Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 35 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capabilities | Sen | Brocker I 890 Skills/Sen: in order to revive a qualitatively oriented economic science, the distinction between "capabilities" and "functionings" must be introduced. Functions/Sen: The term 'functions' [...] reflects the various things a person likes to do or likes to be. The desirable functions may range from elementary conditions such as adequate nutrition or freedom from avoidable diseases to very complex activities or personal states such as being able to participate in community life and having self-respect. A person's 'chances of realization' refer to the possible connections of the functions he or she is able to perform. I 891 Def Realization Chances/Sen: (=abilities): are thus expressions of freedom: namely the [...] [essential] freedom to realize alternative combinations of functions (or, expressed less formally, the freedom to realize different lifestyles).(1) For Sen, the idea of "essential freedom" includes in particular the "procedural freedom" to define the concrete freedoms and opportunities that a community seeks to grant its members. (cf. (2)) >Freedom/Sen. I 892 Sen: the political dispute over the respective situation-appropriate definition of basic economic needs must not be avoided, but should be sought, because it creates the epistemic and political conditions necessary for their realization.(3) 1. Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen. Wege zu Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität in der Marktwirtschaft, München 2000, p. 95 2. B. Giovanola »Personhood and Human Richness. Good and Well-Being in the Capability Approach and Beyond«, in: Review of Social Economy 63/2, 2005, 249-267. 3. Sen 2000, p. 182 Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Classification | Lévi-Strauss | I 28 Classification/Lévi Strauss: classification, even if it is uneven and arbitrary, preserves the richness and diversity of what it captures. By determining that everything has to be taken into account, it facilitates the formation of a "memory". ((s)VsLévi-Strauss: that seems illogical. I 74 Classification/Lévi-Strauss: the principle of classification can never be postulated. It can only be revealed a posteriori. I 75 For example: the tribe of the Osage connects the eagle in this way: eagle - lightning - fire - coal - earth. The eagle, as one of the "masters of coal", is an "earth" animal. I 159 All classification areas have a common trait: whatever the society studied may show, it must allow and even imply the possible recourse to other areas which are analogous to a formal point of view from the privileged area and differ only in their relative position within a comprehensive frame of reference that works with the help of a contrasting pair: general and specific on the one hand, nature and culture on the other. >Order/Lévi-Strauss, >Natural kind/Lévi-Strauss, >System/Lévi-Strauss, >Nature/Lévi-Strauss. |
LevSt I Claude Lévi-Strauss La pensée sauvage, Paris 1962 German Edition: Das Wilde Denken Frankfurt/M. 1973 LevSt II C. Levi-Strauss The Savage Mind (The Nature of Human Society Series) Chicago 1966 |
| Communication | Minsky | nsky I 64 Communication/Minsky: If every mind builds somewhat different things inside itself, how can any mind communicate with a different mind? In the end, surely, communication is a matter of degree but it is not always lamentable when different minds don't understand each other perfectly. For then, provided some communication remains, we can share the richness of each other's thoughts. Understanding/Minsky: The secret of what anything means to us depends on how we've connected it to all the other things we know. That's why it's almost always wrong to seek the real meaning of anything. A thing with just one meaning has scarcely any meaning at all. >Thinking/Minsky, >Meaning/Minsky. Minsky I 67 If agents can't communicate, how is it that people can — in spite of having such different backgrounds, thoughts, and purposes? The answer is that we overestimate how much we actually communicate. Instead, despite those seemingly important differences, much of what we do is based on common knowledge and experience. So even though we can scarcely speak at all about what happens in our lower-level mental processes, we can exploit their common heritage. Internal communication/computers/Minsky: The words and symbols we use to summarize our higher-level goals and plans are not the same as the signals used to control lower-level ones. So when our higher-level agencies attempt to probe into the fine details of the lower-level submachines that they exploit, they cannot understand what's happening. This must be why our language-agencies cannot express such things as how we balance on our bicycles, distinguish pictures from real things, or fetch our facts from memory. Cf. >Translation/Minsky. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Compactness | Logic Texts | Read III 59 Compactness: the classic logical conclusion is compact. To understand this, we must acknowledge that the set of premises can be infinite. Classically, every logical truth (of which there are infinite numbers) is a conclusion from any statement. This can be multiplied, by double negation, the conjunction of itself with its double negation, and so on. III 60 The classical compactness does not mean that a conclusion cannot have an infinite number of premises, it can. But classically it is valid exactly when the conclusion follows from a finite subset of the premises. Compactness limits the expressiveness of a logic. Proof: is performed purely syntactically. In itself, the proof has no meaning. Its correctness is defined based on its form and structure. >Proof. III 61 The counterpart of proof is completeness: there should be a derivation. >Incompleteness/logic texts. III 61 The Omega rule (>Incompleteness/logic texts) is not accepted as a rule of orthodox, classical proof theory. How can I do this? According to classical representation, a rule is valid if the premises are true and the conclusion is false by no interpretation over any range of definition. How can the premises A(0),A(1) etc. was, but be false for each n,A(n)? III 61/62 The explanation lies in the limitation of the expressiveness. In non-compact logic, there may be a categorical set of formulas for arithmetic, but the proof methods require compactness. For expressiveness: >Richness, >Meta language, >Object language. Difference compact/non compact: classical logic is a 1st order logic. A categorical set of axioms for arithmetic must be a second order logic. ((s) quantifiers also for properties). >Quantifier, cf. >Schematic letters. For example, Napoleon had all the properties of a great general: "for every quality f, if for every person x, if x was a great general, then x had f, then Napoleon had f". In reality it is a little more subtle. For syntactically one cannot distinguish whether a formula is like the 1st or 2nd level above. >2nd order logic. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Content | Brandom | I 139ff Content/Brandom: any content is derived from the content of possible judgments. >Judgments. I 145 Semantic content: role in the determination of accuracies practice - basis: inferential relations - those who have content are subject to standards - Frege: Concepts from judgments. I 150f Content/Brandom: must not presume concepts and semantic content - there is a reaction without content: E.g. iron rusts in wet conditions - solution: inferential role - e.g. measurements: an instrument has no concepts. >Semantic content, >Conceptual content, >Inferential role. I 316 Circumstances/Content/Brandom: what the interpreter considers to be the circumstances is an essential feature of the empirical content. I 479 Content/Brandom: must specify the circumstances in the context under which a person is entitled to a definition - content by accuracy of inferences: three problems: 1) functional links do not only exist intra-linguistically, but also with the world - 2) Sentences often have significant portions expressing no parts which do not expres propositions - 3) Representational vocabulary is also used in analysis (> reference/Brandom). I 530 Content/Brandom: of an expression is determined by the set of SMSICs that regulate the substitution inferences (richness) - new vocabulary must be joined with the old vocabulary by SMSICs. >SMSICs. I 566 Content/Brandom (of sentences): the explicit expression of the relations between sentences, which are partly constitutive for sentences to be full of content, can be considered the content of sentences - the contents that are transmitted to the sentences through