Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
All	Field	II 238 All/Field: the use of "all" without quotes is itself the subject of a reinterpretation. - ((s) There could be a contradictory, yet undiscovered property that should not be included under "all properties" - here the dft-operator would in turn help.) VsDeflationism: one could simply say "..all .. " is true iff "..any ... " Vs: in addition you need the dft-operator (definite-Op). Conditions are requested - but not indicated. Field: ditto for higher level quantification. >dft-operator, >Levels (Order), >Vagueness/Field.	Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Civil Rights	Discourse Theories	Gaus I 163 Civil rights/Discourse theories/Bohman: Civil rights, for example, may be interpreted legally so as to establish and guarantee a minimum threshold and the fair value of communicative liberties. of communicative liberties. They can be interpreted, for example, to assure that voting power is more equitably distributed, permitting greater access to representative forums, or they may open up regulations of political speech to diminish the effects of discrepancies in campaign financing. The emergence of new norms or the reinterpretation of old ones may require a period of what Ackerman (1991⁽¹⁾) calls 'constitutional politics' within an existing democracy. Ackerman thus sees the constitution as an open-ended discursive project subject to paradigm shifts at historical junctures such as reconstruction after the Civil War and the Great Depression. These changes reflect 'discourse moments', to use Gamson's (1992⁽²⁾: Part I) term, in which the people, the courts, or the executive respond to historical circumstance by reinterpreting and recreating the Constitution. 1. Ackerman, Bruce (1991) We the People, vol. I. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2. Gamson, William (1992) Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Consistency	Hilbert	Berka I 413 Hilbert/Lecture: "Mathematical Problems" (1900)⁽¹⁾: the second problem of the mathematical problems is to prove the consistency of the arithmetic axioms. Consistency/arithmetics/problem/Schröter: at first, there is no way to see, since a proof by specifying a model is self-banning, since arithmetic is the simplest area on whose consistency all consistency proofs should be returned in other areas. So a new path must be taken. >Proofs, >Provability, >Ultimate justification, >Models, >Model theory. Consistency proof/Schröter: for the arithmetic axioms: the consistency requires the proof that an arithmetical statement cannot also be used to derive the contradictory negation of this statement from the axioms. >Axioms, >Axiom systems, >Derivation, >Derivability. To do this, it suffices to prove the non-derivability of any statement e.g. 0 unequal 0. If this is to be successful, it must be shown that all the deductions from the arithmetic axioms have a certain property which come off the statement that states 0 unequal 0. I 414 Problem: the amount of the consequences is completely unpredictable. Solution/Hilbert: the process of infering (logical inference) has to be formalized itself. With this however, the concluding/infering is deprived of all content. >Conditional, >Implication. Problem: now, one can no longer say that a theory, e.g. is about the natural numbers. Formalism/Schröter: according to formalism, mathematics is no longer concerned with objects which refer to a real or an ideal world, but only by certain signs, or their transformations, which are made according to certain rules. >Formalism. WeylVsHilbert: that would require a reinterpretation of all the mathematics so far. 1. David Hilbert: Mathematische Probleme, in: Nachrichten der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, mathematisch-physikalische Klasse, issue 3, 1900, pp. 253–297.	Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Constitution	Ackerman	Gaus I 163 Constitution/Ackerman/deliberative democracy/Bohman: Civil rights, for example, may be interpreted legally so as to establish and guarantee a minimum threshold and the fair value of communicative liberties. of communicative liberties. They can be interpreted, for example, to assure that voting power is more equitably distributed, permitting greater access to representative forums, or they may open up regulations of political speech to diminish the effects of discrepancies in campaign financing. The emergence of new norms or the reinterpretation of old ones may require a period of what Ackerman (1991⁽¹⁾) calls 'constitutional politics' within an existing democracy. Ackerman thus sees the constitution as an open-ended discursive project subject to paradigm shifts at historical junctures such as Reconstruction after the Civil War and the Great Depression. These changes reflect 'discourse moments', to use Gamson's (1992⁽²⁾: Part I) term, in which the people, the courts, or the executive respond to historical circumstance by reinterpreting and recreating the Constitution. >Civil rights/Discourse theories. 1. Ackerman, Bruce (1991) We the People, vol. I. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2. Gamson, William (1992) Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Constitution	Republicanism	Gaus I 169 Constitution/Republicanism/Dagger: The law only ensures the citizen 's freedom, (...) when it is responsive to the citizenry and when the republic itself is secure and stable enough for its laws to be effective. Sustaining freedom under the rule of law thus requires not only public-spirited participation in public affairs and a willing- ness to bear the burdens of a common life - the civic virtue of the republican citizen - but also the proper form of government. This usually has been some version of mixed or balanced government, so called because it mixes and balances elements of rule by one, by the few, and by the many. >Rule of Law/Republicanism, >Freedom/Republicanism. Republic/Pocock: As J. G. A. Pocock (1975)⁽¹⁾ and others have noted, writers from Polybius and Cicero to Machiavelli and the American Founders celebrated the mixed constitution for its ability to stave off corruption and tyranny. Republicanism: To be sure, republicans have sometimes struggled to reconcile their faith in mixed government with their distrust or even hatred of hereditary monarchy and aristocracy. But this struggle, as in the case of the American Founders, has led to a reinterpretation of balanced government as one that relies upon the checks and balances of separated powers or functions of government. Whether mixed in the older sense or balanced in the newer, though, the point is Gaus I 170 to resist the corruption of power by preventing its concentration. >Freedom/Republicanism. 1. Pocock, J. G. A. (1975) The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Critical Theory	Honneth	Brocker I 789 Critical Theory/Honneth/Sigwart: Honneth combines the basic concerns of Critical Theories, such as their approaches to a reinterpretation of Hegel and Marx and the combination of social theoretical reflection with empirical research, including suggestions of American pragmatism. The works of George Herbert Mead ⁽¹⁾ and John Dewey serve as reference points. ⁽²⁾ >Pragmatism, >G.H. Mead, >J. Dewey, >Th.W. Adorno, >M. Horkheimer, >H. Marcuse, >J. Habermas. 1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 114-147 2. Ebenda p. 96-101. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Entrepreneurship	Austrian School	Parisi I 283 Entrepreneurship/Austrian school: An important and recurring theme in Austrian economics is the role of entrepreneurial alertness in seizing profit opportunities, and thereby enhancing the level of coordination in the market. Krecké: Krecké argues that the Austrian concept of entrepreneurship is, in principle, applicable to legal decision-making. Decisions on which course to follow in a given case, and on which sources to rely, can be supposed to involve entrepreneurial judgments (2002⁽¹⁾, p. 8). Legal entrepreneurs, like their counterparts in the market, are alert to the “flaws, gaps and ambiguities in the law” (Krecké, 2002(1), p. 10). Whitman: Whitman (2002)⁽²⁾ also extends the idea of entrepreneurship to the role played by lawyers and litigants. He examines how legal entrepreneurs discover and exploit opportunities to change legal rules—either the creation of new rules or the reinterpretation of existing ones to benefit themselves and their clients. Harper: Harper (2013)⁽³⁾ believes that the entrepreneurial approach lays the groundwork for explaining the open-ended and evolving nature of the legal process—it shows how the structure of property rights can undergo continuous endogenous change as a result of entrepreneurial actions within the legal system itself. The most important differentiating factor separating the entrepreneurship of the market process from legal entrepreneurship is the absence of the discipline of monetary profit and loss in the latter case. Although money may change hands in the process of legal entrepreneurship, its outputs may not be valued according to market prices, especially when there is a public-goods quality to the rule at issue. Whether effective feedback mechanisms exist in the contexts is therefore an open question. 1. Krecké, E. (2002). “The Role of Entrepreneurship in Shaping Legal Evolution.” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 12(2): 1–16. 2. Whitman, D. G. (2002). “Legal Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change.” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 12(2): 1–11. 3. Harper, D. A. (2013). “Property rights, entrepreneurship and coordination.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 88: 62–77. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Equivalence	Quine	VI 76 Cognitive Equivalence: is the replacement of a sentence by another. One should not interfere with the empirical content. QuineVs: this is not sure because a representative function is possible - instead: synonymy of stimuly - (but this is only for occasion sentences). Afterwards cognitive synonymy is possible also for terms but not for timeless sentences. X 21ff Sentence Equivalence/QuineVs: in everyday language there is no basic order (like pixels in a photo) - you cannot assign the sensual proof clearly to individual sentences ((s) formulations) - Quine: Because of the network of theories - (>underdetermination of empiricism). II 66 Sentence Equivalence: when are two sentences considered equivalent? Frequent answer: if their use is the same! Or, if the stimuli are the same. Obviously it does not work that way! The two sentences cannot be uttered at the same time. The utterance of one must exclude that of the other! Moreover, at every opportunity when one of the two possible sentences has been uttered, there must be a reason, however trivial, for the utterance of one instead of the other! We are obviously asking too much when we are asking for all the irritations in question to be identical. In any case, one criterion would be illusory in practice if it demanded that the stimulus conditions are actually being compared. All in all, statements are practically unpredictable. The motives for the utterance of a sentence can vary inscrutably. Solution/Quine: >Cognitive Equivalence: II 67 Cognitive Equivalence: here we are spared speculations about motives and circumstances. Instead, we can arrange circumstances and say sentences ourselves. If you make a mistake with your verdicts, it does not matter, you will make a mistake with both sentences. II 68 Def Cognitive Equivalence: two occasional sentences are cognitively equivalent if they cause consent or rejection on every occasion. >Cognition/Quine. II 45ff Empirical equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation. Both theories are true, but may be logically incompatible.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Ethics of Conviction	Weber	Habermas III 232 Ethic of conviction/Weber/Habermas: The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction. ⁽¹⁾ >Ethics, >Morality, >Law, >Society, >Modernity, >Modernization. The ethics of conviction is universalistic and guided by principles. It removes the distinction between internal and external morals. This corresponds to a radical break with the traditionalism of legal tradition.