Disputed term/author/ism | Author![]() |
Entry![]() |
Reference![]() |
---|---|---|---|
A priori | Chalmers | I 64 A priori/Knowledge/Chalmers: E.g. Twin Earth: we cannot a priori know that "water is H20" is true. But, we can know, for example, "water is watery stuff": here we can a priori know that the sentence is true. >Twin earth, >Stereotype, >Reference, >Meaning, >Necessity. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
Code | Ricoeur | II 3 Langue/parole/code/Saussure/Ricoeur: Langue is the code - or the set of codes - on the basis of which a particular speaker produces parole as a particular message. To this main dichotomy are connected several subsidiary distinctions. A message is individual, its code is collective. (Strongly influenced by Durkheim, Saussure considered linguistics to be a branch of sociology .) The message and the code do not belong to time in the same way. A message is a temporal event in the succession of events which constitute the diachronic dimension of time, while the code is in time as a set of contemporaneous elements, i.e., as a synchronic system. A message is intentional; it is meant by someone. The code is anonymous and not intended. In this sense it is unconscious, not in the sense that drives and impulses are unconscious according to Freudian metapsychology, but in the sense of a nonlibidinal structural and cultural unconscious. >Parole/Ricoeur. II 32 Code/literature/Ricoeur: The relation between message and code is made more complex by writing in a somewhat indirect way. What I have in mind here concerns the function of literary genres in the production of discourse as such and such a mode of discourse, whether poem, narrative, or essay. Literary genres display some conditions which theoretically could be described without considering writing. The function of these generative devices is to produce new entities of language longer than the sentence, organic wholes irreducible to a mere addition of sentences. (...) the specificity of these dynamic forms seems to proceed from another dichotomy than that of speaking and hearing, from the application to discourse of categories borrowed from another field, that of II 33 practise and work. But, if the dichotomy between theory and practice is irreducible to the pair speaking-writing, writing plays a decisive role precisely in the application of the categories of practice, technique, and work to discourse. There is production when a form is applied to some matter in order to shape it. When discourse is transferred to the field of production it is also treated as a stuff to be shaped. Thanks to writing, the works of language become as self-contained as sculptures. >Literature/Ricoeur, >Writing/Ricoeur, >Speaking/Ricoeur. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
Concepts | Dennett | II 13 Criteria/Recognition/Dennett: E.g. An animal is confused. Question: "what is the conceptual content of it being confused?" II 57 Concepts/thinking//animal/Dennett: can dogs think? Problem: a thought must consist of certain terms. II 58 Question of the description, resp. the formulation: Example A bowl with meat, a bucket with food, "the tasty stuff that tastes like this and like that"... Translation/Ascription: could we e.g. in English, express exactly the thought that the dog thinks? II 59 If not, then dogs can either not think at all, or their thoughts cannot be expressed at all, and so they lie outside our horizon. >Thinking without language, >Language and Thought, >Animal language. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Mind Body Problem | Searle | I 120 Mind Body Problem/Nagel: we have currently no conceptual means to even just imagine a solution because causal explanations of natural science have a certain necessity that is missing here. >Mind/Body problem/Nagel. SearleVsNagel: science cannot explain why two bodies attract each other. >Explanations. I 146f Mind Body Problem/Searle: causality alone is important: micro (physis) causes macro (mind) (from bottom to top). SearleVsSupervenience: supervenience is superfluous. Stability is causally supervenient on molecular structure, but this does not mean that it is epiphenomenal. >Epiphenomenalism, >supervenience. --- II 328f Mind Body Problem/Searle: mental states are both caused by the activities of the brain and realized in the structure of the brain (such as water/molecular structure). There may be a causing and a realization of the same stuff, provided it is done on different levels. >Mental states/Searle, >Brain states/Searle, >Identity theory. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Ostension | Heidegger | Cardorff II 26ff Showing/Heidegger/Cardorff: We have to engage ourselves into what is shown, we belong to it. >Understanding/Heidegger, >Dasein/Heidegger, >Existence/Heidegger, >Stuff, >World/Thinking, >Reality, >Thinking, >Representation, >Terminology/Heidegger. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Hei II Peter Cardorff Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
Realism | Bigelow | I VII Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: pro scientific realism. Logic can also be understood best in this way. Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: a scientific realist should be a modal realist. ((s) I.e. he/she should assume the existence of possible worlds). >Modal realism, >Possible worlds. I 38 Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: our realism is neutral in relation to reductionism. >>Reductionism. I 275 Metaphysical realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro metaphysical realism, which does not simply interpret the causal relation as a predicate, or as a set of ordered pairs, but as a universal. >Metaphysical realism, >Causal relation, >Ordered pairs, >Predicates, >Universals. I 341 Best explanation/BE/Bigelow/Pargetter: behind it are different kinds of realism. >Best explanation. I 342 Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: many of his varieties are based on a best explanation. Since we are assuming there is something to explain in the explanation. Foundation/fundamental realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: a fundamental class of entities is assumed. These do not explain anything themselves, but provide the material to be explained. >Foundation, >Explanation. Vs: the raw material should be sensations (perception, experience). >Sensations, >Perception, >Experience, >Perception, >Experience, cf. >R. Carnap. Appearance/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we start with it, we can reach the best explanation for any kind of realism by concluding. >Appearance. But it is not "realism about phenomena". Realism always accepts objects. BigelowVsTradition: erroneously assumes that we ourselves are in some way outside and not in the midst of reality. Realism/Explanation/Bigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: not everything we assume to be real does contribute to explanations at all! ((s) For example redundancies and repetitions are not unreal, tautologies are not unreal either, nor boring stuff. So we cannot assume from the outset that reality is a valid explanation. Neither would we deny the existence of boring stuff.). >Explanations, >Causal explanation. Reality/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is also doubtful whether all things should explain appearances. I 343 Def direct realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: we perceive objects "directly". I. e. without deducing their existence from anything fundamental by inference. There is some truth in it! (pro: Armstrong 1961(1), discussion in Jackson 1977b(2)). BigelowVsDirect realism: even if we could keep object and appearances apart through reflection, it would be questionable whether the material thing would be the better explanation! >Objects, cf. >Thing in itself. Appearance/Bigelow/Pargetter: dealing with it is tricky. It seems as if we have to find out something about our inner states first. The normal case, however, is the extroverted perceiver. The situation of extroverted perception must also precede introverted reflection. >Perception, >Reflection. Best Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: nonetheless, if we are realists, we will understand material objects as the best explanation of our appearances (or perception). Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: now it shows that there is a hierarchy of two realisms ((s) a) direct, naive, b) reflected, by deduction from appearances) and how this hierarchy is destroyed in practice: we begin with a realism and come to the conclusion of the best explanation to the second realism, and these merge into one and the same reality. >Abduction. The hierarchical order does not remain in things, but becomes an extrinsic characteristic of their relation to us as perceivers. There is also a feedback: the inverse conclusion from the reflected realism on the unreflected. I 344 Holism/Bigelow/Pargetter: that leads to some kind of epistemic holism that we accept. It does not threaten realism. >Holism. Explanation/Best Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we accept realism on the basis of conclusions drawn from the best explanation, we must ask what kind of explanation is at issue. It can be about different kinds of (Aristotelian) causes (see above). The most convincing ones are certainly those that are concerned with "efficient" causes: e.g. Cartwright, Hacking: Realism/Cartwright/Hacking: is best supported by causal explanations. >Realism/Cartwright, >Realism/Hacking. Quine/Two Dogmas/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quine has caused many philosophers not only to sit in the armchair, but also to question the experiments that scientists have carried out in real. We reject that. >Two Dogmas, >W.V.O. Quine, >Experiments, >Science, >Certainty, >Method, >Measurements. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: but we also reject the other extreme, that realism would have to arise solely from causal explanations. >Causal explanation, >Causality. I 345 There may also be formal reasons (formal causes/Aristotle) for realism. >Aristotle. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is also a legitimate question as to what constitutes modalities in science. Modal realism is the best explanation here for such matters. >Modal Realism. Metaphysics/Platonism/Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: can be supported by the Best Explanation: by inferences on the best explanation we show that we need modalities and universals in the sciences. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: their primary source is mathematics. Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: our metaphysics allows a realistic understanding of mathematics. (BigelowVsField). >Mathematics/Hartry Field, >Mathematical entities, >Platonism, >Universals. 1. Armstrong, D. M. (1961). Perception and the physical world. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 2. Jackson, F. (1977b) Perception. A representative theory. Cambridge University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
Search Engines | Pariser | I 41 Search Engines/Filters/Personalized Search/Google/Pariser: Google developed a set of personalization algorithms that divide searchers into groups. A number of these were patented until 2008. Google gives an example in its patent application: People who collect shark teeth and those who do not get different selections of search results when they search for "big white incisors". (1) I 45 Facebook/EdgeRank/Pariser: Facebook does it similarly. Even if you only have 100 friends, you receive too much stuff to read everything. Facebooks solution was EdgeRank that registered every interaction of users. The algorithm is complicated, the idea is based on three factors (2). 1. Degree of connectedness: how much time is spent on interacting with a particular person 2. Content weighting: which news items are selected? 3. Timeliness: more attention will be paid to messages posted recently. 1. Patentvolltext, aufgerufen am 10.12. 2010, http.//patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-adv.htm&r=1&p=1&f=G&1=50&d=PTXT&S1=7,451,130.PN.&OS=pn/7,451,130&RS=PN/7,451,13, 2. Jason Kincaid, »EdgeRank: The Secret Sauce That Makes Facebook’s News Feed Tick«, TechCrunch-Blog, 22. 04. 2010, aufgerufen am 10.12. 2010, http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/22/facebook-edgerank. |
Pariser I Eli Pariser The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We Read and How We Think London 2012 |
Semantic Value | Schiffer | I 91f Semantic Value/Schiffer: E.g. "Snow" refers to the stuff snow "is white" is true of every white thing "not" expresses the negation. Semantic value of logical constants = the truth function. of a singular term: = reference. Schiffer: semantic values play their role in determining the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. Then the semantic sense (not value) is determined by the conceptual role: Conceptual role/Schiffer: is an abstraction from the functional role: to know the functional role of a neural sentence means knowing the functional role of belief of s (or to wish that s, etc.). >Conceptual role, >Functional role. Subsentential: to know the contribution of this role to the conceptual role of the whole sentence. ((s) This is not the same as compositionality because it is about roles, not meanings.) Cf. >Compositionality, >Meaning, >Frege principle. E.g. if you believe that s, then you do not believe [not-s] etc. Problem: the semantic sense is not always determined by the conceptual role. Conceptual role: is in the head. Twin earth: the twin has the same conceptual role. On the other hand: semantic sense of predicates is surely causal - even with general terms. >General terms, >Predicates. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Subjects | Heidegger | Figal I 13 Subject and activity are important to Heidegger: object and representationalism have only meaning as such for a subject. Grasping of objects: "meaningful and active deed". >Actions, >Subject, >Sense, >Senseless, >Objects, >Stuff, >World/Thinking. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 |
Thinking | Dennett | II 58 Thinking/Animal/Dennett: Can dogs think? Problem: An idea must be composed of certain concepts. Question of the description or formulation: E.g. bowl with meat, bucket with feed, "the delicious stuff that tastes so and so" ... Translation: Could we, for example, just express the exact thought the dog thinks in English? If not, dogs can either not think at all or their thoughts cannot be expressed, and thus lie beyond our horizon. II 157 Thinking/Speech/Dennett: All in all, these considerations suggest that our way of thinking had to wait for speech to develop. Speech, in turn, had to wait for keeping of secrets to develop, and that in turn required the development of a certain complexity of the environment. Cf. >Speaking. II 202 DennettVsRyle: Notorious are Ryle's assertions that thinking could only take place in the public world and would not need to occur in a personal place. II 190 Speech/Thinking/Dennett: No thinking without speech - (Thinking is not the same as consciousness. E.g. A dog has no concept of cat as an animal). >Thinking without language. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Understanding | Heidegger | Gadamer I 264 Understanding/Heidegger/Gadamer: Understanding (...) is the original form of the accomplishment of Dasein, the "being-in-the-world" (...). Before all differentiation of understanding into the different directions of pragmatic or theoretical interest, understanding is the way of being of the Da-sein (German: "being-there"), as long as it is "possibility" and able to be. >Dasein/Heidegger. HeideggerVsDroysen/HeideggerVsDilthey: The concept of understanding is no longer a methodological concept, as in Droysen. Neither is understanding, as in Dilthey's attempt at a hermeneutical foundation of the humanities, an inverse operation that follows the course of life towards ideality. Cf. >J.G. Droysen, >W. Dilthey. Understanding is the original character of being of human life itself. (...) [Task of understanding]: to clarify this structure of Dasein through a "transcendental analysis of existence". >Recognition/Heidegger. Figal I 69 Understanding/Heidegger/Figal: we understand ourselves in the different contexts of everyday life. Matter of course. >Stuff. Figal I 85 Understanding: immediately perceiving possibilities (future character). |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 |
Use | Heidegger | I 68 Knowledge/Heidegger: usage knowledge (stuff: things in usage knowledge). Use is deeper than manufacturing. >Knowledge, >Knowledge how, >Stuff, >Object, >Objects(Material things), >World/Thinking, >Thinking, >Thinking/Heidegger. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 |
Wiener | Dennett | Brockman I 43 Wiener/Dennett: Alan Turing’s famous 1950 article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,”(1) in the philosophy journal Mind, foresaw the development of AI, and so did Wiener, but Wiener saw further and deeper, recognizing that AI would not just imitate - and replace - human beings in many intelligent activities but change human beings in the process: Wiener: We are but whirlpools in a river of ever-flowing water. We are not stuff that abides, but patterns that perpetuate themselves.(2) >Artificial intelligence/Wiener, >Control/Wiener. Brockman I 45 Dennett: One of the disturbing lessons of recent experience is that the task of destroying a reputation for credibility is much less expensive than the task of protecting such a reputation.) Wiener saw the phenomenon at its most general: “[I]n the long run, there is no distinction between arming ourselves and arming our enemies.”(2) The information age is also the dysinformation age. 1. Turing, AM (1950) “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,”in: Mind, Volume LIX, Issue 236, October 1950, Pages 433–460, 2. The Human Use of Human Beings (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1954), 96. 3. The Human Use of Human Beings (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1954) Dennett, D. “What can we do?”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
![]() |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author![]() |
Entry![]() |
Reference![]() |