practices of community, are systematically intertwined with each other in a way that they can be considered to be products of those contents which are connected to the subsentential expressions. >Subsententials. I 658 Content/Brandom: assertions are expressed, therefore sentences are full of propositional content - subsentential expressions are indirectly full of inferential content thanks to their significance through substitution - unrepeatable Tokenings are embedded in substitutional inferences and thus indirectly inferentially contentful thanks to their connection to other Tokenings in a recurrent structure (inheritance). I 664 Content: there must be at least one context in which the addition of an assertion has nontrivial consequences. --- II 13 Content/Brandom: is explained by the act and not vice versa. >Actions. II 35 Content/Brandom: non-inferential circumstances: (perception circumstances) are a crucial element of the content of a concept such as red - further content approves the inference from the circumstances to the consequences of using it appropriately, regardless of whether those circumstances are themselves specified in narrowly defined inferential concepts. --- I 698 Content/Action/Brandom: states and actions, as premises and conclusions, obtain content by being embedded in consequences and inferences (instead of representation). I 662 Definition content/equality/Frege : "Two judgements have the same content if and only if the conclusions that can be drawn from one in connection with various others, always also follow from the other in connection with the same other judgements". BrandomVsFrege: this is a universal quantification via auxiliary hypotheses - such a requirement would erase the differences, because such a quantity could always be found: according to Frege, any two judgements have the same consequences if they are connected with a contradiction. >Implication paradox. I 731 Narrow/Content/BrandomVs: (depends only on the individual): coherent history barely possible which only considers one individual - furthermore, the stories of similar individuals should be the same - but different context always possible. >wide/narrow content. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Evolution | Gould | Dennett I 412 Evolution/Gould theory: the key difference in evolution is not simple adaptation but speciation. (DennettVs). Gould: thesis: species are fragile but have unalterable structures. There are no improvements in species, only closed discarding. Correct level: the correct level are not the genes but entire species or clades. Species/Gould/(s): species are not going to be improved, but discarded. Level/explanation/Dennett: as software/hardware: some is better explained on one level, others is better explained on a different level. >Explanation, >Darwinism. Gould I 88ff Evolution/Darwinism/individual/Gould: individuals do not develop evolutionary, they can only grow, reproduce and die. Evolutionary changes occur in groups of interacting organisms. Species are the units of evolution. Orthodox Darwinism/Gould: thesis: gene mutate, individuals are subject to selection and species evolve evolutionary. I 131 Evolution/Gould: Thesis: I do not imagine evolution as a ladder, but rather in the form of a shrub with many branches. Therefore: the more species the better. I 133 The importance of this point can be seen in the development of molecules. The number of differences between amino acids clearly correlates with the time since the diversion of development lines. The longer the separation, the greater the differences. This is how a molecular clock was developed. The Darwinians were generally surprised by the regularity of this clock. After all, the selection should proceed at a noticeably different speed for the different development lines at different times. I 134 VsDarwinism: the Darwinists are actually forced to contemplate that the regular molecular clock represents an evolution that is not subject to selection, but to the random fixation of neutral mutations. We have never been able to separate ourselves from the concept of the evolution of the human being, which puts the brain in the centre of attention. The Australopithecus afarensis disproved what had been predicted by astute evolutionary theorists such as Ernst Haeckel and Friedrich Engels. Tradition: general view: that the upright gait represented an easily attainable gradual development, and the increase in brain volume represented a surprisingly rapid leap. I 136 GouldVs: I would like to take the opposite view: in my opinion, the upright gait is a surprise, a difficult event to achieve, a rapid and fundamental transformation of our anatomy. In anatomical terms, the subsequent enlargement of our brain is a secondary epiphenomenon, a simple transition embedded in the general pattern of human evolution. Bipedality is not an easy achievement, it represents a fundamental transformation of our anatomy, especially of the feet and pelvis. I 191 Evolution/Gould: evolution essentially proceeds in two ways: a) Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. This is because a phyletic transformation does not lead to an increase in diversity and variety, only to a transformation from one state to another. Now that extinction (by eradication) is so widespread, everything that does not have the ability to adapt would soon be destroyed. b) Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. Large stable central populations have a strong homogenizing influence. New mutations are impaired by the strong previous forms: they may slowly increase in frequency, but a changed environment usually reduces their selective value long before they can assert themselves. Thus, a phyletic transformation of the large populations should be very rare, as the fossil finds prove. It looks different in the periphery: isolated small populations here are much more exposed to the selection pressure, because the periphery marks the limit of the ecological tolerance of the previous living beings. I 266 Evolution/Biology/Gould: evolution proceeds by replacing the nucleotides. II 243 Evolution/Gould: thesis: evolution has no tendency. II 331 Evolution/Gould: official definition of evolution/Gould: evolution is the "change of gene frequencies in populations". (The process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency is called definition "genetic drift".) The new theory of neutralism suggests that many, if not most, genes in individual populations owe their frequency primarily to chance. IV 199 Evolution/species richness: the change from a few species and many groups to a few groups and many species would occur even in the case of purely coincidental extinction if every speciation process at the beginning of life's history had been accompanied by average major changes. IV 221 Evolution/Gould: pre-evolutionary theory: a pre-evolutionary theory is "the chain of being": it is the old idea that every organism is a link. It confuses evolution with higher development and has been misinterpreted as a primitive form of evolution, but has nothing to do with it! The thesis is emphatically antievolutionary. Problem: there are no links between vertebrates and invertebrates IV 223 Intermediate form: the theory assumed asbestos as an intermediate form between minerals and plants due to the fibrous structure. Hydra and corals were seen as an intermediate form between plants and animals. (Today: both are animals of course.) Absurd: it is absurd to assume a similarity between plants and baboons, because plants lose their leaves and baboon babies lose their hair. IV 346 Evolution/Gould: evolution is not developing in the direction of complexity, why should it? |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Experience | Evans | McDowell I 73 Experience/Evans: experience is not conceptual. But it has representative content. McDowellVsEvans: experience is conceptual. Definition experience/Evans: a state of an information system is only an experience if it is the input of a thinking, conceptual and logically information system. >Information system/Evans. E.g. animals probably have a feeling for pain, but no a concept of pain. Pain/McDowell: pain is not conceptual, it is inner experience. Experience/McDowell/Evans: in both of us the experience in the Kantian sense is limited, by the connection to the spontaneity (conceptuality). Experience/Evans: although it is not conceptually in Evans (and therefore, according to Kant, it must be blind), he wants to protect it by asserting a "content". That is, an objective property of reality must be present to the subject. Namely, as an apparent view of the world. McDowellVsEvans: without concepts, that does not make any sense. Evans: on the other hand, he makes the demand that perception objects must be supported by an "accompanying theory". McDowell: that is precisely the >spontaneity. --- McDowell I 80/81 ff Experience/Evans: its richness of detail cannot be grasped with terms! For example, there are much more color shades that can be experienced than concepts which are available for these color shades. ((s) The notion of difference is sufficient when samples are present.) McDowell I 91 EvansVsDavidson: (different horn of the dilemma): experience is probably outer conceptual, but still subject to rational control by the outside world. --- Frank I 524f Experience/Evans: experience is different from self-attribution: it is not clearly true/false. I 526 Judgment: although judgments are based on experience (non-conceptual), they are not about the state of information - the "inner state" deos not become the object. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Extinction | Gould | I 291ff Extinction/Evolution/Life/Gould: extinction is not a domino in a development with great consequences, extinction is what all species have in common. They cannot take all their ecosystems with them even when they die out. Therefore, species do not depend very much on each other. New York, for example, could survive without its dogs. II 339 ff Mistake: it is a mistake to say that "any species that is extinct is extinct because of its overspecialization." This is perhaps the most common misunderstanding about the history of life. It is a wrong understanding of progress and a wrong equation of disappearance and ineptitude. If one imagines life as a continuous and constant struggle, disappearance must be the final sign of inadequacy. >Explanation, >Theories. II 340 GouldVs: but the present life does not even come close to perfection. The allegedly classic case of extinction based on competitive inferiority cannot be maintained. For example, when the Andes rose, there was probably a considerable rain shadow over South America and the tropical forests were transformed into dry areas. II 346 Consolation for believers in progress: in the case of mass extinction, an attempt is made with a definition "background rate". The background rate compares the normal development (normal extinction). Discovery: for more than half a billion years, the background rate has been declining slowly but steadily. During the early Cambrian period, at the beginning of adequate fossil records, about 600 million years ago, the average rate stood at 4.6 extinct species per million years. Since then, the rate has been steadily decreasing to about 2.0. If the Cambrian rate had continued, about 710 more genera would have died out! It is interesting to note that the total number of genera has increased since then by almost the same number (680). II 347 No species is immortal. The inevitable should never be depressing. IV 13 Extinction/Gould: extinction is more than just a negative force. IV 178 Mass extinction/Gould: mass extinction must be reinterpreted from four points of view: 1. Mass extinction is not the peak of a continuum, but fractures. 2. Mass extinctions are much more frequent, faster, deeper and very different (in terms of the number of extinct creatures) than we have ever imagined. IV 179 The end of the Ediacara fauna was the first mass extinction. The fauna has been replaced and not improved or strengthened. IV 182 A periodicity of mass extinction has been discovered: it had been 26 million years since the last great death in the Permian period a climax arose. Common cause explanations: common causes for mass extinctions are: mountain formations, volcanism, temperature fluctuations, ... New: a sinking sea level could be considered and has actually been observed before the last mass extinction. But: most mass extinction is preceded by a slow decline in animal groups! Possible explanation: there are only a few fossils, as fewer rocks are suitable for conservation. IV 185 Evolution/classification: some branches of the evolutionary tree contain many species, others, very few. There are strong differences. During normal times, species-rich branches tend to increase their richness. Question: why do they not conquer the entire biosphere for themselves? Solution: in the event of mass extinction, they have worse chances. IV 201 Extinction: each is inevitable forever. An extinct experiment will never be repeated. The chances are mathematically too slim. Biologists speak of the "principle of the irreversibility of evolution". |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Ibn Khaldun | Höffe | Höffe I 133 Ibn Khaldun/Höffe: [Ibn Khaldun's] Book of Examples (Kitab al-lbar) analyses (...) the rise and decay of communities. In [his] "Prolegomena zur Geschichte", probably the most important Arab contribution to the theory of history, social and cultural theory, Ibn Khaldun develops his "new science", a theory of culture, which enables the historian to discover the inner causes of historical dynamics. >History, >Historiography. Höffe I 134 The core is the asabiyya, the epitome of community-promoting life energies. Man/Community: Ibn Khaldun explicitly with Aristotle considers the human being as a being that is designed for politics and domination. He sees the beginning in rural, tribal solidarity and modest communities. Cities: In contrast to rural communities, urban societies represent progress by there cultural richness. >Society, >Community, >Aristotle. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Impredicativeness | Dummett | II 77/8 Def impredicative/Dummett: an extension is impredicative if it allows the predicate "true" also for sentences of the extended language (by adding the predicate "true"). >Expressiveness, >Metalanguage, >Description levels, >Richness. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Language | Brandom | I 238 Language/Brandom: linguistic skills consist of reliable disposition to respond differently to stimuli - more is not necessary. >RDRDs. I 648 You cannot describe a language coherently in which expressions are used demonstratively, but not pronominally. (vice versa it is possible). >Pronouns. I 519 Language/Infinite/Brandom: if there are correct and incorrect uses of phrases that are formed for the first time, there must be some kind of extrapolation. Substitution: if two sentences are substitutional variants, then they are applications of the same function. >Substitution. I 545 Language/Richness/Expressiveness/Brandom: if the language is expressively rich, there must be no asymetrical SMSICs for substitutable expressions (singular terms). >SMSICs, >Singular terms. This would mean that (Vs): for every sentential frame Pa, whenever the interence from Pt to Pt" is correct, but not vice versa, there was a sentence frame P"a in a way that the inference from P"t" to P"t was correct, but not vice versa! It would be impossible to codify inferences in such a language. I 815 Language/Brandom: There are not so many words - the language would be poor if they all had the same meaning in the mouths of different speakers. - Speakers who do not accept the same definition cannot assign every assertion de dicto - E.g. "that scoundrel". >de dicto, >de re. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Logical Truth | Logical truth: a statement is logically true if it is true on the basis of its form alone. This finding, however, is not absolute since the logical truth is also influenced by other factors such as e.g. the richness of the object language. |