⁽²⁾ >Principles, >Tradition. Norms that refer to magic etc. are devalued. Norms are now regarded as mere conventions that are accessible to a hypothetical view and can be set positively. III 233 Norms, procedures and matters become the subject of rational discussion and profane decision making. This leads to the most important characteristics of rules of law: - Any right can become a statute - The law as a whole consists of a system of abstract rules, the administration of justice consists in the application of these rules to individual cases. - Civil servants are not personal rulers. The administration is also bound by rules of law and is conducted in accordance with principles that can be specified and are not disapproved of. - The people who obey the rule constituted by law are citizens and not subjects. They obey the law, not the officials. - Any measure of interference with freedom or property must be justified. ⁽³⁾ >Norms. Habermas III 314 Problem: the moral-practical rationality of ethics of conviction cannot itself be institutionalized in the society whose start it makes possible. Rather, it is replaced by a utilitarianism that owes its existence to an empirical reinterpretation of moral, namely the pseudomoral appreciation of procedural rationality, and no longer has an internal relationship to the moral sphere of value. >Purpose rationality. Solution/Weber: Competition with scientifically rationalized patterns of interpretation and life orders determines the fate of religion Habermas III 315 and ultimately shifts it into the irrational.⁽⁴⁾ >Religion. Habermas III 318 Ethics of Conviction/Weber/Habermas: According to Weber, ethics of conviction is characterized by the following attitude: "The Christian does right and places success in God's hands." ⁽⁵⁾ Habermas: Weber thus enters into a philosophical discussion that was able to work out the stubbornness of moral-practical questions, the logic of the justification of norms of action, after morality and law had separated themselves from the terminology of religious (and metaphysical) world views. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I. 1963, p. 541. 2. Ibid. p. 543. 3. R. Bendix, Max Weber. Das Werk, München 1964, p. 320. 4. M. Weber (1963) p. 253 5. M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I Tübingen, 1963, p.552.	Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Facts	Quine	Rorty I 217 Fact/Quine/Rorty: "Dog" is the English word for "dog", and "Robinson believes in God": that is not a truth type that expresses a "fact", something "factual". Quine thus offers a distinction between truth by virtue of convergence and truth by virtue of correspondence instead of the positivist distinction between conventional and empirically confirmed truth. Davidson:... Quinesian resolution of the distinction between questions of meaning and questions of fact. Quine I 426f Facts/Quine: are not something mediating according to the image of our sentences (VsSellars, VsWittgenstein?) - better: are true sentences or true propositions - facts are not required, especially not in addition to propositions. >Propositions/Quine. II 37 Another term I want to save from the abyss of the transcendental is the term factual which proves to be relevant in the theory of radical translation. In this case, none of the facts decides which of the two manuals is right. And this term of the factual is neither transcendental nor epistemological to such an extent ((s) no fact can decide - requires facts that are just not fit to do so.) II 37 Actual: is the radical translation: no fact decides which of the manuals is right. Actual things are ontological, naturalistic but neither transcendental nor epistemological. They are physical conditions and not empirical skills. Reinterpretation is only done with others, not with ourselves. - Factuality as gravity is inherent in our nature. VI 113 Fact/Quine: we can erase that. "It is a fact" does not contribute anything. It is only seemingly founded in correspondence theory. A true sentence as a whole corresponds to a fact. "It is true that" is necessary for sentences that do not exist.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Fixed Points	Logic Texts	Read III 196 Kripke's Fixed Points/Read: 1. Separate truth and falsehood conditions (i.e. falsehood is not equal to non-truth). 2. Two sentence sets S1: true sentences, S2 false sentences. 3. Do evaluation on each level, therefore you have to choose a higher level. In this way, all sentences are "collected". Fixed point/(s): where evaluation (output) is identical to input. Read: Success: then the extension fails - i.e. the meta language does not contain any further truth-attributions than the object language⁽¹⁾. >Meta language, >Object language, >Levels (Order). III 197 Kripke's Fixed Points/Kripke: the extension fails: the meta language has no further truth-attributions. There is a paradox in the fixed point without truth value. Falsehood does not equal non-truth! >Truth value. Truth-predicate/Kripke's Fixed Points/Read: we separate the truth-predicates truth and falsehood - the truth-predicate is formed by the pair (S1, S2), whereby S1 contains the true sentences and S2 contains the wrong sentences. >Truth predicate. 1st level: here, a sentence has, e.g. ""Snow is white" is true" has no truth value because evaluation at this stage is not possible. >Valuation. Solution: weak matrices for evaluating compound sentences, some of which are without truth value (without truth value) - (A v B) without truth value if one of A or B has no truth value (partial interpretation). III 198 Fixed point/Kripke's Fixed Points/Kripke/Read: the fixed point is reached by transfinite induction - recursive or successive with partial evaluations. 1st transfinite level: all finite partial evaluations of S1 and S2 are collected separately. N.B.: at an early point (before adding all possible sentences), the reinterpretation of the truth-predicate no longer succeeds in adding something new. Special case of the result about fixed points of normal functions over ordinal numbers. Phi/f: represents the operation of expanding by allowing new interpretations. The fixed point here is f(S1, S2) = (S1, S2). III 200 Unfounded assertions: the separation of S1 and S2 leaves some statements without a truth value - e.g. "this statement is true". It has no truth value at the minimum fixed point. One level higher we can give it an arbitrary value-but not to the liar paradox. Paradox/Kripke: follows Tarski: it cannot be expressed in one's own language. The entire discussion belongs to the meta language, as well as the predicates: "paradoxical" and "unfounded". They do not belong to the semantically terminated fixed point. Tarski's truth schema does not work here - (... + ...). >Disquotation schema. 1. Saul Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) in: R.L.Martin (Ed.) Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox Clarendon Oxf/NY 1984	Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Formalism	Quine	XIII 63 Formalism/Quine: deduction is useful if you have previously doubted the truth of the result. XIII 64 For example, you can test a hypothesis by looking at the consequences of it. Euclid: had difficulties to prove theorems, the truth of which nobody doubted anymore. Elegance/Science/Euclid: he already tried, for reasons of simplicity, to limit his postulates. Deduction/Problem/Quine: how can we prevent our already existing knowledge (about the objects ("what is true")) from creeping into the evidence? One tries to simulate ignorance, but what is the point? Knowledge/Truth/Quine/(s): To "know what is true" is more a knowledge of objects than of logic (see below). Disinterpretation/Reinterpretation/Interpretation/Tradition/Quine: one possibility was reinterpretation: in which it was assumed that the logical constants retained their meaning, but the other terms were merely regarded as provisional. And that in the theorem to be proved as well as in its consequences ((s) thus practically then in everyday use, everyday language). Pure Mathematics/Quine: this led many authors to regard their object as intrinsically uninterpreted. Pure Mathematics/Formalism/Russell: here we never know what we are talking about or if what we are saying is true. QuineVsFormalism/QuineVsRussell: in his favour, he has quickly forgotten that again. XIII 65 Pure Mathematics/Science/Quine: seems to be on a par with the other sciences. Pure arithmetic, for example, has to do with pure numbers that count objects, but also electrons in the economy. Variables: go over numbers as well as over objects. Example: speed of light: here a relation is determined between a pure number (300,000) and light waves. Thereby not the number is emphasized as special, but the relation. Example: price: here the number is formed neither by the object, nor by the currency. ((s) Solution/((s): Relation instead of predicate.) Quine: relation instead of pure numbers and "pure object". QuineVsDisinterpretation/Disinterpretation/Quine: the purity of pure mathematics is not based on reinterpretation! Arithmetic/Quine: is simply concerned with numbers, not with objects of daily life. Abstract Algebra/Quine: if it exists, it is simply the theory of classes and relations. But classes and relations of all possible things, not only abstract ones. XIII 66 Logic/Quine: there was a similar problem as before with deduction, where we had to suspend our previous knowledge about objects: how can we suspend our previous knowledge about conclusions? Solution/Frege/Tradition: again through disinterpretation, but this time of the particle. (>Formalism). Formalism/Quine: ironically, it spares us from ultimate disinterpretation. We can extend the conclusions allowed by our signs. We can be sure that they are not altered by the meanings of the signs. Frege/Russell/Principia Mathematica/Quine: the Principia Mathematica⁽¹⁾ was a step backwards from Frege's conceptual writing in terms of formalistic rigor. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Good	Hegel	Bubner I 182 Good/Hegel/Bubner: the entire thought process (e.g. of the Encyclopedia) in the end comes down to the "self-knowing reason", which deserves the name of the absolute since it represents the total mediation between reality and knowledge where nothing remains external. Identity of goal and process. >Knowledge/Hegel, >Absolute/Hegel. Reinterpretation of the classical idea of the good under the caption of the idea of "recognition", which in turn is placed between "life" on the one hand and the "absolute idea" on the other hand. >Recognition/Hegel. I 184 Def Life/Hegel: means the reality of the individual, life process and species, so "it may seem as though the domain of logic was overstepped." Recognition/Hegel: in the middle between life saturated with reality and a transparent method lies the "idea of recognition", which in its turn is split into the "idea of truth" and the "idea of the good". Here, however, instead of the usual triad of Hegelian dialectics, there is only a two-step procedure: because of the elementary subject/object relationship. >Dialectic/Hegel. The subjective, theoretical concept of the good in knowledge is opposed by the "idea of the good" in practical action. Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation on two sides: theory and practice. (Following the example of AristotleVsPlaton's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". >Experience/Kant, >I. Kant, >Reason, >Experience/Hegel, >Practice. I 185 Subject/Object/Antiquity/Bubner: the entire ancient world, and with it Aristotle, knew nothing at all about it. I 186 Good/Hegel: the truth of a purpose implanted in reality must be determined as "the good" beyond the perspective of action: objectivity, "rationality of the world." The finiteness of our everyday goals, their plurality and possible collision, as well as their postulatory status in the ought, must be interpreted merely as an expression of the "incompleteness" of the good. The executed good would be the abolition of otherness. With that, the inadequate subject/object relation disappears, which characterized the metaphysical content that was discussed. Metaphysical Content/Hegel: it must now be called "free, universal identity with itself". Thus, the dialectical genesis about the idea of truth and the idea of good is abolished. Therefore, what "has its own objectivity as an object in its other" is the unity in the division as a construction principle of all reality. After successful mediation it is no longer tinged with the work of reflection. I 187 Parallel to Aristotle: Divine eternal life on the basis of purely rational self-activity. Good/Hegel/Bubner: for him the good is an auxiliary expression!	Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Governance	Pettit	Brocker I 855 Rule/Government/Pettit: Pettit wants to create the image of public life that offers freedom without domination. His ideal-typical conceptualization of the political sphere should be pluralistic, adaptable and focused on sustainability. >Pluralism. It should not only balance out different interests and needs in an egalitarian direction, but also foster public sensitivity to ecological issues, women's emancipation, minority problems and multicultural coexistence. >Egalitarianism, >Minorities, >Emancipation, >Ecology, >Multiculturalism. Pettit is particularly concerned with related constitutional law problems. Brocker I 856 Constitution/Pettit: some authors consider his discussion of constitutional issues too coarse. VsPettit: ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾ >Constitution. Pettit's Replica: PettitVsVs: ⁽⁴⁾⁽⁵⁾ Brocker I 860 VsPettit: Pettit ends up with an amazingly conventional idea of governing. McMahonVsPettit: He ignores the adverse conditions for implementing republican guarantees of freedom in the thicket of real political contexts of action. ⁽⁶⁾ VsPettit: Pettit ultimately ends up in the liberalism he criticized, or a liberal model of the common good that puts respect for the freedom of the individual in the first place. >Liberalism, >Individuals/Pettit. Problem: Pettit has no clear reinterpretation of the collective interaction of individuals and their political function.