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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Free Will | Nozick | II 327 Free will/values/action/Nozick: if action is values-led, is there then perhaps no free will? - What would you choose: the best or free will? >Values/Nozick, >Values, See also Action/Nozick. II 332 The parallel between action and belief results in nothing enlightening about free will. >Beliefs, >Morality, >Ethics. II 355ff Self-choice/freedom/Nozick: Thesis: freedom must not only be chosen by ourselves, it must also be given by something that is itself something chosen. - Only something that grows out of a chosen being, will not bind us. - (It will let us free). - But if the being is selected, how should it be inevitable then? >Self-selection, >Essence. II 105 Nozick: Thesis: we are choosing ourselves partially. II 358 Nozick: Thesis: We are not self-choosers. - E.g. someone may desire not to be a self-chooser. - Then he will wish that a chain of wishes ends in a permanent wish. - It seems that he cannot find one. - Does he has to wish that he himself is still present at the end of the chain? Desire. II 358 We simulate the self-choice partially. II 360 A self-chooser in my situation would not choose to be in my situation. - Then, it may be part of our nature, not to be a self-chooser. Even without self choice we can choose freely within external borders. >Freedom. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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