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| Meaning | Minsky | Minsky I 64 Meaning/Minsky: We'll take the view that nothing can have meaning by itself, but only in relation to whatever other meanings we already know. (…) there's nothing basically wrong with the idea of a society in which each part lends meaning to the other parts. >Society of Minds. Communication/Minsky: If every mind builds somewhat different things inside itself, how can any mind communicate with a different mind? In the end, surely, communication is a matter of degree but it is not always lamentable when different minds don't understand each other perfectly. For then, provided some communication remains, we can share the richness of each other's thoughts. Understanding/Minsky: The secret of what anything means to us depends on how we've connected it to all the other things we know. That's why it's almost always wrong to seek the real meaning of anything. A thing with just one meaning has scarcely any meaning at all. Creativity/Minsky: Rich meaning-networks, however, give you many different ways to go: if you can't solve a problem one way, you can try another. True, too many indiscriminate connections will turn a mind to mush. But well-connected meaning-structures let you turn ideas around in your mind, to consider alternatives and envision things from many perspectives until you find one that works. And that's what we mean by thinking! Minsky I 67 The words and symbols we use to summarize our higher-level goals and plans are not the same as the signals used to control lower-level ones. So when our higher-level agencies attempt to probe into the fine details of the lower-level submachines that they exploit, they cannot understand what's happening. Meaning itself is relative to size and scale: it makes sense to talk about a meaning only in a system large enough to have many meanings. Cf. >Translation/Minsky. ((s) For the philosophical discussion of problems in relation to the concept of meaning: >Meaning/Philosophical theories, especially: >Humpty-Dumpty Theory.) |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Metalanguage | Metalanguage: metalanguage is the language in which linguistic forms, the meaning of expressions and sentences, the use of language, as well as the admissibility of formations, and the truth of statements are discussed. The language you refer to is called object language. A statement about the form, correctness, or truth of another statement thus includes both, i.e. object language and meta language. See also richness, truth-predicate, expressiveness, paradoxes, mention, use, quasi-reference, quotation, hierarchy, fixed points. |
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| Paradoxes | Logic Texts | Read III 187f Paradoxes: Hierarchy (Tarski)-problem: the Cretan does not know which level his own statement assumes. - It is only meaningful if truth attribution takes place at a lower level - it requires knowledge! (> knowledge / >understanding). Self-reference: is not always bad or faulty. >Self-reference. III 192f Curry paradox: If A and if A. then B, then B - If this conditional sentence is true, then snow is black - ponendo ponens - solution: contraction: two applications are replaced by one - change of logic. Example: If this (conditional) theorem is true, then snow is black. Consequentia mirabilis: If A, then ~ A, thus ~ A - contraction: If A, then if A, then 0 = 1; So if A, then 0 = 1 - contraction leads to triviality: it makes every statement from the curry paradox true. III 196 Semantically complete: is a language that contains its own truth predicates. Avoidance of paradox: is done by separation of the truth conditions from fallacy conditions. >Richness of a language, >Meta language, >Object language. --- Sainsbury V 17 Zenon/Sainsbury: Zenon's thesis: no area of space is infinitely divisible, so that it has an infinite number of parts, if each part has a certain extent, for then the sum is infinitly large - Zenon tried to show with this, that not really many things exist - overall, no object can have parts, for then it must be infinitely large. >Limits, >Motion. V 19 Sainsbury: infinite division goes only mentally. Problem: then no composition to space - in the composition, however, the space does not have to grow indefinitely. - e.g. sequences with limit. V 38f Arrow/Paradox/Zenon: at any time, the flying arrow takes a space that is identical to it. The arrow cannot move in a moment because movement requires a period of time and a moment is seen as a point - this also applies to everything else: nothing moves. Time/AristotelesVsZenon: Time does not consist of points. >Zeno. SainsburyVsAristoteles: today: we are constantly trying to allow points of time: E.g. acceleration at a point, etc. V 39 The question of whether the arrow is moving or resting in a moment is also related to other moments - Defininition rest/Sainsbury: an object rests under the condition that it is also at the same point in all nearby moments - no information about the individual moment can determine whether the arrow is moving - the premise is acceptable: no movement at the moment - but the conclusion is unacceptable. V 184 Sentence/Statement: a sentence is only circular at a certain occasion. - The paradox is therefore not in the meaning, but in the occasion. >Circular reasoning, >Utterance. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
| Peace | Augustine | Höffe I 110 Peace/Augustinus/Höffe: The first great peace theorist of the Occident is Augustine. According to his Höffe I 111 early works, peace, following the stoic ideal of the wise man, is an inner state of freedom of affect. Augustine does not give up this understanding later, but he makes three important changes. 1) (...) peace [remains] a guiding interest of man and yet should be unattainable in earthly life. Two factors might be responsible, the paradise lost through original sin and the view of a new paradise in the heavenly Jerusalem: In accordance with the basic character of the God-State the decisive, "true" peace is of eschatological nature. 2) in a clear peak against the "pagan" view that human beings can take care of their own well-being, these secondly depend on divine grace also with regard to peace. 3) Peace should reign not only among men but in the whole cosmos, especially as "peace with God"(1). Höffe: the otherworldliness of peace, its dependence on an extraterrestrial power and the relativization of the tasks assigned to politics, is attractive because it gives peace a reach and conceptual richness, a superlative rank. Problem: The eschatological character, however, has the high price of degrading the earthly peace, which man himself is responsible for, to an imperfect image of the only true spiritual peace dependent on divine grace. Höffe I 112 Earthly peace: The relativization of the peace handed over to man is all the more astonishing because, as mentioned above, the God-state is created against the background of an event of outstanding importance in the history of the state, the capture of Rome. [Augustine] knows earthly peace, but exposes it as the peace of Babylon. Although in earthly life there is nothing more longed for than the good of peace (2), since it promises earthly advantages (3), although man strives for peace by all means (4) and although peace is the natural form of living together (...). HöffeVsAugustine: Apart from the disdain for genuine political peace practiced here, a deficit is noticeable in a concept so rich in topics: Interstate peace is missing. 1. Augustine, The State of God , De civitate dei XIX, 27 2. Ibid. XIX, 11 3. Ibid. XIX, 17 4. Ibid. XIX, 12 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Politics | Ibn Khaldun | Höffe I 134 Politik/Ibn Khaldun/Höffe: Ibn Khaldun explicitly with Aristotle considers the human being as a being that is designed for politics and domination. He sees the beginning in rural, tribal solidarity and modest communities. >Politics/Aristotle. Cities: In contrast to rural communities, urban societies represent progress by there cultural richness. However, their habituation to growing prosperity leads to a striving for luxury that carries the seeds of decadence and decay. Community: This path from a modest community to one that is culturally superior, but dominated by well-being is reminiscent of Plato's Politeia, of its transition from the healthy to the luxuriant polis. Religion: With regard to religion, Ibn Khaldun explains the two driving forces, political energy and religious zeal, as rival powers. >Community, cf. >Polis. Politics: The fact that in the course of history the political side has gained the upper hand can be interpreted as desacralization and secularization of communities. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Principles | Nozick | II 10 Principle/Nozick: to show that principles explain a p, involves that they contain it. But that does not prove that p. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Involvement, >Inclusion, >Proofs, >Provability. II 128 Richness/principle/existence/Nozick: thesis: "All possibilities are realized." - This follows from the assumption of the egalitarian theory that the options "something"/"nothing" are equal. >Ultimate justification/Nozick. This requires infinitely separate possible worlds because options can be contradictory. - Then you need no explanation why something is or is not, because everything is (somewhere) realized. - Then there is no fact "X instead of Y". >Possible worlds, >Totality. II 130 Nothing: one of the unrealized possibilities is also that there is nothing - but that is one among many, not the inegalitary situation that there would be "exclusively nothing". >Nothing, cf. >Impossible World. II 347 Consciousness/explanation/evolution theory/Nozick: consciousness allows other types of behavior: - to be guided by principles. >Consciousness, >Behavior. --- Singer I 220 Principles/Responsibility/Nozick/P. Singer: Nozick makes a sensible distinction between "historical" and "time slices" principles. (R. Nozick 1974)(1): Def historical principle/Nozick: in order to understand whether a given distribution of goods is fair or unfair, we have to ask how the distribution came about. We need to know its history. Are the parties entitled to ownership as a result of originally justified acquisition? Def time-slice principles/Nozick: consider only the current situations and do not ask about their realization. >Time-slice. 1. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, 1974 |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Recursion | Tarski | Skirbekk I 156 Recursion/recursive method/Tarski: starting from simple propositional calculus specifying the operations with which we construct composite functions. >Functions/Tarski, >Recursive rules. Skirbekk I 157 Recursion/Tarski: problem: composite statements are constructed from simpler propositional functions, but not always from simpler statements. >Propositional functions. Hence no general recursion is possible. Recursive definition of satisfaction is only possible in a much richer metalanguage (i.e. in metalanguage we have variables of a higher logical type than the in the object language.(1) >Expressivity, >Richness. 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Semantic Closure | Davidson | Glüer II 23 Def Semantic Closure/Tarski: is a language (object language), if it contains a T-predicate. Def essentially rich/Tarski: is a language that does not contain variables of a higher logical type. Def semantically closed/Tarski/Glüer: Languages in which one can call one's own statements "true" (i.e. self-referential). Such languages enable the "liar paradox". A consistent definition of truth is excluded for such languages. >Paradoxes. It must not be possible to interpret the metalanguage in the object language, otherwise it would be possible to "retranslate" the definition of the W predicate formulated in the metalanguage. this leads to antinomies. The metalanguage must be Def "essentially richer"/Tarski/Glüer: to be more rich than the object language: it must contain variables of higher logical type. (sic). >Object language, >Metalanguage, >Richness, >Expressiveness. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Semantic Closure | Logic Texts | Read III 196 Semantically closed: is a language that contains its own truth predicate. - In order to avoid paradox: separation of the truth conditions from falsity conditions. >Richness of a language, >Meta language, >Object language, >Paradox. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Semantic Closure | Tarski | Skirbekk I 150 Semantically closed/Tarski: is a language it contains the names of the expressions next to each expression. The laws of logic apply. >Expressivity, >Richness, >Names of expressions. Everyday language satisfies these conditions. - Semantically closed languages are inconsistent, that is, one can derive paradoxes in them.(1) 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Social Goods | Demsetz | Henderson I 39 Social goods/Demsetz/Henderson/Globerman: Demsetz (…) analyzed the tragedy of commons a full year and a half before the famous Science article, "The Tragedy of the Commons," by biologist Garrett Hardin(1). >Social goods/Garrett Hardin. Hardin: The Hardin article had introduced the concept of the tragedy of the commons. The core idea is that if a commons, that is, an area that no one owns, is unmanaged, people will overuse it. If, for example, no one owns land on which cattle graze, and no one manages the land, cattle owners will overgraze the land and reduce its value. The Hardin article is one of the most-cited Science articles ever. Demsetz: In his version of the idea published earlier in relation to the fur trade(2), Demsetz wrote: „Because of the lack of control over hunting by others, it is in no person's interest to invest in increasing or maintaining the stock of game. Overly intensive hunting takes place. Thus a successful hunt is viewed as imposing external costs on subsequent hunters - costs that are not taken into account fully in the determination of the extent of hunting and of animal husbandry.“ (p. 351) Later in his article, Demsetz wrote: „It will be best to begin by considering a particularly useful example that focuses our attention on the problem of land ownership. Suppose that land is communally owned. Every person has the right to hunt, till, or mine the land. >Collective goods, >Public goods. Henderson I 40 This form of ownership fails to concentrate the cost associated with any person's exercise of his communal right on that person. If a person seeks to maximize the value ofhis communal rights, he will tend to overhunt and overwork the land because some of the costs ofhis doing so are borne by others. The stock of game and the richness of the soil will be diminished too quickly. It is conceivable that those who own these rights, i.e., every member of the community, can agree to curtail the rate at which they work the lands if negotiating and policing costs are zero. Each can agree to abridge his rights. It is obvious that the costs of reaching such an agreement will not be zero. What is not obvious is just how large these costs may be. (1967(2): 354) Hardin/Demsetz/Henderson: Notice how this anticipates Hardin's later article in Science. Demsetz wrote, "The geographical or distributional evidence collected by Leacock(3) indicates an unmistakable correlation between early centers offur trade and the oldest and most complete development of the private hunting territory." (p. 352)(2). Tribes agreed to hunt in their own well-defined areas. Since furry animals aren't migratory, the agreed-upon territorial rights had value. Conversely, grazing animals in the Southwest wandered all over the land, so territorial rights there didn't have as much value. Costs: Put differently, in the Southwest, the costs of enclosing grazing animals in a specific geographical area were prohibitively high. Recall that this was many decades before the post-Civil War invention of barbed wire. The Iower costs of husbanding fur-bearing forest animals together with the higher commercial value of fur-bearing animals made it productive to establish private hunting lands. Externalities: „Hence both the value and cost of establishing private hunting lands in the Southwest are such that we would expect little development along these lines. The externality was just not worth taking into account.“(1) (p. 353) Property rights: What is particularly interesting in the hunting example is that the property rights arrangement in Quebec that Demsetz cited arose voluntarily in response to circumstances that made the arrangement effcient. Property rights did not come about by government fiat. In furthering their economic interests, people typically choose the property rights regime that best promotes their economic interests. Henderson I 41 Private goods/Demsetz: Among wandering primitive peoples, the cost of policing property is relatively Iow for highly portable objects. The owning family can protect such objects while carrying on its daily activities. If these objects are also very useful, property rights should appear frequently, so as to internalize the benefits and costs oftheir use. It is generally true among most primitive communities that weapons and household utensils, such as pottery, are regarded as private property. Both types of articles are portable and both require an investment of time to produce.(2) (p. 353). 1. Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (3859), December 13, 1968, pp. 682-83. www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_tragedy_of_the_commons.html). 2. Demsetz, Harold (1967). Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 57, 2: 347-359. 3. Leacock, Eleanor Burke. (1954). The Montagnais „hunting territory“ and the fur trade. (tDAR id: 256329). National Archeological Database (NADB). Mause I 154f Social Goods/Demsetz: since common goods are scarce, they cannot simply be consumed free of charge, but their benefits must first be appropriated by using time and other scarce resources. (1) See Social Goods/Hardin. 1. Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1973. The property rights paradigm. Journal of Economic History 33 (1), 1973, pp. 16– 27. |
