should have an importance for us both in synchronic and in diachronic description. >Synchronic, >Diachronic. I 235 Function/Grammar/Tradition/Lyons: old: it is said that "in Vancouver" and "there" have the same function. Function/Tradition: e.g. noun, verb, adverb etc. >Distribution/Lyons, >Grammar, cf. >Generative grammar, >Universal grammar, >Transformational grammar, >Categorial grammar. New: in modern grammar we speak of distribution instead of function. Endocentric/exocentric/Tradition/Lyons: the tradition did not make this distinction. Distribution/Lyons: of course the distribution of the constituents never exactly matches the distribution of the whole construction, but that does not matter. It is only a matter of statements whose acceptability is explained by the grammatical description of the language. I 236 Same distribution/Lyons: when we say that two nouns have exactly the same distribution, we mean that they have the same classification at the lowest level that the grammar reaches. So if it's only about nouns, they (and thus all nominal sentences) have the same distribution! ((s) Each sentence can be grammatically added at one point, because it is independent. Or each noun can be grammatically replaced by another (not in content). Level/Distribution: at a lower level two nouns may have different distribution e.g. one is "animate" the other "inanimate". Endocentric/exocentric: this classification therefore depends on the depth of the subclassification. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Generational Justice | Diamond | Mause I 278 Growth/Generational Justice/Diamond: in a growing economy, the problem of so-called dynamic inefficiency can arise: In an overlapping generation growth model, in which there is at all times an active generation, earning income from work and saving for old age, and a second generation, retired and dissolving savings, dynamic inefficiency exists when the marginal productivity of capital is lower than the growth rate of the population. (1) Then too much is saved overall and the capital stock per person is too large. Problem: dynamic inefficiency is accompanied by an unnecessarily high reduction in consumption. Solution: one could build an efficient pyramid system ("Ponzi scheme", snowball system) that works as long as the next generation is bigger. Snowball System: Such an efficient pyramid scheme is in principle also conceivable in a model with investments in human capital instead of population growth. (2) AbelVsDynamic Inefficiency/AbelVsDiamond: the dynamic inefficiency has been empirically questioned by Abel. (3) See also Generational Justice/Weizsäcker. 1. Peter A. Diamond, 1965. National debt in a neoclassical growth model. American Economic Review 55 (5): 1126– 1150. 2. Berthold U. Wigger. 2005. Public debt, human capital formation, and dynamic inefficiency. International Tax and Public Finance 12( 1): 47– 59. 3. Andrew B. Abel, N. Gregory Mankiw, Lawrence H. Summers, und Richard J. Zeckhauser. 1989. Assessing dynamic efficiency: Theory and evidence. Review of Economic Studies 56( 1): 1– 20. |
EconDiam I Peter A. Diamond National debt in a neoclassical growth mode 1965 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Identity | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 22 Definition sense of the sentence/Tractatus: (4.2:) it is agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of facts. >Facts, >States of affairs. Hintikka: it follows that the identity of the meaning of two expressions cannot be said linguistically. (6.2322) I 140 Note Hintikka: ... for Wittgenstein this is about the dispensability of the identity concept. He could also have said that this term already exists in the other elementary propositions. --- Wittgenstein I 364 Experience/perception/identity/Wittgenstein: the comparison between experiences in terms of their identity does not belong to the primary but to the secondary language games. >Language games. In a certain secondary language game, the relationship can partially be influenced by the possible documentary evidence. >Evidence. --- Wittgenstein II 338 Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. We have to differentiate this use of the equal sign from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. >Rules. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. One can remove the identity sign. --- II 338/339 Identity/logical form/sentence/Wittgenstein: in my writing neither (Ex, y) x = y, nor (Ex) x = x is a set. If there is a thing, then why to express this by a statement about a thing? What tempts us to believe it is a fundamental truth that a thing is identical with itself? Thus, I did not yet met the sentence of identity. II 416 WittgensteinVsRussell: he was just trying to get next to the list another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity. II 418 Identity/substitution/equal sign/Wittgenstein: E.g. "a = a": here the equal sign has a special meaning - because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. - Equal sign: its use is limited to cases in which a bound variable exists. --- IV 103 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essence of the equation is not that the sides have different sense but the same meaning. - But that this can be already seen at the two sides. >Equations. --- VI 179 Identity/Wittgenstein/Schulte: in overlapping silhouettes the question is meaningless, which is A or B after the separation. VI 183 Pain/identity/criteria/Wittgenstein/Schulte: which criterion for identity? Well, simply, the one who is sitting there, or any description. >Criteria. But for my pain? There is no criterion! >Pain. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Individuals | Simons | I 28 Individuals cannot be atoms. Atoms would be all identical because they have the same parts (namely none). Solution: a solution is offered by the proper parts principle. >Atoms/Simons. Proper Parts Principle/strong/SSP/strong supporting principle: if x is not part of y, then there is a z, which is part of x, and separated by y. Problem: the interval [0,1) is not part of the interval (0.1] (or vice versa) but no part of [0,1) is separated from (0,1]. This means that overlapping intervals do not always have a unique product. However, extensionality demands that two overlapping individuals have a maximum common part. Solution: if x and y overlap, then all parts of the overlapping part are parts of x and parts of y. I 109 Individual/SimonsVsGoodman (Leonard): not every still so abstract concept (plural term) should correspond to an individual. But: to have identity conditions for every individual, is an excessive demand. That does not work in everyday life. >Individual calculus. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Individuation | Quine | II 23/24 Theseus' ship: this is not about the expression "the same" but the expression ship. Each general term has its own individuation principle. II 158 Individuation: in our world, moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - are for objects at random (everything can be the object) and they are crucial for predicates. >Truth values. V 84 Individuation/Object/language acquisition/Quine: in order to learn "dog" one has to learn more than the existence. We must also learn the individuating power of the term, the splitting of the reference. One must learn what is to be regared as one dog and what as another. Dog is more like water than like mom: you can see several dogs. Thing: from similarity 2nd order. >similarities/Quine). - Pointing/Problem: This is a dog - must not exclude any dog - (> General term/Quine. V 88 Individuation/Overlapping/Pointing/Quine: is no problem: dogs never overlap: each consists exactly of the points that belong to the same dog as a particular point. Dogs do not have common points - different: overlapping circular disks: here the shape needs to be redrawn while pointing at it - Quine: is only at the beginning of learning - solution: you can easily tell a is identical with b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear. QuineVsGeach: thus his relativism becomes untenable but it is still identity relative in a deeper sense: Identity-standards are different. V 102 Pointing: E.g. This body is an animal: here the outline must be carefully traced, otherwise it may be that only the trunk is regarded as an animal. V 125 Individuation/General term/Quine: "Square" is an individuating word. - ((s) "Fido" is not: E.g. This is a Fido.) V 161 Individuation/Quine: its fineness depends on the number of the general terms in the language - lexical glasses - individuation takes place in the eye of the beholder. VII (h) 157 Properties/Individuation/Quine: properties are individuated as follows: two open sentences which determine the same class do not determine the same property if they are not analytically equivalent. ((s) !). >Properties/Quine. XII 64f Individuation/apparatus/translation indeterminacy/ontological relativity/Quine: words for object, identity predicate the same as, a different one, plural form, logical particles, pronouns - that’s the frame of reference (coordinate system) - Important argument: this is not consistent in translation! - Uncertainty: you can counter: In what sense of rabbit? ((s) whether part or whole). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Information Processing | Ackerman | Corr I 170 Information Processing/psychological theories/Ackerman: Information-processing tasks are typically narrower in scope (…). Information-processing tasks usually involve participants comparing objects for similarities or differences, memorizing random digits, watching a computer display for specific signals over an extended period of time, and so on. Although information-processing tasks are not exactly good indicators for intellectual ability, they are typically associated with abilities to some degree, and some information-processing tasks are components of broader intellectual ability measures. >Abilities, >Intelligence, >Performance. The relationships between personality traits such as Impulsivity, Extraversion, Anxiety and nAch (need for achievement), and information-processing task performance also appear to be more complex. For example, Revelle and his colleagues (see e.g., Humphreys and Revelle 1984)(1) have shown that there are interactions between the kinds of information-processing tasks participants are asked to do, the time-of-day in which they are performing the task, and even the amount of caffeine the participants have before the task. The optimal level of arousal, according to Revelle and his colleagues, would be different for introverts and extraverts (see also the broader theory of Eysenck 1970)(2). Several studies have provided good support for these hypothesized relationships (see e.g., Revelle 1995(3) for a review). Problems: The difficulty in generalizing these findings from information-processing tasks to intellectual abilities is that many of the underlying effects are hypothesized to be curvilinear; for example, if introverts do better in the morning and extraverts do better in the afternoon, then assessments of abilities that are given at various times of the day might yield either positive, negative or zero correlations. >Generalization, >Method, >Experiments. It may be that the ultimate effects of these personality-ability linkages would be found not so much in personality trait-ability correlations, but rather with the interests and orientations of the individuals. There are, in fact, substantial correlations between some personality traits and vocational interest themes (such as Conscientiousness and conventional vocational interests; Extraversion and social and enterprising vocational interests, and Openness to Experience and artistic vocational interests; see Ackerman and Heggestad 1997)(4). >Personality traits. 1. Humphreys, M. S. and Revelle, W. 1984. Personality, motivation, and performance: a theory of the relationship between individual differences and information processing, Psychological Review 153–84 2. Eysenck, H. J. 1970. The structure of human personality, 3rd edn. London: Methuen 3. Revelle, W. 1995. Personality processes, Annual Review of Psychology 46: 295–328 4. Ackerman, P. L. and Heggestad, E. D. 1997. Intelligence, personality, and interests: evidence for overlapping traits, Psychological Bulletin 121: 219–45 Phillip L. Ackerman, “Personality and intelligence”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Intensions | Chalmers | I 54 Intension/Chalmers: intension is a function that defines how a concept is used in different situations. It is not the same as "meaning" and also not a definition. >Meaning, >Definitions, >Situations, >Reference, >Use, cf. >Extension. I 57 Intension/Chalmers: depending on whether a concept picks out an object in the actual world, or in a counterfactual world, I will speak of primary and secondary intension. >Concepts, >Possible worlds, >Actual world, >Terminology/Chalmers. Secondary Intension/Chalmers: secondary intension is therefore, independent of empirical factors. It describes how reference depends on how the outer world turns out. >twin earth, > rigidity). I 61 When counterfactual worlds are involved, it is not a priori determined what the reference is, since the actual world can be determined by different speakers as their own (mirror-inverted), >Centered Worlds/Quine. The determination as a primary or secondary intension will then also vary inversely. Cf. >Intensions/Stalnaker, >Propositions/Chalmers. I 62 Meaning/Chalmers: Both primary as well as secondary intensions are candidates for the "meaning" of a concept. "Water" could mean H2O, or twin earth water, depending on what is meant by the concept in the respective world. I 63 Necessary Truth/Chalmers: both can even be constructed as a necessary truth when possible worlds are conceived as uttering contexts. Cf. >Character/Kaplan, >Content/Kaplan, >Two-dimensional Semantics. I 200 Primary Intension/Chalmers: For example, the largest star in the universe: picks out a star in every given centered world. Even non-existent objects have a primary intension, e.g. the Nicholas, (Santa Claus). This primary intension could have picked out an object if the world had turned out accordingly. Cf. >Non-existence, >Possibilia. For my concept of consciousness, the primary intension is more important than a causal relation to an object. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 205 Also, a zombie can have primary intensions that are overlapping with mine. >Zombies. I 206 Quality/Qualia: primary intensions do not specify Qualia. >Qualia. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Jurisdiction | Economic Theories | Parisi I 172 Jurisdiction/Economic theories/Wangenheim: (…) the law-and-economics discussion on competing jurisdictions relies to a substantial degree on the very evolutionary concept of competition as a discovery process (Hayek, 1949)(1) for better law. Jurisdictions invent new legal rules and jurisdictions imitate the legal rules of other jurisdictions (Mattei and Pulitini, 1991(2); Ogus, 1999(3); van den Bergh, 2000(4)). Tiebout: Tiebout (1956)(5) was the first to describe the interaction between jurisdictions - local communities in his case - as a competitive process, which will eventually entail separation of individuals into various communities according to their differential preferences and certain rather restrictive conditions, in particular concerning the mobility of individuals and the absence of externalities. Buchanan: The idea has been formalized in Buchanan's (1965)(6) theory of clubs. In these early approaches, competition between communities or clubs (governed or owned by entrepreneurs) takes place solely by movement of individuals from one community or club to another. Hirschman: Hirschman (1970)(7) extended the argument to allow for "voice" as a second mode of influencing the governor's or owner's decisions. Legal rules: While early writings in the field saw the mission of communities in the provision of public goods in general, the content of legal rules became a subject of investigation in the course of refinements of the argument. Oates and Schwab (1988)(8) were the first to combine fiscal federalism with regulatory rules in a formal model. Frey and Eichenberger (1996)(9) argued that most public goods need not be supplied and financed by regional polities but also "functional overlapping competing jurisdictions (FOCJ)" could fulfill the task. With these extensions, competition between jurisdictions may refer to legal rules and may be driven both by individuals relocating from one jurisdiction to another and by politicians competing for votes from voters in the jurisdiction who compare the policy of their own jurisdiction to that of others (yardstick competition). Obviously, this is a difference between competition between jurisdictions and competition between firms producing private goods, which should not be neglected. Parisi I 173 Equilibrium: Much of the literature interested in the equilibrium of inter-jurisdictional competition refers to specific legal fields and asks whether competition in the various fields leads to efficient or inefficient equilibria—in other words, whether there is a race to the top or a race to the bottom. Most of the prominent fields of law discussed in this realm are corporate law (e.g. Easterbrook and Fischel, 1996(10); Romano, 2005(11); Romano, 2017), including securities law (Ribstein, 2005(12); Choi and Guzman, 1998(13)) and regulation (Oates and Schwab, 1988)(8), in particular European regulation and its harmonization (e.g. Ogus, 1999(3); van den Bergh, 2000)(4). Path-dependence: Carbonara and Parisi (2009)(14) show that under certain conditions - suffciently liberal choice-of-law rules and governments that are benevolent towards their constituencies - multiple equilibria of the legal evolution emerge and hence a strong path dependency. >Path dependence. 1. Hayek, F. A. v. (1949). Individualism, and Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Mattei, U. and F. Pulitini (1991). "A Competitive Model of Legal Rules," in A. Breton, G. Galeotti, P. Salmon, and R. Wintrobe, eds., The Competitive State: Villa Colombella Papers on Competitive Politics, 207-219. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 3. Ogus, A. (1999). "Competition between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48: 405-418. 4. van den Bergh, R. (2000). "Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe." Kyklos 53: 435-466. 5. Tiebout, C. M. (1956). "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." Journal of Political Economy 64: 416-424. 6. Buchanan, J. (1965) "An Economic Theory of Clubs." Economica 32: 1-14. 7. Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 8. Oates, W. E. and R. M. Schwab (1988). "Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?" Journal of Public Economics 3 5: 333-354. 9. Frey, B. S. and R. Eichenberger (1996). "FOCJ: Competitive Governments for Europe." International Review of Law and Economics 16: 315-327. 10. Easterbrook, F. H. and D. R. Fischel (1996). The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Romano, R. (2005). "Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?" Oxford Review of Economic Policy 21: 212-231. 12. Ribstein, L. E. (2005). "Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition." Review of Law and Economics 1:97-148. 