Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linguistic View | Field | II 159 Linguistic view/Field: does not assume any meanings as mind-independent entities - but assigns the words of a speaker to interpreter's words. - The relations are based on other characteristics - that is, on inferences that contain that word. - This is what I call "meaning-characteristic" - e.g. II 160 ChurchVsLinguistic view/Translation/Field: (Church 1950)(1): ("translation argument"): allegdly says: that if the word "lapin" means [rabbit], then it says that "lapin" means the same as "rabbit", then its German translation should be: ""lapin" means [rabbit]"" instead of ""lapin" means [Kaninchen]"" (Kaninchen, sic). ChurchVs: but this disagrees with the purpose and normal use of translations. Schiffer dito: E.g. two monolingual German speakers: Karl is told that Pierre said something in French that is equivalent to "Schnee ist weiß" (german, sic) - Fritz : ... equivalent to "snow is white". Problem: absurd: then Karl thinks rather than Fritz that Pierre said that Schnee ist weiß (sic, german) - but only because of the linguistic view. FieldVsVs: the linguistic view only has to be formulated more cautiously. Solution: >quasi-translation or > quasi-meaning. II 162 Leeds/linguistic view/LeedsVsChurch/Meaning/Extension/Field: (Leeds, 1979)(2): literal meaning/Leeds: E.g. the German word "bedeutet" means literally not the same as the English word "means": it does not even have the same extension. N.B.: (hereinafter "Hund", sic) "means" refers to "Hund" and "Hund" to "Hund", but not to "dog". - "Means": "dog" refers to "dog" and "Hund" to "dog" but not to "Hund". But: "bedeutet" and "means" are nevertheless in an important homology relation: Homology/meaning/Field: E.g. following two predicates are extensively different: a) "the temperature-in-Fahrenheit of x is r" and b) "the temperature-in-celsius of x is r". Solution: this homology makes it sensibly to translate "bedeutet Hund" as "means dog" - Leeds: the literal meaning is not important. We cannot get it. Field dito. DummettVsChurch: that undermines his argument. >Michael Dummett. II 165 Linguistic view: Alternative to it: a) to assume that that-sentences do not denote and "means that" are "believes that" operators - E.g. inference of "Susan believes that E = mc²" to "Susan believes Einstein's theory". Then the first is only the abbreviation of the second. - Then that-sentences are still singular terms. b) That-sentences and parentheses refer to intentional entities. 1. Church, Alsonzo, 1950. On Carpa's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief. Analysis 10, pp. 97-9. 2. Leeds, Stephen, 1979. Church's Translation Argument. Canadian Journal of PHilosophy 9, 43-51 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning | Dennett | I 565 Example Vending Machine: A beverage vending machine that recognizes quarter dollar coins is later shipped to Brazil, where it accepts certain local coins. Thesis: The environment creates the meaning. Meaning/function/evolution/Dennett: the importance is how the function at the moment of their creation is still nothing definite! Example: a zoo of frogs exclusively with flying dummies, but adequate replacement diet for frogs: What do the eyes tell the brain then? I 281 Meaning/Dennett: origins, birth of meaning: thesis: The nucleotide sequences, initially purely syntactically, take "semantics", "quasi-meaning": e.g. mode of action of macromolecules. SearleVsDennett: this is just as-if intentionality. >As if/Searle. DennetVsSearle: We must start somewhere - the first steps are not to be seen as steps towards significance. I 282 Also parts that have only half-intentionality belong to us. >Intentionality. Brandom I 110ff Meaning/Dennett: That something is a piece of copper means nothing else than that it is appropriate to treat it as such. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Meaning | Field | II 161 Def Quasi-translation/Def quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field: Quasi-translation is what most authors mean by meaning. - Not a literal translation but the use of the words by the interpreter in his own language at the time in his actual world. >Actual world, >Possible worlds. Comparability is preserved even in the quasi-translation, not in a literal. >Comparability, >Translation. Sententialism/sententionalism/Field: Thesis: When we say someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the set of 1st quasi- translation and quasi- meaning rather than literal 2nd "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #snow is white#. ((#): What stands between #, is to be "quasi-translated".) In the quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is obtained. II 167 Intentional meaning/Field: Intentional meaning is completely empty – E.g. Suppose we wanted a theory of intentional meaning, then we also needed one of their combinations. – We also need a theory of the corresponding truth conditions. >Speaker intention, >Intention-based semantics, >Truth conditions. Problem: if we set up a theory here, it is not completely trivial, that the intentional meaning of "Plato" is just Plato! - We need an extra explanation. - That would solve nothing. – It would only bring problems. >Meaning (Intending). Better instead: a compositional theory of expressions (not of meanings). >Compositionality, >Expressions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Translation | Field | II 147ff Untranslatable/Translation/Extension/Deflationism/Field: Problem: Incorporation of untranslatable sentences. - Solution: potential extension of one's own language by accepting truth-preservation in conclusion. >Truth transfer, >Extensions, >Deflationism, >Language dependence. II 148 Names by index: "Georg-i": the George, to which Mary refered at the occasion of Z. Cf. >Situation semantics. II 149 Per sentence theory: "UTT Guru, Z": the sentence the Guru uttered at Z. - The special sentence is then superfluous. II 152 Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotational true. >Disquotational truth, >Disquotationalism. II 161 Def Quasi-translation/Def Quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field: this is what most understand as meaning: not literal translation but reproduction as the interpreter understands the use of the corresponding words in his own language at the point of time in his actual world. >Stephen Schiffer. Comparison: is preserved in the quasi-translation at the moment, not in a literal translation. >Comparisons, >Comparability. Sententialism/Sententionalism/Field: Thesis: If we say that someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the sentence. 1. Quasi-translation and quasi-meaning instead of literal. 2. "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #Snow is white# - (#) what stands between #, should be further translated (quasi-). - In quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is preserved. >Speaker intention, >Intention-based semantics, >Truth conditions. II 273 Translation/Parameter/Field: in many cases, the relativization of the translation to a parameter is necessary to make it recognizable as a translation. - E.g. "finite": the non-standard argument tells us that there are strange models, so that "is in the extension of "finite" in M" functions as a "translation" of "finite" which maintains the inferential role of all what we say in pure mathematics. N.B.: "Is in the extension of "finite" in M" is a parameterized expression. Solution: what we are doing is to "translate" the one-digit predicate "finite" into the two-digit predicate "is in the extension of "finite" in x", along with the statements to determine the value of x on a model M with the necessary characteristics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Searle, J.R. | Dennett Vs Searle, J.R. | I 282 Intentionality/Darwin/Dennett: Darwin turns it all around: intentionality is secured from bottom to top. The first meaning was not a fully developed meaning, it certainly does not show all ’essential’ properties (whatever they may be). "Quasi-meaning", half semantics. I 555 SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: But you have to start somewhere (if you want to avoid metaphysics). The first step in the right direction is hardly recognizable as a step towards meaning. SearleVsArtificial Intelligence: Computers only possess "as-if intentionality". DennettVsSearle: then he has a problem. While AI says we are composed of machines, Darwinism says we are descended from machines!. I 557 You can hardly refuse the first if you agree with the second statement. How can something that has emerged from machines be anything other than a much, much more sophisticated machine?. Function/Searle: (according to Dennett): Only products that have been produced by a real human consciousness have a function ((s)> objet ambigu, Valéry). DennettVsSearle: I.e. the wings of the aircraft, but not the wings of the eagle serve for flying!. I 558 Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: cannot be achieved by the composition of machines or the ever better structure of algorithms. I 569 DennettVsSearle: this is the belief in sky hooks: the mind is not supposed to emerge, it is not created, but only (inexplicable) source of creation. Intention/DennettVsSearle: (E.g. Vending Machine): Those who select its new function perhaps do not even formulate any new intention. They only fall into the habit of relying on the new useful function. They do not perceive that they carry out an act of unconscious exaptation. Parallel: >Darwin: There is an unconscious selection of properties in pets. II 73 Searle: In the case of the artifact the creator must always be asked. Intrinsic (original) intentionality/DennettVsSearle: is metaphysical, an illusion. As if the "author would need to have a more original intention". Dennett: but there is no task for that. The hypothetical robot would be equally capable of transfering derived intentionality to other artifacts. Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: there certainly used to be coarser forms of intentionality (Searle contemptuously "mere as-if intentionality"). Dennett: they serve both as a temporal precursors as well as current components. We are descended from robots and consist of robots (DNA, macromolecules). All intentionality we enjoy is derived from the more fundamental intentionality of these billions of systems. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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