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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entropy | Kanitscheider | I 256/257 Entropy/Universe/Kanitscheider: the photons of the background radiation supply the lion's share to the entropy of the universe. All photons produced later by stars during nuclear fusion are vanishing in comparison. Now the number of photons forms a measure for the entropy of the universe. And this is because they are the least ordered state of the thermal energy of a system, because here the number of possible states is the largest, while the nucleons represent a correspondingly larger type of order, because of fewer possible combinations. This is not affected by the pure expansion itself! (The expansion is adiabatic and therefore isentropic (sic)). Because of the small entropy production of the stars the entropy of the universe remains nearly constant. The high specific entropy of the universe (the number of photons per baryon) s = N(γ)/N(b) +108 already existed at the time of plasma recombination or at the transition from the radiation-dominated to the matter-dominated era. This suggests weighty dissipative smoothing processes in the early time. But even this leads to a much too high value, if one assumes an initial chaotic state. The actual value demands that the universe 10 35 sec after the big bang was already homogeneous. I 257/58 If one lets a space-like hypersurface intersect by our past light cone and considers the individual events on this hypersurface, then it can be asserted on the basis of the above connections that all events presumably possess a singularity in their past, because the high degree of homogeneity at early times conditions the convergence of the time-like geodesics directed from these event points. >Universe/Kanitscheider, >Space-Time/Kanitscheider. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Minkowski Space | Kanitscheider | I 472 Minkowski space/Kanitscheider: the flat space-time of special relativity (SR). Four-dimensional Euclidean space spanned with the imaginary time coordinate ict = x4.(Notation: t time, c speed of light). Here the laws of the SR can be represented particularly simply. A point (event) is a world point, a place vector a world vector, the path of a particle a world line. Lorentz transformation means here a simple rotation of the coordinate system. If one chooses as time coordinate the real quantity x0 = ct = ix4 , then the space has a pseudo-Euclidean metric. The square of the length of any world vector is then given by R2 (squares of the coordinates). For R2 > 0 the world vector is space-like, for R2< 0 time-like. Light cone: the null cone or causality cone defined by R² = 0: The area within the light cone (R² < 0) includes all events which are or can be causally related to events in the vertex. Def Haussdorff space/Kanitscheider: a topological space is Haussdorffian if the Def separation axiom is satisfied: if x and y are two distinct points from T, then there are environments U(x) and U(y) such that there is no intersection of the two environments. >Relativity theory, >Space curvature, >Weyl principle. I 183 Spacetime/Kanitscheider: The Minkowski space (asymptotically flat in great distance is isotropic only from our location! I.e. from other points of view, the universe looks different. This is unsatisfactory. Our requirement is that the whole universe is isotropic (looking the same from all sides) and homogeneous (same approximate density everywhere). I.e. that if one puts a cut S(t) = const through the space-time, then one receives three-dimensional spaces (not Minkowski), which possess everywhere constant curvature and material condition. Friedman succeeded in 1922 to present a solution model. >Field equations/Kanitscheider. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Space | Esfeld | I 231 ~ Space-Time: space and time are not equivalent: there is a difference between >Space-like, >Time-like, >Space, >Time, >Spacetime, cf. >Space curvature, >Four-dimensionalism, >Relativity theory. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Space | Russell | Kursbuch 8 Mathematik, Frankfurt/M. März 1967 12 Weierstraß/Russell: banished the infinitesimal variable from mathematics - VsZenon: error: to think that the world must always be the same because there is no state of change. - Without infinitesimal variables: time: there is no more "next moment". - No immediate result of two moments - in between there are ever more moments. - Space: ditto: is always further divisible. >Time. B. Russell, ABC of Relativity Theory Frankfurt 1989 II 46 Def "space-like"/Russell: two events are space-like if it is impossible for a body to move fast enough to be present at both events - but it can be "halfway" and perceive both as happening at the same time. Def "time-like"/Russell: two events are time-like if it is possible for a physical body to be present at both events. Borderline case: E.g. two events as part of a light beam or - E.g. an event. perception of the other event: then distance 0. Def Distance/Russell: is a physical fact which is part of the events and does not depend on the circumstances of observer. Neglecting gravitation, one can apply the Special Theory of Relativity. Then the distance between two events can be calculated if one knows the spatial and temporal distance, measured by an arbitrary observer. >Theory of Relativity. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Terminology | Russell | ad Putnam II 133 ~ Russell: Terminology: a statement corresponds to true facts. Basic constituents of each statement are logically proper names - singular term: all expressions are singular terms. Later self-criticism: not all statements can be reduced to sense data. I XXXII(Annotation) Def Extensionality principle: no two different properties can belong to exactly the same thing ((s) but only intensional). E.g., "tall man"/"fat man" may be the same, they are just different intensions (therefore no properties)). I XVI Def Intensionality principle: to different definitions belong different terms. Def vicious circle principle/Russell: no totality can contain members that can be defined only in terms of this totality, or members which comprise this totality or presuppose it. Hintikka I 180 Def apparent variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable. >Bound variable. II 46 Def "space-like"/Russell: two events are space-like if it is impossible for a body to move fast enough to be present at both events - but it can be "halfway" and perceive both as happening at the same time. Def "time-like"/Russell: two events are time-like if it is possible for a physical body to be present at both events. Borderline case: E.g. two events as part of a light beam or - E.g. an event. perception of the other event: then distance 0. Def Distance/Russell: is a physical fact which is part of the events and does not depend on the circumstances of observer. II 20 Paradox of Tristram Shandy/Russell: The retention of the axiom (that there are infinitely many time points beween two time points) leads to other paradoxes of which I call one: the paradox of Tristram Shandy. It is the reversal of the Zenonian paradox and says that the turtle can get everywhere if you give it only enough time. Tristram Shandy needed two years to list the course of the first two days of his life and complained that the material accumulated faster than he could capture it. Russell: I assert now that if he had lived his life that way further on, he would not have missed any part of his biography. For the hundredth part is written in the thousandth year, and so on. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Time Travel | Kanitscheider | I 293 "Causality violation"/Kanitscheider: Expression that a thought experiment requires a time reversal, a journey faster than light, or a reversal of effect and cause. Also known as the "grandfather paradox" in the context of time travel. >Causality. Time/Gödel/Kanitscheider: Gödel found a solution to the field equation that enables time travel. Gödel doubts an objective passage of time and interprets the temporality of the world as an anthropomorphic, subjective element unimportant for physical reality. >Field equations. Time/Kanitscheider: The relativity of simultaneity has prompted many authors to consider using a different reference system to destroy the temporal coincidence of two events, as a result of which time has lost its status of reflecting the objective flow of things. But that's only true if you equate "relative" with "subjective". In the case of a neutral, abstract formulation of the theory, however, this is not required at all. It also makes no sense to connect the conceptual and the concrete level in this way. A coordinate system can represent a reference system, a physical object, but does not have to. >Coordinate system. I 296 Time travel/Special Theory of Relativity/SR/Kanitscheider: The Special Theory of Relativity does not hold any possibility for time travel, although it includes the light cone, i.e. a traveler would not only have a single fiber within this cone, but a scope with which he could accelerate his time drift, but with it it can only affect the rate of elapsed time. For example, he can keep the quantum of elapsed time small by placing his movement close to the zero cone. He cannot change the chronology. >Events. Time travel/Kanitscheider: Vs time machine/VsWells: H.G.Wells makes the mistake of letting the traveler ascend and descend the earth's world line on the same earthly point in space. Precisely this leads to the conceptual impossibility of moving forwards and backwards in time. Time travel/General Relativity/Kanitscheider: that changes when matter comes into play. I 298 Violation of causality/Kanitscheider: Assuming a coordinate system with rotational symmetry around the origin, then the local light cone at r = 0 encloses the t coordinate in its future direction upwards as usual. However, if you move away from the origin, the local light cones begin to incline towards the plane of rotation. >Symmetries. When the cone of light touches the plane of rotation with its mantle, the earlier angular coordinate becomes light-like, and at an even greater distance time-like. This role reversal of the coordinates, so that the opening of the light cone is first in a space-like, but now in a time-like coordinate, is the hallmark of the violation of causality. Eg if p is the temporal predecessor of q on an open curve with infinite affine length, then there is also a time-like curve on which q is the predecessor of p. The consequences are absurd: e.g. a body with a circular time-like world line encounters a given galaxy only once when the event is observed from the galaxy, but for the inhabitant of the body the encounter recurs periodically. E.g. In a spiraling world line, everyone thinks the other is younger at every encounter, although both agree that time has passed. Time travel/Kanitscheider: of course the grandfather paradox remains, but the Gödel world cannot be ruled out. Our current universe almost certainly doesn't allow time travel due to the lack of rotation. One would have to rely on a naked singularity or manipulation of local matter. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Weyl Principle | Kanitscheider | I 161 Def Weyl Principle: The galaxies lie on a bundle of geodesics that have no point in common except for a single point in the past from which they diverge. The fact that the galaxies rest in the instantaneous flat triple space is expressed by the fact that the world lines intersect it orthogonally. The Weyl principle represents a forerunner of the co-mobile coordinates used for the homogeneous and isotropic FWR worlds. Def geodesic: The line in space on which freely falling bodies move without the influence of forces, timelike. >Time-like. Def zero line: orthogonal to the geodesics: line on which the light moves, no time. As a result, space-like. >Space-like. Def world lines: geodesics and zero lines. >World lines. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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