---|---|---|---|
Dennett, D. | Stalnaker Vs Dennett, D. | II 180 DennettVsSententialism/Dennett/Stalnaker: Vs propositions as belief objects. (relation theory). Solution/Dennett: "Organismic contribution" of the believer. Neutral with respect to the manner in which it is represented. Def notional attitude-Psychology/not. att./Dennett: (instead of propositional attitude) neutral in terms of the manner of representation. Defined in concepts of possible worlds (poss.w.), "notional worlds". Def prop att-psychology/Dennett: describes attitudes in concepts of wide content. Def sentential attitudes/sent. att./Dennett: syntactic, assumes Mentalese. Def notional world/Dennett: a fictional world that is constructed from a theorist as an external observer, II 181 to characterize the narrow attitudes of a subject. That means my twin on Twin Earth and I have the same notional world. Def narrow content/Dennett: is defined by a set of notional worlds that is the way in which a person who had actual world. notional world/Stalnaker: seem to be exactly the poss.w. that characterize the wide content in the psychology of propositional attitudes. StalnakerVsDennett: all poss.w. except one are fictitious – how can notional attitudes be different propositional attitudes. Why should not. att. be narrow and prop. att. wide? Narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: are then according to Dennett simply propositions. The difference is neither to be found in the worlds themselves nor the nature of the content if both are just sets of poss.w.. The difference lies in the different responses of the two theories to the question by virtue of which fact someone has a conviction with this content. Propositional atitude-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: according to it contents are a function of relation to the actual world although the Twin-Earth-Example shows that they cannot be purely internal. Notional attitudes/not. att.-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: shall explain how purely internal (intrinsic) properties can pick a set of poss.w. that is different than the set that is picked by propositional attitudes. Wide content: e.g. O'Leary (correctly) thinks that there is water on the ground floor. This is wrong in the twin earth (tw.e.) because it is not water but XYZ. narrow content/solution: "water-like stuff". Dennett/Fodor/Stalnaker: we can compare both approaches: II 182 Narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: he changes the nature of the belief object, narrow contents are no longer propositions but functions of context on propositions. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: is for Dennett of the same kind as further content: both are propositions - function of poss.w. (=notional worlds) to truth values (tr.v.). What changed compared to the wide content is the relation between a believer in a proposition by virtue of which the proposition correctly describes the conviction. StalnakerVsDennett: but in addition he still has to explain how the purely internal (intrinsic) properties of the subject determine the narrow content. Solution/Dennett: e.g. Suppose we know all about the dispositions and skills of a subject but nothing about its causal history. Then that is similar as if we find an ancient object and ask what it was good for ((s)Cf. > Paul Valéry, find on the beach, objet ambigu). Dennett: then we imagine what it was ideally created for. In the notional world of an organism we imagine how the environment looks like to which it is best suited. Solution: propositions that are true in such possible worlds (poss.w.) will be the narrow content of the convictions of these subjects. StalnakerVsDennett: which is now not what we want: those poss.w. look more so that the desires and needs of the organisms in them are fulfilled and not that their propositions are true in them. E.g. it is not clear that the antelope with its properties to respond to lions is better off in a world of lions or in one without. It could then do a better job in terms of survival and to reproduce. Ideal/ideal environment/Dennett: could also be a very ugly poss.w. in which the organisms are, however, prepared to survive in it. II 183 StalnakerVsDennett: that is better, surely we try to cope with the world in which we think we live. But something is missing: a) many properties that enable organisms to survive, have nothing to do with their convictions, b) the fact that some counterfactual skills would help us to survive in a counterfactual poss.w. is not sufficient for saying that such a counterfactual possibility is compatible with the poss.w. which we believe to be the actual world. E.g. Suppose there are no real predators of porcupines in the actual world, they carry their spines simply like that. Then it would be unrealistic to artificially populate their notional world with predators. E.g. Suppose a poss.w. with beings who would like to eat us humans because of our special odor. Then we should not use such a poss.w. to characterize our convictions. Solution/Stalnaker: a belief state must serve in any way to be receptive to information from the environment and the information must have a role in determining behavior. StalnakerVsDennett: if we understand him like that we are still dealing with wide content. II 184 Representation system/Stalnaker: is then able to be used in a set of alternative internal states that are systematically depending on the environment. S1, S2,.. are internal states Ei: a state of the environment. Then an individual is normally in a state Si if the environment is in state Si. Representation: then we could say that the organism represents the environment as being in state Ei. Content: we could also say that the states contain information about the environment. Assuming that the states determine a specific behavior to adequately behave in the environment Ei. Belief state/BS: then we can say that these representations are likely to be regarded as a general type of BS. That is like Dennett understands narrow content. Problem/StalnakerVsDennett: 1. the description of the environment is not ascribed to the organism. 