Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Abortion	Rawls	Gaus I 97 Abortion/Rawls/Waldron: Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. >Justice, >Community, >Society, >State(Polity), >Constitution, >Responsibility. Interestingly some of the discussion in Political Liberalism of the abortion example showed how difficult it is to apply this stricture in practice. In a footnote to the original edition Rawls inferred, from the fact that anti-abortion laws usually rest on controversial religious grounds, that liberty in this regard was required (1993⁽¹⁾: 243n). >Liberalism. WaldronVsRawls: But he quickly had to concede that that was a mistake (1996⁽²⁾: lv), for three reasons. 1) (...) we are not entitled to assume liberty in such an area as the default position, any more than we are entitled to conclude that foetuses do not have souls from the fact that political liberalism is unable to countenance religious arguments to the effect that they do. 2) (...) although there might be good neutral arguments for a right to choose abortion in the first trimester, we must not assume that there are no contrary arguments or no way of opposing abortion rights that does not run foul of the strictures of political liberalism. Many opponents of abortion will insist that their arguments for protecting human foetuses are continuous with arguments (that they insist any theory of justice must acknowledge) for protecting all human life, particularly in its most vulnerable forms. 3) (...) the fact that a religious doctrine may not be appealed to in order to justify restrictions on abortion doesn’t mean that such doctrines are altogether beyond the pale. 1. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1996) Political Liberalism, new edn. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Altruism	Rawls	I 189 Altruism/Rawls: the fully developed (perfect) altruism has a peculiarity: the altruist can only fulfil his desires if someone else has an independent desire. For example, suppose everyone decides to do the same. Then nothing happens. Since a system of justice could never emerge, it is necessary to assume that at least two people have individual interests that can come into conflict. The theory of justice as fairness addresses this by demanding a mutual lack of interest in this point. >Fairness. I 190 Rawls: Impartiality, as demanded by moral judgments, can be achieved by other means. >Morals/Rawls, >Impartiality.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Average Utility	Rawls	I 161 Average utility/Rawls: the principle of average utility differs from that of contract theory. Applied to the initial situation of a society to be built, in which the individuals are behind a veil of ignorance in relation to their later position, the principle of average utility requires that institutions be arranged in such a way that the absolute weighted sum of the expectations of the relevant representative individuals is maximized. I 162 This sum increases as the number of people in a society grows. Utilitarianism: here expectations are measured by the sum of actual and predictable satisfaction. >Utilitarianism. Theory of justice as fairness: on the other hand, this is a list of primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.). Classical theory of average utility: was represented by Mill and Wicksell^(1)(2)(3). >J. St. Mill. Sum of Benefits/Population Growth/Rawls: the sum will not grow if we apply it to the fractions of society with certain positions, as long as the percentage of these fractions does not change. Population growth: only when a population changes there is a difference between the classical theory and the theory of justice as fairness. I 166 Average benefit/Rawls: the assumption of an initial situation of a society to be built, in which all are behind a veil of ignorance, argues for the introduction of the average principle and against the classical view. However, the average theory is not teleological, like the classical theory. Average Principle: it is not that it requires the same kind of risk-taking from all participants. I 171 Average Benefits/Rawls: It seems that the average principle must be tied to the principle of insufficient reason (see Risks/Rawls). We need something like the Laplace rule for decisions under uncertainty: the possibilities are determined in a natural way and everyone is given a probability. This does not assume general information about the company^(4)(5)(6). >Probability/Rawls. I 188 Average Benefit/Ideal Observer/Rawls: From the point of view of individuals in the initial situation, there is no reason to agree with the assessments of a compassionate ideal observer. Such an accordance would have all the disadvantages of the classical utility principle. However, if the participants are considered complete altruists, i.e. those who agree with the goals of the compassionate ideal observer,... --- I 189 ...then the classical principle would be adopted. The greatest amount of bliss satisfies the observer as well as the altruist within the system. This gives us the surprising result that, while the principle of average utility corresponds to the ethics of the individual, the classical utilitarian doctrine is one of altruistic ethics! >Altruism, >Altruism/Rawls. 1. See for this: Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory London, 1953, pp.38f.; 2. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, Cambridge, 1961, p. 18.; 3. J.C. Harsanyi „Cardinal Utilitry in Welfare Economics and the Theory of Risk Taking“, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 61, 1953. 4. Cf. W. Feller, Profitability and Profit, pp. 210-233.; 5. L.J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, New York, 1954.; 6. H.E. Kyburg, Probability and Inductive Logic, Riverside, 1970.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Capabilities	Nussbaum	Brocker I 895 Capabilities/Nussbaum: Nussbaum wants central human capabilities to be understood as specific political goals in the context of political order. As political goals, they stand beyond particular metaphysical justifications and can therefore be regarded as the basis of basic constitutional principles. In this way, capabilities can become the object of an "overarching consensus". ...the state is indeed obliged to enable each individual to exercise the basic capabilities, but the actual realization is left to each individual. Brocker I 896 Nussbaum basically focuses on the question of possibilities/skills instead of actual satisfaction.⁽¹⁾ Brocker I 901 Capabilities Approach/Nussbaum: its task is twofold: 1. to enable comparability of the quality of life of different people in different contexts; 2. to establish an overarching normative basis that allows core areas of human functioning to be determined and thus certain capabilities that must be guaranteed for every citizen in every nation in political contexts.⁽²⁾ For problem see >Universalism/Nussbaum. VsNussbaum: Question: Doesn't Nussbaum introduce here an implicit reference to "human nature" that pushes her into the risky direction of metaphysical realism? >Human nature. NussbaumVsVs: Nussbaum does not assume a neutral observer who judges the facts of human life from an external perspective. Rather, she pleads for an internal reconstruction of knowledge about ourselves: We can only understand and comprehend ourselves from ourselves and against the background of shared experiences (cf. Pauer-Studer 1999, 10 f.).⁽³⁾ Brocker I 902 It is crucial that the liberal basic principle of "each person as an end", aggravated by the "principle of each person's capability"⁽⁴⁾, is recognised. The recognition of this principle is reflected in the fact that it is not certain lifestyles that are to be defined, but rather abilities and spheres of action that are to be guaranteed in order to allow people the free choice of how they perceive these possibilities. Functional abilities of the human being: See >Functions/Nussbaum. Brocker I 903 Nussbaum understands the capabilities approach as a theory of basic conditions, not as a full theory of justice. A complete theory would require a more clearly marked approach to determining the threshold level of capabilities.⁽⁵⁾ >Justice theory, cf. >J. Rawls. Three categories of abilities/Nussbaum: a) basic capabilities, b) internal capabilities, c) combined capabilities. (Interaction with external conditions).⁽⁶⁾ Cf. >Rights/Nussbaum. 1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge 2000, p, 12. 2. Ibid. p.71 3. H. Pauer-Studer 1999, »Einleitung«, in: Martha C. Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder das gute Leben, Frankfurt/M. 1999, 7-23., p.10f 4. Nussbaum ibid. p.74 5. ibid. p. 12 6. ibid. p.84 Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Climate Justice	Cosmopolitanism	Norgaard I 325 Climate Justice/Cosmopolitanism: The cosmopolitan approach argues that obligations of justice apply across borders as well as within, deriving these obligations in some cases from actual causal interrelationships (e.g. Pogge 2002)⁽¹⁾, sometimes from universal extension of the same egalitarian premises that ground nationally entered theories of justice (Singer 1972⁽²⁾; Caney 2005b(³⁾), or both (Beitz 1979⁽⁴⁾; Moellendorf 2002(5)). Rejection of such obligation typically relies on the argument that either a shared culture (e.g. Rawls 1999)⁽⁶⁾, shared nationality (Miller 1995)⁽⁷⁾ or a shared sovereignty (Nagel 2005)⁽⁸⁾ is required for the existence of obligations of justice, though proponents of such views —‘communitarians’ taken loosely—do usually advocate beneficence towards persons outside the community. Norgaard I 326 Climate Justice/Climate Costs/VsRawls/Cosmopolitism: While not all the philosophers who have written on climate change are otherwise engaged in debates about cosmopolitanism (…) most conclude that claims of justice do apply to the international distribution of the costs and benefits of climate policy. However, many authors have still found it necessary to engage John Rawls's famous dismissal of cosmopolitan justice claims (Rawls 1999)⁽⁶⁾; most conclude that the inescapable causal relationships of climate change render Rawls's position no longer supportable, if it ever was (see e.g. Vanderheiden 2008)⁽⁹⁾. >Climate Costs/Cosmopolitanism, >Climate Costs/Shue/Singer. Cosmopolitanism/Climate Costs/VsRawls/Nagel/Miller/Rawls: Rawls argued that the social ties required to make possible a contractarian theory of justice, like that of ‘original position’ bargaining, do not exist across national borders, and that only ‘well‐ordered societies’—in practice, nations—could plausibly be bound by such a standard of justice. The theories of Nagel and Miller make similar claims on slightly different grounds. VsRawls: (…) such an argument fails when the status quo involves the imposition of significant cross‐border harms, as from greenhouse pollution; any rejection of international justice claims therefore becomes a de facto endorsement of the right to do harm to non‐citizens, which Rawls did not in fact endorse. And of course the fact that, considered as a resource, the atmosphere is not territorially bound (that is, it is a globally ‘open access’ resource) implies a need for global cooperation, providing further justification for cosmopolitan obligations (Vanderheiden 2008⁽⁹⁾; Moellendorf 2009 ⁽¹⁰⁾). >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Pogge, T. 2002. World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2. Singer, P. 1972. Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs 1: 229–43. 3. Caney, S. 2005b. Justice beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Beitz, C. R. 1979. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 5. Moellendorf, D. 2002. Cosmopolitan Justice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 6. Rawls, J. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 7. Miller, D. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 8. Nagel, T. 2005. The problem of global justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs 33: 113–47. 9. Vanderheiden, S. 2008. Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10. Moellendorf, D. 2009. Global Inequality Matters. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.	Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Communitarianism	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 170 Communitarianism/Political Philosophy/Dagger: [Longing for community] did not find expression in the word 'communitarian' until the 1840s, when it and communautaire appeared almost simultaneously in the writings of English and French socialists. French dictionaries point to Etienne Cabet and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as the first to use communautaire, but the Oxford English Dictionary gives the credit for 'communitarian' to one Goodwyn Barmby, who founded the Universal Communitarian Association in 1841 and edited a magazine he called The Promethean, or Communitarian Apostle. According to Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay on 'English reformers', Barmby Gaus I 171 advertised his publication as 'the cheapest of all magazines, and the paper most devoted of any to the cause of the people; consecrated to Pantheism in Religion, and Communism in Politics' (1842⁽¹⁾: 239). In the beginning, then, 'communitarian' seems to have been a rough synonym of 'socialist' and 'communist'. To be a communitarian was simply to believe that community is somehow vital to a worthwhile life and is therefore to be protected against various threats. Socialists and communists were leftists, but a communitarian could as easily be to the right as the left of centre politically (Miller, 2000c)⁽²⁾ (...) people who moved from the settled, family-focused life of villages and small towns to the unsettled, individualistic life of commerce and cities might gain affluence and personal free- dom, but they paid the price of alienation, isolation, and rootlessness. Ferdinand Tönnies (2001)⁽³⁾, with his distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association or civil society), has been especially influential in this regard. As Tönnies defines the terms, Gemeinschaft is an intimate, organic, and traditional form of human association; Gesellschaft is impersonal, mechanical, and rational. To exchange the former for the latter then, is to trade warmth and support for coldness and calculation. Concern for community took another direction in the twentieth century as some writers began to see the centripetal force of the modern state as the principal threat to community. This turn is evident, for instance, in José Ortega y Gasset's warnings in The Revolt of the Masses against 'the gravest danger that today threatens civilisation: State intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by the State' (1932⁽⁴⁾: 120). Nisbet: Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community (1953)⁽⁵⁾provides an especially clear statement of this position, which draws more on Tocqueville's insistence on the importance of voluntary associations ofcitizens than on a longing for Gemeinschaft. >Community/Tönnies. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in short, the longing for community took the form of a reaction against both the atomizing, anomic tendencies of modern, urban society and the use of the centripetal force of the modern state to check these tendencies. Moreover, modernity was often linked with liberalism, a theory that many took to rest on and encourage atomistic and even 'possessive' individualism (Macpherson, 1962)⁽⁶⁾. Against this background, communitarianism developed in the late twentieth century in the course of a debate with - or perhaps within - liberalism. >Liberalism/Gaus. Philosophical communitarianism: Four books published in rapid succession in the 1980s - Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981)⁽⁷⁾, Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)⁽⁸⁾, Michael Walzer's Spheres of.Justice (1983)⁽⁹⁾, and Charles Taylor's Philosophical Papers (1985)⁽¹⁰⁾ - marked the emergence of this philosophical form of communitarianism.FN7 Different as they are from one another, all of these books express dissatisfaction with liberalism, especially in the form of theories of justice and rights. The main target here was John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971)⁽¹¹⁾, but Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)⁽¹²⁾, Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (1977)⁽¹³⁾, and Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980)⁽¹⁴⁾ also came in for criticism. (CommunitarianismVsRawls, CommunitarianismVsNozick, CommunitarianismVsAckerman, Bruce, CommunitarianismVsDworkin). CommunitarianismVsLiberalism: a typical complaint was, and is, that these theories are too abstract and universalistic. Walzer: In opposing them, Walzer proposes a 'radically particularist' approach that attends to 'history, culture, and membership' by asking not what 'rational individuals under universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort' would choose, but what would 'individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it?' (1983⁽⁹⁾: xiv, 5). >M. Walzer. Walzer thus calls attention to the importance of community, which he and others writing in the early 1980s took to be suffering from both philosophical and political neglect. For a valuable, full-length survey of this debate, see Mulhall and Swift, 1996⁽¹⁵⁾ Gaus I 172 Communitarian responesVsCriticisms: responses: 1) the first is that the communitarians' criticisms are misplaced because they have misconceived liberalism (Caney, 1992)⁽¹⁶⁾. In particular, the communitarians have misunderstood the abstractness of the theories they criticize. Thus Rawls maintains (1993⁽¹⁷⁾: Lecture I) that his 'political' conception of the self as prior to its ends is not a metaphysical claim about the nature of the self, as Sandel believes, but simply a way of representing the parties who are choosing principles of justice from behind the 'veil of ignorance'. Nor does this conception of the individual as a self capable of choosing its ends require liberals to deny that individual identity is in many ways the product of unchosen attachments and social circumstances. 2) 'What is central to the liberal view,' according to Will Kymlicka, 'is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination' (1989⁽¹⁸⁾ : 52). With this understood, a second response is to grant, as Kymlicka, Dworkin (1986⁽¹⁹⁾; 1992⁽²⁰⁾), Gewirth (1996⁾⁽²¹⁾, and Mason (2000)⁽²²⁾ do, that liberals should pay more attention to belonging, identity, and community, but to insist that they can do this perfectly well within their existing theories. 3) the third response, finally, is to point to the dangers of the critics' appeal to community norms. Communities have their virtues, but they have their vices, too - smugness, intolerance, and various forms of oppression and exploitation among them. The fact that communitarians do not embrace these vices simply reveals the perversity of their criticism: they 'want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in witches' (Gutmann 1992⁽²³⁾: 133; Friedman, 1992⁽²⁴⁾). 1. Emerson, R. W. (1842) 'English reformers'. The Dial, 3(2). 2. Miller, David (2000c) 'Communitarianism: left, right and centre'. In his Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Tönnies, Ferdinand (2001 118871) Community and Civil Society, trans. J. Harris and M. Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Ortega y Gasset, José (1932) The Revolt of the Masses. New York: Norton. 5. Nisbet, Robert (1953) The Quest for Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. Macpherson, C. B. (1962) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981 ) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 8. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic. 10. Taylor, Charles (1985) Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 12. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic. 13. Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 14. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale Umversity Press. 15. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. 16. Caney, Simon (1992) 'Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate'. Political Studies, 40 (June): 273-89. 17. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 18. Kymlicka, Will (1989) Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. 19. Dworkin, Ronald (1986) Law's Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 20. Dworkin, Ronald (1992) 'Liberal community'. In S. Avinerl and A. de-Shalit, eds, ommunitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21. Gewirth, Alan (1996) The Community of Rights. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 22. Mason, Andrew (2000) Community, Solidarity, and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 23. Gutmann, Amy (1992) 'Communitarian critics of liberalism'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 24. Friedman, Marilyn (1992) 'Feminism and modern friendship: dislocating the community'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Comparability	Rawls	I 174 Comparability/comparison/society/justice/Rawls: the clearest basis for interpersonal comparisons is in terms of primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, health care, access opportunities), i. e. things that any rational person will probably want, no matter what else he/she wants. >Public goods, >Desires, >Preferences, >Freedom, >Infrastructure, >Healthcare system. However, the more we move on to more specific provisions, the more difficult it becomes. This is because the assessment of foreign preferences would increasingly require us to change our own nature. Purposes/intentions: it seems to be in vain to define his measure for interpersonal comparisons, taking into account all possible intentions and objectives. The value of the circumstances of others is not for us - as the construction (of the average utility) would make us expect - the value of the circumstances for the other person itself. >Average utility, >Relativism, >Circumstances, >Situations, >Values. I 175 Solution/Utilitarianism/Rawls: utilitarianism could create directories of public goods and thus define its principle. However, this would require major changes to the theory of justice. >Utilitarianism. Rawl's solution: the veil of ignorance (in the initial situation of a society to be built, members should not know which position they will take later) prevents a knowledge about the circumstances of others anyway. >Veil of ignorance.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Consent	Constitutional Economics	Parisi I 205 Consent/information/ignorance/Constitutional economics/Voigt: The possibility of hypothetical consent crucially depends on the information assumptions. a) Buchanan and Tullock (1962⁽¹⁾, p. 78) introduced the veil of uncertainty in which the individual cannot make any long-term predictions on her or his future socio-economic position. b) John Rawls' (1971)⁽²⁾ veil of ignorance is more radical because the consenting individuals are asked to decide on proposed rules as if they did not have any knowledge of their individual fate. Rawls' veil is thus more demanding of the individuals. Both veils assume a rather curious asymmetry concerning certain kinds of knowledge: on the one hand, the citizens are supposed to know very little about their own socio-economic position, but on the other, they are supposed to have at their disposal a consistent theory concerning the working properties of alternative constitutional rules. In a paper on "veilonomics," Voigt (2015)(3) compares the two veils and points out that Rawls' veil serves to derive substantial principles, whereas Buchanan's veil serves a procedural purpose, namely to improve the chance that societies reach unanimity in their constitutional choice. >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics, >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics. 1. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press 2. Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap. 3. Voigt, S. (2015). "Veilonomics: On the Use and Utility of Veils in Constitutional Political Economy," in: Louis M. Imbeau & Steve Jacob (eds). Behind a Veil of Ignorance? Power and Uncertainty in Constitutional Design. Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 9-33. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Difference Principle	Rawls	I 75 Difference principle/theory of justice as fairness/Rawls: the difference principle eliminates the uncertainty of the efficiency principle (>Efficiency/Rawls, Pareto-Optimum/Rawls) by defining a position from which the social and economic inequalities of the basic structure ((s) of a society to be built) can be assessed. Assuming the institutional framework of Liberal equality (see Equality/Rawls) and fairness of opportunity, the expectations of the better-offs are fair if and only if they are part of a scheme that improves the expectations of the most disadvantaged members. I 76 The difference principle states that equal distribution of goods is preferable, as long as a different distribution does not favour both sides (better and worse) at the same time. I 77 RawlsVsUtilitarianism: Classical utilitarianism is indifferent to how a constant sum of benefits is distributed. It only calls for equality up to a certain threshold. >Utilitarianism. I 78 Difference Principle/Special Cases/Rawls: 1. Special Case: If the expectation of the worst-off person cannot be improved, no change in the income situation of a better-off person can bring about an improvement in the situation of the worse-off person. 2. Special case: occurs when the expectations of all those who are better off at least contribute to the prosperity of those who are worse off. This means that when their expectations fall, those of the less well-off fall as well. However, the maximum has not yet been reached. I 79 Inequality/Rawls: how unfair a (distribution) scheme is depends on how excessive the expectations of the better-offs are and to what extent they depend on violations of the other principles of justice and fair equal opportunities. >Injustice, >Inequalities. Difference principle/Rawls: is a maximization principle. We must make a strict distinction between cases where it works and cases where it does not (see Special Cases 1 and 2 above). The difference principle is compatible with the principle of efficiency. Democracy/Rawls: a democratic constitution is not consistent with the efficiency principle alone, if it is understood in such a way that only changes that improve the situation of all people are allowed. Reason: Justice... I 80 ...requires some changes that are not efficient in this sense. Difference principle/justice: since the distribution in an initial state can never be exactly determined, it does not play a decisive role if the difference principle is applied. >Justice, >Principles/Rawls. Chain connection/prosperity/company/Rawls: we assume a chain connection, i. e. if the expectation of the worst-offs is raised by a measure, then this will also apply to all positions between these and the best placed persons. However, if there are breakages, those who are in such a position have no right of veto against the improvements for those who are worse off. I 82 Difference principle/Rawls: does not depend on contingent actual deviations from the chain connection, which rarely works perfectly anyway. Problem: we assume close-kitness of the chain connection, but in many cases an improvement of the better-offs may have no effect at all on the situation of the worse-off. More entries on >Difference principle.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Distributive Justice	Rawls	I 274 Distributive Justice/Rawls: thesis: only by shaping markets can the problem of fair distribution be solved as a case of pure procedural justice. In this way, we also maintain efficiency and the important freedom of individual career choice. >Justice, >Markets. I 275 Institutions: We need a suitable social system to ensure distributive justice, no matter how historical coincidences turn out. The basic institutions required for this purpose include a constitution guaranteeing equal civil rights, freedom of thought and consciousness, political freedom, a fair electoral system and fair legislation, fair equal opportunities and free choice of profession. >Freedom, >Liberty/Rawls, >Institutions, >Equal Opportunities. The government must also ensure support for the socially disadvantaged and in the event of illness. The institutions that are supposed to guarantee this can be divided into four branches⁽¹⁾. I 276 1. Assignment: the pricing system must be kept competitive. Problem: Efficiency. The allocation system is concerned with taxes and subsidies in order to be able to correct deviations from the market. 2. Stabilization: this branch is concerned with full employment in the sense that everyone can take up the profession he/she wants and that economic development is effective. The first two branches together ensure the efficiency of the market economy. >Efficiency/Rawls. 3. Transfer: this is about social security (social minimum). Here needs have to be considered and classified. >Social minimum. Problem: A competitive system of market prices does not provide any orientation here. This leads to a division of labour between parts of the social system. I 277 4. distribution: The institutions that enable distributive justice are tax legislation and property law. 1. An equal distribution of property appears to be a necessary condition for maintaining equal freedoms. I 278 Inequality: the inequality of inherited goods is not inherently worse than that of intelligence. The point is that all inequalities are dealt with by the difference principle, so that they ultimately benefit the weakest. (See Difference Principle/Rawls). 2. Tax legislation that provides the state with revenue to guarantee public goods. I 279 The details of the design are a matter of political theory and not of the theory of justice. >Taxation. 1. See R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, New York, 1959, ch. I.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Distributive Justice	Resource-based View (RBV)	Gaus I 226 Distributive Justice/Rawls/Resource-based view (RBV)/Lamont: Influenced by Rawls's natural arbitrariness argument, but even more sensitive than Rawls to what is and what is not a matter of luck, are the resource egalitarians. >Reflective equilibrium/Rawls). Since the rejection of slavery, feudalism, and aristocracy, one point of agreement among contemporary theorists has been that equality, in some sense, is a necessary part of any plausible theory of justice. Disagreements arise, however, in articulating the sense in which equality matters, or in specifying what is to be distributed equally (Sen, 1980)⁽¹⁾. In answer to this question, a number ofthinkers have promoted equality of resources, usually because they believe in both equality and in responsibility, seeking to hold individuals responsible for the choices they make in using their resources (Cohen, 1989⁽²⁾; Dworkin, 2000⁽³⁾; Sen, 1980⁽¹⁾). Institutions: By the same token, however, they believe that social institutions should be designed to prevent inequalities resulting from factors beyond individuals' control. They also recognize that an equal distribution of material goods does not achieve equality of resources, because people's unequal genetic endowments are also important resources. Thus, they tend to argue for some kind of compensation to individuals who are unlucky in the natural lottery, to achieve a genuinely equal distribution of resources (Roemer, 1985)⁽⁴⁾. >Inequalities/Dworkin, >Inequalities/Resource-based view (RBV), >Desert/Political philosophy, >Distributive Justice/Libertarianism. 1. Sen, Amartya (1980) 'Equality of what?' In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195—220. 2. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the currency of egalitarian justice'. Ethics, 99 906_44. 3. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 4. Roemer, John (1985) 'Equality of talent'. Economics and Philosophy, 1: 151-86. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Diversity (Politics)	D’Agostino	Gaus I 239 Diversity/pluralism/D’Agostino: it will be useful, at the outset, to distinguish the fact of diversity from the thesis of pluralism, or, more accurately, from various pluralist doctrines and arguments. The fact of diversity is evident everywhere in our social worlds. Individuals express different preferences, perhaps even different 'reflective' (i.e. well-informed, carefully considered and suitably 'impartial') judgements, when it comes to the ways in which their personal and collective lives are to be organized. Principles/Rawls: of particular political relevance, as John Rawls recognized, is the fact that people 'disagree about which principles should define the basic terms of their association' (1973⁽¹⁾: 5). Concepts/meaning/Walzer: Different standards for the assessment of options are current in different social domains as well (Walzer, 1983⁽²⁾), meaning, inter alia, that even a given individual's attitudes may not be stable across those domains in which she may have occasion to enact roles. Ethics/Nagel: of particular political relevance is the fact, as Thomas Nagel noted, that '[c]onflicts between personal and impersonal [ethical] claims are ubiquitous' and cannot 'be resolved by subsuming either of the points of view under the other, or both under a third' (1979⁽³⁾: 134). Problems: E.g., suppose that A prefers X to Y and that B prefers Y to X, but that A and B must make a collectively binding choice between these two options. Or consider what might happen if A, perhaps acting as an agent for some collectivity, finds himself in a situation in which, according to one criterion relevant to his choice, X is preferable to Y, whereas, according to another such criterion, also relevant, Y is preferable to X. Tragic dilemma/Nozick/Benn/Nussbaum: In some cases, as when the choice-relevant criteria are from different domains and are constituted as 'side-constraints' on action (Nozick, 1974)(4) rather than as values to be maximized subject to 'trade-offs', A may face a 'tragic dilemma', of the kind analysed by theorists such as Stanley Benn (1988)⁽⁵⁾ and Martha Nussbaum (1986)⁽⁶⁾. Cf. >Conflicts/Tetlock, Gaus I 240 Diversity/Pluralism/D’Agostino: Diversity, then, is a familiar phenomenon, of some potential relevance to political theory and practice. Pluralism, on the other hand, is embodied in theses and arguments about this phenomenon. >Pluralism/D’Agostino. 1. Rawls, John (1973) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford Umversity Press. 2. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. Oxford: Blackwell. 3. Nagel, Thomas (1979) 'The fragmentation of value'. In Alan Ryan, ed., The Idea of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. 5. Benn, Stanley (1988) A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Nussbaum, Martha (1986) The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Diversity (Politics)	Liberalism	Gaus I 244 Diversity/Liberalism/D’Agostino: (...) if we tolerate 'too much' diversity in individuals' cognitive and evaluative attitudes, it cannot be ruled out that we will be unable to identify a collectively best system of social arrangements. Of course, neither pluralism nor representativeness requires the recognition of all empirically given diversity of attitudes (see, especially, Gaus, 1996⁽¹⁾). ((s) For problems in relation to diversity see >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino.) Normalization: some attitudes can reasonably be 'filtered out' or normalized as part of any reasonable procedure for the identification of collectively binding social arrangements. If this can be done compatibly with specifically liberal principles, then liberalism can acknowledge diversity without abandoning a commitment to coherence in theory and in its institutional embodiments. (The idea of normalization is associated with Michel Foucault, 1977, (...). Nromalization/Rawls: John Rawls's original position (1973⁽²⁾: ch. Ill) represents the most influential attempt to identify a device of normalization that meets specifically liberal requirements. Bruce Ackerman's (1980)⁽³⁾ 'neutral dialogue' and Jürgen Habermas's (1990)⁽⁴⁾ >ideal speech situation are other examples (...). Normalization/Rawls: Rawls addresses this problem by considering how diversity of individuals' antecedent judgements might be reduced compatibly with specifically liberal ideals and principles. His task is twofold: 1) to find a basis for reduction, and 2) to find a specifically liberal rationale for reduction. Without (1), the coherence requirement cannot be satisfied; there is 'too much' antecedent diversity for a collectively best structure to be identified. Without (2), representativeness is not adequately acknowledged, for, absent a rationale, any reduction will be arbitrary from an ethical point of view - i.e. will arbitrarily fail adequately to represent decision-relevant diversity of assessments. Rawls's solution is embodied, specifically, in the veil of ignorance. >Veil of ignorance/Rawls, >Veil of ignorance/D’Agostino. Arrow’s Theorem/problems/solutions: a problem of coherence results, in fact, precisely in so far as we demand, of a solution to the problem of collective choice, that it identify a particular option as one which will be binding on all the individuals involved. >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino. Three Individuals (A, B, C) and three possible social arrangements (S1, S2, S3); Table I of preferences S1: A 1st – B 3rd – C 2nd S2: A 2nd – B 1st – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 1st There is, however, another possibility, and it has been widely exploited in specifically liberal institutions. It is, in effect, to see the profile of preferences represented in Table I as the end-point, not the starting-point, of a process of collective deliberation. Perhaps the individuals involved agree to devolve decision-making about these options to the individual level. In so far as they do agree to this, we have a collective solution to a problem of choice. Each of the individuals agrees, with all the others, not about what preference should collectively be honoured, but rather that that distribution of preferences over individuals is to be preferred to any other in which each individual has the preferences which he antecedently has (or which he would have, subject to specifically liberal normalization of his attitudes). 1. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1973) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 4. Habermas, Jürgen (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhart and Shierry Weber Nicholson. Cambridge: Polity. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Diversity (Politics)	Waldron	Gaus I 90 Diversity/society/toleration/pluralism/liberalism/Waldron: (...) by elaborating and defending liberal principles and liberal solutions to the problems of social life (…), we seem to be taking sides in the midst of cultural and ethical plurality. Toleration/Locke/Waldron: (...) part of the Lockean defence of religious toleration is built up on religious foundations: ‘The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion,’ says Locke, ‘is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light’ (1983⁽¹⁾: 25). >Toleration/Locke. Problem/Waldron: Maybe you cannot see what is really important about toleration except from a perspective that invokes particular values and particular philosophical conceptions. Gaus I 91 Hobbes: Another may opt for a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach, emphasizing justificatory premises that all members of a pluralist society may be presumed to accept, whatever the differences in their ethics or world view. And the phrase ‘may be presumed to accept’ may be glossed in various ways, ranging from the idea of universally accessible reasons and reasoning to some fairly aggressive account of basic human interests, like the survivalist account developed by Hobbes (1991)⁽²⁾. >Toleration/Waldron. Gaus I 94 Individualism/Rawls/SandelVsRawls/Communitarianism/Waldron: (...) the individualism of Rawls’s thin theory drew criticism from communitarian philosophers, who repudiated the implicit assumption that individual plans of life are chosen by persons unencumbered by prior commitments and allegiances. Those who thought of themselves as essentially members of a particular family or community or people might find it hard to accept a theory of justice oriented at foundational level to the well-being of persons conceived as liberated from all such attachments (Sandel, 1982)⁽¹⁾. Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993⁽³⁾: 4). Gaus I 95 Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron. Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2 , … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1 , and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2 , and so on. Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical Gaus I 96 importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke, Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron, >Overlapping consensus/Rawls. 1. Locke, John (1983 [1689]) A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James H. Tully. Indianapolis: Hackett. 2. Hobbes, Thomas (1991 [1651]) Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Egoism	Rawls	I 136 Egoism/Rawls: under the consideration of which principles should be applied in the initial situation of a society to be built, there are no principles for avoiding egoism. That is not necessary either, because no form of egoism is a serious candidate. This only confirms that, although egoism is logically consistent and not irrational in this sense, egoism is incompatible with what we intuitively consider a moral standpoint. Philosophically, egoism is not an alternative concept, but a challenge of any conception. >Principles/Rawls. In justice as fairness, this is reflected by the fact that we can interpret general egoism as an attitude of disagreement. It is what the parties are thrown back at if they cannot agree. >Fairness. I 147 The theory of justice as fairness/Rawls: one might think that this theory is just as egoistic in the sense that Schopenhauer believed Kant's theory to be egoistic⁽¹⁾. RawlsVs: our theory of justice as fairness is not egoistic,... I 148 ...because the assumed disinterest in the goals of others does not imply that one does not ignore the rights and claims of others. Precisely under the condition of the veil of ignorance, where the individual has no information about accidental peculiarities, it is not in a position to exploit them to its advantage. On the contrary, it must have the well-being of others in mind, since it does not know what position it will have in a society to be built. >Justice, >Society. 