⁽⁹⁾ Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, S. 129 2. John A. Bruegger »Republican Freedom: Three Problems«, in: The Journal Jurisprudence 11, 2011, p. 582 3. McMahon, Christopher, »The Indeterminacy of Republican Policy«, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs 33/1, 2005, 67-93. 4. Philip Pettit, »The Determinacy of Republican Policy: A Reply to McMahon«, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs 34/3, 2005, 275-283. 5. Philipp Schink,»Freedom, Control and the State«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013, p. 224 6. McMahon Ibid. 7.Laborde, Cécile/Maynor, John, »The Republican Contribution to Contemporary Political Theory«, in: dies. (Hg.), Republicanism and Political Theory, Malden, Mass./Oxford/Carlton 2008, p. 1 - 28 8. John P. McCormick, »Republicanism and Democracy«, in: Andreas Niederberger/Philipp Schink (Hg.), Republican Democracy. Liberty, Law, and Politics, Edinburgh 2013 9. Laborde, Cécile/Maynor, John, »The Republican Contribution to Contemporary Political Theory«, in: dies. (Hg.), Republicanism and Political Theory, Malden, Mass./Oxford/Carlton 2008, p. 9. Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Impossible World	Hintikka	II 12 Impossible World/Hintikka: I believe that we must allow the impossible world to fight the problem of another kind of omniscience, the logical omniscience. >Logical omniscience. II 63 Impossible Worlds/logical omniscience/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: thesis: the problem of omniscience does not occur here at all! E.g.: (1) A sentence of the form "a knows that p" is true in a world W iff. P is true in all a-alternatives. That is, in all worlds, which are compatible with the knowledge of a. The failure of the logical omniscience can be formulated like this: (2) There is a, p and q such that a knows that p, p implies logically q, but a does not know that q. The logical truth is then analyzed model-theoretically: (3) A sentence is logically true, iff. it is true in every logically possible world. Problem: (1) - (3) are incompatible! However, they are not yet incompatible in the form given above, but only with the additional assumption: (4) Every epistemically possible world is logically possible. II 64 Problem: now it can be that in an epistemic a-alternative W'q is wrong! Problem: according to (4), these epistemic worlds are also logically possible. However, according to the logical truth of (p > q) ((s) in this example), q must be true in any logically possible world. This results in the contradiction. Solution: different authors have responded differently: Positivism: positivism takes refuge in the noninformative (tautological) logical truth. HintikkaVs: instead: semantics of possible worlds. (4) already presupposes omniscience! It assumes that a can only eliminate seeming possibilities. This is circular. Solution: there may be possibilities that appear only possible but contain hidden contradictions. II 65 Problem: the problem here is (4) and not (2)! Solution/Hintikka: we have to allow worlds that are logically impossible, but still epistemically possible ((s) unlike the impossible worlds discussed in Stalnaker and Cresswell.) Then (1) - (3) can be true together. That is, in an epistemic world (p > q) can fail. Impossible World/Hintikka: how we can allow a possible world? Impossible World/Cresswell/Hintikka: Cresswell proposes a reinterpretation of the logical constants (model-theoretical). HintikkaVsCresswell: the real problem with omniscience is that people do not recognize all the logical consequences of their knowledge. And this takes place in classical logic. Non-standard logic: bypasses the problem. You could say it destroys the problem instead of solving it. II 65 Impossible World/logical omniscience/solution/Veikko RantalaVsHintikka: Hintikka has solved some problems of this approach. II 66 Nonclassical models: nonclassical models are for first level sentences. Impossible World/Rantala: impossible worlds are not "impossible" according to Rantala, but they differ from normal possible worlds, in the way that they are "changing worlds" by allowing new individuals. However, they differ in such a subtle way that they normally cannot be distinguished from invariant worlds (with always the same individuals). It is about: Urn Model/statistics/omniscience/Hintikka: in the urn model, variant worlds are such worlds with which moves from the urn possibly get new individuals into the game. But only so few that you may not notice it. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility, >Possible worlds.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Keynesianism	Hicks	Mause I 57 Keynesianism/John R. Hicks: Keynesianism tried to incorporate the findings by Keynes into neoclassical theory. >Neoclassical economics. Problem: the neoclassical mainstream assumed that the price mechanism was in principle efficient and capable of ensuring a full employment equilibrium. Solution: And in order to capture these short-term phenomena, Keynesian analysis was used, which was formalized and annexed to the neoclassical theory building.⁽¹⁾ >Labour, >Labour market, >Equilibrium. 1. J. R. Hicks, Mr. Keynes and the „classics“; a suggested reinterpretation. Econometrica 5: 1937, S. 147-159.	EconHicks I John R. Hicks Mr. Keynes and the "classis"; a suggested reinterpreation 1937 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Keynesianism	Tobin	Mause I 57 Keynesianism/Tobin: Keynesianism tried to incorporate the findings by Keynes into neoclassical theory. >Neoclassical economics. Problem: the neoclassical mainstream assumed that the price mechanism was in principle efficient and capable of ensuring a full employment equilibrium. Solution: And in order to capture these short-term phenomena, Keynesian analysis was used, which was formalized and annexed to the neoclassical theory building.⁽¹⁾ Other representatives of Keynesianism were Franco Modigliani (1918-2003) and James Tobin (1918-2002). At least as far as the economic policy guidelines were concerned, the Keynesians did not deviate from the recipes of "General Theory". Like Keynes, they advocated active economic stabilisation by the state - not only through anti-cyclical fiscal policy, but also through a corresponding monetary policy. >Monetary policy, >Monetarism. 1. Cf. J. R. Hicks, Mr. Keynes and the „classics“; a suggested reinterpretation. Econometrica 5: 1937, S. 147-159.	EconTobin I James Tobin The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash 1956 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Legal Entrepreneurship	Austrian School	Parisi I 283 Legal Entrepreneurship/ Austrian school: Whitman (2002)⁽¹⁾ (…) extends the idea of entrepreneurship to the role played by lawyers and litigants. He examines how legal entrepreneurs discover and exploit opportunities to change legal rules—either the creation of new rules or the reinterpretation of existing ones to benefit themselves and their clients. Harper: Harper (2013)⁽²⁾ believes that the entrepreneurial approach lays the groundwork for explaining the open-ended and evolving nature of the legal process—it shows how the structure of property rights can undergo continuous endogenous change as a result of entrepreneurial actions within the legal system itself. The most important differentiating factor separating the entrepreneurship of the market process from legal entrepreneurship is the absence of the discipline of monetary profit and loss in the latter case. Although money may change hands in the process of legal entrepreneurship, its outputs may not be valued according to market prices, especially when there is a public-goods quality to the rule at issue. Whether effective feedback mechanisms exist in the contexts is therefore an open question. Martin: Martin argues that, in such structures, the feedback mechanism in polities is not as tight as feedback in the market mechanism, and therefore ideology plays a greater role in such decision-making (Martin, 2010)⁽³⁾. Legal entrepreneurship can be coordinating and yet also increase uncertainty and conflicts in society. It all depends on the kind of legal order in operation and the mechanism by which it is generated and maintained. Rubin/Priest: Rubin (1977)⁽⁴⁾ and Priest (1977)⁽⁵⁾ originally analyzed how the openly competitive legal process tends to promote economic efficiency. They more recently point out that the common law system has succumbed to interest group pressures and has deviated from producing efficient rules (Tullock, 2005/1980(6); Tullock, 2005/1997⁽⁷⁾; Priest, 1991)⁽⁸⁾. They argue that litigation efforts by private parties can explain both the common law’s historic tendency to produce efficient rules as well as its more recent evolution away from efficiency in favor of wealth redistribution through the intrusion of strong interest groups into political and legal processes. Zywicki: Zywicki (2003)⁽⁹⁾ describes the common law system in the Middle Ages as polycentric. He focuses on three institutional features of the formative years of the common law system. First, courts competed in overlapping jurisdictions and judges competed for litigants. Second, there was a weak rule of precedent instead of the present-day stare decisis rule. And third, legal rules were more default rules, which parties could contract around, instead of mandatory rules. These features are missing in the present-day common law system, which is non-competitive, has strong rules of precedent, Parisi I 284 precedent, and is dominated by mandatory rules. The efficiency claims pertain to a social system grounded in private ordering where those who are subject to those legal rules select the rules in open competition. Rajagopalan/Wagner : Rajagopalan and Wagner (2013)⁽⁹⁾ argue that the inefficiency claims pertaining to the current system of common law rules are a result of the entrepreneurial action within the contemporary system of the “entangled political economy.” The entangled political economy is essentially a “hybrid” of a monocentric state structure interacting with polycentric or private ordering, encouraging “parasitical” entrepreneurship within the legal system (Podemska-Mikluch and Wagner, 2010)⁽¹⁰⁾. Rajagopalan (2015)⁽¹¹⁾ provides India as a case study to discuss a system of rules incongruent to the economy consequently giving rise to “parasitical” entrepreneurial action and entanglement of economic and legal orders. There is also “political entrepreneurship” within a given constitutional or governance structure that seeks to create coalitions to effect specific legislation or transfers of wealth (rent seeking). Martin and Thomas (2013⁾⁽²⁾ describe such political entrepreneurship at different levels of the institutional structure, at the policy level, legislative level, or the constitutional level. These non-market orders determine the precise form that entrepreneurship takes (Boettke and Coyne, 2009⁽¹³⁾; and Boettke and Leeson, 2009)⁽¹⁴⁾. Political entrepreneurship may also attempt to change higher-level rules—like property rights systems, constitutional constraints, and so forth—as a means to gain rents and transfers within an economy (Rajagopalan, 2016)⁽¹⁵⁾. 1. Whitman, D. G. (2002). “Legal Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change.” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 12(2): 1–11. 2. Harper, D. A. (2013). “Property rights, entrepreneurship and coordination.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 88: 62–77. 3. Martin, A. (2010). “Emergent Politics and the Power of Ideas.” Studies in Emergent Order 3: 212–245. 4. Rubin, P. H. (1977). “Why is the Common Law Efficient?” Journal of Legal Studies 6(1): 51–63. 5. Priest, G. L. (1977). “The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules.” Journal of Legal Studies 6(1): 65–77. 6. Tullock, G. (2005/1980). “Trials on Trial: The Pure Theory of Legal Procedure,” in C. Rowley, ed., The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Vol. IX. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 7. Tullock, G. (2005/1997). “The Case Against the Common Law,” in C. Rowley, ed., The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Vol. IX. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 8. Zywicki, T. J. (2003). “The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply Side Analysis.” Northwestern University Law Review 97(4): 1551–1633. 9. Rajagopalan, S. and R. Wagner (2013). “Legal Entrepreneurship within Alternative Systems of Political Economy.” American Journal of Entrepreneurship 6(1): 24–36. 10. Podemska-Mikluch, M. and R. W. Wagner (2010). “Entangled Political Economy and the Two Faces of Entrepreneurship.” Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 28(2–3): 99–114. 11. Rajagopalan, S. (2015). “Incompatible institutions: socialism versus constitutionalism in India.” Constitutional Political Economy 26(3): 328–355. 12. Martin, A. and D. Thomas (2013). “Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system.” Public Choice 154(1): 21–37. 13. Boettke, P. J. and Coyne, C. J. (2009). Context matters: Institutions and entrepreneurship. Hanover: MA, Now Publishers Inc. 14. Boettke, P. J., C. J. Coyne, and P. T. Leeson (2008). “Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 67(2): 331–358. 15. Rajagopalan, S. (2016). “Constitutional Change: A public choice analysis,” in Sujit Choudhary, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Madhav Khosla, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution. New York: Oxford University Press, pp 127–142. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Literal Truth		Literally true: a theory can only be literally true when its terms may not be re-interpreted in a given situation. On the other hand, a reinterpretation can make some theories and laws applicable to special cases, without being true or false.	Link to abbreviations/authors
