Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 23 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bare Truth | Dummett | II 94 "Simply true"/bare truth/Dummett: irreducible - If a sentence is not simply true, its truth sentence is non-trivial: i.e. the truth sentence for the sentence S does not have S itself on the right side. (Cf. >Truth definition). II 100 Important Argument: counterfactual conditionals (>counterfactual conditional) cannot be simply true means: we cannot imagine what the ability of identifying the truth would have to look like. II 95 "Barely true": model: observation, we know what it means for the tree to be taller than the other one. II 106 Simply true/Dummett: a sentence is simply true if there is no set of sentences out of which none is a trivial variant of the original sentence, and the truth of all of which defines the original sentence as true. - Then the trivial Tarski scheme fits: "snow is white" is true iff snow is white. "True because"/True/Dummett: Some sentences that cannot be simply true: E.g. conjunction: is the true because of both conjuncts - disjunction: true because of one of the disjuncts - universal quantification: true because of all instances. - This has led some philosophers to to say that there is no "disjunctive fact". - N.B.: this allows to characterize the concept of reduction of a class of sentences to another class. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Canonicalness | Bigelow | I 137 Canonical models/Bigelow/Pargetter: deal with maximally consistent sets of sentences to provide completeness proofs. >Models, >Completeness, >Proofs, >Provability. Canonical models were discovered only after Hughes/Cresswell 1968(1), they were described in the later work (Hughes/Cresswell 1984)(2). Definition completeness theorem/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a theorem that proves that if a proposition in a certain semantics is guaranteed true this proposition can be proved as a theorem. How can we prove this? How can we prove that each such proposition is a theorem? Solution: we prove the contraposition of the theorem: Instead: If a is assuredly true in semantics, a is a theorem We prove If a is not a theorem, it is not assuredly true in semantics. >Semantics. Then we prove this by finding an interpretation according to which it is false. >Interpretation, >Valuation. Def canonical model/Bigelow/Pargetter: provides an interpretation which guarantees that every non-theorem is made wrong in at least one possible world. >Possible worlds. I 138 We begin that there will be a sentence a, for which either a or ~a is a theorem. This can be added to the axioms to give another consistent set of sentences. Maximum consistent set of sentences/Bigelow/Pargetter: it can be proved that for the axiom systems which we deal with, there is always a maximally consistent set of sentences. >Maximum consistent. That is, a consistent set of sentences to which no further sentence can be added without making the set inconsistent. That is, for each sentence g is either γ in the set or ~ γ. W: be the set of all maximally consistent extensions of the axiom system with which we have begun. >Expansion. 1. Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M.C. (1968) An introduction to modal logic. London: Methuen. 2. Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M.C. (1984) A companion to modal logic. London: Methuen. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Certainty | Leibniz | Holz I 50 Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. I 53 Certainty/proof/perception/experience/Leibniz: of the multiplicity expressed in an infinite set of sentences, one can say that these sentences are perceived by us as the basis of every knowledge of truth. Before any provability! This process of perception is just with what I experience myself. (> I, Ego, Self, Experience/Leibniz, "I think"). This is also where the I differs from every other. (Position in the chain, position in the universe). Therefore the sentence "varia a me percipiuntur" is not provable and also not obliged to be proved. It is not possible here to go back to an underlying principle. The two principles (of identity and variety) are only necessary to form further sentences. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Content | Schurz | I 23 Content/Schurz: A proposition is the more substantial, the more consequences it has. Probability and content of hypotheses are often opposite. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Theories, >Probability, >Truth. I 89 Content/stronger/weaker: The content strength decreases during the transition from all-phrases via singular phrases to existential phrases. E.g. A universal sentence (x)Fx is logically stronger than its singular Fa instances and these are stronger than the corresponding existential sentence (Ex)Fx). >Stronger/weaker, >Generalization/Schurz, >Falsification/Schurz. I 97 Def Logical Content/Schurz: the logical content of a proposition (or set of propositions) S is the set of all propositions or consequences logically following from S. Def Empirical Content/Schurz: only the set of empirical (and thus verifiable) propositions or consequences logically following from S, which are not already analytically true. Def Observational content/Schurz: is even narrower than empirical content: only the observational propositions that follow from S. This notion has very limited applicability: Only for purely universal law hypotheses. Observation proposition/Schurz: no observation propositions follow from an allexistence hypothesis Ex H:= (x)(Fx > (Ey)(Gxy). Schurz: From H follows by universal instantiation only Fa > Gay and this is no observation theorem, because (Ey)Gay is a spatiotemporally restricted existence theorem. Such allexistence hypotheses are therefore also not falsifiable. However, they are confirmable. But this is weaker than falsifiable. >Observation, >Observation sentences. Def Probabilistic content/statistics/probability/Schurz: Let S be a set of statistical hypotheses, this logically does not imply any observational propositions, but at best gives them a belief probability. Wrong: to assume that the content would be the set of propositions with a certain minimum probability. Because this set can be contradictory! Even if r is still so close to 1. Conjunction probability: the conjunction of many highly probable sentences can be very improbable on their part! Solution/Schurz: probabilistic content is the set of all probability propositions which follow from S according to the axioms of probability. >Probability, >Subjective propability. I 109 Def relevant content/relevance/logic/Schurz: (a) the relevant logical content of a proposition or set of propositions S is the set of its relevant consequence elements. Notation: Cr(S) b) the relevant empirical content of S is the set of those relevant consequence elements of S that are empirical and not analytic true propositions. Notation: Er(S). Each set of sentences is L equivalent to the set of its relevant consequence elements. >Relevance/Schurz. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Equivalence | Lyons | I 230 Def Weak Equivalent/Grammar/Linguistics/Lyons: are two grammars if they generate an identical set of sentences. Def Strongly Equivalent: they are strongly equivalent if they also assign the same structural description to the sentences. The difference between the two is evident in the categorical grammars, which differ from the "substitution systems" discussed above. >Grammar, >Generative Grammar, >Universal Grammar, >Categorial grammar, >Transformational grammar. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Explanation | Hempel | Bigelow I 299 Explanation/tradition/laws/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Representatives: Hempel and Oppenheim 1948(1), Hempel 1965(2), Mill 1843/50(3), Jevons 1877(4), Ducasse 1925(5), Feigl 1945(6), Popper 1945(7), Hospers 1946(8)). Hempel/terminology/spelling/Bigelow/Pargetter: O: result L: laws C: conditions (sets of sentences, as premises) Then "O" could also be seen as a set of sentences. But we are talking about compound sentences. Then we have: L C O Initial conditions/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: initial conditions are sometimes not needed at all. Sometimes, however, the laws alone do not explain the case: for example, Halley's comet comes back in 60 years, for this we need information about certain facts, it does not only follow from the laws. The facts are contingent, of course. I 301 Non-statistical explanation/Hempel: thesis: if L and C explain O, then they must entail O logically. Otherwise, we have at best a sketch of the explanation that requires further assumptions. Bigelow/Pargetter: this does not yet fully express the idea of the explanation by "deriving from laws": the laws must be used and not only mentioned. In other words, there must be a reliance on laws. BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: N.B.: but these are just apparant explanations! I 302 Just as quackers and magicians often provide an explanation with reference to prestigious natural laws, which turns out to be circular on closer inspection. Solution/Hempel: to exclude this, Hempel demands that additionally the premises must be true and O would not have followed if C alone had been without the laws (L). BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: there are still a lot of refinements to be made and special cases to consider. Lewis would call that the "one patch per hole" method. Statistical explanation/probabilistic/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Hempel 1965) here it is impossible to find laws that predict the exact result. However, it may be very likely in certain cases. Or more likely if the law is true than if it was not true. I 303 The statistical explanations are something like derivations from the thing to be explained. And indeed such derivatives, which originate from invalid conclusion. Logical form: the conclusion should be probable, given the premises. Variants: one can demand a high probability from the outset. Or it should be higher than O's without the premises or weaker: that O only has to be made to a certain degree likely, etc. (Lit: Salmon 1982). Bigelow/Pargetter: all this does not differ significantly from the non-statistical explanation. Statistical laws are also part of the set of laws. Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: with Hempel's help, we can now broaden our concept of explanation. I 304 If we get the probability of a result, we have explained the result a little bit as well. Statistical explanation/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the end, it is all about whether a result comes out or is likely. We can summarize both cases. "Statistical"/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: "statistical" is only served to attenuate the requirement of logical validity. Explanation/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: an explanation is an open process. This is important. Both the initial conditions can be varied, as well as the laws derived from other laws. Kepler's laws, for example, have been traced back by Newton to deeper ones. These then logically entail the Kepler ones. I 305 Openness/Hempel: openness is that you may be able to find deeper and even deeper laws. Bigelow/Pargetter: that is one of the strengths of his theory. >Laws, >Natural laws. 1.Hempel, C.G. and P. Oppenheim: Studies in the Logic of Explanation PS, 1984, p. 15. 2.Hempel, C. G.: Aspects of Scientific Explanation, in: Aspects of Scientific Explanation in the Philosophy of Science. New York 1965: The Free Press. 3. Mill, J. St.: A System of Logic, 1843. 4. Stevons W. J.: The Principle of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method, 2nd edition London 1877: Macmillan Press. 5. Ducasse, C. J.: Explanation, Mechanism and Teleology. Journal of Philosophy 22. pp. 150-5. 6. Feigl, H.: Operationism and Scientific Method. Psychological Review 52, 1945, pp. 250-9, 284-8 7. Popper, K. R.: The Open Society and Its Enemies. London 1945. 8. Hospers, J.: On Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 43, 1946, pp. 337-56. Schurz I 224 Explanation/Law/Hempel: The law premises can often be omitted! Humanities/Hempel/Schurz: claimed to be able to provide explanations for them, too, by assuming that laws rule here, too. VsHempel: but these laws are not strict. Hempel: late: for it probabilistic explanation. Schurz I 224 Potential Explanation/Hempel: Here merely logical consistency of the premises is required. This is important when evaluating hypotheses in terms of their explanatory power. >Best explanation. Schurz I 225 Explanation/Hempel/Schurz: is the answer to a why-question. Why-question/Hempel: a) Explanation seeker: asks for causes. b) Justification seeker: asks for reasons of belief. I 226 Causes: can serve as reasons for justification. (Also vice versa!). >Causes, >Justification. Structural equality/prediction/explanation/Hempel/Schurz: (early and middle Hempel): Thesis: explanation and prediction are structurally equal. Popper: ditto: causality = prediction-eduction. Explanation and prediction differ only in the pragmatic time circumstances of the becoming known of premises and conclusion. Prediction: here only the premises are known first. Explanation: vice versa. (...) ex ante reasoning/Hempel: = prediction, potential explanation. Explanation: = ex ante reasoning. ManyVs: (...) >Structures, >Microstructure, >Causal explanation/Schurz, >Explanation/Schurz. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Language | Lyons | I 142 Language/infinite/Lyons: the sentences of a language are numerically unlimited. I 147 Language/infinite/Lyons: no natural language can be considered a finite set of sentences. >Language, >Sentences, >Infinity. ((s) See the discussion on researchgate: "Are there infinitely many possible sentences in a natural language?" ). |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Language | Nagel | I 57 NagelVsprimacy of language: leads to the devaluation of reason, decay product of analytic philosophy. >Linguistic turn, >Analytic philosophy. Rejection of Frege. Thinking is often not linguistical. The most common forms of thinking do not depend on any single language. >Thinking without language. I 57 If language reveals principles of thought, this is not because logic is grammar, but because grammar follows a logic. >Logic, >Grammar, >Thinking, >Thoughts. I 61 That "and" has become the word for the conjunction by contingent circumstances has no concequences for the status of the true statement that p is implied by p and q. What a set of sentences means depends on conventions. What follows from a set of premises does not depend on them (formal). Rorty VI 144 ff NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. >Heterophenomenology. Nagel thesis: the sources of philosophy are preverbal, their problems are not dependent on culture. Rorty VI 144 ff NagelVsWittgenstein: (according to Rorty): the limits of language are not the limits of thinking! "The content of some thoughts goes beyond any form that they may take in human consciousness." (Per distinction scheme/content). >Scheme/content. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | Quine | X 134 Language/Carnap/Quine: the language is presented as a deductive system Carnap - 1. Formation rules: Deliver the grammar and the lexicon so that they deliver the well formed formulas - 2. Transformation rules: these provide logical truths (including the mathematical, generally the analytical truths). >Logical Truth/Quine.# VI 17 Ontology/Language/Quine: as far as the assumption of a scientific theory can be called a linguistic matter, the assumption of an ontology can also be called a linguistic matter - but not more than this. >Ontology/Quine. VI 63 Language/Observation/Translation/Quine: most of our utterances are not correlated with stimuli at all, e.g. connectives etc. VI 64 The linguist can create an archive of uninterpreted sentences and dissect them. Recurring segments can be treated as words. (Analytical hypothesis). VI 65 Ultimately, we depend on very poor data material. We can expect successive statements to have something to do with each other. Later, the translator will be dependent on psychological hypotheses. What will the jungle inhabitants most likely believe to be true? What will they probably believe? VI 66 In this case, preference is given to recognizably rational translations. But to establish an alleged grammar and semantics of the natives would be nothing more than bad psychology. Instead one should assume that the psyche of the natives is largely like ours. VI 67 When the linguist discovers an error, he will wonder how far back it goes. VI 105 Language/QuineVsMentalism: The prerequisite of language is that people perceive that others perceive something. This, however, is the seduction to overstretch the mentalistic way of speaking. Mentalism. VII (b) 26 Definition/Quine: can serve two opposite purposes: 1. abbreviation and practical representation (short notation) 2. reverse: redundancy in grammar and vocabulary. Economical vocabulary leads to longer strings. Conversely, economical vocabulary simplifies the theoretical discourse about a language. Language/Quine: by habit these two types are fused together, one as part of the other: External language: is redundant in grammar and vocabulary and economical in terms of the length of strings. Partial language "primitive notation": is economical in grammar and vocabulary. VII (b) 27 Part and whole are connected by translation rules. We call these definitions. They are not assigned to one of the two languages, but connect them. But they are not arbitrary. They should show how primitive notations can serve all purposes. VII (d) 61 Language/Translation/Whorf/Cassirer/Quine: you cannot separate the language from the rest of the world. Differences in language will correspond to differences in life form. Therefore, it is not at all clear how to assume that words and syntax change from language to language while the content remains fixed. VII (d) 77 Introduction/Language/General Term/Quine: the use of general terms has probably arisen in the course of language development because similar stimuli cause similar reactions. Language would be impossible without general terms. In order to understand them, one must recognize the additional operator "class of" or "-ness" when introducing them. Failure to do so was probably the reason for accepting abstract entities. >General Terms/Quine. VII (d) 78 Science/Language/Quine: how much of our science is actually contributed by language, and how much is an original (real) reflection of reality? To answer this, we have to talk about both the world and the language! ((s) And that is already the answer!) Quine: and in order to talk about the world, we have to presuppose a certain conceptual scheme that belongs to our particular language. Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we were born into it, but we can change it bit by bit, like Neurath's ship. VII (d) 79 Language/Quine: its purpose is efficiency in communication and prediction. Elegance is even added as an end in itself. X 34/35 Truth/Language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or characters in one language are equivalent to "2 < 5" and in another to "2 > 5". When meaning changes over many years within a language, we think that they are two different languages. Because of this relativity, it makes sense to attribute a truth value only to tokens of sentences. Truth/World/Quine: the desire for an extra-linguistic basis for truth arises only if one ignores the fact that the truth predicate has precisely the purpose of linking the mention of linguistic forms with the interest in the objective world. X 42 Immanent/Language/Quine: are immanent in language: educational rules, grammatical categories, the concept of the word, or technically: the morpheme. ad X 62 Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (spoken about), the meta language is used to speak about the object language. X 87 Language/Grammar/Quine: the same language - the same infinite set of sentences can be created with different educational rules from different lexicons. Therefore, the concept (definition) of logical truth is not transcendent, but (language) immanent. (logical truth: is always related to a certain language, because of grammatical structure). >Logical Truth/Quine. Dependence on language and its grammatization. XI 114 Theory/Language/Quine/Lauener: we do not have to have an interpreted language in order to formulate a theory afterwards. This is the rejection of the isolated content of theoretical sentences. Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be considered purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) Such a system is not truthful). XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: a person's language and theory are different systems in any case, even if you would agree with Quine otherwise. XI 116 Quine: (ditto). Uncertainty of translation: because of it one cannot speak of a theory invariant to translations. Nor can one say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or conversely that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language. ((s) Because of the ontological statement that I cannot argue about ontology by telling the other that the things that exist in it do not exist in me, because then I contradict myself that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the fallacy that language contributes to the syntax but theory to the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: i.e. not that there is no contradiction between the two at all: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, this means that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction between language and theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language and theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. V 32 Def Language/Quine: is a "complex of dispositions to linguistic behaviour". V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be one way or the other, but words are out there where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve to transmit ideas! (> NominalismVsLocke). >Nominalism. Quine: it is probably true that when we learn a language we learn how to connect words with the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? V 89 Composition/language/animal/animal language/Quine: animals lack the ability to assemble expressions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Loewenheim | Putnam | V 54 ff Loewenheim/reference/PutnamVsTradition: Loewenheim tries to fix the intension und extension of single expressions via the determination of the truth values for whole sentences. V 56f PutnamVsOperationalism: e.g. (1) "E and a cat is on the mat." If we re-interpret this with cherries and trees, all truth values remain unchanged. Cat* to mat*: a) some cats on some mats and some cherries on some trees, b) ditto, but no cherry on a tree, c) none of these cases. Definition cat*: x is a cat* iff. a) and x = cherry, or b) and x = cat or c) and x = cherry. Definition mat*: x = mat* iff. a) and x = tree or b) and x = mat or c) and x = quark. Ad c) Here all respective sentences become false ((s) "cat* to mat*" is the more comprehensive (disjunctive) statement and therefore true in all worlds a) or b)). Putnam: cat will be enhanced to cat* by reinterpretation. Then there might be infinitely many reinterpretations of predicates that will always attribute the right truth value. Then we might even hold "impression" constant as the only expression. The reference will be undetermined because of the truth conditions for whole sentences (>Gavagai). V 58 We can even reinterpret "sees" (as sees*) so that the sentence "Otto sees a cat" and "Otto sees* a cat" have the same truth values in every world. V 61 Which properties are intrinsic or extrinsic is relative to the decision, which predicates we use as basic concepts, cat or cat*. Properties are not in themselves extrinsic/intrinsic. V 286ff Loewenheim/Putnam: theorem: S be a language with predicates F1, F2, ...Fk. I be an interpretation in the sense that each predicate S gets an intension. Then, there will be a second interpretation J that is not concordant with I but will make the same sentences true in every possible world that are made true by I. Proof: W1, W2, ... all be possible worlds in a well-ordering, Ui be the set of possible individuals existing in world Wi. Ri be the set, forming the extension of the predicate Fi in the possible world Wj. The structure [Uj;Rij(i=1,2...k)] is the "intended Model" of S in world Wj relative to I (i.e. Uj is the domain of S in world Wj, and Rij is (with i = 1, 2, ...k) the extension of the predicate Fi in Wj). J be the interpretation of S which attributes to predicate Fi (i=1, 2, ...k) the following intension: the function fi(W), which has the value Pj(Rij) in every possible world Wj. In other words: the extension of Fi in every world Wj under interpretation J is defined as such, that it is Pj(Rij). Because [Uj;Pj(Rij)(i=1,2...k)] is a model for the same set of sentences as [Uj;Rij(i=1,2...k)] (because of the isomorphism), in every possible world the same sentences are true under J as under I. J is distinguished from I in every world, in which at least one predicate has got a non-trivial extension. V 66 Loewenheim/intention/meaning/Putnam: this is no solution, because to have intentions presupposes the ability to refer to