1. See for this: Schopenhauer, On the Basics of Ethics, New York 1965, pp. 89-92.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Equality	Singer	I IX Equality/Animal/Human/Equal rights/Ethics/P. Singer: thesis: my book Practical Ethics⁽¹⁾ fights the attitude that all members of the human species would have higher-ranked rights solely because of their belonging to this species. >Animals, >Rights. P. SingerVs: it would be unphilosophical to forbid any comparisons beyond a species. This is about injustice that we inflict on animals and the damage we do to our environment. I 16 Equality/ethics/P. Singer: what does it actually mean when we say that all people are equal? Problem: the more we investigate individual cases, the more the belief in the universal validity of the principle of equality disappears. Example: Intelligence/Jensen/Eysenk/P. Singer: (Debate in the 1970s between Arthur Jensen, psychologist UC Berkeley and Hans Jürgen Eysenk, psychology at the University of London): I 17 Question: to what extent do variances of intelligence depend on genetic differences? This dispute was again taken up by Herrstein/Murray 1994⁽²⁾. >Intelligence, >A. Jensen, >H.J. Eysenck. Racism: the critics of these authors say their theses, if justified, would justify racial discrimination. Are they right? Similar problem: was Larry Summers a sexist when he - at that time president of the Harvard University - claimed biological factors in connection with difficulties to appoint more women to chairs in mathematics and sciences? Similar question: should disadvantaged groups receive special preferential treatment in access to jobs or to the university? P. Singer: Differences between genders and differences between giftedness exist in any case. Range property/John Rawls: (in Rawls, Theory of Justice)⁽³⁾ if one belongs to a domain, one simply has the property to belong to this domain and all within the domain have this property alike. I 18 Equality/Rawls/P. Singer: Rawl's thesis: a moral attitude is the basis for equality. >Morals, >Ethics. VsRawls: 1. One might object that this is a gradual matter. 2. Small children are not capable of having a moral personality. Solution/Rawls: small children are potentially moral personalities. I 19 VsRawls: Rawls does not provide a solution for people with irreparable impairments.⁽³⁾ I 20 Suffering/interest/Third person/P. Singer: Problem: we have to explain whether the pain of a certain person is less undesirable than that of another person. >Suffering, >Pain. I 20 Interest/P. Singer: Principle: When it comes to equality, we should weigh interests as interests and not as interests of persons, as mine or someone else's interests. If then X loses more by an action than Y wins, the action should not be executed. >Interest. I 21 Then the race plays no role anymore in the weighing of interests. This is the reason why the Nazis were wrong: their policy was based only on the interests of the Aryan race. >Racism, >Fascism. 1. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press (2011). 2. Herrnstein, R. J., & Murray, C. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. New York, NJ: Free Press (1994). 3. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Original Edition. Belknap Press (1971).	SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Generalization	Freeden	Gaus I 5 Generalization/individuals/generality/political theory/Freeden: (... ) the increasing democratization of politics has shifted the emphasis of scholarship from ‘great men and women’ philosophers to the moral claims any individual and all individuals may direct at their societies and the benefits they ought to derive from social life. Just as historians now seldom tell the story of kings and queens but have developed a keen interest in popular history, so political theorists have refocused around individual selfdevelopment, participation, citizenship, and civic virtue (Young, 1986⁽¹⁾: 479, 484–5), notions close to the concerns of contemporary liberal theory (...). One manifestation of this has been the recent fascination of philosophers with questions of justice. >Self-realization, >Participation. Although justice is a systemic property of a wellorganized society, it has been reformulated, primarily by John Rawls (1971)⁽²⁾, as establishing the correct manner of attaining fairness for individuals, through devices that ensure that ordinary persons themselves decide reasonably on the rules of justice that ought to apply to them. >Justice, >Justice/Rawls, >J. Rawls. Deontology/method: Consequently, the deontology of rights and duties has been predominantly assigned to individuals, and Anglo-American political philosophy has been resistant to the impingement of groups and communities on its fundamental epistemology – an inclination towards atomism that is itself ideological as well as methodological. >Deontology. Universality/generality: Moreover, that approach is predicated on the assumption that the rationally exercised faculties of individuals will in crucial instances converge on common ground rather than diverge in a range of acceptable, rational and good solutions radiating out from a common core, as John Stuart Mill had indicated. >Generality. 1.Young, Robert (1986) Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom. London: Croom-Helm. 2. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Freeden, M. 2004. „Ideology, Political Theory and Political Philosophy“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Good	Rawls	I 396 Good/The Good/Goodness/being good/Justice/Rawls: we must distinguish between two theories of good, since in the theory of justice as fairness the concept of law precedes that of good. In contrast to teleological theory, something is only good if it can be integrated into existing principles. On the other hand, you need a concept of good to establish the principles, because you have to take into account the motives of those involved. In order not to jeopardise the primacy of the concept of law, the concept of good can only be reduced to the essentials here. That's what I call the Thin Theory of the good. I 397 Rationality: does not require the disposition of all knowledge. I suppose that rational actors are more likely to choose more than less primary public goods. >Public Goods/Rawls, >Rationality. In the initial situation of a society to be established, the participants assume that their ideas of good have a certain structure. The concept of good is later used in connection with the moral value of persons. I 398 In a well-ordered, approximately fair society it will turn that it is good in itself to be a good person. For this, however, we need a theory of good that presupposes the principles of justice. If the sense of justice itself is a good one, then only in the sense of the Thin Theory. I 399 In this case, the sense of justice contributes to the stability of an orderly society. I call this accordance of goodness and justice congruence. Def Good/The Good/Rawls: I assume the following for a definition. 1. a thing A is a good X if it has a certain property to a greater extent than something else, average⁽¹⁾. 2. A is a good X for a person K exactly when A has the characteristics that make it rational for K to aim for X. 3. K's life plan has to be rational on the whole. I 400 See footnotes 2-15. I 423 Being Good/Goodness as Rationality/Rawls: (See Planning/Rawls): One might think that it is necessary for the individual to constantly raisonninate to explore whether his/her plans are rational. This is a misunderstanding. Ultimately, it's about finding a criterion for the value of a person. This is mainly defined by reference to a rational (hypothetical) plan. >Rationality. I 424 However, we cannot infer from the definition of a rational plan the content of objectives. There are human needs in general, plans have to take into account human skills and social dependencies, etc. I 426 Def Aristotelian Principle/Terminology/Rawls: that is what I call the following principle: ceteris paribus means that people enjoy the exercise of their abilities, and all the more so the more they realize these abilities and the more complex they are^{(16)(17)(18)(19)}. >ceteris paribus, >Aristotle. I 429 Rawls: The principle formulates a tendency and shows no pattern of how to make a choice. I 431 VsRawls: Why should the Aristotelian Principle be true - RawlsVsVs: we observe it on children and higher animals. It also seems to be possible to explain it with evolutionary theory. The selection will have selected the individuals to whom it applies^(20)(21)(22). I 435 In order to make the Thin Theory a fully-fledged one that is about the value of a person, we ask how fellow citizens judge other fellow citizens who are in the same position. This involves average skills in an average position and in different roles, especially those that are considered more important. In addition, we assume broad characteristics that are normally sought by rational persons. (The indication of broad properties comes from T. M. Scanlon). >T.M. Scanlon. I 437 Def good person/Def moral value/Rawls: a person of moral value is then an individual with an above-average degree of broad moral qualities, so that it is rational for individuals in the initial situation of a society to be established to strive for this for themselves and for each other. N.B.: no additional ethical concepts are introduced. >Values, >Morals. Person/HareVsRawls: some authors have argued that a person qua person has no defined role or function if he/she is not treated as an instrument or object, so this definition of goodness or rationality would also have to fail⁽²³⁾. >R. M. Hare. I 438 RawlsVsHare/RawlsVsVs: we do not have to assume that people have a certain role and even less that they should serve as a means to higher purposes. We only refer to the initial situation of a society to be established. I 446 Good/The Good/The Right/Rightness/Rawls: how does the Good differ from the Right? 1. The principles of justice that are used for the purpose of determining the good are principles that are chosen in the initial situation of a society to be established. On the other hand, the principles of rational decision and rationality used to determine the right thing are not chosen. >Principles/Rawls. I 447 Another difference is that people differ in what is considered good, but not so in the case of determining the right thing. 1. See W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford 1930), p. 67. 2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. I, vk. III, ch. 1-63. 3. Kant, The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Acadmy Edition, vol. IV, pp. 425-419; The Critique of Practical Reason, ch. II, bk I of pt. I. 4. See H. J. Paton on Kant in: In Defense of Reason (London, 1951), pp. 157-177. 5. H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7th Ed.(London, 1907), bk. I, ch. IX and bk. III, ch. XIV. 6. F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd Ed. (Oxford, 1926), ch. II. 7. Joshua Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York, 1908), lext II. 8. H. J. Paton, The Good Will (London, 1927), bk. II and III, esp. ch. VIII and IX. 9. W.D. Lamont, The Value Judgment (Edingurgh, 1955). 10. J. N. Findlay, Values and Intentions (London, 1961) ch. V, secs I and III; ch. VI. (11. For the naturalistic value theory see: John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922), pt. III. 12. See also R. B: Perry, General Theory of Value (New York, 1926), ch. XX-XXII. 13. As well as C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Lasalle Ill. 1946), bk. III. 14. Rawls' own approach is based on: J. O. Urmson „On Grading“, Mind (1950), vol. 59, Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca, NY, 1960), ch. VI. 15. Philippa Foot, „Goodness and Choice“, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 35 (1961). 16. Cf. Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII, ch. 11-14, bk. X. ch. 1-5. 17. See W.F.R. Hardie, Aristote’s Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1968), ch. XIV. 18. G.C. Field, Moral Theory (London, 1932), pp. 76-78. 19. R. W. White, „Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory“,Psychological Issues, vol. III (1963), ch. III and pp. 173-175, 180f. 20. See B. G. Campbell, Human Evolution (Chicago, 1966), pp. 49-53. 21. W. H. Thorpe, Science, Man and Morals, (London, 1965), pp. 87-92. 22. I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Ethology (New York, 1970), pp. 217-248. 23. See R. M. Hare, Geach on Good an Evil, Analysis 17(5), p. 109ff.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Good	Sandel	Brocker I 677 Good/The Good/Politics/State/Reason/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Sandel wants to put the achievements of modern democracy on a different basis than the purely formal one that Rawls drafts in his theory of justice. ⁽¹⁾ Instead of a formal theory of rights, they should find their justification through an understanding of goodness rich in content. See Liberalism/Sandel, Rawls/Sandel, Contract Theory/Sandel, SandelVsRawls, Politics/Sandel. The space of the political would then be the space of lively debate about the good and not a space of a priori formulation of principles of justice. ⁽²⁾ 1 . Cf. John Rawls, Theory of Justice 1971(dt. 1975) 2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Hobbes	Gaus	Gaus I 109 Hobbes/justice/liberalism/Gaus: the line between a Hobbesian justification of liberal principles and what I shall call a ‘liberal theory of justice’ is fuzzy and open to challenge. The rationale for the distinction is this: utilitarian, Hobbesian and value subjectivist moralities may be employed to justify liberal arrangements, but depending on the details and assumptions, they can also justify distinctively illiberal policies. They thus require additional premises (say, the theory of the market) to ground liberal political principles. GausVsHobbes: After all, Hobbes’s own theory was distinctively illiberal. Liberalism: In contrast, what I shall call ‘liberal theories of justice’ tie the very idea of justice and moral reasoning to basic liberal principles. >Rights/Liberalism, >Rights/Mill. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Idealism	Rawls	I 264 Idealism/form of society/justice/Rawls: our theory of justice as fairness could be reminiscent of idealism, insofar as it puts the concept of community on an individualistic basis. We do not want to take an undefined concept of community as a basic concept. (See Part III, Theory of Justice). >Idealism, >Idealism as author, >Justice/Rawls, >Fairness/Rawls.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Indeterminacy	Rawls	I 201 Indeterminacy/form of society/political process/Rawls: in the initial state of a society to be established, it is not necessarily clear which constitutional form is to be preferred. >Constitution. Then justice itself is, in a way, indeterminate. Institutions within a certain range of possibilities are equally fair, including laws and policies. This indeterminacy is not a deficiency. We should be expecting it. Solution: the theory of justice as fairness/Rawls. >Fairness/Rawls, >Justice/Rawls, >Society/Rawls, >Institutions.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Individualism	Rawls	Gaus I 94 Individualism/Rawls/SandelVsRawls/Communitarianism/Waldron: (...) the individualism of Rawls’s thin theory drew criticism from communitarian philosophers, who repudiated the implicit assumption that individual plans of life are chosen by persons unencumbered by prior commitments and allegiances. >Communitarianism. Those who thought of themselves as essentially members of a particular family or community or people might find it hard to accept a theory of justice oriented at foundational level to the well-being of persons conceived as liberated from all such attachments (Sandel, 1982)⁽¹⁾. >Justice/Rawls. Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993⁽²⁾: 4). In the introduction to Political Liberalism, he argued that this could no longer be achieved by convincing everyone of the ethical and philosophical premises on which a comprehensive liberal theory of justice might be founded. Instead Rawlsian justice would now have to be presented as something that could command support from a variety of ethical perspectives. >Inequalities. Question: how many of the substantive principles and doctrines of A Theory of Justice would survive this new approach? Rawls described (...) diversity as a social fact - a permanent feature of modern society. Human life engages multiple values and it is natural that people will disagree about how to balance or prioritize them. Gaus I 95 However, not all dissensus is regarded as reasonable. Problem: Waldron: Unfortunately, as Rawls uses it, the term ‘reasonable’ is ambiguous (...). >Reason/Rawls, >Conflicts. 1. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Individuals	Mill	Gaus I 102 Individual/Mill/Gaus: (...) a great deal of liberal philosophy has been built on a particular view of human excellence. What might be called a perfectionist theory of the good life, or one devoted to self-realization as the end, can be found in Mill, T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, L. T. Hobhouse, John Dewey and even, I would venture, in the third part of John Rawls’s Theory of Justice⁽¹⁾ - the most distinctly ‘comprehensive’ element of the book (Gaus, 1983a)⁽²⁾. The crux of this theory is presented in the third chapter of On Liberty⁽³⁾, ‘Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being’, where human nature is compared to ‘a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces that make it a living thing’ (Mill, 1963a⁽³⁾: ch. 3). Mill closely ties individuality to this growth or development of human nature: ‘Individuality is the same thing with development’ (1963a(3): ch. 3). Mill believes that reason reveals our nature and its needs; human nature possesses impulses or energies that try to manifest themselves. Not only do we naturally possess different capacities, but these capacities are sources of energy that seek to express themselves. Consequently, to block a person from developing her capacities is to de-energize her - to make her passive and lethargic (1963a⁽³⁾: ch. 3; Gaus, 1983a⁽²⁾: ch. 4). >Liberalism/Gaus, >Liberalism/Waldron, >Liberalism/Mill, >Liberalism/Kymlicka, >Autonomy/Gaus; cf. >Communitarianism. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Gaus, Gerald F. (1983a) The Modern Liberal Theory of Man. New York: St Martin’s. 3. Mill, John Stuart (1963a) On Liberty. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. XVIII, 213–301. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justice	International Political Theory	Gaus I 294 Justice/International political theory/Brown: The reinvigoration of theories of justice begun by John Rawls's A Theory of Justice⁽¹⁾ (...) here, the technicalities of Rawls's scheme will be taken for granted, and the focus will be on their international implications (Brown, 1997⁽²⁾; 2002a⁽³⁾; 2002b)⁽⁴⁾. International justice/Brown: of the 'difference principle'. International society is not a 'co-operative venture for mutual advantage'; individual societies are assumed to be bounded and self-sufficient, and so there is nothing that could provide the basic materials for redistribution required by the notion of international distributive justice. VsRawls: For a theory of social justice to have nothing to say about the extraordinary inequalities that exist between societies appears perverse. International Justice/BarryVsRawls: Brian Barry this is symptomatic of wider problems with Rawls's project. International justice poses problems that are structurally similar to those posed by, for example, intergenerational justice and environmental justice; in each case the central notion of a contract based, at least in part, on the search for mutual advantage by the contractors, cannot easily respond to the interests of those who cannot be present as contractors, which category includes foreigners. Moreover, the requirement that arrangements be, in some sense, based on reciprocity is equally if not more limiting (Barry, 1989)⁽⁵⁾. >Justice/Barry, >Jutice/Beitz, >International relations/Pogge. Gaus I 295 Borders/boundaries/refugees: Since existing boundaries are clearly not the result of any kind of contract - nor are they 'natural' - what, if any, justification can be given for the norm which assigns to state authorities the right to control such borders, and thus creates categories such as 'political refugee' and 'economic migrant'? Pogge⁽⁵⁾ suggests none, and the majority of cosmopolitan liberals agree (Barry and Goodin, 1992(6); O'Neill, 1994⁽⁷⁾). However, as most cosmopolitans also agree, there are obviously practical problems with such a position, and liberal nationalists such as Michael Walzer and David Miller argue that Rawls was essentially correct to assume that distributive justice can only be a feature of bounded communities (Miller and Walzer, 1995⁽⁸⁾). A socially just society will involve redistribution of resources, and the willingness of citizens to redistribute depends crucially on the existence of a sense of community (Miller, 1995)⁽⁹⁾. Equality/inequality/justice/Brown: problem: a world of socially just communities might still be a radically unequal world. Can such a state of affairs truly be just? Liberalism/Brown: There is an impasse here which is symptomatic of a wider set of problems for contemporary cosmopolitan liberalism (Brown, 2000a)⁽³⁾. The distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' is difficult to justify rationally, but a politics without this distinction, a politics without borders, is, in the world as it is, unattainable and undesirable, unless a libertarian conception of liberalism be taken to its limits, as Hillel Steiner (1992)⁽¹⁰⁾ advocates. >Hillel Steiner. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2. Brown, C. (1997) 'Review essay: theories of international justice'. British Journal of Political Science, 27:273—9. 3. Brown, C. (2000a) 'On the borders of (international) political theory'. In N. O'Sullivan, ed., Political Theory in Transition. London: Routledge. 4. Brown, C. (2000b) 'Cultural diversity and international political theory'. Review of International Studies, 26: 199-213. 5. Pogge, T. (1989) Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 6. Barry, B. and R. E. Goodin, eds (1992) Free Movement. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 7. O'Neill, O. (1994) 'Justice and boundaries'. In C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe. London: Routledge, 69-88. 8. Miller, D. and M. Walzer, eds (1995) Pluralism, Justice and Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9. Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 486—93. 10. Steiner, H. (1992) 'Libertarianism and the transnational migration of people'. In B. Barry and R. E. Goodin, eds, Free Movement. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justice	Liberalism	Gaus I 96 Justice/Liberalism/Waldron: we should not understand the strategy of the political liberal as a strategy of attempting to suppress all basis for disagreement about justice. Political liberals should think about justice as a topic that naturally evokes disagreement even when the influence of rival comprehensive conceptions is left out of account. ((s) For the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism see >Liberalism/Waldron.) Rights/law/society/Waldron: The fact that one major source of dissensus is removed should not lead us to assume - what many political theorists mistakenly assume about rights - that what is just and unjust can be determined in some realm of principle that is beyond politics, some arena of philosophical argument where political procedures like voting will not be necessary. Like individual rights, justice remains an intensely contested issue, and though the contestation may be diminished it is not eliminated by the strategies that the political liberal proposes. Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people. >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Waldron. Gaus I 97 Justice/Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. responsibilities. So political liberalism also has implications for what this sharing a conception of justice amounts to. Example: (...) e.g., a left liberal like me ((s) Jeremy Waldron) may not say, for example, to a Social Darwinian that even the feeblest person is entitled to our compassion because he is created in the image of God. I must find some way of putting my point about equality that can be affirmed even by people who do not share my religious convictions. Equally a Christian conservative may not justify laws restricting abortion on the grounds that foetuses have souls, since this too is rooted in a comprehensive conception he cannot expect others to share. Gaus I 98 (...) the dative element (...) - that political justification be understood as justification to each and every individual -can be understood in more than one way. a) It may be understood as a requirement that the justificatation of political arrangements should be directed to the good or interests of each and every one who is subject to those arrangements. I shall call this the ‘interestregarding’ interpretation. b) Or it may be understood as a requirement that the justification of a political decision be plausibly reckoned likely to persuade everyone who is subject to the arrangements. I shall call this the ‘premise-regarding’ interpretation, because it understands ‘justification to X’ as justification that seeks to hook up with premises to which X is already committed. Rawls/Waldron: Clearly Rawls’s political liberalism assumes what I have called the ‘premise-regarding’ interpretation of the requirement that political justification must be justification to each and every individual. >Justice/Rawls. Waldron: However it is also important to see that interestregarding interpretation of justifiability to all can be maintained even if the premise-regarding interpretation is given up. >Liberalism/Waldron. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justice	Miller	Gaus I 416 Justice/Miller/Weinstein: According to Miller, justice is (1) pluralistic, in so far as desert, need and equality comprise its threefold criteria, and (2) contextual, in so far as the strength of these criteria varies according to the goods and social practices at issue. Miller's justificatory strategy on behalf of these three criteria owes much to Sidgwick, though he trades on Sidgwick largely via Rawls's reflective equilibrium. >Utilitarianism/Sidgwick, >Sidgwick/Political philosophy. Miller hopes to 'show that a theory of justice rooted in popular beliefs can retain a sharp critical edge' (1999⁽¹⁾: xi). We first try to discover the principles of justice embodied in our everyday beliefs. We next hone them philosophically before reapplying them as guides to the distributive social dilemmas facing us. But we never forgo the moorings of common sense justice lest our theory become either so abstract or so controversial as to prove irrelevant (...). Miller prefers Rawls's later writings where the original position becomes little more than a heuristic device for impartially systematizing and clarifying our common sense notions of justice. Consequently, Gaus I 417 ‚It ... merely highlights his preferred method ofproceeding, which is to move back and forth between our particular beliefs about justice and the general principles that might be used to systematize them, always bearing in mind that these principles ... must be publicly justifiable'. (1999⁽¹⁾: 58) Weinstein: But given this shift towards public justifiability, Rawls ought to have been more sensitive to empirical evidence about how we, in fact, understand justice. Miller, then, evokes Sidgwick unawares, and empirical social science, to rehabilitate Rawls in the name of egalitarian communitarianism. >Egalitarianism/Miller. 1. Miller, David (1999) Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justice	Pettit	Brocker I 858 Justice/PettitVsRawls/Pettit: Pettit has stylized himself as a republican opponent of Rawl's theory of justice. He wants to oppose Rawl's model (see Justice/Rawls) with its own model, which "in a more substantial way" elaborates the ideas of freedom and social justice.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ Rawls/(s): is based on principles instead of "contents". >Principles, >J. Rawls. Brocker I 859 RichterVsRawls: Pettit's model appears weak precisely where the concrete allocation of functions to public participation for the purpose of defining and controlling options for action by the state is concerned. Moreover, ironically, Rawls and Pettit's models resemble each other at precisely those points where Pettit claims to present the alternative to liberal political theory. Cf. >Liberalism. It is Rawl's principle of difference that makes it possible to solve the problems raised by Pettit. ⁽³⁾ >Difference Principle/Rawls. 1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004 2. Philip Pettit, Beyond Rawls, 2012, 107ff 3. John Rawls, Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, 1975, S. 96 Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Pett I Ph. Pettit Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Justice	Rawls	I 3 Justice/Rawls: justice is the first virtue of social institutions, just like truth is for thought systems. Justice as an untrue theory must be rejected or revised, laws and institutions must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. >Injustice, >Laws. Each person has an inviolability based on justice that cannot be overridden even by the welfare of a society as a whole. Therefore, a loss of the freedom of some cannot be offset by a greater good, which is given to several. (RawlsVsUtilitarianism, RawlsVsSinger, Peter) >Utilitarianism, >P. Singer. I 4 The rights guaranteed by justice are not the subject of political negotiation or social interests. Cf. >Human Rights, >Fundamental Rights. Just as the acceptance of a faulty theory is only justified by the absence of a better theory, injustice is only tolerable if necessary to avoid greater injustice. To investigate whether these too strong claims are justified, we must develop a theory of justice. >Society/Rawls. I 5 Justice/Society/Rawls: although people are at odds about which principles to accept, we still assume that they all have an idea of justice. That is, they understand that such principles are necessary to determine basic rights and obligations and to monitor their distribution. Therefore, it seems reasonable to contrast a concept of justice with different notions of justice. I 6 Justice/Rawls: justice cannot stop at distribution justice. It must become a feature of social institutions. I 54/55 Justice/Principles/Rawls: the principles of justice are very different depending on whether they apply to individuals or institutions. >Principles/Rawls. I 237 Natural justice/Rawls: the principles of natural justice are intended to ensure the integrity of the legal process.⁽¹⁾ >Natural justice. I 310 Justice/Idealization/RawlsVsLeibniz/RalwsVsRoss, W. D. /Rawls: one should not equate or try to define justice with an "ideal happiness"⁽²⁾⁽³⁾. >G.W. Leibniz. I 311 What people are entitled to is not measured by intrinsic value. The moral value does not depend on supply and demand. When certain services are no longer in demand, moral merit does not decrease equally. I 312 The concept of moral value does not provide a first principle of distributive justice. The moral value can be defined as a sense of justice when the principles of justice are available. 1. Cf. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, 1930), pp. 21,26-28,57f. 2. Leibniz, „On the Ultimate Origin of Things“ (1697) ed. P.P. Wiener (New York, 1951), p. 353. 3. Leibniz, „On the Ultimate Origin of Things“ (1697) Hrsg. P.P. Wiener (New York, 1951), S. 353. Gaus I 94 Justice/Rawls/Waldron: Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993⁽²⁾: 4). Gaus I 95 Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron. Problems: (...) there are further questions about how [a] threshold test should be understood. One possibility is that T represents an acceptable modus vivendi for the adherents of the various comprehensive conceptions {C1, C2, …, Cn }. Like a treaty that puts an end to conflict between previously hostile powers, T may be presented as the best that C1 can hope for in the way of a theory of justice given that it has to coexist with C2, …, Cn , and the best that C2 can hope for given that it has to coexist with C1, C3 ,…, Cn , and so on. Rawls, however, regards this as unsatisfactory as a basis for a conception of justice. It leaves T vulnerable to demographic changes or other changes in the balance of power between rival comprehensive conceptions, a vulnerability that is quite at odds with the steadfast moral force that we usually associate with justice (1993⁽¹⁾: 148). Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2, … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1, and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2, and so on. Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical Gaus I 96 importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke. Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron, >Overlapping consensus/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justice	Waldron	Gaus I 95 Justice//the good/liberalism/Waldron: Assuming we can define, even roughly, the set of conceptions of the good that must be accommodated in the approach that we take to justice and the justification of the basic structure of a liberal society, what is the relation supposed to be between the set of reasonable conceptions and an acceptable theory of justice? >Rawls/Waldron, >Justice/Rawls. Waldron: One possibility is to insist on something like a unanimity requirement: i.e. we could say that no theory of justice is acceptable if members of a given conception of the good are inclined to repudiate it. But this is much too strong, and in a way that misconceives the nature of the difficulty that political liberalism addresses. The problem is not that theories of justice are controversial; the critical reaction that led Rawls to modify the approach he took to the subject of justice was not that people (like Nozick, 1974⁽¹⁾, for example) disagreed with his principles on justice-related grounds. The problem was that some people would have a particular kind of difficulty with his theory (...). Waldron: The key, then, is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. Obviously, of course, this is a threshold test only: T may be acceptable in this sense, but still unacceptable overall as a theory of justice. But this would be for justice-related reasons, not because of T’s complicity with a particular comprehensive conception. Problems: (...) there are further questions about how this threshold test should be understood. One possibility is that T represents an acceptable modus vivendi for the adherents of the various comprehensive conceptions (...). >Justice/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Waldron. Gaus I 97 Justice/Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. 1. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia Oxford: Blackwell. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justification	Ackerman	Gaus I 93 Justification/Ackerman/Waldron: Bruce Ackerman (1980)⁽¹⁾ developed a theory of justice in the form of a contractarian dialogue, for which it was laid down as a ground rule that no reason (adduced in conversation to justify any particular distribution of power) ‘is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert … that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens’ (1980⁽¹⁾: 11). >Neutrality/Waldron. Waldron: Now, why should this be the ground rule? Ackerman said that there were several ways to justify the neutrality principle: it could be justified by reference to the epistemic value of experiments in ethics, or the intrinsic importance of autonomy, or scepticism about ethics, or about the ability of power-holders to reach accurate conclusions about the good (1980⁽¹⁾: 11–12). The liberal state need not side with any of these justifications in particular. It only needs an assurance that everyone can reach neutrality by at least one of these routes. WaldronVsAckerman:Could this strategy work? It might, but only if we were certain that the different paths to neutrality did not make a difference to the meaning or character of the destination. But this seems unlikely. Moral principles are characteristically dependent for their interpretation on some understanding of the point or purpose for which they are imposed. Change the purpose and you provide a different basis for interpreting the principle. So far as neutrality is concerned, one of the main interpretive difficulties concerns the issue of intention: does neutrality forbid only political action motivated by a non-neutral intention or does it forbid also action, however motivated, which is non-neutral in its effects? It turns out that some of Ackerman’s paths to neutrality favour the intentionalist interpretation while one, at least, favours the consequentialist interpretation: scepticism about a power-holder’s ethical abilities should inhibit only his deliberate attempts to favour one conception of the good. The value of ethical diversity, on the other hand, should make us pause whenever state action actually has a detrimental impact on some conceptions of the good, whether this is intended or not. Ackerman’s ‘overlapping consensus’ is really a recipe for a disordered society, as citizens follow their different paths to an interpretive quarrel and find no common basis to resolve it (see Waldron, 1993⁽²⁾: 151–3). 1. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2. Waldron, Jeremy (1993) Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Justification	Lamont	Gaus I 230 Theories/principles/justification/Lamont: (...) theories [on distributive justice] have been characterized mainly according to the content of their approach to the moral demands of welfare (or luck) and responsibility. It is important to note here some of the complications of these characterizations and Gaus I 231 also other ways of conceptualizing the distributive justice literature. Most theorists are accurately described by a number of non-equivalent labels. The classifications used here are widespread in the contemporary literature, but there are nevertheless subtle differences in the ways different authors use these labels. Content/principle/justification: one important distinction is between the content of a distributive principle, and its justification. Content: 'Content' refers to the distribution ideally recommended by a principle, whereas 'justification' refers to the reasons given in support of the principle. Theorists can be distinguished and labelled according to the content of their theory or according to the justification they give. Problems: 1) (...) the common labels used here refer sometimes to the content and other times to the justifications for various positions. 2) (...) most groups of theories have justifications from a number of different sources and single writers even will sometimes use more than one source of justification for their theory. Most combinations of content and justification, in fact, have been tried. For instance, different libertarians use natural rights, desert, utilitarianism or contractarianism in the justification of their theories; different desert theorists use natural rights, contractarianism and even utilitarianism (Mill 1877⁽¹⁾; Sidgwick, 1890⁽²⁾). Partly this comes about because there are different versions of justifications which nevertheless, due to some similarity, share the same broad label. Contract theory: For instance, contractarianism features in the justifications of many theories, and covers both Hobbesian and Kantian contractarians, after Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant (Hampton, 1991⁽³⁾). A) Hobbesian contractarians, such as David Gauthier, attempt to justify morality in terms of the self-interested reasons individuals have for agreeing to certain terms of social co-operation. B) Kantian contractarians, such as John Rawls, appeal to moral reasons to justify the terms of social cooperation that would be worthy of consent, usually arguing for distributions on the egalitarian end of the spectrum. A Hobbesian contractarian, as you might suspect, is more likely to argue for libertarian oriented systems (Buchanan, 1982⁽⁴⁾; Gauthier, 1987⁽⁵⁾; Levin, 1982⁽⁶⁾). However, there are also followers of Hobbes who insist his contractarianism is better read to justify some important aspects of the welfare state, rather than a merely minimalist government (Kavka, 1986⁽⁷⁾; Morris, 1998⁽⁸⁾: ch. 9; Vallentyne, 1991⁽⁹⁾). So theorists who share the 'contractarian' label may also be characterized by a libertarian rejection of redistribution or an egalitarian insistence on widespread distribution (...). Equality/egalitarianism: the most common alternatives to characterizing distributive justice theories along the dimensions of welfare and responsibility have been to characterize them either along the related dimension of equality, or according to the degree of egalitarianism the theories prescribe. So each of the theories already surveyed here could alternatively be categorized according to its treatment, or approach, to equality (Joseph and Sumption, 1979⁽¹⁰⁾; Rakowski, 1991)⁽¹¹⁾. >Equality/Sen. Sen: in his influential lecture 'Equality of what?' (1980)⁽¹²⁾, Amartya Sen addresses the question of what metric egalitarians should use to determine the degree to which a society realizes the ideal of equality. A range of alternative variables for what should be equalized have since been introduced (Daniels, 1990⁽¹³⁾) and refined, including the resource egalitarians discussed above (Dworkin, 2000)⁽¹⁴⁾, equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989⁽¹⁵⁾; 1990⁽¹⁶⁾; 1991⁽¹⁷⁾), equal access to advantage (Cohen, 1989)⁽¹⁸⁾, and equal political status (Anderson, 1999)⁽¹⁹⁾. Gaus I 232 Concepts/content/theories: Another complication (...) comes from differences in how the very topic of distributive justice itself is conceived, with some theorists emphasizing process rather than content or justification. Principles: [many theories] address the question of distributive justice by recommending principles intended as normative ideals for institutions, which themselves will significantly determine the distribution of resources. These theories reflect progress and a growing consensus throughout most of the twentieth century about what is not acceptable. For example, all of the theories on offer reject the inequalities characteristic in feudal, aristocratic, and slave societies, as well as the inequalities inherent in systems that restrict access to goods, services, jobs or positions on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or religion. Deciding processes: On the other hand, some theorists believe that the ongoing existence of reasonable disagreement reflects importantly on the very nature of distributive justice. They argue that, within the area of reasonable disagreement about what are the best distributive ideals, the additional questions to examine are whether the processes for deciding distributive questions are just. So, some argue that certain distributive justice issues should be dealt with at the constitutional level, variously described, while other issues are properly decided at the legislative level. Just processes; a subgroup of these theorists also take the view that some decisions about distributive justice issues can be partly or fully justified because they are the result of a just process (Christiano, 1996⁽²⁰⁾; Gaus, 1996⁽²¹⁾). Rational argument alone may be able to exclude some systems as unjust, but others will be justified not simply on the grounds of their content, but also by the process by which they were reached. >Liberalism/Lamont. 1. Mill, John S. (1877) Utilitarianism, 6th edn. London: Longmans, Green. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1890) The Methods of Ethics, 4th edn. London: Macmillan. 3. Hampton, Jean (1991) 'Two faces of contractarian thought'. In Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier 's Morals by Agreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 31—55. 4. Buchanan, Allen (1982) 'A critical introduction to Rawls' theory of justice'. In H. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth H. Smith, eds, John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 5. Gauthier, David Peter (1987) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Levin, Michael (1982) 'A Hobbesian minimal state'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 1 (4): 338-53. 7. Kavka, Gregory S. (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Morris, Christopher (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Vallentyne, Peter (1991) Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Joseph, Keith and Jonathan Sumption (1979) Equality. London: Murray. 11. Rakowskl, Eric (1991) Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 12. Sen, Amartya (1980) 'Equality of what?' In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-220. 13. Daniels, Norman (1990) 'Equality of what: welfare, resources, or capabilities?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (Fall): 273-96. 14. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 15. Arneson, Richard (1989) 'Equality and equal opportunity for welfare, Philosophical Studies, 56: 77-93. 16. Arneson, Richard (1990) 'Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism and equal opportunity for welfare', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 159-94. 17. Arneson, Richard (1991) 'Lockean self-ownership: towards a demolition', Political Studies, 39 (l): 36-54. 18. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the currency of egalitarian justice'. Ethics, 99 906_44. 19. Anderson, Elizabeth (1999) 'What is the point of equality?' Ethics, 109 (2): 287-337. 20. Christiano, Thomas (1996) The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview. 21. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Kant	Sandel	Gaus I 111 Kant/Sandel/Gaus: Benn and Gewirth both seek a direct route from agency to liberal rights: if we understand the type of agents we are, we see that we must claim certain liberal rights and grant them to others. >Person/Benn, >Rights/Gewirth. KantVsGewirth/KantVs/Benn: in contrast, what is often called ‘Kantian liberalism’ seeks to establish liberal rights via a hypothetical contract, which then generates basic rights. SandelVsKant: In the words of Sandel, its most famous critic, according to ‘deontological’ or ‘Kantian liberalism’, ‘society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good’ (1982(1): 1–7). Respect/recognition: Because, on this view, each is a chooser of her own ends in life, respect for the person of others demands that we refrain from imposing our view of the good life on her. Only principles that can be justified to all respect the personhood of each. Respect, then, requires a certain mode of justification, according to which moral principles are acceptable to all free moral persons in a fair choice situation. Liberal principles are then generated via this mode of justification. Cf. >Reason/Scanlon. 1. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. Brocker I 670 Kant/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead fully relied on a theory of right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1975). See Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. See Liberalism/Sandel, Law/Kant, SandelVsRawls. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Legitimacy	Morris	Gaus I 202 Legitimacy/Morris: suppose that some states - those that serve our interests, that behave justly, and so on - are such that they are justified and that they are thereby legitimated. Do they then possess all of the normative powers they claim? We need to investigate legitimacy. When are states legitimate? What is the basis of their legitimacy? And what exactly does legitimacy entail? 'Legitimacy' is derived from lex and has the same root as 'legislation'. One sense of 'legitimate' is being in accordance with law or lawful (legality). Any lawful or 'legal' state is legitimate in this sense. Closely related would be the more general notion of being in accordance with the established rules or procedures relevant to the matter at issue (e.g. a legitimate move in chess, the legitimate heir to the throne). These senses of 'legitimate', largely procedural and similar to the primary sense of 'legal' (being in accordance with the law), are not very useful for our normative inquiry. Problems: often in politics and especially international affairs a state is thought to be legitimate if it is recognized or accepted by others. There is considerable unclarity as to what this means. Sometimes the suggestion seems to be merely that a legitimate state is a genuine state. Legitimacy in this sense is uninteresting. Sometimes the idea of acceptance or recognition suggests that being a legitimate state requires being so recognized by other states, as if legitimacy were a kind of membership in an organization or club. Even if the members of this club are not all corrupt, this notion also seems uninteresting. The question is what conditions ought to be imposed for membership. Social scineces/Weber: in the social sciences, accounts derived from Weber would have us understand the state's legitimacy in terms of the attitudes of subjects. MorrisVsWeber: the crudest would say that a state is legitimate in so far as it is so regarded by its subjects, which is not very illuminating until we understand what it is for someone so to regard a state. State: What is it then for a state to be legitimate in a more substantive sense? If a state is legitimate it has a certain status. At the least, its existence is permissible. It may also have a (claim-)right to exist. >State/Morris. Solution: a legitimate state, we shall say, is minimally one which has a liberty, presumably a (claim-)right, to exist. It would presumably also possess the liberty or the right to establish laws and to adjudicate and enforce these as necessary for the maintenance of order and other ends. Legitimacy in this minimal sense would be the right to exist and to rule. >Obedience/Morris. Legitimacy, strong and weak: it is useful at this point to distinguish weaker and stronger conceptions of legitimacy. A legitimate state possesses a (claim-)right to exist and to rule. The right to exist entails obligations on the part of others not to threaten its existence in certain ways (e.g. not to attack or to conquer it). a) a state is Gaus I 203 minimally legitimate, I shall say, if its right to rule entails that others are obligated not to undermine it but are not necessarily obligated to obey it. 2) by contrast, a state is fully legitimate if its right to rule entails an obligation of subjects, or at least citizens, to obey (each valid law). This obligation may be thought of as a general obligation to obey the law, one which requires compliance with every law that applies to one except in circumstances indicated by the law (e.g. justified or excused disobedience).* Minimal legitimacy: What establishes minimal legitimacy? Suppose a state to be just.** That is, suppose that it respects the constraints of justice and does not act unjustly. In addition, suppose that it provides justice to those subject to its rule; it makes and enforces laws, adjudicates disputes, and provides mechanisms for collective decisions (e.g. contracts, corporate law, local governments, parliaments). Some of the laws as well as a number of social programmes seek to effect distributive justice (...).Government in general is responsive to the just interests or wishes of the governed. A state like this would be just. Suppose in addition that it is relatively efficient in its activities. (Morris, 1998⁽⁵⁾: chs 4 and 6). >Justice/Morris, >Justification/Morris, >Natural justice/Political philosophy. * 'A state's legitimacy is its exclusive right to impose new duties on subjects by initiating legally binding directives, to have those directives obeyed, and to coerce noncompliers' (Simmons, 1999⁽¹⁾: 137). '"Justifying the state" is normally thought to mean showing that there are umversal obligations to obey the law... [T]he goal of justification of the state is to show that, in principle, everyone within its territories is morally bound to follow its laws and edicts' (Wolff, 1996⁽²⁾: 42). ** 'Without justice, what are kingdoms but great robber bands?' (Augustine, 1984⁽³⁾: 30). 'Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought' Rawls, 1971⁽⁴⁾: 3). 1. Simmons, A. John (1999) 'Justification and legitimacy'. In his Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 122-57. 2. Wolff, Jonathan (1996) An Introduction to Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Augustine (1994 [1425]) Political Writings, eds E. Fortin and D. Kries, trans. M. Tracz and D. Kries. Indianapolis: Hackett. 4. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Morris, Christopher W. (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Liberalism	Gaus	Gaus I 100 Liberalism/Gaus: The distinction between ‘comprehensive’ and ‘political’ liberalisms (...) has become central to contemporary political theory. >Liberalism/Waldron. Comprehensive liberalism: versions: - liberalism as a secular philosophy; - liberalism as a philosophy of the good life; - liberalism as a political theory derived from a specific moral theory; - liberalism as itself a distinctive theory of the right or justice. Liberalism as a secular philosophy is a distinctly radical conception, which in some ways is the paradigmatic ‘fully comprehensive’ liberalism. On the other hand, liberalism as a theory of right is much more cautious about the extent that human reason converges; its more modest versions shade off into Rawlsian political liberalism. GausVsRawls: Thus I shall argue that the ‘comprehensive’ liberalism of A Theory of Justice (1971)⁽¹⁾ was a distinctly ‘partial’ comprehensive view, which was not as comprehensive as many other varieties of liberalism. Gaus I 101 Throughout the last century, liberalism has been beset by controversies between, on the one hand, those broadly identified as ‘individualists’ and, on the other, ‘collectivists’, ‘communitarians’ or ‘organicists’ (for scepticism about this, though, see Bird, 1999⁽⁵⁾). Gaus I 102 (...) the last 20 years have witnessed a renewed interest in collectivist analyses of liberal society - though the term ‘collectivist’ is abjured in favour of ‘communitarian’. Gutmann: Writing in 1985, Amy Gutmann observed that ‘[w]e are witnessing a revival of communitarian criticisms of liberal political theory. Like the critics of the 1960s, those of the 1980s fault liberalism for being mistakenly and irreparably individualistic’ (1985⁽³⁾: 308). Starting with Michael Sandel’s famous (1982)(4) criticism of Rawls, a number of critics charged that liberalism was necessarily premised on an abstract conception of individual selves as pure choosers, whose commitments, values and concerns are possessions of the self, but never constitute the self. >Rawls/Sandel. What is important for our purposes is that these debates focus on whether liberalism entails an individualist theory of humans in society, or whether its political and moral commitments can be conjoined with various conceptions of the self and the social order; it is thus a debate about just how ‘comprehensive’ liberalism really is. Gaus I 103 Liberalism becomes identified with the promotion of a certain sort of self-realizing individual, one who develops her nature, is rational and suspicious of custom, experiments with different ways of living and is not prone to conformism. Cf. >Mill/Gaus, >Individual/Mill, >Individualism/Rawls, >Perfectionism/Rawls. Gaus I 104 It is a mistake to try to define liberalism; liberal theories are complex clusters of conceptual and value commitments. But surely a crucial criterion for describing a view as ‘liberal’ is whether freedom is the core conceptual commitment (Freeden, 1996⁽⁶⁾; Gaus, 2000a⁽⁷⁾). >Freedom/Liberalism. Gaus I 105 Moral theory: (...) a liberal theory of the good life and morality must be distinguished from a commitment to liberalism built on a moral theory; these two distinct conceptions of liberalism are often lumped together as ‘comprehensive’ liberalism. Liberal political principles can be derived from moral theories that themselves are not intrinsically liberal. [There are] three such theories: utilitarianism, Hobbesian contractualism and value scepticism. >Utilitarian Liberalism/Gaus. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Bird, Colin (1999) The Myth of Liberal Individualism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Gutmann, Amy (1985) ‘Communitarian critics of liberalism’. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14: 308–22. 4. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. Freeden, Michael (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Gaus, Gerald F. (2000a) Political Theories and Political Concepts. Boulder, CO: Westview. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Liberalism	Kant	Brocker I 670 Liberalism/State/Kant: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead based himself entirely on a theory of the right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1971)⁽¹⁾. >Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. >Liberalism/Sandel. See Law/Justification/Kant. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberalism	Sandel	Brocker I 668 Liberalism/Communitarianism/Sandel: Sandels Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, together with Alasdair MacIntyres After Virtue and Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice, are considered the main work of communitarianism. Sandel, however, is more concerned with a differentiation from John Rawl's liberalism (and his main work Theory of Justice (1975)⁽¹⁾). SandelVsLiberalism, SandelVsRawls. Def Liberalismus/Rawls/Rothhaar: Rawls's liberalism is usually characterized in that it postulates a priority of the "right" over the "good", whereby these terms stand for two different possibilities to justify ethical and legal norms at all. A. Teleology: ethical theories aimed at the good or a successful life (eudaimonia), Brocker I 669 are usually called teleological. >Eudemonia. Norms/values: are justified here by the fact that a good or successful life is realized through them. B. Law/Rightfulness/Ethics/Liberalism: ethical theories, on the other hand that are aimed at the right, are characterized by the fact that norms are to be founded here independently of any idea of a good life. The concept of "right" only makes sense as a counter-concept to a teleological theory of normativity and can only occur where teleological theories have already become questionable. HobbesVsTeleology: Hobbes rejects the idea of a "highest good" himself. >Order/Hobbes. Other (liberal) approaches assume a plurality of conceptions of a good life. Norms: are usually defined in such theories of the right in relation to the generalizability of rules of action or to the concept of freedom. >Norms. State/Liberalism: such theories normally confer on the state the role of guaranteeing, through a legal system, the freedom it needs to pursue its respective notions of good. Liberalism/Rawls: this is about the priority of the right over the good in a twofold sense: a) at the level of justification, b) at the level of the state and society itself. SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: Sandel criticizes above all the priority of rights at the level of justification: he criticizes the "claim that the principles of justice (...) do not depend on a particular conception of good living (...) to justify them. ⁽²⁾ >The Good, >Life, cf. >Utilitarianism. Brocker I 676 SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. ⁽³⁾ >Democracy. 1. John Rawls, (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. x. 3. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge 1996. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberalism	Waldron	Gaus I 89 Liberalism/Waldron: The modern distinction between ‘political’ and ‘comprehensive’ versions of liberalism arises in connection with a serious problem about the basis of justification for liberal principles in a pluralistic society. The problem arises as follows. Liberals envisage a tolerant, inclusive society, populated by people adhering to a variety of belief systems. Many modern societies in which liberalism flourishes as a political ideal already have this character: they are religiously pluralist and multicultural societies (...). But a pluralist society also faces an additional agenda. Where different faiths and cultures rub shoulders, there is likely to be friction and offence: one group’s worship or festivities might seem like a reproach or an attack on another group, and as values and philosophies compete in the marketplace of ideas, the competition will often seem disrespectful as each creed tries to discredit its opponents and gain adherents for itself. It is not easy to define the duty of mutual toleration under these circumstances, or to sustain the distinction between harm and offence that a pluralistic regime requires. >Pluralism/Waldron. Gaus I 90 Toleration/pluralism/liberalism/Problem: (...) by elaborating and defending liberal principles and liberal solutions to the problems of social life on this sort of basis, we seem to be taking sides in the midst of cultural and ethical plurality. We seem to be picking and choosing among the variety of ethical, philosophical and religious traditions in the world, privileging some as foundational and marginalizing others. >Toleration/Waldron. Gaus I 91 Def Political liberalism/Waldron: Two political liberals may therefore be distinguished from one another by their different positions and their different conceptions. But what they will have in common – as political liberals – is their insistence on a distinction between the principles and ideals that (in their respective views) define a liberal order for society, and the deeper values and commitments associated with particular philosophical outlooks. Def Comprehensive liberalism/Waldron: The political liberal insists that the articulation and defence of a given set of liberal commitments for a society should not depend on any particular theory of what gives value or meaning to a human life. A comprehensive liberal denies this. He maintains that it is impossible adequately to defend or elaborate liberal commitments except by invoking the deeper values and commitments associated with some overall or ‘comprehensive’ philosophy. Political liberalism: There may also be a second layer of difference among political liberals. Whether or not the substance of their liberal commitment is the same, two political liberals may differ in the justificatory strategies they adopt as political liberals. >Consensus/Waldron. ((s) Cf. >Agreement/Habermas). Comprehensive liberalism: obviously there are important differences, also, among comprehensive liberals. Two comprehensive liberals may have different liberal commitments: one may be a left liberal and the other a libertarian liberal. A second layer of difference has to do with the content of the comprehensive outlooks on which their liberal commitments are based. John Locke’s Christian foundations are not the same as Immanuel Kant’s (1991)⁽¹⁾ theory of autonomy, and none of those is the same as the hedonistic foundation of Jeremy Bentham’s (1982)⁽²⁾ utilitarianism. >Autonomy/Kant, >Utilitarianism. Gaus I 92 Problems: (VsMill, VsKant, VsHumboldt): It does not seem to have occurred to Locke, Kant, and Mill that [the] foundational positions would pose a problem for the politics of liberalism in a society whose members disagreed about the existence of God, the nature of reason, and the destiny of the human individual. They just took it for granted that liberalism required a philosophical foundation of this kind, and that their task as political philosophers was to articulate that foundation, convince (as Mill put it) ‘the intelligent part of the public … to see its value’ (1956⁽¹⁾: 90), and if necessary argue, as Locke argued in his discussion of atheism (1983⁽²⁾: 51), that those who could not subscribe to these foundational positions might have to be regarded as dangerous by the government of a liberal society. >Liberalism/Mill, >Community/Humboldt, >State/Humboldt, >Categorical Imperative. >Neutrality/Waldron. Gaus I 97 The doctrine of human dignity and equality deployed in a theory of justice must be able to resist – in more or less the manner of a moral absolute – various pragmatic considerations that might tempt us to sacrifice or neglect the interests of a few weak and vulnerable persons for the sake of the convenience or prosperity of the wealthy or powerful. Justice has to be able to stand up to that, and its constitutive doctrines have to have what it takes to do that heavy moral lifting. Many of the comprehensive conceptions that political liberals want to exclude from the public realm address themselves to exactly this issue: they explain in ethical or transcendent terms why exactly it is that the few weak and vulnerable may not be sacrificed in this way. The political liberal proposes to do this work without help from any such conception, but in a way which nevertheless retains their allegiance in overlapping consensus. >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Overlapping consensus/Waldron, >Abortion/Rawls. Gaus I 99 Comprehensive liberalism/Waldron: Some comprehensive conceptions will affirm the moral importance of people’s actual experience here and now, while others may sideline or denigrate it. Those that do affirm it will sit more naturally with, and in a way will generate and inspire, the moral and political commitments traditionally associated with liberalism. And that is what the comprehensive liberal wants to remind us of. Liberalism is based on certain ethical commitments, certain propositions about what matters and about the importance of certain kinds of respect for the lives, experiences, and liberty of ordinary men and women. It is not a neutral or nonchalant creed, and its commitments arguably cannot be articulated at a purely political level. 1. Mill, John Stuart (1956 [1859]) On Liberty, ed. Currin V. Shields. Indianapolis: Hackett. 2. Locke, John (1983 [1689]) A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James H. Tully. Indianapolis: Hackett. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Moral Theory	Rawls	I 46 Moral Theories/Rawls: we discuss moral theory problems using the example of reflexive equilibrium. We assume that every adult person develops an ability to make justice judgments under normal social circumstances, as well as the expectations that other members of their community will develop similarly and have similar aspirations. This results in considerable complexity. >Reflexive equilibrium. At first, one could assume that moral theories have to deal with this complexity. However, this would lead to potentially infinite lists of judgments. Instead, we need to understand what principles guide us in each individual case. >Principles/Rawls. I 47 Moral Principles/Rawls: Rawls compares the ability to make extremely complex moral judgments with the inherent sense of grammatical correctness assumed by Chomsky. Rawls assumes that the principles - which are also decisive for our moral judgments - themselves will not be too complex. >Morals/Rawls. I 48 Justice/Reflexive Equilibrium/Rawls: from a moral-philosophical point of view, it is best to attribute a person's sense of justice not to an idea of justice, but to a concordance of their judgments with a reflexive equilibrium, i. e. after weighing up different ideas. >Justice/Rawls. I 50 Rawl's thesis: if we understand how people judge morally, we have the beginning of a moral theory, analogous to the grammar theory of Rawls, which is based on the observation of language behavior. In this sense, a theory of justice is exactly that, a theory. I 51 Moral philosophy: must be able to take into account contingent assumptions and general facts to any degree.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Neutrality	Waldron	Gaus I 92 Liberal neutrality/liberalism/Waldron: Problem: it does not seem to have occurred to Locke, Kant, and Mill that [the] foundational positions would pose a problem for the politics of liberalism in a society whose members disagreed about the existence of God, the nature of reason, and the destiny of the human individual. >Liberalism/Mill, >Community/Humboldt, >State/Humboldt, >Categorical Imperative. Neutrality: The difficulty (...) came to the fore in discussions of ‘liberal neutrality’ in the 1970s and 1980s. A number of theorists attempted to sum up the essence of liberalism in terms of a principle requiring the state to refrain from taking sides on disputed ethical and religious questions. >Neurality/Dworkin, >Neutrality/United States. Problems:: Liberal neutrality may be seen as a generalization of religious toleration into the realm of ethical choice generally. But therein lay the position’s vulnerability. So long as liberalism was read as a principle about religious neutrality, its defence could be rooted in moral ideas. Once it expanded into the ethical realm, it was not clear what it could rest on. It couldn’t be based on scepticism about values, for it seemed to represent a particular commitment in the realm of value (Dworkin, 1985⁽¹⁾: 203). Liberal theorists scrambled to define a distinction within the realm of values between political morality (e.g. moral principles of justice and right, like the neutrality principle itself), on which the state was permitted to act, and ethics (and perhaps the rest of morality besides justice and right), on which it was not permitted to act (Waldron, 1993⁽²⁾: 156–63). Gaus I 93 But it was always a fine line, and the wider world tended to blur the distinction between ethics and morality and talk generally about the liberal commitment to value neutrality. A similar dilemma confronted those who tried to use neutrality as a meta-principle of political justification. Bruce Ackerman (1980) developed a theory of justice in the form of a contractarian dialogue, for which it was laid down as a ground rule that no reason (adduced in conversation to justify any particular distribution of power) ‘is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert - that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens’ (1980⁽³⁾: 11). WaldronVsAckerman:Could this strategy work? It might, but only if we were certain that the different paths to neutrality did not make a difference to the meaning or character of the destination. But this seems unlikely. Moral principles are characteristically dependent for their interpretation on some understanding of the point or purpose for which they are imposed. 1. Dworkin, Ronald (1985) A Matter of Principle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Waldron, Jeremy (1993) Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Obligations	Rawls	I 113 Obligations/Rawls: 1. unlike moral requirements, obligations arise from voluntary action, whether explicitly or tacitly. >Actions, >Community. 2. the content of an obligation is always defined by an institution. >Institutions. 3. obligations are usually due to an individual, namely those individuals whose cooperation maintains a questionable arrangement. Examples are obligations resulting from a public office or marriage. It may be that someone is entitled to refuse obligations if this follows from the principle of fairness. >Fairness/Rawls, >Principles/Rawls. I 115/116 Reciprocity: does not follow from a contractual agreement between individuals, but from the second part of the fairness principle⁽¹⁾: I 116 (footnote) Commitments/M. Waltz/Rawls: Views to derive political obligations solely from consensus can be found in M. Walzer⁽²⁾. >Reciprocity, >M. Walzer. I 350 Duties/Commitment/Rawls: Question: under what conditions are we obliged to comply with an unfair law? It is a mistake that we would never be obliged to do this. >Laws, >Legislation, >Obligations, >Injustice. I 350 Up to certain limits, we are obliged to comply with unfair laws within the framework of our legal system. Problem: where are the limits? Different principles must be weighed here. Additional problem: our principles of justice accept an ideal society in perfect order, including strict compliance with laws. Inequality: when we are dealing with injustice, other principles come into play, including a theory of punishment, equitable justice, fair war, civil disobedience and military resistance. The theory of justice as fairness cannot be applied directly to it. >Punishment, >Punishment/Rawls. 1. See Rawls I 111: "This arrangement has been approved." 2. M. Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship, Cambridge, Mass. 1970, pp. Ix-xvi, 7-10,18-21, and ch. 5.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Overlapping Consensus	Rawls	Gaus I 93 Overlapping Consensus/Diversity/individualism/Rawls/Waldron: what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (Rawls 1980⁽¹⁾: 518–19). >Justice/Rawls, >Principles/Rawls. Gaus I 94 Ethical and religious heterogeneity were no longer to be regarded as a feature that societies governed by justice might or might not have, or might have at one period but not at another. It was to be seen instead as a permanent feature of the societies, one that could not be expected soon to pass away. >Society/Walzer. RawlsVsRawls: By the beginning of the 1990s Rawls had become convinced that his approach in A Theory of Justice⁽²⁾ was disqualified generally on this ground. >Individualism/Rawls. Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993⁽³⁾: 4). In the introduction to Political Liberalism, he argued that this could no longer be achieved by convincing everyone of the ethical and philosophical premises on which a comprehensive liberal theory of justice might be founded. Instead Rawlsian justice would now have to be presented as something that could command support from a variety of ethical perspectives. Question: how many of the substantive principles and doctrines of A Theory of Justice would survive this new approach? Rawls described (...) diversity as a social fact - a permanent feature of modern society. Human life engages multiple values and it is natural that people will disagree about how to balance or prioritize them. Gaus I 95 Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron. Problems: (...) there are further questions about how [a] threshold test should be understood. One possibility is that T represents an acceptable modus vivendi for the adherents of the various comprehensive conceptions {C1, C2, …, Cn }. Like a treaty that puts an end to conflict between previously hostile powers, T may be presented as the best that C1 can hope for in the way of a theory of justice given that it has to coexist with C2, …, Cn, and the best that C2 can hope for given that it has to coexist with C1 , C3 ,…, Cn , and so on. Rawls, however, regards this as unsatisfactory as a basis for a conception of justice. It leaves T vulnerable to demographic changes or other changes in the balance of power between rival comprehensive conceptions, a vulnerability that is quite at odds with the steadfast moral force that we usually associate with justice (1993⁽³⁾: 148). Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2 , … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1 , and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2, and so on. Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical Gaus I 96 importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke. Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron. Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls: The idea of overlapping consensus assumes that there can be many routes to the same destination. Geographically the metaphor is plausible enough, but when the destination is a set of moral principles, and ‘routes’ is read as reasons for the acceptance of those principles, then the matter is less clear. Unlike legal rules, moral propositions are not just formulas. A principle is perhaps best understood as a normative proposition together with the reasons that are properly adduced in its support. On either of these accounts, the principle of toleration arrived at by the Christian route is different from the principle of toleration arrived at by Mill’s route. And this is a difference that may matter, for a theory of justice is not only supposed to provide a set of slogans for a society; it is also supposed to guide the members of that society through the disputes that may break out concerning how these slogans are to be understood and applied. >Justice/Liberalism, >Liberalism/Waldron. WaldronVsRawls: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people. Cf. >Abortion/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72. 2. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 3. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Overlapping Consensus	Waldron	Gaus I 96 Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls/Waldron: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people. >Overlapping consensus/Rawls, >Justice/Rawls, >Liberalism/Waldron. WaldronVsOvverlapping consensus: The actual examples of overlapping consensus for a pluralist society provided in Political Liberalism are laughably easy by comparison. Both Kantians and non-Kantians might favour democracy, Rawls says, and both Christians and secularists may well oppose slavery (1993⁽¹⁾: 122–5). The hard part comes when we try to establish an overlapping consensus among (say) Christian fundamentalists, Hindus, secular humanists, scientific determinists, and members of the dot-com generation on the definition of ‘equal opportunity’, the use of economic incentives, and the distinction between liberty and the worth of liberty. (...) it was not hard to see that insistence on a strong theory of desert might mean that a theory of justice would have to buy into social and religious controversies about virtue. But it was much more difficult to know what to do with that point, or what would be a fair or a neutral way to move on from it. Can we imagine an overlapping consensus on problems like that between (say) the Protestant work ethic, the notion of apostolic poverty, and ideas of the fundamental solidarity of community? It is easy to despair of answering questions like this under the conditions that Rawls’s later work has emphasized. Gaus I 97 Justice/Waldron: A theory of justice (...) is not just some set of esoteric formulas; it is supposed to be something public, something shared among the citizens as a common point of reference for their debates about the allocation of rights and responsibilities. Cf. >Abortion/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Political Economy	Rawls	I 259 Political economy/Rawls: by this I mean economic arrangements and political arrangements as well as the background institutions that are related to them. Welfare economics/K. J. Arrow/Rawls: Defines welfare economics in a similar way^(1)(2)(3). Welfare/Rawls: I do not use this expression because it is reminiscent of utilitarianism. (RawlsVsUtilitarianism). >Utilitarianism, >Welfare economics, >Welfare state. The theory of justice as fairness treats social forms as closed systems. An economic system is also shaped by existing needs and necessities. The current cooperation between people in meeting these needs affects the way in which the needs of the future will look. These things are known and shared by such diverse authors as Marx and Marshall⁽⁴⁾ >Fairness/Rawls, >Society/Rawls. I 260 Social order/Rawls: Problem: how does this reciprocal influence of needs, satisfaction and new needs in the initial situation of a society to be established, where people stand behind a veil of ignorance in relation to their future position, affect the possible shaping? Solution: only the most general assumptions about primary public goods (e. g. freedoms) are made. >Veil of ignorance. I 263 Economy/disagreement/RawlsVsArrow, K. J/Rawls: different from what K. J. Arrow⁽⁵⁾ assumes, disagreement between parties is not a particular feature of idealism. In contract theory, it is part of the initial situation of a society to be established. It forms the content of the theory of justice as fairness. It tries to combine Kant's concept of the realm of purposes with that of autonomy and the categorical imperative. In this way, we can avoid metaphysical assumptions. >Contract Theory, >Purposes/Kant, >J.K. Arrow. 1. See K. J. Arrow and Tibor Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare, Homewood, 1969, p. 1. 2. A. Bergson, essays in Normative Economics, Cambridge, MA, 1966, pp 35-39,60-63,68f. 3. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco, 1970, pp. 56-59. 4. See Brian Barry, Political Argument, London, 1965. 5. K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 2nd. Ed. New York, 1963, pp. 74f, 81-86.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Politics	Sunstein	I 42 Politics/Sunstein: should politics be made according to survey results? The theorem of Condorcet makes the question seem less pointless than it appears at first glance. >Decision Theory/Condorcet. However, this only applies to yes/no questions within groups whose members are most likely to be correct in their majority. This may be the case in consultative bodies in companies, or in certain specialist areas when a panel of experts is consulted. However, it would not work if the population of a country, such as the United States, were asked whether the Kyoto Protocol should be signed. I 44 In many areas, people are subject to systematic mistakes. However, the question remains whether group discussions help. >Democracy/Sunstein. Functioning democracies delegate certain issues to expert committees. >MorozovVsJarvis and MorozovVsShirky. I 45 In an experiment in Colorado in the summer of 2005, liberal and conservative groups were mixed together to discuss some issues such as whether the United States should sign a climate change agreement or whether affirmative action should be accorded to disadvantaged groups. ⁽¹⁾ The result was clear: in almost every group, the positions were more extremely polarized after the discussions, with the respective starting positions of the groups being more strongly represented. I 46 In addition, the respective groups found greater homogeneity. I 49 Group discussion/John Rawls: Thesis: The advantages lie in the combination of information and increasing the range of arguments.⁽²⁾ SunsteinVsRawls: see above. 1. See Reid Hastie, David Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein, “What Really Happened on Deliberation Day?” (University of Chicago Law School, unpublished manuscript, 2006). 2. 8. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971), 358–59.	Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017
