Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 42 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acquaintance | Peacocke | I 180ff Acquaintance/Russell: via sense-data, resulting in complexes (aRb), immediate memory, universals. Objects are found as a component in thought. >Objects of thought, >Complexes, >Relation, >Picture theory, >Sense data, >Universals, >Memory. PeacockeVsRussell: we reinterpret that: the object specifies the type of the way of givennes. Objects appear intensionally in thought, not extensionally. >Objects (material things), >Thoughts, >Content, >Intensions, >Extensions, >Way of givenness. We think of objects as a characteristics of a type of a way of givenness in causal antecedents and consequences of thoughts. >Type/Token, >Causality, >Perception, >World/thinking. A descriptive explanation of action or a possible world requires no acquaintance. ((s) E.g. the winner has won the prize.) >Possible worlds, >Truth, >Logical knoledge. Demonstrative: requires acquaintance: ((s) The winner has a beard.) Aquaintance/Peacocke: Aquaintance is something quite different from identification between worlds. >Cross world identity, >Identification, >Individuation. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Acquaintance | Schiffer | I 68 Def acquaintance/belief content/Russell/Schiffer: one is known with an aptitude Q when Q occurs unaccompanied by a way of givenness in a proposition, which is the full content of a belief. >Belief content, >Way of givenness, >Proposition. E.g. redness, e.g. squareness. Problem this is not true for "dog": this is composed of a natural kind, expertise, denoting, genotype, etc. - some of them we do not know from acquaintance. >Natural kinds, >Stereotypes, >Knowledge, >Denotation. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Concepts | Peacocke | I 89f Concept/Peacocke: a concept is a way to showcase a property. Translation: the translation cannot preserve both the property and the way of givenness. >Way of givenness, >Properties, >Translation, >Representation. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Content | Frege | Berka I 85 Content/Frege: content is the function of an argument. A concept is formed in the following way: the subject is the argument and the predicate is the function. >Subject, >Predicate, >Function. Berka I 86 Not every content can be assessed: e.g. the idea/concept of a house. >Judgment, >Imagination, >Negation. Berka I 87 Affirmation/Frege: affirmation refers to the whole of content and judgment. Berka I 88 Against: negation/denial: negation is part of the content, not of the judgment. Berka I 87 Def Conceptual Content/Frege/(s): conceptual content is common to passive and active. ((s) From which the same set of conclusions can be drawn.) This has nothing to do with the distinction function/argument. Berka I 96 Content Identity/Frege: content identity differs from the contingency (implication) in that it refers to names, not to contents. Two names have the same content. >Proper names. Problem: characters can sometimes stand for themselves, sometimes they stand for a content. E.g. in geometry, the same point can have different meanings. Therefore, you must use two different names first to show this later. Different names are not a mere formality. Spelling: with a triple bar ≡. This refers to conceptual content. Also content identity needs its own character, because the same content can be determined differently.(1) 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 Content/Frege: content is intension, a way of givenness. >Intensions, >Way of givenness. II 57ff Content/sentence/Frege: content can be true or false. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
| Content | Peacocke | I 144 Content/Peacocke: evidence-based approach: about constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states" = I. >Belief content, >Thought, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Constitutive role, >Roles, >Conceptual role, >Empirical content, >I, Ego, Self, >I think, >cogito, >Thinking, >Person. I 187 Description/Thought Content/Peacocke: Triple from way of givenness, object, point in time: no solution: a thought component could remain the same, while the object changes. >Descriptions, >Localization, >Identification, >Individuation, >Way of givenness. As with descriptive thoughts: it is possible that the content remains the same, while the "reference" changes. >Reference, cf. >Demonstratives, >Index Words, >Indexicality, >Objects of Belief, >Objects of Thought. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| de re | Cresswell | II 18 Belief de re/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: a de re belief about the numbers 5 and 7, so that they have a certain property, namely the property of adding up to 12. de re: is the correct analysis for sentences with propositional attitude, because it is sensitive to the individual parts, not only for the whole that-sentence. >That-clause, Fince-grained/coarse-grained, >Propositional attitudes. The opposite position: "propositional account" - this corresponds to the relation theory. >Relation theory. Problem: the proposition: that 5 + 7 = 12 is the same as that 12 = 12 - but this cannot be paraphrased like this for the attribution of propositional attitude. II 22f Belief de re/Example Ralph/Ortcutt:/Cresswell: problem: that Ortcutt loves Ortcutt, should be the same proposition as that Ortcutt loves himself. >Way of givenness, >Ortcutt expample. For Ralph: not through the brown hat. - Therefore Ralph only agreed with the first proposition, not with the second - but the first is de dicto. >de dicto. II 144 Belief de re/Cresswell: is not compatible with an abstention from the judgment. - From "x does not believe G of y" cannot be concluded - "x does not believe that G of y". Kaplan: that is also a solution for Example Ralph/Ortcutt. II 182 De re/essence/Lewis/Cresswell: (Lewis 1979a(1), p. 540): Knowledge of the nature is a too strong condition for reference de re. >Reference. 