Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Rationalism | Chisholm | II 36f RationalismVsBerkeley: we believe in the outside world from the beginning, no decision situation; similar to Hume, but very modest position. Methodology/Sciences: Strategy: better than maintaining a change -> belief in the uniformity of the world. II 39 Rationalism/Rutte: reason always appealed to already existing belief-majorities. Rason: strategy: attitude maintained when change is not attractive. This is also true for indecision. It is more attractive to maintain realism. On the other hand: Solipsism: maintaining is less attractive. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 II 76 KantVsRationalism: mere consistency shall impose existence - (s) existence: freedom from contradiction, but not vice versa guaranteed -> Field: consistency = logical possibility. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Redshift | Kanitscheider | I 222 Redshift/Theory: ambiguous: one thought earlier that the redshift of the spectral lines of the light of the distant galaxies is a Doppler effect. This is wrong! Not the galaxies move through the space, but the space itself expands. (Therefore it is also possible that the expansion can assume superluminal speed). But then the galaxies themselves are in rest. I 223 Theory/Empirical/Kanitscheider: nevertheless, here was a real support of the theory by theory-neutral empirical data: because the linear Hubble law (whatever value the Hubble constant may have) is logically firmly connected with the uniformity of the world at large. An empirical connection was discovered without the help of those theories for which this connection should be supporting instance. From such a law of expansion follows that every galaxy can be regarded as center of such an expansion. >Universe/Kanitscheider, >Cosmological principle/Kanitscheider, cf. >Olbers paradox, >Relativity theory. I 225 Redshift/Kanitscheider: for the cosmological interpretation the wavelength independence is important. Only then the statement can be made that the measured value of z = 1 is due to a doubling of the size of space. Since Rem approaches zero at (time-inverse) approach to the initial singularity, the redshift of very old and distant objects can go beyond all limits. At t = 0, z is infinite. However, no observable corresponds to this, since redshift is also accompanied by a slowing down of all processes. Around the big bang the physical events appear frozen. I 226 Redshift/Kanitscheider: It is important to recognize that the different interpretations are not based on relationist Vs absolutist conception of space! The interpretation, according to which the redshift is caused by the expansion of space, is of course the relativistic one, but it is not only a facon de parler, but has also empirical consequences: if the redshift would be really a velocity and not an expansion effect, the energy flux S, which is measured from a galaxy of luminosity L on the earth, not S = L / 4πR²(1 + z)², but S = L / 4πr²(1 + z)². However, this is not valid for an overlapping area with very small distances, where both theories give equal values. Redshift/Kanitscheider: there is a third explanation: light fatigue by gravitational effect. Photons experience an interaction on their way, be it with atoms or with electrons, which triggers an energy loss and thus a frequency decrease. Or the photon decays into a lower energy photon and a vector boson. Vs: One can exclude such hypothesis only by comparing the consequences with the empiric: Bsp It would have to accompany by interaction with intergalactic matter also a smearing of the pictures of distant objects. This has never been observed. Even quasars are always sharply point-like. Likewise, the spectral lines would have to become broader, which has also never been observed. Moreover, the fatigue phenomenon would have to occur depending on the wavelength, that the radiophotons decay faster than the light photons. Moreover, the static universe - which is implied by this assumption - would have no place for the background radiation. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Berkeley, G. | Chisholm Vs Berkeley, G. | II 33 Def Immanence/Rutte: E.g. Berkeley: the concept of real external thing is absurd, because this would mean wanting to grasp the idea of an imaginary thing not thought of by anyone. (Contradiction). VsBerkeley: confusion between "not thought of" with "thought independent". Reality/Verification/Berkeley: experiences and their courses are reviewing instances for the assumption of external things. There are no specific experiences for such reviews. We can make the same predictions when denying the outside world. We cannot appeal to any other instance than our order of experience. II 34 In order to show that things are causes we would have to be able to show that we could have an experience of the external things without our experiences. But this is impossible. The same experience might exist if there were no external things. BerkeleyVsRealism: that makes realism obsolete! VsBerkeley: the same is also true of spiritualism, which Berkeley does not seem to see! (The fact that it is as superfluous as realism). II 35 Analytical philosophy/ Philosophy of language/Rutte: the language-analytical counterpart to realism is the assumption that we have learned on the basis of criteria to distinguish perception from illusion: without criteria we could not learn it. BerkeleyVs: such criteria do not exist! VsBerkeley: then we cannot even make the distinction by concepts between a perception of external things and a total hallucination! Berkeley himself already presupposes this conceptual distinction! ((s) Why?). (Rutte: elsewhere Berkeley already sees the concept of external things as absurd, but not here). Berkeley: needs no criteria, since we will never learn this distinction anyway. VsBerkeley: nevertheless this distinction can be thought in a meaningful way. The concepts "experience" and "subject-independent" are available to everyone. They can be made explicit without referring to a specific perceptual situation. III 36 RationalismVsBerkeley/Rutte: the representatives of reason can point out that de facto such a decision situation does not exist: we believe in the outside world from the start. Hume: has referred to a similar natural belief with view to the even more fundamental question of the uniformity of the world. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |