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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anarchism | Kropotkin | Brocker I 19 Anarchism/Kropotkin: Kropotkin's turn towards anarchism goes back to his personal experiences with the egalitarian coexistence of watchmakers on a farm in Switzerland in 1872. Brocker I 20 However, the associated basic concept of communist anarchism existed even before Kropotkin. With his essays and books, he primarily contributed to their historical and scientific foundation, since Kropotkin wanted to provide a scientific explanation for anarchism. It was about free cooperation of individuals without regulation by the institution of the state. >Cooperation. The central organisational principle should be free agreement. Kropotkin saw the prerequisite for this in the formation of small and manageable groups, which would be formed by working together, local proximity or private interests. Work should be carried out in small decentralised businesses in order to overcome the negative impact of the division of labour. In the social order he was striving for, the distribution of goods should no longer take place via the individual work performed in each case. Rather, a generally equal consumption must be possible according to the formula "Everyone according to his/her needs". KropotkinVsCounsils: instead, a decentralized federation of autonomous groups in a stateless society. >Community, >Society, >Organization. Armin Pfahl-Traughber Pjotr Alexejewitsch Kropotkin, Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt (1902) in: Brocker 2018. |
Kropot I Peter Kropotkin Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt Frankfurt/Berlin/Wien 1975 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Causality | Dennett | I 577ff Two Black Boxes/Dennett: e.g. two black boxes: If you press the button "a" on box A, a red light goes on on box B. If you press button "b", a green light goes on. Apparently, the amber light never goes on. Inside box B there is a super computer. You will find that each step formed a clear causal chain without any secrets. What is puzzling, however, is that the computer always gives the same result, but does not pass through the same sequence of intermediate steps. The box checks the beliefs of the other one. If they are the same: red, if not, green. Incomprehensible (e.g. manipulated) message: amber. Declaration of the designers: It is an "expert system with trivial information" ("world experience"). The builders of the boxes insist, however, that there is no prospect to explore the causal rules with which the whole story started without using semantic concepts (or related to the mind). >Cause/Dennett. I 628 Reason/Darwin/causality/Dennett: Question: Can there be reasons which are recognized without being recognised by a conscious mind? Answer: Yes! The selection is the "blind watchmaker." (Dawkins) who still finds forced moves and other good tricks. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Evolution | Paley | Dennett I 35 Evolution/Paley: Thesis: There is no design without designers. - A clock will never be composed of pieces by itself. Dennett: This is anticipated by Hume. Hume/Dennettt: But likewise Hume expresses himself quite differently: "If now it were discovered that God himself had only imitated others?" (Embodied in the figure of Philo). - But this view was denied for fear of persecution. Dennett I 59 Evolution/Darwin/Dennettt: if one found a composite organ that was not formed by successive amendments the theory would collapse. >D. Hume, >Watchmaker, >Evolution, >Darwinism, cf. >Creationism, >God, >Complexity, >Parts, >Wholes, cf. >Mereology. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Order | Paley | Dennett I 35 Paley: "throw together a few pieces of steel, there will never be a clock without a watchmaker." Anticipated by Hume. >Evolution/Paley, >Watchmaker. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Hume | Fraassen I 212 Proof of God/HumeVsThomas Aquinas: the universe instead of God. If God's will would be crucial how should we understand this will? ((s) God's will would always be identical with the factual and therefore not to distinguish from anything else.) --- II 253 Cosmological proof of God: there must be a cause for every thing and thus an explanation of its existence. This is something necessary existent. >Cause, >Condition, >Dependence, >Causal dependence, >Ontological dependence. HumeVs: the existence of God would be a fact. Facts are never necessary. >Facts, >Necessity, >Contingency. Hume: the necessary existing could be the universe instead of God. >Totality, >Whole, >Universe. II 256 Teleological proof of God/Hume: the teological proof of god is the only one he takes seriously, because it does not require a priori assumptions. >Teleology. Here: variant: the amazing reconciliation cannot be a coincidence. An intelligent creator is necessary. >"Clockmaker". HumeVs: 1. It lacks the repetition which is necessary for connection. 2. The analogy to humans is questionable. >Absoluteness, >Connection, >Distribution. II 257 3. If yes, then they would make a) the unity of God and b) the immateriality and endlessness questionable. >Unity, >Infinity. II 259 4. Order is not evidence of conscious planning, e.g. animals have no less order than a clock, but are not begotten by a watchmaker, but by parents. >Order, >Planning, >Evolution. II 260 Principle: the production of plants and animals is always herbal or animal. In human inventions, there is an understanding of the causes but not in divine inventions. >Knowledge, >Causality. 5. (Anticipating the theory of evolution): matter is in constant motion and eventually reaches a certain stability. >Entropy, >Second law of thermodynamics. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Reason/Cause | Dennett | II 66 Reason/Cause/Knowledge/Evolution/Dennett: The early doubling macromolecules did have causes, but they had no idea about their reasons. II 77 Cause/existence/ontology/Dennett: There were causes and reasons for millions of years, but no one existed to formulate them, represent the reasons or even to appreciate them in the strict sense. Brandom I 379 Reason/Davidson/Brandom: reasons are causes - (elsewhere): Davidson always defines causality as an explanation - we only need causality. Den I 627 Reason/Darwin/causality/Dennett: Question: Can there be reasons which are recognized without a conscious mind recognizing them?. I 628 Yes! Selection is the "blind watchmaker" (Dawkins), who nevertheless finds forced moves. - Connection: with truths/Goedel which you can see but cannot prove. Dennett: intermediate solutions are good! E.g. the halting problem: a program that would not perfect but still good. >Causation, >Causality, >Causes, >Progress, >Decidability. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Science | Descartes | Duhem I 53 Descartes: "In physics, I do not admit any principles that are not permissible in mathematics. These principles are sufficient to support everything that I deduce with evidence. Descartes: the human knows the very essence of matter, which consists in extension; he/she can, therefore, deduce all properties of matter from it in a logical way. >Knowledge, >Deduction, >Substance, >Principles. The intellect does not proceed from the knowledge of the phenomena to arrive at the knowledge of matter, but it first understands the true nature of matter, from which the explanation of the phenomena results. >Phenomena. I 54 Descartes: E.g. the watchmaker can make two watches, both of which display the hours equally correctly, but which consist of different gear sets. In the same way, God has been able to produce all things visible in several different ways without the human mind being able to recognize the means he actually used. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
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