Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Actualism Stalnaker I 12
Actualism/Stalnaker: the actualism does not take possible worlds literally as worlds but as ways of how the world might have been. N.B.: contingent identity is not allowed but probably contingent dissimilarity.
((s) According to Kripke, identity is always necessary identity insofar as descriptions are not involved, but names are).
>Identity/Kripke, >Rigidity, >Descriptions.
I 120
Actualism/Stalnaker: actualism is not a restrictive metaphysical theory as materialism or nominalism - it is just a trivial consequence of the meaning of "actual". >Materialism, >Nominalism.
I 128
Presentism/Stalnaker: presentism is analogous to actualism regarding worlds: thesis: we are extended in time just as we are spread over possible worlds. >Presentism.
Then we can have real temporal identity. (Stalnaker pro).
Fusion/fission/personal identity: cases of fusion and fission are then cases where persons who were separated earlier become identical or a person is divided into two.
>Personal identity, >Fusion, >Split.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Atoms Quine IX 7f
Atomic schemas: E.g. "Fxy", "Gx" etc: can represent any number of complex statements.
I 218
Atomic Facts/Quine/Cresswell: "Quine has no interest in a theory that would turn atomic facts into simple facts about our experience that are logically independent of all others. Quine: correct. See also >Atomism/Quine.
XIII 12
Atom/Atoms/Quine: Worlds/Possible Worlds/Best World/Leibniz/Quine: according to Leibniz we are blessed with the "best of the worlds". But "the best" according to what criteria? He gives a hint:
Def Perfection/perfect/Leibniz/Quine: wealth of purposes and economy of means. The number of components and forces with which the observed wealth of the world is attainable must be as small as possible.
Science: similar procedure.
Theory/Quine: is always more complicated than you want, but the scientist is committed to his/her stubborn data and does what he/she can.
Leibniz/Quine: was himself a scientist, so he came up with it.
Atomism/Atom/Democritus/Leukipp/Quine: also their atomism was motivated by the pursuit of economy. They limited the possible variability of the building blocks of nature. The atoms differed only in shape and size.
XIII 13
Point event/four-dimensionalism/space-time points/Quine: pro: 1. because it turned out that the basic building blocks (quarks, etc.) are not as uniform as one had hoped from the atoms. 2. because there are problems identifying a particle from one moment to another (identity in time, temporal identity, elementary particles).
Individuality/Particle Physics/Quine: the statistical interchangeability of particles threatens their individuality.
Atom/Atomism/Quine: but which decisive move should make a theory atomistic anyway?
XIII 14
Solution/Quine: Thesis: there are an infinite number of particles, but not an infinite number of types of particles. Identity/elementary particles/species/Quine: particles of the same species play an identical role within the laws of theory. Only this allows the theory to be suitable for measuring information.
Def point event/Quine: are atoms whose types are the different states in which a point can be, according to prevailing physics. The atoms are the minimal space-time localizations and the species are the few things that can happen in such a place.
Point/Linguistics/Atom/Quine: for linguists the point is the phoneme. Not the phonemes themselves, (their sound is individual to each speaker) but their classifiability!
Def Phonem/Quine: is not a single sound, but a type of sound. They are then equivalent for all purposes in the particular language, even if they are not phonetically identical!
Atoms/Speeche/Quine: Atoms fall under phonemes.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Change Simons I 134
Change/event/Simons: actually events cannot change. Exceptions: e.g. the confrontation became more heated, the wedding party was moved into the house. Solution: in reality, we are talking about the involved continuants. >Events, >Continuants, >Motion, >Temporal identity.
I 135
Change/Simons: change in one variable (vector or scalar, e.g. acceleration) is a measure of change, not change in itself... >Measuring.
I 176
Change/Simons: ... but it is the whole continuant, not just a part that has these different properties in succession. Attribution/change: it follows that the attribution of properties to a continuant normally must specify the point in time as well.
>Attribution, >Properties.
I 193
Part/change/flux/shift/SimonsVsChisholm: if a small part is cut off a table, then this is not a table. >Process/Flux.
ChisholmVsVs: it is a table because it was there before, it must be a table.
Solution/Quine: out of the many simultaneously entangled sums that could all be a table only that one should count as a table which is not embedded in the others. Tables are meant to mutually exclude each other.
>Mereological sum.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Community Blackburn Esfeld I 119
Community/Individual/Simon Blackburn(1): Thesis: Members of a community behave to each other like temporal phases of an individual. (Corrections are possible). Private language/rule order/BlackburnVsKripke/BlackburnVsWittgenstein: Therefore, when viewed in isolation, an individual can follow rules in the same way as a community.
>Private language, >Rule following, >Language community, >Language use.
KripkeVs: Someone could have followed the addition yesterday and today follow the quaddition. In the light of the rule she is now trying to follow, she can judge previous actions as correct/incorrect, but whatever you now seem to be correct/incorrect in these judgments is correct or incorrect.
>Addition, >Quaddition, >Kripke's Wittgenstein.
I 120
EsfeldVsBlackburn: a social solution is not available for the isolated skeptic (>sanctions). Convergence cannot be negotiated. The present dispositions always have a privileged position! >Dispositions.
The same applies to the simulation of another person: they cannot give feedback.
I 121
Private language/rule sequence/field: second reason why an individual in isolation cannot determine a disagreement: I may not be scheduled to predetermine a property F now, but earlier but already (although the thing in question has not changed). Problem: why is this not a case of disagreement with myself?
Pointe: what counts as a change of a thing is not independent of the fact that conceptual content is determined. To determine the change, conceptual content must be defined.
>Change, >Temporal identity, >Conceptual content.

1. S. Blackburn,"The Indivdual strikes back", Synthesis, vol 58, No. 3,1984 pp. 281-301.

Blckbu I
S. Blackburn
Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984


Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Consciousness Millikan 91
Consciousness/tradition: we experience our consciousness directly.
MillikanVsTradition: What kind of experience of intentionality is this? What kind of force should this argument have?
>Self-identification, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Intentionality.
The force should be epistemic and rational.
Uncorrectability/MillikanVsTradition: the experience of consciousness (experience of intentionality) should have something infallible. We should also have an immediate understanding then. It should also assume the existence of intentionality and consciousness, otherwise the experience could not be "in" it.
Consciousness/Tradition: tradition assumes that consciousness is transparent. And therefore it cannot consist solely of external relations to the external world, and even if these are necessary.
MillikanVsVs: Suppose we reject this epistemically rationalist image, that is, we deny that there is "epistemically given". Then we could admit that people are sometimes aware of their thoughts. But we could maintain that this awareness is partly an external relation. The "inside" of this feeling (awareness)...
>Awareness.
I 92
...does not guarantee that it is the inside of a true awareness relation. Consciousness/Millikan: self awareness of consciousness is not an immediate object. There is nothing transparent in consciousness.
N.B./Millikan: that is disturbing because it follows - negative thesis: that it is possible that we do not know what we think! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: dito). That is, from the act of consciousness itself nothing is guaranteed.
Rationalism/rationalisticiIntentionality/consciousness/MillikanVsRationalism/Millikan: the traditional rationalist view of consciousness and intentionality leads to a cul-de-sac one after another.
>Rationalism.
I 246
Consciousness/classical realism/Millikan: an act of becoming aware of an object is momentary and never has any relation to past or future consciousness acts. Problem: how should a thing then be identified as the one from earlier. From this, classical realism makes a mystery.
Object/thing/classical realism: an object must then have no permanent existence.
>Realism.
Perception/Plato/Descartes/Locke/Millikan: Thesis: Nothing can be identified by perception alone, Recognition: is an act of pure thought in the reunion in the volatile flow of the things given to the senses.
>Perception.
Sense/Plato/Descartes/Locke: consisted then in the fact to direct the mind somehow to eternal objects.
Thinking/Plato/Descartes/Locke: then one could only have thoughts of eternal objects, or of the eternal nature of volatile objects.
Solution/Millikan: qualities and species were assumed as the eternal objects of which one could directly think.
>Thinking/World, >Plato, >Descartes, >Locke.
I 247
Problem: How should one explain that eternal objects (properties) are related to temporal states? How could involvement in the world be essential to it. Then one had to assume that there are properties and types that are not exemplified. Cf. >Temporal identity.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Consistency Millikan I 269
Consistency/Law of Consistency/Millikan: consistency is then a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template.
I 283
Consistency/Millikan: consistency is basically a law of ontology. (E.g. an object must not contain any contradictory properties in itself). >time/Millikan, >temporal identity, >Terminology/Millikan.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Continuants Meixner I 49
Def Continuant/Contuants/Meixner: continuants are singular individuals with a time duration that have at most spatial parts - no temporal parts! Therefore no accidents.
>Accidens, >Individuals, >Objects.
((s) then no change is possible).
Identity in time is given anyway, no question about it is possible. - Then a continuant is no individual which has these temporal parts, the accidents.
Cf. >Temporal identity, >Change, >Motion, >Person.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004

