Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Berkeley Kant Adorno XIII 57
Berkeley/KantVsBerkeley/Adorno: Kant (...) calls Berkeley, whom we would call a spiritualist, an idealist and speaks of dreamy idealism, because it is an idealism that simply contests the reality of the external world, while its own transcendental idealism as an attempt for the rescue of objectivity, precisely wants to be empirical realism.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Correspondence Theory Putnam VII 440
PutnamVsCorrespondence theory/correspondence theory/Putnam: if objects are theory-dependent, it is useless if one wants to define or explain truth in terms of "correspondence" - Then there is no correspondence between language and language-independent pieces of the world - solution/Putnam: like Kant’s transcendental idealism:> idealized rational acceptability.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

I, Ego, Self Husserl Gadamer I 252
I, Ego, Self/Husserl/Gadamer: It is clear that the lifeworld is always at the same time a community world and contains the coexistence of others. It is a personal world, and such a personal world is always assumed to be valid in a natural attitude. >Lifeworld/Husserl. But how is this validity to be justified from a performance of subjectivity?
Constitution/Phenomenology: For the phenomenological analysis of constitution [this, the justification of validity], represents the most difficult task, the paradoxes of which Husserl has tirelessly reflected upon. How can something arise in the "pure I" that has no objective validity, but wants to be itself? >Constitution/Husserl.
The reflective I knows itself as living in purposefulness, for which the living world is the ground. Thus the task of a constitution of the lifeworld (like that of intersubjectivity) is a paradoxical one. But Husserl considers all this to be apparent paradoxes.
Idealism/HusserlVsIdealism: [Husserl] himself assures that as a result of his thinking he has thoroughly overcome the fear of generational idealism. His theory of phenomenological reduction rather wants to bring the true meaning of this idealism to the first implementation. Transcendental subjectivity is the "primal ego" and not "one ego". For it, the ground of the given world is suspended. It is the irrelative par excellence, to which all relativity, including that of the researching ego, is related.
Gadamer I 253
Idealism/Husserl/Gadamer: Meanwhile, there is already a moment in Husserl's work that threatens to constantly break this framework. His position is in fact even more than a radicalization of transcendental idealism, and the function that the term gains with him is characteristic of this. >Life/Husserl.


Husserl I 102
I, Ego, Self/principle of unity/Husserl: keeps identical through different acts of consciousness. I-Pole/Husserl: to be attentive, to be focused on, to be busy with, to take a stand. Here the ego center functions.
Stream of consciousness: is a temporal stream - the ego is identical. See also Person/Husserl.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Idealism Carnap II 195ff
CarnapVsIdealism-realism-debate: A meaningless debate about concepts.
II 196/7
Def idealism/Carnap: objects will only be considered as being, if we can form concepts about them.
VI 248/249
Constitutional Theory/Carnap: agrees with the subjective idealism that all statements about objects of knowledge can be transformed into statements about structural connections. Agrees with transcendental idealism that all objects are "created in thought".
With solipsism: the given are my experiences.
Constitutional theory is also compatible with phenomenalism.
All do not contradict each other at any point as long as they do not enter the realm of metaphysics.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Idealism Kant Strawson V 211
Transcendental Idealism/StrawsonVsKant: non-empirical knowledge/Kant: geometric knowledge - but only when the analysis is complete. - StrawsonVs: this premise does not make more than the definition of the conditions to be explored - that means, they do not depend on the transcendental idealism. - And if the premise is not dependent on him, then the evidence is not either - and thus also not the whole non-empirical knowledge. - N.B.: it is not necessary to invoke the doctrine that what we perceive as objects, are no such objects in reality. ---
Stra V 213
Definition Phenomenalistic Idealism: the claim that physical things are not independent of our perceptions. - Definition Problematic Idealism: claims that the assumption of external objects is only a conclusion from internal perception. - KantVs: this presupposes what is wrong, namely that bodies exist independently of our perception - what is wrong is the transcendental idealism. (KantVsTranscendental Idealism) ---
Stra V222
Transcendental Idealism/Kant: claims it is an empiricist realism. Confidence must include an awareness of specific awareness-independent objects. - StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism - this dualism questions the "our". ---
Stroud I 129f
Definition Dogmatic Idealism/Kant/Stroud: the thesis that there is no world besides mine - KantVs: that would be a statement about the world we want to investigate: that is absurd. ---
Stroud I 130
Definition Problematic Idealism: Thesis: that the independent world from us was unknowable. - KantVs: that misinterprets our actual situation in the world. ---
Adorno XIII 58
Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Adorno: Kant is a transcendental idealist in the sense that he believes that the judgments which we can make as valid judgments about the empirical world are constituted by the original forms of our consciousness, but that the world, so constituted once, as one already constituted, in which we live, is precisely the world which forms the object of our experiences; of its empirical reality, we must be convinced, because the forms of organization by which they are transcendental (...) must always refer to a material which itself is derived from experience. KantVsPlato/Adorno: there is a critique of (Platonic) ideas in this. In this sense, he is one of the great executors of the overall nominalistic tradition of the modern Enlightenment.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Idealism Leibniz Holz I 59f
Idealism/LeibnizVsDescartes: in order not to fall into an irrational transcendental idealism, the rationality of the factual must be proved. To this extent, Leibniz is definitely not a precursor of Kant.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Holz I
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Perception Kant Strawson V 126
Perception/Kant/Strawson: between veridical and non-veridical perception we can only distinguish when the general conditions of objective determination of time (objective perception) have been met. ---
V 169f
Perception/Kant: it exists very well "in itself"! - Problem: then the question of the beginning of the series is repeated - StrawsonVsKant: always talks of our perception. - But your perceptions are not given to me. ---
Stroud I 164
Perception/Kant/Stroud: he can only accept empirically direct perception of independent things, because he does not accept them transcendental. - Direct perception: only possible with dependent things . - E.g. representations. KantVsTranscendental realism: this would also have to take independent things. - Problem: then we would have to denote our representations inadequate as these things. - StroudVsKant: I'm trapped in my subjectivity. - Thus the transcendental idealism can hardly be distinguished from skepticism. - StroudVsKant: according to him the best science (physics, etc.) is possible, but still dependent on our subjectivity.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Skepticism Kant Stroud I 128
Skepticism/Kant: it remains a scandal of philosophy that the existence of things outside of us must be accepted solely on the basis of belief. - KantVsDescartes: the relation between philosophical question and everyday knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. - ((S) But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct.)