2. Information is not distinguished from misinformation (error, deception). That means if it is in state Si it represents the environment as in Ei being no matter if it is. Problem: the concept which originates from a causal relation is again wide content. Important argument: if the environment would be radically different the subject might otherwise be sensitive to it or sensitive to other features ((s) would reverse everything) or it would not be sensitive to the environment at all! narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: problem: if the skills and dispositions of the organism are included in the descriptions of the content the actual world is initially essential. ((s) problem/Stalnaker/(s): how should we characterize their skills in a counterfactual poss.w.?) II 185 Dennett: if organisms are sneaky enough we might also here ascribe a narrow ((s) counterfactual) content. StalnakerVsDennett: I see no reason for such optimism. You cannot expect any information about virtual poss.w. expect when you do not make any assumptions about the actual world (act.wrld.) (actual environment). Ascription/content/conviction/belief/Stalnaker: in normal belief attributions we ignore not only fairytale worlds but in general all possibilities except the completely everyday! E.g. O’Leary: distinguishes only poss.w. in which the ground floor is dry or wet, II 186 not also such in which XYZ is floating around. Question: Would he then behave differently? Surely for olive oil but not for XYZ. Twin earth/tw.e./ascription: even if the behavior would not change in twin earth-cases, it is still reasonable not to ascribe tw.e.-cases. Context dependence/revisionism/Stalnaker: could argued that it is not twin earth but normal world which makes it unsuitable for scientific ascriptions. Dennett: stands up for his neutral approach (notional world). StalnakerVsDennett: nevertheless causal-informational representation is substantially relative to a set of alternative options (poss.w.). internal/intrinsic/causality/problem: the system of causal relations cannot itself be intrinsical to the representing. Theory: has admittedly a scope to choose between different possibilities of defining content II 187 StalnakerVsDennett: but there is no absolute neutral context without presuppositions about the environment. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: binds himself a hand on the back by forbidding himself the information that is accessible to wide content. StalnakerVsDennett: I believe that no sensible concept of content results from this restriction. II 238 Language dependency/ascription/belief/Stalnaker: this third type of language dependence is different from the other three. II 239 People must not be predisposed to express belief that type of language dependency at all. It may be unconscious or tacit assumptions. The content must also not involve any language. Dennett: e.g. Berdichev: we should distinguish simple language-specific cases - whose objects are informational states - from those, so propositions are saved - E.g. approval or opinions. StalnakerVsDennett: we should rather understand such cases as special cases of a more general belief that also non-linguistic beings like animals might have. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Goodman, N. | Putnam Vs Goodman, N. | III 145 Putnam: where do these worlds even come from? PutnamVsGoodman: this is a form of realism that is no less extreme than that of Hegel or Fichte! III 146 Goodman/Putnam: the limits of natural species are in some ways arbitrary, albeit less than in artificial species. (III 268, water always contains H4O2, H6O3, etc.). Not every glowing gas cloud is deemed star. Some stars do not shine. Is it not ourselves that by the inclusion and exclusion attribute all these different objects to a category? In this respect it has been us ourselves who has made them stars. PutnamVsGoodman: Now Goodman makes a daring extrapolation: then there should not be anything that we have not made to what it is. III 147 If we want to beat Goodman in his own chosen sport by trying to nominate a "substance independent of consciousness", we obviously get into great difficulties. But we can mitigate Goodman: There is actually a fundamental difference between such expressions as "constellation" and "Ursa Major" on the one hand and an expression like "Star" on the other. The extension of the term "Ursa Major" is determined by a language convention. A typical proper noun when learning. Which stars belong to it we learn by finding out what is called the "Ursa Major". III 148 That it includes all these stars, I would not call "analytical", because if one disappeared, we undoubtedly still spoke of Ursa Major and would say it no longer encompasses as many stars as previously. Which stars are Ursa Major is a question that does not concern the astrophysicist, but the ethnologist or the linguist. The word "star" (as opposed to the term "Ursa Major") is an extension that can not be determined by specifying a list! No single object belongs to an extension by the very fact that it is called a star. In this regard, the term "constellation" lies somewhere in the middle between "Ursa Major" and "star". If we find out that all the stars are giant dummies, we would say: "actually there are no stars", but not "actually, it's not Ursa Major." Would we no longer view it as a constellation? That's not certain! III 149 Goodman: asks: can you name anything that we did not create ourselves? PutnamVsGoodman: easy answer: we have not brought about the star Sirius itself. We have not even made it a star! We have brought about the term star, and it applies to Sirius. Our concept of bachelor applies to "Joseph Ullian", without, however, our language practice making him a bachelor! Objectivity/Putnam: We create the concepts, but we do not cause them to be true. III 154 Incompatibility/change of meaning/change of concept/change of theory/language/theories: (Goodman and Davidson find them so exciting): point, line, border etc. are used differently throughout the versions. Ex "points are converging sets of concentric spheres". Incompatible with the sentence: "Points are not sets, but individuals". Putnam: But that would be too easy! Goodman concludes, either there is no world or we lived in more than one. Davidson: the actually acknowledged phenomenon of equivalent descriptions would somehow hold a logical contradiction. PutnamVsGoodman, PutnamVsDavidson: we should simply drop the thought that the sentences discussed above maintained their so-called "meaning" when we pass from one version to another. III 157 Goodman: Challenge: "all right, then please describe this reality as it is, independent of these modes of expression." PutnamVsGoodman: but why would you assume that it is possible to describe the reality independent of our descriptions anyway? Why should that lead to the assumption that there is nothing but the descriptions? Finally, also according to our own descriptions it applies that the word "quark" is something completely different than a quark. I (k) 257 Ontology/Goodman/Putnam: in a sense, there is nothing we have not created! One can even conceive of elementary particles as dependent on our spirit. Putnam: it is really difficult to find any stuff "independent of spirit"! PutnamVsGoodman: in fact there is a difference between constellations and stars: the extension of "Big Dipper" is determined by linguistic convention. One can learn what stars are in the group, if one learns the meaning of the expression. A typical proper noun. It is not analytical that the Big Dipper includes the stars. Ex If one of the stars should disappear, we would still speak of the constellation. We would say: the Big Dipper no longer includes as many stars as previously, just like someone losing hair, yet the person remains the same. Ex if a new star appeared, we would not automatically include it in the constellation! Which stars belong to the constellation is a question for anthropologists or linguists, not for the astrophysicists. I (k) 257/258 The expression "star" in contrast to the expression "Big Dipper" is an extension which can not be defined by a list. No object is the extension of "star" because it is called a star. Ex Someone who believes that Sirius is a giant light bulb, would thus not demonstrate not knowing how to use the expression "star"! Conversely, someone who doubts that this constellation is the Big Dipper the fact shows not knowing how to use the expression "Big Dipper"! Ex If aliens have replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper with giant light bulbs, we would say: "That aren't really stars", but not "This is not really the Big Dipper". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Hume, D. | Nozick Vs Hume, D. | Brendel I 254 Skepticism/Dretske/Nozick/Brendel: both. Thesis: the truth of the skeptical hypothesis is, however, not to be excluded. But it does not follow the impossibility of any knowledge. DretskeVsHume/NozickVsHume/Brendel: knowledge and the possibility of skepticism can coexist peacefully. Nozick II 111 I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. The solves the problem e.g. of localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception." NozickVsHume: perhaps he did not search thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he? 2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment. 3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff. II 112 A property is never the identical with the object. The difficulty of specifying the relationsh of a property with an object is the general reason why we have such trouble locating the self, but that is not a particular problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways how a person can be identified with a property: 1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick" 2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that. I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective. Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it. Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem: 1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring. People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you, II 113 but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ! Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring! |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
Kant | Nozick Vs Kant | II 12 Hypothesis/How-is-it-possible questions/Nozick: a hypothesis that is false does not explain how something is possible. But maybe it increases understanding. Hypothesis: must not even be plausible. How-is-it-possible question: can go so deep that the only answers that are sufficient, are implausible. One should not exclude that the p with which the question began is excluded at the end. (VsKant). II 110 Synthesis/Self/I/Nozick: VsKant: VsSynthesis: against the perspective of self-synthesizing self could be argued that it does not localize itself as an entity, it is not a "part of the equipment of the universe". possible solution: II 111 I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. That solves, for example, the problem of the localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception." NozickVsHume: perhaps he has not searched thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he? 2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment. 3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff. II 112 A property is never identical with the object. The difficulty to specify the relation of a property to the object is the general reason why we can only locate the self with difficulty, but it is not a specific problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways to identify a person with a property: 1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick" 2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that. I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective. Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it. Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem: 1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring. People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you, II 113 but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ! Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring! II 318 Action/Decision/Free Will/Knowledge/Belief/Nozick: Is there a parallel between belief and action, according to the model by which we have established conditions for belief and knowledge in the previous chapter? Belief is in connection with facts (covariance). What are actions to be connected to? Just like beliefs should respond to facts, actions should respond to correctness or quality ("bestness", optimum, "optimal desirability", "the best"). Then we need to know the relevant facts as well. II 319 Our actions must be sensitive to accuracy or "the best". Conditions: (1) Action A is correct (2) S does A on purpose (intentionally) (III) if A were not right, S would not do A intentionally. (IV) if A were correct, S would intentionally do A. Distinction: "Allowed"/"the best" (nothing better). Similar: "Maximum": several maximums possible: even if there is nothing bigger. Maximum: only one possible. "bigger than all the others". then: correctness: (3) if A was not allowed, S would not do A (4) if A were mandatory, S would do A. "the best": (1) A is the best (at least maximum, perhaps maximum) (2) S does A intentionally (3) if A were not as good as a possible other thing, S would not do A (4) if A were better than anything else, S would do A. II 320 So here we can also introduce a reference to a motif M in accordance with conditions (3) and (4). Moral/Kant/Nozick: when we happen to do something moral, immoral motives may be present. Problem: it could be that if the act is immoral, other non-moral (neutral) motives move the person to carry out the action anyway. NozickVsKant: he would be better served with our conditions (3) and (4). In addition, we need the inclusion of methodologies (see above, example grandmother: would still believe, even if the facts were different. E.g. Theater/Nuclear Reactor: if it were not a play, the person would still believe it via other methods). Action: similar: E.g. someone carries out a mandatory action after careful consideration. If it were not right, its moral quality would never have come to his attention, but he could still have chosen it. Only this time without reflection on its correctness. Method/Action/Nozick: like with belief, methods can also be weighed against each other even with actions: A person meets the Kantian requirements if there is a motive M for which he does a, which satisfies the conditions (3) and (4), and outweighs any other motive M' that does not satisfy (3) and (4). II 352 Self-Choice/Action/Morality/Ethics/Free Will/Nozick: the concept of a free action as in connection with accuracy (or "the best") is defined in terms of the result. And not so much as a process. Tradition: Thinks that a free action emerges from a process of choice that could also have had an incorrect result. How close can we get to the process of choice in a simulation? II 353 Anyway, we will not get out of a causal nexus. 1) Locke/Hume/Tradition/Nozick: we are not free if our actions are caused. 2) Kant: we are free if our actions are in harmony with reason 3) Free actions must not be caused by any independent source, II 354 but must come forth from our nature. (Spinoza: only God is free). Hegel: combines 2) and 3): (with Aristotle) Reason and thought are the essence of man. We are free when we are limited by a law of reason in a way conscious of ourselves, which is a constitutive principle of our nature. Nozick: is that enough? Although our actions come forth from our nature, would we then not be unfree in the extent that we are bound by our nature? Could external sources not be as binding for us? Why should I want to be moral? Do I have to wish to be happy? Why should I want to be rational? "Your being is rationality, do what is rational to realize your nature". Why should I realize my nature? It's bad enough that it is so difficult. "Your nature, that is you." If I am not really me, do I have to wish to be me? Could I not wish to be the Messiah? "But you have no choice, you had to be what you are." So, that is what you offer me as freedom. Objective morality seems to be something inevitable. Categorical Imperative/Nozick: some read it as follows: "Do this if you wish to be rational" "Do this if you want to be free" (absurd: command). Freedom/Nozick: has to be something that does not bind us. II 355 Then there can be no free will with objective morality. Law/Kant/Nozick: the law that does not bind us is the one that we give ourselves, that is not borrowed from nature, but is set by reason itself as a necessity of its own nature. Nozick: but does that not bind us, too? Could we not act as autonomously out of very different motives? NozickVsKant: the status of morality in his theory is unclear. Example: Suppose someone finds out what the categorical imperative wants and then does the opposite. "But what motive could he have for that?" Perhaps he just wants autonomy? The chances are not good. Morality/Freedom/Nozick: Thesis: must not only be chosen by ourselves, it must also be given by something that is in turn chosen for its part! Only something that arises from a chosen nature will not bind us. But if the nature is chosen, how should then it be inevitable? (>self-choice, self-ownership.). |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