things. Intention/mind State: is ambiguous: "pure": is e.g. pain, "impure": means e.g. whether I know that snow is white does not depend on me like pain (> twin earth). Non-bracketed belief presupposes that there really is water (twin earth). Intentions are no mental events that evoke the reference. V 70 Reference/Loewenheim/PutnamVsField: a rule like "x prefers to y iff. x is in relation R to y" does not help: even when we know that it is true, could relation R be any kind of a relation (while Field assumes that it is physical). --- I (d) 102ff E.g. the sentence: (1) ~(ER)(R is 1:1. The domain is R < N. The range of R is S). Problem: when we replace S by the set of real numbers (in our favourite set theory), then (1) will be a theorem. In the following our set theory will say that a certain set ("S") is not countable. Then S must in all models of our set theory (e.g. Zermelo-Fraenkel, ZF) be non-countable. Loewenheim: his sentence now tells us, that there is no theory with only uncountable models. This is a contradiction. But this is not the real antinomy. Solution: (1) "tells us" that S is non-countable only, if the quantifier (ER) is interpreted in such a way that is goes over all relations of N x S. I (d) 103 But if we choose a countable model for the language of our set theory, then "(ER)" will not go over all relations but only over the relations in the model. Then (1) tells us only, that S is uncountable in a relative sense of uncountable. "Finite"/"Infinite" are then relative within an axiomatic set theory. Problem: "unintended" models, that should be uncountable will "in reality" be countable. Skolem shows, that the whole use of our language (i.e. theoretical and operational conditions) will not determine the "uniquely intended interpretation". Solution: platonism: postulates "magical reference". Realism: offers no solution. I (d) 105 In the end the sentences of set theory have no fixed truth value. I (d) 116 Solution: thesis: we have to define interpretation in another way than by models. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Logic | Nagel | I 61 That "and" has become the word for the conjunction by contingent circumstances has no consequences on the status of the true statement that p is implied by p and q. What a set of sentences means depends on conventions. What follows from a set of premises does not depend on them (formal). >Convention, >Logical constants, >Logical truth, >Meaning/Nagel. I 85 Logic/Nagel: logical judgments are based on our comprehension, but they are not a judgment about our ability of comprehension. >Judgments, >Recognition. I 94 Logical skepticism/NagelVsSkepticism/Nagel: we can never reach a point where there are two possibilities that are compatible with all evidence. I cannot imagine that I am in a similar realization situation where 2 + 2 = 5, but my brain would be confused, because I could not imagine that 2 + 2 = 5. The logical skeptic offers no level of reason. There is no point that allows reviewing the logic without presupposing it. Not everything can be revised. - Something has to be maintained in order to check that the revision is justified. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Logical Truth | Quine | X 87 Logical Truth/Quine: is always in relation to a particular language, because grammatical structure (is not transcendent). - Because the same language (i.e. set of sentences) can be generated by different formation rules or encyclopedia - dependency on language and its grammar. X 88 Identity/logical truth/structure/Quine: Identity puts structural conception of the logical truth (as structural property of schemes) in question, because they become wrong if one inserts a different predicate instead of = (in logical truth each predicate must be replaceable by another). X 90 Identity/logical truth/structure/definition/Quine: if = is not simply interpreted as a predicate in the lexicon of the object language, but only as an abbreviation for compound sentences like (3), then the laws of identity are nothing but abbreviations of logical truths of the quantifier logic. Then the structural conception of the logical truth is saved. X 109 Logical truth/attitudes/propositional attitude/Quine: if we had schemes with them, we could not decide which of them are valid. - Laws for attitudes should not be logical laws, because propositional attitudes are too content rich. X 109 Logical Truth/modality/modal logic/Quine: the modalities leave more room here than the attitudes: we can get schemes here that are valid: E.g. ~(~ p necc. p) - Also, we receive from any valid scheme another one by prefixing of necessary E.g. necc. (p or ~p) from p or ~p. X 127 Logical truth/Carnap: Thesis: are purely linguistical, because they are true in every replacement from the lexicon. >Lexicon/Quine. X 127ff Logic/language/reality/QuineVsCarnap: logical truth is not purely linguistic, because evidence is as important as the translation. - E.g. expression of "it is raining" when it rains. - But no logical consequences from circumstances, because true sentences follow from any sentence. - All evident things are inseparable from the translation. - Semantic ascent seems to speak for the language of logic. - Vs: the truth predicate shows the separation from the language. - Quine: the logic is based on the world and not on the language. I 133 Yet: pro Carnap: we learn the logic by learning the language. - But that’s not different from everyday knowledge. >Logic/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Modal Realism | Bigelow | I 165 Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: should accept a correspondence theory for modal language. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: Possible worlds exist. But we have not yet said anything about what they are made of and what they are. Different kinds of realisms will assume different kinds of possible worlds. >Possible worlds. Truthmaker/Bigelow/Pargetter: we have not said anything yet about how modal sentences are made true. >Truthmakers. Realism/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: all realisms will say that it is possible that there is a world that represents the actual world as being represented as being in a certain way. ((s) >Stalnaker). Of course, all but one of them represent it wrong. >Realism. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: are therefore representations of the actual world. "Representation" is only a technical term,... I 166 ... and not exploratory. >Representation. Possible worlds: represent not only the actual world, but also other possible worlds! >Actual world, >Actualism, >Actuality. Modal realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: in this way of speaking, we can then differentiate between what they see as possible worlds. Modal Realism/Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: three varieties: 1. book theories = maximally consistent sets of truthmakers - "books". 2. replica theories = thesis: worlds are not carriers of truth but replicas ((s) i.e. objects). Substitutes: David Lewis. >David Lewis. 3. property theories: = thesis: worlds cannot be understood as books, they are a multitude of books. This means that there is a multitude of truths ((s) within a possible world. There are three sets of truthmakers here: (a) set of sentences (b) set of propositions (c) sets of beliefs. Cf. >Ersatz worlds. I 173 Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: modal realism must be able to explain possible worlds without using any modal basic concepts. And that is harder than it looks at first glance. There is a thesis that this is not possible at all: modalism. Definition Modalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: the thesis that it is not possible to define modal terms in a non-modal way. Representatives: Lycan 1979(1), Plantinga 1974(2), 1976(3), 1987(4), van Inwagen (1984(5): some modalities do not need to be defined in more fundamental terms.) BigelowVsModalism. Modalism: according to Hume's critique of the naturalistic fallacy (avant la lettre) one could express it with the slogan thesis "No must from the is". That is to say, moral desires cannot be deduced logically and entirely from outer-moral facts. Bigelow/Pargetter: from this we can gain two attitudes: a) there are no moral truths, (moral nihilism) or b) some moral truths we must take as undefined basic facts. Modal logic/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problems with the moral "must" are reflected in the metaphysical "must". >Modal logic. Correspondence theory: is the theory which brings the problems, because without it modal basic concepts would be no problem. But since we want to keep the correspondence theory, we need better access to possible worlds. >Correspondence theory. I 174 Possible solution: cannot we just say that some things cannot be described without modal terms? Analogue: For example, name: a fantasy name like "Gough" could refer to something non-linguistic that is not a carrier of truth. In any case, we have to assume an individual. We are assuming correspondence with this. If we tried a description instead, it would reintroduce a name again. >Descriptions, >Names. Therefore, we would have to accept some names as undefined basic terms. But that would not yet be a threat to the correspondence theory. (Question/s): many basic terms would make a correspondence relationship superfluous, because something undefined does not have to be shown?) Modal Basic Term/Correspondence/Bigelow/Pargetter: analogously, we can assume that modal basic terms are not a threat to correspondence: e.g. Conchita can play guitar is true by correspondence between this statement and things in the world. >Basic concepts. The property of being able to play the guitar is assumed. (Bigelow/Pargetter pro). Modal terms/Bigelow/Pargetter: their threat comes not only from the correspondence theory, but also from their supervenience of non-modal properties. >Supervenience, >Humean Supervenience/Lewis. I 175 Supervenience/Definability/Definition/Bigelow/Pargetter: a supervenience would guarantee the definition of modal properties in non-modal terms! >Definition, >Definability. Problem: to do so, we would have to allow an infinite number of complex definitions. This would at least allow a characterization of modal terms. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the following we will consider attempts to characterize possible worlds in non-modal terms. Characterization/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): less than a definition, from many individual cases. Method/Bigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: whenever a theory leads to modal basic concepts, we will put this theory aside. This is because it cannot then play an explanatory role within the Humean Supervenience. Not because the corresponding possible worlds did not exist. >Humean supervenience. I 187 Modal Realism/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: his extremely concrete modal realism has the advantage that it would explain many things if it were true. And most people agree on that. Then why has the unbelieving gaze not disappeared? His theory has nothing irrational either. >D. Lewis, >Counterpart theory. VsLewis: to disprove him, you would have to adopt one of two strategies: 1. the initial probability is 0 (instead of something above) 2. even if the probability increases in the course of time, the increase would be infinitesimal. Ad 1.: the probability cannot increase from zero. Nevertheless, the question remains whether it is ever rational to attribute a probability of 0. Especially not Lewis' theory. LewisVsVs: that would lead to a trilemma: (1) the opponents might realize that a greater intelligence has thought longer about it than they did and therefore the probability is > 0 and that he means what he says. (2) they could assume that he does not mean what he says (3) they could say that sometimes it is rational,... I 188 ... to assign a chance of zero to something, which a serious and intelligent authority has said. Rationality/Bigelow/Pargetter: from Lewis' Trilemma there would only be (3) left, and thus the question of rationality. Rationality should not lead us to the acceptance of (3). But it also remains, however, even if Lewis's position is only considered to be very unlikely. >Rationality. Problem: to deny someone rationality in an area to which, in principle, one has no better epistemic access than the critizised. Ad 2. (the probability remains infinitesimal): i.e. it does not matter how much evidence we teach. BayesVs: this could only happen after the Bayes-theorem,... I 189 ...if the required probability for each future document should be practically 1. And that is unacceptable. >Bayes-Theorem, >Bayesianism. 1. Lycan, W.G. (1979). The trouble with possible worlds. In: The possible and the actual. (ed. M.J. Loux), pp. 274-316. Ithaca, NY., Cornell University Press. 2. Plantinga, A. (1974). The nature of necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. Plantinga, A. (1976). Actualism and possible worlds. Theoria 42, pp. 139-60. 4. Plantinga, A. (1987). Two concepts of modality. Modal realism and modal reductionism. Philosophical Perspectives Vol I: Metaphysics (ed. J. E. Tomberlin). pp.189-231. Atascadero, Calif., Ridgeview. 5. van Inwagen, P. (1985). Two concepts of possible worlds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9, pp.185-92. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Ordinal Numbers | Neumann | Thiel I 205 Ordinal numbers/Neumann/Thiel: Today, ordinal numbers are not only introduced differently than in Cantor and Dedekind, but are also defined differently. >Numbers. John v. Neumann: Axiomatic construction of the set theory. In the foundation of logic certain formulas are recognized as "excellent formulas". >Axioms, >Axiom systems, >Set theory, >Sets. I 206 The rules allow us to form unreservedly new sentential connective-logical propositional schemas, in which we can recognize excellent ones and not a. But this does not provide us with a real overview of the sentences of the sentential connectives logic, nor a systematic insight into their connections. We must distinguish between the logical framework and the sentences themselves in an axiomatic structure. >Logic, >Statements. I 207 Axiomatization allows a potentially infinite set of sentences by representing them as a conclusion set from finitely many sentences. >Axiomatization, cf. >Are there infinitely many possible sentences?/Researchgate. |
NeumJ I J. v. Neumann The Computer and the Brain New Haven 2012 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Possible Worlds | Bigelow | I 138 Definition Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: a possible world e, in which a sentence a is true, is then defined as the maximum consistent set containing a as an element. >Modalities/Bigelow. Possible world/(s): Possible worlds are then completely described in all details, nothing is unmentioned and no detail is described contradictory. N.B./Bigelow/Pargetter: the wit is that then every non-theorem in any possible world is wrong. It will be wrong in a maximum consistent extension. There will be a maximum consistent extension in which the sentence is wrong, i.e. a world in which it is wrong. Theorem: is then a sentence that is true in all possible worlds. And that is what a completeness theorem is supposed to show. >Completeness. Maximum Consistent Extension/Bigelow/Pargetter: a consistent set of sentences is extended by adding either a or ~a if it does not become inconsistent as a result. The extension is maximally consistent if a (or ~a) was the last sentence that could be added. >Maximum consistent. ((s) there may be many extensions depending on whether an individual is described differently in the sentence added. This provides equivalence classes. I 206 Definition Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a maximum consistent property that includes all the things and properties of a world. World/Properties/Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: how do the previous theories in philosophy history look like, in which one tried to describe the world as an aggregate of properties? E.g. Wittgenstein, Tractatus E.g. Carnap, The logical structure of the world. .... >L. Wittgenstein, >Tractatus, >R. Carnap, >Properties, >Facts, >Circumstances, >World, >Reality, >Ontology, >Atomism. Bigelow/Pargetter: we could consider the space-time points as the last individuals of the world. Each of them can either have a certain property or not. >Space-time points. Then we can construct sets of ordered pairs ‹assigned, x› Democritus' world/Terminology/Cresswell/Bigelow/Pargetter: that is how Cresswell called worlds constructed from such points. (Cresswell 1972(1), 1973(2)) >M. J. Cresswell. That is roughly the same as Russell's logical atomism. An n-digit predicate, followed by n individuals. >B. Russell, >Predicates. Atomism: we should assume that such atomic sentences are logically independent of each other. >Atomism. I 207 If it is only a question of whether a point is occupied or not, the corresponding sentence set will surely be consistent. Book: a complete "book of the world" would not be a world, but only a representation. Properties: then arise from books as follows: instead of the atomic sentences, we form longer sentences from combinations of descriptions of points by ordered pairs. This simply leads to a longer book. I 208 Points: instead of them we could also take waves, or elementary particles. Properties: instead of the property of a space-time point to be occupied we could also choose properties such as charge, mass, and so on. From these we can make sequences: ‹P^1, P2,... x› this represents a point with several properties. Mass: is of course a determinable (see above).), i. e. we still need real numbers to indicate the proportion that determines the D-able. >Determinates/determinables. Therefore, we are dealing with a sequence that relates an individual to its properties: ‹r1, r2,... x› wherein ri is a real number. Def possible world/Bigelow/Pargetter: a lot of such sequences... {‹r1, r2,... x›, ‹r' 1, r' 2,... y›,... }} I 209 ...then represent a possible world (which is much richer than a Democritical world). >Democritus. 1. Cresswell, M. J. (1972). The world is everything that is the case. Australasen Journal of Philosophy 50, pp.1-13. 2. Cresswell, M. J. (1973). ogic and languages. London: Methuen. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Possible Worlds | Kripke | I 51f The expressions "winners" and "losers" do not refer to the same objects in all possible worlds. >Rigidity. I 51 Proper names are rigid designators: Nixon is Nixon in all possible worlds, but he is not the winner of the election in all the possible worlds (descriptions are non-rigid designators). >Names/Kripke. I 54 Possible worlds are no foreign countries. A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate it with. Cf. >Telescope theory of possible worlds. I 55 Possible world/Lewis: possible worlds are counterparts, not the same people. Kripke: then it is not about identification but about similarity relation. >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory, >Counterpart relation, >Possible world/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. I 90/91 We do not demand that the objects must exist in all possible worlds of course. Possible world/counterparts: strict identity: are molecules. Counterparts: are for example, tables (not identity of qualities, but of individual objects). Counterpart/Lewis: representatives of the theories that a possible world is only given qualitatively to us ("counterpart theory", David Lewis) argue that Aristotle and his counterparts "in other possible worlds" are "to be identified" with those things that Aristotle resembles most in his most important characteristics. I 123 ff Remember, though, that we describe the situation in our language, not in the language that would be used by people in that situation. Hesperus = Phosphorus is necessarily true (but situation possible in which Venus does not exist). >Morning star/evening star, >Nonexistence. I 143 Epistems: epistems are a different concept of possibility than in logic. The designation is done by us. >Naming/Kripke. --- Berka I 161 Def normal world/Kripke: a normal world is a maximum consistent set of sentences in which at least one statement is necessary. Def non-normal world/Kripke: in non-normal worlds each sentence of the type LB is false. Berka I 179 Definition possible world/Kripke: old: (1959)(1) a world is possible with the complete attribution of truth value, i.e. it is impossible to find two possible worlds in which each atomic formula is attributed to the same truth value (absolute concept of the possible world). New definition: (1963)(2): a world is possible in relation to another world (relatively possible world) Hughes/Cresswell: > accessibility relation. Reflexive accessibility: each possible world is in itself, i.e. that each statement that is true in H is also possible in H. Definition necessary: a formula A in H if it is true in every (possible) world accessible from H. Definition possible: dual to this: if A is possible in H1, iff a world H2 exists, which is possible in relation to H1, and true in A. Transitivity: H2RH3: any formula that is true in H3 is possible in H2. Problem: for traceability to H1 we need a reduction axiom: "what is possibly possible is possible" - you can also set the equivalence relation as accessibility relation. --- Hughes/Cresswell I 243 Non-normal world/possible world/Kripke: non-normal worlds are worlds in which each statement is possible without exception, i.e. including those of the form p. ~p rating: like in normal worlds (p ~ p.) Never 1 - but for modal formulas V (Ma) is always 1 in non-normal worlds, and hence V(La) is always 0, i.e. there are no necessary statements in non-normal worlds. this n-n world is at least accessible for a normal world, but no world is accessible to a n-n world - not even for these themselves. --- Frank I 114 Identity/Kripke: if an identity statement is true, it is always necessarily true, e.g. heat/motion of molecules, Cicero/Tullius, Water/H20 - these are compatible with the fact that they are truths a posteriori. But according to Leibniz: they it is not conceivable that one occurs without the other. Frank I 125 Identity/body/Kripke: "A" is the (rigid) name for the body of Descartes - it survived the body, i.e.: M (Descartes unequal A). This is not a modal fallacy, because A is rigid. Analog: a statue is dissimilar to molecule collection. 1) S.A. Kripke (1959): "A completeness theorem in modal logic", in: The journal of symbolic logic 24 (1), pp. 1-14. 2) S.A. Kripke (1962): The Undecidability of Monadic Modal Quantification Theory, in: Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, Vol. 8, pp. 113-116. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Quotation Marks | Quine | VII (f) 112 Quotes/Quine: square quotation marks: notation [] only upper half: is an expression marked as a noun m- variables are nouns if they occupy the place of names of sentences (Greek letters). See also Quote/Disquotation, Second Intention. X 33 Quotation Marks/Quine: it depends on them whether we are talking about words or the world. Quotation Marks/Quine: create the name of a sentence containing a name of snow, namely "snow". Truth-Predicate/Quine: by calling the sentence true, we call the snow white. Truth-Predicate: cancels the quotes. Sentence: we can say it simply by pronouncing it. Therefore we can dispense with quotation marks and truth-predicates. Truth-Predicate/Quine: we need it if we want to claim an infinite set of sentences that we can only define by talking about the sentences. Example: "All sentences of the form 'p or not p' are true". We need it to restore the reference to an object when we have used semantic ascension for generalization. >Truth Predicate/Quine Quotation Marks/Quine: the Tarski example cannot be generalized as follows: p' is true iff p because if you write the schema letter 'p' in quotation marks, you get the name of the 16th letter of the alphabet and not a general expression for sentences. III 67 Quotation Marks/Quine: form names (designations) e.g. we write "lies close to" not between Mannheim and Heidelberg, but between their designations (names). III 68 Rhyme/Quine: "Erden" (earth) rhymes with "werden" (become). Without quotation marks it would not only be wrong but ungrammatic and pointless. See also >Implication/Quine, >Conditional/Quine, >Mention/Quine, >Use. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Redundancy Theory | Brandom | I 433f Redundancy theory/Brandom: VsPragmatism: has not recognized that the significance of the corresponding assertions must be the same - VsRamsey: E.g. "Goldbach’s Conjecture" is not equivalent to "the Goldbach's Conjecture is true". - Solution: Originally posted eradication > set of sentences. VsRamsey. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Relevance | Schurz | I 107 Def relevance/logic/conclusion/Schurz: 1. A conclusion K of a valid argument is relevant gdw. there is no predicate in K which is simultaneously replaceable at some occurrences by any other predicate salva veritate. 