13. Choi, S. and A. Guzman (1998). "Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation." Southern California Law Review 71:903. 14. Carbonara, E. and F. Parisi (2009). "Choice of Law and Legal Evolution: Rethinking the Market for Legal Rules." Public Choice 139:461-492. Wangenheim, Georg von. „Evolutionary Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Justice | Liberalism | Gaus I 96 Justice/Liberalism/Waldron: we should not understand the strategy of the political liberal as a strategy of attempting to suppress all basis for disagreement about justice. Political liberals should think about justice as a topic that naturally evokes disagreement even when the influence of rival comprehensive conceptions is left out of account. ((s) For the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism see >Liberalism/Waldron.) Rights/law/society/Waldron: The fact that one major source of dissensus is removed should not lead us to assume - what many political theorists mistakenly assume about rights - that what is just and unjust can be determined in some realm of principle that is beyond politics, some arena of philosophical argument where political procedures like voting will not be necessary. Like individual rights, justice remains an intensely contested issue, and though the contestation may be diminished it is not eliminated by the strategies that the political liberal proposes. Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people. >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Waldron. Gaus I 97 Justice/Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. responsibilities. So political liberalism also has implications for what this sharing a conception of justice amounts to. Example: (...) e.g., a left liberal like me ((s) Jeremy Waldron) may not say, for example, to a Social Darwinian that even the feeblest person is entitled to our compassion because he is created in the image of God. I must find some way of putting my point about equality that can be affirmed even by people who do not share my religious convictions. Equally a Christian conservative may not justify laws restricting abortion on the grounds that foetuses have souls, since this too is rooted in a comprehensive conception he cannot expect others to share. Gaus I 98 (...) the dative element (...) - that political justification be understood as justification to each and every individual -can be understood in more than one way. a) It may be understood as a requirement that the justificatation of political arrangements should be directed to the good or interests of each and every one who is subject to those arrangements. I shall call this the ‘interestregarding’ interpretation. b) Or it may be understood as a requirement that the justification of a political decision be plausibly reckoned likely to persuade everyone who is subject to the arrangements. I shall call this the ‘premise-regarding’ interpretation, because it understands ‘justification to X’ as justification that seeks to hook up with premises to which X is already committed. Rawls/Waldron: Clearly Rawls’s political liberalism assumes what I have called the ‘premise-regarding’ interpretation of the requirement that political justification must be justification to each and every individual. >Justice/Rawls. Waldron: However it is also important to see that interestregarding interpretation of justifiability to all can be maintained even if the premise-regarding interpretation is given up. >Liberalism/Waldron. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Justice | Rawls | I 3 Justice/Rawls: justice is the first virtue of social institutions, just like truth is for thought systems. Justice as an untrue theory must be rejected or revised, laws and institutions must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. >Injustice, >Laws. Each person has an inviolability based on justice that cannot be overridden even by the welfare of a society as a whole. Therefore, a loss of the freedom of some cannot be offset by a greater good, which is given to several. (RawlsVsUtilitarianism, RawlsVsSinger, Peter) >Utilitarianism, >P. Singer. I 4 The rights guaranteed by justice are not the subject of political negotiation or social interests. Cf. >Human Rights, >Fundamental Rights. Just as the acceptance of a faulty theory is only justified by the absence of a better theory, injustice is only tolerable if necessary to avoid greater injustice. To investigate whether these too strong claims are justified, we must develop a theory of justice. >Society/Rawls. I 5 Justice/Society/Rawls: although people are at odds about which principles to accept, we still assume that they all have an idea of justice. That is, they understand that such principles are necessary to determine basic rights and obligations and to monitor their distribution. Therefore, it seems reasonable to contrast a concept of justice with different notions of justice. I 6 Justice/Rawls: justice cannot stop at distribution justice. It must become a feature of social institutions. I 54/55 Justice/Principles/Rawls: the principles of justice are very different depending on whether they apply to individuals or institutions. >Principles/Rawls. I 237 Natural justice/Rawls: the principles of natural justice are intended to ensure the integrity of the legal process.(1) >Natural justice. I 310 Justice/Idealization/RawlsVsLeibniz/RalwsVsRoss, W. D. /Rawls: one should not equate or try to define justice with an "ideal happiness"(2)(3). >G.W. Leibniz. I 311 What people are entitled to is not measured by intrinsic value. The moral value does not depend on supply and demand. When certain services are no longer in demand, moral merit does not decrease equally. I 312 The concept of moral value does not provide a first principle of distributive justice. The moral value can be defined as a sense of justice when the principles of justice are available. 1. Cf. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, 1930), pp. 21,26-28,57f. 2. Leibniz, „On the Ultimate Origin of Things“ (1697) ed. P.P. Wiener (New York, 1951), p. 353. 3. Leibniz, „On the Ultimate Origin of Things“ (1697) Hrsg. P.P. Wiener (New York, 1951), S. 353. Gaus I 94 Justice/Rawls/Waldron: Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993(2): 4). Gaus I 95 Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron. Problems: (...) there are further questions about how [a] threshold test should be understood. One possibility is that T represents an acceptable modus vivendi for the adherents of the various comprehensive conceptions {C1, C2, …, Cn }. Like a treaty that puts an end to conflict between previously hostile powers, T may be presented as the best that C1 can hope for in the way of a theory of justice given that it has to coexist with C2, …, Cn , and the best that C2 can hope for given that it has to coexist with C1, C3 ,…, Cn , and so on. Rawls, however, regards this as unsatisfactory as a basis for a conception of justice. It leaves T vulnerable to demographic changes or other changes in the balance of power between rival comprehensive conceptions, a vulnerability that is quite at odds with the steadfast moral force that we usually associate with justice (1993(1): 148). Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2, … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1, and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2, and so on. Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical Gaus I 96 importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke. Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron, >Overlapping consensus/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. 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Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Justice | Waldron | Gaus I 95 Justice//the good/liberalism/Waldron: Assuming we can define, even roughly, the set of conceptions of the good that must be accommodated in the approach that we take to justice and the justification of the basic structure of a liberal society, what is the relation supposed to be between the set of reasonable conceptions and an acceptable theory of justice? >Rawls/Waldron, >Justice/Rawls. Waldron: One possibility is to insist on something like a unanimity requirement: i.e. we could say that no theory of justice is acceptable if members of a given conception of the good are inclined to repudiate it. But this is much too strong, and in a way that misconceives the nature of the difficulty that political liberalism addresses. The problem is not that theories of justice are controversial; the critical reaction that led Rawls to modify the approach he took to the subject of justice was not that people (like Nozick, 1974(1), for example) disagreed with his principles on justice-related grounds. The problem was that some people would have a particular kind of difficulty with his theory (...). Waldron: The key, then, is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. Obviously, of course, this is a threshold test only: T may be acceptable in this sense, but still unacceptable overall as a theory of justice. But this would be for justice-related reasons, not because of T’s complicity with a particular comprehensive conception. Problems: (...) there are further questions about how this threshold test should be understood. One possibility is that T represents an acceptable modus vivendi for the adherents of the various comprehensive conceptions (...). >Justice/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Waldron. Gaus I 97 Justice/Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. 1. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia Oxford: Blackwell. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
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| Justification | Ackerman | Gaus I 93 Justification/Ackerman/Waldron: Bruce Ackerman (1980)(1) developed a theory of justice in the form of a contractarian dialogue, for which it was laid down as a ground rule that no reason (adduced in conversation to justify any particular distribution of power) ‘is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert … that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens’ (1980(1): 11). >Neutrality/Waldron. Waldron: Now, why should this be the ground rule? Ackerman said that there were several ways to justify the neutrality principle: it could be justified by reference to the epistemic value of experiments in ethics, or the intrinsic importance of autonomy, or scepticism about ethics, or about the ability of power-holders to reach accurate conclusions about the good (1980(1): 11–12). The liberal state need not side with any of these justifications in particular. It only needs an assurance that everyone can reach neutrality by at least one of these routes. WaldronVsAckerman:Could this strategy work? It might, but only if we were certain that the different paths to neutrality did not make a difference to the meaning or character of the destination. But this seems unlikely. Moral principles are characteristically dependent for their interpretation on some understanding of the point or purpose for which they are imposed. Change the purpose and you provide a different basis for interpreting the principle. So far as neutrality is concerned, one of the main interpretive difficulties concerns the issue of intention: does neutrality forbid only political action motivated by a non-neutral intention or does it forbid also action, however motivated, which is non-neutral in its effects? It turns out that some of Ackerman’s paths to neutrality favour the intentionalist interpretation while one, at least, favours the consequentialist interpretation: scepticism about a power-holder’s ethical abilities should inhibit only his deliberate attempts to favour one conception of the good. The value of ethical diversity, on the other hand, should make us pause whenever state action actually has a detrimental impact on some conceptions of the good, whether this is intended or not. Ackerman’s ‘overlapping consensus’ is really a recipe for a disordered society, as citizens follow their different paths to an interpretive quarrel and find no common basis to resolve it (see Waldron, 1993(2): 151–3). 1. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2. Waldron, Jeremy (1993) Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
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| Language | Mbembe | Brocker I 917 Language/Mbembe/Herb: Mbembe is looking for a new "vocabulary" (Mbembe 2016(1), 66) that frees African discourse from the hegemony of Western categories and designs new forms of thought for the African subject. "Postcolony" is the main word of the new vocabulary. Mbembe gives a first definition of this. Def Postcolony/Mbembe: appears here as "epoch", "peculiarity" or "zeitgeist". "As an epoch, the postcolony in fact comprises manifold periods of time, consisting of overlapping, nested and enclosing discontinuities, overturns, inertia, fluctuations" (66). It goes without saying for Mbembe that such an undertaking cannot be mastered with the linear concepts of time of traditional African studies and ethnological field studies. "Commandement." [is] the new basic word of colonial and post-colonial domination. For Mbembe - following Derrida - colonial sovereignty can be defined in three ways: as founding, meaningful and ratifying violence. (2016, 73-125). >Colonialism, >Postcolonialism, >Vocabulary, >Language use, >Theoretical language. Brocker I 922 Postcolonialism/Mbembe: The colonial language is anything but understanding and consensus-oriented. "Its main purpose is to transmit orders, enforce silence, prescribe, censor and intimidate" (2016, 257). Language turns out to be an instrument of rule, it becomes a "guillotine" (260). The colonial vocabulary is used to dress and prepare the victims of the colony. In practice, violence and sex go hand in hand. For Mbembe, colonial rule is phallocracy in the literal sense. Hegel/Mbembe: In the Africa picture in Hegel's The Reason in History (Mbembe 2016(1), 252) he discovers the archetypes of the colonial language. Hegel sees Africa as a continent of drives, its inhabitant, the Negro, as an animalistic driving force. In his character there is "nothing to be found that reminds one of humanity" (253). Admittedly, Hegel with his anticipation of the verbal economy is from the view of Mbembe Brocker I 923 not only an accomplice, but also a commentator on colonialism. With his theory of self-consciousness, Hegel provides the keywords for the postcolonial debate on alterity. (Cf. Fanon 1981(2); Spivak 2013(3)). 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 2. Fanon, Frantz, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt/M. 1981. 3. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, Kritik der postkolonialen Vernunft. Hin zu einer Geschichte der verrinnenden Gegenwart, Stuttgart 2013. Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Legal Entrepreneurship | Austrian School | Parisi I 283 Legal Entrepreneurship/ Austrian school: Whitman (2002)(1) (…) extends the idea of entrepreneurship to the role played by lawyers and litigants. He examines how legal entrepreneurs discover and exploit opportunities to change legal rules—either the creation of new rules or the reinterpretation of existing ones to benefit themselves and their clients. Harper: Harper (2013)(2) believes that the entrepreneurial approach lays the groundwork for explaining the open-ended and evolving nature of the legal process—it shows how the structure of property rights can undergo continuous endogenous change as a result of entrepreneurial actions within the legal system itself. The most important differentiating factor separating the entrepreneurship of the market process from legal entrepreneurship is the absence of the discipline of monetary profit and loss in the latter case. Although money may change hands in the process of legal entrepreneurship, its outputs may not be valued according to market prices, especially when there is a public-goods quality to the rule at issue. Whether effective feedback mechanisms exist in the contexts is therefore an open question. Martin: Martin argues that, in such structures, the feedback mechanism in polities is not as tight as feedback in the market mechanism, and therefore ideology plays a greater role in such decision-making (Martin, 2010)(3). Legal entrepreneurship can be coordinating and yet also increase uncertainty and conflicts in society. It all depends on the kind of legal order in operation and the mechanism by which it is generated and maintained. Rubin/Priest: Rubin (1977)(4) and Priest (1977)(5) originally analyzed how the openly competitive legal process tends to promote economic efficiency. They more recently point out that the common law system has succumbed to interest group pressures and has deviated from producing efficient rules (Tullock, 2005/1980(6); Tullock, 2005/1997(7); Priest, 1991)(8). They argue that litigation efforts by private parties can explain both the common law’s historic tendency to produce efficient rules as well as its more recent evolution away from efficiency in favor of wealth redistribution through the intrusion of strong interest groups into political and legal processes. Zywicki: Zywicki (2003)(9) describes the common law system in the Middle Ages as polycentric. He focuses on three institutional features of the formative years of the common law system. First, courts competed in overlapping jurisdictions and judges competed for litigants. Second, there was a weak rule of precedent instead of the present-day stare decisis rule. And third, legal rules were more default rules, which parties could contract around, instead of mandatory rules. These features are missing in the present-day common law system, which is non-competitive, has strong rules of precedent, Parisi I 284 precedent, and is dominated by mandatory rules. The efficiency claims pertain to a social system grounded in private ordering where those who are subject to those legal rules select the rules in open competition. Rajagopalan/Wagner : Rajagopalan and Wagner (2013)(9) argue that the inefficiency claims pertaining to the current system of common law rules are a result of the entrepreneurial action within the contemporary system of the “entangled political economy.” The entangled political economy is essentially a “hybrid” of a monocentric state structure interacting with polycentric or private ordering, encouraging “parasitical” entrepreneurship within the legal system (Podemska-Mikluch and Wagner, 2010)(10). Rajagopalan (2015)(11) provides India as a case study to discuss a system of rules incongruent to the economy consequently giving rise to “parasitical” entrepreneurial action and entanglement of economic and legal orders. There is also “political entrepreneurship” within a given constitutional or governance structure that seeks to create coalitions to effect specific legislation or transfers of wealth (rent seeking). Martin and Thomas (2013)(2) describe such political entrepreneurship at different levels of the institutional structure, at the policy level, legislative level, or the constitutional level. These non-market orders determine the precise form that entrepreneurship takes (Boettke and Coyne, 2009(13); and Boettke and Leeson, 2009)(14). Political entrepreneurship may also attempt to change higher-level rules—like property rights systems, constitutional constraints, and so forth—as a means to gain rents and transfers within an economy (Rajagopalan, 2016)(15). 