Stroud I 136
KantVsSkepticism: two stages: 1. prove external things (Moore has managed) - 2. show the general possibility of such evidence -
Stroud I 138
Stroud: Problem: we do not have a specific text (sentence) with which Kant would formulate his realism and could prove it to Moore.
Stroud I 142
Everyday knowledge is unproblematic, complete and does not have to be proved. ---
Stroud I 140
Skepticism/KantVsSkepticism: can never reach a conclusion because of the premises accepted by himself.
Stroud I 147
KantVsDescartes: he does not go far enough and relies too heavily on "testimonies" - (documents, evidence) - more important: the conditions of possibility -> Davidson: Kant: no study of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects we assume around us. Solution/Kant: "Copernican revolution": idealism of all appearances. - "We only have direct consciousness of what belongs to us. Our perception depends on our capacity - wrong. That our experience would be in accordance with the things, but vice versa.
Stroud I 149
Things of the outer world/objects/world/reality/Kant/Stroud: all our perception, whether internal or external, and all "external objects of perception ... we have to regard them as representations of what we can be immediately conscious . - ((s) so the thing is the representation of our consciousness -> transcendental idealism - founds the a priori character of our knowledge of space and time (geometry). - Therefore things cannot exist independently of our thoughts and experiences.
Stroud I 163
StroudVsKant: that we need to be aware of our experiences is the return of the "epistemic priority" (from Descartes).
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Thing in itself Gadamer I 451
Thing in itself/being by itself/Gadamer: As a linguistically composed world, every (...) world is of itself open to every possible insight and thus to every expansion of its own world view and accordingly accessible to others. "Perceived": (...) this makes the use of the term "world in itself" problematic. The yardstick for the progressive expansion of one's own world view is not formed by the "world in itself" situated
outside of all linguistically. Rather, the infinite perfectibility of human experience of the world means that, whatever language one uses, one never arrives at anything other than an ever more extended aspect, a "view" of the world.
Phenomenologically speaking, the "thing in itself" consists in nothing other than the continuity with which the perspectival shadows of the perception of the thing merge into one another, as Husserl has shown (1).
Gadamer: Whoever contrasts "the thing in itself" with these must either think theologically - then to "thing in itself" is not for him, but for God alone - or he will think luciferically, as one who wants to prove his own divinity to himself by having the whole world obey him - then to him the thing in itself is a limitation of the omnipotence of his imagination.
I 453
In linguistic events (...) not only the insistent finds its place, but also the change of things. (...) in language the world represents itself. The linguistic experience of the world is "absolute". It transcends all relativities of being, because it encompasses all things in themselves,
I 454
in which relations (relativities) it always appears. The linguistic nature of our experience of the world is prior to everything that is recognized and addressed as being. The basic reference of language and world does not therefore mean that the world becomes the object of language. Rather, what is the object of knowledge and statement is always already enclosed by the world horizon of language. The linguistic nature of human experience of the world as such does not mean the objectification of the world. What is in itself, is independent of one's own will and choice. But by recognizing it as it is in itself, it is made available in the very way that one can count on it, i.e. that one can classify it to its own purposes.
As can be seen, this concept of the thing in itself is only seemingly the equivalent of the Greek concept of kath' hauto. The latter, first of all, means the ontological difference of what a being is according to its substance and its essence, from what can be and what is changing in it. What belongs to the permanent essence of a being is certainly also knowable in an excellent sense, i.e., it has always been previously assigned to the human spirit. What is "in itself" in the sense of modern science has nothing to do with this ontological difference between the essential and the inessential, but is determined as a secure knowledge that allows the mastery of matter. The assured facts are like the object and resistance with which one must reckon. What in itself is, therefore, as Max Scheler showed in particular, is relative in a certain way of knowing and wanting (3).
I 456
Natural Sciences/Recognition/Thing in itself/Gadamer: As a science the one as well as the other [physics or biology] has pre-designed its subject area, the knowledge of which means its mastery. Linguistically composed world: A completely different situation is found, however, where the world relationship of humans as a whole, as it is situated in the linguistic execution, is meant. The world, which appears and is written linguistically, is not in the same sense in itself and not in the same sense relative, as the object of science. It is not in itself, if it does not have the character of the representational at all. As the comprehensive whole that it is, it is never given in experience. But as the world that it is, it is not relative to a particular language either.


1. Husserl, Ideen 1, § 41.
2. It is therefore a mere misunderstanding to invoke the thing in itself of the world against idealism, be it transcendental or the philosophy of language. In doing so, one misjudges the methodological meaning of idealism, whose metaphysical form may be considered overcome since Kant (see Kant's refutation of idealism (in the Critique of Pure Reason, B 274ff).
3. GadamerVsScheler: This remains correct, even if Scheler misunderstands the sense of transcendental idealism as generational idealism, and understands the "thing in itself" as opposition to the subjective production of the object.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977


The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Carnap, R. Kant Vs Carnap, R. Stroud I 173
Transcendental idealism/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: would say that he could not be wrong, because it is necessary in order to clarify any other meaningful questions empirically. CarnapVsKant: According to the verification principle this is but a "pseudo-theory", which cannot explain or guarantee anything. Meaning/Sense/CarnapVsKant: In order to make sense, we need to know the truth value of the propositions which contain the corresponding expressions. weaker: We must be able to give a reason why it is better to believe the truth of something then his falsehood.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Carnap, R. Stroud Vs Carnap, R. I 182
External/internal/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine seems to interpret Carnap this way. That the distinction between "category questions" and "subsets questions" corresponds to the distinction. External/QuineVsCarnap: this is nothing more than two ways of formalizing the language. If we have only one kind of bound variable for all things, it will be an external question: "Is there such and such?" if the variable goes over the whole range. (This is a question of category).
Internally: if there is a variable for every kind of thing, it will be a subset question. Then the question does not refer to all the things that can exist.
I 183
Philosophy/QuineVsCarnap: differs from the sciences only in the range of its categories. (Quine, Word and Object, p. 275). External/internal/QuineVsCarnap: Category questions differ from internal questions only in their generality from subset questions. We can get to the generality by letting some kind of variable go over all things.
I 191
StroudVsCarnap: this introduces a "we", and something that happens to us, called "experience". That we exist and have experience cannot simply be seen as an "internal" truth of the thing language.
One cannot then see the meaning of experience as the common goal of all "real alternatives", because then it is assumed that there are external things.
Problem: the question of the common goal of all genuine alternatives cannot be regarded as an external question of all reference systems either, because then it becomes meaningless.
