Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| A priori | Kripke | I 46 Necessary/not a priori: e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: Goldbach's conjecture will turn out to be true or false but then by necessity. I 75f A priori/not necessary: e.g. determining the reference of the term "one meter"/stadard meter: it is possible to know a priori that the length of this stick is one meter, and this would not be seen as a necessary truth. I 127 Difference: a priori/necessary: Kripke: one could empirically discover the essence (e.g. water = H20). >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity de re, >standard meter, >Necessity a posteriori. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Definitions | Kripke | III 342 Definition/Kripke: a definition is a "great fundamental principle". Definitions must be formulated in a language already understood - then there is little room for alternative interpretations of a metalanguage (even if the syntactic and semantic structure can be interpreted differently). >Loewenheim, >Meta language, >Object language. III 390 Implicit Definition/Kripke: an implicit definition is given by rule - otherwise no generalizations in finite systems can be derived from (infinite) instances. III 392 Definition/Kripke: no inductive definition is possible if it does not start with a general characterization of the atomic (basic) case. III 393 Direct definition: a direct definition is not recursive. Recursive definition: is indirect. In Tarski the definition of truth is given via a recursive definition of fulfillment. Question: could he also have defined truth directly? If so, would fulfillment be definable in terms of truth? >Satisfaction, >Satifiability. III 399 Implicit Definition: depends on axioms. These imply (for example) truth implicit in the sense that truth is the only interpretation of the predicate T(x) which makes all the axioms true. Explicit definition: does not depend on axioms, but on expressive power of the language (not theory). Sat1(x,y) is explicitly definable in terms of T(x) - it is an explicit definition by introducing a new variable (II 402). --- Kripke I 66ff Definition/reference/standard meter/Kripke: Kripke does not use this definition to specify the meaning, but to define the reference. There is a certain length which he would like to denote. He denotes it through an accidental property. Someone else may refer to the same reference by another accidental property. He can still definitely say: if heat had been in the game, the length would have changed. Rigid: the meter is rigid. Not rigid: the length of S at time t is not rigid. >Standard meter, >Rigidity/Kripke, >Reference/Kripke. I 136f The "definition" does not say that the two terms are synonymous, but that we have determined the reference of the term "one meter" by establishing that it should be a rigid designation expression that actually has the length S. So not a necessary truth! We must distinguish between definitions that specify a reference, and definitions that specify a synonym. >Synonymy/Kripke. Definition: is not necessary: e.g. tiger: large, carnivorous, four legged cat, etc. Suppose someone says: "This is the meaning of tiger in German". ZiffVs: this is wrong. E.g. a tiger with three legs is not a contradiction in itself. I 153 In the case of proper names the reference can be defined in various ways. Determination of reference: is a priori (contingent) and not synonymous. Meaning: is analytical (required). Definition: specifies reference and expresses a priori truth. >Meaning/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Descriptions | Kripke | I 78 ff You could say "The Jonah of the book never existed", as one might say "the Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed." Existence is independent of representation. >Existence/Kripke, >Description dependence/Kripke, >Presentation. I 94 Reference by description: E.g. "Jack the Ripper" E.g. "Neptune" was named as such before anyone had seen him. The reference was determined because of the description of its place. At this point they were not able to see the planet. Counter-example: "Volcano". I 94f It might also turn out that the description does not apply to the object although the reference of the name was specified with the description. E.g. the reference of "Venus" as the "morning star", which later turns out not to be a fixed star at all. In such cases, you know in no sense a priori that the description that has defined the reference applies to the object. I 93ff Description does not shorten the name. E.g. even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel would still refer to Goedel. I 112f Description determines a reference, it does not provide synonymy. "Standard meter" is not synonymous with the length - description provides contingent identity: inventor = post master. Cf. >Standard meter. I 115 Identity: through the use of descriptions contingent identity statements can be made. >Identity/Kripke. I 117 