Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Correspondence Theory | Field | I 229
Correspondence Theory/Truth/Field: correspondence theory needs an additional concept of the truth theoretical content of psychological states. - And it is used in a way that it cannot occur in the disquotation scheme. I 250
Correspondence Theory/FieldVsCorrespondence Theory: even for an inconsistent theory it is consistent when the the correspondence theory is assumed that it is true, because the logical words in it could have been used differently. - Therefore, the truth of the correspondence theory should not be applied to disquotational truth, because it is a logical concept itself and the instances of disquotation scheme must be regarded as logical truths.
II 199
Correspondence Theory/ontological commitmentQuine/Field: the ontological commitment seems to exclude the correspondence theory.
FieldVsQuine: despite the uncertainty we should allow correspondence. - >Partial denotation.IV 416
VsCorrespondence: which one is the right one? - Field: which one is relevant may depend on epistemic values, but not on which values are "correct. - Field pro "epistemic relativism". I 419
RelativismVsSkepticism: the question of the "real" justification does not make sense. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |

Generalization | Field | II Realism/variant/Field: here: "There are sentences in our language that are true, but for which we shall never have a reason to believe them." - Then you need a truth-term to generalize (> infinite conjunction/disjunction). Anti-Realism/Variant: here would be the opposite position: to identify truth with justifiability in the long run. - (> ideal justification). --- II 120
Truth-predicate/generalization/truth/Field: For example, the desire to only express true sentences: "I only utter "p" if p."
---II 121
E.g. "Not every (of infinitely many) axioms is true" - or, for example, they are contingent: "not every one needed to be true". - N.B.: this is only possible with purely disquotational truth.
---II 205
Partial Denotation/generalization/Field/(s): partial denotation - This is a general case of denotation (not vice versa).
---II 206
This makes a simple denotation (which is a special case) superfluous.
---II 207
Partial match: generalization of consistency.
---II 206
Generalization/Field: E.g. partial agreement is a generalization of agreement. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |

Theories | Field | I 249ff
Theory/object level/Field: we assume a theory here instead of the truth of the theory. Problem: the theory requires mathematical entities.
---I 262
Physics/theory/Language/ontology/Field: Thesis: in the typical physical language, sentences are essential for the description of observations that contain mathematical entities. Then a theory without mathematical entities does not allow any inference about distances and masses.
Solution: new (comparative) predicates: For example, the distance between x and y is r-times the distance between z and w, etc. - For example, the velocity of y relative to y multiplied by the time difference between z and w is r-times spatial distance between u and v (Definition acceleration without numbers). - r: is a rational number.This distinguishes the predicates in the family. NominalismVs: these are too many predicates. --- II 46
Theory/truth/Field: it is the assertion that the axioms of the theory are true of their objects at certain points of time (or at all times) - not the theory itself. - Variables: We leave it out here very often, but they must be understood as implicitly existing. - Instead of "pain has that and that causal role" we must say: "For every t and every c (organism) of type S to t, pain has that and that causal role in c to t".
---II 187
Ideal theory/Quine/Field: (Quine 1960, 23-4): Suppose there is an ideal theory (in the future) that could be considered as completely true: - Problem: this ideal theory could not correct the truth values of our actual (present) individual sentences. - reason: there is no general sense in which one can equate a single sentence of a theory with a single sentence of another theory. - Quine/(s): there is no inter-theoretical translatability. - Thus there is no Truth-predicate for single sentences of a theory - Falsehood is distributed to the whole theory. - There is no fact that distributes falsehood to single sentences.
FieldVsQuine: therefore the sentences are not "intertheoretically meaningless". Solution/Field: "partial denotation": Newton's mass partially denoted. FieldVsKuhn/FieldVsIncommensurability: denotational refinement: (later only partial quantity) means no incommensurability. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |

Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Carnap, R. | Lewis Vs Carnap, R. | Field II 196
Theoretical Terms/TT/Ramsey sentence/Carnap/Lewis/Field: (Carnap 1956, Kap.26, Lewis 1979b,1972).
Theoretical Term/Introduction/Content/Ramsey sentence/Carnap: if a new TT was introduced by a theory Θ(T), then the content of the theory is equal to the content of the Ramsey sentence (Ex)Θ(x). Only realization: In a special case in which (E!x)Θ(x) is, we can say that T denotes the only object that fulfills Θ(x). multiple realization: Problem: what does the theoretical term denote here? (>Functionalism/Lewis, >Turing machine). It seems to need to denote something, if this were not possible we cannot explain why Θ(T) is true (and this must be according Carnap's thesis that it "has the content" of(Ex)Θ(x).) Solution/Carnap: if Θ (x) is realized multiple times, then T denotes one random object which fulfills Θ(x). LewisVsCarnap: This is not plausible because it is not explained how it is possible for a user of T to take a particular object instead of another one. Field II 197
Content/TT/Ramsey sentence/Lewis/Field: Lewis felt obliged (probably reluctantly) to not take the content of the Ramsey sentence Ex Θ (x), but the modified sentence of Ramsey:
(E! x) Θ (x) ((s) which only presumes one object). I.e. the theory is wrong if Θ(x) is realized multiple times, so that T can be seen as without denotations. Then there is no ambiguity. LewisVs: (1970b): This is costly: Then if somebody states Θ (T), then it is absolutely implausible that he thereby has asserted that nothing than T Θ (x) can be fulfilled. LewisVs: (1972): even worse: it has been applied here on functionalism, which is after all based on multiple realization. Multiple Realization/Functionalism/Field: Many authors actually want to accept mR in one and the same organism at the same time. Partial Denotation/Lösung/Field: Lewis could simply say that (as Carnap says) the content of Θ (T) is simply the Ramsey sentence (Ex) Θ (x), and if Θ (x) is realized multiple ways, then T partially denotes each of the "Realisierer". Lewis IV 88
Theoretical Terms/TT/Definition/Description/Lewis: After having defined the TT through descriptions, we can eliminated the latter with their help. This is how we obtain O sentences.
Def Extended Postulation/Lewis: the postulate of T that we get by replacing the TT by descriptions (O sentence). It says that the theory T is realized by the n tuple of the first, second...component of the only realization of T. The extended postulate is equivalent in definition to the postulate. It says that the theory is uniquely realized. It is logically equivalent to a shorter O phrase, which says the same in a shorter form. This is what we call the "sentence of the only realization of T": IV 89
Ey1...yn (x) x1...xn (T[x1,,,xn] ↔ . y1 = x1 & ..& yn = xn
LewisVsCarnap: then the postulate is true if and only if the theory is realized once. Problem: the expanded postulate is an O phrase that is stronger than the Ramsey phrase that merely says that there is at least one realization. Nevertheless, if the definition sentences are part of T, then the extended postulate is a theorem of T. Then the definitions give us theorems that could not have been derived without them. This means that the definitions themselves, unlike the Carnap theorem, are not logically implied by the postulate. Therefore, if we want to say that the definition sets of T are correct definitions, we must abandon the idea that the theorems are all and only the logical consequences of T's postulate. And we like to give that up. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |

Lewis, D. | Field Vs Lewis, D. | I 233
Knowledge/Belief/Explanation/Mathematics/Lewis: consequently, since mathematics consists of necessary truths, there can be no explanation problem.
FieldVsLewis: at least 4 points, why this does not exclude the epistemic concerns:1) not all the facts about the realm of mathematical antities apply necessarily. But suppose it were so, then there are still facts about the mathematical and non-mathematical realm together! E.g. (A) 2 = the number of planets closer to the Sun than the Earth. (B) for a natural number n there is a function that depicts the natural numbers smaller than n on the set of all particles in the universe ((s) = there is a finite number of particles). (C) beyond all sp.t. points there is an open region, for which there is a 1: 1 differentiable representation. I 234
of this region on an open subset of R4 (space, quadruples of real numbers).
(D) there is a differentiable function y of spatial points on real numbers, so that the gradient of y indicates the gravitational force on each object, as measured by the unit mass of that object.Field: these facts are all contingent. But they are partly about the mathematical realm (mathematical entities). Explanation/FieldVsLewis: There remains the problem of the explanation of such "mixed" statements. (Or the correlation of these with our beliefs). Solution: You can divide these statements: an a) purely mathematical component (without reference to physical theories, but rather on non-mathematical entities, E.g. quantities with basic elements, otherwise the condition would be too strong). Important argument: this component can then be regarded as "necessarily true". b) purely non-mathematical component (without reference to mathematics). I 235
2) FieldVsLewis: even with regard to purely mathematical facts, Lewis’ answer is too simple.
Necessary Facts/Mathematics: to what extent should they be necessary in the realm of mathematics? They are not logically necessary! And they cannot be reduced to logical truths by definition.Of course they are mathematically necessary in the sense that they follow from the laws of mathematics. E.g. Similarly, the existence of electrons is physically necessary, because it follows from the laws of physics. FieldVsLewis: but in this physical case, Lewis would not speak of a pseudo-problem! But why should the fact that numbers exist mathematically necessary be a pseudo-problem?. Mathematical Necessity/Field: false solution: you could try to object that mathematical necessity is absolute necessity, while physical necessity is only a limited necessity. Metaphysical Necessity/Field: or you could say that mathematical statements. I 236
Are metaphysically necessary, but physical statements are not.
FieldVs: It is impossible to give content to that.I 237
3) FieldVsLewis: he assumes a controversial relation between Counterfactual Conditional and necessity. It is certainly true that nothing meaningful can be said about E.g. what would be different if the number 17 did not exist. And that is so precisely because the antecedent gives us no indication of what alternative mathematics should be considered to be true in this case. I 238
4) FieldVsLewis: there is no reason to formulate the problem of the explanation of the reliability of our mathematical belief in modal or counterfactual expressions. II 197
Theoretical Terms/TT/Introduction/Field: TT are normally not introduced individually, but in a whole package. But that is no problem as long as the correlative indeterminacy is taken into account. One can say that the TT are introduced together as one "atom".
E.g. "belief" and "desire" are introduced together.Assuming both are realized multiply in an organism: Belief: because of the relations B1 and B2 (between the organism and internal representations). Desired: because of D1 and D2. Now, while the pairs (B1, D1) and (B2, D2) have to realize the (term-introductory) theory. II 198
The pairs (B1, D2) and (B2, D1) do not have to do that. ((s) exchange of belief and desire: the subject believes that something else will fulfill its desire).
FieldVsLewis: for this reason we cannot accept its solution.Partial Denotation/Solution/Field: we take the TT together as the "atom" which denotes partially as a whole. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |