Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Partial Identity | Armstrong | II (c) 98f Partial identity/Armstrong: non-mereologically: complex property and relation can be in a whole-part-relation or be overlapping, but not mereologically. - E.g.. the property of having 5 kg weight: then the particular is among other things, composed of several non-overlapping parts, each of which has a 3 kg and the other 2 kg mass. - Here >universals seem correct. - A case of partial identity. Cf. >Identity. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Partial Identity | Lewis | V 256 Partial identity: nose/man: neither identical nor distinct! e.g. greet/loud greetings: are not distinct from quiet greetings - one cannot be the cause of the other - yet counterfactual dependence - implication of events: not distinct events. - >Counterfactual dependence, not >causal dependence. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Partial Identity | Meixner | I 48 Partial Identity/Ship of Theseus/Meixner: if the ship survived, a collector could build a second original from the old parts. Both are not identical, but equally good candidates for uniqueness: that is absurd. >Unity, >Uniqueness, >Identity, >Completeness, >Ontology, >Parts, >Part-of-Relation, >Mereology. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inflationism | Field Vs Inflationism | II 220 Gavagai/Deflationism/Field: the question is whether the facts about our use of the equal sign determine that it stands for identity instead of partial identity. The normal axioms just make sure that it is an equivalence relation and also a congruence relation with respect to the other predicates of our language. FieldVsInflationism: amplifies the uncertainty. Even if partial identity was a "partial reference" of "=" in a primitive language that contains no predicate "is a unseparated part of", it is likely that the addition of this predicate would then exclude this. Thus, the vagueness of "rabbit" would also be reduced. II 221 These observations are based on an inflationist perspective. Deflationism/Field: reduces the indeterminacy. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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