Continuants Millikan I 283
Continuants/Identity/Identification/Whole/Millikan: we are dealing here with two problems that need to be distinguished: 1. The problem of the identity of a whole.
2. The problem of the identification of an object as a whole. How do we come to regard some things as whole, others only as parts of other things?
Answer: by the way of composition. It is clear that parts of an object are never identical.
Part/Whole/Relation/Part relation/Mereology/Millikan: The relation of a part to the whole or the parts to one another is never identity. And it has nothing to do with identity either.
Question: Does the analogy between temporal and spatial parts help us? Surprisingly yes!
Part/Whole/Millikan: the problems, which seem to be first the problems of identity, almost all of them appear as a problem of the part/whole relation.
This is abbout the principles of union or unity.
>Unity, >Identity, >Identification, >Temporal identity, >Mereology, >Parts, >Part-of-relation.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Continuants Simons I 117
Continuant/Broad: a continuant has no temporal parts, only spatial parts. Contrast: event: an event has spatial and temporal parts. Continuant: e.g. human. N.B.: that is why he is able to change. ((s) Otherwise there is the question of whether he remains the same.)
>Temporal identity, >Personal identity.
Contrast: occurrence/Broad: an event cannot change. ((s) A human (continuant) can grow old - an event cannot grow old.)
>Humans, >Events, >Persons.
I 127
Continuants/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: things that can have mass are continuants and they are used in the argument of the Relativity Theory that nothing which has a mass can be accelerated beyond the speed of light. >Four-dimensionalism, >Relativity Theory.
I 173
Continuants/Locke: continuants are constant clusters of matter. They cannot lose or gain any parts (SimonsVsLocke). >J. Locke.
I 175
Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll other authors: thesis: even continuants can have temporal parts, i.e. they are not mereologically constant, but mereologically variable. Simons: thesis: continuants can also have an interrupted existence.
>Existence.
I 176
Continuants/Simons: not all continuants have to be material things, e.g. smile, nodes, waves: they are rather disruptions of material things.
I 180
Def coincidence/continuants/Simons: coincidence predicate:
CTD5 a ‹ ›t b ≡ a ‹t ∧ b ‹t a

For a similarity of parts in terms of the mutual inclusion see Identity/Simons.
I 187
Continuant/ChisholmVsAll other authors: thesis: a continuant is mereologically constant. Mereologically variable continuants are not really primary substances, but rather logical constructions of mereologically constant continuants. Organisms are only constructions.
I 305
Event/continuants/Simons: event: here, a formula like "a‹b" is complete. Continuants: we need an additional time index here: ((s) with quantification) "(∃t)[a‹t b]".
I 350
Continuant/Simons: events happen to a person and are called their life (or life story). Context: not all events of a life are causally connected. Solution: genetic identity (gene-identical): i.e. all events involve a single continuant.
I 351
Continuant/temporal relationship/Simons: it is not the continuant, which belongs together, but its life story. HumeVsContinuants, RussellVsContinuants: continuants bring about a reduction to events, they are mere clotheslines. Whether a continuant exists depends on whether there is a life story to it.
I 353
Simons: nothing maintains their continuous existence.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Descriptions Burks I 138
Description/Burks: for the speaker the use is analytical, for listeners synthetic. >Analyticity/syntheticity.
Most do not have a complete knowledge,but they apply descriptions correctly - e.g. "this red table was brown yesterday": not a contradiction: a description is never complete.
>Identification, >Temporal identity, >Identity, >Unambiguity,
>Correctness, >Completeness, >Contradictions,

Burks I
Arthur W. Burks
"A Theory of Proper Names", in: Philosophical Studies 2 (1951)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Burks II
A. W. Burks
Chance, Cause, Reason 1977

Ethics Nozick II 17
Ethics/Nozick: there is no argument, which Hitler had to bow to. - This means that we cannot regard ethics as absolute, but: E.g. Heimson: does not bring our belief system about personal identity in the same way at risk. >Heimson case/Perry.
We have more of a "How's that possible?"
Question about ethics than about personal identity.
>Identity, >Personal identity, >Temporal identity, >Identification, >Individuation, >Individual, >Person.
II 118
Categorical imperative/Kant/Nozick: when the content could be extracted from the form, it would not be a "hard fact" (brute fact) anymore. - It would arise necessarily from the form. >Bare fact, >Categorical imperative, >Ethics/Kant, >Morality/Kant.
II 570
Ethics/Nozick: how important is it, anyway? - As long as the meaning of our lives is not shown, ethics and values appear to be meaningless. >Life.
II 631
Ethics/moral/reduction/Reductionism/Nozick: VsReductionism: infringes the principle that everything has a value in itself. NozickVsVs: this is not only theoretically wrong but also morally wrong.
>Reductionism, >Reduction, >Values.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Events Kim Schwarz I 132
Event/LewisVsKim: definition: Def Event/Kim: (Kim 1976)(1): a triple of a thing, a time and a property.
LewisVsKim: (1986f(5),196) that is too fragile:
Schwarz I 133
This assigns too many essential properties to events. For example, a football match could have happened a little later or a little different. Or would it have been another game then? Bennett: (1988(4),§23 24) intuitively the question has no sense.
Schwarz: that's not what Lewis is all about. But fragility is what matters when it comes to causes and effects:
Def Fragility/fragile/Event/Lewis/(s): a modified event would not be the same but different. Then modification cannot be expressed at all: "what was modified?
>Identity, >Identification, >Similarity, >Distinctions, >Classification.
Counterfactual analysis: according to it, A causes B if B would not have happened without A.
>Counterfactual conditionals.
Question: under what circumstances would one event have happened (even if it was different) and under what circumstances would it have been replaced by another. This will lead to problems later on.
Cause/effect/Lewis/Schwarz: both are no intuitive event. For example acoustic feedback: here the later temporal parts are caused by the earlier ones. (1986f(5),172f).
>Cause, >Effect.
Similarly: e.g. the temporal parts of persons are linked by causal relationships!
>Temporal identity, >Parts, cf. >Continuants, >Person.
But these temporal parts are not events in the intuitive sense. Causes such as the presence of oxygen in an explosion (ok, as a cause) are also not an event in the everyday sense. (1986d(6),261).
Event/BennettVsLewis/MellorVsLewis/Schwarz: shouldn't Lewis rather speak of "facts"? "that p causes q".
Fact/Schwarz: if you understand them as classes of space-time regions, this is not an alternative, but only a terminological variant.
>Facts, >Space-time regions.

1. Jaegwon Kim [1976]: “Events as Property Exemplifications”. In Myles Brand und Douglas Walton
(ed.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, 159–177
4. Jonathan Bennett [1988]: Events and Their Names. Oxford: Clarendon Press
5. D. Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press
6. D. Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269

Kim I
J. Kim
Philosophy of Mind 2010


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Events Montague Lewis V 246
Definiton Event/Richard Montague/Lewis: (Montague 1969)(1): certain properties of time. Lewis: that means it is identified with the property to be a time when it happens.
>Properties, >Time, >Time points, >Space-time, >Spacetime points, >Temporal identity.
LewisVsMontague: 1. in the Relativity Theory it is not always clear, what time is.
>Relativity Theory.
2. With Montague we first have to find the place with it the region is already given.
>Localization, >Spacetime region.
Event/Quine: (as Lewis): can be easily identified with the region - then there cannot be two events in one region - if two in the same, it is a single event.
>W.V.O. Quine.
Wrong: to say e.g. that a "qua conference" the other "qua battle"(if it is the same).
>Qua-objects.