Loewenheim	Putnam	V 54 ff Loewenheim/reference/PutnamVsTradition: Loewenheim tries to fix the intension und extension of single expressions via the determination of the truth values for whole sentences. V 56f PutnamVsOperationalism: e.g. (1) "E and a cat is on the mat." If we re-interpret this with cherries and trees, all truth values remain unchanged. Cat* to mat: a) some cats on some mats and some cherries on some trees, b) ditto, but no cherry on a tree, c) none of these cases. Definition cat: x is a cat* iff. a) and x = cherry, or b) and x = cat or c) and x = cherry. Definition mat: x = mat iff. a) and x = tree or b) and x = mat or c) and x = quark. Ad c) Here all respective sentences become false ((s) "cat* to mat" is the more comprehensive (disjunctive) statement and therefore true in all worlds a) or b)). Putnam: cat will be enhanced to cat by reinterpretation. Then there might be infinitely many reinterpretations of predicates that will always attribute the right truth value. Then we might even hold "impression" constant as the only expression. The reference will be undetermined because of the truth conditions for whole sentences (>Gavagai). V 58 We can even reinterpret "sees" (as sees) so that the sentence "Otto sees a cat" and "Otto sees a cat" have the same truth values in every world. V 61 Which properties are intrinsic or extrinsic is relative to the decision, which predicates we use as basic concepts, cat or cat. Properties are not in themselves extrinsic/intrinsic. V 286ff Loewenheim/Putnam:* theorem: S be a language with predicates F1, F2, ...Fk. I be an interpretation in the sense that each predicate S gets an intension. Then, there will be a second interpretation J that is not concordant with I but will make the same sentences true in every possible world that are made true by I. Proof: W1, W2, ... all be possible worlds in a well-ordering, Ui be the set of possible individuals existing in world Wi. Ri be the set, forming the extension of the predicate Fi in the possible world Wj. The structure [Uj;Rij(i=1,2...k)] is the "intended Model" of S in world Wj relative to I (i.e. Uj is the domain of S in world Wj, and Rij is (with i = 1, 2, ...k) the extension of the predicate Fi in Wj). J be the interpretation of S which attributes to predicate Fi (i=1, 2, ...k) the following intension: the function fi(W), which has the value Pj(Rij) in every possible world Wj. In other words: the extension of Fi in every world Wj under interpretation J is defined as such, that it is Pj(Rij). Because [Uj;Pj(Rij)(i=1,2...k)] is a model for the same set of sentences as [Uj;Rij(i=1,2...k)] (because of the isomorphism), in every possible world the same sentences are true under J as under I. J is distinguished from I in every world, in which at least one predicate has got a non-trivial extension. V 66 Loewenheim/intention/meaning/Putnam: this is no solution, because to have intentions presupposes the ability to refer to things. Intention/mind State: is ambiguous: "pure": is e.g. pain, "impure": means e.g. whether I know that snow is white does not depend on me like pain (> twin earth). Non-bracketed belief presupposes that there really is water (twin earth). Intentions are no mental events that evoke the reference. V 70 Reference/Loewenheim/PutnamVsField: a rule like "x prefers to y iff. x is in relation R to y" does not help: even when we know that it is true, could relation R be any kind of a relation (while Field assumes that it is physical). --- I (d) 102ff E.g. the sentence: (1) ~(ER)(R is 1:1. The domain is R < N. The range of R is S). Problem: when we replace S by the set of real numbers (in our favourite set theory), then (1) will be a theorem. In the following our set theory will say that a certain set ("S") is not countable. Then S must in all models of our set theory (e.g. Zermelo-Fraenkel, ZF) be non-countable. Loewenheim: his sentence now tells us, that there is no theory with only uncountable models. This is a contradiction. But this is not the real antinomy. Solution: (1) "tells us" that S is non-countable only, if the quantifier (ER) is interpreted in such a way that is goes over all relations of N x S. I (d) 103 But if we choose a countable model for the language of our set theory, then "(ER)" will not go over all relations but only over the relations in the model. Then (1) tells us only, that S is uncountable in a relative sense of uncountable. "Finite"/"Infinite" are then relative within an axiomatic set theory. Problem: "unintended" models, that should be uncountable will "in reality" be countable. Skolem shows, that the whole use of our language (i.e. theoretical and operational conditions) will not determine the "uniquely intended interpretation". Solution: platonism: postulates "magical reference". Realism: offers no solution. I (d) 105 In the end the sentences of set theory have no fixed truth value. I (d) 116 Solution: thesis: we have to define interpretation in another way than by models.	Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Loewenheim	Quine	X 79 Validity/Sentence/Quantity/Schema/Quine: if quantities and sentences fall apart in this way, there should be a difference between these two definitions of validity (via schema with sentences) or models (with quantities). But it follows from the Loewenheim theorem that the two definitions of validity (via sentences or quantities) do not fall apart as long as the object language is not too weakly (poorly) expressive. Condition: the object language must be able to express (include) the elementary number theory. Object Language: in such a language, a scheme that remains true for all sentence implementations is also fulfilled by all models and vice versa. The demand of elementary number theory is quite weak. Def Elementary Number Theory/eZT/Quine: is about positive integers using addition, multiplication, identity, truth functions and quantification. >Number Theory/Quine. Standard Grammar/Quine: the standard grammar would express the addition, multiplication and identity functions by appropriate predicates. That is how we get the two sentences: (I) If a scheme remains true for all implentations of sentences of the elementary number theory sets, then it is fulfilled by all models. X 80 (II) If a scheme is fulfilled by each model, then e is true for all settings of sets. Quine: Sentence (I) goes back to Loewenheim 1915: Sentence of Loewenheim/Quine: every scheme that is ever fulfilled by a model is fulfilled by a model 'U,‹U,β,α...', where U contains only the positive integers. Loewenheim/Hilbert/Bernays: intensification: the quantities α, β,γ,...etc. may each be determined by a sentence of the elementary number theory: So: (A) If a scheme is fulfilled by a model at all, it is true when using sentences of the elementary number theory instead of its simple schemes. Prerequisite for the implentations: the quantifiable variables must have the positive integers in their value range. However, they may also have other values. (I) follows from (A) that: (A) is equivalent to its contraposition: if a schema is wrong in all the implementations of s of sentences of the elementary number theory, it is not fulfilled by any model. If we speak here about its negation instead of the schema, then "false₂" becomes "true" and "from no model" becomes "from every model". This gives us (I). The sentence (II) is based on the theorem of the deductive completeness of the quantifier logic. II 29 Classes: one could reinterpret all classes in its complement, "not an element of ..." - you would never notice anything! Bottom layer: each relative clause, each general term determines a class. >Classes/Quine. V 160 Loewenheim/Quine: there is no reinterpretation of characters - but rather a change of terms and domains - the meanings of the characters for truth functions and for quantifiers remain constant. The difference is not that big and can only play a role with the help of a new term: "ε" or "countable". For quantifiers and truth functions only the difference finite/infinte plays a role. Uncountable is not a matter of opinion. Solution: it is all about which term is fundamental: countable or uncountable.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Power	Republicanism	Gaus I 169 Power/Republicanism/Dagger: The law only ensures the citizen 's freedom, (...) when it is responsive to the citizenry and when the republic itself is secure and stable enough for its laws to be effective. Sustaining freedom under the rule of law thus requires not only public-spirited participation in public affairs and a willing- ness to bear the burdens of a common life - the civic virtue of the republican citizen - but also the proper form of government. This usually has been some version of mixed or balanced government, so called because it mixes and balances elements of rule by one, by the few, and by the many. >Rule of Law/Republicanism, >Freedom/Republicanism. Republic/Pocock: As J. G. A. Pocock (1975)⁽¹⁾ and others have noted, writers from Polybius and Cicero to Machiavelli and the American Founders celebrated the mixed constitution for its ability to stave off corruption and tyranny. Monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, according to these writers, are prone to degenerate into tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule, respectively; but a government that disperses power among the three elements could prevent either the one, the few, or the many from pursuing its own interest at the expense of the com- mon good. With each element holding enough power to check the others, the result should be a free, stable, and long-lasting government. Republicanism: To be sure, republicans have sometimes struggled to reconcile their faith in mixed government with their distrust or even hatred of hereditary monarchy and aristocracy. But this struggle, as in the case of the American Founders, has led to a reinterpretation of balanced government as one that relies upon the checks and balances of separated powers or functions of government. Whether mixed in the older sense or balanced in the newer, though, the point is Gaus I 170 to resist the corruption of power by preventing its concentration. 1. Pocock, J. G. A. (1975) The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Reductionism	Nagel	I 9 ff Reductionism/Nagel: (here a subjective or relativistic reinterpretation of the ratio) seems to provide a refuge from skepticism. >Skepticism. Rorty VI 144 NagelVsReductionism: one can not explain the world in purely objective concepts that would deny certain obvious phenomena. >Objectivity, >Objectivity/Nagel, >Subjectivity, >Subjectivity/Nagel.	NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Relativism	Quine	II 44 Theory: rewording: E.g. assuming, we swap electron and molecule - any empirical statement (with theoretical term) is rated opposite - solution: we mark the theoretical terms and assign them to the two theories: then no problem, no relativism. V 89 Relative Identity/Geach: (Geach, Reference and generality, p. 39f)⁽¹⁾: Identity only makes sense with regard to a general term such as "the same dog". QuineVsGeach: this certainly applies to the beginning of language learning. Identity/Showing/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in showing twice and saying, "This is the same as that". Then one could still ask. "The same what?" Example: One could have pointed once at the dog and once only at the ear. Solution: You can easily say a is identical to b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear. QuineVsGeach: this makes his relativism untenable once you get used to the identity speech. Identity/Quine: but is still relative in a deeper sense. 