EconDems I Harold Demsetz Toward a theory of property rights 1967 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Species | Gould | I 223 Species/Gould: an average invertebrate species lived about 5 - 10 million years unchanged. It hardly changes in time and dies out without successors. At a higher level, evolution is basically a matter of the different successes of species and not a slow transformation of lineages. II 331 Species/Gould: Definition species: species are defined as populations isolated from all others in reproduction. When brought together with other species, they will not mix. Key question for the origin of a new species: how do isolation mechanisms develop? II 332 Traditional point of view: an originally unified population is separated from continents by drifting apart, by newly formed mountain ranges, the newly isolated groups would adapt to their new environment by adaptation. After a certain time, the populations become so different that they can no longer be crossed. New view: the ultimate success of a species may depend on the evolution of adaptation, but the act of species formation itself can be a coincidental event. Taxonomists have discovered that many groups of closely related species are not very different in form, behavior, and even in genetic equipment. However, there are striking differences in the number and shape of chromosomes, and these differences produce the isolation mechanisms that they receive as a separate species. The main change occurs in a single individual. Who should it breed with? IV 198 Species: biodiversity has certainly increased over time. Today's oceans contain at least twice as many species as the oceans in the Palaeozoic. Therefore, one could expect that they not only contain more species, but also more diverse species of organisms, with fundamentally different blueprints. But this is not the case! Today, twice as many species are put in much fewer groups of higher taxa. Today's seas are dominated by fewer groups: primarily by mussels, snails, crabs, fish and sea urchins. Each group includes many more species than any tribe in the Palaeozoic ever had. This steady decrease of organic construction types with a strong increase in the number of species is probably the most prominent trend of fossil documents! IV 199 Causality/coincidence/evolution: there may be one principle that can be identified: "initial experimentation and later standardization". For example, around 1900 there were few car brands and a much wider range of construction types. Today, there are hundreds of brands and much more uniform construction. Evolution/species richness: the change from a few species and many groups to a few groups and many species would occur even in the case of purely coincidental extinction if every speciation process at the beginning of life's history had been accompanied by average major changes. IV 201 Extinction: each is inevitable forever. An extinct experiment will never be repeated. The chances are mathematically too slim. Biologists speak of the "principle of the irreversibility of evolution". Order/coincidence/Gould: coincidental processes produce a high degree of order. The fact that they result in certain patterns does not speak against their coincidence. IV 327 Species/Gould: each species is a concatenation of improbabilities. Every species, whether human, coral or squid, is the last link in a chain that stretches back to the beginning of life. If any of these species had died out or evolved in any other direction, the end results would be very different. For example, our ancestors, the fish, developed a special fin with a stable, central bony axis. Without them, they could not have developed ashore. Nevertheless, these fins did not develop in anticipation of the necessities of rural life. They developed as adaptations to a local habitat. Necessity: human brains did not develop on a direct and necessary ascending ladder, but on winding paths full of accidents. III 264 Species/Gould: in the early days of evolution, the greatest spectrum of forms was reached, and most of the early experiments were extinct. It was accidental and not by predictable causes. Today, there are only a small number of possibilities left. >Evolution, >Explanation, >Darwinism. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Strength of Theories | Quine | IX 237ff Stronger/weaker/theory/system/Quine: Problem: Comparability: it fails if both of the two systems have theorems that cannot be found in the other - it also depends on contingencies of interpretation and not on structure. >Comparisons, >Comparability. If we can interpret the primitive logic characters (only "ε" in set theory) new so that we can ensure that all theorems of this system are made to translations of the theorems of the other system, then the latter system is at least as strong as the other. >Systems. If this is not possible in the other direction, one system is stronger than the other one. Definition "ordinal strength"/set theory: numerical measure: the smallest transfinite ordinal number whose existence you cannot prove anymore in the system. The smallest transfinite number after blocking of the apparatus shows how strong the apparatus was. Relative strength/proof theory: Goedel incompleteness sentence: since the number theory can be developed in set theory, this means that the class of all theorems (in reality all Goedel numbers of theorems) of a present set theory can be defined in this same set theory, and different things can be proven about them. >Incompletenes/Goedel. One can produce an endless series of further based on a arbitrary set theory, of which each in the proof-theoretic sense is stronger than its predecessors, and which is consistent when its predecessors were. - One must only add via Goedel numbering a new arithmetic axiom of the content so that the previous axioms are consistent. Ordinal strength: is the richness of the universe. >Goedel numbers. --- X 71 Metalanguage/Set Theory/Quine: in the metalanguage a stronger set theory is possible than in the object language. In the metalanguage a set of z is possible so that satisfaction relation z applies. - ((s) A set that is the fulfillment relation (in form of a set of arranged pairs) - not in the object language, otherwise Grelling paradox. >Meta language, >Set theory, >Grelling's paradox, >Metalanguage. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Substitution | Quine | VII (b) 29 Substitutability/substitution/QuineVsLeibniz: the strength of this requirement varies with the richness of the language - we need both, single- and multi-digit predicates, truth functions (not, and, or, etc.), classes, classes of classes, descriptions, singular terms. >Classes, >Descriptions, >Truth functions, >Predicates, >Richness, >Expressiveness, >Singular terms. This language is then extensional: any two predicates that match extensionally (are true for the same object) are substitutable salva veritate - but that does not secure cognitive synonymy. >Extensionality, >Extension. --- VII (c) 56 Substitutability/Quine: question salvo quo? Something is always changed. --- IX 9 Replace/substitution/Quine: if in a statement that has been substituted for "Fx" free variables other than "x" occurr, then they may not be such that fall under the scope of quantifiers that occur in the scheme in which the substitution was made. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Theories | Nozick | II 121 Inegalitarian Theory/Nozick: an inegalitarian theory assumes that a state is privileged as a "natural". This needs no explanation and also does not allow one. - Other situations are then differences that need to be explained. E.g. For Newton rest or uniformity of movement was the natural state. For Aristotle: rest. - inegalitarian theory does not answer, 1. Why this state is the natural. 2. Why exactly these forces are making a difference. To accept something as a natural state is also to ascribe a specific content to him. II 122 R. Harris: the thesis that something remains the same, does not need to be explained. >Regularity, >Explanations, >Constancy. NozickVs: but we have to explain why a thing for the purposes of this principle counts as the same and not in other contexts. Existence: the question concerning it, is typical inegalitary. Punchline: here we presuppose the nothing as their natural state. Cf. >Existence/Leibniz. II 126 1. We do not know what the natural state is. 2. We do not know whether there is a fundamental natural state at all. That means whether the correct fundamental theory is inegalitary. Each inegalitarian theory leaves a bare fact as inexplicable back, a "natural state". II 127 Egalitarian Theory/Nozick: needs to see much more possible states as in need of explanation. - But it asks no longer the question "Why X instead of Y?" - But always "Why X?". II 127 Egalitarian Theory/existence/nothing/Nozick: "principle of indifference" (from probability theory). - For them, there are many ways, how things could be, but only one possibility how nothing exists. - Punchline: then is the chance that something exists much greater than that nothing exists. Vs: one has to make an appropriate division into states that are to be treated as equally likely. - Many ways how things exists can be summarized as one. Extreme case: only two ways: something exists or does not exist. II 128 Under the worst assumption if we assume a division, there is a 50%-chance that something exists. - Because all other divisions have to be at least three partitions then, the chance that something exists rises for the next alternative already to two-thirds. - At the end almost 1. - Problem: the probability theory is still assuming the non-existence as the natural state - because it assumes that if something exists, then randomly - The natural state of a way is the non-realization. Solution:> richness. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Thinking | Chomsky | McGinn I 19f Chomsky thesis: richness in one direction is accompanied by indigence in the other direction, and vice versa. McGinn per. >Forms of thinking, >Thinking, >Method, >Explanation, >Abilities, >Competence. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Truth | Davidson | I (c) 56 Immanence Theory of Truth/Davidson: The sentence of another could be true for him, even though, when I translate it correctly, it makes no sense for me. The truth predicate defined in the meta-language can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination can be restored of the "true". >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. Object language and meta-language should contain the predicate "true". >Expressiveness, >Richness, >Truth theory. Davidson, however, can avoid the dilemma by not defining a definition at all. He calls this a truth definition in the style of Tarski in the following called "truth theory". DavidsonVsTarski: empirical instead of formal - Empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) - Convention: truth is not sufficiently empirical. >Convention T. The truth of an utterance depends only on two things: of what the words, as they were used, mean, and of the world. Glüer II 131 VsTranscendentalism: one cannot separate language competence and influence on the world. "Negative Transcendentalism". Rorty VI 51 Davidson/Truth: We collect information and patterns about whether actors agree to sentences or not. And this, without knowing the meaning of the sentences of actor. But after a while we do the step from the "nonpropositional to the propositional". A theory of truth is at the same time automatically a theory of meaning and rationality. Every intensional concept is intertwined with every other intensional concept. Glüer II 28 Interpretation Theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle) - therefore DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning. >Interpretation theory. Horwich I 443 Truth/Davidson/Rorty: should be identified with nothing. - There is no correspondence, no truth-making. DavidsonVsPragmatism: Truth is not equal to assertion. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty VI 189 Truth/Norms/Davidson: (according to Brandom): the pursuit of truth cannot go beyond our own practices (also Sellars). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Conditions | Logic Texts | Read III 196 Semantically closed language/Read: is a language that contains its own truth predicate. In order to avoid paradoxes: separation of the truth conditions from the falsity conditions. >Richness of a language, >Meta language, >Object language, >Paradox. Cf. >Assertibility condition. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Truth Definition | Logic Texts | Read III 40 T-Scheme/Tarski/Read: metaphysically neutral, not facts correlated with statements. T-scheme: >Disquotational scheme. Sainsbury V 196 T-Scheme/Liar-Paradox/Tarski/Sainsbury: the T-scheme allows the Liar paradox. Because it does not initially distinguish between levels. This shows that the everyday language is not coherent. >Everyday language, >Richness of a language, >Meta language, >Object language, >Paradox. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
| Truth Predicate | Logic Texts | Read III 41 T-predicate/truth predicate/Read: according to the correspondence theory it is a substantial predicate that assigns a relational property to statements. >Correspondence theory, >Predicate. --- Sainsbury V 178 T-predicate/levels/Tarski/Sainsbury: the object language cannot contain a predicate that applies only to their true sentences. ((s) The everyday language has such.) >Everyday language, >Richness of a language, >Meta language, >Object language, >Paradox. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
| Ultimate Justification | Nozick | II 131 ff Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Leibniz/existence/Nozick: 1. Inegalitarian Theory: Distinction of something before the nothing 2. Egalitarian Theory: (Probability Theory): Nothing is equal: when multiple options are accepted, then nothing is very unlikely because only one of many possibilities can consist. Richness: all possibilities are realized. Cf. >Possible Worlds/Leibniz, >Possible Worlds. Requirement: possible worlds are separated, otherwise contradictions - realm of possibilities includes possible worlds. >Possibility, cf. >Real world. In addition: principle of invariance: otherwise there are possible worlds that exclude possibilities: Restricted richness/self-subsumption: validity due to application, reference and supply by itself. Then existence is not a hard fact and not arbitrary (due to invariance). >Invariance, >Bare Facts, >Existence/Nozick. II 137 Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: Problem: the various limited types of richness all apply because of their limitation and because of their validity and because of their special invariance principle. - This is just the characteristic of reflexivity. >Reflexivity, >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 138 Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: it is no shame that circularity occurs at the end if it is only avoided in the middle. - It should not be an addition ("and that are all"). >Circular reasoning, >Lists. Principle of sufficient reason: every truth has an explanation. >Sufficient reason. II 278 Self-subsumption/self-affirmation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: self-subsumption is a sign of a fundamentality, not for truth. - Something can be fundamental in one dimension, without being fundamental in another. >Wholes, >Totality. A fundamental principle needs not to be "non-circular". - In different realms different relations, orders and connections apply. - E.g. justification, explanation, evidence. >Justification, >Explanation, >Evidence. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Unity | Historism | Gadamer I 212 Unity/History/Historicism/Gadamer: If the reality of history is conceived as a game of forces, this thought is obviously not enough to make its unity necessary. Even what Herder and Humboldt were led by - the ideal of the richness of phenomena of the human, does not as such establish true unity. It must be something that, in the continuity of events, turns out to be a guiding goal. In fact, the place occupied in the historical-philosophical eschatologies of religious origin and in their secularized variations is here at first empty(1). No pre-opinion about the meaning of history is to be formed before the exploration of it. Nevertheless, the self-evident precondition of its exploration is that it forms a unity. Thus Droysen can explicitly recognize the idea of the unity of world history itself - even if it is not a substantive idea of Providence's plan - as a regulative idea. Meanwhile there is a further precondition included in this postulate, which determines its content. The idea of the unity of world history includes the uninterrupted continuity of the development of world history. This idea of continuity is also initially formal in nature and does not imply any concrete content. It too is like an a priori of research, inviting us to delve deeper and deeper into the intertwining of the world-historical context. In this respect it is only to be judged as a methodological naivety of Ranke when he speaks of the "admirable continuity" of historical development(2). What he really means by this is not at all this structure of continuity itself, but rather the content-related things that are formed in this continuous development. >Unity/Ranke, >Continuity/Ranke. Gadamer I 214 HistoricismVsHegel: (...) the historical school was not able to accept Hegel's justification of the unity of world history by the concept of the spirit. That in the completed self-consciousness of the historical present the path of the spirit to itself is completed, which constitutes the meaning of history - that is an eschatological