1. Richard Montague. On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities. The Monist 53 (2):159-194 (1969)


Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Forms Quine V 107
Form/similarity/Quine: E.g. ovate: is something that is more similar in shape to each of two eggs than these are to one another. It is always between two things. (s) Idealization: applies to two arbitrarily chosen things. It cannot differ independently in one direction from both eggs - pomegranate-colored: in the middle between two concrete colors.
V 165
Form/analytic geometry/Quine: are class of classes of pairs of real numbers. ((s) Two-dimensional).
V 184
Form: a variety can only be recognized as a square if it is marked - against this: Colour: Scarlet red, for example, does not need to be marked. Form/Colour/Quine: Difference: the union of squares is usually not a square, while the union of several scarlet areas is scarlet red.
Form/Colour/Ontology/Quine: classic solution: comes down to a double ontology: matter and space.
Spatial diversity: is an aggregate of points, physical objects, particles. Certain particular at a time.
Squares: are spatial manifolds.
For example, a certain cross-section of a physical object will occupy almost exactly a certain square, and it will occupy an infinite number of squares that almost coincide with it almost exactly.
Spatiotemporal Identity/Quine: is then no longer a problem. A square, a certain aggregate of points retains its identity for all times.
V 186
Manifold/Quine: these were merely individual squares, circles, etc. These were not abstract objects like squares. Forms: would be classes of such, i.e. objects of higher abstraction - Forms/(s) i.e. are classes of classes of points. Letter forms: are classes of inscriptions.
>Similarity.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Four-Dimensionalism Lewis Schwarz I 25
Four-dimensionalism/Lewis: The time operator shifts the range: E.g., „In 1642 there were no cuckoo clocks“ is like e.g., „there are no cuckoo clocks in Australia“. The sentence about 1642 is true if there are no cuckoo clocks in this area (part of reality). Intrinsic change/time/four-dimensionalism: Problem: e.g., I make the sentence true: "Last night there was someone in my bed" but I am sitting here at the table.
Cf. >Truth maker/Lewis.
Schwarz I 26
Intuitive Answer: (some representatives): Having slept last night is not at all incompatible with being awake now. The things seem to instantiate only incompatible properties, these are in reality merely time-relative. Objects about which we quantify with "last night" are in themselves neither sleeping nor sitting nor anything else. They also have neither shape nor color.
Correct: you are "awake at t" etc.
Properties: According to this view, simple properties are actually relations between strangely featureless things and times.
Cf. >Properties/Lewis.
Time-relative properties/LewisVs: This is unacceptable.
Form/Lewis: A form is a property and not a relation!
Properties, intrinsic/SchwarzVsLewis: Lewis misstated the problem; it is not about intrinsic properties, but about single-digit properties.
Properties/Relation: Question: Whether form predicates express disguised relations similar to e.g. "famous" and "far". It is meaningless to say someone is famous without reference to anything.
Lewis: But I guess it makes sense without reference to anything else to say something is red or round.
Intrinsic change/Lewis: Lösung: Solution: According to the analogy of time and space: e.g., a long wall is high and red in some places, low and gray in others. As a whole, it is neither high nor low, neither red nor gray.
Solution: It is simply composed of different parts.
Schwarz I 27
Change/Lewis: Ordinary things have different properties at different times by being composed of parts with those properties. >Change/Lewis.
Identity/time/temporal identity/Lewis/Schwarz: Problem: Then past things are not strictly identical with present things. The thing that used to be asleep and the thing that is sitting here now are not strictly identical. The different temporal parts are different things after all.(1976b(1)
>Temporal Identity.
MellorVsLewis:That is absurd. When we talk about someone, we are not talking about his parts.
LewisVsVs: E.g., surely the whole man was Hillary on Mt. Everest.
Solution: Hillary has a past temporal part that is on a past part of Everest. Edmund Hillary as a whole meets this condition.
Problem: E.g., Then I am strictly speaking as a whole neither waking nor sitting. But as a whole I am not formless because of that.
Lewis/Solution: I have a complex four-dimensional form. There are always temporal parts which are ignored.
I/Four-dimensionalism/Lewis: "I" often refers only to a single temporal part of me.
Ted Sider: (1996(3), 2001a(4), 188-208): Ted Sider elaborated: Names always refer to temporal parts. I tonight was a temporal counterpart of me now.


1. David Lewis [1976b]: “The Paradoxes of Time Travel”. American Philosophical Quarterly, 13: 145–152. In [Lewis 1986f].
2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell.
3. Theodore Sider [1996]: “All the World’s a Stage”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 433–453.
4. Theodore Sider [2001a]: Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Four-Dimensionalism Meixner I 50
Spacetime cuts/four-dimensional/MeixnerVs: we die as whole individuals, it is not only the most recent time period that dies. >Ontology, >Temporal identity, >Continuants, >Person,
>Individuals, >Humans, >Life, >Death.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004

I, Ego, Self Russell McGinn I 86f
Russell: characterizes "I as a number of classes of mental particulars" (as opposed to "needlepoint-I"). The temporal identity then boils down to saying that there are certain relationships between the mental qualities of the ego. The individual states of a person are so connected by something like memory, causal continuity, psychological similarity. >Temporal identity, >Memory, >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Identification Geach I 139f
Identification/Reference object/Intentionality/Geach: Problem: E.g.: "Someone made a derogatory remark about an unnamed person. Mrs. Supanich claims to be that person." E.g. "Ralph is the person x so that it was the will of the testator that x should inherit his business."
Def Shakespearian context/Geach: is given if any name can be used ("A rose, whatever its name may be, would smell lovely.")
Def non-Shakespearian context/Geach: is given if not every name can be used because of opacity.
E.g. inheritance example: Shakespearian.
E.g. "Ralph was (one person that) expressly from the testator..." - (here any name can be used). - Even non-extensional contexts can be Shakespearian: E.g. "It is logically and chronologically possible that Caesar was the father of Brutus."
(But not when instead of "Caesar" a description is used).
We also do not want quantification on "possible names".
>Someone, >Reference, >Identification, >Name, >Description, >Context, >Quantification.
I 145ff
Intentionality/Identification/Intensional object/Geach: E.g. a fraudster buys a car under a wrong name: Problem: The correct name cannot be assigned.
Solution: identification over time - then ad hoc name possible: "A" (Existential generalization, "Existence interoduction"). >Existential generalization, >Temporal identity.
E.g.,
"Hutchinson" is not the same person as __ and the plaintiff believed that __ wanted to buy her car. - N.B.: wrong: "Hutchinson is the Person x and the plaintiff believed of x that he wanted to buy her car" (then the plaintiff would have lost).
((s) Identification not with "the buyer", then the purchase would have been achieved - but in case of misidentification: then there was no purchase.)
I 148f
Identity/Intentionality/Intensional objects/Geach: Problem: de re "in relation to someone .." - "... >de re.
Hob and Nob believe that she is a witch".
This presupposes that one and the same person is meant. - This is the same problem as "There is a horse that he owes me" (which horse?). >Intensional objects.

The Cob-Hob-Nob case.
To refer to indeterminate things often means to refer in an undefined way to something specific. - Problem: Quantification does not help: "Hob thinks a witch has blinded Bob's mare and Nob wonders if she (same witch) killed Cob's sow."
The range of the quantified sentence part seems to be fully within the earlier dependent context, on the other hand it covers something of the later context. - This cannot be represented in a logical schema at all.
Problem: Anaphora: "she" or "the same witch" is tied to an antecedent: "the only one ..."
Best solution: Hob thinks that the (one and only) witch which is F, blinded Bob's mare, and Nob wonders if the witch who is F has killed Cob's sow.
((s) additional property F).
N.B.: the sentence is true if a suitable interpretation of the property F is true.
((s) Otherwise the sentence is false because of the non-existence of witches.)
>Non-existence, >Predication, >Attribution. cf. the logical definition of >"Exactly one".

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Identity Anscombe Frank I 78
Identity/I/Time/Memory/Locke: Question: How can it be guaranteed that the self who did something some time ago is identical with the self that remembers this act? >Personal identity.
Anscombe/Schaede: Anscombe unthinkingly shares the traditional view that the time fell apart into discrete moments, which must first and foremost be related to one another. Then the corresponding successive consciousness moments would have to be synthesized.
>Time, >Temporal identity, cf. >Zeno.
But only if this theory is shared, problems arise with the temporal identity of "I".
Frank I 93
I/Self/Memory/Identity/Anscombe: a repeated thought of "I" in conjunction with the same self would have to include a re-identification. But that is not at all part of the role of "I". On the other hand, it was part of the role of "A".
>Logic/Anscombe.
Frank I 104
I/Identity/Anscombe: when I ask: what carries out my actions? Then the answer is "this object here", "this thing here" but that is not an assertion of identity. The sentences about my actions are verified by my body. But observation does not show me which body is precisely this one. >Self-identification, >Observation, >Actions.