1. Geach, Peter T., Reference and Generality, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1962) II 44 Relativity of Theories/Quine: A theory formulation merely implies its categorical observational sentences without being implied by them. Therefore, the observation conditionals implied by two theory formulations can all be identical without the formulations implying each other. II 45 Let us assume that in a situation there is no possibility of harmonisation by reinterpretation of the terms. We would probably not know that they are empirically equivalent. Because that they are, one usually gets out by the discovery of such a reinterpretation. Nevertheless, we want to assume that they are empirically equivalent. Further assumed: all categorical observations are de facto true, although this is not known either. Further conditions for the truth of one theory or the other certainly cannot be set. Question: are they both true? Quine: I say yes. But even they can be logically incompatible despite their empirical equivalence, which raises the spectre of >cultural relativism. Because each of them is obviously only true from its point of view. QuineVsCultural Relativism: The spectre can easily be dispelled: by a step that is as trivial as the interchange of "electron" and "molecule": Since the two theoretical formulations are incompatible, they have to evaluate a certain sentence in the opposite direction. Since they are nevertheless empirically equivalent, this sentence must contain terms that are not sufficiently determined by observation criteria. Then we might as well pick out one of these terms and treat it as if it were two independent words, one belonging to one theory, the other to another. II 46 We could indicate this by the notation. By consistently maintaining this spelling, we could resolve any conflict between these theories. From then on, both could be accepted as terminologically different true descriptions of one and the same world. The threat of truth relativism has been averted. XI 121 QuineVsCultural Relativism/Lauener: is contradictory in itself.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Science	Gould	II 27 Science/media/Gould: popular representations leave a false impression when they quote extreme examples as (wrong) prime examples, exaggerate the lack of continuity in nature very much and rarely mention species in between. In any case, the greatest possible diversity is the keyword of nature. II 316ff Science/Gold: you cannot actively search for the unexpected. II 378 Science/Gould: the most disturbing facts are the individual cases. Most "classical" stories in science are wrong. IV 273 Science Theory/Gould: why was this predecessor of Darwin completely ignored? Reason: he published his discovery within a work that dealt with a completely different subject and did not pursue his own approach. He also did not generalize his principle (although it would have been correct). Gould: ideas are cheap. Everyone can have ideas, it is important to make something out of them. Darwin used his insight as a mainstay for a complete reinterpretation that could explain everything from worm to human. He made a new research program possible. >Darwinism.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Second Order Logic, HOL	Field	I 37 Second Order Logic/Second Order Logic/Higher Order Logic/HOL/Field: Here, the the quantifiers have no recursive method of evidence. >Quantifiction, >Quantifiers, >Logic, >Recursion. Quantification/Field: therefore it is vague and indeterminate, but even then applies: (A > logically true (A)) & (~ A > logically true (~ A)) is always true. The vagueness refers to the A. --- II 238 Referential indeterminacy/logical operators/2nd order Logic/Field: special case: Question: can complex logical operators - e.g., unrestricted 2nd order quantifiers ((s) via properties) have any particular truth conditions? No: e.g. everything that you express with them can be reformulated (reduced) with a more restricted quantification (via sets). It does not help to say e.g. "with "for all properties" I mean for all properties". >"Everything he said"). >Truth conditions, >Sets, >Extensions, >Extensionality. All/Field: the use of "all" without quotes is itself the subject of a reinterpretation. >All/Field. ((s) There could be a contradictory, still undiscovered property which should not be included under "all properties.") Field: E.g. Acceleration near speed of light - here the definitive operator would again help. VsDeflationism: Deflationism could simply say ".. all .. " is true iff all ... Vs: in addition one needs the definitive-operator (dft-operator), which demands conditions - but it does not specify them. Field: dito with Higher Order Quantification (HOL). --- III 39 First order Logic/2nd order/stronger/weaker/attenuation/Field: to weaken the second order logic to the 1st order, we can attenuate the second-order axioms to the axiom-schemata of first-order , namely the schema of separation. Problem: not many non-standard models come in. Namely, models in which quantities that are in reality infinite, satisfy the formula which usually defines straight finiteness. >unintended models. III 92 2nd Order Logic/Field: we have it at two places: 1. At the axiomatization of the geometry of the spacetime and at the scalar order of spacetime points we have III 93 The "complete logic of the part-whole relation", or the "complete logic of the Goodman sums". 2. The binary quantifier "less than". But we do not need this if we have Goodman's sums: Goodman's sum: it's logic is sufficient to give comparisons of powerfulness. For heuristic reasons, however, we want to keep an extra logic for powerfulness ("less than").	Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Situations	Asendorpf	Corr I 50 Situations/Psychology/Asendorpf: The definition of situations is a tricky question (Vansteenlandt and Van Mechelen 1998)⁽¹⁾. A useful distinction is made in ecological psychology between a setting of a person that is defined completely by an observer (e.g., ‘Fritz is together with his mother’), and a subjective situation that is partly defined by the person (e.g., ‘Fritz is together with his friend Hans’) (Barker 1968)⁽²⁾. Whether Hans is a friend of Fritz can ultimately be decided not by observers but only by Fritz himself. This person-dependency of the situational definition opens the door for personality influences on the very definition of a situation. For example, Sarason, Shearin, Pierce and Sarason (1987)⁽³⁾ studied the correlation between self-reported loneliness and self-reported quantity and quality of social relationships. Loneliness correlated −.28 with the number of relationships, −.53 with the number of supportive relationships, and −.63 with satisfaction with the support of others. The more subjective the definition of the relationship quality, the higher the negative correlation with loneliness. Even the correlation of −.28 with the number of relationships is confounded with an effect of loneliness on the definition of what a relationship is. Researchers can disentangle personality effects from situational effects in two main ways. A. First, they can restrict their analyses to settings that are completely defined by observers. E. g. work (Diener and Larsen 1984)⁽⁴⁾, (Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli and Morris 2002⁽⁵⁾). Corr I 51 B. Alternatively, researchers can define a situation by aggregating the subjective situation perception across all actors in the situation. See the SRM model by Kenny and colleagues >Interaction/Kenny. It requires that each situation is judged by many actors such that the influence of each judge’s personality is minimized. Traits and situations: there are three main possibilities: a) people tend to actively select (approach or avoid) situations according to their personality b) people passively evoke situations by their personality c) people manipulate (actively change or even create) situations by their personality d) situational exposure can affect personality traits over the long run.(Asendorpf and Wilpers 1998⁽⁶⁾; Lytton 1990⁽⁷⁾), 1. Vansteenlandt, K. and Van, Mechelen I. 1998. Individual differences in situation-behaviour profiles: a triple typology model, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 751–65 2. Barker, R. G. 1968. Ecological psychology: concepts and methods for studying the environment of human behaviour. Stanford University Press 3. Sarason, B. R., Shearin, E. N., Pierce, G. R. and Sarason, I. G. 1987. Interrelations of social support measures: theoretical and practical implications, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52: 813–32 4. Diener, E. and Larsen, R. J. 1984. Temporal stability and cross-situational consistency of affective, behavioural, and cognitive responses, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47: 871–83 5. Gosling, S. D., Ko, S. J., Mannarelli, T. and Morris, M. E. 2002. A room with a cue: personality judgments based on offices and bedrooms, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 82: 379–98 6. Asendorpf, J. B. and Wilpers, S. 1998. Personality effects on social relationships, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74: 1531–44 7. Lytton, H. 1990. Child and parent effects in boys’ conduct disorder: a reinterpretation, Developmental Psychology 26: 683–97 Jens B. Asendorpf, “Personality: Traits and situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Stanford Prison Experiment	Social Identity Theory	Haslam I 141 Stanford Prison Experiment/Social Identity Theory: [the theory] suggests that people do not automatically take on roles associated with group membership, but do so only when they have come to identify with the group in question (Tajfel and Turner, 1979)⁽¹⁾. For the Stanford prison experiment the theory suggests that the guards only came to identify with their role, and to define that role in brutal terms, because a tyrannical social identity was actively promoted by Zimbardo in his guard briefing. This suggests that the roles will only be accepted when they are seen as an expression of a person’s sense of self (i.e., the social identity of ‘us’). Moreover, the theory suggests that when members of a low-status group (e.g., prisoners) come to develop a sense of shared social identity this can be a basis for them to collectively resist oppression rather than just succumb to it (see Haslam and Reicher, 2012a)⁽²⁾. This leads to a reinterpretation of a number of key events in the Stanford prison experiment (SPE). 1) The prisoners only became passive because (and after) their social identity had been systematically broken down by the actions of the guards and the experimenters. 2) Among the prisoners there was also no evidence that they were overwhelmed by the context in which they found themselves such that they succumbed uncritically to the demands of their role. Indeed, on the contrary and as predicted by the Social Identity Theory (SIT), as their sense of shared identity increased they displayed increasing resistance to the guards. >Tyranny/psychological theories, >Tyranny/Reicher, >Method/Zimbardo, >Milgram Experiment, >Cooperation, >Conformity, >Obedience. 1. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’, in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33–48. 2. Haslam, S.A. and Reicher, S.D. (2012a) ‘When prisoners take over the prison: A social psychology of resistance’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 16: 152–79. S. Alexander Haslam and Stephen Reicher, „Tyranny. Revisiting Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Systems	Quine	VII (e) 91 Abbreviations/Quine: defining abbreviations are always outside of a formal system - that's why we need to get an expression in simple notation before we examine it in relation to hierarchy. IX 190 System/Quine: a new system is not introduced by new definitions, but by new distinctions. ((s) Example (s): if I always have to note "n + 1" to mark the difference between real and rational numbers, I did not eliminate the real numbers, but kept the old difference. I only changed the notation, not the ontology.) IX 232 Theory/Enlargement/Extension/System/Quine: an enlargement is not an extension! Extension: addition of axioms, can create contradictions. Magnification/Quine: means to relativize an added scheme to already existing axioms of a system, e.g. to "Uϑ", (s) so if something exists in "Uϑ", it must be a set. Such a magnification never creates a contradiction. IX 237 Theory/stronger/weaker/Quine: if a deductive system is an extension of another in the sense that its theorems include all of the other and others, then in a certain way one is stronger than the other. But this basis of comparison is weak: 1. It fails if each of the two systems has theorems that are not found in the other. (Comparability). 2. It depends on randomness of interpretation and not simply on structural properties. Example: suppose we would have exactly "=" and "R" as primitive two-digit predicates with an ordinary identity axiom and transitivity. Now we extend the system by adding the reflexivity "x(xRx)". The extended system is only stronger if we equate its "R" with the original "R". But if we reinterpret its "xRy" as "x = y v x R y" using the original "R", then all its theorems are provable in the non-extended system. (>Löwenheim, >Provability), Example (less trivial): Russell's method ((1) to (4), Chapter 35) to ensure extensionality for classes without having to accept them for attributes. Given is a set theory without extensionality. We could extend it by adding this axiom, and yet we could show that all theorems of the extended system could be reinterpreted with Russell's method as theorems already provable in the non-extended system. Stronger/weaker/Quine: a better standard for the comparison of strength is the "comparison by reinterpretation": if we can reinterpret the primitive logical signs (i.e. in set theory only "e") in such a way that all theorems of this system become translations of the theorems of the other system, then the latter system is at least as strong as the first one. IX 238 If this is not possible in the other direction, one system is stronger than the other. Def "ordinal strength"/Quine: another meaningful sense of strength of a system is the following surprising numerical measure: the smallest transfinite ordinal number, whose existence can no longer be proven in the system. Any normal set theory can, of course, prove the existence of infinitely many transfinite numbers, but that does not mean that you get them all. Transfinite/Quine: what is so characteristic about it is that we then iterate the iteration further and iterate the iteration of iterations until our apparatus somehow blocks. The smallest transfinite number after blocking the apparatus then indicates how strong the apparatus was. An axiom that can be added to a system with the visible goal of increased ordinal strength is the axiom that there is an unattainable number beyond w (omega). (End of Chapter 30). An endless series of further axioms of this kind is possible. Strength of systems/Ordinal Numbers/Quine: another possibility to use ordinal numbers for strength: we can extend the theory of cumulative types to transfinite types by accrediting to the x-th type for each ordinal number x, all classes whose elements all have a type below x. So the universe of the theory of cumulative types in chapter 38, which lacks the transfinite types, is even the ω-th type. Def "Natural Model"/Montague/Vaught/Quine: this is what they call this type, if the axioms of set theory are fulfilled, if one takes their universe as such a type. So Zermelo's set theory without infinity axiom has the ω-th type as a natural model. (We have seen this in chapter 38). So the ordinal strength of this system is at most ω, obviously not smaller. With infinity axiom: ω + ω. Strength of the system of von Neumann-Bernays: one more than the first unattainable number after w. XII 33 Object/existence/system/Quine: systematic considerations can lead us to reject certain objects XII 34 or to declare certain terms as non-referring. Occurrence: also individual occurrences of terms. This is Frege's point of view: an event can refer to something on one occasion, not on another (referential position). Example "Thomas believes that Tullius wrote the Ars Magna". In reality he confuses Tullius with Lullus.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Temperament	Psychological Theories	Corr I 177 Temperament/psychological theories/Rothbart: The Eastern European temperament tradition has its roots in Pavlov’s (1951–52)⁽¹⁾ observations of individual differences in his dogs’ behaviour in the laboratory. Pavlov linked temperamental differences among the animals (which he argued would generalize to humans) to qualities of the central nervous system, including strength of neural activation. Subsequent work by Nebylitsyn (1972)⁽²⁾ and others adapted these ideas to the study of individual differences in human adults and, although Eastern European methods changed considerably, contemporary research remains heavily influenced by Pavlov’s work (for a discussion see Strelau and Kaczmarek 2004)⁽³⁾. In contrast to Eastern European research, early studies of temperament in the West were more focused on identifying regularities in the structure of individual differences through the use of psychometric techniques. For example, in 1908 Heymans and Wiersma asked 3,000 physicians to observe a family (parents and children) and to fill out a temperament/personality questionnaire on each family member. >Personality, >Personality traits, >Extraversion, >Introversion. Corr I 178 More recently, (…) a resurgence of interest in temperament has stemmed at least in part from the realization that the parent-child influence is bidirectional, not only from parent to child but also from child to parent. Children bring much to interactions with their families (Bell 1968)⁽⁴⁾, and a large part of what they bring is related to temperament. Temperament research has also been linked to recent advances in neuroscience, with individual differences in temperament providing links to genes and neural networks, as well as to social interaction. >Interaction, >Behavior, >Social behavior. Corr I 179 Temperament/Thomas and Chess: (Thomas and Chess 1977)⁽⁵⁾: A content analysis of interview information on the first twenty-two infants yielded nine dimensions of temperamental variability: Activity Level, Rhythmicity, Approach-Withdrawal, Adaptability, Threshold, Intensity, Mood, Distractibility and Attention Span-Persistence. The goals of the New York Longitudinal Study (NYLS) were chiefly clinical, and no attempt was made to conceptually distinguish these dimensions from one another. As a result of more recent research, however, major revisions to the NYLS list have been proposed (Rothbart and Bates 2006)⁽⁶⁾. See >Temperament/Rothbart, >M.K. Rothbart. 1. Pavlov, I. P. 1951–52. Complete works, 2nd edn. Moscow: SSSR Academy of Sciences 2. Nebylitsyn, V. D. 1972. Fundamental properties of the human nervous system. New York: Plenum 3. Strelau, J. and Kaczmarek, M. 2004. Warsaw studies on sensation seeking, in R. M. Stelmack (ed.), On the psychobiology of personality: essays in honor of Marvin Zuckerman, pp. 29–45. New York: Elsevier 4. Bell, R. Q. 1968. A reinterpretation of the direction of effects in studies of socialization, Psychological Review 75: 81–95 5. Thomas, A. and Chess, S. 1977. Temperament and development. New York: Brunner/Mazel 6. Rothbart, M. K., and Bates, J. E. 2006. Temperament in children’s development, in W. Damon and R. Lerner (Series eds.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional, and personality development, 6th edn, pp. 99–166. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Mary K. Rothbart, Brad E. Sheese and Elisabeth D. Conradt, “Childhood temperament” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Theories	Quine	I 34 Theory does not have to be based on intention, it was internalized in the past. I 56 QuineVsVerification: it is pointless to equate a sentence within the theory with one outside - Inter-theoretically no meaning - no additions with "or" ((s) Cf. Goodman, Davidson, "fake theories"). >Verification, >Additional hypotheses. I 57 For the time being, we retain our beliefs in theory creation. I 74 Basics for a theory: Carnap: terms - Quine: sentences. I 393 Theory is only predication, universal quantification, truth function (for derived properties) - general term (for primary properties) - (no "because"). I 429 Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: behavior in every case more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore it is acceptable - but not allowed in ontology - unlike geometric object: Position of mass points made no sense - therefore no individuation - no identity. (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960⁽¹⁾, §52.) I 431 Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically - like Church: "true in a higher sense" - sometimes acceptable. I 432 Theory: Structure of meaning, not choice of objects (Ramsey, Russell) Quine: new: even with physical objects they are also theoretical. Reason: sentences are semantically primary. >Frege principle. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press --- II 45 Equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation - both true - but possibly logically incompatible. --- VI 134 Theory/Empirically equivalent/logically equivalent/Quine: Two theories can be logically incompatible and yet empirically equivalent. E.g. Riemann/Euclidean geometry. Case 1: even untransformable theories (in the same terminology, where each implies certain sentences that the other one does not imply) are empirically equivalent - no problem. Case 2: additional theoretical terms Case 3: logically incompatible. Davidson: can be traced back to case 2 - because contentious sentences depend on theoretical terms which are not empirical - therefore they are still empirically equivalent. Solution: theoretical term in question in two spellings (according to theory) - that makes them logically compatible. >Theoretical terms. VI 136 Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Case 2: (theory for global worlds without context embedding): solution: eliminate exotic terms (without predictive power) Important argument: then it is about consistency (otherwise QuineVsConsistency theory). Elimination: justified by the fact that we have no other access to the truth except our own theory. >Elimination. VI 139 Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Variant/Davidson: Both theories are valid, truth predicate: in comprehensive, neutral language. QuineVsDavidson: how much further should the variables reach then? - We need a stop, because we do not want a third theory - "everything different"/Important argument: the two systems definitely describe the same world - purely verbal question. --- XII 70 Theory form/Quine: after abstraction of the meanings of the non-logical vocabulary and the value range of the variables - reinterpretation of the theory form provides models. >Vocabulary, >Reinterpretation, >Abstraction, >Models.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Translation	Quine	Rorty I 217 Quine: indeterminacy of translation: we look at the totality of truths about nature, also unknown and unobservable as well as future truths. My thesis is that the indeterminacy of translation even resists all of these truths, the whole truth about nature. There is not really a question of making the right choice. Also within the allotted choices under determination any theory about nature has no objective fact. >Indeterminacy, >Facts, >Objectivity, >Theories. VsQuine: Many critics believe this is a remnant of traditional empiricism (Chomsky). PutnamVsQuine: why should we not just say: translation in accordance with those manuals that have this property? This is a variant of essentialism: according to which we know from the outset that something that cannot be packed into the vocabulary of the physics of the day is so insignificant that it merely exists "in the eyes of the affected person". (subjective convenience). Quine I 90 Stimulus meaning/SM: objective reality that the linguist needs - translation, not identity but approaching stimulus meaning. I 81 Translation: is independent of stimulus meaning. E. g. "soltero" = "Bachelor" not because of a particular face. - But words are learned first through stimulus meaning, later through abstraction. I 117 Truth of categorical sentences depends on the object. - Our special denoting apparatus. - But stimulus meaning is similar for natives. - Goodman’s individuals calculus is translatable as syllogistic. I 129ff Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunctions, negatives, alterations) - Identifiable: stimulus analytical sentences, stimulus synonymous occasion sentences of natives - untranslatable: stimulus synonymous occasion sentences. I 368 Animal: for them fear is equivalent to an English sentence. - Church: but this sentence has many different possible translations. I 431 Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically. - That is like some sentences used in Church: "true in a higher sense". - Quine: Sometimes that is acceptable. --- II 34 Permutation: is possible if sentence-by-sentence structure is maintained. II 37 Actual: radical translation: no fact decides which of the two translation manuals is right - Actual ontologically, naturalistically - neither transcendental nor epistemological. - Physical conditions, not empirical skills are decisive. - Reinterpretation is possible only for others, not for ourselves. - Factuality like gravity, inherent to our nature. >Radical interpretation. II 61 ff Cognitive synonymy: various points in time, individual > Community > substitutability of words - same verdicts. - But this does not hold for translation. >Synonymy. --- VII (c) 60f Translation/Quine: (early): a) link a sound sequence to the circumstances - b) a synonymy of this sound sequence with English sound sequence that is associated with similar circumstances, assume - problem: the relevant properties of the circumstances are hidden in the person of the speaker (>Gavagai). Cassirer/Whorf/Quine: language inseparable from the rest of the world - differences correspond with circumstances of the form of life - Morning Star can still be a good translation of the Evening Star. - We confuse meaning and reference, because we are used to pointing to things - problem: during work alienation from direct reports, thus the clarity of potential conflicts decreases.