Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstraction | Frege | Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 49 Definition abstraction/Frege/St: abstraction is a process to identify each other in the various elements of a region, e.g. same color, same size, same shape. New objects are gained by abstraction of the partial identity. ((s) Such objects which are only about numerical equality or color identity are individuated.) If A is such an abstraction, then there is by definition a (base) object a, so that the following is true: A is the F of a. --- Thiel I 131 Abstraction/Mathematics/Frege/Thiel: abstraction is a purely logical process, an operation with statements, the logical character of which is revealed by the change from the structure of the complicated initial statement to the structure of the new statement. Frege understood this first. Tere are statements not only about numbers, but also about sets, functions, concepts, situations, meaning and truth value of a statement, about structures. I 133 Numbers/digits/number names/names/mathematics/Thiel: the philosophical punch line of the transition from general statements via digits to arithmetic statements is that although we have introduced the speech about numbers in addition to the speech about digits, it is still a form of speech, a facon de parler, whose possibility does not depend on the fact that there are still abstract objects beyond the concrete digits, which we call "numbers". >Numerals. I 134 We also had no reason to conceive the digits as "names" of numbers, so that 4, IV, and |||| would denote the same number four, as it was assumed in the traditional philosophy of numbers. >Numbers. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Copula | Geach | I 221 Copula/Geach: if you understand concept and object correctly, you do not need the copula. >Concept/Geach, >Concept/Frege, >Object, >Object/Frege. Instead, you can use "falls under". - (In ancient times it was also handled like this). >Ancient philosophy. "is": ((s) "is a" suggests false identity (at most partial identity, i.e. classification). >"Is", >Identity, >Identification, >Classification. Frege late: VsFrege early: nor "falls under". "is a"/Frege: does not mean "belongs to a class"! "Is a..."/Geach: is no logical relation between an x and an object (class) called "human." >Prediation/Geach, >Predication, >Attribution. Complex Expression/Geach: "A person is wise" is a complex expression that needs to be split (analyzed): into "person" and ".... is wise". Accordingly, Frege's remark "the concept of man" (which is not supposed to be a concept) is to be divided: E.g., "The concept of man is realized" does not assert of a particular object that it is realized. To say that a certain object, e.g. Caesar, is realized does not lead to falsity (as Frege believed) but is nonsense. (GeachVsFrege). >Senseless, >Truth value gap. The sentence splits into "Man" and "The concept ... is realized". The latter is a paraphrase of "something is a...". Sentences that cannot be analyzed in this innocent way must be considered meaningless. >Sentences/Geach, cf. >Saturated/unsaturated/Frege. E.g., "The concept of man is timeless". |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Gavagai | Field | II 201 Indeterminacy/Gavagai/Theory/Reference/FieldVsQuine: the indeterminacy does not only refer to the absolute sense. - Either a) to the absolute b) to the relative reference. Absolute reference/Field: here there is no fact which decides what Gavagai has as an extension. >Absoluteness/Field, >Reference, >Meaning. --- II 202 Correspondence theory/indeterminacy/Gavagai/Field: new correspondence theory: partial signification: Gavagai has the relation of partial signification a) to the quantity of rabbits b) to the quantity of rabbit parts. This is only interesting, if one can explain truth with it. - Then "is" is either identity relation or partial identity. >Identity, >Partial identity, >"is", >Truth. Indeterminacy: is then the thesis that there is no fact that decides about it. - This does not mean that there is no disquotation scheme. - Modi fication: "signifies partially a and partially b". Partial signification/everyday language: E.g. "tall man": 180-185cm? >Everyday language. --- II 204 Problem: relativized signification and denotation leads again to the myth of the museum. >Myth of the museum. For each predicate T, set y (or {x I Fx} and translation manual M: T signifies {x I Fx} relative to M iff M T displays to a term which signifies y (or {x I Fx}). Gavagai/FieldVsQuine: Quine needs a connection between "rabbits" ((s) not "Gavagai") in our language and actual rabbits. But his indeterminacy thesis denies the existence of such a one which does not consist at the same time equally well out of rabbit parts. II 216 Gavagi/metalanguage/Field: we need defined expressions for the description of the partial extension: - E.g. "Rabbit" partly signifies the set of rabbits and partly the set of the unseparated parts of rabbits. >Metalanguage. Question: how can this be understood by someone for whom the last two tokens of "rabbit" are indeterminate? >Indeterminacy. N.B.: The sentence is just as understandable and has the same truth conditions when the metalanguage is indeterminate. >Understanding, >Truth conditions. --- II 220 Gavagai/indeterminacy/Field: the addition of "is an unseparated part of" to language reduces the indeterminacy. - (This comes from an inflationary view). >Inflationism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Identity | Geach | I 218 Identity/GeachVsFrege: identity is not a relation - "Is an A" does not mean "has identity with A" - (whereby "A" is a name). VsFrege: (in Frege, basic principles of artihmetics) instead of "There are just as many Fs as Gs": "Either any given object F iff it is a G, or there is a relation that is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and Gs". But this must not be an identity. I 226 Identity/Geach: only objects can be strictly identical. - In terms, there is only analogous identity: if they are coextensive. >Coextensive. I 238 Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: Identity is relative. - If someone says "x is identical to y", this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same as y". - (Weird, that Frege did not represent this). >Identity/Quine. Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single schema. (1) l- Fa (x)(Fx u x = a) - everyday-language: whatever is true of something which is identical with an object y is true of a and vice versa. From this we derive the law of self-identity: "l-a = a". Because we take "Fx" for "x unequal a", then schema (1) gives us: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx(y unequal a u x = a) - this,of course, gives "l-a = a" I 240 Identity/Geach: if we demand strict identity, regardless of the theory in which we move, we get into the semantic paradoxes such as Grelling's or Richard's >Grelling's paradox. Solution: relative identity on theory or language, indissibility/"indiscernibility"/Quine -> Partial identity. 1. Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle. --- Tugendhat I 37 Identity/Dummett/Geach: "=" can only be used with reference to objects. >Equal sign. Habermas IV 158 Identity/Geach/Habermas: Peter Geach argues that identity predicates can only be used meaningfully in connection with the general characterization of a class of objects.(1) (See also Criteria/Henrich, HenrichVsGeach). E.g. Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. Also see >Identity/Henrich. 1.P.Geach, Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity, in: K. Munitz, Logic and Ontology, NY. 1973 |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Partial Identity | |||