G. Elizabeth M.Anscombe (1975a): The First Person, in:
Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) (I975): Mind and Language: Wolfson College
Lectures 1974, Oxford 1975,45-65

Anscombe I
G.E. M. Anscombe
"The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36
In
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Baudrillard Blask I 82
Identity/Baudrillard: Baudrillard recommends the search for the other in order to escape the obligation to be oneself, the necessity of one's own search for identity. "Never to be oneself, but never to be alienated: to enter from the outside into the form of the other." The highest pleasure lies in metamorphosis. >Personal identity, >Temporal identity, >Person, >Subject, >Human, >Self, >I, Ego, Self, >Change.

Baud I
J. Baudrillard
Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994

Baud II
Jean Baudrillard
Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993
German Edition:
Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009


Blask I
Falko Blask
Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013
Identity Evans I 315f
Identity / Evans: trivial criterion: e.g."to be the same as a".
Frank I 512
temporal identity / Evans: Does not just follow from description, but "The subject of the hypothesis recalls it, therefore, it is the same person".
Frank I 539
Temporal identity / Evans: "I" spans past and present, but this is based on a capacity of the subject - that leads to a new way of bust - there must be exactly one thing the act of the imagination is about. >Temporal identity.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Parfit Lewis IV 57
Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/Parfit: when it comes to survival, both answers (continuity and identity) cannot be correct, so we must choose. a) Identity: is a relation with a certain formal character: it is one to one and cannot be gradual.
b) Continuity: (and connection) (e. g. in relation to mental things) can be one to many or many to one and gradual.
>Continuity.
Parfit: therefore, it is the continuity and connection that is relevant to personal (temporal) identity (survival).
>Temporal identity, >Personal identity, >Person.
c) what is important for survival is not identity therefore! At most a relation that coincides with identity to the extent that problematic cases do not occur.
>Relations, >Identity/Lewis, >Counterpart relation/Lewis,
>Individuation/Lewis.
LewisVsParfit: someone else might just as well represent the argument in the other direction, and put identity as relevant. And of course, identity is that what counts in the end! Therefore, the divergence between a) and b) must be eliminated!
I agree with Parfit that continuity and connection are crucial, but it is not an alternative to identity.
Borderline case/Parfit: Problem: borderline cases have to be decided arbitrarily.
Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/LewisVsParfit: the opposition between identity and continuity is wrong.
Intuitively, it is definitely about identity. Namely, literally identity!
IV 58
Definition R-relation/identity/continuity/person/Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the former?
IV 59
I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: Thesis: the two are identical because they are coextensive! >Coextension.
IV 61
Identity/Fusion/Split/Person/State/Lewis: is one to one, in the sense that a thing is never identical with several things. However, this does not apply to the I and R relations. Many of their other states are states of the same person and related to this and also to each other. But that is not what Parfit means when he says that R relations are one to many. Parfit: means that there can be several states to which a state is related, but which are not related to each other. (fusion and splitting of the person). That means the R relation would not be transitive.
Split: the forward-related R relation is one many, backward: many one, simpliciter: transitive.
IV 65
Methuselah example/Person/Identity/Lewis: (Original passage): Connectivity/mental states/Parfit: thesis: the connection of mental states disappears with time.
IV 67
Person/Fusion/Parfit: For example, if you merge with someone very different, the question is of who survives. But there is no specific, hidden answer. Rather, the important point is that the R-relationship is only available to a very small degree.
IV 73
ParfitVsLewis: one should not cross our common views with the common sense. I.e. it is about another sense of survival.
IV 74
Lewis: I had written, what matters is identity in survival. Then for the short-living C1, the stage S to t0 is actually Ir to states in the distant future such as S2, namely over the long-living C2! ParfitVsLewis: "But is that not the wrong person?"
Lewis: in fact, if C1 really wants to survive (C1), then this wish is not fulfilled.
LewisVsParfit: but I do not think he can have that wish at all! There is a limit to everyday psychological desires under conditions of shared states.
The shared state S thinks for both. Every thought he has must be shared. He cannot think one thing in the name of C1 and one thing in the name of C2.
On the other hand, if C1 and C2 are supposed to share something every day, then it must be a "plural" wish, "Let's survive".
IV 75
Person/Survival/Identity/LewisVsParfit: For example, until now we had assumed that both of us knew before the split that there would be a split. Now: Variant: both do not know about the coming split.
Question: cannot we share the wish: "Let me survive!"?
Problem: that C1 and C2 share the same desire is due to the wrong presupposition that they are one person. Meaning the "me" is a false description. It cannot refer to C1 in C1's thoughts and not to C2 in its thoughts. For these thoughts are one and the same.
Vs: but their desire to survive is fulfilled! At least the one of C2 and the one of C1 is not differentiated. Then their wish cannot consist only in the unfulfillable singular wish. They both must also have the weak plural desire, even if they do not know the split beforehand.

Parf I
D. Parfit
Reasons and Persons Oxford 1986

Parf II
Derekt Parfit
On what matters Oxford 2011


Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Identity Shoemaker Frank I, 70f
Temporal identity/Shoemaker: with Butler: there are no criteria for temporal identity. >Temporal identity, >Criteria.
Solution: functionalism: only when the I is identified previously.
>Functionalism.
Shoemaker: This is not a problem because experience is marked by an internal perspective.
>Self-identification, >Perspective, >Consciousness, >Self-consciousness.

Shoemaker I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003

Identity Wessel I 220
Identity/Wessel: identity statement: Abbreviation of a statement about the importance of equality of two terms: mutual meaning inclusion - ta tb = definition (ta > tb) and (tb> ta) - but that is only correct for individual subject termini. >Singular terms, >Statements, >Levels/order, >Description levels.
I 220f
Identity/Hegel: a = a: E.g. Socrates is Socrates: demands that Socrates does not undergo any changes in time. >G.W.F. Hegel.
WesselVsHegel: confusion of word and object - identity and difference two-digit predicates (relation) - not one-digit predicate. - x = y is existentially charged.
I 221
Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: suggests an incorrect comparison of separate objects. >Identity/Leibniz, >Leibniz Principle.
I 227
Identity/logic/Wessel: x = x: existentially charged: only true if one thing x exists - not logically true, not a tautology, empirical fact. >Identity/Russell.
I 335
Definition identity/Wessel: i1 = i2 = definition S(i1, ti2). (s) S: the fact that i1 is designated by the name i2? - That a is designated with the name b? b stands for a? Def diversity/Wessel: -i (i1 = i2) = def E(i1) u E(i2) ~ u (i1 = i2)
((s),Tthere are two expressions i1 and i2, which do not stand for the same object.).
Identity/Wessel: we use the axiom: l- i1 = i2> ti 1 ti2.
((s) if the objects are identical, it follows that the corresponding expressions are equivalent in meaning.)
I 379f
Identity/Science Logic/Wessel: 1) at any time is the object a identical with the object b in any spatial order with respect to any method for determining the order
2) always, if one of a and b exists, the other also exists - structure must take into account the relations of objects - there is nothing in nature that justifies the preference for one or another relation (not a fact).
Identity in time/Science Logic/Wessel: if t2 after t1, one can no longer speak of identity - T1 and t2 are then only representative of the same class of objects a, if the objects were defined using time.
>Temporal identity.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Information Bigelow I 68
Information/Movement/Causality/Speed of Light/Bigelow/Pargetter: an image can be transmitted faster than light: e.g. a laser cannon on earth can swing on the surface of the Jupiter moon Callisto and move an image from one point to another through the angular speed, which is faster than the speed of light.
I 69
This is possible because there is no causal process under way here. The point at a time is not the same thing as the point at another time, the point is not an object. >Causality, >Causation.
N.B.: then in the case of this point there is only one Ockhamistic speed, no vector. Saying "it" moved was misleading. It also has no identity in time.
>Temporal identity.
Cause: is the movement of the laser cannon on Earth.
>Causes.
N.B.: therefore, the existence of a pattern of 2nd level of positions does not imply the existence of a property of the 1st level of the instantaneous velocity.
>Levels/order, >Description levels.
Newton: shows again that instantaneous velocity (property of the 1st level) does not imply properties of the 2nd level (sequence of positions).
Flux theory: this is what it needs, the logical independence of properties 1st and 2nd level. Nevertheless, it must accept an intimate connection between the two.
>Flux/Bigelow.
False solution: to say that the point of light receives its identity from the numerical identity. That would be a dubious combination of first and second level properties.
I 70
Vs: if, for example, a world of Malebranche - God creates the moving objects at any time in any place - is a logical possibility, then there is no implication (entailment) between Ockhamistic speed and velocity according to the flux theory (2nd and 1st level of properties). >Malebranche, >Entailment, >Implication, >William of Ockham.
Bigelow/Pargetter: That is why we say that the connection between Ockham speed and flux speed is not guaranteed by a metaphysically necessary connection, but by a contingent natural law.
>Laws of nature, >Contingency.
Motion/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Ockham's change of location is often explained by instantaneous speed. The reason is that there is no other possibility according to the laws of nature.
>Motion, >Change.
Moment/Bigelow/Pargetter: this vector understands velocity among itself. Moment is not an intrinsic property (or "invariant"), but is relativized to a frame of reference.
>Reference systems.
Vector/Natural Laws/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Vectors play an important role in natural laws. It is they who give the natural laws their explanatory power.
Intrinsic property/Vector/Bigelow/Pargetter: each vector constitutes an intrinsic characteristic of an object at a time. ((s) No contradiction to above, if related to point of time).
Velocity/acceleration/Bigelow/Pargetter: their connection is mediated by their role in natural laws.
Gravitational Acceleration/Galilei/Bigelow/Pargetter: is actually not quite constant, because gravitation becomes stronger when approaching the center of gravity. And it is increasingly accelerating. Galilei, however, assumes constancy.
I 71
Explanation/Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: not all quantities play an explanatory role such as acceleration and velocity. For example, the change in acceleration (see above gravitational acceleration) does not play an explanatory role. That is why we do not assume a vector for them. All we need here is "Ockham's" pattern of acceleration. No flux. However, we do need the flux for the underlying vectors of velocity and acceleration.
>Intrinsic.
Vector/Physics/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: there is no reason to assume vectors above the level of acceleration, neither flux vectors nor Ockhamist vectors.
>Vectors.
Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows an explanatory link between flux vectors and patterns in time.
>Explanations, >Causal explanation.
This connection is not a close logical or metaphysical one, but a looser, a nomological one.
>Metaphysics, >Metaphysical possibility, >Nomothetic/idiographic.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Memory Nietzsche Ries II 81
Memory/On the genealogy of Morality(1)/Nietzsche: it never worked out without blood, torture, sacrifice, if the human considered it necessary to make a memory.
1. F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI.
---
Danto III 212
Memory/Nietzsche/Danto: He characterizes the human as the animal that makes promise and thus has a "memory of the will".(1)
Danto III 213
Forget/Nietzsche/Danto: Forgetting is not something that happens to us. It is something we do. The human is the necessary forgetful animal. In this sense, remembering is only a matter of not-forgetting. Problem: How can we then comprehend ourselves as an identical person in time, who is still bound to the same promise?(2)
>Personal identity, >Temporal identity.
According to Nietzsche, the technique of inflicting pain makes the human calculable.
Cf. >Violence.