But if it were "internal", what would be the difference if one were to switch from one reference system to another that does not even contain this goal?
Carnap does not answer that.
I 192
This makes it difficult to grasp his positive approach. CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic frame of expression about external objects and the truths expressed within this system of reference.
StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-sceptical approach to this relation?
1. To which system does Carnap's thesis belong that assertions of existence in the language of things are neither true nor false?
2. What does the thesis express at all then?
Knowledge/internal/Carnap: for example the geometer in Africa really comes to knowledge about the mountain.
StroudVsCarnap: but what does it mean in addition to the fact that this is not a truth that is independent of a reference system?
Suppose for some reason we did not have the thing language and could freely choose another language. Does it follow from this that, for example, the sentence about the mountain in Africa would no longer be true?
Surely we would express something completely different in a completely different language without thing expressions. But would the sentence we can make now not be true in this other language?
I 193
And could it never be true if we had never accidentally adopted the thing language. Existence/Language/Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: that cannot be right and it leads to an extreme idealism that Carnap just rejects. It is absurd because we already know enough about mountains to see that they are not influenced by a chosen language.
Language/object/Stroud: things were there long before language came into being in the world. And that again is something we know "internally" in the thing language.
StroudVsCarnap: then his thesis, understood as "internal" to the language, is wrong. It contradicts what we already assume it as knowledge about ourselves and external things.
Empirically speaking, it leads to idealism that contradicts the known facts.
CarnapVsVs: would say that of course one must not understand his thesis "empirically" and not the thing language "internally".
StroudVsCarnap: but within some reference system it must be internal, otherwise it is meaningless.
Problem: but this is a statement about the relation between a chosen framework and the internal statements within that framework. And if that implies that these internal statements would have been neither true nor false, if a different frame of reference had been chosen, it is still idealism, whether empirical or non empirical idealism.
Truth Value/tr.v./Convention/StroudVsCarnap: the truth value of the internal sentences would depend on the choice of language (of the reference system).
I 194
StroudVsCarnap: it is important to see that if this did not follow, Carnap's thesis would not be different from traditional skepticism! There would then be room for the possibility that statements about things would remain true, even if we abandoned the thing language and truth would again be independent of language. Problem: that would again lead to our choice of a linguistic framework being necessary only to formulate or recognize something that would be true anyway ((s) > metaphysical realism) independently of that framework.
Theoretically: according to Carnap this would then be a "theoretical" question about the acceptability of the thing language as a whole. But in terms of objectivity, which we then presuppose.
CarnapVsTradition: it is precisely the incomprehensibility of such theoretical questions that is important in Carnap. Because
Problem: then it could be that even if we carefully apply our best procedures (> Best explanation), things could still be different from what we think they are. This is equivalent to skepticism.
"Conditional Correctness"/Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: Carnap accepts what I have called the "conditional correctness" of skepticism: if the skeptic could ask a meaningful question, he would prevail.
StroudVsCarnap: if he now would not deny that the "internal" sentences remain true or false when changing the reference system, his approach would be just as tolerant of skepticism as tradition. ((s) So both denial and non-denial would become a problem.)
Kant/Stroud: he also accepts the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If Descartes' description of experience and its relation to external things were correct, we could never know anything about these things.
Carnap/Stroud: his thesis is a version of Kant's "Copernican Turn". And he obtains it for the same reasons as Kant: without it we would have no explanation, how is it possible that we know anything at all?
Reference system/frame/StroudVsCarnap: a gap opens up between the frame and what is true independently of it. ((s) If a choice between different frames is to be possible).
StroudVsCarnap: in this respect, Carnap's approach is entirely Kantian.
I 196
And he also inherits all the obscurity and idealism of Kant. There are parallels everywhere: for both there can be a kind of distancing from our belief. We can do a philosophical study of everyday life (as far as the conditions of knowledge are concerned).
I 197
Reference system/framework/StroudVsCarnap: to which framework does Carnap's thesis belong that no propositions about external objects are true or false regardless of the choice of a reference system (language)? And is this thesis - analytical or not - itself "internal" in any framework? And whether it is or not, is it not merely an expression of Kantian Transcendental Idealism? Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: the basic mistake is to develop any competing theory at all to tradition.
I 198
A purely negative approach or deflationary use of the verification principle would simply eliminate skepticism as pointless. If that were possible, scepticism would no longer need to be undermined. But: Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: Problem: the status of the verification principle itself, or its acceptability. We can only use it to refute Descartes if we have a good reason to accept it as necessary. But that depends on how it is introduced.
It should serve to prevent the excesses of senseless philosophical speculation.
StroudVsCarnap: 1. Then we can only watch and see how far the principle can lead to a distinction that we have already made before! The only test would be sentences, which we would have recognized as senseless before!
2. But even assuming that the principle would be adequately proven as extensional and descriptive, i.e. it would distinguish between meaningful and senseless, as we do,
I 199
it would not allow us to eliminate something as senseless that we had not already recognized as senseless by other means. Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: was incorrectly introduced ((s) with the ulterior motive of producing a result that was already fully known). Early Carnap sketches show that general laws of nature were initially wrongly excluded.
Verification principle/VP/StroudVsCarnap: a correct introduction would provide a strong destructive tool that Kant was already looking for: it would have to explain why the verfication principle is correct. This would probably be identical to an explanation of how knowledge of external things is possible.
Verification Principle/Hempel/Carnap/Stroud: the early representatives had in mind that
1. a sentence is meaningful only if it expresses an "actual content",
2. that understanding a sentence means knowing what would happen if the sentence were true.
Verificationism/Stroud: There is nothing particularly original about this approach. What gives it the verificationist twist is the idea that we cannot even understand anything that cannot be known as true or false, or
weaker: at least to believe as more rational than its opposite.
StroudVsCarnap: that failed, even as an attempt to extract empirically verifiable sentences.
I 205
SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why-question).
I 207
StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap/StroudVsHempel: it is more plausible to reject the verification principle ((s) > empiricist sense criterion) than to claim that Descartes never said anything meaningful. StroudVsVerification Principle: it will remain implausible as long as it is not understood why the traditional distinction internal/external should not be correct.
I 214
Formal manner of speaking: ""Wombat" applies to (is true of) some living beings in Tasmania". QuineVsCarnap: misunderstands the semantic ascent when he speaks of external issues. But this does not reject Carnap's pragmatic approach to simplicity and fertility of theories.