Probability	Rawls	I 172 Probability/philosophy/society/justice/Rawls: that probability plays a role in the theory of justice and philosophy is a consequence of the contract theory, which considers moral philosophy as part of the theory of rational choice. >Contract Theory. The veil of ignorance (the members of the initial situation of a society to be established do not know anything about their later position) leads directly to the problem of the decision under uncertainty. >Veil of ignorance, >Decisions, >Decision theory. Problem: we must not allow the principles we have chosen to depend on the willingness of individuals to take risks. >Principles/Rawls. There must be a risk assessment, but it must not depend on the individual individuals. Probability estimation/Rawls: must be based on known facts. I 173 We need objective reasons, especially because individuals want their decisions to be plausible to others. The information should, however, come from the principle of the insufficient reason (equal probability distribution for all unknown possibilities) and not from the knowledge of contingent facts. Problem: lastly, the assessment must be about the assessment of a single individual, but we only have the assessment of changing individuals. Rawls: at the moment I cannot offer a solution for this. I 174 Perspective/Rawls: Problem: we can put ourselves in another person's position, but we cannot evaluate his situation including his character and all circumstances, without any reference to the details of our own conception of what a good is. The value of the circumstances of others is not as the construction would have expected, the value of the circumstances for the other himself. >Circumstances, >Self/Rawls.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Racism	Rawls	I 149 Racism/theory of justice as fairness/Rawls: in the theory of justice as fairness, a hypothetical initial state of a society to be established is assumed, in which the persons are behind a veil of ignorance that does not allow them to know what positions they will take in the structure later on. In this situation it is clear that racism and sexual discrimination are not only unfair but also irrational. Not only are they not moral conceptions, but they are simply a means of oppression. --- I 150 However, this is not a question of definition, but rather a consequence of the conditions of the initial situation of a society to be established, in particular from the conditions of rationality. The fact that legal concepts have a certain content and exclude arbitrariness is a consequence of the theory.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Rawls	Barry	Gaus I 94 Rawls/Barry, Brian/Waldron: Some commentators (e.g. Barry, 1995⁾⁽¹⁾ have expressed doubts about Rawls’s self-criticism⁽²⁾ that the adoption of this ‘thin theory’ ((s) >Good/Rawls) means that A Theory of Justice was rooted in a particular comprehensive conception. WaldronVsBarry: But it is pretty clear that large parts of Rawlsian justice would not work without this thin theory of the good and of the importance of self-respect. The thin theory of the good and the notion of self-respect are implicated in the non-negotiable status that Rawls accords to freedom of conscience, for example, as well as in the general doctrine of the priority of liberty, the doctrine of the priority of opportunity, and his argument to the effect that citizens in a well-ordered society will not be motivated by material envy. 1. Barry, Brian (1995) ‘John Rawls and the search for stability’. Ethics, 105 (4): 874–915. 2. Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	EconBarry I Brian Barry Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Rawls	Waldron	Gaus I 93 Rawls/Waldron: When it was first published in 1971, John Rawls’s book A Theory of Justice seemed to present itself as a set of more or less universal claims: it was supposed to tell us what justice was and what it required in any society which faced what Rawls called ‘the circumstances of justice’ – moderate scarcity, mutual disinterest of individuals in one another’s ends, and so on (1971⁽¹⁾: 126). Under these circumstances, Rawls seemed to be implying, it was appropriate for people to use the idea of the ‘Original Position’ – decision behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ – as a way of figuring out appropriate principles of justice. And he argued that anyone selecting principles from that perspective would adopt strong principles of equal basic liberty, equal opportunity, and a social framework oriented to the well-being of members of the worst-off group. He seemed prepared to argue for these conclusions and defend them against rival conceptions (like Nozick, 1974)⁽²⁾ as a conception which could command the support of anyone interested in the subject. Later development: Through the 1980s, however, Rawls began to offer a more modest characterization than he had in 1971: „(...) what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (198⁰⁽³⁾: 518–19) >Society/Walzer, >Universalism/Rawls, >Individualism/Rawls, >Justice/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia Oxford: Blackwell. 3. Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Reciprocity	Singer	I 61/62 Ethics/Reciprocity/Compensation/Equality/Plato/P. Singer: Plato lets Glaucon say in the state: "It is by nature good to commit injustice, but to suffer it is bad, and the latter in a stronger way than the first. So if you have experienced both, you should come to avoid both. >Plato. I 62 Socrates disproves this view of Glaucon in the dialogue. P. SingerVsRawls: Glaucon's conception is still to this day found in the work of John Rawls and David Gauthier. It leads to the exclusion of animals from the sphere, which is subject to our own ethical standards, because animals cannot behave in the way we behave towards them. Therefore, no reciprocity can be assumed in our relationship with them. In order to deal with this problem, we must distinguish between explanation and justification. >Animals, >Humans, >Behavior, >Ethics, >Morals, >Equality, >Inequality. 1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Original Edition. Belknap Press (1971).	SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Reflective Equilibrium	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 226 Reflective equilibrium/Political philosophy/Lamont: theorists, the general population, and hopefully politicians, engage in a collective cognitive process through discussion and debate in order to come up with principles and policies to better cohere with the moral judgements and beliefs of the people. >Reflective equilibrium/Rawls. Of course, theorists can achieve such an equilibrium only by finding out what people believe (Miller, 1999⁽¹⁾: chs 3—4; Swift et al., 1995⁽²⁾). Fortunately, over the last couple of decades, there has been a sustained effort to collect the data necessary to this project (Elster, 1995⁽³⁾; Hochschild, 1981⁽⁴⁾; Kluegel and Smith, 1986⁽⁵⁾; Miller, 1999⁽¹⁾). Miller: David Miller (1999⁽¹⁾: ch. 4) has surveyed the empirical studies, partly summarizing the findings as follows: in people's thinking about social distribution, (there is) a tendency to favour more equality than presently exists in liberal democracies. This is partly to be explained by considerations of desert and need: people do not regard income inequalities of the size that currently obtain as deserved, and at the bottom of the scale they think it unfair that people cannot earn enough to meet their needs. (1999⁽¹⁾: 91) Frohling and Oppenheimer: In a series of experiments conducted to see what distributive principles people would choose, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992⁽⁶⁾) presented the subjects with four principles for distributing income: (l) maximizing the average income, (2) maximiz- ing the minimum income, (3) maximizing the average subject to a floor constraint (no income to fall below $x), and (4) maximizing the average subject to a range constraint (the gap between top and bottom incomes not to exceed $y). Maximizing the average subject to a floor constraint (or safety net) was chosen by the vast majority of individuals, while maximizing the average was a distant second. Lamont: The alternative used to gauge support for the difference principle - maximizing the minimum income - had very little support. Rawls: So while Rawls (1993⁽⁷⁾: 8) popularized the theory of reflective equilibrium, his own theory of distributive justice gains little support from it. >J. Rawls. VsRawls: Some critics of his difference principle provide one reason for this. Although the argument, outlined above, for the difference principle gives moral weight to reducing the influence of factors over which people have no control, it gives little positive weight to choice and responsibility. Under the difference principle, the social structure is designed to maximize the position of the least advantaged group (characterized by Rawls, 1972⁽⁸⁾: 97, as the bottom socio-economic quartile), no matter what choices individual members of that group have made. If the general public has a stronger view of the moral weight that should be given to responsibility, as Samuel Scheffler (1992)⁽⁹⁾ has argued they do, then the degree of support the public believes is owed to the disadvantaged will depend on whether the disadvantage is due to a disability, a lack of motivation, or an individual lifestyle choice. Such considerations have influenced resource egalitarians and desert theorists (...). >Inequalities/Dworkin, >Inequalities/Resource-based view (RBV), >Distributive justice/ Resource-based view (RBV), cf. >Distributive Justice/Libertarianism. 1. Miller, David (1999) Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Swift, A., G. Marshall, C. Burgoyne and D. Routh, (1995) 'Distributive justice: does it matter what the people think?' In James R. Kluegel, David S. Mason and Bernard Wegener, eds, Social Justice and Political Change. New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 15—47. 3. Elster, Jon (1995) 'The empirical study of justice'. In David Miller and Michael Walzer, eds, Pluralism, Justice, and Equality. New York: Oxford University Press, 81-98. 4. Hochschild, Jennifer L. (1981) What; Fair: American Beliefs about Distributive Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Kluegel, James R. and Eliot R. Smith (1986) Beliefs about Inequality. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter. 6. Frohlich, N. and J. Oppenheimer (1992) Choosing Justice: An Experimental Appoach to Ethical Theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 7. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 8. Rawls, John (1972) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9. Schemer, Samuel (1992) 'Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and politics'. Lamont, Julian, „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Reflective Equilibrium	Schurz	I 26 Reflexive equilibrium/reflexive reasoning equilibrium/Schurz: (Rawls 1979(1), 38,68 71), Goodman 1955/75(2), 85 89): Similar to rational reconstruction: reflexive equilibrium however purely coherence-theoretic: mutual adjustment of methodological rules and intuitions. >Rational Reconstruction. 1.Goodman, N. (1955). Fact, Fiction and Forecast. London, England: University of London. 2. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Belknap Press.	Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Religious Liberty	Rawls	I 211 Religious freedom/Rawls: The theory of justice as fairness provides strong arguments for equal freedom of consciousness for the members of a society to be established and also for the primacy of general freedom, freedom of thought and... --- I 212 ... freedom of religion. However, the latter may be regulated by the state's interest in public order and security. The state must not favour religion and must not punish the lack of a religious attitude. Infidelity or disbelief from belief is not investigated, and much less punished. In this respect, the state upholds moral and religious freedom. The limits of freedom of consciousness are drawn by the Community's interest in order and security. However, this does not mean that such a public interest is more important than moral and religious interests. The conception of a fair constitution simply does not allow the practice of religion to be restricted, nor does it allow science and art. --- I 213 Limits are derived solely from the principle of the public interest. Any task of generally accepted reasoning would imply a primacy of certain attitudes over other attitudes. Such a principle would never be adopted in the initial situation.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Rights	Utilitarianism	Gaus I 106 Rights/Utilitarianism/Gaus: Utilitarians, or more broadly, consequentialists, have spent a good deal of effort investigating in what ways personal rights might enter into a utilitarian system. Sen (1990)⁽¹⁾ offers a version of consequentialism that takes rights satisfaction as part of the utility of a state of affairs (cf. Scanlon, 1977⁽²⁾; Nozick, 1974⁽³⁾: 166). Mill’s complicated utilitarianism – which seems to integrate rules into the concept of a morality – has often been used as a model for utilitarian rights (Lyons, 1978⁽⁴⁾; Frey, 1984⁽⁵⁾) (...). Russell Hardin (1988⁽⁶⁾; 1993) has advocated an ‘institutional utilitarianism’ that takes account of knowledge problems in designing utilitarian institutions, which he offers as an alternative to both act and rule utilitarianism. According to Hardin, ‘[w]e need an institutional structure of rights or protections because not everyone is utilitarian or otherwise moral and because there are severe limits to our knowledge of others, whose interests are therefore likely to be best fulfilled in many ways if they have substantial control over the fulfillment.’ Gaus I 107 That, he adds, ‘is how traditional rights should be understood’ (1988⁽⁶⁾: 78). >Rights/Consequentialism. 1. Sen, Amartya K. (1990) ‘Rights consequentialism’. In Jonathan Glover, ed., Utilitarianism and its Critics. London: Macmillan, 111–18. 2. Scanlon, Thomas (1977) ‘Rights, goals and fairness’. Erkenntnis, 11 (May): 81–95. 3. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic. 4. Lyons, David (1978) ‘Mill’s theory of justice’. In A. I. Goldman and J. Kim, eds, Values and Morals. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1–20. 5. Frey, R. G. (1984) ‘Act-utilitarianism, consequentialism and moral rights’. In R. G. Frey, ed., Utility and Rights. Oxford: Blackwell, 61–95. 6. Hardin, Russell (1988) Morality within the Limits of Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. Brocker I 601 Rights/Utilitarianism: for utilitarianism, maximising the overall well-being is the central objective. Rights, for example in the form of ownership guarantees, can also benefit the overall welfare. It can never be excluded that sacrificing fundamental individual interests of individuals or groups could increase the overall benefit. DworkinVsUtilitarianism: Rights always protect the individual with reference to fundamental and central interests.⁽¹⁾ >Utilitarianism/Dworkin, >Utilitarianism. 1.cf. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Risks	Rawls	I 168 Risks/Rawls: In the initial situation of a society to be established, when members find themselves behind a veil of ignorance about their future position, it is first of all that everyone has information about their own abilities. It is therefore unlikely that everyone will have the same chances of finding out who they are later on. In any case, a newcomer has knowledge of his or her abilities and bases his or her risk assessments on this knowledge. But at the last stage of the initial situation, however, there is complete ignorance of contingent facts, the construction of individual expectations is based solely on the principle of inadequate reason (principle of insufficient reason). This principle is used to assess probabilities in the absence of any information. Def principle of insufficient reason: under the condition of lack of any information, all possible results are equally likely. I 169 Initial situation/Rawls: then we can link different types of information within a strictly probabilistic framework and draw conclusions about probabilities without further knowledge⁽¹⁾. Vs Principle of insufficient reason: see J. M. Keynes⁽²⁾. Solution/Carnap: an alternative system of inductive logic with other theoretical means than those of the classical principle⁽³⁾. Principle of insufficient reason/Rawls: excludes that initial opportunities are ignored. Solution/Rawls: in the initial situation we have the possibility to accept the two principles of justice according to the theory of justice as fairness, then the imponderables can be circumvented: Cf. I 61 Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. This guarantees fundamental freedoms. 1. See W. Feller, Probability and Profit, pp. 27f. 2. See J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, London, 1921, ch. IV. 3. R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, 2nd. ed. Chicago, 1962.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Sidgwick	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 414 Sidgwick/Political philosophy/Weinstein: Sidgwick's significance for contemporary political theory has been enormously undervalued. John Rawls's Theory of Justice is, to a considerable extent, a critical response to Sidgwick. When Rawls says we 'often seem forced to choose between utilitarianism and intuitionism', the utilitarianism he has in mind is Sidgwick's (1981⁽¹⁾: viii). >H. Sidgwick. Contemporary political theorists must take Sidgwick seriously if they take Rawls seriously (...). BarryVsRawls: If Barry is right in insisting that we live in a 'post-Rawlsian' world, then navigating this world requires that we take better account of Sidgwick. Cf. >J. Rawls. Utilitarianism/Sidgwick: Sidgwick's 'classical' utilitarianism was also a form of liberal utilitarianism in so far as Sidgwick held, like Mill, that utility was best promoted indirectly via intermediary moral principles. Hence, Rawls's attack on 'classical' utilitarianism is warfare against a straw man. For Sidgwick, the 'middle axioms' of common sense morality generally constituted appropriate happiness-maximizing guides and therefore needed modest critical refinement. Sidgwick nevertheless held, like Mill, that 'as this actual moral order is admittedly imperfect, it will be the Utilitarian's duty to aid in improving it' (1981⁽¹⁾: 476). Common sense: More recently, Rawls has embraced Sidgwick's healthy reverence for common sense. Following Sidgwick, Rawls holds that our moral intuitions play a critical role in justifying and systematizing our political principles. Whereas Sidgwick justifies and systematizes common sense by appealing to utility, Rawls deploys the veil of ignorance as a justificatory and systematizing filtering device (...). >Veil of ignorance. Sidgwick: For Sidgwick as well as Rawls, common sense tames radical reform. The utilitarian reformer ‚will naturally contemplate (established morality) with reverence and wonder, as a marvelous product of nature, the result of long centuries of growth . he will handle it with respectful delicacy as a mechanism, constructed of the fluid element of opinions and dispositions, by the indispensable aid of which the actual quantum of human happiness is continually being produced.‘ (1981⁽¹⁾: 475). In sum, for Sidgwick, utility was best maximized indirectly via healthy but not uncritical deference to the 'middle axioms' of common sense morality. >Utilitarianism/Sidgwick. 1. Sidgwick, Henry (1981 [1907]) The Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Slavery	Rawls	I 167 Slavery/average benefits/Rawls: against the principle of average benefit one could argue that it requires the same risk acceptance from all. Since in the beginning there was never a situation in which all parties involved could agree, the principle should be rejected. Extreme example: A slave keeper could argue that in the circumstances of his society, the institution of slavery is necessary to produce the greatest average happiness. Furthermore, he would argue that he himself, in the initial situation of a society to be established (in which all parties involved stand behind a veil of ignorance with regard to their later position in society), would have voted for slavery with the risk of ending up as a slave themselves. Rawls: At first glance, this could be dismissed as absurd, one could think that it makes no difference what he chooses; as long as individuals have agreed to a concept of justice with real risks, no one is bound to such requirements. Contract theory/Rawls: if one takes the view of contracts as a basis, however, the argument of the slave keeper is correct: it would be a mistake if the slaves wanted to answer that the argument was superfluous, since there is no actual choice and no equal distribution of opportunities. The treaty doctrine is purely hypothetical: if a version of justice were chosen in the initial situation, its principles would be those that were applied. It is not an argument that such an understanding was not intended or would ever be. We cannot have both: a hypothetical interpretation without concrete information about the result... I 168 ...and later by reassessing the risk, rejecting principles we no longer want to have. G. HarmanVsRawls/Rawls: Gilbert Harman pointed out to me that I had made this mistake myself⁽¹⁾. Solution/Rawls: The theory of justice as fairness refutes the slave owner argument already in the initial situation. >Principles/Rawls). Here, according to the theory of justice as fairness, we have the possibility to accept the two principles of justice, then the imponderables can be circumvented: I 61 Principles/justice/Rawls: provisional wording: 1. every person must have the same right to the widest possible fundamental freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the same freedom for others. 2. social and economic inequalities shall be arranged in such a way that they (a) are reasonably expectable for everyone's benefit; and (b) are linked to positions and administrative procedures that can be held by anyone. This guarantees fundamental freedoms. 1. See G. Harman "Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice", Nomos VI: Justice, ed. C. J. Friedrich and J. W. Chapman, New York, 1963.