1. Whitman, D. G. (2002). “Legal Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change.” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 12(2): 1–11. 2. Harper, D. A. (2013). “Property rights, entrepreneurship and coordination.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 88: 62–77. 3. Martin, A. (2010). “Emergent Politics and the Power of Ideas.” Studies in Emergent Order 3: 212–245. 4. Rubin, P. H. (1977). “Why is the Common Law Efficient?” Journal of Legal Studies 6(1): 51–63. 5. Priest, G. L. (1977). “The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules.” Journal of Legal Studies 6(1): 65–77. 6. Tullock, G. (2005/1980). “Trials on Trial: The Pure Theory of Legal Procedure,” in C. Rowley, ed., The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Vol. IX. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 7. Tullock, G. (2005/1997). “The Case Against the Common Law,” in C. Rowley, ed., The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Vol. IX. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 8. Zywicki, T. J. (2003). “The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply Side Analysis.” Northwestern University Law Review 97(4): 1551–1633. 9. Rajagopalan, S. and R. Wagner (2013). “Legal Entrepreneurship within Alternative Systems of Political Economy.” American Journal of Entrepreneurship 6(1): 24–36. 10. Podemska-Mikluch, M. and R. W. Wagner (2010). “Entangled Political Economy and the Two Faces of Entrepreneurship.” Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 28(2–3): 99–114. 11. Rajagopalan, S. (2015). “Incompatible institutions: socialism versus constitutionalism in India.” Constitutional Political Economy 26(3): 328–355. 12. Martin, A. and D. Thomas (2013). “Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system.” Public Choice 154(1): 21–37. 13. Boettke, P. J. and Coyne, C. J. (2009). Context matters: Institutions and entrepreneurship. Hanover: MA, Now Publishers Inc. 14. Boettke, P. J., C. J. Coyne, and P. T. Leeson (2008). “Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 67(2): 331–358. 15. Rajagopalan, S. (2016). “Constitutional Change: A public choice analysis,” in Sujit Choudhary, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Madhav Khosla, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution. New York: Oxford University Press, pp 127–142. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Liberalism | Waldron | Gaus I 89 Liberalism/Waldron: The modern distinction between ‘political’ and ‘comprehensive’ versions of liberalism arises in connection with a serious problem about the basis of justification for liberal principles in a pluralistic society. The problem arises as follows. Liberals envisage a tolerant, inclusive society, populated by people adhering to a variety of belief systems. Many modern societies in which liberalism flourishes as a political ideal already have this character: they are religiously pluralist and multicultural societies (...). But a pluralist society also faces an additional agenda. Where different faiths and cultures rub shoulders, there is likely to be friction and offence: one group’s worship or festivities might seem like a reproach or an attack on another group, and as values and philosophies compete in the marketplace of ideas, the competition will often seem disrespectful as each creed tries to discredit its opponents and gain adherents for itself. It is not easy to define the duty of mutual toleration under these circumstances, or to sustain the distinction between harm and offence that a pluralistic regime requires. >Pluralism/Waldron. Gaus I 90 Toleration/pluralism/liberalism/Problem: (...) by elaborating and defending liberal principles and liberal solutions to the problems of social life on this sort of basis, we seem to be taking sides in the midst of cultural and ethical plurality. We seem to be picking and choosing among the variety of ethical, philosophical and religious traditions in the world, privileging some as foundational and marginalizing others. >Toleration/Waldron. Gaus I 91 Def Political liberalism/Waldron: Two political liberals may therefore be distinguished from one another by their different positions and their different conceptions. But what they will have in common – as political liberals – is their insistence on a distinction between the principles and ideals that (in their respective views) define a liberal order for society, and the deeper values and commitments associated with particular philosophical outlooks. Def Comprehensive liberalism/Waldron: The political liberal insists that the articulation and defence of a given set of liberal commitments for a society should not depend on any particular theory of what gives value or meaning to a human life. A comprehensive liberal denies this. He maintains that it is impossible adequately to defend or elaborate liberal commitments except by invoking the deeper values and commitments associated with some overall or ‘comprehensive’ philosophy. Political liberalism: There may also be a second layer of difference among political liberals. Whether or not the substance of their liberal commitment is the same, two political liberals may differ in the justificatory strategies they adopt as political liberals. >Consensus/Waldron. ((s) Cf. >Agreement/Habermas). Comprehensive liberalism: obviously there are important differences, also, among comprehensive liberals. Two comprehensive liberals may have different liberal commitments: one may be a left liberal and the other a libertarian liberal. A second layer of difference has to do with the content of the comprehensive outlooks on which their liberal commitments are based. John Locke’s Christian foundations are not the same as Immanuel Kant’s (1991)(1) theory of autonomy, and none of those is the same as the hedonistic foundation of Jeremy Bentham’s (1982)(2) utilitarianism. >Autonomy/Kant, >Utilitarianism. Gaus I 92 Problems: (VsMill, VsKant, VsHumboldt): It does not seem to have occurred to Locke, Kant, and Mill that [the] foundational positions would pose a problem for the politics of liberalism in a society whose members disagreed about the existence of God, the nature of reason, and the destiny of the human individual. They just took it for granted that liberalism required a philosophical foundation of this kind, and that their task as political philosophers was to articulate that foundation, convince (as Mill put it) ‘the intelligent part of the public … to see its value’ (1956(1): 90), and if necessary argue, as Locke argued in his discussion of atheism (1983(2): 51), that those who could not subscribe to these foundational positions might have to be regarded as dangerous by the government of a liberal society. >Liberalism/Mill, >Community/Humboldt, >State/Humboldt, >Categorical Imperative. >Neutrality/Waldron. Gaus I 97 The doctrine of human dignity and equality deployed in a theory of justice must be able to resist – in more or less the manner of a moral absolute – various pragmatic considerations that might tempt us to sacrifice or neglect the interests of a few weak and vulnerable persons for the sake of the convenience or prosperity of the wealthy or powerful. Justice has to be able to stand up to that, and its constitutive doctrines have to have what it takes to do that heavy moral lifting. Many of the comprehensive conceptions that political liberals want to exclude from the public realm address themselves to exactly this issue: they explain in ethical or transcendent terms why exactly it is that the few weak and vulnerable may not be sacrificed in this way. The political liberal proposes to do this work without help from any such conception, but in a way which nevertheless retains their allegiance in overlapping consensus. >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Waldron, >Abortion/Rawls. Gaus I 99 Comprehensive liberalism/Waldron: Some comprehensive conceptions will affirm the moral importance of people’s actual experience here and now, while others may sideline or denigrate it. Those that do affirm it will sit more naturally with, and in a way will generate and inspire, the moral and political commitments traditionally associated with liberalism. And that is what the comprehensive liberal wants to remind us of. Liberalism is based on certain ethical commitments, certain propositions about what matters and about the importance of certain kinds of respect for the lives, experiences, and liberty of ordinary men and women. It is not a neutral or nonchalant creed, and its commitments arguably cannot be articulated at a purely political level. 1. Mill, John Stuart (1956 [1859]) On Liberty, ed. Currin V. Shields. Indianapolis: Hackett. 2. Locke, John (1983 [1689]) A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James H. Tully. Indianapolis: Hackett. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Meaning Change | Feyerabend | Rorty I 293 Meaning Change/Feyerabend: Thesis: the traditional empirical position assumed a "postulate of the invariance of meaning". Feyerabend, like Th. Kuhn, wanted to show that the meaning and predictions change when a new theory arises. Once conceptual schemata became transient, the distinction between schema and content itself was in danger, and thus the Kantian concept of philosophy as a discipline made possible by the a priori knowledge of our own contribution to science. --- Feyerabend I 357 Meaning Change/Feyerabend: Changes in ontology are often accompanied by conceptual changes. (>PutnamVs). Feyerabend: E.g. classical physics: the properties are inherent in the objects. Relativity Theory: Properties are only relations. These two systems do not have a single statement in common. I 357/358 Theory/Popper/Lakatos/Feyerabend: are theories comparable? Feyerabend: No, they have no content classes common, in which the logical relations of inclusion, exclusion, or overlapping can be established. >Comparability, >Comparisons, >Theories, >Incommensurability. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Measurements | Kanitscheider | I 220 Def Measure/Def Define/Kanitscheider: measuring is an empirical process supported by theories, while defining is a conceptual activity carried out within the framework of a theory. The meaning of a theoretical term can only be elucidated by semantic investigation. Measurement assigns numerical values to already metrized quantities with factual reference represented by a particular function. >Operationalism/Kanitscheider. I 229 Measurement/Kanitscheider: Problem: all astronomical distance determinations have always only certain range. So one must work with overlapping measuring chains. "Homogeneity extrapolation: e.g. period luminosity relation of Cepheids, diameter luminosity relation of H II regions and constancy of luminosity of Sc I galaxies. Bsp These models carry into the determination of H0 (age of the universe) a hypothetical element, which one can justify if not empirically, nevertheless rationally. Similarly: Ex Determination of today's acceleration parameter q0 (or brake parameter): is mostly tried to be determined from the dependence between the apparent brightness and the redshift of the galaxies. Problem: to find an object of known standard magnitude at a sufficient distance. Method: to pick the brightest galaxy in a known regular cluster of elliptical galaxies as a "standard candle". But again, the assumption is that the galaxies retain their luminosity over a long time. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Mind Body Problem | Maturana | I 289 Mind-body problem/domains/Maturana: physicality (corporeality) and behavior are two non-overlapping domains. - They are coupled in their realization, however, because a living system operates as structurally determined. >Operation/Maturana. Physiology: disassembled into parts - in contrast: behavior: interactions (as wholes). >Behavior. Separate domains: solutions for mind-body problem: language depends on physicality, but does not act in its field. - This solves the problem of consciousness, self, soul. >Consciousness, >Self, >Soul. Mind-body: recursive coupling of the areas of behavior and physiology. >Recursion, >Mind, >Body, cf. >Materialism, >Identity theory. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Object | Quine | I 102 Goodman: "Rabbitness": is a discontinuous space-time segment, which consists of rabbits. --- I 372f Objects of propositional attitude eliminated: "Thomas believes (Cicero has): no longer the form" Fab" a = Thomas, b = () - but: "Fa" where "F" is a complex expression - no longer "believes" term, but operator. I 402 Existence: does not arise from dichotomy "single thing" - "universal" - it does not matter whether they do exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - linking with stimuli is weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions. >Existence/Quine. I 412 Object: name which is denoted by singular terms, accepts it as values - (but the singular term is eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". I 438 Ideal objects are not permitted - geometric objects are permitted (no identity without localization). I 435 Relativity: additional dimension: space-time: point moments are absolutely different, independent of relative movement of the viewpoint. II 30 Object/Quine: space-time piece can also be distributed or scattered. (Nominalism, Goodman). II 23 Physical object is deceptive - better space-time pieces - "space" and "places as such" untenable, otherwise there would be absolute standstill and absolute movement - 4-digit coordinates suffice - ontology of pure set theory - no more physical object. II 156 ff Object (physical)/Quine: arbitrarily scattered and arbitrarily singled out - pocket contents, single coin at various points in time, combination with the Eiffel Tower, space-time points, anything - are not so strongly body-oriented - identification like from one possible world to another: without content as long as no instructions are given - value of a variable. VI 32 Object/Ontology/Quine: bodies constitute themselves as ideal nodes in the centers of overlapping observation sentences - problem: observation sentences are not permanent - therefore the objectification (reification) is always already a theory. VI 34 Question: what should be considered real objectification and not just a theoretically useful one (like classes). VI 35 Abstract objects: it is pointless to speak of permanent stimulus phases - solution: pronouns and bound variables - Vs singular term: are often not referring - there must be unspecifiable irrational numbers - Solution: bound variable instead of singular term. VI 38f Objectification/Reification/Quine: for the first time in predicative connection of observation sentences - instead of their mere conjunction - "This is a blue pebble": calls for embedding pebble into the blue. VI 41 Abstract objects/Modal/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects - QuineVsModal logic: instead quantification (postulation of objects) - so we can take the slack out of the truth function. >Modal Logic/Quine. VII (d) 69 Object/Quine: may be unconnected: E.g. USA Alaska. XII 36 Properties/Identity/Quine: Problem: (unlike objects) they are ultimately based on synonymy within a language - more language-specific identity. >Properties/Quine. V 39 Ultimately we do without rigorous individuation of properties and propositions. (different term scheme) - Frege dito: (Basic Laws): do not extend identity to terms. XII 68 Object/Theory/Quine: what is an object, ultimately, cannot be stated - only in terms of a theory - (ultimately overall theory, i.e. language use) - but wrong: to say that talk about things would only make sense within a wider range - that would correspond to the false thesis that no predicate applied to all things - there are universal predicates. >Mention, >use, >word, >object. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Overdetermination | Peacocke | I 16f Experience/PeacockeVsPerception Theory/PeacockeVsTradition: Experience is more than just perception: sensation-like content, not merely representational: E.g. tipping dice: jumps, the network of lines looks completely different. >Sensation. On the other hand: E.g. Rabbit-Duck-Head: the network of lines does not change, therefore the perception theorists might argue that there are two representational components: a) the lines, b) Rabbit Duck Head. >Rabbit Duck Head. Perception Theory: Translation variant: The missing properties must be introduced into appropriate statements. PeacockeVs: that would only provide a priori knowledge, not empirical, because the postulated experience type could not go wrong. Vs added terms: they do not have to be available to the naive person, so they do not change the truth; Overdetermination of the representational content. >Representational content. Overdetermination: the angle can be changed by appropriate overlapping without changing the picture. I 20 Perception/overdetermined/overdetermination/Peacocke: E.g. the angle could be changed without changing the representational content. Such problems arise when one tries to construct a sensation-like property (e.g.size) as a representational property. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Overlapping Consensus | |||