B. Stroud
I Barry Stroud
The Significance of philsophical Scepticism Oxford 1984
Descartes, R. Carnap Vs Descartes, R. VI 226
Ego/Carnap: is a class of elementary experiences. No bundle, because classes do not consist of their elements! CarnapVsDescartes: the existence of the ego is not a primordial fact of the given. From "cogito" does not follow "sum". Carnap: the ego does not belong to expression of the fundamental experience. But the "this experience". Thinking/RussellVsDescartes: "it thinks". (> Lichtenberg). ("Mind", p.18).
Stroud I 196
KantVsDescartes/CarnapVsDescartes. Frame/Reference system/Carnap/Stroud: for Carnap there is no point of view from which one can judge a frame as adequate or inadequate. That would be an "external" question.
Kant/Stroud: Kant's parallel to this is transcendental idealism: if things were independent of us, skepticism would be inevitable.
Problem: the transcendental idealism should not be crossed with the verification principle. Is Carnap's own positive theory better off here? That is a question of its status. It pursues the same goal as Kant: to explain the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, but without going beyond the limits of comprehensibility.
General/special/internal/external/generalization/Stroud: it would be necessary to explain how the general sceptical conclusion can be meaningless, even if the particular everyday empirical assertions are meaningful. This cannot simply be because one is general and the other particular.
Descartes/Stroud: the particular is representative in its argument and can therefore be generalized. The uncertainty in the individual case is representative of all our knowledge. This is the strength of the argument.
VerificationismVsGeneralization: he considers this generalization suspicious.
CarnapVsSkepticism/CarnapVsDescartes: statements that make sense within a reference system cannot be applied to the reference system itself.
Stroud: but this is the problem inside/outside and not a question of generality or special.
StroudVsCarnap: so he has to show that movement from the inside out is impossible and not the generalization. But he needed an explanation why the traditional view of the relation between "internal" and "external" questions is wrong if he wants to avoid skepticism. ((s) Why Question).
Special/VerificationismVsDescartes: Thesis: the single sentence of Descartes is meaningless from the beginning. (Because unverifiable). (StroudVsVs).
I 207
StroudVsVerificationism: he must now show why this verdict does not apply to all individual (special) sentences of everyday life. Verificationism would otherwise have to assume that our whole language (everyday language) is meaningless! (Because it is not verifiable according to skeptical criteria). For example "I don't know if explanation is caused by sitting in a draught" or "The aircraft spotter doesn't know if the aircraft is an F" would be damned as senseless! If verificationism condemns certain sentences as meaningless only if they are uttered, for example, by Descartes or another skeptic, he would have to show that there is a deviant use on such occasions. Otherwise he could not even indicate what VsDescartes is supposed to have gone wrong with his utterance. ((s) utterance here = action, not sentence, which should be meaningless, neither true nor false).

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Descartes, R. Leibniz Vs Descartes, R. Leibniz I 35
"Clear and Distinct"/"Clare et Distincte"/LeibnizVsDescartes: Unsatisfactory, because not clearly determined. Perception: either dark or clear
Def clear: either confused or distinct
Def distinct: either adequate or inadequate
Def adequate: either symbolic or intuitive
Def Absolute Knowledge [Vollkommene Erkenntnis]: if it is both adequate and intuitive at the same time
Def dark: is a term that is not sufficient for recognition
Def clear: is a term if it is sufficient for recognition
Def confused: if insufficient indicators can be enumerated separately. ((s) can still be clear, see above).
Def distinct: e.g. the coin assayers' idea of gold
I 36
Def symbolic: If we do not see the whole essence of a thing all at once, and use symbols there, then knowledge is symbolic. Def intuitive: Is knowledge if it is nevertheless possible to think of different terms constituting the object at the same time (constituting as in "the object shows its terms itself").
Important argument: They are all operationalistic definitions, which is sensible if the terms cannot be dissected further.
I 43
Knowledge/Thinking/LeibnizVsDescartes: He needs a true God (who is not a fraud) so that the self-confidence does not remain imprisoned in a content-free "pure thinking in itself". Leibniz: instead: reasoning by truth of fact, e.g. about the ontological status of the world.
I 59
LeibnizVsDescartes: To refrain from falling into an irrational transcendental idealism, the rationality of facts must be proved. As such, Leibniz is definitely not a precursor of Kant!

Construction/World/Experience/Rationality/Identity/Leibniz: The construction of Leibniz' ontology consist in two phases:
1. The possibility to deduce all meaningful, i.e. true and knowledge-contained sentences are shown by reducing them on identical sentences.(Deduction/Reduction). (Prädikative Evidenz).
2. The evidence of identity shall be proved itself as such in the world. The identity as the world's basis shall find its basis once again in the constitution of the world's being.

I 78
Proof of God/LeibnizVsDescartes/Holz: Is similar to Descartes' proof of God, but modified. There is a difference between accepting God as author for the exterior or for the totality of the whole (and as such for the interior as well).
I 80
Particulars/Leibniz: Depicts the effects of the interrelationship in itself and obtains the whole. Dual Inclusion: Of the particular in the whole and the whole in the particular. Problem: circular argument Solution/Descartes: Justification by God. LeibnizVsDescartes: This is not possible because metaphysics are based on a complete conjunction.
Solution/Leibniz: The function of sensory perception cannot be deceived.

I 99
Force/Passivity/Leibniz: Force is also the ability to adapt your own state to the changes of other substances. Sufferance [Erleiden] The original force is twofold: vis activa and vis passiva.
Leibniz calls these "force points" also "metaphysical points".
I 100
The original force is blocked from all sides by the individual substances which cannot unfold freely. So the derived forces are only modifications of the original force. Force/LeibnizVsDescartes: A simple expansion is not sufficient! Therefore, force needs to be added.
I 101
The merely expanded mass does not carry a principle of qualitative differentiation since expansion is purely quantitative. Only then motion and change can happen. Nature needs to be explained from its own definition!
I 102
Matter/LeibnizVsDescartes: Impenetrability is not sufficient! For Descartes the body was immobile. Substantial being needs a carrier.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Kant Carnap Vs Kant Newen I 112
CarnapVsKant: no synthetic judgements are a priori possible.
Stroud I 171
Def Pseudo-Question/CarnapVsMetaphysics/CarnapVsKant/Stroud: are questions that cannot be answered because there is no possible sensory experience that decides the truth or falsity of the sentences in which certain expressions occur. ((s) e.g. metaphysical or transcendental expressions). Carnap: For example, two geographers want to find out whether a certain mountain in Africa is real or just a legend.
