Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| I, Ego, Self | Castaneda | Frank I 159 ff I/Castaneda: "volatile egos": like "here", "now", irreducible. - They are entirely epistemological, only for re-presentation, not empirical. Limited identity: only consubstantiation (sameness between coexisting sets of characteristics): not diachronic (transsubstatiation), therefore not all properties are identical, no substitutability, no strict identity with person. "I" is criteria-less, content-neutral. - "I" can only be represented by the impersonal and situation independent quasi-indicator "he". I-design/Castaneda: Vs "I" as "Something". >Guise theory, >Quasi-Indicator. I 167ff I*/Castaneda: "I myself" in an episode of self-awareness one refers to oneself - (corresponding for he*). I 186 "I" is no demonstrative. >Demonstratives. I 170 Transcendent I/Castaneda: we experience ourselves as a not completely identical with the content of our experiencen and therefore associated to the world beyond experience. I 171 I/Self/Consciousness/Self-Awareness/SA/Logical Form/Hintikka/Castaneda: E.g. "The man who is actually a, knows that he is a". Wrong: "Ka (a = a). - Right: (Ex) (Ka (x = a)) -the individual variables occurring in "Ka (...)" are conceived as relating to a range of objects that a knows - "there is a person whom a knows, so that a knows that this person is a" - CastanedaVs: does not work with contingent assertions: "there is an object, so that a does not know it exists" - E.g. "the editor does not know that he is the editor" - (Ex) (Ka(x = a) & ~Ka(x = a))) was be a formal contradiction - better: (Exa)(Ka (x = a) & Ka (x = himself) (not expressible in Hintikka). I 226f I/Castaneda: no specific feature - different contrasts: opposites: this/that, I/she - I/he - I (meaning/acting person) - I/you - I/we -> Buber: I/it - I/you -> Saussure: network of contrasts (plural). Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 Frank I 378 I/hall of mirrors/Castaneda: seems to need two selves: one he speaks to, one he speaks about - but simple self as different from I and body not sufficient. I 430f I/Extra sense/Castaneda: psychological role that one associates with "I" - which explains mental states that do not explain proper names or descriptions: "I'm called for on the phone": spec. mental states - PerryVsCastaneda: not sufficient, you also need to know that it is the own It! - A proposition with "he*" itself says nothing about the meaning of this expression, therefore no identification - E.g. "heaviest man in Europe" could know this without a scale if "he*" could act independently without antecedent. Solution: intermediary extra sense for Sheila's beliefs about Ivan's extra-sense-i. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 I 470 I/Castaneda: Variable, not singular term, not singular reference: instead: i is the same as j and Stan believes of j... >Singular Terms, >Variables. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Nozick | II 79 I/use/Nozick: all semantic facts about what the use of "I" refers to, state necessity de dicto, not de re. Cf. >de re, >Semantic facts, >Use, >Mention, >I, Ego, Self, >Reference, >Index words, >Indexicality. II 91 I/synthesis/Nozick: Problem: how do we know that not in any moment a new I is synthesized? Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. II 104 I/unit/self/Nozick: unit is not about the act, which could have produced something else - but as a unified whole the I constitutes itself as capable of having other bodily parts or to lose memories (perhaps all). >I/Kant, >I/Fichte, >Memory, >Subject, >Self. II 105 I/self: is projected into the future, as comprising certain stages - after the scheme of the next successor the self-concept will be a listing and weighting of dimensions - but no metric (more Next are possible). >Nearest Successor/Nozick, >Terminology/Nozick, >Similarity Metrics. Nozick: Thesis: we are choosing partially by ourselves. II 112 I/Nozick: physical descriptions exclude me, because they are not reflexive. >Description. II 113 Self/I/Part/Whole/Nozick: a) self as the next successor of each act of synthesis, or b) rather an underlying, enduring self: then rather a whole, less limitations, more unit. >Castaneda: volatile egos. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tradition | Nozick Vs Tradition | II 113 Properties/Tradition/Nozick: philosophers tend to regard properties as something eternal and immutable. NozickVsTradition: it is natural to regard properties as something that amerges: E.g. did the property of being president of the United States exist before Washington became the first president? Certainly: the position was provided by the Constitution before the election. But I would not be able to say when exactly the property came about. ((s) E.g. "The thickest Neanderthal man has the property of being president of the United States": this sentence can be formed and then it can be found out that it is false. This would not be possible if the property had not yet formed.) E.g. the property of being a human being: from fertilization? E.g. the property of being me: does it not change in the course of life with the acquisition of experience? I/Property/Nozick: here the question whether is we want to apply the scheme of nN: e.g. being the nN of the bearer of this exact reflexive self-referring acts may walk on too winding a path. ((s) >Castaneda, "volatile egos") I could simply assume a permanent, underlying self. Nozick: this amounts to the question of whether I prefer to assume less intrinsic unity or fewer boundaries. II 264 Def Reliability Theories/Reliability/Knowledge/Document/Talbott/Hanson/Nozick: Question: is the method by which the subject comes to a belief reliable? (FN 94). Nozick: Problem: how do you determine this statistical fact about the method used or find the reference class. Reference Class Problem/Nozick: the reference class of beliefs cannot consist in the beliefs acquired so far, because it may have been a coincidence that the method was reliable. Like the class of all possible acquisitions of beliefs, because the method is not influenced by II 265 the possibility that it fails in situations that never occur! It is about possible situations in the actual world. How do you represent it? Def Strong Reliability/Nozick: should provide knowledge rather than belief. Would be worth investigating. Reliability Theory/Nozick: externalizes justification. (Just as we have already externalized knowledge and evidence (VsTradition). Reliability/Nozick: should be right in more than 50% of cases. It would also be possible that a method delivers less than 50% correct answers, but more correct ones than any other method (see above >closest continuer). In addition, a method may be suitable (reliable) to acquire very specific (narrow) beliefs. E.g. I know from experience that every piece of news in the paper contains errors, but still I believe every statement and its conjunction. I do not know what the mistakes are! II 266 Reliability/Nozick: is a relation between belief (by method) and truth. Direction: from belief to truth. Vice versa: Conditions/Connection: (tracking) (3), (4) (see above): from truth to belief. Difference (like between error type I and II): a) the probability that a particular method leads to the belief that p is false. This relates to the adequacy of the method. (Real connection?). b) the probability that p is false, given this particular method has convinced you that p is false. That is the question of reliability. (sic). (Symmetry/Asymmetry). Evidence/Knowledge/Justification/Nozick: what are the relationships? Can we know without evidence? We can believe without having made any conclusions. A counterfactual conditional or conditional may apply without us understanding the mechanisms. Knowledge: but if a person knows something, then there is a fact available for him that p. II 267 Knowledge/NozickVsTradition: believing something is true without (perhaps weak) evidence does not imply knowledge, but it is evidence of knowledge. JTB: justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Nevertheless, it seems to be evidence of knowledge. Connection: to facts: involves a kind of universality. It seems plausible that in the case of knowledge there is a reliable submethod. II 268 Belief: in evidence: is this a reliable method for justified belief? ((s) that's not a method, at most it is circular.) Nozick: the question is whether it is the most reliable one. II 291 Free Will/Nozick: Tradition/Nozick: often presents the problem as one of punishment and responsibility. How can we punish someone if the action was causally determined? NozickVsTradition: my interest is not how we can legitimately punish others, or can consider ourselves responsible. Without free will we seem reduced, our value and our human dignity seems to be cut short. II 292 Determinism/Nozick: if our actions, as opposed to determinism were purely coincidental, our human dignity would be equally questioned. Indeterminism: hence the opponent of determinism needs a positive concept of free acts. Free Will/Nozick: a free action is then an undetermined act with a little extra. What is this little extra? This should in turn be compatible with determinism and also with the notions of human value. In this case this little extra would be the whole access to free will. Procedure: the division must look like this: a) causal determinedness and coincidence on the one hand, b) assessable actions and agents on the other. Free Will/Nozick: different approaches are possible, for example, there is an analogy to our study of knowledge (see above). We want our beliefs to relate to the facts (co-vary with them). Could the causation of actions not be related in the same way with the facts? |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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