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Truth Predicate	Davidson	Rorty VI 20 "True"/Davidson: "true" is not a name of a relationship between language statements and the world. In other words: the expression "true" should neither be analyzed nor defined. There is no thing that makes sentences and theories true. >Truthmakers. "True" is not synonymous with anything at all. Neither with "justified according to our knowledge", nor with "justified by the circumstances in the world". --- Glüer II 27 Truth-Predicate/Tarski: Problem: DavidsonVsTarski: object language and meta language should contain the predicate true. >Expressiveness, >Object language, >Metalanguage, >Truth theory. The truth predicate defined in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language. Solution/Davidson: does not set up a truth definition at all. Instead: Truth Theory/Davidson: Reinterpretation of the convention truth as a criterion of appropriateness for truth-theories of natural languages. Glüer II 28 Truth-Predicate/Tarski: any predicate that delivers correct translations is a truth-predicate. - This presupposes meaning in order to explicate truth. Glüer II Truth-predicate/TarskiVsDavidson: provides a structural description of a language whose translation is known. - The truth-predicate does not contribute to the truth theory. - It is not interpreted in Tarski. - ((s) we do not know what truth is - Truth-Predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: is interpreted a priori.) - ((s) we already know what truth is.) - Definition interpreted/(s): know what a word means. Rorty IV 22 True/Davidson/Rorty: does not correspond to any relationship between linguistic expressions and the world. - No correspondence. Cf. >Correspondence theory.	Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Boyd, R.	Putnam Vs Boyd, R.	Williams II 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far: Williams II 493 Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods. Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodological principles likewise. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts". Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the >theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way". Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation. Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here. Ad. 3) Vs: Williams II 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept. BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism. Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept. Putnam I (c) 80 Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976). Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer (2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises). I (c) 81 Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained. Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true. Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case. PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1! I (c) 82 Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether. With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference. I (c) 85/86 Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations: I (c) 86 Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements: p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable "~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p). "p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q "p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this). I (c) 87 Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement. Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all. We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically: ~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist) u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist) p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist) p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist) So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.) The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)). E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false. Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!).	Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Constructivism	Russell Vs Constructivism	Quine IX 184 VsConstructivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen how Russell's constructivist access to the real numbers failed (least upper bound (Kos), see above). He gave up the constructivism and took refuge in the reducibility axiom (RA). --- IX 184/185 The way he gave it up, had something perverse in it: Reducibility axiom/QuineVsRussell: the reducibility axiom implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation, are superfluous. When Russell's system is consistent with reducibility axioms, then no contradictions will arise if we ignore all orders except the predicative. We can determine that the order of each attribute is always the next highest in comparison to the order of things that have this attribute, according to intensional relations. If somehow an attribute of the order n + k is referred to, which is an attribute of objects of the order n, so we need this name only as such, which is based on a systematic reinterpretation that refers to an attribute of the order n + 1 with the same extension. According to intensional relations. Reducibility Axiom: tells us that an equal-extensional attribute or equal-extensional intensional relation of the desired order, and namely in predicative execution, always exists. Is the axiom planned from the outset, so you should avoid its necessity in that we speak in the beginning only of types of attributes instead of orders of any distinctive sense. Orders are only excusable if one wants to maintain a weak constructive theory without reducibility axiom. ((s)Axiom/Quine/(s): should not be taken as necessary)	Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Cresswell, M.J.	Hintikka Vs Cresswell, M.J.	Cresswell I 158 Game-Theoretical Semantics/GTS/Game Theory/Hintikka/Terminology/Cresswell: is actually not important for my purposes. I 159 HintikkaVsCresswell: Vs use of higher order entities. ((s) instead of 2nd order logic and instead branching quantifiers in order to re-establish compositionality). (Hintikka 1983, 281-285). CresswellVsHintikka/CresswellVsGame-Theoretical Semantics: 1) quantifies over higher-order entities itself, namely strategies! In particular, in the truth conditions for sentences like (28), despite Hintikka’s assertion that branched quantifiers would only mention individuals. (p 282). CresswellVsHintikka: 2) Def Truth/Game-Theoretical Semantics/Hintikka: consists in the existence of a winning strategy. If we formalize (x)(Ey)Fxy as Ef(x)Fxf(x), we are not involved in a move! Move/Game Theory/Hintikka/Cresswell: consists of a single specific choice of nature of x and then a specific choice by me. Sentence Meaning/CresswellVsHintikka: Important argument: then a single game can define the sentence meaning, and not represent how the speaker deals with it or represents its meaning. Hintikka II 63 Logical Omniscience/Semantics of Possible Worlds/Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: the problem does not occur here! E.g. (1) A sentence of the form "a knows that p" is true in a possible world W iff. p is true in all a-alternatives. I.e. in all possible worlds that are compatible with the knowledge of a. logical omniscience: its failure can be formulated as follows: (2) There is a, p and q so that a knows that p, p logically implies q, but a does not know that q. logical truth: is then model-theoretically analyzed: (3) A sentence is logically true, iff it is true in every logically possible world. Problem: (1) - (3) are incompatible! However, they are not incompatible yet in the above given shape, but only with the additional assumption: (4) Every epistemically possible world is logically possible. II 64 Problem: now it may be that in an epistemic a-alternative W’q is false! Problem: according to (4), these epistemic worlds are also logically possible. Following the logical truth of (p>q) ((s) in this example) q must be true in any logically possible world. This creates the contradiction. Solution: different authors have different responds: Positivism: takes refuge in the non-informative of (tautological) logical truth. HintikkaVs: instead: possible world semantics. (4): already presumes omniscience! It assumes that a can already eliminate only apparent options. This is circular. Solution: There may be possibilities that only appear to be possible, but contain hidden contradictions. II 65 Problem: the problem here is therefore (4) and not (2)! Solution/Hintikka: we must allow possible worlds which are logically impossible, but nevertheless epistemically possible ((s) other than the impossible worlds that are being discussed in Stalnaker and Cresswell. Then (1)-(3) can be true together, i.e. can in an epistemic possible world (p > q) can fail. Impossible World/Hintikka: Problem: how we can allow it. Impossible World/Cresswell/Hintikka: suggests a reinterpretation of the logical constants (model-theorically). HintikkaVsCresswell: the real problem with omniscience is that people do not recognize all the logical consequences of their knowledge and that takes place in classical logic. Non-standard logic: goes past the problem. One could say that it destroys the problem instead of solving it.	Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Frege, G.	Waismann Vs Frege, G.	Waismann I 77 Frege: Definition of the number in two steps a) when two sets are equal. b) Definition of the term "number": it is equal if each element of one set corresponds to one element of the other set. Unique relation. Under Def "Number of a Set"/Frege: he understands the set of all sets equal to it. Example: the number 5 is the totality of all classes of five in the world. VsFrege: how shall we determine that two sets are equal? Apparently by showing such a relation. For example, if you have to distribute spoons on cups, then the relation did not exist before. As long as the spoons were not on the cups, the sets were not equal. However, this does not correspond to the sense in which the word equal is used. So it is about whether you can put the spoons on the cups. But what does "can" mean? I 78 That the same number of copies are available. Not the assignment determines the equivalence, but vice versa. The proposed definition gives a necessary, but not sufficient condition for equal numbers and defines the expression "equal number" too narrowly. Class: List ("school class") logical or term (mammals) empirical. With two lists it is neither emopirical nor logical to say that they can be assigned to each other. Example 1. Are there as many people in this room as in the next room? An experiment provides the answer. 2. Are 3x4 cups equal to 12 spoons? You can answer this by drawing lines, which is not an experiment, but a process in a calculus. According to Frege, two sets are not equal if the relation is not established. You have defined something, but not the term "equal numbered". You can extend the definition by saying that they can be assigned. But again this is not correct. For if the two sets are given by their properties, it always makes sense to assert their "being-assignment", (but this has a different meaning, depending on the criterion by which one recognizes the possibility of assignment: that the two are equal, or that it should make sense to speak of an assignment! In fact, we use the word "equal" according to different criteria: of which Frege emphasizes only one and makes it a paradigm. Example 1. If there are 3 cups and 3 spoons on the table, you can see at a glance how they can be assigned. I 79 2. If the number cannot be overlooked, but it is arranged in a clear form, e.g. square or diamond, the equal numbers are obvious again. 3. The case is different, if we notice something of two pentagons, that they have the same number of diagonals. Here we no longer understand the grouping directly, it is rather a theorem of geometry. 