I 172
a) If they find a mountain there that more or less corresponds to what was assumed, they can say that it is real, that it exists. Reality/Carnap: thus, they use an empirical, non-metaphysical concept of reality. (Carnap, Chicago 1958, 207).
b) Assuming they were not only scientists, but also philosophers: one of them calls himself "2Realist", the other "Idealist":
"Realist"/Carnap: will say that the mountain not only has the qualities (characteristics) that one has discovered in it, but it is also real, i.e. independent of our perception.
"Idealist"/Carnap: denies that the mountain is independent of our perception. I.e. it is not real in the sense of the realist.
Sciences/Empiricism/Carnap: here this divergence between the two cannot arise at all. (333f)
But that does not mean that both theses are wrong.
I 173
Transcendental idealism/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: would say that it could not be wrong because it is necessary to empirically clarify all other meaningful questions. CarnapVsKant: according to the verification principle, however, this is a "pseudo-theory" that cannot explain or guarantee anything.
Sense/Sensible/CarnapVsKant: for something to be sensible, we need to know the truth value (WW) of the sentences that contain the corresponding expressions.
Weaker: we must be able to give a reason why it is better to believe the truth of something than its falsity.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Kant Nagel Vs Kant I 129
NagelVsKant: unrestricted judgments about astronomy belong to a worldview that, compared to the Kantian alternative, is quite durable! In a conflict with Kant both opinions would be in competition, as there is no independent position from which to assess them.

I 137
NagelVsKant: but to defend ourselves against Kant's limiting of the reach of reason, we have to claim more than this.
I 138
Kant admits that we cannot help but understand ourselves as part of an independently existing world, though. But his thesis is not a thesis about the phenomenal world, but one about the relation of the phenomenal world to the world itself.
I 139
But since he claims that the normal scientific thinking only applies to the phenomenal world, he exempts himself from the usual conditions of evaluation. The thesis of transcendental idealism is itself not one of the synthetic judgments a priori whose validity it claims to explain, but a thesis, a priori it still is. If this is unimaginable or self-contradictory, the story ends here. It implies, as Kant says, thesis: that Berkeley's idealism is inevitable if we assume that the things themselves have spatial properties!
Nagel: the whole idealism becomes a hypothesis. There is something wrong with insisting that we had a bare idea of ​​our position in an consciousness-independent world, while arguing the logical possibility of something that goes beyond it.
PutnamVsKant: (elsewhere) from the fact that we cannot recognize the world as such does not follow that it must be completely different from what we do recognize.

I 146
NagelVsKant: we note that our unrepentant empirical and scientific thinking unabatedly prevails even against Kant's skepticism. Kant is implausible for empirical reasons and thus simply implausible.
III 126
NagelVsKant: the step towards objectivity reveals how things are in themselves and not how they appear to be. If that is true, then the objective picture always omits something.

II 54
Ethics/Law/Moral/God/Theology/Nagel: an act does not become wrong by the fact that God exists. Murder is wrong per se and thus prohibited by God. (>Eutyphro). Not even the fear of punishment provides the proper motives of morality. Only the knowledge that it is bad for the victim.
NagelVsKant: categorical imperative: we could say that we should treat others considerately so that do likewise by us. That is nothing but good advice. It is only valid in as far as we believe that our treatment of others will have an impact on how they treat us.
Nagel: as a basis of ethics, nothing else is in question than a direct interest in the other.
II 55
Nagel: there is a general argument against inflicting damage on others which is accessible to anyone who understands German: "Would you like it if someone else did that to you?"
II 56
If you admit that you had something against someone else doing to you what you just did to him, you admit that he had a reason not to do it to you. Question: what is this reason? It cannot be anchored in the particular person.
II 57
It is simply a matter of consequence and consistency. We need a general point of view that any other person can understand.
II 58
Problem: this must not mean that you always ask if the money for the movie ticket would bring more happiness into the world if it was given to someone else. Because then you should no longer care more for your friends and family than for any stranger.
II 59
Question: are right and wrong the same for everyone?
II 60
Right/Wrong/Ethics/Morality/Nagel: if actions depend on motives and motives can be radically different in humans, it looks as if there could be no universal right and wrong for each individual. The possible solutions, all of which are not very convincing:
1) you could say: Although the same things for everyone are wrong or right, not everyone has a reason to do what is right and not to do what is wrong.
Only people with the "right moral motives" have a reason.
Vs: it is unclear what it would mean that it was wrong for someone to kill, but that he has no reason not to do it. (Contradiction).
2) you could say that the reasons do not depend on the actual motives of the people. They are rather reasons that modify our motives if they are not the right ones.
Vs: it is unclear what the reasons may consist in that do not depend on motives. Why not do something if no one desire prevents you from doing it?
II 61
3) you could say that morality is not universal. I.e. that someone would only be bound by morality if he had a specific reason to act like this, with the reason generally depending on how strongly you care for others. Vs: while making a psychologically realistic impression this conflicts with the idea that moral rules apply for everyone.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982
Kant Strawson Vs Kant Rorty VI 359
StrawsonVskKant/Rorty: shows that thanks to the progress since Kant some concepts are no longer that attractive: e.g. "in the mind", "created by the mind" (Wittgenstein, Ryle have dissuaded us from this). ---
Strawson V 9
StrawsonVsKant: appears to violate his own principles by attempting to set sense limits from a point which is outside of them, and that, if they are properly marked, cannot exist. ---
V 16
Continuous determination/Kant/Strawson: everywhere through the mind guaranteed applicability of the concepts. StrawsonVsKant: seed for the disastrous model of determination of the whole universe.
---
V 19
StrawsonVsKant: this one had unlimited confidence in a certain complicated and symmetrical scheme, which he freely adopted from the formal logic as he understood it, and forced upon this the whole extent of his material. ---
V 23
StrawsonVsKant: this one is constantly trying to squeeze out more of the arguments in the analogies than there is. ---
V 25
StrawsonVsKant: the whole deduction is logically incorrect. The connection to the analysis is thin and is, if at all, brought about by the concept of "synthesis". ---
V 37
Dialectic/Kant: primary goal: exposing the metaphysical illusion. Instrument: the principle of sense. Certain ideas that do not have any empirical application, are sources of appearance, yet they can have a useful or even necessary function for the extension of empirical knowledge.
E.g. we think of internal states of affair, as if they were states of affair of an immaterial substance. ("regulative ideas").
StrawsonVsKant: which is obviously quite implausible. But why did he represent it?
