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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cartesianism | Dilthey | Gadamer I 241 Cartesianism/Dilthey/Gadamer: [Dilthey was not able] to really record the consequence of his life-philosophical approach against the philosophy of reflection of idealism (...). Otherwise he would have had to recognize in the objection of relativism the one from which his own starting point of the immanence of knowledge in life just wanted to take away the basis. >Relativism/Dilthey, >Life/Dilthey, >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. This ambiguity has its final reason in an inner inconsistency of his thinking, the unresolved Cartesianism from which he takes his starting point. His epistemological reflections on the foundation of the humanities do not really coincide with his life-philosophical starting point. There is proof of this in his latest works. Dilthey demands from a philosophical foundation that it must extend to every area in which "consciousness has shaken off the authoritative and Gadamer I 242 seeks to arrive at valid knowledge through the standpoint of reflection and doubt"(1). Gadamer: Such a sentence seems to be a harmless statement about the nature of science and philosophy in modern times in general. The Cartesian echoes in it are not to be overheard. In truth, however, this sentence finds its application in a quite different sense, if Dilthey continues: "Everywhere life leads to reflections on what is set in it, reflection leads to doubt, and if life is to assert itself against this, then thinking can only end in valid knowledge"(2). Here it is no longer philosophical prejudices that should be overcome by an epistemological foundation in the style of Descartes, but here it is realities of life, the tradition of custom, religion and positive law, which are decomposed by reflection and need a new order. When Dilthey speaks here of knowledge and reflection, he does not mean the general immanence of knowledge in life, but a movement directed against life. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 6. 2. Ebenda. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Freud | Ricoeur | 1 10 Freud/Ricoeur: My problem is the consistency of the Freudian speech. a) Epistemological problem: What does "interpret" mean in psychoanalysis and how does the interpretation of human signs intertwine with the economic explanation that claims to get to the root of desire? b) Problem of the philosophy of reflection: What new self-understanding arises from this interpretation (...)? c) Dialectical problem: Does the Freudian interpretation of culture exclude any other? >Sigmund Freud, >Psychoanalysis, >Self-knowledge, >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Interpretation of dreams. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Hegel | Gadamer | I 349 Hegel/Dialectics/Gadamer: The criticism that has been made against [the] philosophy of absolute reason from the most diverse positions by Hegel's critics cannot assert itself before the consequence of total dialectical self-mediation, as Hegel described it in particular in his phenomenology, the science of appearing knowledge. Cf. >Reflection/Hegel. VsHegel/Gadamer: That the other must be experienced not as the other of myself, embraced by pure self-consciousness, but as the other, as "you", this prototype of all objections to the infinity of Hegelian dialectic, does not seriously affect him. See as an example: >Recognition/Hegel. HegelVsVs/Gadamer: The polemic against the absolute thinker is itself without position. The Archimedean point of unhinging Hegelian philosophy can never be found in reflection. >Absoluteness/Hegel. This is what makes the formal quality of the philosophy of reflection that there can be no position that is not included in the reflective movement of the consciousness coming to itself. The insistence on immediacy - be it that of bodily nature, be it that of the "you" making demands, be it that of the impenetrable reality of historical coincidence or that of the reality of the conditions of production - has always disproved itself, insofar as it is itself not an immediate behaviour but a reflective action. I 375 Hegel/Dialectics/Gadamer: But the originality of the conversation as the reference of question and answer still shows itself even in such an extreme case as Hegelian dialectic as a philosophical method. To unfold the totality of thought determinations, as it was the concern of Hegel's logic, is, as it were, the attempt in the great monologue of the modern "method" to embrace the continuum of meaning, the particular realization of which is provided by the conversation of the speakers. When Hegel sets himself the task of liquefying and putting spirit in (sic) the abstract determinations of thought, this means melting logic back into the consummative form of language, the concept back into the meaning of the word that asks and answers - a reminder, still in failure, of what dialectic actually was and is. Hegel's Dialectic is a monologue of thought that seeks to achieve in advance what gradually matures in each real conversation. >Dialektics, >Dialektics/Hegel, >G.W.F. Hegel. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Humboldt, Wilhelm von | Gadamer | I 347 Humboldt/Historism/Gadamer: In the final analysis, it is Hegel's position that [19th-century historism] finds its legitimation, even if the historians who inspired the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. >Historism, >G.W.F. Hegel. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt really thought their position through to the end. They may emphasize individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end, understanding is only completed in an infinite consciousness and the idea of individuality finds its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality into the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. So here, too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. >Humboldt as an author, >Absoluteness/Hegel, >Pantheism. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glaube und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Reflection | Gadamer | I 347 Reflection/History of Effects/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Our whole presentation about horizon formation and horizon fusion should (...) describe the full extent of the consciousness of the history of effects. >History of Effect/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Understanding/Gadamer. But what kind of consciousness is this? Here lies the crucial problem. No matter how much one emphasizes that the consciousness of the history of effects is, as it were, inserted into the effect itself. As consciousness it seems to be essentially in the possibility to rise above what it is consciousness of. The structure of reflexivity is basically given with all consciousness. It must therefore also apply to the awareness of the history of effects. Doesn't this force us to agree with Hegel, and doesn't the absolute mediation of history and truth, as Hegel thinks, appear to be the foundation of hermeneutics? Ultimately, it is Hegel's position that legitimizes [19th century historism], even if the historians who were inspired by the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt have really thought their position through. They may emphasize the individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end only in an infinite consciousness the understanding finds its completion and the thought