| Partial Identity | Armstrong | II (c) 98f Partial identity/Armstrong: non-mereologically: complex property and relation can be in a whole-part-relation or be overlapping, but not mereologically. - E.g.. the property of having 5 kg weight: then the particular is among other things, composed of several non-overlapping parts, each of which has a 3 kg and the other 2 kg mass. - Here >universals seem correct. - A case of partial identity. Cf. >Identity. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Partial Identity | Lewis | V 256 Partial identity: nose/man: neither identical nor distinct! e.g. greet/loud greetings: are not distinct from quiet greetings - one cannot be the cause of the other - yet counterfactual dependence - implication of events: not distinct events. - >Counterfactual dependence, not >causal dependence. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Partial Identity | Meixner | I 48 Partial Identity/Ship of Theseus/Meixner: if the ship survived, a collector could build a second original from the old parts. - Both are not identical, but equally good candidates for uniqueness: that is absurd. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Thoughts | Frege | Dummett I 62 Consciousness Content/Frege/Dummett: the content of consciousness are sensations but not meaning. Thoughts: thoughts are the grasping of external things. Dummett I 19 Thought/Thinking/Frege: thought is not identical with the meaning of the sentence - beings with identical thoughts are possible without linguistic cover. Frege II 47 Frege: a sentence about a non-existent unicorn is without truth value, predicates cannot be attributed or denied - the thought is the same, whether there is reference ("meaning") or not. Thought: is a sentence without truth value (because "meaning" (reference) is unresolved) - the same thought in an actor without meaning - judgment: is progress from thought to its truth value. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. II 71 Truth Value: a truth value cannot be one part of a thought, as little as the sun can, because it is not a sense, but an object (truth value = object). >Truth value, >Object. II 76 Thought: one part must be unsaturated, as a binding agent, e.g. "falls under". Thought: not all parts of the thought may be complete, at least one should be unsaturated (predicative), otherwise they would not stick together. Dummett I 32 Frege: grasping the thought: is psychic act. The thought is not the content of consciousness. Consciousness is subjective, the thought is objective - WittgensteinVs. >">Objectivity. Frege IV 52 Thought/Frege: there is not a complete thought without a time determination. But then it is timelessly true or false. Expression/assertion/Frege: there is a difference: time determination belongs to the expression whereas truth belongs to assertion and is timeless. Timeless things are not part of the external world. >Truth, >Timelessness. --- Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 ff Thought/Frege: a thought is not the sentence meaning (reference), because it is possible common property of many thinkers (content, objective). Sense of the sentence: is the expressed thought (abstract). Unequal content: sense can be grasped without knowing whether the sentence has a meaning (reference, existing object). Thought/Frege: a thought is abstract. Contradiction: content, idea. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 57ff Odd Meaning/Frege: odd meaning refers to the expressed thoughts - (thought: abstract, unequal content). Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 66ff Thought/identity criterion for thoughts/Frege/St: sentence A contains the same idea as sentence B, if (i) the assumption that A and B lead to a contradiction - (ii) vice versa - that allows us to conceive thoughts as invariant abstractions - (>partial identity: identity of thoughts) Invariant: is the thought. The thought contained in a sentence is what element A has in common with all the propositions which are logically equivalent to A, and that changes when we move on to a proposition B which is not logically equivalent to A. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68 Thought/Frege/St: a thought is that element of an assertion that can be true or false, and which is the object of the believing-to-be-true of epistemic subjects. >Propositions. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
| Type/Token | Type/Token, philosophy: tokens are single occurrences of something classified by a type. The distinction goes back to Ch. S. Peirce (Peirce, Charles S. (1931-58), “Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce”, Hartshorne and Weiss (eds.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Section 4.537). See also tokening, classification, categories, identity, order, partial identity, universalism, nominalism, conceptualism. |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inflationism | Field Vs Inflationism | II 220 Gavagai/Deflationism/Field: the question is whether the facts about our use of the equal sign determine that it stands for identity instead of partial identity. The normal axioms just make sure that it is an equivalence relation and also a congruence relation with respect to the other predicates of our language. FieldVsInflationism: amplifies the uncertainty. Even if partial identity was a "partial reference" of "=" in a primitive language that contains no predicate "is a unseparated part of", it is likely that the addition of this predicate would then exclude this. Thus, the vagueness of "rabbit" would also be reduced. II 221 These observations are based on an inflationist perspective. Deflationism/Field: reduces the indeterminacy. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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