---
V 29
StrawsonVsKant: It is not clear that there is no empirical mediation of antinomies. ---
V 32
Kant: I really appear to myself in the time but I do not really appear to myself in time. StrawsonVsKant: incomprehensible what "to appear" means here. It is no defense of an incomprehensible doctrine to say that its incomprehensibility is guaranteed by a product obtained from its principle.
---
V 33/34
Space/time/StrawsonVsKant: Kant: things themselves not in space and time. Strawson: thereby the whole doctrine becomes incomprehensible. ---
V 35
Synthetically a priori/StrawsonVsKant: Kant himself has no clear conception of what he means with it. The whole theory is not necessary. Instead, we should focus on an exploration and refining of our knowledge and social forms. ---
V 36
Limit/StrawsonVsKant: to set the coherent thinking limits it is not necessary to think from both sides of these limits as Kant tried despite his denials. ---
V 49
Space/Kant: our idea of space is not recovered from the experience, because the experience already presupposes the space. StrawsonVsKant: that is simply tautological. If "to presuppose" means more than a simple tautology, then the argument is not enlightening.
---
V 50
StrawsonVsKant: he himself admits that it is contradictory to represent a relational view of space and time and to deny its transcendental ideality at the same time. ---
V 58
StrawsonVsKant: there are the old debates about "inherent" ideas of space and time. They are unclear. There is the argument that the acquisition of skills presupposes the ability to acquire skills.
Experience/space/time/properties/Kant/Strawson: problem: the manifestation of the corresponding trait in experience, his appearance in the world, can be ascribed only to our cognitive abilities, the nature of our skills, not to the things themselves.
StrawsonVsKant: problem: then these ideas must themselves be prior to all experience in us.
---
V 66
Categories/Strawson: we have to understand them here in the way that to the forms of logic the thought of their application is added in judgments. StrawsonVsKant: his subdivision of the categories puts quite a bit on the same level, which certainly cannot be regarded as equivalent as e.g. affirmative, negative, infinite.
---
V 73
StrawsonVsKant: he thinks it is due to the (failed) metaphysical deduction (see above) entitled to identify "pure" concepts. ---
V 75
StrawsonVsKant: why should the objects of consciousness not be understood as realities that are distinguished from the experiences of consciousness existence, even if sequence and arrangement coincide point by point with the experiences of consciousness? ---
V 83
StrawsonVsKant: unity of the different experiences requires experience of objects. Can his thesis withstand the challenge?
Why should not objects (accusatives) form such a sequence that no differentiation between their order and the corresponding experiences has to be made?
E.g. Such items may be sensory data: red, round spots, tickling, smells, lightning, rectangles.
---
V 84
Why should the terms not simply be such sensory quality concepts? StrawsonVsKant: it is very easy to imagine that experience exactly has this sort of unrelated impressions as its content. Impressions that neither require nor permit, to become "united in the concept of an object".
StrawsonVsKant: the problem with the objects of experience is that their ESSE is at the same time entirely their percipi how their percipi nothing but their ESSE. That is, there is no real reason for distinguishing between the two.
---
V 106
Room/persistence/Kant: The space alone is persistent. Any time determination presupposes something persistent. StrawsonVsKant: unclear. For the concept of self-consciousness the internal temporal relations of the sequence are completely insufficient. We need at least the idea of a system of temporal relations, which includes more than these experiences themselves. But there is no access for the subject itself to this broader system than by its own experiences.
---
V 107
StrawsonVsKant: there is no independent argument that the objective order must be a spatial order. ---
V 116
Causality/StrawsonVsKant: its concept is too rough. Kant is under the impression that he is dealing with a single application of a single concept of "necessity", but he shifts in his application, the meaning of this concept. The required sequence of perceptions is a conceptual, but the necessary sequence of changes is a causal one.
---
V 118
Analogies/StrawsonVsKant: fundamental problem: the conditions of the possibility of objective determination of time. Possible objects/Kant: Problem: whether there should be a "at the same time" or "not at the same time" of possible and actually perceived objects. If there is no "at the same time", there can be no distinction made between possible and real objects.
---
V 124
Pure space/Kant: is itself not an object of empirical perception. StrawsonVsKant: element of deceptive logic: Kant seems to think that certain formal properties of the uniform spatiotemporal frame must have direct correlates in the objects themselves.
---
V 128
StrawsonVsKant: its entire treatment of objectivity is under considerable restriction, he relies nowhere on the factor onto which, for example, Wittgenstein strongly insists: the social nature of our concepts. ---
V 157
StrawsonVsKant: but assuming that the physical space is euclidic, the world could be finite in an otherwise infinite empty space. And that would be no meaningless question. ---
V 163
Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: from the fact that it seems to be the case that there are things which are ordered in time or space in a certain way, it does not follow that it either seems that all things appear as members of a limited series, neither that it seems that all things exist as members of an infinite series. In fact, neither of the two members of the disjunction is true. ---
V 164
Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: certainly the notion of a sequential order is justified, but it does not follow that the concept for the "whole series" of things must apply. ---
V 178
Antinomies/StrawsonVsKant: he was mistaken that the antinomies are the field, on which the decisive battles are fought. ---
V 184
Existence/Kant: "necessity of existence can only be recognized from the connection with what is perceived according to general laws of experience." StrawsonVsKant: this is a deviation from the critical resolution of antinomies and has to do with the interests of "pure practical reason": that is, with morality and the possibility of free action.
---
V 194
StrawsonVsKant: we can draw the conclusion from the assertion that when a being of endless reality exists, it does not exists contingently, not reverse in that way that if something exists contingently, it is a character of endless reality. ---
V 222
Transcendental idealism/Kant: claims, he is an empirical realism. Confidence must include an awareness of certain states of consciousness independent of objects. StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism. This dualism questions the "our".
---
V 249
StrawsonVsKant: to say that a physical object has the appearance, a kind of appearance of a physical character, means, trying to brighten an unclear term by another dubious, namely the one of the visual image.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kant Stroud Vs Kant I 145
Def Reality/Real/(Kant: "whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws is real". (A 376)).
I 146
StroudVsKant: but he does not go into detail how we can distinguish reality from appearance in individual cases where the question might arise.
I 159
Skepticism/transcendental/StroudVsKant: does he really refute skepticism with his transcendental philosophy? Is it a better answer than others? 1. We can only understand his answer if we understand and accept his transcendental approach. We must then also accept his idealism.