2. The set of premises P of a valid argument is relevant if there is no predicate in P which can be replaced at a single occurrence by any predicate salva veritate. I 108 Ex P relevant, K irrelevant: p II- p v q,: p II- q > p ; p II- p u (q v ~q) (x)(Fx > Gx) II- (x)(Fx > Gx v Hx) P irrelevant, K relevant: p u q II p ; (x)(Fx v Hx > Gx) II- (x)(Fx > Gx) P relevant and K relevant: p > q ; p II- q ; p > q II ~q > ~p ; (x)(Fx > Gx) ; Fa II- Ga ; (x)(Fx II- Fa ; Fa II- (Ex(Fx) P irrelevant and K irrelevant: p u q II- p v r ; (x)(Fx u Gx) II- (x)(Fx v Hx) Notation: "II- " "logical consequence". Relevance/Logic/Schurz: Cognitive psychology has shown that the concept of validity in classical logic does not capture everything that is important for applied reasoning. Non-classical relevance logic/Anderson/Belnap: (1975)(1). Relevance/Logic/Schurz: solution: the relevant consequences of a theory must be decomposed into the smallest relevant conjunctive parts. Ex If A is a true consequence, and B is a false consequence of T, the conjunction A u B must not count as a third false consequence. PKN/Terminology/Schurz: prenex conjunctive normal form. >Logic, >Cognitive psychology. I 109 Def relevant consequence element/Schurz: 1. a formula A is called elementary iff it is in PKN (prenex conjunctive normal form) and not L equivalent to a conjunction of PKN formulas, which are all shorter than A. 2. K is a relevant consequence element of P iff K is an elementary relevant consequence of O. Def relevant content/relevance/logic/Schurz: (a) the relevant logical content of a proposition or set of propositions S is the set of its relevant consequence elements. Notation: Cr(S) b) the relevant empirical content of S is the set of those relevant consequence elements of S that are empirical and not analytic true propositions. Notation: Er(S). Each set of sentences is L equivalent to the set of its relevant consequence elements. 1. Anderson, A.R. and Belnap N. D. (1975). Entailment, The Logic of Relevance and Necessity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. I 125 Statistical relevance/correlation/qualitative/Schurz: A is (statistically) relevant for K iff. p(Kx I Ax) unequal p(Kx) A is irrelevant for K iff. p(Kx I Ax) = p(Kx) A is positively relevant for K iff A increases K's probability, i.e. k(Kx I Ax) > p(Kx) A is negatively relevant to Kx iff. A decreases K's probability. Simple correlation measure for qualitative characteristics: Corr(A,K) = p(Kx I Ax) - p(Kx) Corr(A,K) is always between +1 and -1. A is positively relevant if Korr (A,K) is positive, or negative if negative, irrelevant if 0. I 127 Information/relevance/statistics/Schurz: in the strict case the all proposition (x)(Ax u Bx) > Kx is irrelevant, (Bx) has no information. Rather, it follows logically from (x)(Ax > Kx) . In contrast: probabilistic: here the irrelevant generalization p(Kx I Ax u Bx) = r has additional information compared to p(Kx I Ax) = r because it does not follow from it, but expresses an independent fact. This information is needed if we want to predict Ka for an individual a to which both Aa and Ba apply. This is because, according to the principle of the closest reference class, we must ensure that conditionalization on Bs does not change the probability p(Ax I Ax). Since empirical predictions must always exclude a myriad of irrelevant assumptions, one does this by default: Default assumption/Schurz: one excludes something, or makes a decision, as long as there is nothing against it. Here against the irrelevance assumption. >Generalization, >Probability. >Probability theory. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Software Agents | AI Research | Norvig I 64 Software Agents/artificial intelligence/Russell/Norvig: agents base their actions on a direct mapping from states to actions. Such agents cannot operate well in environments for which this mapping would be too large to store and would take too long to learn. Goal-based agents, on the other hand, consider future actions and the desirability of their outcomes. Problem-solving agents use atomic representations, (…) that is, states of the world are considered as wholes, with no internal structure visible to the problem-solving algorithms. Norvig I 4 Computer agents are expected to do more: operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist over a prolonged time period, adapt to change, and create and pursue goals. A rational agent is one that acts so as to achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome. Norvig I 235 Knowledge based Agents/logical agents: The central component of a knowledge-based agent is its knowledge base, or KB. A knowledge base is a set of sentences. (Here “sentence” is used as a technical term. It is related but not identical to the sentences of English and other natural languages.) Each sentence is expressed in a language called a knowledge representation language and represents some assertion about the world. Norvig I 240 Semantics: The semantics defines the truth of each sentence with respect to each possible world. Model: instead of “possible world” we need to be more precise and use the term model. Whereas possible worlds might be thought of as (potentially) real environments that the agent might or might not be in, models are mathematical abstractions, each of which simply fixes the truth or falsehood of every relevant sentence. Norvig I 241 Knowledge Base: The KB can be thought of as a set of sentences or as a single sentence that asserts all the individual sentences. The KB is false in models that contradict what the agent knows (…). Norvig I 242 Completeness: an inference algorithm is complete if it can derive any sentence that is entailed. Fortunately, there are complete inference procedures for logics that are sufficiently expressive to handle many knowledge bases. Real world: if [the knowledge base] KB is true in the real world, then any sentence α derived from KB by a sound inference procedure is also true in the real world. So, while an inference process operates on “syntax”—internal physical configurations such as bits in registers or patterns of electrical blips in brains - the process corresponds Norvig I 243 to the real-world relationship whereby some aspect of the real world is the case by virtue of other aspects of the real world being the case. Grounding: grounding [is] the connection between logical reasoning processes and the real environment in which the agent exists. In particular, how do we know that KB is true in the real world? A simple answer is that the agent’s sensors create the connection. Cf. >Semantics, >Syntax; for the philosophical discussion see also >Facts/Wittgenstein, >States of Affairs/Wittgenstein, >Foundation/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 257 Forward chaining: The forward-chaining algorithm (…) determines if a single proposition symbol q - the query - is entailed by a knowledge base of definite clauses. It begins from known facts (positive literals) in the knowledge base. If all the premises of an implication are known, then its conclusion is added to the set of known facts. Norvig I 258 It is easy to see that forward chaining is sound: every inference is essentially an application of Modus Ponens. Forward chaining is also complete: every entailed atomic sentence will be derived. The easiest way to see this is to consider the final state of the inferred table (after the algorithm reaches a fixed point where no new inferences are possible). Cf. >Fixed points. Forward chaining is an example of the general concept of data-driven reasoning – that is, reasoning in which the focus of attention starts with the known data. It can be used within an agent to derive conclusions from incoming percepts, often without a specific query in mind. Backward chaining: works backward from the query. If the query q is known to be true, then no work is needed. Otherwise, the algorithm finds those implications in the knowledge base whose conclusion is q. If all the premises of one of those implications can be proved true (by backward chaining), then q is true. Backward chaining is a form of goal-directed reasoning. It is useful for answering specific questions such as “What shall I do now?” and “Where are my keys?” Often, the cost of backward chaining is much less than linear in the size of the knowledge base, because the process touches only relevant facts. Norvig I 275 History: John McCarthy’s paper “Programs with Common Sense” (McCarthy, 1958(1), 1968(2)) promulgated the notion of agents that use logical reasoning to mediate between percepts and actions. Allen Newell’s (1982)(3) article “The Knowledge Level” makes the case that rational agents can be described and analyzed at an abstract level defined by the knowledge they possess rather than the programs they run. The declarative and procedural approaches to AI are analyzed in depth by Boden (1977)(4). The debate was revived by, among others, Brooks (1991)(5) and Nilsson (1991)(6), and continues to this day (Shaparau et al., 2008)(7). Meanwhile, the declarative approach has spread into other areas of computer science such as networking (Loo et al., 2006)(8). Norvig I 278 Current state: The current state of theoretical understanding is summarized by Achlioptas (2009)(9). The satisfiability threshold conjecture states that, for each k, there is a sharp satisfiability threshold rk, such that as the number of variables n→∞, instances below the threshold are satisfiable with probability 1, while those above the threshold are unsatisfiable with probability 1. The conjecture was not quite proved by Friedgut (1999)(10): a sharp threshold exists but its location might depend on n even as n → ∞. Despite significant progress in asymptotic analysis of the threshold location for large k (Achlioptas and Peres, 2004(11); Achlioptas et al., 2007(12)), all that can be proved for k=3 is that it lies in the range [3.52,4.51]. Current theory suggests that a peak in the run time of a SAT solver is not necessarily related to the satisfiability threshold, but instead to a phase transition in the solution distribution and structure of SAT instances. Empirical results due to Coarfa et al. (2003)(13) support this view. In fact, algorithms such as survey propagation (Parisi and Zecchina, 2002(14); Maneva et al., 2007(15)) take advantage of special properties of random SAT instances near the satisfiability threshold and greatly outperform general SAT solvers on such instances. Neural networks: The idea of building agents with propositional logic can be traced back to the seminal paper of McCulloch and Pitts (1943)(16), which initiated the field of neural networks. >Frame problem, >Environment/AI research, >Universe/AI research, >Decisions/AI research, >Uncertainty/AI research. 1. McCarthy, J. (1958). Programs with common sense. In Proc. Symposium on Mechanisation of Thought Processes, Vol. 1, pp. 77–84. 2. McCarthy, J. (1968). Programs with common sense. In Minsky, M. L. (Ed.), Semantic Information Processing, pp. 403–418. MIT Press. 3. Newell, A. (1982). The knowledge level. AIJ, 18(1), 82–127. 4. Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. Basic Books 5. Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. AIJ, 47(1–3), 139–159. 6. Nilsson, N. J. (1991). Logic and artificial intelligence. AIJ, 47(1–3), 31–56. 7. Shaparau, D., Pistore, M., and Traverso, P. (2008). Fusing procedural and declarative planning goals for nondeterministic domains. In AAAI-08. 8. Loo, B. T., Condie, T., Garofalakis, M., Gay, D. E., Hellerstein, J. M., Maniatis, P., Ramakrishnan, R., Roscoe, T., and Stoica, I. (2006). Declarative networking: Language, execution and optimization. In SIGMOD-06. 9. Achlioptas, D. (2009). Random satisfiability. In Biere, A., Heule, M., van Maaren, H., and Walsh, T. (Eds.), Handbook of Satisfiability. IOS Press. 10. Friedgut, E. (1999). Necessary and sufficient conditions for sharp thresholds of graph properties, and the k-SAT problem. J. American Mathematical Society, 12, 1017–1054. 11. Achlioptas, D. and Peres, Y. (2004). The threshold for random k-SAT is 2k log 2−o(k). J. American Mathematical Society, 17(4), 947–973. 12. Achlioptas, D., Naor, A., and Peres, Y. (2007). On the maximum satisfiability of random formulas. JACM, 54(2). 13. Coarfa, C., Demopoulos, D., Aguirre, A., Subramanian, D., and Yardi, M. (2003). Random 3-SAT: The plot thickens. Constraints, 8(3), 243–261. 14. Parisi, M. M. G. and Zecchina, R. (2002). Analytic and algorithmic solution of random satisfiability problems. Science, 297, 812–815. 15. Maneva, E., Mossel, E., and Wainwright, M. J. (2007). A new look at survey propagation and its generalizations. JACM, 54(4). 16. McCulloch, W. S. and Pitts, W. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5, 115–137. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Software Agents | Norvig | Norvig I 64 Software Agents/artificial intelligence/Russell/Norvig: agents base their actions on a direct mapping from states to actions. Such agents cannot operate well in environments for which this mapping would be too large to store and would take too long to learn. Goal-based agents, on the other hand, consider future actions and the desirability of their outcomes. Problem-solving agents use atomic representations, (…) that is, states of the world are considered as wholes, with no internal structure visible to the problem-solving algorithms. Norvig I 4 Computer agents are expected to do more: operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist over a prolonged time period, adapt to change, and create and pursue goals. A rational agent is one that acts so as to achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome. Norvig I 235 Knowledge based Agents/logical agents: The central component of a knowledge-based agent is its knowledge base, or KB. A knowledge base is a set of sentences. (Here “sentence” is used as a technical term. It is related but not identical to the sentences of English and other natural languages.) Each sentence is expressed in a language called a knowledge representation language and represents some assertion about the world. Norvig I 240 Semantics: The semantics defines the truth of each sentence with respect to each possible world. Model: instead of “possible world” we need to be more precise and use the term model. Whereas possible worlds might be thought of as (potentially) real environments that the agent might or might not be in, models are mathematical abstractions, each of which simply fixes the truth or falsehood of every relevant sentence. Norvig I 241 Knowledge Base: The KB can be thought of as a set of sentences or as a single sentence that asserts all the individual sentences. The KB is false in models that contradict what the agent knows (…). Norvig I 242 Completeness: an inference algorithm is complete if it can derive any sentence that is entailed. Fortunately, there are complete inference procedures for logics that are sufficiently expressive to handle many knowledge bases. Real world: if [the knowledge base] KB is true in the real world, then any sentence α derived from KB by a sound inference procedure is also true in the real world. So, while an inference process operates on “syntax”—internal physical configurations such as bits in registers or patterns of electrical blips in brains - the process corresponds Norvig I 243 to the real-world relationship whereby some aspect of the real world is the case by virtue of other aspects of the real world being the case. Grounding: grounding [is] the connection between logical reasoning processes and the real environment in which the agent exists. In particular, how do we know that KB is true in the real world? A simple answer is that the agent’s sensors create the connection. Cf. >Semantics, >Syntax; for the philosophical discussion see also >Facts/Wittgenstein, >States of Affairs/Wittgenstein, >Foundation/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 257 Forward chaining: The forward-chaining algorithm (…) determines if a single proposition symbol q - the query - is entailed by a knowledge base of definite clauses. It begins from known facts (positive literals) in the knowledge base. If all the premises of an implication are known, then its conclusion is added to the set of known facts. Norvig I 258 It is easy to see that forward chaining is sound: every inference is essentially an application of Modus Ponens. Forward chaining is also complete: every entailed atomic sentence will be derived. The easiest way to see this is to consider the final state of the inferred table (after the algorithm reaches a fixed point where no new inferences are possible). Cf. >Fixed points. Forward chaining is an example of the general concept of data-driven reasoning – that is, reasoning in which the focus of attention starts with the known data. It can be used within an agent to derive conclusions from incoming percepts, often without a specific query in mind. Backward chaining: works backward from the query. If the query q is known to be true, then no work is needed. Otherwise, the algorithm finds those implications in the knowledge base whose conclusion is q. If all the premises of one of those implications can be proved true (by backward chaining), then q is true. Backward chaining is a form of goal-directed reasoning. It is useful for answering specific questions such as “What shall I do now?” and “Where are my keys?” Often, the cost of backward chaining is much less than linear in the size of the knowledge base, because the process touches only relevant facts. Norvig I 275 History: John McCarthy’s paper “Programs with Common Sense” (McCarthy, 1958(1), 1968(2)) promulgated the notion of agents that use logical reasoning to mediate between percepts and actions. Allen Newell’s (1982)(3) article “The Knowledge Level” makes the case that rational agents can be described and analyzed at an abstract level defined by the knowledge they possess rather than the programs they run. The declarative and procedural approaches to AI are analyzed in depth by Boden (1977)(4). The debate was revived by, among others, Brooks (1991)(5) and Nilsson (1991)(6), and continues to this day (Shaparau et al., 2008)(7). Meanwhile, the declarative approach has spread into other areas of computer science such as networking (Loo et al., 2006)(8). Norvig I 278 Current state: The current state of theoretical understanding is summarized by Achlioptas (2009)(9). The satisfiability threshold conjecture states that, for each k, there is a sharp satisfiability threshold rk, such that as the number of variables n→∞, instances below the threshold are satisfiable with probability 1, while those above the threshold are unsatisfiable with probability 1. The conjecture was not quite proved by Friedgut (1999)(10): a sharp threshold exists but its location might depend on n even as n → ∞. Despite significant progress in asymptotic analysis of the threshold location for large k (Achlioptas and Peres, 2004(11); Achlioptas et al., 2007(12)), all that can be proved for k=3 is that it lies in the range [3.52,4.51]. Current theory suggests that a peak in the run time of a SAT solver is not necessarily related to the satisfiability threshold, but instead to a phase transition in the solution distribution and structure of SAT instances. Empirical results due to Coarfa et al. (2003)(13) support this view. In fact, algorithms such as survey propagation (Parisi and Zecchina, 2002(14); Maneva et al., 2007(15)) take advantage of special properties of random SAT instances near the satisfiability threshold and greatly outperform general SAT solvers on such instances. Neural networks: The idea of building agents with propositional logic can be traced back to the seminal paper of McCulloch and Pitts (1943)(16), which initiated the field of neural networks. >Frame problem. 1. McCarthy, J. (1958). Programs with common sense. In Proc. Symposium on Mechanisation of Thought Processes, Vol. 1, pp. 77–84. 2. McCarthy, J. (1968). Programs with common sense. In Minsky, M. L. (Ed.), Semantic Information Processing, pp. 403–418. MIT Press. 3. Newell, A. (1982). The knowledge level. AIJ, 18(1), 82–127. 4. Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. Basic Books 5. Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. AIJ, 47(1–3), 139–159. 6. Nilsson, N. J. (1991). Logic and artificial intelligence. AIJ, 47(1–3), 31–56. 7. Shaparau, D., Pistore, M., and Traverso, P. (2008). Fusing procedural and declarative planning goals for nondeterministic domains. In AAAI-08. 8. Loo, B. T., Condie, T., Garofalakis, M., Gay, D. E., Hellerstein, J. M., Maniatis, P., Ramakrishnan, R., Roscoe, T., and Stoica, I. (2006). Declarative networking: Language, execution and optimization. In SIGMOD-06. 9. Achlioptas, D. (2009). Random satisfiability. In Biere, A., Heule, M., van Maaren, H., and Walsh, T. (Eds.), Handbook of Satisfiability. IOS Press. 10. Friedgut, E. (1999). Necessary and sufficient conditions for sharp thresholds of graph properties, and the k-SAT problem. J. American Mathematical Society, 12, 1017–1054. 11. Achlioptas, D. and Peres, Y. (2004). The threshold for random k-SAT is 2k log 2−o(k). J. American Mathematical Society, 17(4), 947–973. 12. Achlioptas, D., Naor, A., and Peres, Y. (2007). On the maximum satisfiability of random formulas. JACM, 54(2). 13. Coarfa, C., Demopoulos, D., Aguirre, A., Subramanian, D., and Yardi, M. (2003). Random 3-SAT: The plot thickens. Constraints, 8(3), 243–261. 14. Parisi, M. M. G. and Zecchina, R. (2002). Analytic and algorithmic solution of random satisfiability problems. Science, 297, 812–815. 15. Maneva, E., Mossel, E., and Wainwright, M. J. (2007). A new look at survey propagation and its generalizations. JACM, 54(4). 16. McCulloch, W. S. and Pitts, W. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5, 115–137. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Software Agents | Russell | Norvig I 64 Software Agents/artificial intelligence/Russell/Norvig: agents base their actions on a direct mapping from states to actions. Such agents cannot operate well in environments for which this mapping would be too large to store and would take too long to learn. Goal-based agents, on the other hand, consider future actions and the desirability of their outcomes. Problem-solving agents use atomic representations, (…) that is, states of the world are considered as wholes, with no internal structure visible to the problem-solving algorithms. Norvig I 4 Computer agents are expected to do more: operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist over a prolonged time period, adapt to change, and create and pursue goals. A rational agent is one that acts so as to achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome. Norvig I 235 Knowledge based Agents/logical agents: The central component of a knowledge-based agent is its knowledge base, or KB. A knowledge base is a set of sentences. (Here “sentence” is used as a technical term. It is related but not identical to the sentences of English and other natural languages.) Each sentence is expressed in a language called a knowledge representation language and represents some assertion about the world. Norvig I 240 Semantics: The semantics defines the truth of each sentence with respect to each possible world. Model: instead of “possible world” we need to be more precise and use the term model. Whereas possible worlds might be thought of as (potentially) real environments that the agent might or might not be in, models are mathematical abstractions, each of which simply fixes the truth or falsehood of every relevant sentence. Norvig I 241 Knowledge Base: The KB can be thought of as a set of sentences or as a single sentence that asserts all the individual sentences. The KB is false in models that contradict what the agent knows (…). Norvig I 242 Completeness: an inference algorithm is complete if it can derive any sentence that is entailed. Fortunately, there are complete inference procedures for logics that are sufficiently expressive to handle many knowledge bases. Real world: if [the knowledge base] KB is true in the real world, then any sentence α derived from KB by a sound inference procedure is also true in the real world. So, while an inference process operates on “syntax”—internal physical configurations such as bits in registers or patterns of electrical blips in brains - the process corresponds Norvig I 243 to the real-world relationship whereby some aspect of the real world is the case by virtue of other aspects of the real world being the case. Grounding: grounding [is] the connection between logical reasoning processes and the real environment in which the agent exists. In particular, how do we know that KB is true in the real world? A simple answer is that the agent’s sensors create the connection. Cf. >Semantics, >Syntax; for the philosophical discussion see also >Facts/Wittgenstein, >States of Affairs/Wittgenstein, >Foundation/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 257 Forward chaining: The forward-chaining algorithm (…) determines if a single proposition symbol q - the query - is entailed by a knowledge base of definite clauses. It begins from known facts (positive literals) in the knowledge base. If all the premises of an implication are known, then its conclusion is added to the set of known facts. Norvig I 258 It is easy to see that forward chaining is sound: every inference is essentially an application of Modus Ponens. Forward chaining is also complete: every entailed atomic sentence will be derived. The easiest way to see this is to consider the final state of the inferred table (after the algorithm reaches a fixed point where no new inferences are possible). Cf. >Fixed points. Forward chaining is an example of the general concept of data-driven reasoning – that is, reasoning in which the focus of attention starts with the known data. It can be used within an agent to derive conclusions from incoming