| Overlapping Consensus | Rawls | Gaus I 93 Overlapping Consensus/Diversity/individualism/Rawls/Waldron: what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (Rawls 1980(1): 518–19). >Justice/Rawls, >Principles/Rawls. Gaus I 94 Ethical and religious heterogeneity were no longer to be regarded as a feature that societies governed by justice might or might not have, or might have at one period but not at another. It was to be seen instead as a permanent feature of the societies, one that could not be expected soon to pass away. >Society/Walzer. RawlsVsRawls: By the beginning of the 1990s Rawls had become convinced that his approach in A Theory of Justice(2) was disqualified generally on this ground. >Individualism/Rawls. Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993(3): 4). In the introduction to Political Liberalism, he argued that this could no longer be achieved by convincing everyone of the ethical and philosophical premises on which a comprehensive liberal theory of justice might be founded. Instead Rawlsian justice would now have to be presented as something that could command support from a variety of ethical perspectives. Question: how many of the substantive principles and doctrines of A Theory of Justice would survive this new approach? Rawls described (...) diversity as a social fact - a permanent feature of modern society. Human life engages multiple values and it is natural that people will disagree about how to balance or prioritize them. Gaus I 95 Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron. Problems: (...) there are further questions about how [a] threshold test should be understood. One possibility is that T represents an acceptable modus vivendi for the adherents of the various comprehensive conceptions {C1, C2, …, Cn }. Like a treaty that puts an end to conflict between previously hostile powers, T may be presented as the best that C1 can hope for in the way of a theory of justice given that it has to coexist with C2, …, Cn, and the best that C2 can hope for given that it has to coexist with C1 , C3 ,…, Cn , and so on. Rawls, however, regards this as unsatisfactory as a basis for a conception of justice. It leaves T vulnerable to demographic changes or other changes in the balance of power between rival comprehensive conceptions, a vulnerability that is quite at odds with the steadfast moral force that we usually associate with justice (1993(3): 148). Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2 , … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1 , and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2, and so on. Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical Gaus I 96 importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke. Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron. Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls: The idea of overlapping consensus assumes that there can be many routes to the same destination. Geographically the metaphor is plausible enough, but when the destination is a set of moral principles, and ‘routes’ is read as reasons for the acceptance of those principles, then the matter is less clear. Unlike legal rules, moral propositions are not just formulas. A principle is perhaps best understood as a normative proposition together with the reasons that are properly adduced in its support. On either of these accounts, the principle of toleration arrived at by the Christian route is different from the principle of toleration arrived at by Mill’s route. And this is a difference that may matter, for a theory of justice is not only supposed to provide a set of slogans for a society; it is also supposed to guide the members of that society through the disputes that may break out concerning how these slogans are to be understood and applied. >Justice/Liberalism, >Liberalism/Waldron. WaldronVsRawls: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people. Cf. >Abortion/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72. 2. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 3. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Overlapping Consensus | Waldron | Gaus I 96 Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls/Waldron: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people. >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Justice/Rawls, >Liberalism/Waldron. WaldronVsOvverlapping consensus: The actual examples of overlapping consensus for a pluralist society provided in Political Liberalism are laughably easy by comparison. Both Kantians and non-Kantians might favour democracy, Rawls says, and both Christians and secularists may well oppose slavery (1993(1): 122–5). The hard part comes when we try to establish an overlapping consensus among (say) Christian fundamentalists, Hindus, secular humanists, scientific determinists, and members of the dot-com generation on the definition of ‘equal opportunity’, the use of economic incentives, and the distinction between liberty and the worth of liberty. (...) it was not hard to see that insistence on a strong theory of desert might mean that a theory of justice would have to buy into social and religious controversies about virtue. But it was much more difficult to know what to do with that point, or what would be a fair or a neutral way to move on from it. Can we imagine an overlapping consensus on problems like that between (say) the Protestant work ethic, the notion of apostolic poverty, and ideas of the fundamental solidarity of community? It is easy to despair of answering questions like this under the conditions that Rawls’s later work has emphasized. Gaus I 97 Justice/Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. Cf. >Abortion/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Partial Identity | Armstrong | II (c) 98f Partial identity/Armstrong: non-mereologically: complex property and relation can be in a whole-part-relation or be overlapping, but not mereologically. - E.g.. the property of having 5 kg weight: then the particular is among other things, composed of several non-overlapping parts, each of which has a 3 kg and the other 2 kg mass. - Here >universals seem correct. - A case of partial identity. Cf. >Identity. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Parts | Simons | I 26f Real part/mereology: there must be at least a second real part. BrentanoVs: e.g. a man is a real part of the event "sitting human" but here there is no second real part. Otherwise: Thatcher qua Prime Minister: is not part of Thatcher. >Qua-objects. Solution: supplement principles: there must be at least two real parts (if at all). There must be the possibility of separate parts and not only overlapping. >Overlapping. I 135 Predicate/part/whole/mereology/Simons: certain predicates are true of their objects because other predicates are true of their parts: e.g. Socrates was snub-nosed, because his nose was blunt, e.g. a table mountain is flat, because its upper part is flat. Predication of the whole is inherited by predication of the parts (local predication). For continuants this is even the only kind of predication. >Predicates, >Predication. Variation/continuants/mereology/McTaggart/Simons: e.g. the poker which is hot at the front and cool at the back: that is a variation on the object, but no change of the properties. It is a complex condition. On the other hand: e.g. when the entire poker gets hot, we have to say that the point in time is not the same.> >Change, >Temporal identity, >Properties. I 210 Part/whole/Simons: thesis: we reject the antisymmetry between part and whole. Then different objects can have the same parts - and these are necessarily in the same place at the same time. >Superposition. I 229 Part/Simons: the wit of this expression is that without it, we have no concept of space restrictions or perhaps of the space at all. I 235 Part/plural designation/multiplicity/Simons: (1): b is part of a: here b is a mass term (e.g. dough) or individual term (e.g. an apple) (2): b is part of a: here b must be an individual term (e.g. an apple) (3): b are parts of a: here b must be a plural term (e.g. wolves, e.g. blueberries are part of the cake, they are not "a part" of the cake. "Are part of": is the plural of "is part of". "Are parts of": is the plural of "is part of". (4): b are parts of a: here any b must be part of a, e.g. crankshaft and transmission are parts of the car, e.g. "the front" is part of the car, but not a part of the car. Whatever is a part of something, is also part of it but not vice versa. "A part of" has extra sense opposed to "part of". Component ("a part of") exists before installation and survived replacement. I 334 Part/fragment/relation/function/mereology/Simons: an arbitrary conceptual cut, e.g. "northern part of the house" is typically not closed under the relation, under which the whole is closed. >Mereology. I 337 Part/pure mereology/Simons: a mere relation of co-parts could not distinguish which objects are more unified (integrated). >Part-of-relation. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Person | Williams | Nozick II 29f Self/Person/Self-identity/Identity/B. Williams: e.g. two stories together that put us to a mystery: 1st case: one person enters a new body, actually two people exchange their bodies. A-body-person: (now connected with the A-body): has all the memories, knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (earlier, complete) person B - if A could choose which pain should be inflicted after the change, he would choose the A-body for it - because he assumes that he lives in B. 2nd case: someone tells them to endure pain. after that, you will learn that you will undergo a change in your psychological condition - so that you will possess the character of someone else - which frightens you, you don't want to lose your identity and then endure pain. Question: Why did the A-person not have the same fears in the first case? Why is case 1: Transfer of a person to another body and case 2: something that happens to a permanent person? Why does memory play a role in case 1? II 31 Difference 1/2: in 2, B does not acquire the memories of A. Nozick II 29f Identity/Person/Self/B. Williams: e.g. Symmetric case: Outside view: two people swap bodies, A is now in the B-body and decides that B (now in his old A-body) pain should be inflicted instead of him in the new body - inside view (symmetric): You are supposed to get pain inflicted which frightens you, before you should get another character which frightens you even more - you choose the pain for yourself to ward off the loss of the person - other decision, symmetric case. Problem: nothing outside influences A's task and acquisition of a new psyche. Question: how can then two tasks and acquisitions lead to an exchange of bodies? Williams: Thesis: physical identity is a necessary condition for personal identity. II 31 Problem: what happens elsewhere can have no effect on whether A continues to live in the A-body. Williams: Thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity. Nozick II 32 Identity/Person/Self/B. Williams: Principle 1: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of any kind. Principle 2: if it is possible that there is another thing that prevents identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist. NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong. E. g. The Vienna Circle dissolves - several successor groups emerge - then the identity depends on something that happens elsewhere ((s) whether there are several groups). >"closest continuer, . Nozick II 33 Identity/time/next successor/NozikVsWilliams: but dependence on the existence of other things: whether a group can call itself a Vienna circle depends on whether there are other groups in exile - if two things are equally close to the original, there is no next successor (closest continuer). Identity in time: necessary condition: to be next successor. II 35 If God provided causally for identity in time, he would also have to decide how the factors should be weighted. >Ship of Theseus. II 40 It may be that the next successor is not close enough. II 41 Randomly created copy is not a next successor (because of missing causality) - we could have the second one without the first one. II 45 Identity in time/problem: overlapping. >Overlapping, >Identity, >Personal identity, >Continuity, >Change, >Temporal identity. |
WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Personality Traits | Ackerman | Corr I 165 Personality traits/intelligence/Ackerman: there is no equivalent ‘general personality trait’ that exists in parallel to general intelligence. >Intelligence/psychological theories. The lack of a clear hierarchy of traits with positive manifold means that one must take account of the level of analysis when considering the most likely sources of overlap between personality traits and intellectual abilities. >Method, >Experiments, >Personality traits. If a narrow personality trait is selected, it may not provide a suitable basis for mapping to a general intellectual ability construct, and if a more general personality trait is selected, it might have only a small relationship with a narrow construct of intellectual ability. Most of the basis for explication of the specific associations between personality traits and intellectual abilities is drawn from a meta-analysis of 135 studies containing a total of roughly 2,000 separate correlations (Ackerman and Heggestad 1997)(1). I 166 Personality traits that share construct overlap with intelligence: Openness to Experience (Costa and McCrae 1992)(2), Culture, Intellectance (e.g., Welsh 1975(3)), and Intellectual Efficiency (Gough 1953)(4). Corr I 167 Def TIE/Ackerman: a measure of Typical Intellectual Engagement: TIE is defined as the individual’s preference toward or away from intellectual activities.(Goff and Ackerman 1992)(5). The authors of the TIE hypothesized that scores on the measure would correlate mainly with measures of accumulated knowledge (an ability called ‘crystallized intelligence’) and less so with measures of fluid intellectual abilities (e.g., deductive reasoning and quantitative reasoning). >Deduction, >Quantities. 1. Ackerman, P. L. and Heggestad, E. D. 1997. Intelligence, personality, and interests: evidence for overlapping traits, Psychological Bulletin 121: 219–45 2. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1992. Four ways five factors are basic, Personality and Individual Differences 13: 653–65 3. Welsh, G. S. 1975. Creativity and intelligence: a personality approach. Chapel Hill, NC: Institute for Research in Social Science 4. Gough, H. G. 1953. A nonintellectual intelligence test, Journal of Consulting Psychology 17: 242–6 5. Goff, M. and Ackerman, P. L. 1992. Personality-intelligence relations: assessing typical intellectual engagement, Journal of Educational Psychology 84: 537–52 Phillip L. Ackerman, “Personality and intelligence”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Possibility | Hintikka | II 210 Possibility/situation/situation semantics/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: both approaches, the semantics of possible worlds and situation semantics agree that situations may have several dimensions, e.g. temporal, spatial, the overlapping of relations, inclusion etc. A crucial dimension is the following: Intentionality/intensionality/Hintikka: intentionality and intensionality require the consideration of a background of alternatives (worlds, alternative situations). Solution: there must be a dimension of pure possibility. >Possible world semantics, >Situation semantics, >Situations, >Intentionality. Possibility/dimension/Hintikka: the dimension of the possibility is simply introduced by a pure space-time structure, then we have branches of time that have the same temporal (and if necessary spatial) coordinates as the set s of all situations. Intensional/possibility/Hintikka: when intensional concepts come in, we need a world which is just like a given world, except that everything there is possible. ((s) But it is indistinguishable from the world in which all this is given.) Semantics of possible worlds/situation semantics/Hintikka: then there is the question of how the two still differ at all. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Postcolonialism | Mbembe | Brocker I 912 Postcolonialism/Mbembe/Herb: Achille Mbembe's study De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine(1) is, despite all appearances, not a postcolonial book about Africa. As little as the investigation wants to be a book, it is not sure about Africa as its subject. Under the title Postcolony, the author rather provides fragments of a study that first wants to find its approach to the subject of Africa, and this at a critical distance to the postcolonial currents of the present. The reception (...) [of the] work obviously means otherwise. From the very beginning, the author is attributed to post-colonialism. The author, who was born in Cameroon in 1957, sees himself more as a dissident who moves freely between the boundaries of occidental rationality and postcolonial criticism, seeking to overcome the rigid boundaries between academic traditions and disciplines. Brocker I 914 The chapters "du commandement" and "du gouvernement privé indirect" analyse the period of post-colonial regimes. Here Mbembe formulates his thesis of the manifest and hidden continuities between colonial hierarchy and postcolonial rule. It will be shown that violence, arbitrariness and death function as the matrix of African regimes, and this before and after the attainment of political independence from the colonial powers. (...) in states such as Cameroon, Senegal and Togo (...) the idiosyncratic "aesthetics of vulgarity" ("Esthétique de la vulgarité") is still at work in the discipline and dressage of post-colonial societies. They are organized under the sign of fetish, ritual representation and the rule of the simulacrum. Brocker I 917 Postcolony appears (...) as "epoch", "peculiarity" or "spirit of the age". "As an epoch, the postcolony in fact encompasses multiple periods of time, consisting of overlapping, nested and enclosing discontinuities, overturns, inertia, fluctuations" (Mbembe 2016(1), 66). >Tyranny/Mbembe. The colonial transformation of the economy into political and social life also takes place under changed conditions in postcolonial regimes. It forms virtually the "cement of postcolonial African authoritarianism" (107). Brocker I 923 Postcolony/Mbembe: Mbembe's analyses suggest that the conditions in the postcolony are not significantly different from those in the colony. In any case, the time after that does not mark a new beginning. It seems as if the same theatre is being performed, only with different actors and different spectators. The postcolony appears as an "epoch of raw life" (282), as a place of indistinguishability of life and death. HigddlestonVsMbembe: After the publication of the postcolony, Mbembe had to put up with contradiction and criticism from various sides. His concept of the postcolony, as diverse, vociferous and colorful as it may have been, seemed to many as all too "abstract", his individual analyses as "somewhat hyperbolic and extraordinarily generalized" (Hiddleston 2009(2), 175). The individual colonial regimes were often lumped together and remained undiscovered in their historical particularities. 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 2. Hiddleston, Jane, Understanding Postcolonialism, Stocksfield 2009. Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Principles | Simons | I 228 Simons is in favor of Locke's Principle (weak) for substances: two substances cannot be at the same place at the same time. >Substance/Locke. I 264 Falsehood Principles/modal mereology/Kit Fine: in a possible world, where an object does not exist, every sentence is wrong, that says that this object has a part or is a part of something (not without truth value). This also applies to overlapping, but not to separateness. Def weakly separated/Simons: objects are weakly separated when in a possible world either both exist or both do not exist. Def strongly separated/Simons: here one might demand, that the objects exist in a possible world in which they are separated. This is just contrary and not contradictory to overlap. >Part-of-Relation. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Property Dualism | Chalmers | I 125 Property Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: from the lack of a logical supervenience of consciousness from the physical follows that conscious experiences imply the properties of an individual that are not implied by the physical properties of that individual. It is not about a separate "substance". >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Consciousness. Consciousness is a feature, a property of the world, beyond the physical facts. Property Dualism: there is a weaker kind of property dualism, according to which biological fitness is not implied by physical facts. Such a property dualism would be compatible with materialism. Vgl. >Materialism. This variety is not to be confused with our present one. Consciousness/Chalmers: consciousness can result, according to our variety, from property dualism of physical properties without being implied by them. Cf. >Emergence, >Emergence/Chalmers. I 126 This view is completely naturalistic and compatible with our scientific knowledge. I 128 Definition Naturalistic Dualism/Chalmers: I call my variety of dualism naturalistic dualism, according to which properties of the phenomenal consciousness supervene on physical facts in a still to be determined manner, although not logically. >Dualism/Chalmers. What could happen in the future would be what happened with Maxwell's equations: known laws could be extended as far as their scope of application is concerned. There could be a psychophysical theory, as there is an electromagnetic theory. Cf. >Laws of nature, >Explanation, >Causal explanation. This dualism is naturalistic because it proceeds from the validity of all known laws. It is closer to materialism than many other forms of dualism by negating any transcendental elements. >Naturalism. I 129 My dualism, by the way, can still turn out as a kind of monism if it should be shown that the phenomenal and the physical are two aspects of an overlapping kind, as it turned out to be the case with matter and energy. >Monism. I have a certain sympathy for this view. But this could not be a materialistic ((s) eliminative) monism. >Elimination, >Reduction, >Reductionism. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Propositions | Lewis | Frank I 17 Proposition/Lewis: the number of possible worlds in which this proposition is true. >Possible world/Lewis. Def property/Lewis: the number of (actual or non-actual) beings that have this property. >Properties/Lewis. Proposition/Lewis/Frank: now a one-to-one correspondence can be established between each proposition and the property to inhabit a world in which the proposition applies. It makes it possible to dispense with propositions as the objects of the attitudes. But there are now attitudes that cannot be analyzed as an attitude toward a proposition: where we locate ourselves in space and time. E.g. memory loss: someone bumps into their own biography and can still not fit themselves in. - ((s) Because proposition = number of possible worlds, then - e.g. I’m true here in every possible worlds. - Therefore no knowledge). Frank I 329 Proposition: number of possible worlds in which they are true (extensional). Advantage: non-perspectivic access. - ((s) Not everyone has their own possible worlds.) Frank I 355 Propositions: have nothing intersubjective per se. - Problematic therefore is the subjectivity of reference of the first person. >First Person, >Subjectivity, >Centered world. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- Lewis IV 137 Proposition/Lewis: divides the population into inhabitants of such worlds in which it applies and those in which it does not apply - one assigns oneself to one of the worlds through belief and localizes oneself in a region of logical space - if quantification over several possible worlds is possible (cross-world), there is a large population across worlds and times. IV 142 E.g. Heimson thinks I’m Hume/Perry/Lewis: self-attribution of a property, not an empty proposition Heimson is Hume - all propositions that are true for Hume, are also true for Heimson, because both live in the same world. - Lewis: So Heimson believes the same things as Hume by believing a true proposition - the predicate -believes to be Hume - applies to both. E.g. of HeimsonVsPropositions as objects of belief - otherwise "I am Hume" would either be true both times or false both times - ((s) difference > proposition / > statement). IV 145 Proposition: in a divided world any proposition is either true or false - hence individual objects of desire are more likely properties (that can be self-attributed) than propositions. IV 146 Proposition: No Proposition: E.g. - there is something that I wish now and I will also want it even when I have it, only I will be happier then - no proposition, because it applies to the time before and after - one time of me will not be happy to live in a world where it will happen at some time. - Solution: the wish for the property to be located later in time - localization in logical space instead of proposition: E.g. The Crusader wants a region in logical space without avoidable misfortune - these are properties. V 160 Proposition: no linguistic entity - no language has enough sentences to express all the propositions - truth functional operations with propositions are Boolean operations about sets of possible worlds. - > inclusion, overlapping. --- ad Stechow 42 Language/Infinite/Lewis/(s): number of propositions is greater than the number of sentences, because power set of the possible worlds). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Psychological Resilience | Psychological Theories | Slater I 204 Resilience/Psychological theories: among others a study by Werner and Smith “Vulnerable but invincible: A study of resilient children” (Werner and Smith, 1982)(1) contributed a landmark in resilience research. See also Anthony and Koupernik, (1974)(2), Garmezy and Rutter (1983)(3). Slater I 205 According to Masten (2007)(4) there are four overlapping waves of resilience science 1) basic research to define, measure, and describe this family of phenomena 2) efforts to understand resilience processes 3) tests of resilience theory through experimental intervention studies 4) integrative, inherently multidisciplinary, research across multiple levels of analysis. Def Resilience/psychology/tradition/Masten: Resilience was often described in terms of positive function or development despite the presence of risk factors. Children who did well in adverse circumstances were identified as “invulnerable” (an unfortunate term that soon lost adherents), “stress- resistant,” or “resilient.” The goals of such studies were often to identity qualities of the child (e.g., gender, personality, or abilities) or environment (e.g., relationships or supports) that seemed to be associated with positive adaptation, competence or mental health in the context of risk. VsTradition: new approaches: Transactional models highlighted the bidirectional nature and multiplicity of effects resulting from ongoing interactions of a changing person with a changing environment. During socialization, for example, a parent would be expected to change child behavior through discipline, monitoring, or encouragement in age- and child-appropriate ways. (Eisenberg, 1977(5); Gottesman & Shields, 1972(6), 1982(7); Sameroff & Chandler, 1975(8); Sroufe, 1979(9)). >Resilience/Rutter. Slater I 207 The definition of resilience and related terms has become even more dynamic, with concepts like “resilience” or “protection” or “vulnerability” assumed to arise from complex interactions and processes across many levels of the individual and the person interacting with other people or their context (Cicchetti, 2010(10); Sapienza & Masten, 2011(11)). Concepts like protection or resilience are increasingly viewed as emergent properties of dynamic systems in interaction. In later years, many resilience scientists would refer to generally good influences (associated with desirable outcomes for all levels of risk) as “promotive” factors (Sameroff, 2000)(12) and generally bad influences as “risk factors,” while recognizing that many characteristics or experiences play varying roles along a continuum. >Distinctions/Rutter. For protection see >Resilience/Rutter, >Interaction/Rutter. For negative chain reactions see >Resilience/developmental psychology. Slater I 212 Parental care: a number of experiments corroborate the important roles of parental care for resilience (see Gest & Davidson, 2011(13)), in studies that have targeted change in quality of parenting (e.g., Borden et al., 2010(14), Patterson et al., 2010)(15) or foster care (Fisher, Van Ryzin, & Gunnar, 2011(16); Smyke, et al., 2010(17)). Neurobiology of resilience: see Curtis & Cicchetti, 2003)(18). Culture/ecology of resilience: see Luthar (2006)(19), Ungar (2008(20), 2011(21). 1. Werner, E. E., & Smith, R. S. (1982). Vulnerable but invincible: A study of resilient children. New York: McGraw-Hill 2. Anthony, E. J., & Koupernik, C. (Eds) (1974). The child in his family: Children at psychiatric risk. New York: Wiley. 3. Garmezy, N., & Rutter, M. (1983). Stress, coping and development in children. New York: McGraw-Hill. 4. Masten, A. S. (2007). Resilience in developing systems: Progress and promise as the fourth wave rises. Development and Psychopathology, 19, 921—930. 5. Eisenberg, L. (1977). Development as a unifying concept in psychiatry. British Journal of Psychiatry, 131, 225—237. 6. Gottesman, L L, & Shields, J. (1972). Schizophrenia and genetics: A twin study vantage point. New York: Academic Press. 7. Gottesman, I. I., & Shields, J. (1982). Schizophrenia: The epigenetic puzzle. New York: Cambridge University Press. 8. Sameroff, A. j., & Chandler, M. j. (1975). Reproductive risk and the continuum of caretaking casualty. In F. D. Horowitz, E. M. Hetherington, S. Scarr-Salapatek, & G. M. Siegel (Eds), Review of child development research (VoL 4, pp. 187—243). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 9. Sroufe, L. A. (1979). The coherence of individual development: Early care, attachment, and subsequent developmental issues. American Psychologist, 34, 834—841. 10. Cicchetti, D. (2010). Resilience under conditions of extreme stress: A multilevel perspective. World Psychiatry, 9, 145—154. 11. Sapienza, J. K., & Masten, A. S. (201 1). Understanding and promoting resilience in children and youth. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 24, 267—273. 12. Sameroff, A. J. (2000). Developmental systems and psychopathology. Development and Psychopathology, 12, 297—312. 13. Gest, S. D., & Davidson, A. J. (2011). A developmental perspective on risk, resilience and prevention. In M. Underwood & L. Rosen (Eds), Social development: Relationships in infancy, childhood and adolescence (pp. 427-454). New York: Guilford Press. 14. Borden, L. A., Schultz, T. R, Herman, K. C., & Brooks, C. M. (2010). The incredible years parent training program: Promoting resilience through evidence-based prevention group. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research and Practice, 14, 230—24 1. 15. Patterson, G. R., Forgatch, M. S., & DeGarmo, D. S. (2010). Cascading effects following intervention. Developmental Psychopathology, 22,941—970. 16. Fisher, P. A., Van Ryzin, M. J., & Gunnar, M. R. (2011). Mitigating HPA axis dysregula-tion associated with placement changes in foster care. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 36, 531—539. 17. Smyke, A., Fox, N., Zeanah, C., Nelson, C. A., & Guthrie, D. (2010). Placement in foster care enhances quality of attachment among young institutionalized children. Child Development, 81, 212—223. 18. Curtis, J., & Cicchetti, D. (2003). Moving resilience on resilience into the 21st century: Theoretical and methodological considerations in examining the biologica1 contributors to resilience. Development and Psychopathology, 15, 773—810. 19. Luthar, S. S. (2006). Resilience in development: A synthesis of research across five decades. In D. Cicchetti and D. J. Cohen (Eds), Developmental psychopathology. Vol. 3: Risk, disorder, and adaptation (2nd edn, pp. 739—795). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons. 20. Ungar, M. (2008). Resilience across cultures. British Journal of Social Work, 38, 18—35. 21. Ungar, M. (201 1). The social ecology of resilience: Addressing contextual and cultural ambiguity of a nascent construct. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 81, 1—17. Ann S. Masten, “Resilience in Children. Vintage Rutter and Beyond”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Recognition | Hintikka | II 209 Re-Identification/Hintikka: with this problem, situation semantics and semantics of possible worlds are in the same boat again. >Situation semantics, >Semantics of possible worlds. Situation Semantics: situation semantics rather veils the problem. For overlapping situations it assumes, e.g. that the overlapping part remains the same. Re-Identification/Quine/Hintikka: Quine and Hintikka consider re-identification as hopeless because you cannot explain how it works. Re-Identification/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke ditto, but that is why we should simply postulate it, at least for physical objects. HintikkaVsQuine/HintikkaVsKripke: this is either too pessimistic or too optimistic. But ignoring the problem would mean to neglect one of the greatest philosophical problems. >Cross world identity, >Centered worlds, >Identification. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Redshift | Kanitscheider | I 222 Redshift/Theory: ambiguous: one thought earlier that the redshift of the spectral lines of the light of the distant galaxies is a Doppler effect. This is wrong! Not the galaxies move through the space, but the space itself expands. (Therefore it is also possible that the expansion can assume superluminal speed). But then the galaxies themselves are in rest. I 223 Theory/Empirical/Kanitscheider: nevertheless, here was a real support of the theory by theory-neutral empirical data: because the linear Hubble law (whatever value the Hubble constant may have) is logically firmly connected with the uniformity of the world at large. An empirical connection was discovered without the help of those theories for which this connection should be supporting instance. From such a law of expansion follows that every galaxy can be regarded as center of such an expansion. >Universe/Kanitscheider, >Cosmological principle/Kanitscheider, cf. >Olbers paradox, >Relativity theory. I 225 Redshift/Kanitscheider: for the cosmological interpretation the wavelength independence is important. Only then the statement can be made that the measured value of z = 1 is due to a doubling of the size of space. Since Rem approaches zero at (time-inverse) approach to the initial singularity, the redshift of very old and distant objects can go beyond all limits. At t = 0, z is infinite. However, no observable corresponds to this, since redshift is also accompanied by a slowing down of all processes. Around the big bang the physical events appear frozen. I 226 Redshift/Kanitscheider: It is important to recognize that the different interpretations are not based on relationist Vs absolutist conception of space! The interpretation, according to which the redshift is caused by the expansion of space, is of course the relativistic one, but it is not only a facon de parler, but has also empirical consequences: if the redshift would be really a velocity and not an expansion effect, the energy flux S, which is measured from a galaxy of luminosity L on the earth, not S = L / 4πR²(1 + z)², but S = L / 4πr²(1 + z)². However, this is not valid for an overlapping area with very small distances, where both theories give equal values. Redshift/Kanitscheider: there is a third explanation: light fatigue by gravitational effect. Photons experience an interaction on their way, be it with atoms or with electrons, which triggers an energy loss and thus a frequency decrease. Or the photon decays into a lower energy photon and a vector boson. Vs: One can exclude such hypothesis only by comparing the consequences with the empiric: Bsp It would have to accompany by interaction with intergalactic matter also a smearing of the pictures of distant objects. This has never been observed. Even quasars are always sharply point-like. Likewise, the spectral lines would have to become broader, which has also never been observed. Moreover, the fatigue phenomenon would have to occur depending on the wavelength, that the radiophotons decay faster than the light photons. Moreover, the static universe - which is implied by this assumption - would have no place for the background radiation. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Reinforcement Learning | AI Research | Norvig I 831 Reinforcement Learning/AI Research/Norvig/Russell: In many complex domains, reinforcement learning [by reward and punishment] is the only feasible way to train a program to perform at high levels. For example, in game playing, it is very hard for a human to provide accurate and consistent evaluations of large numbers of positions, which would be needed to train an evaluation function directly from examples. Instead, the program can be told when it has won or lost, and it can use this information to learn an evaluation function that gives reasonably accurate estimates of the probability of winning from any given position. Similarly, it is extremely difficult to program an agent to fly a helicopter; yet given appropriate negative rewards for crashing, wobbling, or deviating from a set course, an agent can learn to fly by itself. A. Passive Reinforcement learning Situation: an agent is placed in an environment and must learn to behave successfully therein. A utility-based agent learns a utility function on states and uses it to select actions that maximize the expected outcome utility. A Q-learning agent learns an action-utility function, or Q-function, giving the expected utility of taking a given action in a given state. A reflex agent learns a policy that maps directly from states to actions. Exploration: an agent must experience as much as possible of its environment in order to learn how to behave in it. >Markov decision processes/Norvig. Norvig I 833 Passive reinforcement learning: A simple method for direct utility estimation was invented in the late 1950s in the area of adaptive control theory by Widrow and Hoff (1960)(1). The idea is that the utility of a state is the expected total reward from that state onward (called the expected reward-to-go), and each trial provides a sample of this quantity for each state visited. Utility: the utilities of states are not independent! The utility of each state equals its own reward plus the expected utility of its successor states. That is, the utility values obey the Bellman equations for a fixed policy. (>Values/AI Research). Problem: By ignoring the connections between states, direct utility estimation misses opportunities for learning. Norvig I 834 Adaptive Dynamic Programming /ADP: An adaptive dynamic programming (or ADP) agent takes advantage of the constraints among the utilities of states by learning the transition model that connects them and solving the corresponding Markov decision process using a dynamic programming method. Alternatively, we can adopt the approach of modified policy iteration (…), using a simplified value iteration process to update the utility estimates after each change to the learned model. Norvig I 836 Temporal difference learning/TD: All temporal-difference methods work by adjusting the utility estimates towards the ideal equilibrium that holds locally when the utility estimates are correct. Norvig I 839 B. Active reinforcement learning: A passive learning agent has a fixed policy that determines its behavior. An active agent must decide what actions to take. First, the agent will need to learn a complete model with outcome probabilities for all actions, (…). Next, we need to take into account the fact that the agent has a choice of actions. The utilities it needs to learn are those defined by the optimal policy; they obey the >Bellman equations (…).The final issue is what to do at each step. Having obtained a utility function U that is optimal for the learned model, the agent can extract an optimal action by one-step look-ahead to maximize the expected utility; alternatively, if it uses policy iteration, the optimal policy is already available, so it should simply execute the action