QuineVsMarcus ("mere tag") is not a necessary identity of proper names, but an empirical discovery - (Cicero = Tully) identity does not necessarily follow from description - the identity of Gaurisankar is also an empirical discovery. I 25/26 Description/names/Kripke: the description serves only to determine the reference, not to identify the object (for counterfactual situations), nor to determine the meaning. I 36 Description is fulfilled: only one sole object fulfils the description, e.g. "The man drinking champagne is angry" (but he drinks water). Apparent description: e.g. the Holy Roman Empire (was neither holy nor Roman) - it is a hidden proper name. --- III 353 Description/substitutional quantification: L must not occur in the substitution class: necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure that each sentence of the referential language retains its truth value is that whenever (Exi)f is true (when only xi is free), a substitution class f" of f will be be true (> condition (6)) - this does not work with certain L, even if (6) is fulfilled. III 369 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: y(ixf(x)) where f(x) is atomic, analyzed as follows: (Ey)(x)(y = x ↔ f(x)) ∧ y(y)) (Wessel: exactly one": (Ex)(P(x) ∧ (y)(P(y) > x = y)) "There is not more than one thing": (x)(y)(x = y) - is ambiguous, if there is more than one description: order of elimination. >Reference/Kripke, >Meaning/Kripke, cf. >necessary a posteriori. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Extrinsic | Field | I 193 Extrinsic explanation/Loar/Field: E.g. when the role of numbers is only the role of names (descriptions) of properties of the physical system. - Then the properties of numbers will have no effect on the system. >Numbers, >Mathematical entities, >Ontology, >Properties, >Effect. Extrinsic explanation is often useful but it must have an underlying intrinsic explanation. >Explanation, >Intrinsicness, >Terminology/Field. III 44 Extrinsic explanation/Field: E.g. distance and angle size, use real numbers, but these are causally irrelevant. >Real numbers, >Causality. Intrinsic explanation: uses "betweenness" and congruence - (without numbers). Numbers: are eliminated because they are causally ineffective - (as opposed to electrons). Extrinsic explanation/Field: extrinsic explanations are fruitless, if they are to be the final outcome. - Intrinsically: can be arbitrarily: E.g. standard meter. >Standard meter. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Measurements | Logic Texts | Read III 135 ff Standard meter: at least one meter at a time was defined by reference to this Standard meter. Therefore, we could know a priori that the standard meter was one meter long. Nonetheless, it could be longer or shorter. "The Standard meter is one meter long" is only contingently true, but a priori knowable. >a priori, >a posteriori, >Contingency, >Standard meter. III 207 ff Measuring instruments: can they tell us what color the stains are? That one is a red, the other is green? They cannot. And this is because words like "red" are observation predicates. The reason of our judgments about the accuracy of the applications of "red" is based on observation. >Observation, >Colour, >Colour words. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Natural Kinds | Stalnaker | I 80 Natural Kind/necessary properties/Stalnaker: the characteristics of kangaroos are empirical, not linguistic, i.e. actual kangaroos play a necessary role. >Language dependence, >Empricism. N.B.: but that is not sufficient for the fact that kangaroos are necessarily kangaroos. >Necessary identity. E.g. standard meter/Kripke: the object itself could be longer or shorter - so actual kangaroos can specify the reference of "kangaroo", without themselves being genuine elements of the natural kind. >Standard meter. I 208 Natural kind/rigidity/rigid/Stalnaker: names and natural kind terms are rigid. >Rigidity. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Paratactic Analysis | Loar | II 147ff Paratactic analysis/Davidson: 1. avoids problems of the logical form of sentences with propositional attitudes - (purely significant position/not purely) 2. propositional attitudes no longer refer to intensional entities "The earth moves" is simply both times a meaningful expression. No reference to meaning. LoarVsDavidson: but this can be true only if there is something substantial behind it. KripkeVsVs: E.g. measuring: relates an object onto another, the standard meter. But if there were no standard meter, the object would still have a length. LoarVs: but that does not go for the meaning theory. - Thesis: therefore it is necessary to introduce intensional entities for a meaning theory. >Meaning theory, >Intensional objects. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Truth | Kripke | I 47/48 Necessary and a priori are not obviously synonymous. They are not even coextensive: there are both: necessary truths from posteriori and probably contingent truths a priori! >Necessary/Kripke, >necessary a posteriori, >necessary de re/Kripke, >a priori/Kripke. Many people have thought that these two things should mean the same thing because they imagine we would go through all possible worlds in our minds and then be able to recognize them a priori. But that is not so clear! I 50 Description: if we call Nixon "the man who won the 1988 election", it will of course be a necessary truth. >Description/Kripke. I 66 Prototype meter/standard meter: someone who thinks that everything you know a priori is necessary might think: "This is the definition of a meter. This is a necessary truth." Kripke: however, he/she does not use this definition to specify the meaning, but to define the reference. >Standard meter, >Speaker reference, >Reference/Kripke. I 68 Rigid: a meter is rigid ((s) "rigid" means that the reference is the same in all possible worlds). Non-rigid: the length of S at time t is non-rigid. The "definition" does not say that the two expressions are synonymous, but rather that we have determined the reference of the expression "one metre" by fixing that it is to be a rigid expression of designations, which in fact has the length S. The term "one metre" is not synonymous with the term "one metre". So it is no necessary truth! And that is because under certain circumstances it would not have been one metre long. One expression is rigid and the other is not. The truth he/she knows is contingent. So I prefer not to call them "analytical." >Analytic/synthetic, >Rigidity, >Contingency. I 77 E.g. a thesis may be true because it is simply a definition. >Definition/Kripke. I 153ff Reference of proper names: Definition of the reference: is given a priori (contingent) - this is not the same as synonymy. Meaning: the meaning is analytical (necessary). Definition: defines reference and expresses truth a priori. I 156 E.g. necessary truth: "Cats are animals". I 175 The phrase "heat is the movement of molecules" expresses a truth a posteriori. I 181 A posteriori: one can experience a mathematical truth a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician. The philosophical analysis tells us that it was not contingent and therefore any empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity. --- III 409 Truth/formal languages: understanding the meta language > explicit truth-definition > truth conditions > understanding of the language examined. >Truth conditions, >Understanding. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Description Theory | Kripke Vs Description Theory | Evans I 310/311 Reference/Description/Acquaintance/Kripke: Although the reference is set by the standard meter of Paris, not every speaker must know it or even know that it exists (according to Evans). Strawson: "the mean of different opinions". KripkeVsDescription Theory/Evans: His attacks were only directed against the first variant (speaker designation). They ignore the social character of naming. Field II 117 Reference/Deflationism/Field: Deflationism seems to make the hard work of recent years regarding the study of the reference insignificant. For if truth conditions do not play a central role, neither do the references. E.g.: KripkeVsDescription Theory/Name/Field: (Kripke 1972): This is not correct. Field: At least if they do not use metalanguage. Reference/Deflationism/Field: Problem: When the truth condition does not matter, then it is also valid for the reference since the relevant scheme is: (R) if b exists, "B" refers to b and nothing else; if B does not exist, "b" refers to nothing. Problem: It this is all that can be said about reference, what is the meaning of Kripke’s critique on Description Theory? Description Theory/Gödel-Schmidt Case/Kripke: e.g. Gödel = proves the "Incompleteness Theorems" Then e.g. Schmidt did actually prove it, but was murdered. Everyone would say that "Gödel" nevertheless refers to Gödel and not to Schmidt. Deflationism/Field: Problem: If deflationism is unable to explain this, then something is wrong with it! But it is actually able to: Reference/Deflationism/Field: The reference is not the actual basis, but observations about our practice of closing. That is actually what Kripke shows. Stalnaker I 15 KripkeVsDescription Theory/Stalnaker: Arises from a confusion between semantics and metasemantics. Anti-Essentialism/Kripke/Stalnaker: Arises from a confusion between semantics and metaphysics. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Necess. Properties | Kripke, S.A. | Staln I 80 necessary property / material properties / natural kind / Kripke / Stalnaker: the word- meaning (extension) and the facts about the elements of the extension determine the essential characteristics for this species i.e. actual kangaroos play a necessary role. Problem: this is not sufficient for saying that the individuals who are kangaroos are necessarily kangaroos, respectively that being a kangaroo is necessary for kangaroos. (> Standard meter / Kripke). |
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