1. F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 308.
2. Ibid.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Motion Motion: spatial variation of one or more observed or not observed objects in time. Problems arising in connection with attribution or withdrawal of predicates. See also change, temporal identity, process, flux, vectors.

Objects (Material Things) Lewis V XIII
Thing/time/particular/permanent/Lewis: permanent individual things consist of temporal parts, which are combined by various types of continuity - ((s) continuants are not mentioned here). Cf. >continuants, >temporal identity, >personal identity, >change.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Observation Language Millikan I 13
Observational concepts/Millikan: we have much more of it than we commonly assume. For them there are good tests - although they are fallible, which are independent of our theories.
I 307
Observation Language/Learning/Quine/Word and Object/Word and Object(1)/Millikan: If a general term is learned by induction from observation instances, these instances must be similar in two ways:
1. From the point of view of the learner, they must be sufficiently similar from time to time,
2. From different points of view. So that teachers and students can talk about the same.
E.g. "a square perpendicular to the line of sight" is nothing that can be shared by two people.
>Temporal identity, >General term.


1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Parts Millikan I 283
Temporal part/Millikan: the temporal part is a momentary or almost momentary three-dimensional object. >Mereology.
I 284
Analogously, you can split an object into time slices. >Fourdimensionalism.
Just as with spatial parts, two temporal parts of a whole can never be identical. Otherwise they could not be distinguished.
Identity/Self-Identity/Unity/Uniformity/Millikan: to be identical with oneself, a thing must never exemplify a principle of uniformity. E.g. also a very loosely held sheep herd is always this herd itself.
Temporal identity: also plays no role in the question of self-identity: no one believes that an object state to t1 would be the same as to t2.
>Temporal identity.
Unity/Object/Thing/Millikan: nevertheless, we need principles of uniformity to approach objects as such. Thus, it is about the question as to which relation must have the states S1 and S2 in order to be valid as states of the same thing.
I 285
Identity/unity/Millikan: thus questions of the identity of a thing do not seem to be separated from questions of the principles of uniformity. >Identity/Millikan, >Unity/Millikan.
Problem: there are often different ways to summarize parts into a whole. Here we must ask which category the whole is to belong to.
Self-Identity/Sameness/Millikan: slef-identity then appears relative to the category to which a thing should belong.
Problem: is the water surface S1 part of the same water mass as water surface S2? Such questions are not fully defined. We need principles to summarize parts. The relations between the parts can also be more or less loose.
I 286
And that has nothing to do with the identity of the whole! Whole: can also be specified by a mere list. This would identify the whole without mentioning the relations of the parts at all. And the self-identity of the whole would not be dependent on the strength of the cohesion of the parts at all.
Temporal/spatial: so far the analogy between temporal and spatial parts seems to apply.
Cf. >Part-of-relation.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Parts Nozick II 99
Part/whole/Nozick: a whole is not equal to the sum: different parts always form another sum, but that may be an equal whole. >Mereology, >Wholes, >Part-of relation, >Mereological sum,
>Totality.
A body can lose the appendix or get dentures. - Body remains a whole during the time (identical). - The sum is not identical when parts are replaced.
>Body, >Identity, >Temporal identity, >Person, >Personal identity, >Continuants.
The self (whole) may even lose memories and change goals and dispositions.
>Memory, >Actions, >Goals, >Dispositions.
Identity of the parts is not sufficient for continuity of the whole: the relations of the parts could be changed.
>Relations.
The whole is not equal to sum: scheme of the next successor: the n.c. of the sum is the sum ofthe n.c. of the parts.
>Next Successor/Nozick.
But the next successor of the whole is not the sum of the next successor of the parts (similar for numbers).
Later successor: body, but not the sum of the parts.
Self: is therefore a whole, not a sum.
Whole/criterion: it could also exist if it were made of other parts.
II 102
The whole thing must not be a conglomerate.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Parts Simons I 26f
Real part/mereology: there must be at least a second real part. BrentanoVs: e.g. a man is a real part of the event "sitting human" but here there is no second real part.
Otherwise: Thatcher qua Prime Minister: is not part of Thatcher.
>Qua-objects.
Solution: supplement principles: there must be at least two real parts (if at all). There must be the possibility of separate parts and not only overlapping.
>Overlapping.
I 135
Predicate/part/whole/mereology/Simons: certain predicates are true of their objects because other predicates are true of their parts: e.g. Socrates was snub-nosed, because his nose was blunt, e.g. a table mountain is flat, because its upper part is flat. Predication of the whole is inherited by predication of the parts (local predication). For continuants this is even the only kind of predication. >Predicates, >Predication.
Variation/continuants/mereology/McTaggart/Simons: e.g. the poker which is hot at the front and cool at the back: that is a variation on the object, but no change of the properties. It is a complex condition. On the other hand: e.g. when the entire poker gets hot, we have to say that the point in time is not the same.>
>Change, >Temporal identity, >Properties.
I 210
Part/whole/Simons: thesis: we reject the antisymmetry between part and whole. Then different objects can have the same parts - and these are necessarily in the same place at the same time. >Superposition.
I 229
Part/Simons: the wit of this expression is that without it, we have no concept of space restrictions or perhaps of the space at all.
I 235
Part/plural designation/multiplicity/Simons: (1): b is part of a: here b is a mass term (e.g. dough) or individual term (e.g. an apple)
(2): b is part of a: here b must be an individual term (e.g. an apple)
(3): b are parts of a: here b must be a plural term (e.g. wolves, e.g. blueberries are part of the cake, they are not "a part" of the cake. "Are part of": is the plural of "is part of". "Are parts of": is the plural of "is part of".
(4): b are parts of a: here any b must be part of a, e.g. crankshaft and transmission are parts of the car, e.g. "the front" is part of the car, but not a part of the car. Whatever is a part of something, is also part of it but not vice versa.
"A part of" has extra sense opposed to "part of".
Component ("a part of") exists before installation and survived replacement.
I 334
Part/fragment/relation/function/mereology/Simons: an arbitrary conceptual cut, e.g. "northern part of the house" is typically not closed under the relation, under which the whole is closed. >Mereology.
I 337
Part/pure mereology/Simons: a mere relation of co-parts could not distinguish which objects are more unified (integrated). >Part-of-relation.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Person Kant Strawson V 142
Person/personal identity/Descartes: (not physical!) - Our ordinary concept brings very well empirically applicable criteria for numerical identity of a subject with itself (concept!). But not by self-ascription - "I" is simply used without criteria.
>Criteria/Kant.
KantVsDescartes: the only criteria would be: "the same person", "the same soul" - that would be circular.
>Circular reasoning, >Temporal identity.
V 146
Kant: there is no inner intuition of the subject. >Subject/Kant.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Person Nagel III 105
Identity/person/personal identity/temporal/objectivity/subjectivity/Nagel: underlying problem: even if any set of conditions is met, the question arises again whether we are still dealing with the same subject. >Personal identity, >Identity/Henrich, >Subject.
Even a metaphysical ego raises the question again - when temporal identity is only to be guaranteed by my metaphysical ego, this cannot not be the individual that guarantees my personal identity.
>Temporal identity, >Individual, >Metaphysical I, cf. >Apprehension/Kant, >Apperception/Kant.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Person Williams Nozick II 29f
Self/Person/Self-identity/Identity/B. Williams: e.g. two stories together that put us to a mystery: 1st case: one person enters a new body, actually two people exchange their bodies.
A-body-person: (now connected with the A-body): has all the memories, knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (earlier, complete) person B - if A could choose which pain should be inflicted after the change, he would choose the A-body for it - because he assumes that he lives in B.
2nd case: someone tells them to endure pain. after that, you will learn that you will undergo a change in your psychological condition - so that you will possess the character of someone else - which frightens you, you don't want to lose your identity and then endure pain.
Question: Why did the A-person not have the same fears in the first case? Why is case 1: Transfer of a person to another body
and case 2: something that happens to a permanent person? Why does memory play a role in case 1?
II 31
Difference 1/2: in 2, B does not acquire the memories of A.
Nozick II 29f
Identity/Person/Self/B. Williams: e.g. Symmetric case: Outside view: two people swap bodies, A is now in the B-body and decides that B (now in his old A-body) pain should be inflicted instead of him in the new body - inside view (symmetric): You are supposed to get pain inflicted which frightens you, before you should get another character which frightens you even more - you choose the pain for yourself to ward off the loss of the person - other decision, symmetric case. Problem: nothing outside influences A's task and acquisition of a new psyche. Question: how can then two tasks and acquisitions lead to an exchange of bodies?
Williams: Thesis: physical identity is a necessary condition for personal identity.
II 31
Problem: what happens elsewhere can have no effect on whether A continues to live in the A-body. Williams: Thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity.
Nozick II 32
Identity/Person/Self/B. Williams: Principle 1: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of any kind. Principle 2: if it is possible that there is another thing that prevents identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist.
NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong.
E. g. The Vienna Circle dissolves - several successor groups emerge - then the identity depends on something that happens elsewhere ((s) whether there are several groups). >"closest continuer, .
Nozick II 33
Identity/time/next successor/NozikVsWilliams: but dependence on the existence of other things: whether a group can call itself a Vienna circle depends on whether there are other groups in exile - if two things are equally close to the original, there is no next successor (closest continuer). Identity in time: necessary condition: to be next successor.
II 35
If God provided causally for identity in time, he would also have to decide how the factors should be weighted. >Ship of Theseus.
II 40
It may be that the next successor is not close enough.
II 41
Randomly created copy is not a next successor (because of missing causality) - we could have the second one without the first one.
II 45
Identity in time/problem: overlapping. >Overlapping, >Identity, >Personal identity, >Continuity, >Change, >Temporal identity.