percepts, often without a specific query in mind. Backward chaining: works backward from the query. If the query q is known to be true, then no work is needed. Otherwise, the algorithm finds those implications in the knowledge base whose conclusion is q. If all the premises of one of those implications can be proved true (by backward chaining), then q is true. Backward chaining is a form of goal-directed reasoning. It is useful for answering specific questions such as “What shall I do now?” and “Where are my keys?” Often, the cost of backward chaining is much less than linear in the size of the knowledge base, because the process touches only relevant facts. Norvig I 275 History: John McCarthy’s paper “Programs with Common Sense” (McCarthy, 1958(1), 1968(2)) promulgated the notion of agents that use logical reasoning to mediate between percepts and actions. Allen Newell’s (1982)(3) article “The Knowledge Level” makes the case that rational agents can be described and analyzed at an abstract level defined by the knowledge they possess rather than the programs they run. The declarative and procedural approaches to AI are analyzed in depth by Boden (1977)(4). The debate was revived by, among others, Brooks (1991)(5) and Nilsson (1991)(6), and continues to this day (Shaparau et al., 2008)(7). Meanwhile, the declarative approach has spread into other areas of computer science such as networking (Loo et al., 2006)(8). Norvig I 278 Current state: The current state of theoretical understanding is summarized by Achlioptas (2009)(9). The satisfiability threshold conjecture states that, for each k, there is a sharp satisfiability threshold rk, such that as the number of variables n→∞, instances below the threshold are satisfiable with probability 1, while those above the threshold are unsatisfiable with probability 1. The conjecture was not quite proved by Friedgut (1999)(10): a sharp threshold exists but its location might depend on n even as n → ∞. Despite significant progress in asymptotic analysis of the threshold location for large k (Achlioptas and Peres, 2004(11); Achlioptas et al., 2007(12)), all that can be proved for k=3 is that it lies in the range [3.52,4.51]. Current theory suggests that a peak in the run time of a SAT solver is not necessarily related to the satisfiability threshold, but instead to a phase transition in the solution distribution and structure of SAT instances. Empirical results due to Coarfa et al. (2003)(13) support this view. In fact, algorithms such as survey propagation (Parisi and Zecchina, 2002(14); Maneva et al., 2007(15)) take advantage of special properties of random SAT instances near the satisfiability threshold and greatly outperform general SAT solvers on such instances. Neural networks: The idea of building agents with propositional logic can be traced back to the seminal paper of McCulloch and Pitts (1943)(16), which initiated the field of neural networks. >Frame problem. 1. McCarthy, J. (1958). Programs with common sense. In Proc. Symposium on Mechanisation of Thought Processes, Vol. 1, pp. 77–84. 2. McCarthy, J. (1968). Programs with common sense. In Minsky, M. L. (Ed.), Semantic Information Processing, pp. 403–418. MIT Press. 3. Newell, A. (1982). The knowledge level. AIJ, 18(1), 82–127. 4. Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. Basic Books 5. Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. AIJ, 47(1–3), 139–159. 6. Nilsson, N. J. (1991). Logic and artificial intelligence. AIJ, 47(1–3), 31–56. 7. Shaparau, D., Pistore, M., and Traverso, P. (2008). Fusing procedural and declarative planning goals for nondeterministic domains. In AAAI-08. 8. Loo, B. T., Condie, T., Garofalakis, M., Gay, D. E., Hellerstein, J. M., Maniatis, P., Ramakrishnan, R., Roscoe, T., and Stoica, I. (2006). Declarative networking: Language, execution and optimization. In SIGMOD-06. 9. Achlioptas, D. (2009). Random satisfiability. In Biere, A., Heule, M., van Maaren, H., and Walsh, T. (Eds.), Handbook of Satisfiability. IOS Press. 10. Friedgut, E. (1999). Necessary and sufficient conditions for sharp thresholds of graph properties, and the k-SAT problem. J. American Mathematical Society, 12, 1017–1054. 11. Achlioptas, D. and Peres, Y. (2004). The threshold for random k-SAT is 2k log 2−o(k). J. American Mathematical Society, 17(4), 947–973. 12. Achlioptas, D., Naor, A., and Peres, Y. (2007). On the maximum satisfiability of random formulas. JACM, 54(2). 13. Coarfa, C., Demopoulos, D., Aguirre, A., Subramanian, D., and Yardi, M. (2003). Random 3-SAT: The plot thickens. Constraints, 8(3), 243–261. 14. Parisi, M. M. G. and Zecchina, R. (2002). Analytic and algorithmic solution of random satisfiability problems. Science, 297, 812–815. 15. Maneva, E., Mossel, E., and Wainwright, M. J. (2007). A new look at survey propagation and its generalizations. JACM, 54(4). 16. McCulloch, W. S. and Pitts, W. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5, 115–137. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Truth Maintenance | AI Research | Norvig I 460 Truth maintenance/AI research/Norvig/Russell: We have seen that many of the inferences drawn by a knowledge representation system will have only default status, rather than being absolutely certain. Inevitably, some of these inferred facts will turn out to be wrong and will have to be retracted in the face of new information. This process is called belief revision. Belief revision: is often contrasted with belief update, which occurs when a knowledge base is revised to reflect a change in the world rather than new information about a fixed world. Belief update combines belief revision with reasoning about time and change; it is also related to the process of filtering. Suppose that a knowledge base KB contains a sentence P - perhaps a default conclusion recorded by a forward-chaining algorithm, or perhaps just an incorrect assertion - and we want to execute TELL(KB, ¬P). To avoid creating a contradiction, we must first execute RETRACT(KB, P). Norvig I 461 Problem: For example, the implication P ⇒ Q might have been used to add Q. The obvious “solution” - retracting all sentences inferred from P - fails because such sentences may have other justifications besides P. For example, if R and R ⇒ Q are also in the KB, then Q does not have to be removed after all. Truth maintenance systems, or TMSs, are designed to handle exactly these kinds of complications. One simple approach to truth maintenance is to keep track of the order in which sentences are told to the knowledge base by numbering them from P1 to Pn. A more efficient approach JTMS is the justification-based truth maintenance system, or JTMS. In a JTMS, each sentence in the knowledge base is annotated with a justification consisting of the set of sentences from which it was inferred. The JTMS assumes that sentences that are considered once will probably be considered again, so rather than deleting a sentence from the knowledge base entirely when it loses all justifications, we merely mark the sentence as being out of the knowledge base. Norvig I 462 An assumption-based truth ATMS maintenance system, or ATMS, makes this type of context switching between hypothetical worlds particularly efficient. An ATMS represents all the states that have ever been considered at the same time. >Truth transfer/Philosophical theories. Norvig I 472 The study of truth maintenance systems began with the TMS (Doyle, 1979)(1) and RUP (McAllester, 1980)(2) systems, both of which were essentially JTMSs. Forbus and de Kleer (1993)(3) explain in depth how TMSs can be used in AI applications. Nayak and Williams (1997)(4) show how an efficient incremental TMS called an ITMS makes it feasible to plan the operations of a NASA spacecraft in real time. 1. Doyle, J. (1979). A truth maintenance system. AIJ, 12(3), 231–272 2. McAllester,D. A. (1980). An outlook on truth maintenance. Ai memo 551, MIT AI Laboratory 3. Forbus, K. D. and de Kleer, J. (1993). Building Problem Solvers. MIT Press. 4. Nayak, P. and Williams, B. (1997). Fast context switching in real-time propositional reasoning. In AAAI-97, pp. 50–56 |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Armstrong, D. | Lewis Vs Armstrong, D. | V 353 "New Work for a Theory of Universals" (Armstrong 1983)(1): Universals/Armstrong: Armstrong's theory of universals is supposed to be the solution for the problem of the One and the Many >Universals/Armstrong, >Universals/Lewis. LewisVsArmstrong: but it allows for either nominalist solutions or for no solution of any kind. --- Schwarz I 71 Combinatorialism/Armstrong: combinatorialism merely consists of several fundamental properties for which - contrary to colours - any combination should be possible (1986(2), §7). LewisVs: 1986a(3), 86, HellerVs (1998)(4): it is unclear whether this is actually possible. LewisVsArmstrong: as such the problem is not solved, it only allows different interpretations of the descriptions: when does a set of sentences represent the fact that there are donkeys if there is no mention of donkeys? It does represent this fact if the sentences imply the existence of donkeys (1986e(5), 150-157). Problem: modality is required. VsVs: it could be stated that the relationship between the distribution of fundamental properties and of all other truths is analytic, and can be characterized without requiring primitive modal vocabulary. (2002b(6), Heller 1996, see below Chapter 11, LewisVs: 1992a(8), 209). Schwarz I 118 Laws of Nature/LoN/DretskeVsLewis/TooleyVsLewis/ArmstrongVsLewis: there is something missing in Lewis’ laws of nature: for Lewis, laws of nature are simple regularities. But they should be more than that. Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, therefore properties. Since regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds with precisely the same local events can nicely differ in their laws of nature. For one world, it may be a regularity, for the other, a relation of universals. Relation of universals: is the foundation for everything and cannot be analyzed. To state that there is a relation between F's and G's because all F's are G's is not enough. This would be the regularity theory. SchwarzVs: this leads to problems with not instantiated universals (Mellor 1980(9), §6). Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong/LewisVsTooley/LewisVsDretske: if laws of nature express fundamental relations between universals which are logically independent from observable regularities why do we assume that physics will tell us something about laws of nature? Schwarz I 119 What is the use of universals? Physicists only want to observe regularities. And what is then the relation between universals and regularities? Additional explanations will then be needed! How could a rule-maker exclude that N(F,G) is valid, but some F's are nevertheless not G's. It is not resolved by giving a name to the "rule-maker" like Armstrong does with the term "necessitation". Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong: better: regularities which are justified because of a primitive relation between universals. It is a relationship which also exists in possible worlds in which laws of nature are not valid. It is rather more obscure, but at least not a miracle anymore that all F's are G's if a law of nature demands it. Schwarz I 124 Probability/LewisVsArmstrong: VsFundamental probability property: fundamental properties cannot fulfill the role which we attribute to probability. Schwarz I 139 Cause/causation/Armstrong: absence is not a real cause. LewisVsArmstrong: yes, it is. However, it is so common that is it ignored. Problem: numerous absences in vacuum. Schwarz I 140 Solution/Lewis: absences are absolutely nothing, there is nothing. Problem: if absence is only an empty space-time region, why would oxygen - and not nitrogen- only exist because of absence? Solution/Lewis: "influence", small increase of probability. Schwarz I 141 Counterfactual dependence as well between the how, when and where of the event. Schwarz I 231 Def Principle of truth-maker/to make truth/Armstrong/Martin/Schwarz: all truths must be based on the ontology. Strong form: for each truth, there is something that makes it true. Its existence necessarily implies the truth. LewisVsArmstrong: that is too strong, e.g. the example "no unicorns exist" is true, not because there is something specific, but because unicorns really do not exist (1992a(8), 204, 2001b(10), 611f). Truthmaker: a truthmaker would be an object here which only exists in worlds in which there are no unicorns. Problem: why is it not possible for this object to also exist in worlds in which there are unicorns? Answer: such an object would be a contradiction to the principle of recombination. SchwarzVsLewis: but this is not true: the truth-maker for "no unicorns exist" could be an object which essentially lives in a possible world without unicorns. However, the object could very well have duplicates in the possible worlds with unicorns. The counterpart relation is not a relation of intrinsic resemblance. To make truth/predicate/Armstrong/Schwarz: (Armstrong 1997(11), 205f): if object A has the property F, an object must exist which implies the existence of this fact. LewisVsArmstrong: why can this object not exist, although A is not F (1998b)(12)?. If A is F in one world, but it is not so in the other world, why is it always necessary to have something that exists in one possible world, but is missing in the other world. Two possible worlds are only different on the grounds of the characteristics the objects have in their worlds. ((s) So different characteristics in an area that remains constant). Characteristics/truth-maker/Lewis: a truth-maker is not needed for something that has a (basic) characteristic: the sentence "A is F" is true because A has the characteristic F. That is all (1998b(12), 219). Def principle of truth-maker/LewisVsArmstrong/Schwarz: only the following will then remain: truth supervenes upon the things that exist, and upon perfect natural characteristics which it chooses to instantiate (1992a(8), 207, 1994a(13), 225, Bigelow 1988(14), §25). Whenever two possibilities are different from each other, there are either different objects in them or these objects have different fundamental characteristics (1992a(8), 206, 2001b(10), §4). Schwarz I 232 N.B.: if there are possibilities that are qualitatively indistinguishable, but numerically different (which Lewis neither states nor denies, 1986e(5), 224), the principle must be limited to qualitative truths or characteristics (1992a(8), 206f). If there are none, simplification is possible: no other two possibilities are exactly the same regarding which objects exist as well as the fundamental characteristics are instantiated. ((s) If the distribution of fundamental characteristics sets everything, then the objects are set as well. As such, the possible worlds are only different regarding their characteristics, but these are naturally set.) Schwarz: this can be amplified. 1. D. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a Law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. D. M. Armstrong [1986]: “The Nature of Possibility”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16: 575–594. 3. D. Lewis [1986a]: “Against Structural Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46. 4. Mark Heller [1998]: “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds”. Journal of Philosophy, 95: 293–316. 5. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 6. D. Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97. 7. Mark Heller [1996]: “Ersatz Worlds and Ontological Disagreement”. Acta Analytica, 40:35–44. 8.D. Lewis [1992a]: “Critical Notice of Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224. In [Lewis 1999a] als “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility”. 9. David H. Mellor [1980]: “Necessities and universals in natural laws”. In David H. Mellor (Hg.) Science, belief and behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10. D. Lewis [2001b]: “Truthmaking and Difference-Making”. Noˆus, 35: 602–615. 11. D. M. [1997]: A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12. D. Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30. 13. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 14. John Bigelow [1988]: The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Best Explanation | Fraassen Vs Best Explanation | Field I 15 Principle of the Best Explanation/Field: Suppose we have a) certain beliefs about the "phenomena" that we do not want to give up b) this class of phenomena is large and complex c) we have a pretty good (simple) explanation that is not ad hoc and from which the consequences of the phenomena follow d) one of the assumptions in the explanation is assertion S and we are sure that no explanation is possible without S. Best Explanation: then we have a strong reason to believe S. False: "The phenomena are as they would be if explanation E was correct": As If/Field: As-if assertions that are piggyback passengers on true explanations may not be constructed as explanations themselves (at least not ad hoc). Then the principle is not empty: it excludes the possibility that we accept a large and complex set of phenomena as a brute fact. (van FraassenVsBest Explanation: 1980) Best Explanation/BE/Field: the best explanation often leads us to believe something that we could also test independently by observation, but also to beliefs about unobservable things, or unobservable beliefs about observable things. Observation: should not make a difference here! In any case, our beliefs go beyond what is observed. I 16 Important argument: if no test was done, it should make no difference in the status of the evidence between cases where an observation is possible and those where no observation is possible! A stronger principle of the best explanation could be limited to observable instances of belief. FieldVs: but that would cripple our beliefs about observable things and would be entirely ad hoc. Unobserved things: a principle could be formulated that allowed the inference on observed things - that have been unobserved so far! - while we do not believe the explanation as such. FieldVs: that would be even more ad hoc! I 25 VsBenacerraf: bases himself on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. I 90 Theory/Properties/Fraassen: theories have three types of properties: 1) purely internal, logical: axiomatization, consistency, various kinds of completeness. Problem: It was not possible to accommodate simplicity here. Some authors have suggested that simple theories are more likely to be true. FraassenVsSimplicity: it is absurd to suppose that the world is more likely to be simple than that it was complicated. But that is metaphysics. 2) Semantic Properties: and relations: concern the relation of theory to the world. Or to the facts in the world about which the theory is. Main Properties: truth and empirical adequacy. 3) pragmatic: are there any that are philosophically relevant? Of course, the language of science is context-dependent, but is that pragmatic? I 91 Context-Dependent/Context-Independent/Theory/Science/Fraassen: theories can also be formulated in a context-independent language, what Quine calls Def "External Sentence"/Quine. Therefore it seems as though we do not need pragmatics to interpret science. Vs: this may be applicable to theories, but not to other parts of scientific activity: Context-Dependent/Fraassen: are a) Evaluations of theories, in particular, the term "explained" (explanation) is radically context-dependent. b) the language of the utilization (use) of theories to explain phenomena is radically context-dependent. Difference: a) asserting that Newton’s theory explains the tides ((s) mention). b) explaining the tides with Newton’s theory (use). Here we do not use the word "explains". Pragmatic: is also the immersion in a theoretical world view, in science. Basic components: speaker, listener, syntactic unit (sentence or set of sentences), circumstances. Important argument: In this case, there may be a tacit understanding to let yourself be guided when making inferences by something that goes beyond mere logic. I 92 Stalnaker/Terminology: he calls this tacit understanding a "pragmatic presupposition". (FraassenVsExplanation as a Superior Goal). I 197 Reality/Correspondence/Current/Real/Modal/Fraassen: Do comply the substructures of phase spaces or result sequences in probability spaces with something that happens in a real, but not actual, situation? ((s) distinction reality/actuality?) Fraassen: it may be unfair to formulate it like that. Some philosophical positions still affirm it. Modality/Metaphysics/Fraassen: pro modality (modal interpretation of frequency), but that does not set me down on a metaphysical position. FraassenVsMetaphysics. I 23 Explanatory Power/Criterion/Theory/Fraassen: how good a choice is explanatory power as a criterion for selecting a theory? In any case, it is a criterion at all. Fraassen: Thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars). Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/Salmon/Reichenbach: Thesis: it is incomplete as long as any regularity remains unexplained (FraassenVs). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Possible Worlds | Verschiedene Vs Possible Worlds | Schwarz I 41 Def Possible World/poss.w./Lewis: early: ways how things could be. Van InwagenVs: These are characteristics rather than concrete universes. (StalnakerVsLewis, RichardsVsLewis: ditto). Lewis: later: possible worlds correspond to ways how things could be. Schwarz: but we do not necessarily have to introduce special entities for it. They could also be grammatical illusions. Even considering possible worlds as entities does not determine what kind of entities they are. E.g.: Def Possible World/Stalnaker/Schwarz: the determination as (maximum) ways how things could be: then they are special properties or propositions. (Stalnaker 1976(1), Robert Adams, 1974(2)). Def Possible World/Plantinga: (1974(3), Chapter 4) Maximum circumstances. According to this, a distinction must be made between the existence and existence of a state of affairs. Example: The state of affairs that donkeys could speak exists, but it does not exist. (Existence: Possibility - Existence: Reality? - rather reality (as another term): contains possibilities). Schw I 42 Def Possible World/Decision Theory/Richard Jeffrey: (1965(4),196f): maximum consistent sentence sets. Since the phrase "donkeys can speak" is consistent, there is a maximum consistent set of sentences that contains it. We express this when we say that there is a possible world... Def Surrogate Four-Dimensionalism/Schwarz: These positions correspond to the facts of the philosophy of time (see above 22), which perceives other times as abstract entities of a different kind from the present. LewisVs: other times are just as real. Def Co-Existence/Lewis: two things are in the same world, iff there is a space-time path from one to the other. Consequence: Possible Worlds/Lewis: are space-time isolated! So there is no causality between them. No event in one possible world causes another in another possible world. This means further that possible worlds just were not created by us! We also cannot see, measure or visit them from here. (1986e(5),3,80f). Lewis does not care if you call your possible world concrete or abstract. This has no clear meaning (1986e(5),§1,7). Real World/Lewis: what makes it different from the other possible worlds? Not its concreteness, but the fact that we live in it. Objectively, the real world is as little excellent as any other, or as the present. "Actual"/Lewis: is an indexical expression like "here" or "now". Therefore, we cannot meaningfully ask whether we live in the real world or in a possible one. Likewise, we cannot ask whether we live in the present or perhaps in the future. Reality/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis's analysis of "real" is also shared by opponents of modal realism: Van InwagenVsModal Realism/InwagenVsLewis: "Concretism". Stalnaker: "extreme modal realism". Lewis IV 85 Meaning/Reference/Theoretical Terms/TT/Lewis: if we have the denotation of theoretical terms, what about its meaning? But we already have it! Because we have specified its denotation in every possible world. Def Sense/Lewis: Denotation of an expression in each possible world. I.e. in every possible world the theoretical terms must name the components of whatever the theory T realizes uniquely in this world. If there is no realization in the world, they do not name anything. Def Sense/Lewis: therefore we can say, the sense is a function (of all or some) possible worlds on named entities. VsPossible Worlds/VsPossible Worlds/Lewis: some call them occult, VsVs: but they are not more occult than e.g. infinite amounts, which we can handle very well. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1976]: “Possible Worlds”. Nous, 10: 65–75 2. Robert M. Adams [1974]: “Theories of Actuality”. Noˆus, 8: 211–231 3. Alvin Plantinga [1974]: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University P 4. Richard Jeffrey [1965]: The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Structuralism | Chomsky Vs Structuralism | Searle VIII 409 ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. Old: object of investigation: an arbitrary set of sentences. Classifications, corresponding discovery procedures. New: object of investigation: the basic language knowledge of the speaker. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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