self-interpretation, which basically abolishes history in the speculative concept. Instead, the historical school saw itself forced into a theological understanding of itself. If it did not want to suspend its own nature of thinking of itself as progressive research, it had to relate its own finite and limited knowledge to a divine spirit, to whom things are known in their perfection. Ranke/Gadamer: It is the old ideal of infinite understanding, which is still applied here even to the knowledge of history. Thus Ranke writes: "The God - if I may dare to make this remark - I think to myself in such a way that, since no time lies ahead of him, he overlooks the entire historical humanity in its entirety and finds it equally worthy everywhere"(3). Gadamer: Here the idea of the infinite mind (intellectus infinitus), for whom everything is at once (omnia simul) transformed into the archetype of historical justice. The historian who knows all epochs and all historical phenomena equally before God comes close to him. Thus the consciousness of the historian represents the perfection of human self-consciousness. The more he succeeds in recognizing the own indestructible value of every phenomenon, and that is to say: to think historically, the more godlike he thinks(4). For this very reason Ranke has compared the office of a historian with that of a priest. "Directness to God" is for the Lutheran Ranke the actual content of the Christian message. 1. Cf. K. Löwith, Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen (Stuttgart 1953), and my article „Geschichtsphilosophie“ in RGG3. 2. Ranke, Weltgeschichte IX, 2 Xlll. 3. Ranke, Weltgeschichte IX, 2, p. 5, p. 7. 4. »Denn das ist gleichsam ein Teil des göttlichen Wissens« (Ranke, ed. Rothacker p. 43, similar to p. 52). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Validity | Stalnaker | I 148 Validity/expressiveness/modal/quantification/Stalnaker: the validity of the generalization schema is unlike the identity scheme. >Generality, >Generalization. It depends on limitations of the expressiveness of the extensional theory. If the language is richer, some new instances will be no theorems. >Extensions, >Extensionality, >Expressivivity, >Expressibility, >Richness. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Evans, G. | McDowell Vs Evans, G. | I 73 Judgment/McDowellVsEvans: but the judgment only introduces new types of content! It simply confirms the conceptual content that originates from experience! Justification/McDowell: does not exist in a derivation of one content from another. A typical perceptual judgment makes a selection from a richer content, which is provided by experience. I 75 Experience/Evans: although it is non-conceptual (and therefore must be blind, according to Kant) he wants to protect it by claiming a "content." That is, the subject is to have an objective property of reality. Namely as an apparent view of the world. McDowellVsEvans: doesn't make sense without concepts. Evans: contrasts this with the demand: objects of perception must be supported by an "accompanying theory." McDowell: just that is spontaneity. Spontaneity/animal/McDowell: distinguishes us from animals that have no terms. I 80/81 Experience/Evans: their richness of detail cannot be captured by concepts! Ex many more shades of color perceptible than terms available. (S) maybe the term difference suffices if samples are available. McDowellVsEvans: Ex colors: fine grain: we should not assume that there is always a proof-sample. I 86 There must also be recognition involved. Thinking: certainly, there are thoughts that cannot necessarily put into words in a way that their content would thereby be completely determined. Concept/McDowellVsEvans: the tendency to apply a concept does not come out of the blue. If anyone makes a judgment, it is wrested from him by experience. I 87 Experience/judgment/McDowell: the connection between the two is that experiences provide grounds for judgments. That is, the tendency to use concepts does not mysteriously hover independently of the situation as in Evans. I 89 McDowellVsEvans: there is no reason for a disection into factors of similarity and difference. Instead, we can say that we possess something that animals possess too, namely the sensitivity of the perception of the characteristics of our surroundings. We are different from animals only in the sense that our sensitivity is incorporated into the realm of spontaneity. I 91 Sensuality/concepts/McDowellVsEvans: Sensuality is conceptual. Without this assumption one lapses into the myth of the given if one tries to look at the rational control of empirical thinking. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Ordinary Language | Cresswell Vs Ordinary Language | I 45 Natural language/Logic/Cresswell: Thesis: The analysis only makes progress when it leaves the narrow confines of logic and considers the natural language in all its richness. Here, every word has "its own logic". --- I 46 CresswellVsOxford/CresswellVsOrdinary language philosophy/Cresswell: this may recall the heyday of Oxford. But the difference is that we do not claim the impossibility of formal semantics. Meanwhile, there have been fascinating, albeit frighteningly complex formal semantics. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Tarski, A. | Kripke Vs Tarski, A. | III 337 Expansion/Language/Kripke: Here we need Set Theory, at least the sets of the expressions of L. (As Tarski, who is dealing, however,with referential language). DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: he needs less ontology and less richness of metalanguage. III 367 Substitutional quantification/sQ/KripkeVsTarski: substitution quantification together with the formula Q(p,a) solves Tarski’s problem to define a "true sentence". III 410 Language/Kripke: When a language is introduced, an explicit definition of W is a necessary and sufficient condition that the language has mathematically defined (extensional) semantics. Otherwise, the language can be explained in informal English. The semantics is then intuitive. Before Tarski, semantics have generally been treated that way. Convention T/DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: for Davidson the axioms must be finite in number. Kripke: his work is much more controversial than that of Tarski. Field I 245 Def disquotational truth/dW/Field: can be defined with the help of substitution quantification (∏/(s): for all sentences, not objects .... is valid) for all sentences, not objects") definiert werden. S is true iff ∏p(if S = "p", p). where "p" sentences are substituents. But which sentences?. Konjunctions/Understanding/Paradoxies/Field: Konjunctions of sentences: makes only sense if the sentences have been understood beforehand, i.e. that the conjunctions themselves (and sentences constructed from them) are not allowed as conjuncts. (>Semantic Paradoxes, (s) >Everything he said is true). Solution: Tarski similar hierarchy of T-predicates. Predicates: then the definition of the dW by substitutional quantification (sQ)is typically ambiguous: each element of the hierarchy is provided by the corresponding sQ. KripkeVsTarski: (Kripke 1975): he is to restrictive for our aim: as such we do not obtain all ueK that we need. Solution/Kripke: others, quasi imprädikative Interpretation von dW. Analog für Field I 246 Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Kripke: Authorizes sentences to be a part of themselves and things, which are build from those sentences, to be conjuncts. However, the truth value of those quasi impredicative conjuncts are to be objectively indeterminate until the truth value is assigned to a certain level. sQ/Field: Allows then ueK without semantic ascent. If we want to talk about the non-linguistic world, why should we use sentences which we do not need?. → sQ: Could then be used as a basic term. → Basic term/Field: This means that a) the basic term is not defined by even more basic termini. → b) the basic term does not try to explain even more basic terms in theory (Field for each a) and b). → If we accept a), we need, however, to explain how the term obtains its meaning. Perhaps from logical laws which regulate its use. If we accept a), it is not a problem to accept b) as well. → Explanation/Field: e.g. the issue regarding mentalistic terms is not to give a meaning, but to show that the term is not primitive (basal). The ideology in logical terms does not need to be reduced that much. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Limits | Chomsky, N. | I 17 Chomsky thesis: richness in one direction is accompanied by indigence in the other direction, and vice versa. ((s) Compensation. McGinn ditto). |
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