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Picture (Image) Baudrillard Blask I 29
Picture/Baudrillard: E.g. Cézanne's thesis: one has to hurry, if one wants to see something, because everything disappears! >Hyper-Reality/Baudrillard, >Temporal identity, >Perception, >Seeing, >Image, >World/thinking, >Simulacra/Baudrillard, >Signs.

Baud I
J. Baudrillard
Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994

Baud II
Jean Baudrillard
Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993
German Edition:
Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009


Blask I
Falko Blask
Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013
Reality Baudrillard Blask I 10
Reality/Baudrillard's thesis: Diagnosis of the disappearance of the real in favor of simulation and hyperreality. ---
Blask I 31
Definition Hyper-reality/Baudrillard: first the model exists, or models endlessly circling in themselves and then the events! There is no manipulator! As if war were only a test for whether there can still be wars. E.g. Movie »Company Capricorn«: NASA is staging a manned Mars expedition in the studio for technical reasons. >Hyper-Reality/Baudrillard, >Temporal identity, >Perception, >Seeing, >Image, >World/thinking, >Simulacra/Baudrillard, >Signs.

Baud I
J. Baudrillard
Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994

Baud II
Jean Baudrillard
Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993
German Edition:
Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009


Blask I
Falko Blask
Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013
Rigidity Simons I 306
Modal Rigidity/Simons (without time): e.g. it is essential that a person has parents, yet he/she mostly survives them. >Necessity, >Essence.
Temporal rigidity: temporal rigidity is more difficult to find (not modal): a parasite takes simultaneous existence of its host, even if it was a coincidence that it ended up in this particular host.
>Temporal identity.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Ship of Theseus Millikan I 287
Ship of Theseus/terminology/Millikan: S0: the original Sn: the ship, newly built from new parts.
Sr: the renovated ship ((s) intermediate stage).
All three are ship stages.
I 287
Question: was the whole permanent whole, of which Sn was a part, the same permanent whole like that, of which S0 was a part? Or correspondingly with Sr and S0? Solution/Millikan: a solution can only be given if the principle is established before, according to which the unit (uniformity) is to be determined.
Problem: it seems clear that both Sn and Sr cannot be parts of the same whole. Because they exist at the same time in different places.
Problem: For example, three water surfaces S1, S2, S3, if they are designed in a way that it is unclear whether S1 and S2 are part of the same lake and correspondingly also for S1 and S3, it would be inconceivable that it would be completely clear at the same time, that S2 and S3 were not part of the same lake.
N.B.: Is there perhaps an asymmetry at the end between temporal and spatial parts?
Ship of Theseus: Sn and Sr cannot be stages of the same ship because they exist simultaneously but have different properties and occupy different spatial parts composed of different collections of matter, etc.
Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: his undisputed principle excludes that Sn and Sr are the same ship.
Unity/Uniformity/Millikan: whatever principle we choose here, it seems that it should rule out that different temporal parts could exist at the same time.
Separation/Millikan: i.e. a separation should not preserve both parts equally, as in an amoeba.
Unit/Millikan: a corresponding principle must maintain the Leibniz principle of the identity of the indistinguishable.
Problem: the principle simply says that a thing must have the same properties as it does itself. It does not say that a part must have the same properties as another part.
Ship of Theseus: then Sn and Sr could be simultaneous but spatially distant parts.
Spatial/temporal/Millikan: it is rather the principle of uniformity (not the one of identity) that requires that objects have only one position at a time.
Mereology/Unity/Uniformity/Millikan: we often break this principle when we say that the same thing still exists when it is broken or decomposed into its parts.
Definition/thing/object/Millikan: nevertheless, we need the principle of uniformity to define objects at all.
Seperation/Millikan: a ban on division would have nothing to do with the principle of identity.
I 289
Ship of Theseus/Millikan: Whether we say that newly built ship or the ship built from the original parts would be the right ship, is in the end only a verbal question of the principles of uniformity that we want to apply. On the other hand:
Identity/Millikan: Questions of identity are objective questions that are not only decided by the language use.
>Language behavior.
Unity/Uniformity/Millikan: is a question of used descriptions.
>Description.
Separation/fusion/identity in time/temporal/Millikan: are actually questions of the chosen (conventional) principles of unity. (Uniformity)
Identity/Objectivity/Millikan: Questions of identity are objective questions in which one can be confused about what to think, not merely what one is to say.
Temporal identity/Millikan: temporal identity is not more problematic than spatial identity.
>Identity/Millikan, >Temporal identity.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Similarity Baudrillard Blask I 106
Similarity/Baudrillard: "...this disgusting promiscuity with itself, which calls itself similarity."
Blask I 82
Identity/Baudrillard: Baudrillard recommends the search for the other in order to escape the obligation to be oneself, the necessity of one's own search for identity. "Never to be oneself, but never to be alienated: to enter from the outside into the form of the other." The highest pleasure lies in metamorphosis. >Personal identity, >Temporal identity, >Person, >Subject, >Human, >Self, >I, Ego, Self, >Change.