Searle, J.R. | Poundstone Vs Searle, J.R. | I 350 Chinese Room/Searle/Poundstone: Variant: E.g. book: "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door." The room is exhibited at fairs. It is claimed that there was a pig in the room that speaks Chinese. People assume that in reality a Chinese is locked in the room (this variant also expresses the belief in the behavior). I 351 PoundstoneVsSearle: Problem: feasibility of the thought experiment. The algorithm must include commmon knowledge. I 352 It must be able to answer questions like those from the short story: e.g. a guest gets scorched food. Furious, he leaves the restaurant without paying. Question: did he eat the food? E.g. "What's the red stuff called that some people put on their fries?" Here, the answer is not included in the question. And perhaps there is no Chinese word for ketchup. SearleVsTuring: the Turing test is not very insightful, therefore Chinese Room. A computer that behaved exactly like a human would be situation a sensation, no matter if he possessed consciousness or not. I 353 Searle: Surprising position: the brain is indeed something like a computer, but consciousness has something to do with the biological and neurological structure. A computer made of wires would therefore not make the experience of his own consciousness. And yet, it could pass the Turing test! Artificial Intelligence/AI/Searle: compares it with photosynthesis: a computer program could create a detailed realistic illustration of photosynthesis, but it would not produce sugar! It would only deliver images of chlorophyll molecules on the screen. I 354 VsSearle/Chinese Room: a book with the algorithm "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door" cannot exist: it would have to be larger than the largest libraries in the world. We could depart from Davis' office simulation. E.g. the brain contains about 100 billion neurons. If every human drew 20 strings, all of humanity could simulate a single brain. I 355 But no one would know what thoughts are going on! Consciousness/Searle: his followers resort to the distinction "syntactic/semantic". Semantic understanding seems essential for consciousness. I 356 Meaning/PoundstoneVsSearle: VsSemantic Understanding E.g. you were ill on the first day of school and missed the lesson in which numbers were introduced. Later you never dared to ask, what numbers are. In spite of that, you can do maths quite passably. At the bottom of your heart, you have the feeling of being an impostor. In fact, actually we all do not know what numbers are. I 357 Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: Ex Chinese Room: Suppose that, due to brain damage, the person does not know that they speak Chinese. We all have many skills of which we know virtually nothing. (Involuntary muscle movements, metabolism). I 358 Chinese Room/"System Response": the person himself does not speak Chinese, but the overall system: Person, plus room, plus manual, plus time, plus paper and pencil fulfill the condition. I 359 SearleVsSystem Response: We tear down the walls and let the person learn the manual by heart. Does he speak Chinese? PoundstoneVsSearle/Thought Experiments: the risk with thought experiments is their convenience. One must make reassure oneself that the reason of only imagining the experiment is no reason that makes the experiment altogether impossible. Here: the manual would be to extensive to be written at all, let alone to be learned by heart. ((S) VsPoundstone: could construct a simpler example which is about fewer rules.) I 364 Chinese Room/Poundstone: the room is not only extremely enlarged spatially but also timely. The person could also be a robot, that does not matter. I 365 Consciousness/Hofstadter: E.g. conversation with Einstein's brain: book with answers that simulate exactly what Einstein would have said. Two levels that must be separated: the book and the user! Of course, the book itself has no consciousness! Here, some hair-splitting questions about the "mortality" of Searles room arise: suppose the user goes on a 5-weeks holiday, is the book called "Einstein" dead in meantime? I 366 The book itself could not notice the interruption. Variant: if the pace of work was reduced to one question per year, would that be enough to keep the book "alive"? Time/Poundstone: we could not find that time had stopped if it did. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
![]() |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author![]() |
Entry![]() |
Reference![]() |
---|---|---|---|
Vs Skepticism | Austin, J.L. | Stroud I 42 AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) one arrives at the source of Descartes' skeptical conclusion by uncovering a series of misunderstandings and (especially verbal) errors and fallacies. I 44 Knowledge/Philosophy/Everyday/Austin/Stroud: (Austin Other Minds, (Phil.Papers 1961,45) These typical philosophical investigations are carried out from our normal (everyday) practice. I 45 Austin Thesis: "enough is enough": i.e. not everything has to be said. It is not always necessary to prove that this goldfinch is not a stuffed bird. (OM 52). I 48 Dream/AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes: it is about Descartes' strong thesis that we cannot know if we are not dreaming. Without it, skepticism would be disarmed. Austin's nuclear thesis Method/Everyday Language/AustinVsDescartes: can it be shown ((s) >Manifestation) that Descartes with his strong thesis violates the normal standards or conditions for knowledge? I 51 Misconception/Deception/Austin: thesis "you cannot always deceive all people". I 64 StroudVsAustin: the accusation of AustinVsSkepticism (AustinVsDescartes) that the meaning of "Knowledge" has been distorted in everyday use can only be raised if it can be shown that a certain usage of language, a certain concept and the relation between them has been misinterpreted. Stroud: that is what I meant by the fact that the source of Descartes' demand reveals something deep and important. I 76 Stroud: this leads us to the depth and importance of skepticism. It is about much more than deciding if you know something about the world around you, it is about our practice (actions) and reflection of our knowledge (self-knowledge). Can we take a distant position here? I 82 Skepticism/Source/Stroud: Thesis: The source of the philosophical problem of the outside world lies somewhere in our notion of an objective world or our desire to understand our relation to the world. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
de re | Cresswell, M.J. | II 165 Learning/de re/Cresswell: Thesis: there is a description F that picks out water and Oscar has just learned that whatever F is, is H2O. Here, F can be the stuff that Oscar just "sees". Then you could say that although it is still strictly true that Oscar learned that water is water, it would be misleading to portray it that way. Because that makes it look like Oscar learned a tautology. |
|
![]() |