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Solidarity	Welfare Economics	Gaus I 217 Solidarity/justice/Welfare economics/Moon: An adequate account of the welfare state, one that can justify its redistributive aims, must ultimately be based upon a theory of justice, and the most promising theories are those which Phillipe Van Parijs calls 'solidaristic conceptions of justice' (1995⁽¹⁾: 28), such as those offered by Rawls, Dworkin, Amartya Sen, and Van Parijs himself. Solidaristic conceptions of justice are based upon a commitment to 'equal concern' for the interests of all, and to 'equal respect, that is, the view that what counts as a just society should not be determined on the basis of some particular substantive conception of the good life' (1995⁽¹⁾: 28). Liberalism: The 'liberal' commitment to equal respect in solidaristic theories of justice underlies their support for the standard 'negative' and democratic rights characteristic of the welfare state, and the commitment to equal concern underlies their accounts of social justice and so the redistributive elements of the welfare state. >Van Parijs. Institutions: No theory, by itself, directly supports the institutional welfare state. Van Parijs, for example, rejects it in favour of a system providing the highest possible basic income for all, and Rawls explicitly rejects the welfare state on the grounds that it tolerates the highly unequal distribution of wealth produced by a capitalist society, and so undermines democracy by concentrating too much economic and political power in a wealthy elite. Solidaristic approaches: Still, solidaristic theories can supply the deficiencies, noted above, in justifications of the welfare state that appeal to membership and solidarity, and to the baseline problem in efficiency-based arguments. Membership: with regard to the appeal to membership, solidaristic theories of justice provide grounds for the value of social inclusion on a principle of equality. And they address the serious lacunae in efficiency-based arguments, specifically the fact that they take a market generated outcome as their starting point, and ask whether that outcome could be improved through some government policy. Distributive equality: But because there is nothing privileged about market generated outcomes, market institutions and the 'initial' distribution of resources must themselves be morally justified, and solidaristic theories of justice address that problem. Welfare state: while solidaristic arguments do not necessarily justify the welfare state as the ideal regime, they do Gaus I 218 provide grounds for central welfare state policies. Rawls: Rawls's ideal regimes, a property-owning democracy or market socialism, would have to be welfare states in the sense I have used the term here: that is, they would have to have social policies that would collectively provide for certain needs, justified in terms of efficiency and their redistributive conse- quences. Van Parijs: (...) Van Parijs allows significant scope for collective provision including the area of medical care.* * See Rawls (2001⁽²⁾: 135—40) and the preface to the revised edition of his Theory of Justice (1999)(3) for his discussion of politico-economic regimes; and see Van Parijs (1995⁽¹⁾: 41-5). 1. Van Parijs, Philippe (1995) Real Freedom for All. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Rawls, John (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 3. Rawls, John (1999) A Theory of Justice, rev. edn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Stasis	Aristotle	Gaus I 313 Stasis/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: since the perception of injustice often leads to stasis, or faction, the opposition between homonoia and stasis is closely tied to that between justice and injustice. Aristotle discusses stasis in Politics V and homonoia, or like-mindedness, in Eudemian Ethics V 11.7 and Nicomachean Ethics IX.6. >Justice/Aristotle. Polis: Poleis are of one mind, Aristotle says, 'when their citizens agree about what is advantageous, choose the same things, and do that which is decided upon in common', whereas when each of two rivals wishes himself to rule, they engage in stasis (EN IX.6.1167a26-34). The rulers under correct constitutions cultivate homonoia by aiming at the common advantage, whereas those under deviant constitutions generate stasis by aiming solely at their own advantage (Pol. II.6.1279a 17-20). Questions: Scholars disagree over whether Aristotle Gaus I 314 understands the common advantage as the overall advantage (holism) or the mutual advantage (individualism). If the latter, then Aristotle's theory of justice supports rights, or just claims, in an interesting sense. >Inequalities/Aristotle, >Equality/Aristotle. Literature: (For varying views see Miller, 1995⁽¹⁾ and 1996⁽²⁾; Cooper, 1996⁽³⁾; Kraut, 1996⁽⁴⁾; Schofield, 1996⁽⁵⁾. For Aristotle's account of stasis see Yack, 1993⁽⁶⁾, and the commentary on Politics V in Keyt, 1999⁽⁷⁾.) EE: Aristotle Eudemian Ethics EN: Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics Pol: Aristotle Politics 1. Miller, Fred D. (1995) Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Claredon. 2. Miller, Fred D. (1996) 'Aristotle and the origin of natural rights'. Review of Metaphysics, 49: 873—907. 3. Cooper, John M. (1996) 'Justice and rights in Aristotle's Politics'. Review ofMetaphysics, 49: 859-72. 4. Kraut, Richard (1996) 'Are there natural rights in Aristotle?' Review of Metaphysics, 49: 755—74. 5. Schofield, Malcolm (1996) 'Sharing in the constitution'. Review of Metaphysics, 49: 83—58. 6. Yack, Bernard (1993) The Pmblems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 7. Keyt, David (1999) Aristotle Politics Books V and VI. Oxford: Clarendon. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Theories	Lamont	Gaus I 230 Theories/principles/justification/Lamont: (...) theories [on distributive justice] have been characterized mainly according to the content of their approach to the moral demands of welfare (or luck) and responsibility. It is important to note here some of the complications of these characterizations and Gaus I 231 also other ways of conceptualizing the distributive justice literature. Most theorists are accurately described by a number of non-equivalent labels. The classifications used here are widespread in the contemporary literature, but there are nevertheless subtle differences in the ways different authors use these labels. Content/principle/justification: one important distinction is between the content of a distributive principle, and its justification. Content: 'Content' refers to the distribution ideally recommended by a principle, whereas 'justification' refers to the reasons given in support of the principle. Theorists can be distinguished and labelled according to the content of their theory or according to the justification they give. Problems: 1) (...) the common labels used here refer sometimes to the content and other times to the justifications for various positions. 2) (...) most groups of theories have justifications from a number of different sources and single writers even will sometimes use more than one source of justification for their theory. Most combinations of content and justification, in fact, have been tried. For instance, different libertarians use natural rights, desert, utilitarianism or contractarianism in the justification of their theories; different desert theorists use natural rights, contractarianism and even utilitarianism (Mill 1877⁽¹⁾; Sidgwick, 1890⁽²⁾). Partly this comes about because there are different versions of justifications which nevertheless, due to some similarity, share the same broad label. Contract theory: For instance, contractarianism features in the justifications of many theories, and covers both Hobbesian and Kantian contractarians, after Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant (Hampton, 1991⁽³⁾). A) Hobbesian contractarians, such as David Gauthier, attempt to justify morality in terms of the self-interested reasons individuals have for agreeing to certain terms of social co-operation. B) Kantian contractarians, such as John Rawls, appeal to moral reasons to justify the terms of social cooperation that would be worthy of consent, usually arguing for distributions on the egalitarian end of the spectrum. A Hobbesian contractarian, as you might suspect, is more likely to argue for libertarian oriented systems (Buchanan, 1982⁽⁴⁾; Gauthier, 1987⁽⁵⁾; Levin, 1982⁽⁶⁾). However, there are also followers of Hobbes who insist his contractarianism is better read to justify some important aspects of the welfare state, rather than a merely minimalist government (Kavka, 1986⁽⁷⁾; Morris, 1998⁽⁸⁾: ch. 9; Vallentyne, 1991⁽⁹⁾). So theorists who share the 'contractarian' label may also be characterized by a libertarian rejection of redistribution or an egalitarian insistence on widespread distribution (...). Equality/egalitarianism: the most common alternatives to characterizing distributive justice theories along the dimensions of welfare and responsibility have been to characterize them either along the related dimension of equality, or according to the degree of egalitarianism the theories prescribe. So each of the theories already surveyed here could alternatively be categorized according to its treatment, or approach, to equality (Joseph and Sumption, 1979⁽¹⁰⁾; Rakowski, 1991)⁽¹¹⁾. >Equality/Sen. Sen: in his influential lecture 'Equality of what?' (1980)⁽¹²⁾, Amartya Sen addresses the question of what metric egalitarians should use to determine the degree to which a society realizes the ideal of equality. A range of alternative variables for what should be equalized have since been introduced (Daniels, 1990⁽¹³⁾) and refined, including the resource egalitarians discussed above (Dworkin, 2000)⁽¹⁴⁾, equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989⁽¹⁵⁾; 1990⁽¹⁶⁾; 1991⁽¹⁷⁾), equal access to advantage (Cohen, 1989)⁽¹⁸⁾, and equal political status (Anderson, 1999)⁽¹⁹⁾. Gaus I 232 Concepts/content/theories: Another complication (...) comes from differences in how the very topic of distributive justice itself is conceived, with some theorists emphasizing process rather than content or justification. Principles: [many theories] address the question of distributive justice by recommending principles intended as normative ideals for institutions, which themselves will significantly determine the distribution of resources. These theories reflect progress and a growing consensus throughout most of the twentieth century about what is not acceptable. For example, all of the theories on offer reject the inequalities characteristic in feudal, aristocratic, and slave societies, as well as the inequalities inherent in systems that restrict access to goods, services, jobs or positions on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or religion. Deciding processes: On the other hand, some theorists believe that the ongoing existence of reasonable disagreement reflects importantly on the very nature of distributive justice. They argue that, within the area of reasonable disagreement about what are the best distributive ideals, the additional questions to examine are whether the processes for deciding distributive questions are just. So, some argue that certain distributive justice issues should be dealt with at the constitutional level, variously described, while other issues are properly decided at the legislative level. Just processes; a subgroup of these theorists also take the view that some decisions about distributive justice issues can be partly or fully justified because they are the result of a just process (Christiano, 1996⁽²⁰⁾; Gaus, 1996⁽²¹⁾). Rational argument alone may be able to exclude some systems as unjust, but others will be justified not simply on the grounds of their content, but also by the process by which they were reached. >Liberalism/Lamont. 1. Mill, John S. (1877) Utilitarianism, 6th edn. London: Longmans, Green. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1890) The Methods of Ethics, 4th edn. London: Macmillan. 3. Hampton, Jean (1991) 'Two faces of contractarian thought'. In Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier 's Morals by Agreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 31—55. 4. Buchanan, Allen (1982) 'A critical introduction to Rawls' theory of justice'. In H. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth H. Smith, eds, John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 5. Gauthier, David Peter (1987) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Levin, Michael (1982) 'A Hobbesian minimal state'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 1 (4): 338-53. 7. Kavka, Gregory S. (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Morris, Christopher (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Vallentyne, Peter (1991) Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Joseph, Keith and Jonathan Sumption (1979) Equality. London: Murray. 11. Rakowskl, Eric (1991) Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 12. Sen, Amartya (1980) 'Equality of what?' In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-220. 13. Daniels, Norman (1990) 'Equality of what: welfare, resources, or capabilities?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (Fall): 273-96. 14. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 15. Arneson, Richard (1989) 'Equality and equal opportunity for welfare, Philosophical Studies, 56: 77-93. 16. Arneson, Richard (1990) 'Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism and equal opportunity for welfare', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 159-94. 17. Arneson, Richard (1991) 'Lockean self-ownership: towards a demolition', Political Studies, 39 (l): 36-54. 18. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the currency of egalitarian justice'. Ethics, 99 906_44. 19. Anderson, Elizabeth (1999) 'What is the point of equality?' Ethics, 109 (2): 287-337. 20. Christiano, Thomas (1996) The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview. 21. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Universalism	Rawls	Gaus I 93 Universalism/Rawls/Waldron: : „(...) what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (Rawls 1980⁽¹⁾: 518–19). Waldron: that amounted to a withdrawal from moral universalism in one direction: Rawlsian justice was not a theory for all societies, but a theory for societies like the United States. Gaus I 94 Ethical and religious heterogeneity were no longer to be regarded as a feature that societies governed by justice might or might not have, or might have at one period but not at another. It was to be seen instead as a permanent feature of the societies, one that could not be expected soon to pass away. >Society/Walzer. RawlsVsRawls: By the beginning of the 1990s Rawls had become convinced that his approach in A Theory of Justice⁽²⁾ was disqualified generally on this ground. >Individualism/Rawls. (1) Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72. (2) Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Utilitarianism	Gaus	Gaus I 105 Utilitarianism/happiness/utility/liberalism/Gaus: It does seem, (...) that if one accepts that (1) I value my own happiness, (2) because happiness is good, and (3) indeed is the only good and (4) more good is better than less good, then (5) assuming that we can interpersonally compare the happiness of different people, (6) one ought to seek the greatest happiness. Each step of this argument is controversial (and remains so regardless of whether ‘pleasure’ or ‘preference satisfaction’ is substituted for ‚happiness‘ (...). RawlsVsUtilitarinamis: Rawls (1971)⁽¹⁾, of course, argued that it was, at best, uncertain whether a principle that aims at maximizing the aggregate amount of utility (happiness, pleasure, etc.) would yield an equal distribution of liberty. If greater happiness for many could be achieved by granting a few a lesser liberty, then the principle of utility would apparently justify illiberal policies. >Utilitarian liberalism/Gaus, >Liberalism/Gaus, >Utilitarianism/Rawls. Most of the great classical political economists were utilitarians of some sort (Gaus, 1983b)⁽²⁾, as probably are most economists today. The theory of the market is, in effect, a sophisticated argument showing that, under certain conditions, the best way to maximize aggregate utility is for each person to act to promote her own welfare. >Markets/J.R. McCulloch, cf. >Preference Utilitarianism. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2.Gaus, Gerald F. (1983b) ‘Public and private interests in liberal political economy, old and new’. In S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds, Public and Private in Social Life. New York: St Martins, 183–222. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Utilitarianism	Rawls	I 20 Utilitarianism/Sidgwick/Rawls: I take here the strictly classical doctrine of utilitarianism as best illustrated by Henry Sidgwick⁽¹⁾ to use this utilitarianism as a counterpoint to my contract theory. RawlsVsUtilitarianism. > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?author=Sidgwick&first_name=Henry">H. Sidgwick. I 24 Utilitarianism/Rawls: Utilitarianism assumes that the principle of inviolability, which is based on justice for us,... I 25 ... is only a Common Sense command, and has only subordinate importance as a secondary rule, as has the concept of natural law, as far as it benefits the majority of society. >Common sense. Principles of Social Election and Justice/Rawls: we assume the principles of social election and justice in our contract theory as an object of an initial agreement, while utilitarianism simply expands it to the idealization of society as an ideal total person. I 26 RawlsVsUtilitarianism: that is to take the plurality and particularity of individuals not seriously. RawlsVsUtilitarianism: our contract theory is also not teleological, as utilitarianism is. However, we also consider - like any serious ethical theory - the consequences. I 27 But the theory of justice as fairness never considers the maximization of utility. RawlsVsUtilitarianism: Justice as fairness accepts from the outset the principle of equal freedom, without knowledge of its purposes, while utilitarianism wants to take into account whether the discrimination of individuals may increase the overall benefit. Justice as fairness: does not accept inclinations as given in order to then fulfil them, but these are limited from the beginning by the principles of justice. >Justice/Rawls, >Fairness/Rawls. I 28 That the right takes precedence over the good is a central principle. It should ensure that institutions remain stable. >Good/Rawls. Utilitarianism/Rawls: is strongly based on natural properties and coincidences of human life, while the theory of justice as fairness is based on the first principles of ethical theory. I 184 Utilitarianism/Rawls: his most important principle is the average principle. However, this is rejected by Sidgwick⁽²⁾. I 187 Utilitarianism/Individuals/Rawls: the classical Utilitarianism ignores in a certain sense the distinction of individual persons. The principle of rational choice of a human being is at the same time the principle of rational choice for everyone. N.B.: this makes this ideal person identical to the ideal sympathetic observer! >Ideal observer, >Observation. I 188 Classical utilitarianism then culminates in the - impersonal - merging of all desires into a single system of desires⁽³⁾⁽⁴⁾. 1. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, London, 1907. 2. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, London, 1907, pp. 415f. 3. See C. I. Lewis, The Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, 1946. 4. J. C. SmartVsLewis, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, p. 26.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Veil of Ignorance	D’Agostino	Gaus I 245 Veil of ignorance/Rawls/D’Agostino: what the veil of ignorance prevents the use of is, precisely, information that it would be morally improper to use as a basis for the assessment of alternative basic structures. It prevents the use of information that people would, characteristically, use in a self-interested way. As Rawls says, '[o]ne excludes knowledge of those contingencies which set men at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices' (1973⁽¹⁾ 19). Blocking the use of such information forces individuals to think impartially, i.e. ethically, about the terms of their association with one another. On the other hand, the information about themselves that is available to individuals deliberating about the basic structure does, according to Rawls (1993⁽²⁾: ch. Il, s. 6), represent them as (potential) citizens of a specifically liberal state, especially in acknowledging their identities as free and equal moral agents. Normalization/D’Agostino: There is, then, nothing arbitrary, according to this reasoning, about the reductions of diversity effected by deployment of the veil of ignorance. Such normalizing devices are, then, one liberal response to the conundrum which is posed by the fact of diversity and by the endorsement of this fact by various pluralist doctrines and arguments. ((s) For problems in relation to diversity see >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino.) 1. Rawls, John (1973) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004

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