the optimal policy recommends. Norvig I 843 Q-Learning: There is an alternative TD method, called Q-learning, which learns an action-utility representation instead of learning utilities. [A] TD [temporal difference] agent that learns a Q-function does not need a model of the form P(s’| s, a), either for learning or for action selection. For this reason, Q-learning is called a model-free method. Norvig I 845 Function approximation: simply means using any sort of representation for the Q-function other than a lookup table. The representation is viewed as approximate because it might not be the case that the true utility function or Q-function can be represented in the chosen form. Norvig I 846 Generalization: The compression achieved by a function approximator allows the learning agent to generalize from states it has visited to states it has not visited. That is, the most important aspect of function approximation is not that it requires less space, but that it allows for inductive generalization over input states. Norvig I 848 Policies: a policy π is a function that maps states to actions. (…) we could represent π by a collection of parameterized Q-functions, one for each action, and take the action with the highest predicted value (…).if the policy is represented by Q-functions, then policy search results in a process that learns Q-functions. This process is not the same as Q-learning! In Q-learning with function approximation, the algorithm finds a value of θ such that ˆQ θ is “close” to Q ∗, the optimal Q-function. Policy search: Policy search, on the other hand, finds a value of θ that results in good performance; (…). VsPolicy search: Problems: One problem with policy representations of the kind (…) is that the policy is a discontinuous function of the parameters when the actions are discrete. Solution: This means that the value of the policy may also change discontinuously, which makes gradient-based search difficult. For this reason, policy search methods often use a stochastic policy representation πθ(s, a), which specifies the probability of selecting action a in state s. Norvig I 854 History of reinforcement learning: Turing (1948(2), 1950(3)) proposed the reinforcement-learning approach, although he was not convinced of its effectiveness, writing, “the use of punishments and rewards can at best be a part of the teaching process.” Arthur Samuel’s work (1959)(4) was probably the earliest successful machine learning research. Around the same time, researchers in adaptive control theory (Widrow and Hoff, 1960)(1), building on work by Hebb (1949)(5), were training simple networks using the delta rule. The cart–pole work of Michie and Chambers (1968)(6) can also be seen as a reinforcement learning method with a function approximator. The psychological literature on reinforcement learning is much older; Hilgard and Bower (1975)(7) provide a good survey. Neuroscience: The neuroscience text by Dayan and Abbott (2001)(8) describes possible neural implementations of temporal-difference learning, while Dayan and Niv (2008)(9) survey the latest evidence from neuroscientific and behavioral experiments. Markov decision process: The connection between reinforcement learning and Markov decision processes was first made by Werbos (1977)(10), but the development of reinforcement learning in AI stems from work at the University of Massachusetts in the early 1980s (Barto et al., 1981)(11). The paper by Sutton (1988) provides a good historical overview. Temporal difference learning: The combination of temporal-difference learning with the model-based generation of simulated experiences was proposed in Sutton’s DYNA architecture (Sutton, 1990)(12). The idea of prioritized sweeping was introduced independently by Moore and Atkeson (1993)(13) and Norvig I 855 Peng and Williams (1993)(14). Q-learning: was developed in Watkins’s Ph.D. thesis (1989)(15), while SARSA appeared in a technical report by Rummery and Niranjan (1994)(16). Function approximation: Function approximation in reinforcement learning goes back to the work of Samuel, who used both linear and nonlinear evaluation functions and also used feature-selection methods to reduce the feature CMAC space. Later methods include the CMAC (Cerebellar Model Articulation Controller) (Albus, 1975)(17), which is essentially a sum of overlapping local kernel functions, and the associative neural networks of Barto et al. (1983)(18). Neural networks are currently the most popular form of function approximator. The best-known application is TD-Gammon (Tesauro, 1992(19), 1995(20)), (…). Policy search: Policy search methods were brought to the fore by Williams (1992(21)), who developed the REINFORCE family of algorithms. Later work by Marbach and Tsitsiklis (1998)(22), Sutton et al. (2000)(23), and Baxter and Bartlett (2000)(24) strengthened and generalized the convergence results for policy search. The method of correlated sampling for comparing different configurations of a system was described formally by Kahn and Marshall (1953)(25), but seems to have been known long before that. Its use in reinforcement learning is due to Van Roy (1998)(26) and Ng and Jordan (2000)(27); the latter paper also introduced the PEGASUS algorithm and proved its formal properties. Norvig I 857 Inverse reinforcement learning: Russell (1998)(28) describes the task of inverse reinforcement learning - figuring out what the reward function must be from an example path through that state space. This is useful as a part of apprenticeship learning, or as a part of doing science—we can understand an animal or robot by working backwards from what it does to what its reward function must be. Cf. >Learning, >Generalization, >Understanding. 1. Widrow, B. and Hoff, M. E. (1960). Adaptive switching circuits. In 1960 IRE WESCON Convention Record, pp. 96–104. 2. Turing, A. (1948). Intelligent machinery. Tech. rep. National Physical Laboratory. reprinted in (Ince, 1992). 3. Turing, A. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59, 433–460. 4. Samuel, A. L. (1959). Some studies in machine learning using the game of checkers. IBM Journal of Research and Development, 3(3), 210–229. 5. Hebb, D. O. (1949). The Organization of Behavior. Wiley. 6. Michie, D. and Chambers, R. A. (1968). BOXES: An experiment in adaptive control. In Dale, E. and Michie, D. (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 2, pp. 125–133. Elsevier/North-Holland. 7. Hilgard, E. R. and Bower, G. H. (1975). Theories of Learning (4th edition). Prentice-Hall. 8. Dayan, P. and Abbott, L. F. (2001). Theoretical Neuroscience: Computational and Mathematical Modeling of Neural Systems. MIT Press. 9. Dayan, P. and Niv, Y. (2008). Reinforcement learning and the brain: The good, the bad and the ugly. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 18(2), 185–196. 10. Werbos, P. (1977). Advanced forecasting methods for global crisis warning and models of intelligence. General Systems Yearbook, 22, 25–38. 11. Barto, A. G., Sutton, R. S., and Brouwer, P. S. (1981). Associative search network: A reinforcement learning associative memory. Biological Cybernetics, 40(3), 201–211. 12. Sutton, R. S. (1990). Integrated architectures for learning, planning, and reacting based on approximating dynamic programming. In ICML-90, pp. 216–224. 13. Moore, A. W. and Atkeson, C. G. (1993). Prioritized sweeping—Reinforcement learning with less data and less time. Machine Learning, 13, 103–130. 14. Peng, J. and Williams, R. J. (1993). Efficient learning and planning within the Dyna framework. Adaptive Behavior, 2, 437–454. 15. Watkins, C. J. (1989). Models of Delayed Reinforcement Learning. Ph.D. thesis, Psychology Department, Cambridge University. 16. Rummery, G. A. and Niranjan, M. (1994). Online Q-learning using connectionist systems. Tech. rep. CUED/F-INFENG/TR 166, Cambridge University Engineering Department. 17. Albus, J. S. (1975). A new approach to manipulator control: The cerebellar model articulation controller (CMAC). J. Dynamic Systems, Measurement, and Control, 97, 270–277. 18. Barto, A. G., Sutton, R. S., and Anderson, C. W. (1983). Neuron-like adaptive elements that can solve difficult learning control problems. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 13, 834– 846. 19. Tesauro, G. (1992). Practical issues in temporal difference learning. Machine Learning, 8(3–4), 257– 277. 20. Tesauro, G. (1995). Temporal difference learning and TD-Gammon. CACM, 38(3), 58–68. 21. Williams, R. J. (1992). Simple statistical gradient following algorithms for connectionist reinforcement learning. Machine Learning, 8, 229–256. 22. Marbach, P. and Tsitsiklis, J. N. (1998). Simulation based optimization of Markov reward processes. Technical report LIDS-P-2411, Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 23. Sutton, R. S., McAllester, D. A., Singh, S. P., and Mansour, Y. (2000). Policy gradient methods for reinforcement learning with function approximation. In Solla, S. A., Leen, T. K., andM¨uller, K.-R. (Eds.), NIPS 12, pp. 1057–1063. MIT Press. 24. Baxter, J. and Bartlett, P. (2000). Reinforcement learning in POMDP’s via direct gradient ascent. In ICML-00, pp. 41–48. 25. Kahn, H. and Marshall, A. W. (1953). Methods of reducing sample size in Monte Carlo computations. Operations Research, 1(5), 263–278. 26. Van Roy, B. (1998). Learning and value function approximation in complex decision processes. Ph.D. thesis, Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, MIT. 27. Ng, A. Y. and Jordan, M. I. (2000). PEGASUS: A policy search method for large MDPs and POMDPs. In UAI-00, pp. 406–415. 28. Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning agents for uncertain environments (extended abstract). In COLT-98, pp. 101–103. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Rules | Wright | I 260f Rules only exist within a practice, which is maintained by the fact that the parties are in agreement. >Convention, >Community, >Language community. Rules/Wittgenstein/Wright: whatever Wittgenstein's dialectic exactly achieves it forces in any case some kind of restriction for a realistic idea of rules and meaning. >Realism. And therefore also for truth, because truth is a function of meaning. >Truth, >Meaning. Rule-following/Wright: shows that judgments about meanings and that what corresponds to these conditionally, are withdrawn from cognitive coercion. And then the same must also apply to claims about the truth of sentences. >Cognitive coercion, >Rule following. This intuitive reasoning is therefore not a trivial solipsism and the ghost of a global minimalism (Boghossian) is still among us. >Nonfactualism, >Minimalism/Wright. I 288 Rule-following/Wright: in the three other areas of discourse (without evidence transcendence as in mathematics) however, it appears that they are biased by considerations to rule consequences. These considerations may 1. prevent the formulation itself, and prevent that the problem appears solvable at all 2. discover misconceptions, presented jointly by the opponents, 3. affect the result from the outset in favor of minimalism. 4. Difficulty: how can we achieve the desired realism of objectivity, if our response to a problem will never be able to free itself from a dependence on skills and aptitudes to spontaneous reactions whose own state is drawn into doubt with respect to objectivity. >Objectivity. --- Rorty VI 55ff WrightVsDavidson: Cognitive bid, language, meaning, truth and knowledge would collapse if there is no offense in relation to what we call "addition". >Nonfactualism, >Cognitive coercion, >Quaddition, >Facts, >D. Davidson. --- II 225 Rules/Wright: not in the same language. >Metalanguage, >Object language. Exception: an expression of what someone understands when he understands "red": can be formulated in the same language. >Understanding. Chess: not from the inside/(s) otherwise learnable by observation - then never certain whether these are all rules, or if not in reality quite different rules. >Chess. Prevailing view/Wright: the prevailing view is that rules can be recognized from the inside out. WrightVs: that would demand that language use can be explained as an application of rules. - That excludes to see it at the same time as a game (as actually desired). II 226 Rules/vagueness/Wright: problem when applying predicates which should be guided by rules: then in the case of vagueness simultaneous application and non-application prescribed when overlapping. >Vagueness, >Predication, >Attribution. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Self- Consciousness | Hegel | Gadamer I 256 Self-Consciousness/Hegel/Gadamer: [Hegel had already developed] the structural correspondence between life and self-consciousness in the "Phenomenology" (...). Gadamer I 257 The fundamental fact of being alive is assimilation. The distinction is therefore at the same time a non-distinction. The foreign is appropriated. This structure of the liveliness has (...) its counterpart in the essence of self-consciousness. Its being consists in the fact that it knows how to make everything and anything the object of its knowledge and yet knows itself in everything and everyone that knows it. Thus, as knowledge, it is a "differentiation from itself" and, as self-consciousness, it is at the same time an overlapping, in that it unites itself with itself. >Dialectic/Hegel, >Method/Hegel, >Thinking/Hegel, >Reflection/Hegel. Gadamer: Obviously it is more than a mere structural correspondence between life and self-consciousness. Hegel is quite right when he derives self-consciousness dialectically from life. What is alive is in fact never really recognizable to the objective consciousness, the effort of the mind that strives to penetrate the law of phenomena. Life/Hegel: Living things are not of the kind that one could ever come from outside to see them in their liveliness. The only way to grasp liveliness is rather to become aware of it. Hegel alludes to the story of the veiled image of Sais when he describes the inner self-objectivation of life and self-consciousness: "Here the inner sees the inner"(1). Gadamer: It is the way of self-feeling, the inner being of one's own vitality, in which life is experienced alone. Hegel shows how this experience flares up and goes out in the form of desire and satisfaction of desire. This self-consciousness of vitality, in which the liveliness becomes conscious of itself, is admittedly an untrue preform, a lowest form of self-consciousness, provided that the becoming conscious of oneself in desire simultaneously destroys itself through the satisfaction of desire. As untrue as it is to the objective truth, the consciousness of something foreign, it is nevertheless, as the vital feeling, the first truth of self-consciousness. >Subject/Hegel, Cf. >Apperception, >Apprehension. 1. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Hoffmeister, S. 128 Grenz I 38 Self-Consciousness/Hegel/Gadamer/Grenz: Gadamer draws attention to Hegel's emphasis on the universality of self-consciousness (Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p.19, Hegel Phänomenologie, p. 148). Comparability/Gadamer: comparability of the consciousness is ensured by the universality of the produced things. >Generality, >Consciousness. Höffe I 329 Self-Consciousness/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: In competition with his or her peers, the human does not first depend on self-assertion, but already on the constitution of a self. Hegel extends the debate, which is often conducted in a purely social, legal or state theoretical manner, by three further topics: a) confrontation of humans with themselves, b) confrontation with nature and c) the three dimensions belonging to the concept of work. At first, people are not finished subjects, but must first acquire the necessary self-consciousness in a dynamic process. In the complex course (...) of a veritable "fight for recognition", three dimensions interlock: - the personal confrontation of the individual with him- or herself, - the social with his or her peers and - the economic with nature. Self-Consciousness/Fight for Recognition: Self-confidence appears at first as a simple striving for self-preservation, but encounters the competing striving of another (...) and leads, since one self-preservation contradicts the other, to a "fight for life and death". >Master/Slave/Hegel, >Recognition/Hegel. 1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Symbols | Deacon | I 79 Symbols/Deacon: Tradition: assumes that symbolic association is formed by learning the connection between a sound or string with something else in the world. DeaconVsTradition: this is what we mean by index or index-like or indexing association. >Icon/Deacon. I 80 Words can also be an index: e.g."Aha!","there" etc. >Indexicality. Understanding: a sign that someone has understood a word is his ability to use that word in other sentences. However, if the word is only inserted somewhere, it would only be an index-like or iconic understanding. >Understanding, >Language use. Symbol: to use something as a symbol, you should be able to handle the referential functions (what does it refer to?). >Reference, >Symbolic reference. Def stimulus generalization: the transfer of associations from one stimulus to a similar one. Similarly, the transfer of learned patterns to a similar context. This is often confused with symbolic associations. >Association, >Stimulus, >Stimulus meaning, >Language use, >Generalization. I 81 Learning/DeaconVsTradition: such transfers are not special forms of learning, but simply iconic projections. This happens by itself, because ambiguity is always involved. Psychological models often speak of rules for this transfer. >Learning, >Rules. DeaconVs: since this is an iconic relation, there is no implicit list of criteria that is learned. ((s) Images are compared directly, not based on lists of criteria). Icon/Deacon: Words or stimuli stand for a set of things that differ more or less from each other. People and animals learn this. This learning is not done by criteria for symbols, but by iconic overlapping. This provides the basis for an indexed reference. I 83 Symbol/learning/Deacon: the difficulty of symbolic learning stems from the complex relation a symbol (e.g. a word) has to other symbols. Such complex relations do not exist between indices (simple signs with a physical connection to an object). I 92 Symbols/Deacon: Problem: Symbols cannot be learned individually as they form a system among each other. I 93 Before a single symbol-object association can be detected, the complete logical system of symbols must be learned. Problem: even with a few symbols there is a very large number of possible combinations, most of which are pointless. These must be sorted out, i.e. "forgotten". I 99 Symbols/Deacon: Symbols are not an unstructured set of tokens representing objects, but they represent each other. Symbols do not refer directly to things in the world, but they do so indirectly by referring to other symbols ((s) because they are located in a syntactic and semantic system). I 100 Limitation/Borders: Randomly uninterpreted strings of signs have no reference and therefore no limit in their set. Other symbols: their quantity is limited because of (practical, external) use and because of the use of the other symbols by which they are defined. Question: why are only some types of symbol systems implemented in human languages, but not others? I 266 Symbols/Deacon: it is wrong to assume they are located somewhere in the brain. They are rather relations between tokens, not the tokens themselves. It is also not constituted by a special association, but by the set of associations that are partially represented in each instance of the symbol. I 267 In the brain, the operations for organizing these combinatorial relations are located in the prefrontal cortex. I 336 Symbols/language/brain/evolution/Deacon: Thesis: it is the use of symbols that made it necessary for our human brain to develop in such a way that special emphasis could be placed on actions in the prefrontal cortex. >Adaptation/Deacon. I 339 Symbols/Evolution/Brain/DeaconVsPinker/DeaconVsChomsky: whatever we call "language instinct", symbol processing is so widely distributed in the brain that it cannot be subjected to natural selection. Thus language is cut off from what biological evolution can shape. >Thinking, >Cognition, >Information processing/psychology, cf. >Cognitive psychology. I 339/340 Universal grammar/language evolution/solution/Deacon: Co-evolution of languages with regard to the circumstances and dispositions of the brain. This can be an explanation for a developing grammatical universality. >Universal grammar, >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic learning, >Symbolic representation. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Terminology | Economic Theories | Mause I 276 Def Principle of Equivalence/Taxes/Terminology/Economic Theory: The principle of equivalence (for taxes) requires that every tax be legitimised by a benefit for citizens on the expenditure side. Mause I 278 Dynamic Inefficiency/Terminology/Economic Theories: In an overlapping generation growth model, in which there is at all times an active generation, earning income from work and saving for old age, and a second generation, retired and dissolving savings, dynamic inefficiency exists when the marginal productivity of capital is lower than the growth rate of the population. (1) Then too much is saved overall and the capital stock per person is too large. 1. Peter A. Diamond, 1965. National debt in a neoclassical growth model. American Economic Review 55 (5): 1126– 1150. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Terminology | Goodman | I 88 Art: There are characteristics to define a mode of symbolization that indicates whether something is a work of art. 1. Syntactic density: syntactic density is, where certain minimal differences serve to distinguish symbols, e.g. a scale free thermometer (in contrast to a digital instrument.) 2. Semantic density: semantic density is, where symbols are available for things that differ only by minimal differences from each other, e. g. not only the scale free thermometer mentioned above, but also common German, as long as it is not syntactically dense. 3. Relative fullness: relative fullness is, where comparatively many aspects of a symbol are significant, e. g. the drawing of a mountain of Hokusai consisting of a single line, in which every property such as line, thickness, shape, etc. counts. Contrary to the same curve as a depiction of the stock market trend of a day, in which only the height of the values above the basis counts. 4. Exemplification: in the exemplification, a symbol, whether or not it is denoted, is symbolized by the fact that it serves as a sample of properties which it possesses literally or metaphorically. 5. Multiple and complex reference is also possible, where one symbol fulfils several related and interacting reference functions, some direct and others mediated by other symbols. --- III 128 Definition symbol scheme: a symbol scheme consists of characters. Definition characters: characters are certain classes of utterances or inscriptions. Characteristic of the character in a notation is that its elements can be freely interchanged without any syntactic effects (class of marks). Score requires character separation. A character in a notation is an abstraction class of character indifference among inscriptions. Definition inscriptions: inscriptions include statements. An inscription is any brand visually, auditively, etc. that belongs to a character. An inscription is atomic if it does not contain any other inscription, otherwise it is compound. For example, a letter is considered atomic, including spaces. In music, the separation in atomic/together cannot always be recognized immediately, it is more complex. The atoms are best sorted into categories: key sign, time sign, pitch sign. III 128/129 Definition mark: a mark is an individual case of a character in a notation and it includes inscriptions. Actual marks are rarely moved or exchanged. All inscriptions of a given brand are syntactically equivalent. And this is a sufficient condition that they are "genuine copies" or replicas of each other, or are spelled in the same way. No mark may belong to more than one character (disjunctiveness) a mark that is unambiguously an inscription of a single character is still ambiguous, if it has different objects of fulfillment at different times or in different contexts. Definition type (opposite: use, Peirce): the type is the general or class whose individual cases or elements are the marks. Goodman: I prefer to do without the type altogether and instead name the cases of use of the type replica. Definition case of use: the case of use the replica of a type ("genuine copy"). There is no degree of similarity necessary or sufficient for replicas. Definition genuine copy: a genuine copy of a genuine copy of a genuine copy... must always be a genuine copy of "x". If the relation of being a genuine copy is not being transitive, the whole notation loses its meaning (see below: strictly speaking, a performance may not contain a single wrong note). Score requires character separation. Definition Notation: 1. Condition is character indifference among the individual cases of each character. Character indifference is a typical equivalence relation: reflexive, symmetrical, transitive. (No inscription belongs to one character to whom the other does not belong). 2. Demand to notation: the characters must be differentiated or articulated finally. For every two characters K and K' and every mark m that does not actually belong to both, the provision that either m does not belong to K or m does not belong to K' is theoretically possible. 3. The (first) semantic requirement for notation systems is that they must be unambiguous. Definition ambiguity: ambiguity consists of a multitude of fulfillment classes for one character. Definition redundancy: redundancy consists of a multitude of characters for one fulfillment class. III 133 Definition syntactically dense: a schema is syntactically dense if it provides an infinite number of characters that are arranged in such a way that there is always a third between two. Such a scheme still has gaps. For example, if the characters are rational numbers that are either less than 1 or not less than 2. In this case, the insertion of a character corresponding to 1 will destroy the density. Definition consistently dense: if there is no insertion of other characters at their normal positions, the density is destroyed. Definition ordered syntactically: e. g. by alphabet Definition discreetly not overlapping: note how absurd the usual notion is that the elements of a notation must be discreet: first, characters of a notation as classes must be rather disjoint! Discretion is a relationship between individuals. Secondly, there is no need for inscriptions of notations to be discreet. And finally, even atomic inscriptions only need to be discreet relative to this notation. Definition disjunct/disjunctiveness: no mark may belong to more than one character. The disjunctiveness of the characters is therefore somewhat surprising since we do not have neatly separated classes of ordered spheres of inscriptions in the world, but rather a confusing mixture of marks. Semantic disjunctiveness does not imply the discreetness of the objects of fulfillment, nor do syntactic disjunctiveness of the characters imply the discreetness of the inscriptions. On the other hand, a schema can consist of only two characters that are not differentiated finally. For example, all marks that are not longer than one centimeter belong to one character, all longer marks belong to the other. III 213 Definition fullness: the symbols in the picturial schema are relatively full, and fullness is distinguished from both the general public of the symbol and the infinity of a schema. It is in fact completely independent of what a symbol denotes, as well as the number of symbols in a scheme. Definition "attenuation": for the opposite of fullness I use attenuation. Definition density: e.g. real numbers, no point delimitation possible. The opposite of dense is articulated. III 232 ff Syntactic density, semantic density and syntactic fullness can be three symptoms of the aesthetic. Syntactic density is characteristic for non-linguistic systems; sketches differ from scores and scripts. Semantic density is characteristic of representation, description and expression through which sketches and scripts differ from scores. Relative syntactic fullness distinguishes the more representational among the semantically dense systems from the diagrammatic ones, the less from the more "schematic" ones. Density is anything but mysterious and vague and is explicitly defined. It arises from the unsatisfactory desire for precision and keeps it alive. III 76ff Def scheme: a scheme implicit set of alternatives. III 128 Def symbolic scheme: a symbolic scheme consists of characters. >Symbols. III ~ 140 Def symbol system: a symbol system is a symbol diagram, which is correlated with a reference region. III 76 A description does not work in isolation, but in its belonging to a family. III 195 The text of a poem, a novel or a biography is a character in a notation scheme. As a phonetic character with comments as the satisfaction of objects it belongs to an approximately notational system. >Systems. III 195 As a character with objects as the satisfaction of objects it belongs to a discursive language. >Satisfaction. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Terminology | Lyons | I 66 Spelling/Lyons: /1/: Elements of the expression level [t]: phonetic transcription (phonetic spelling) I 84 Def Functional load/Linguistics/Lyons: For example, many words can be distinguished by the opposition of /p/ and /b/. Therefore, the contrast between these two elements has a high functional load. If only a few words are distinguished by an opposition e.g. wreath and wreathe the functional load is low. Position: depending on the position in the word, the functional load of a certain given contrast can be different. For example, two elements could often contrast at the beginning but rarely at the end of a word. I 85 Importance: of contrast: also depends on whether the words themselves appear in the same context and can contrast or not. Functional load = 0: For example, if A and B are two word classes with complementary distribution and each element of class A differs in its realization from an element of B only in that it has /a/ where the corresponding word of class B has /b/, then the functional load of the contrast between /a/ and /b/ is = 0. Functional load: must therefore be calculated for words that have the same or overlapping distribution. Furthermore, not only the grammar (distribution) must be taken into account, but also the quantity of the actual statements made. Importance: of a contrast: also depends on the absolute frequency of occurrence. This shows how difficult it is to accurately measure the functional load. I 86 However, it should have an importance for us both in synchronic and in diachronic description. I 92 Principle of least effort/information/linguistics/Lyons: = tendency to maximize the performance of the system so that the syntagmatic length of words and expressions approaches the theoretical ideal. (>Shortening the chains). On the other hand: Principle 2: Principle: the desire to be understood counteracts the shortening tendency. I 93 "Homeostatic balance": should prevail between these two principles. (Zipf's law). I 142 Def Generative/Linguistics/Grammar/Lyons: any linguistic description that can describe actual utterances as elements of a larger class of potential utterances is called generative. I 235 Def Endocentric/Grammar/Lyons: a construction is endocentric if its distribution (distribution, occurrence in possible contexts) is identical to that of one or more of its constituents, otherwise exocentric. Def Exocentric: a construction is exocentric if its distribution (distribution, occurrence in possible contexts) is different from that of its constituents. Endocentric: Example "poor John" has the same distribution as his constituent John. ((s) if that John is meant! Vs(s): it's not about that, but simply about John standing grammatically in the same place as poor John ("poor" is irrelevant). For each sentence in which John appears, a sentence can be found in which poor John is in the same position. Exocentric: Example "in Vancouver": does not have the same distribution as its constituents "in" and "Vancouver". Distribution: is equal in the case of e.g. wage and poor John. Distribution: is different in the case of e.g. "in Vancouver" and "Vancouver". The distribution of "in Vancouver" corresponds approximately to that of "there". This corresponds to the traditional expression of function. I 236 Nesting/Grammar/Linguistics/Lyons: (concerns endocentric constructions (see Terminology/Lyons). a) Coordinating endocentric construction: e.g. bread and cheese, e.g. coffee or tea. b) Subordinating endocentric construction: (the constituents still have the same distribution) e.g. poor Hans, e.g. very clever, e.g. the girl one floor higher, e.g. the man in the bus. Def Carrier element/carrier/head/subordinating construction/terminology/Lyons: is the constituent whose distribution is the same as that of the entire construction (i.e. endocentric). I 237 Def Determination element/modifier/subordinating construction/Lyons: is the constituent whose distribution is not identical to that of the whole construction Example(s) "poorer" in "poor Hans". Nesting/Lyons: the determining element (modifier) can be repeatedly nested in subordinating constructions, for example the man on the roof of the bus: Carrier: Man Determination element: on the roof of the bus (exocentric adverbial expression with preposition on and nominal expression the roof of the bus) Roof of the bus: endocentric, Carrier: the roof Destination element: "of the bus". Endocentric/exocentric/Lyons: goes back to Bloomfield. I 244 Def Regimen/Grammar/Lyons: (in contrast to congruence): the verb "reigns" the case of the object, Latin: here the preposition also reigns over certain case-dependent nouns, pronouns or nominal expressions. Example ad urbem, ab urbe. Regimen: between words of different categories. Congruence: between words of the same category. I 270 Def Clause/Terminology/Linguistics/Lyons: Subset Def Phrase/Terminology/Linguistics/Lyons: word complex. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Thinking | Leibniz | Holz I 41 Thinking/Leibniz: the contents are ultimately determined by definitions and axioms. >Definition/Leibniz, >Axiom/Leibniz. I 69 Thinking/Leibniz: means to think of relationships and connections. Def "Golden Chain" of the connections/Holz: metaphor of the baroque. "Aura catena": if one is defined by its relation to another, then the totality of the elements is the reason of this one. Chain/Leibniz: more than temporal: one is respectively more determined by its closer neighbor. Sufficient reason/Leibniz: something can be adequately substantiated by its connection with its nearest neighbor, but not completely. >Sufficiency/Leibniz, >Terminology/Leibniz. I 70 Complete justification/reason/determination/Leibniz: is only possible through the whole chain. (Infinite, only to be seen by God). The individual terms would have to be given by identical sentences. >Ultimate justification, >Identity/Leibniz. I 77 Unity/multiplicity/Leibniz: now the multiplicity of the world (manifoldness of perceptions) is given empirically. >Perception/Leibniz; cf. >Unity and multiplicity. Axiom: Variety principle: "I perceive different things" (varia a me percipiuntur). This is undoubtedly by direct intuition. This is not provable as empiricism, but it is also not a burden of proof, since it is directly given. (> Given). From this it follows that if the being of the world as a whole is necessary, "every contingent is necessary in a certain way." Holz: necessity is thus overlapping over contingency. I 78 Principle of Variety/Principles/Thinking/Leibniz: the formal principle of thinking is based on the principle of variety. ((s) Because you cannot think of a single thing without relation to anything else.) Double movement/ascent/descent/Leibniz/Holz: from the certainty of the perceived multiplicity, one can now ascend to the infinitesimal boundary concept "all beings at the same time". >Principles/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Two Omniscient Gods | Castaneda | Frank I 356 f Two omniscient gods/Example/ Lewis: omniscient: only through knowledge of all propositions. - But incapable of self-ascribtion of the decisive properties, since properties (attributes) are not propositional. >Propositions, >Attributes, >Self-identification. CatanedaVsLewis: his notion of the unique counterpart fits more to the part-subject areas of private objects. The overlapping structure would be a total world, and each extension would be "my World" for every person in the world. Therefore, Lewis' example of the two Gods is not evident, even not if we equate propositions with sets of possible worlds. >Possible Worlds, >Possible Worlds/Lewis, cf. >Possible Worlds/Cresswell. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Wholes | Maturana | I 171 Whole/part/Maturana: a whole can not operate as its own component: unit has two non-overlapping regions that are distinguished (as simple/composite) - ((s) of connection of level and domain: the level "has a range".) >Domains/Maturana, >Simplicity, >Complexity, >Unity, >Levels, >Parts, >Part-of-Relation. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Austin, John L. | Searle Vs Austin, John L. | SearleVs Traditional Speech act analysis. (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good", "true" mean the same in different acts. Ignored by the traditional speech act theory) good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something. Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements. Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVs). In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A". >Speech act theory. IV 17 illocutionary act/Austin: five categories: verdictive, expositive, exercitive, conductive, commissive) speech acts/SearleVsAustin: Distinction between illocutionary role and expression with propositional content: R(p). The various acts performed in different continua! There are at least 12 important dimensions. IV 18 1. Differences in joke (purpose) of the act. (However, not to every act a purpose has to belong). IV 19 The illocutionary joke is part of the role, but both are not the same. E.g. a request may have the same joke as a command. 