I 160
Understanding/Stroud: we should do best when we observe people and their behavior (>Behaviorism). But that would be an empirical study. It would be about language, language behaviour and language acquisition.
StroudVsKant: we understand his argument only if we understand his concept of a priori knowledge. And this investigation presupposes that we accept transcendental idealism. That seems circular! (Circle):
to understand idealism again, we must understand the particular nature of the investigation that makes idealism transcendental.
I 161
2. StroudVsKant: (this would even be Kantian reasons VsKant): according to Kant, thoughts are only possible if they are applied to what categories can be applied to. But this is only possible within the framework of possible experiences. The concepts must be able to have an empirical application. ((s) So they must be learned in empiricism). StroudVsKant: then how is it possible that we can have (transcendental) thoughts at all that are not determined by empirical conditions?
a) empirically:
For example, if expressions such as "directly perceive" and "independently of us" are given in everyday empirical use, then we see ((s) according to Kant!) that
the sentence "We perceive independent things directly" is true. Empirically understood this simply means: e.g. without mirrors or screens.
b) transcendental: other language use:
here the sentence "we perceive independent things directly" does not express truth.
((s) Beware, Stroud does not say that he is wrong according to Kant).
StroudVsKant: with the transcendental meaning we thus move away from everyday language.
KantVsStroud: would reply that this use must be understandable for us, otherwise knowledge about the world would not be possible.
I 162
StroudVsKant: this leads to two problems: 1. Suppose we accepted Kant's transcendentalism:
Question: why would the rejection of idealism at the transcendental level be more attractive than accepting it at the empirical level?
Why does Kant reject empirical idealism?
((s) "Condition"/empirical/(s): a condition cannot be understood empirically. But their fulfilment > Fact. But one cannot see that a fact is supposed to fulfil something.)
Solution: making a corresponding sentence true. (But this sentence must be expressed first).
StroudVsKant: if the argument is that our knowledge would otherwise be limited to the things we know are dependent on us, why should we then seek "refuge" in the view that our knowledge is limited to things we have recognized as (transcendently spoken) dependent on us?
Skepticism/StroudVsKant: is so painful precisely because it does not allow knowledge of independent things. Why should Kant's solution be less painful just because it is transcendental?
Empirical Idealism/KantVsStroud: cannot be true.
2. Question about the strength of the guarantee that Kant's transcendentalism exists:
This corresponds to the question why Kant rejects transcendental realism.
KantVsTranscendental Realism: would not be a correct explanation of our knowledge because - if it were true - we could never directly perceive things independent of ourselves and therefore could never be certain of their existence.
Transcendental realism thus opens the way for empirical idealism by perceiving external things as something separate from the senses.
Problem: we can then be aware of our representations, but we do not know if something existing corresponds to them!
StroudVsKant: he rejects these attitudes for the only reason for which transcendental explanations can be rejected at all: that they provide no explanation, how is it possible that we know something?
StroudVsKant: why does he think that empirical idealism paves the way for transcendental realism?
Probably because he believes that the only things we can directly perceive are the things that depend on us. And he does not assume this as an empirical thesis, but only as a transcendental one.
The sentence "everything we perceive is dependent on us" is true when understood transcendently.
Kant/Stroud: probably he assumes this because he does not understand how perception is possible without the perception of a "representation" or something "in us".
StroudVsKant: this is how the thesis of the "epistemic priority" appears here
again:
I 164
shifted from the empirical to the transcendental level. Perception/Kant/Stroud: he can only accept direct perception of independent things empirically spoken because he does not accept them transcendently spoken.
StroudVsKant: important: that this is the only point he rejects.
Kant: if we treat external things as things in themselves, it is impossible to understand how we can arrive at knowledge.
StroudVsKant: Suppose Kant were right that transcendental realism leaves our knowledge of external things unexplained.
Question: why is that alone sufficient to make our theory wrong, transcendentally speaking? Couldn't it simply be transcendentally true that things cannot be known?
Kant/Stroud: would say no, as he understands "transcendental" as following: transcendental knowledge is part of the explanation of our knowledge.
Direct Perception/Kant: is only possible of dependent things (representations etc.).
Transcendental Realism/Kant/Stroud: would then have to say that there are also independent things. Namely, those that correspond to these representations. But then we would be forced to conclude that all our representations (sensory experiences) would be inadequate to establish the reality of these things. (A 369). The outer things would then be separate from the things we are aware of.
StroudVsKant: the only problem of transcendental realism is that it prevents our explanation of "how knowledge is possible".
I 165
Problem: then there is no independent way to determine his truth or falsehood. The only test of his acceptability is whether he makes an explanation possible. Transcendental Aesthetics/Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Stroud: Transcendental idealism is integrated into transcendental aesthetics: (A 378), independent of these consequences.
StroudVsKant: but it is not bound differently than transcendental or a priori as an a priori condition of an investigation of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. And this is the only way how a transcendental theory can be founded at all: that it is the only possible explanation of our synthetically a priori possible knowledge in geometry and arithmetic.
Skepticism/StroudVsKant: so there is no independent possibility to justify a transcendental theory. ((s) than that it is the only explanation for something else). Then one has to ask whether skepticism has been refuted at all.
I 166
Skepticism/StroudVsKant: there are at least two ways in which an explanation of our knowledge of the outer world can fail: If skepticism were true; Kant claims to have at least empirically refuted this, but only by putting in place a transcendental version of the same description.
Understanding/StroudVsKant: if we understand transcendentalism (transcendental use of our words) at all, this use is not satisfactory. It still represents knowledge as limited to what I understand to be dependent on me.
I am once again a prisoner of my subjectivity.
Transcendental Idealism/StroudVsKant: is ultimately difficult to distinguish from skepticism.
I.e. not that it is the same as empirical idealism, but that it is unsatisfactory as an explanation, namely on the empirical level!
I 167
Transcendental Idealism/KantVsStroud/KantVsDescartes: Kant would say: "I won't lose anything if I accept it". My knowledge is not limited to the things that are empirically dependent or are only empirically subjective. I am theoretically able to deliver the best physics, chemistry and other sciences. I am in a better position than Descartes.
StroudVsKant: but then, according to Kant, all our scientific knowledge is still subjective or dependent on our human sensitivity.
I 168
Knowledge/Explanation/StroudVsKant: but we could also do without an explanation in another way: not because skepticism was true (and thus nothing could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be conclusively posed! (>Carnap, see below). Kant/Stroud: N.B.: pleads in a way for a limited ("deflationary") view that corresponds to this critique. ((s) deflationary here: not aimed at the most comprehensive framework, see below).