Baud I
J. Baudrillard
Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994

Baud II
Jean Baudrillard
Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993
German Edition:
Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009


Blask I
Falko Blask
Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013
Sortals Tugendhat I 453
Sortal/Aristotle/Tugendhat: E.g. "chair" distinguished through function -> "bottom-up": we ask how singular term must function - sortal: allows to decide what belongs to it and what does not - no temporal, only spatial limits - (>continuant). Life phases of an object are not regarded as parts.
>Parts, >Part-of-relation, >Temporal identity.
I 457f
Sortal/Tugendhat: allows new type of temporal-spatial identification - we should not presuppose perceptual object - then identification by distinguishing space-time locations. >Specification.
I 460
Sortal: Not just imagination. Sortal predicates: presuppose a specific configuration of spatial or temporal extended - e.g. "the same cat".
Conversely: sortal predicates are only explainable through space locations together with equal signs.
>Equal sign.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Theories Morgenthau Brocker I 285
Theory/Morgenthau: If political theory is to provide orientation and guide action over time and space, then elements of constancy must crystallize out of the constantly changing kaleidoscope of social events and be detached from ephemeral elements.(1) >Invariants, >Covariance, >Temporal identity.
Theory is a coagulated experience in this perspective; it arises as an abstract summary of insights from history, which are compared with the here and now. The focus is first on the human being in his psychological constitution, then on the social arena in the broadest sense.
>Abstraction, >Individuals.

1. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948. Dt.: Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik, Gütersloh 1963, S. 4.

Christoph Frei, „Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden (1948)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Pol Morg I
Hans Morgenthau
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948
German Edition:
Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik Gütersloh 1963


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Time Millikan I 283
Identity in Time/temporal Identity/Millikan: Thesis: something like identity about time does not seem to exist at first sight. In the end, however, I will admit that it exists. It has the same structure as the identity of perfect substances (see Chapter 16, e.g. Gold, can also be a property). Temporal identity/Millikan: is, however, only an identity in situ ((s), i.e., one that exists only in a given object, not according to a natural law).
Identity/Millikan: real identity, on the other hand, is a matter of natural necessity, similar to causality.
This leads to that...
I 283
Consistency/Millikan: ...consistency is basically a law of ontology. (see below: an object must not contain any contradictory properties in itself). >Temporal identity.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Time Simons I 90f
Interval/time interval/mereology/van Benthem/Needham/Simons: interval is a term of time and terms of temporal intervals. Needham: an interval is temporal betweenness. Benthem: the term "interval" is part of time organization.
>Time, >Parts, >Temporal identity.
I 117
Object/thing/everyday language/time/existence/modification/terminology/Simons: we say, an ordinary material object lasts in time (enduring in time) but it is not extended in time (developing, extending, extended in time ). Cf. >Endurantism, >Perdurantism.
Participants in the race (continuants) have no temporal parts. The race has temporal parts.
I 178
Time/Simons: we assume time as being dense and empty and not relativized onto events. >Events.
Singular Term: the singular term is also not temporally relativized. Identity predicate: the identity predicate is not time relativized (unlike the existence predicate).
>Singular terms.
Time relativized is written as follows: "true-to-t".
Points in time themselves are not relativized temporal.
>Spacetime points.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Unity Nozick II 100
Def unity/Nozick criterion: something is a unity if its identity in time is not identical with the identity of its parts. >Identity, >Temporal identity, >Parts, >Part-of relation.
Unity is determined by relations among parts. - The closer the relations, the greater the unity.
I.e. there is no "underlying unity" provided.
>Complexity, >Mereology.
II 102
Important: sequential order of the parts to the whole. >Wholes, >Unity and multiplicity, >Unity.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Universe Esfeld I 231 ~
Block Universe/Esfeld: existence is not relative to time/place: but the objective relations before/after are. Existence contains only events, not things. An object has spatial, but not temporal parts. An event has both spatial and temporal parts. Esfeld: only objects can be at rest/in motion. >Ontology, >Events, >Objects, >Motion, >Continuants, >Temporal identity, >Parts.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002


The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Geach, P. Wiggins Vs Geach, P. Simons I 213
"Relative Identity"-view of super position: a) (Representative: Geach): "Sortal Theory" of relative identity: known as "theory R": for Sortals F and G it is possible to find two objects a and b, so that a and b are both Fs and Gs, a is the same F as b, but not the same G.
Nicholas Griffin: pro.
WigginsVsGeach: that violates Leibniz' law. And because this applies necessarily, the theory is necessarily wrong.
DoepkeVsGeach: "relative identity" is only a false name for similarity.
b) Grice/George Myro: (both unpublished): VsWiggins' thesis that things that are ever different are always different.
GriceVsWiggins: the assumption depends on finding properties in which the objects differ in the times when they are not superposed. Then identity is relative to time. I.e.
TI a = t b ↔ (F)[Ft a ↔ Ft b]
Where the quantifier runs only over properties whose instantiation does not include the instantiation of any other property at any other time.
This excludes: the property,
e.g. to be two years old,
e.g. to be ex-president
e.g. to be bride-in-spe.
Simons: we can call this the relation of "temporal indistinguishability". It is characterized by a limitation of Leibniz's law.
I 214
SimonsVsGrice: if we call this similarity "identity", then any other kind of similarity is possible, like for example "surface identity" of a body with its surface. Indistinguishability/Time/Simons: will turn out to be important below (in constitution).
System CT/Simons: (see above) with him, we have already rejected "temporal identity".
Ad (3): dichrone view of super position: Thesis: superposed objects do not have to exist at the same time. For example, the gold forms into a ring. When the ring is melted, it is replaced by the gold. I.e. they exist at different times.
For example, a person does not coincide with its body, it transforms into its body (the corpse). (Only if "body" is understood as "corpse", as is often, but not always the case).
Dichrone view: Thesis: there is no substrate that survives the change.
Change/Diachronic View: Thesis: is always a replacement of one object by another.
SimonsVsDiachronic View: does not explain why so many properties are transferred from the original to the later object.
Solution: an (assumed) substrate would explain this.

Wiggins I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

Wiggins II
David Wiggins
"The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Hume, D. McGinn Vs Hume, D. I 86
Main tradition: retains the mentalist conception of self but explains self identity with the help of certain psychological conditions. (Hume) Russell: characterizes "the self as a series of classes of mental individual things" (as opposed to the "Needlepoint self"). The temporal identity exists then because there are certain relationships between the mental qualities of the self. The individual states of a person, etc. are connected by something like memory, causal continuity, psychological similarity.
I 87
A mysterious substance that were constitutive for the self does not exist. Only the continued existence of the psychic relationships. McGinnVs: there are systematic problems with the concepts of necessity, sufficient condition and circularity. It is also easy to come up with counterexamples.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Mereology Verschiedene Vs Mereology Schwarz I 34
Temporal Parts/Mereology/Schwarz: but if you accept aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, you could still deny that Socrates itself has temporal parts. Lewis: does not even claim that necessarily everything that exists over time consists of temporal parts (1986f(1),x,1986e(2),205,1994(3) §1) VsStowe: temporal parts should not provide an analysis of temporal existence.
Lewis: (1083d(4),76,similar to Armstrong 1980(5),76): Example: one child, Frieda1 suddenly disappears, while another child, Frieda2 suddenly appears. This may contradict the laws of nature, but it is logically possible.
Schw I 35
Maybe nobody notices anything. And there would be nothing to notice. Vs: that is not convincing.
Endurantism Vs: cannot accept the premises at all.
van InwagenVs: Frieda1 and Frieda2 cannot exist in such a row and yet remain different. (2000(6),398)
Schwarz I 36
Thing/EndurantismVsLewis/VsMereology: the objects are not the mereological sum of their parts, because the sum and the parts exist even if the things themselves do not exist (e.g. if they are disassembled or broken). Vs: then the term "part" is not used exactly. The scattered parts are then no longer parts, because the (disassembled) bicycle does not exist at that time.
Solution/Lewis: Part of the bicycle is only a past temporal part of the gearshift. Personal identity, temporal identity: we too are not identical with any aggregate of molecules, because we constantly exchange many of them with the metabolism. (1988b(7), 195).