4. Equal numbers with unambiguous assignability 5. The normal criterion of equality of numbers is counting (which must not be understood as the representation of two sets by a relation). WaismannVsFrege: Frege's definition does not reflect this different and flexible use. I 80 This leads to strange consequences: According to Frege, two sets must necessarily be equal or not for logical reasons. For example, suppose the starlit sky: Someone says: "I don't know how many I've seen, but it must have been a certain number". How do I distinguish this statement from "I have seen many stars"? (It is about the number of stars seen, not the number of stars present). If I could go back to the situation, I could recount it. But that is not possible. There is no way to determine the number, and thus the number loses its meaning. For example, you could also see things differently: you can still count a small number of stars, about 5. Here we have a new series of numbers: 1,2,3,4,5, many. This is a series that some primitive peoples really use. It is not at all incomplete, and we are not in possession of a more complete one, but only a more complicated one, beside which the primitive one rightly exists. You can also add and multiply in this row and do so with full rigor. Assuming that the things of the world would float like drops to us, then this series of numbers would be quite appropriate. For example, suppose we should count things that disappear again during counting or others emerge. Such experiences would steer our concept formation in completely different ways. Perhaps words such as "much", "little", etc. would take the place of our number words. I 80/81 VsFrege: his definition misses all that. According to it, two sets are logically necessary and equal in number, without knowledge, or they are not. In the same way, Einstein had argued that two events are simultaneous, independent of observation. But this is not the case, but the sense of a statement is exhausted in the way of its verification (also Dummett) Waismann: So you have to pay attention to the procedure for establishing equality in numbers, and that's much more complicated than Frege said. Frege: second part of the definition of numbers: Def Number/Frege: is a class of classes. ((s) Elsewhere: so not by Frege! FregeVs!). Example: the term "apple lying on the table comes to the number 3". Or: the class of apples lying on the table is an element of class 3. This has the great advantage of evidence: namely that the number is not expressed by things, but by the term. WaismannVsFrege: But does this do justice to the actual use of the number words? Example: in the command "3 apples!" the number word certainly has no other meaning, but after Frege this command can no longer be interpreted according to the same scheme. It does not mean that the class of apples to be fetched is an element of class 3. Because this is a statement, and our language does not know it. WaismannVsFrege: its definition ties the concept of numbers unnecessarily to the subject predicate form of our sentences. In fact, it results the meaning of the word "3" from the way it is used (Wittgenstein). RussellVsFrege: E.g. assuming there were exactly 9 individuals in the world. Then we could define the cardinal numbers from 0 to 9, but the 10, defined as 9+1, would be the zero class. Consequently, the 10 and all subsequent natural numbers will be identical, all = 0. To avoid this, an additional axiom would have to be introduced, the Def "infinity axiom"/Russell: means that there is a type to which infinitely many individuals belong. This is a statement about the world, and the structure of all arithmetic depends essentially on the truth of this axiom. Everyone will now be eager to know if the infinity axiom is true. We must reply: we do not know. It is constructed in a way that it eludes any examination. But then we must admit that its acceptance has no meaning. I 82 Nor does it help that one takes the "axiom of infinity" as a condition of mathematics, because in this way one does not win mathematics as it actually exists: The set of fractions is dense everywhere, but not: The set of fractions is dense everywhere if the infinity axiom applies. That would be an artificial reinterpretation, only conceived to uphold the doctrine that numbers are made up of real classes in the world (VsFrege: but only conditionally, because Frege does not speak of classes in the world). Waismann I 85 The error of logic was that it believed it had firmly underpinned arithmetic. Frege: "The foundation stones, fixed in an eternal ground, are floodable by our thinking, but not movable." WaismannVsFrege: only the expression "justify" the arithmetic gives us a wrong picture, I 86 as if its building were built on basic truths, while she is a calculus that proceeds only from certain determinations, free-floating, like the solar system that rests on nothing. We can only describe arithmetic, i.e. give its rules, not justify them. Waismann I 163 The individual numerical terms form a family. There are family similarities. Question: are they invented or discovered? We reject the notion that the rules follow from the meaning of the signs. Let us look at Frege's arguments. (WaismannVsFrege) II 164 1. Arithmetic can be seen as a game with signs, but then the real meaning of the whole is lost. If I set up calculation rules, did I then communicate the "sense" of the "="? Or just a mechanical instruction to use the sign? But probably the latter. But then the most important thing of arithmetic is lost, the meaning that is expressed in the signs. (VsHilbert) Waismann: Assuming this is the case, why do we not describe the mental process right away? But I will answer with an explanation of the signs and not with a description of my mental state, if one asks me what 1+1 = 2 means. If one says, I know what the sign of equality means, e.g. in addition, square equations, etc. then one has given several answers. The justified core of Frege's critique: if one considers only the formulaic side of arithmetic and disregards the application, one gets a mere game. But what is missing here is not the process of understanding, but interpretation! I 165 For example, if I teach a child not only the formulas but also the translations into the word-language, does it only make mechanical use? Certainly not. 2. Argument: So it is the application that distinguishes arithmetic from a mere game. Frege: "Without a content of thought an application will not be possible either. WaismannVsFrege: Suppose you found a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is for pleasure only. Would it not express a thought anymore? Why cannot one make use of a chess position? Because it does not express thoughts. WaismannVsFrege: Let us say you find a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is just for fun. Would it notexpress a thought anymore? Chess: it is premature to say that a chess position does not express thoughts. Waismann brings. For example figures stand for troops. But that could just mean that the pieces first have to be turned into signs of something. I 166 Only if one has proved that there is one and only one object of the property, one is entitled to occupy it with the proper name "zero". It is impossible to create zero. A >sign must designate something, otherwise it is only printer's ink. WaismannVsFrege: we do not want to deny or admit the latter. But what is the point of this assertion? It is clear that numbers are not the same as signs we write on paper. They only become what they are through use. But Frege rather means: that the numbers are already there somehow before, that the discovery of the imaginary numbers is similar to that of a distant continent. I 167 Meaning/Frege: in order not to be ink blotches, the characters must have a meaning. And this exists independently of the characters. WaismannVsFrege: the meaning is the use, and what we command.	Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976
Hilbert	Verschiedene Vs Hilbert	Berka I 414 Problem: the number of conclusions is completely incalculable. Solution/Hilbert: the process of following (logical inference) has to be formalized itself. This, however, removes all content from the closing process. Problem: now one can no longer say that a theory is about natural numbers, for example. Formalism/Schröter: after that mathematics is no longer about objects, which refer to a real or an ideal world, but only about certain signs, resp. their transformations, which are done according to certain rules. WeylVsHilbert: this makes a reinterpretation of the whole mathematics necessary. Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 29 Donkey Sentences/Epsilon Analysis/Heusinger: Thesis: that certain and indefinite nominal phrases are context-dependent. I 30 The epsilon operator EO represents NP and anaphora as context-dependent selection functions - classic: by Hilbert. VsHilbert: too inflexible - modified: represents the progress of information - modified EO: selects a certain object in a certain situation. I 36 Modified Epsilon Operator/situation/Egli/Heusinger: (Egli 1991, Heusinger 1992,1993), Van der Does 1993) the epsilon operator receives a parameter for the situation. Selection function/VsHilbert/Heusinger: Problem: the selection principle does not say which element is selected. ((s) it means only afterwards: "the selected element"). Problem: with an ordered range like the numbers this can be the smallest. The linguistic range lacks such an order. Order/Language/Linguistic/Lewis: Solution: Def "Salience Hierarchy"/Lewis: (Lewis 1979) (s): contextual or situational outline of a given linguistic area. (salient. = outstanding). Selection function/Heusinger: so we have to assume a whole family of selection functions. I.e. not from a selection function defined by the model M. Salience Hierarchy/Epsilon operator/Egli/Heusinger: the salience hierarchy is represented by modified epsilon expressions. Index i/Spelling mode/Heusinger: represents the respective selection function here: For example, eix Fx refers to the most salient (outstanding) object in context i that has the property F. Unambiguity/Situation/Heusinger: the modified epsilon operator always specifies a certain object. Context/Sincerity/Heusinger: in changing contexts different objects can be selected. Solution/Heusinger: 1. the individual range of a model M must be extended by the range of indices I. The individual range of a model M must be extended by the range of indices I. 2. the function F is added to model M itself.	Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Realism	Putnam Vs Realism	I (c) 96/97 Realism/Putnam: argues ultimately that science should be taken "at face value", given the failure of all serious programs by philosophical reinterpretation of sciences without philosophical reinterpretation and that science, "taken at face value" implies realism. Realism is sort of "scientific theory of science". VsRealism: could be cited (in the absence of convergence) at the most that the realism would be refuted diachronically. --- I (i) 243 PutnamVsRelativism/PutnamVsRealism: both claim at the same time to be able to exist inside and outside the language. The Realism thus does not refute itself because it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But Relativism refutes itself with that. I (i) 249 PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism: both see the world as a product Realism: the world is a product ex nihilo. Relativism: product of our culture. Putnam: but the world is not a "product", it is only the world.	SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Mathematics	Putnam, H.	Field II 319 Putnam: Thesis: there are many properties and relations in which these mathematical entities can stand to each other. And there is not much to say about what such properties and relations for which we use our mathematical predicates should stand, apart from making the mathematical propositions we accept true. II 321 Truth/Mathematics/Putnam: Thesis: Truth is too easy to attain ((s) by reinterpretation) to limit our choice of axioms. (However, only as long as there are (infinitely many) mathematical objects). II 328 Usefulness/truth/mathematics/Putnam/Field: (Putnam 1971 locus classicus, unlike 1980): Thesis: We must regard mathematics as true in order to be able to explain its usefulness in other fields. E.g. in science and meta logic. (i.e. the theory of the logical sequence). Modality/modal/mathematics/Field: this contrasts with his earlier view that we can use modality instead of mathematical objects to explain mathematical truth. II 329 Modal explanation: will not work for other disciplines like physics. (FieldVsPutnam, Field 1989/91: 252-69). Putnam/Field: the general form of its argument goes like this: (i) we must speak in terms of mathematical entities in order to practice science, meta logic, etc.. (ii) if we need them for such important purposes, we have reason to believe that this kind of entities exists. VsPutnam/Field: ... +	Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994