KantVsDescartes: if its question could be asked coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate.
StroudVsKant: but he does not explain what Descartes was concerned about.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Kant Hegel Vs Kant Leibniz I 32
Hegel: we must not "let multiplicity disappear in unity". If deduction were only possible as reduction (as with Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought.
Kant: draws from this the consequence of founding the unity of the world in the priority of thought. Only then is unity transcendentally or subjective idealistically justified.
HegelVsKant: tries to renew the metaphysics of substance, which wants to explain the unity of being with the unity of the being: the self-development of the absolute mind in world history.
---
Rorty II 153
HegelVsKant/Rorty: both God and the moral law must be temporalized and historized to remain credible.
Rorty VI 195
HegelVsKant/Rorty: "transcendental idealism" is just another name for skepticism.
VI 203
HegelVsKant/Rorty: he is too much geared towards scientific research. ---
Vollmer I 220
Knowledge/Criterion/Realization/Vollmer: we need a criterion for when realization is valid. Such a criterion would itself be a piece of knowledge and would also need a criterion recourse. On the other hand, the criterion could not be a simple convention, since a convention cannot justify any recognition. If at all, then by further conventions. Regress.
This is approximately:
SchellingVsKant: we need a recognition of recognition. And that is circular.
HegelVsKant: Examination of recognition: cannot be carried out without recognizing. As if you wanted to learn to swim before you go into the water.
Vollmer: the argument was developed by Leonard Nelson and is therefore called "Double Nelson".

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Leibniz, G.W. Kant Vs Leibniz, G.W. Descartes I 139
Descartes/Holz: Hegel pro: Move back of thinking from the world to God himself. God is ambiguous according to him. Spinoza: continues radically Descartes but drops the substance of the manifold. Leibniz: comes back to pluralism (dialectic unity/plurality) - KantVsLeibniz: Only "logic of illusion": (per Descartes, but mediated by Hume’s skepticism) Hegel: ties back to Leibniz’s dialectic.

Descartes I 142
KantVsLeibniz: This is only a "logic of illusion".
Kant I 34
Critique of Pure Reason: VsLeibniz, VsWolff: Against "school philosophy". Starting point: Freedom notion of academic philosophy: contradiction: freedom (as soul and God) ought to be unthinkable, although they were made ​​the subject of metaphysical teachings.
I 85
Room/Leibniz: (according to Kant): Is only by virtue of the mutual relationship of the things in it. KantVsLeibniz: counterexample: Mismatch between left and right hands or mirror image. An inversion will not restore the identity.
Strawson V 227
Body/idealism/realism/Kant: we do not have an external scale or an external system, in which concepts, we can give an esoteric (obvious for the initiated) meaning of the question if such objects really exist.
V 228
KantVsLeibniz: Vs pre-established harmony: we have no knowledge of the "real causes" of our perceptions. But we need it in order to decide whether those objects, which create our perceptions, really exist.
V 228
Terms/sense principle/Kant: Only when concepts are applied to objects of possible experience they really hold a meaning.
V 229
Due to the transcendental idealism we are now, however, obligated to create the objects,which exist in themselves, independently in the design of objects in general obligation objects as they exist in themselves, independently of our perception. But:
V 230
KantVsMetaphysics/KantVsLeibniz: these alleged truths about objects independent of time and space. ("intelligible" objects). Kant: that is only consistent with the assumption that one speaks not of objects themselves, but of concepts.
I 234
Justification/Vollmer: is not even necessary. What should make us look for a justification? Kant/early/precritical: Newton’s theory cannot be proven logically. The KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff had realized this. But Newton’s theory can also not be empirically verified. This, Kant had learned from Hume. This is then in contradiction to the assumed "absolute truth" and "logical provability" of Newtonian theory.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Realism Fraassen Vs Realism Hacking I 92
Def realism / Fraassen: aims to tell a true story about the Suchness of the world with the help of theories (FraassenVs). Acceptance here means considered a theory is true.
Cartwright I 88
van FraassenVsRealism: it is a mistake to say that if a theory received the phenomena, then its laws must be true. Nor do we have to assume that the corresponding theoretical entities exist. That the theory is true is merely an additional assumption. Duhem: ditto, as van Fraassen. Cartwright: This has nothing to do with skepticism or Kant’s transcendental idealism.
I 1
Modern Science/Realism/Fraassen: has apparently circumnavigated this dilemma: Experiment/Robert Boyle: to produce qualities mechanically. I 2 FraassenVsRealism: the old problems re-surface at the level of the behavior of parts of atoms: here no mechanical explanations are possible because atoms have no parts! ((s) for science at Boyle’s time?). So, once again, skills qualities had to be attributed. Nominalism/Fraassen: brings another problem: part of its motivation was epistemic: the observation of phenomena does not clearly show the suspected causal connections. Phenomenon/Fraassen: does not decide about the truth or falsity of hypotheses about atoms. I 4 FraassenVsRealism: commits the reverse error (for positivism which puts everything in words): by reifying everything that cannot be defined away. I 7 VsRealism/Fraassen/(s): Cannot argue that the current best theory is wrong, i.e. ultimately denial of progress.
Fraassen I 7
Existence/Ontology/Theory/Sellars: Thesis: a good reason to defend a theory is ipso facto a good reason to consider the entities postulated by this theory existent. Brian Ellis: (a realist in terms of theoretical entities): stronger thesis: theoretical statements are true generalized descriptions of reality or at least pretend to be. Fraassen: This has the advantage of avoiding the epistemic focus on belief reasons, and also the assumption that one is set on considering current theories to be true. VsRealism/Fraassen/(s): Cannot assert that the currently best theory is wrong, i.e. ultimately denial of progress. FraassenVsEllis: the "pretending" brings its own problems.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Wittgenstein Williams, B. Vs Wittgenstein McDowell I 187
LearVsWittgenstein: "stunted transcendental idealism". A fully formed one would be the argument that we cannot be fundamentally deceived about the world, since we have constituted it ourselves. With the "stunted" the "we" disappears.
McDowell: That is correct, but we never needed reinsurance through the "we".
Bernard WilliamsVsWittgenstein: variety of transcendental idealism. The world and the fact that we have mind are transcendental for each other.
McDowell: but none of that is found in Wittgenstein.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Transc..Idealism Putnam, H. Horwich I 440
Transcendental idealism / Kant / Putnam: the image that I propose instead, is not quite Kant but similar: Truth = idealized rational acceptability.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994