1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press
2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
3. David Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490.
4. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press
5. David Armstrong [1980]: “Identity Through Time”. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause,
Dordrecht: Reidel
6. Peter van Inwagen [2000]: “Temporal Parts and Identity across Time”. The Monist , 83: 437–459.
7. David Lewis [1988b]: “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”. Analysis, 48: 65–72





Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Metaphysics Nagel Vs Metaphysics I 126
Moore's Hands/NagelVsMoore: Moore commits a petitio principii by relying on the reality of his hands, because if there are no material objects, not even his hands exist, and he cannot help to clarify this.
III 105
Identity/Person/Personal Identity/Temporal/Objectivity/Subjectivity/Nagel: Problem: the search for the conditions that must be met to be able to attribute two temporally separate experience episodes to the same person. Attempted solution: Continuities of physical, mental, causal or emotional nature are considered.
Basic problem: even if an arbitrary number of conditions is satisfied, the question arises again whether we are still dealing with the same subject under these conditions!
(s) E.g. "Is it the same subject for which this causal continuity applies?" etc.).
Nagel: E.g. "Would this future experience indeed be my experience?"
III 106
Person/Identity/NagelVsMetaphysics: even assuming a metaphysical ego, the question arises again. If, on the other hand, temporal identity was given solely by that it is still my ego, it cannot be the individual whose persistence guarantees my personal identity.
Outside perspective: here, the problem seems not to exist anymore: people arise and pass in time and that is how they must be described!
Subjective Perspective: here, the question of identity appears to have a content that cannot be grasped from any external description.
III 107
You can inwardly ask about your identity by simply concentrating on your current experiences and determining the temporal extent of their subject. For the concept of the self is a psychological one.
III 124
NagelVsMetaphysics/Problem: as soon as these things become part of the objective reality, the old problems arise again for them! It does not help us to enrich our image of the objective world by what the subjective perspective reveals to us, because the problem is not that anything has been omitted.
This also applies to the prophecy (brain research) that the mental phenomena as soon as we will have understood them systematically, will be counted among the physical phenomena.
NagelVsPhysicalism: we cannot solve these problems by incorporating everything in the objective (or even only the physical) world that is not already contained in it.
Perhaps distancing and transcendence does simply not lead to a better description of the world.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982
Perry, J. Lewis Vs Perry, J. Lewis IV 70
Person/Identity/Split/Perry/Lewis: we both have the same objective, but different priorities. Perry: does not use the temporal identity (identity to t). He does not allow the identification of the I-Relation (IR) and the R-Relation (RR) but only of certain temporal underrelations of them.
LewisVsPerry: for this, he must introduce an unintuitive distinction between people who exist (have states) at different times. ((s) >Castaneda: "Volatile I":

Frank I 210
"I" / Castaneda: thesis: "here", "now", "there" are volatile. Irreducible volatile individual things only exist as content of experience.)
Fra I 402
(Castaneda thesis: "I" is irreplaceable for its user.)).
Lewis IV 70
All persons are identifiable at one time (except for problem cases). Example Stage S1 is R relative to t short R1r in relation to S2 if and only if S1 and S2 are Rr simpler and S2 is also localized to t. Then the R1 relation is the R-Relation between stages at t and other stages at other times or at t.
IV 71
And S1 is IR to t short I1 relative to S2 when both S1 and S2 are stages of a dP which is determinable to t and S2 is localized to t. We must omit the enduring person that cannot be determined to t. Enduring Person/Perry: (continuant, e.p.): a C is an e.p. if for a person stage S, isolated to t, C is the aggregate that comprises all and only stages that are Rtr on S.
Generally, a dP is a continuant that is determinable at a time. No one is condemned to permanent unidentifiability.
Def Lifetime/Perry: enduring person, (continuant).
Def Branch/Terminology/Perry: maximum R correlated aggregate of person stages (exactly what I call a dP).
Split: here some lifetimes are not branches. The whole is a lifetime (no branch) that can be determined to t0 (before splitting). C1 and C2 are not yet distinguishable, while C can no longer be determined to t1 (after split).
PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the RR is not the same as the IR (in this case). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are IR, but because of the split they are not RR.
It follows that for each time t the RtR is the same as the I1R.
Lewis: maybe that is enough, then every question about survival or identity arises at a certain time! This means that only RtR and ItR are relevant for t.
It is harmless that S1 and S2 are IR because they are neither It0 nor It1R nor ever ItR at any time.
Perry thesis: each person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable at the time. Persons can share stages:
E.g. Split: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1.
Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined.
Therefore, we can count with identity if we only count the people who are identifiable at a time and get the right answer. One person exists before the split, two after.
Altogether there are three, but then also the indeterminable ones are counted! But with the split, the first one disappears and two new ones emerge.
LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity to t is slightly counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons?
"There are"/exist: seeing it timeless there are people but they exist at a time. (i.e. they have states, stages).
IV 72
And so they are not identical to the people we count. Isn't it unjustified to exclude them? Perry can say: we have excellent practical reasons. Methusela/Perry/Lewis: Perry does not go into this, but his approach can be applied to it:
The whole of Methuselah is both a lifetime and a branch and thus an unproblematic person.
Branches/Lewis: (= continuants, permanent persons) the (arbitrarily chosen) segments of 137 years. For Perry, it's the double 274 years.
Lifetime: is not identical for the trivial exceptions of the beginning and the end. This means that the first and the last 137 years are both: branch and lifetime, since they cannot diverge.
Each stage belongs to exactly one person who can be determined to t and to an infinite number of indeterminable persons!
Counting by identity provides the correct answer, because it omits the indeterminable one.
RtR and ItR are identical for each time t, but the RR and IR differ for two stages further apart than 137 years. (But not more than 274).
Identity/Perry: he says nothing about degrees of personal identity.
Lewis: but he could take it over.
LewisVsPerry: pro Perry for normal cases, but in pathological cases (splits, etc.) an exact point of reference is missing:
This leads to overpopulation again:
For example, how many people were involved in a split that occurred a long time ago? I say: two, Perry: three. Or he says: none that can be determined today.
IV 151
Heimson Example/LewisVsPerry: as far as his argument goes and I think it works, but it's too complicated without doing anything extra. His solution must be at least as good as mine, because it is part of my solution. Whenever I say that someone attributes property X to themselves, Perry says: the first object is a pair of him and property X. The second object is the function that ascribes the pair Y and X to any subject.
The apparent advantage of Perry is that he explains external attribution (e.a.) as well as self attribution (s.a.).
Belief de re: Attribution of characteristics to individuals.
Perry's schema is made for attribution de re, but de se falls under this as a special case.
IV 152
De re: Heimson and the psychiatrist agree to attribute Heimson the quality of being Hume. LewisVsPerry: my solution is simpler: the self-attributions of a subject are the whole of its belief system ((s) >Self-Ascription/Chisholm).
External attributions: are no further belief settings apart from the ...
Belief/Conviction/LewisVsPutnam: is in the head! ((s) Putnam also speaks only of meanings that are not in the head.)
Lewis: but I agree with Perry that belief de re is generally not in the head, because in reality it is not belief at all! They are facts, power of the relations of the subject's belief to things.
LewisVsPerry: his scheme represents something else besides belief. For belief it is redundant. If we have a few first objects and a few necessary facts that are not about belief.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Russell, B. McGinn Vs Russell, B. I 86
Main tradition: retains the mentalist conception of self but explains self identity with the help of certain psychological conditions. (Hume) Russell: characterizes "the self as a series of classes of mental individual things" (as opposed to the "Needlepoint self"). The temporal identity exists then because there are certain relationships between the mental qualities of the self. The individual states of a person, etc. are connected by something like memory, causal continuity, psychological similarity.
I 87
A mysterious substance that were constitutive for the self does not exist. Only the continued existence of the psychic relationships. McGinnVs: there are systematic problems with the concepts of necessity, sufficient condition and circularity. It is also easy to come up with counterexamples.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001