2. Differences in orientation (word to the world or vice versa). Either, the world needs to match the words, or vice versa. IV 20 Example by Elizabeth Anscombe: Shopping list with goods, the same list is created by the store detective. IV 21 3. Differences in the expressed psychological states E.g. to hint, to regret, to swear, to threaten. (Even if the acts are insincere). Def sincerity condition/Searle: You cannot say, "I realize that p but I do not believe that p." "I promise that p but I do not intend that p" The mental state is the sincerity condition of the act. IV 22 These three dimensions: joke, orientation, sincerity condition are the most important. 4. Differences in the strength with which the illocutionary joke is raised. E.g. "I suggest", "I swear" 5. Differences in the position of speaker and listener E.g. the soldier will make not aware the general of the messy room. IV 23 6. Differences of in which the utterance relates to what is in the interest of speaker and listener. E.g. whining, congratulating 7. Difference in relation to the rest of the discourse E.g. to contradict, to reply, to conclude. 8. Differences in propositional content, resulting from the indicators of the illocutionary role E.g. report or forecasts IV 24 9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can be carried out differently. E.g. you need not to say anything to classify something, or to diagnose 10. Differences between those acts, for which the extra-linguistic institutions are needed, and those for which they are not necessary E.g. wedding, blessing, excommunication IV 25 11. Differences between acts where the illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where this is not the case E.g. performative use: to state, to promise, to command no performative: "I hereby boast", "hereby I threaten". 12. differences in style E.g. announcing, entrustment. IV 27 SearleVsAustin: the list does not refer to acts but to verbs. One must distinguish between verb and act! E.g. one can proclaim commands, promises, reports but that is something else, as to command, to announce or to report. A proclamation is never merely a proclamation, it also needs to be a determination, a command or the like. IV 30 Searle: E.g.iIf I make you chairman, I do not advocate that you chairman IV 36 Def Declaration/Searle: the successful performance guarantees that the propositional content of the world corresponds. (Later terminology: "institutional facts) Orientation: by the success of the declaration word and world match to each other () No sincerity. Overlapping with assertive:... The referee's decisions. SearleVsAustin: Vs Distinction constative/performative. VII 86 Cavell: "Must we mean what we say?" defends Austin and adds: The deviation can be "really or allegedly" present. Austin: it is neither true nor false that I write this article voluntarily, because if there is no deviation, the concept of free will is not applicable. SearleVsAustin: that's amazing. VII 88 SearleVsAustin: Five theses to see Austin in a different light: 1. Austin exemplifies an analysis pattern that is common today as it is also used at Ryles' analysis of "voluntarily". Ryle thesis of "voluntary" and "involuntary" can be applied only to acts, "you should not have done." Again, it is absurd to use it in an ordinary use. VII 89 Neither true nor false: Wittgenstein: e.g. that I "know that I am in pain" E.g. that Moore knows he has two hands. etc. (> certainty). Austin: E.g. it is neither true nor false, that I went out of free will to the session. VII 90 The use of "voluntary" required certain conditions are not met here. Words in which they are not met, we can call "A-words", the conditions "A-Conditions". We can create a list. 2. the conditions that are exemplified by the slogan "No modification without deviation", penetrate the whole language and are not limited to certain words. E.g. The President is sober today. Hans breathes. etc. VII 91 3. Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word is not in turn an A-word! E.g. I bought my car not voluntarily, I was forced to. I did not volunteer, I was dragged here. He does not know whether the object in front of him is a tree. Considerable asymmetry between A-words and their opposite or negation. VII 92 SearleVsAustin: according to him, in both cases a deviation is required. 4. A deviation is generally a reason to believe that the claim that is made by the statement to the contrary is true, or could have been, or at least could have been held by someone as true. An A-condition is simply a reason to believe that the remark could have been false. SearleVsAustin: his presentation is misleading because it suggests that any deviation justifies a modification. E.g. if I buy a car while strumming with bare toes on a guitar, which is indeed a different way to buy a car, but it does not justify the remark "He bought his car voluntarily." VII 93 SearleVsAustin: we can come to any list of A-words, because if word requires a deviation, will depend on the rest of the sentence and on the context. Then Austin's thesis is not about words but about propositions. VII 94 Standard situation/circumstances/SearleVsAustin: notice that there is a standard situation, is to suggest that this fact is remarkable and that there is reason to believe that it could also be a non-standard situation. VII 95 SearleVsAustin: his thesis even is not on propositions: to make an assertion means to specify that something is the case. If the possibility that the situation does not exist, is excluded, it is meaningless. Austin's slogan should be formulated to: "No comment, which is not remarkable" or "No assertion that is not worth to be claimed". VII 96 SearleVsAustin: this one has seen it wrong. This is connected with the concept of intention: Intention/Searle: Thesis: the oddity or deviation which is a condition for the utterance "X was deliberately done" represents, at the same time provides a reason for the truth of the statement by "X was not done intentionally". assertion condition/utterance condition: it is the utterance condition of an assertion precisely because it is one reason for the truth of the other. SearleVsAustin: the data must be explained in terms of the applicability of certain terms. So my view is simple and plausible. (VII 98): In Austin's slogan "No modification without deviation" it is not about the applicability of these terms, but rather about conditions for putting up claims generally. Negation/SearleVsAustin: then the negations of the above, are not neither true nor false, but simply false! E.g. I did not go voluntarily to the meeting (I was dragged). etc. VII 98 Example The ability to remember ones name is one of the basic conditions ... |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Bennett, J. | Lewis Vs Bennett, J. | Schwarz I 133 Cause/Effect/Event/Fact/LewisVsBennett/Schwarz: Event as fact: Problem: to distinguish "true causes": Resemblance is not a solution here: e.g. Xanthippe's widowhood: you cannot refer to resemblance of >regions. Schwarz I 134 Overlapping events. E.g. if seen as fact, the writing "rr" in "Larry" cannot be defined because of overlapping regions. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Counterfactual Conditional | Schwarz Vs Counterfactual Conditional | Schwarz I 131 Similarity criteria/VsLewis: but even so a counterfactual dependence without causality would be possible: E.g. the halting problem would be solvable, were the PL decidable (because counterfactual conditionals with a false antecedent is always true with Lewis) but that one is not the cause of the other. Vs counterfactual conditional/Vs co.co: Problem: after the previous analysis every event would also cause itself: it would not happen, then it would not have happened! E.g. Jaegwon Kim (1973(1), 1974(2)): if Socrates had not died, Xanthippe would not have become a widow, e.g. had I not turned the window handle, I would not have opened the window, e.g. had I not written "rr", I would not have written "Larry". Everything counterfactual relations without causality. Solution/Lewis: we must limit the Relata A and B: they may neither be mathematical truths nor be identical to each other. Allowed are only contingent, non-overlapping single events. Overlapping/Schwarz: "Non-overlapping" is weaker than "not identical". ((s) "overlapping" can also be "not identical". This excludes that e.g. a football match caused its first half..) ((s)> Hume: Only between non-identical events causality can be effective). LewisVsKim: so also its examples are done: partly the entities Kim considered, are no events (e.g. Xanthippe) partly it is a single event, described by two identifiers (e.g. window), or two events that are not completely separated (E.g. Larry). (1981c(3), 124). 1. Jaegwon Kim [1973]: “Causes and Counterfactuals”. Journal of Philosophy, 70: 570–572 2. Jaegwon Kim [1974]: “Noncausal Connections”. Nous, 8: 41–52. In [Kim 1993] 3. David Lewis [1981c]: “Nachwort (1978) zu ‘Kausalität’ ”. In Güuter Posch (ed.), Kausalität: Neue Texte, Stuttgart: Reclam, 124–126 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Hintikka Vs Kripke, S. A. | II XIII Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: the term is misleading. (Began in the late 50s). Kripke Semantics/HintikkaVsKripke: is not a viable model for the theory of logical rules (logical necessity and logical possibility). (Essay 1). Problem: the correct logic cannot be axiomatized. Solution: interpreting Kripke semantics as non-standard semantics, II XIV in the sense of Henkin’s non-standard interpretation of higher-level logic, while the correct semantics for logical modalities would be analogous to a standard interpretation. Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsQuine: we do not have to give them up entirely, but there will probably never be a complete theory. My theory is related to Kant. I call them "epistemology of logic". II XVI Cross World Identity/Hintikka: Quine: considers it a hopeless problem HintikkaVsKripke: he underestimates the problem and considers it as guaranteed. He cheats. World Line/Cross World Identity/Hintikka: 1) We need to allow that some objects in certain possible worlds do not only exist, but that their existence is unthinkable there! I.e. world lines can cease to exist - what is more: it may be that they are not defined in certain possible worlds. Problem: in the usual knowledge logic (logic of belief) this is not permitted. 2) world lines can be drawn in two ways: a) object-centered b) agent-centered. (Essay 8). Analogy: this can be related to Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by description. (Essay 11) II 2 Kripke Semantics/Modal Logic/Logical Possibility/Logical Necessity/HintikkaVsKripke/HintikkaVsKripke Semantics: Problem: if we interpreted the operators N, P so that they express logical modalities, they are inadequate: for logical possibility and necessity we need more than an arbitrary selection of possible worlds. We need truth in every logically possible world. But Kripke semantics does not require all such logically possible worlds to be included in the set of alternatives. ((s) I.e. there may be logically possible worlds that are not considered). (see below logical possibility forms the broadest category of options). Problem: Kripke semantics is therefore inadequate for logical modalities. Modal Logic/Hintikka: the historically earliest purpose for which it was developed was precisely dealing with logical modalities. This was the purpose for which the Lewis systems were developed. HintikkaVsKripke: does not only have a skeleton in the closet, but said skeleton haunts the entire house. Equivalence Relation/Hintikka: if R is required to be reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive, it does not provide the solution: it still does not guarantee that all logically possible worlds are contained in the set. It can (possibly together with with connectedness) only guarantee that w0 has a maximum number of sets as its alternatives that are, so to speak, already in SF. II 3 KripkeVsVs/Hintikka: It could be argued that this does not yet show that Kripke semantics is wrong. It just needs to be reinforced. E.g. Nino Cocchiarella: Cocchiarella: additional condition: all models (in the usual 1st order sense) with the same domain of individuals do (w0) must occur among the alternative possible worlds to w0. ((s) No new individuals may be added or removed with regard to the original possible world w0). Hintikka: technically it is of course possible. "Old": (= Kripke semantics): non-standard semantics. new: F must include all models that have the same individuals domain do(w0) of well-defined individuals as w0. Individual/Individuals/Modal/Hintikka: an individual must be well-defined, but it does not have to exist! ((s) I.e. it can be expressed then that it is missing, E.g. the hero has no sister in a possible world). Domain of Individuals: for each possible world is then a subset of the domain D. II 4 HintikkaVs: Problem: this is unrealistically interpretative: this flexible approach namely allows non-well-shaped individuals. Then there is no point in asking whether this individual exists or not. Fusion/Fission: a flexible semantics must also allow fission and fusion between one possible world and the another. Def Well-Defined/Individual/Hintikka: an individual is well-defined, if it can be singled out by name at a node of the world line. World Line: can link non-existent incarnations of individuals, as long as they are well-defined for all possible worlds in which a node of the world line can be located. Truth Conditions: are then simple: (Ex) p(x) is true iff there is an individual there, E.g. named z, so that p(z) is true in w. Modal Semantics/Hintikka. About a so defined (new) semantics a lot can be said: Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: corresponds to a non-standard semantics, while the "new" semantics (with a fixed domain of individuals) corresponds to a standard semantics. (For higher-order logic). Standard Semantics/higher level: we get this by demanding that the higher level quantifiers go over all extensionally possible entities of the appropriate logical type (higher than individuals) like quantifiers in the standard semantics for modal logic should go over all extensionally possible worlds. This is a parallelism that is even stronger than an analogy: Decision problem: for 2nd order logic this is reduced to the 1st order standard modal logic. Standard: does the same job in the latter sense as in the former sense. Quantified 1st Order Standard Modal Logic/Hintikka: all of this leads to this logic being very strong, comparable in strength with 2nd order logic. It follows that it is not axiomatizable. (see above HintikkaVsKripke). The stronger a logic, the less manageable it is. II 12 Kripke/Hintikka: has avoided epistemic logic and the logic of propositional attitudes and focuses on pure modalities. Therefore, it is strange that he uses non-standard logic. But somehow it seems to be clear to him that this is not possible for logical modalities. Metaphysical Possibility/Kripke/HintikkaVsKripke: has never explained what these mystical possibilities actually are. II 13 Worse: he has not shown that they are so restrictive that he can use his extremely liberal non-standard semantics. II 77 Object/Thing/Object/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke Thesis: the existence of permanent (endurant) objects must simply be provided as a basic concept. HintikkaVsKripke: this requirement is not well founded. Maybe you have to presuppose the criteria of identification and identity only for traditional logic and logical semantics. But that also does not mean that the problem of identification was not an enduring problem for the philosophers. II 84 KIripkeVsHintikka: Problem: the solutions of these differential equations need not be analytic functions or features that allow an explicit definition of the objects. Hintikka: it seems that Kripke presupposes, however, that you always have to be able to define the relations embodied by the world lines. HintikkaVsKripke: that is too strict. World Line: we allow instead that they are implicitly defined by the solutions of the differential equations. II 86 HintikkaVsKripke: our model makes it possible that we do not necessarily have to presuppose objects as guaranteed like Kripke. ((s) it may be that a curve is not closed in a time section). II 116 Cross World identity/Rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: it’s more about the way of identification (public/perspective, see above) than about rigidity or non-rigidity. The manner of identification decides what counts as one and the same individual. HitikkaVsKripke: his concept of rigidity is silently based on Russell’s concept of the logical proper name. But there is no outstanding class of rigid designation expressions. Proper Names/Names/HintikkaVsKripke: are not always rigid. E.g. it may be that I do not know to whom the name N.N. refers. Then I have different epistemic alternatives with different references. Therefore, it makes sense to ask "Who is N.N.?". Public/Perspective/Identification/Russell/Kripke/Hintikka: Russell: focuses on the perspective II 117 Kripke: on public identification. II 195 Identity/Individuals/Hintikka: it is much less clear how the identity for certain individuals can fail in the transition to another possible world. I.e. world lines can branch (fission). Separation/KripkeVsFission/SI/Hintikka: Kripke excludes fission, because for him the (SI) applies. A fission, according to him, would violate the transitivity of identity. After a fission, the individuals would by no means be identical, even if it should be after the transitivity. Therefore, for Kripke the (SI) is inviolable. HintikkaVsKripke: that is circular: Transitivity of Identity/Hintikka: can mean two things: a) transitivity within a possible world. b) between possible worlds. The plausibility of transitivity is part of the former, not the latter. To require transitivity of identity between possible worlds simply means to exclude fission. This is what is circular about Kripke’s argument. II 196 Possible World/Individuals Domain/HintikkaVsKripke: it should not be required that the individuals remain the same when changing from possible world to possible world. Talk about possible worlds is empty if there are no possible experiences that might distinguish them. ((s) is that not possible with a constant domain? Also properties could be partly (not completely) exchanged). Possible World/Hintikka: should best be determined as the associated possible totalities of experience. And then fission cannot be ruled out. II 209 Re-Identification/Hintikka: also with this problem situation semantics and possible worlds semantics are sitting in the same boat. Situation semantics: rather obscures the problem. In overlapping situations, E.g. it assumes that the overlapping part remains the same. Re-Identification/Quine/Hintikka: deems it hopeless, because it is impossible to explain how it works. Re-Identification/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke ditto, but that’s why we should simply postulate it, at least for physical objects. HintikkaVsQuine/HintikkaVsKripke: that is either too pessimistic or too optimistic. But mistaking the problem would mean to neglect one of the greatest philosophical problems. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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