of individuality its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality in the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. Thus, here too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. The criticism of the philosophy of reflection(1) that Hegel meets, meets with them. VsHegel/Gadamer: For us it is about thinking of the historical consciousness of the effect in such a way that in the consciousness of the effect the immediacy and superiority of the work does not dissolve again into a mere reflexion reality, thus to think of a reality where the omnipotence of reflection is limited. This was precisely the point against which the criticism of Hegel was directed, and at which in truth the principle of the philosophy of reflection proved to be superior to all his critics. >Reflection/Hegel. I 350 VsReflection Philosophy/Gadamer: [The] question arises how far the dialectical superiority of reflection philosophy corresponds to a factual truth and how far it merely creates a formal appearance. The fact that the criticism of speculative thinking, which is practiced from the standpoint of finite human consciousness, contains something true, cannot be obscured by the argumentation of the philosophy of reflection in the end. >Young Hegelians/Gadamer. Examples for reflection/Gadamer: That the thesis of scepticism or relativism wants to be true itself and in this respect cancels itself out is an irrefutable argument. But does it achieve anything? The argument of reflection, which proves to be so victorious, rather strikes back at the arguing party by making the truth value of reflection appear suspicious. It is not the reality of skepticism or relativism that is affected by this, but the truth claim of formal argumentation in general. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glauben und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Reflection | Hegel | Gadamer I 348 Reflection/Hegel/Gadamer: [We illustrate Hegel's philosophy of reflection with his] well-known polemic(1) against Kant's "thing in itself". Kant: Kant's critical definition of the limits of reason had limited the application of categories to the objects of possible experience and had declared the thing in itself that underlies the phenomena to be unrecognizable in principle. HegelVsKant: Hegel's dialectical argumentation objects that reason, by drawing this line and distinguishing the appearance from the thing in itself, proves this difference to be its own in truth. In this way, it does not reach a limit of itself, but is rather completely with itself by setting this limit. For that means that it has already crossed it. >Thing in itself, >I. Kant. Border/Hegel: What makes a border a border always includes at the same time that which is limited by the border. It is the dialectic of the border to be only by abolishing itself. >Dialektic/Hegel. Thing in itself/Hegel: So is the viewpoint that characterizes the thing in itself in contrast to its appearance, only for us in itself. What can be shown in the dialectic of the boundary in logical generality Gadamer I 349 is specified for the consciousness in the experience that the view distinguished from it is the other of itself and that it is only known in its truth when it is known as self, i.e. when it knows itself in the completed absolute self-consciousness. >Hegel/Gadamer, >Recognition/Hegel. Gadamer: The polemic against the absolute thinker is itself without position. The Archimedean point of unhinging Hegelian philosophy can never be found in reflection. This is what makes the formal quality of the philosophy of reflection that there can be no position that is not included in the reflective movement of the consciousness coming to itself. The insistence on immediacy - be it that of bodily nature, be it that of the "you" making demands, be it that of the impenetrable reality of historical coincidence or that of the reality of the conditions of production - has always disproved itself, insofar as it is itself not an immediate behaviour but a reflective action. >Absoluteness/Hegel. Gadamer I 351 Plato's mythical refutation of the dialectical sophism, plausible as it may seem, [is] not satisfactory for modern thinking. >Sophists/Plato. HegelVsPlato: Hegel knows no mythical foundation of philosophy. Rather, myth belongs to his pedagogy. In the end, it is reason that establishes itself. By working through the dialectic of reflection as the total self-mediation of reason, Hegel is fundamentally superior to the argumentative formalism that we called sophistic with Plato. His dialectic is, therefore, no less polemical than Plato's Socrates against the empty argumentation of understanding, which he calls "external reflection". >Dialectic/Hegel, >Understanding. 1. Hegel, Enzyklopadie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, § 60 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Relativism | Dilthey | Gadamer I 241 Relativism/Dilthey/Gadamer: [Dilthey's philosophy] thinks life itself to an end by also understanding philosophy as an objectivation of life. It becomes a philosophy of philosophy, but not in the sense and with the claim that idealism raised. It does not want to establish the only possible philosophy from the unity of a speculative principle, but continues on the path of historical self-contemplation. In this respect it is not at all subject to the objection of being guilty of relativism. Dilthey himself has always considered this objection and sought a resolution to the question of how objectivity is possible in all relativity and how the relationship of the finite to the absolute can be conceived. "The task is to show how these relative concepts of value of the ages have expanded into something absolute"(1). Gadamer: But a real answer to this problem of relativism will be sought in vain in Dilthey, and not because he never found the right answer, but because it was not his own question at all. Rather, he knew himself in the unfolding of the historical self-contemplation that led him from relativity to relativity, always on the way to the absolute. In this respect, Ernst Troeltsch has correctly summed up Dilthey's life's work in the slogan: "From relativity to totality". Dilthey's own formula for this was: "to be a conditioned being with consciousness"(2) - a formula that is openly directed against the claim of the philosophy of reflection, in the elevation to the absoluteness and infinity of the spirit, in the perfection and truth of self-consciousness to leave behind all limits of finiteness. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 290. 2. Ges. Schriften V, 364. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Schleiermacher | Gadamer | I 347 Schleiermacher/Historism/Gadamer: In the final analysis, it is in Hegel's position that [19th century historism] finds its legitimation, even if the historians who inspired the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt really thought their position through to the end. They may emphasize individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end, understanding is only completed in an infinite consciousness and the idea of individuality finds its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality into the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. So here, too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. >Schleiermacher as an author. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glaube und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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