1. Lewis, D.K. (1979). Attitudes de dicto and de se. Philosophical Review 88. pp 513-43. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| de re | Schiffer | I 60f Belief de re/belief/proposition/complete content/Schiffer: (2) "Tanya believes that Gustav is a dog." attributes a belief de re with respect to canis familiaris. Complete content: contains a way of givenness of species (regardless whether it contains the species itself). E.g. "She is clever." Complete content: not ‹Emily, cleverness›. >Index words, >Indexicality, >Anaphora. Problem: she may not be clever in any possible world, or the speaker does not recognize her again. - If this is the complete content, then he would have to believe it simultaneously and do not believe it. Solution/Frege: different ways of givenness. >Way of givenness. VsProposition: "she"-refers both times to Emily. - Therefore it is not the complete content, but says only that the content contains any way of givenness. >Propositions. Problem/Schiffer: we do not know what ways of givenness are and whether there are any. Schiffer/early: (1977(1) and 1978(2)): I tried a description theory for thoughts de re. >Thoughts, >Description theory. Today SchifferVsSchiffer: that requires too complex refined a belief, that, for example, children cannot have. >Beliefs. 1. Stephen Schiffer (1977). Naming and knowing. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):28-41 2. Stephen Schiffer (1978). The basis of reference. Erkenntnis 13 (1):171--206 |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Denotation | Searle | V 254 Denoting/Frege: denoting has always a certain way of presentation (Frege’s sense). Searle: error: to think a part of the meaning of "horse" was "called horse". >Way of givenness, >Fregean sense. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Description Theory | Dummett | III (b) 68 Def " Theory of descriptions"/Kripke: According to Kripke the wrong theory that every name has the same meaning as a particular description. Dummett: In fact, Frege's view that it is essential that a name can have the same meaning as a particular description. >Recognition. III (c) 135 Attribution/Frege: Attribution of pure object knowledge without further identification of the meaning is incomprehensible. An object must somehow be given. There can be no "mere knowledge of reference". Description theory/Kripke/RussellVsFrege/Dummett: This theory is tendentiously attributed to Frege. ((s) Ultimately the view that names are "hidden descriptions", but this is not explicitely claimed by Frege). Frege is concerned with the fact that reference without meaning (meaning) is not possible. III (c) 151 Description Theory/Names/Dummett: The theory derives its considerable plausibility from the fact that someone who does not know a proper name can be made familiar with it by a verbal explanation. Modified version of the theory of descriptions: two characteristics: 1st: There is usually more than one legitimate introduction of a proper noun. The ways of givenness together offer more than is necessary for introduction. 2nd: Several solutions are available in advance for each conflict. This can be expressed in such a way that a weighted majority of sentences containing the name must prove to be true. >Way of givenness. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Explanation | Peacocke | I 71 Explanation/behavior/Peacocke: assuming, the spatial relations of a subject determine its settings. Problem: then we could explain the behavior solely from the accepted beliefs of the subject without mentioning the spatial relations. >Belief attitudes, >Spatial localization, >Behavior, >Behavioral explanation. I 81 Narrow explanation/Peacocke: E.g. someone has only the terms "there is an F", "there are two Fs", "There are three Fs" and "the Fs are numerically equivalent to the Gs". Then operations with higher numbers are explainable with these few terms. >Numerical equality. E.g. He actually arranges 20 pebbles and pieces of gold one to one. Then there is no difference in his intentional actions without one which is formulated with its few terms. >Intentions. Problem: such an unstructured ability would then be necessary and a priori. "Numerically equivalent"/numerical equality: can be treated as an unstructured operator of 2nd order. >Operators, >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Second Order Logic. I 133ff Explanation/Peacocke/Nozick: must rely on the nature of the object, not on the manner of givenness. - ((s) intension: is virtually equated with appearance- "nature" with "real object".) >Way of givenness, >Intensions. I 185 Action explanation/Peacocke: by properties of objects - explanation of thoughts: by specific markings - better: by the object itself. --- I 192 Action explanation/Peacocke: in the case of properties no specific object is meant: E.g. "red lamp", not "John's favorite color" - demonstrative: specific object, descriptively: can also be another object. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Fido-Fido-Principle | Schiffer | I 278f "Fido"-Fido principle/Nathan Salmon: E.g. Floyd believes that a) Lois Lane does not know that Clark Kent can fly - and b) Lois does not know that Superman can fly refers to the same proposition. >Proposition, >Intension, >Belief content. Because Floyd knows the story and for him the two modes of presentation refer to the same person. - For him it is the same way of givenness. >Way of givenness. For Floyd, there is no English word for a three-digit belief relation B (x, p) iff. (Em) BEL (x, p, m) (m = way of givenness). Floyd therefore cannot express what he wants to say. - Floyd himself must believe that Lois recognizes the identity. Schiffer: Salmon himself gives no representation of the way of givenness and thus the three-digit ratio - (which he himself admits). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Horizon | Husserl | Gadamer I 250 Horizon/Time Consciousness/Husserl/Gadamer: [With the term horizon] Husserl apparently tries to capture the transition of all the excluded intentionality of meaning into the supporting continuity of the whole. After all, a horizon is not a rigid boundary, but something that wanders along with it and invites further penetration. Thus the horizon intentionality, which constitutes the unity of the >stream of consciousness, corresponds to an equally comprehensive horizon intentionality on the objective side. For everything given as being is given worldly and thus carries the world horizon with it. >Way of Givenness. Self-Criticism/HusserlVsHusserl: In his "Retractations to Ideas I", Husserl emphasized in explicit self-criticism that at that time (1923) he had not yet sufficiently grasped the significance of the world phenomenon(1). The theory of transcendental reduction, which he had communicated in the ideas, thus had to become more and more complicated. The mere suspension of the validity of the objective sciences could no longer suffice, because even in the completion of the "epoch", the suspension of the being of scientific knowledge, the world remains valid as a given one. In this respect, the epistemological self-contemplation that asks for the a priori, the eidetic truths of the sciences, is not radical enough. HusserlVsNew Kantianism/DiltheyVsNew Kantianism: This is the point at which Husserl could know himself in a certain harmony with the intentions of Dilthey. In a similar way, Dilthey had fought the criticism of the New Kantians, in so far as the decline to the epistemological subject was not enough for him. >Subject/Dilthey. Dilthey: "There is no real blood running in the veins of the cognitive subject that Locke, Hume and Kant construct"(2) Dilthey himself went back to the unity of life, to the "point of view of life" and, similarly, Husserl's "life of consciousness" is a word he apparently took over from Natorp, already an indicator of the later widely accepted tendency, not only of individual experiences of consciousness, but of the veiled, anonymous implicit intentionalities Gadamer I 251 to study the consciousness and in this way to make the whole of all objective rules of being understandable. Later this means: to enlighten the achievements of the "performing life". >Subjectivity/Husserl. 1. Husserl Ill, 390: "The great mistake of starting from the natural world (without characterizing it as a world)" (1922), and the more detailed self-critique Ill, 399 (1929). The concept of horizon (and horizon consciousness is, according to Husserliana VI, 267, also inspired by W. James' concept of "fringes". The impact that R. Avenarius (Der menschliche Weltbegriff. Leipzig 1912) had on Husserl's critical turn against the "scientific world" was last pointed out by H. Lübbe in the "Festschrift für W. Szilasi" (Munich 1960) (cf. H. Lübbe, Positivismus und Phänomenologie (Mach und Husserl), FS W. Szilasi, pp. 161-184, esp. p. 171 f.). 2 Dilthey, Ges. Schriften, vol. 1. p. XVIII. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Identity | Frege | Frege II 65 Identity/Frege: e.g. a = b: the meaning of "a" is the same as that of "b". But the sense of "b" is different from that of "a". >judgment, >epistemological value, >non-trivial identity. Dummett III 70f Identity/VsFrege/Dummett: (informative/uninformative) example a = b: some: in order to understand this, you need to know: if it is true - that it is true. Important argument: then it does not provide information. FregeVs: there is no need to know if two expressions designate the same object if you understand the expressions. ((s) You can also know the "general" reference.) - ((s) The intentions may just be different.) >Way of givenness, >Intension. Frege II 40 Identity/statement/assertion of identity/identity statement/Frege: E.g. a = b: does not say anything about signs, but about objects. Otherwise, no insight would be expressed by this, because signs are arbitrary anyway. So it is not about "a" and "b" meaning the same thing. That would be a statement about signs. ((s) Instead: that they are different modes of givenness of the same object (the manner of givenness/(s): is not the sign). II 65 Identity/Frege: a = b: the meaning of "a" is the same as that of "b". But the sense of "b" is different from that of "a". Identity/Frege: identity has the same meaning but a different sense. Notion: therefore, the thought expressed by "a = a" is different from that expressed by "a = b". >Thoughts, >Equal sign, >Copula. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Incorrigibility | Peacocke | I 140 Certainty/Peacocke/(s): demonstrative way of givenness: guarantees that the object has properties that are determined by the perception (not that he has certain properties for sure). - In any case that these properties do not depend on other beliefs. >Certainty, >Properties, >Observation, >Way of givenness, >Pointing, cf. >Ostensive definition. I 140 f Infallibility/incorrigibility/immunity to error/perception: visual condition: E.g. "This man is bald": infallible in reference of "this man". >Reference, >Appearance, cf. >Appearance/Sellars, Peacocke: this is no identification, not of identity with something dependent, which is just not given - "There is (in this perception situation) no one, so he would be bald, but not this man" presented by the perception at this location. - It cannot be that the way of givenness refers to "this box" while this box is not the thing which is cubical. >Reference. Hallucination: also in this case the thought "Dummett amuses himself" is a thought about Dummett! >Hallucination. I 175 Immunity/infallibility/tradition/Evans: the judgement, to be the judgment of a specific content, can be constituted that this judgement responds to this condition. >Judgments. I/Evans: The reference may fail. >I, Ego, Self, >Self-identification, >Self-reference, cf. >Quasi-indicator. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Indexicality | Peacocke | I 106f Demonstrative way of givenness/Peacocke: here, now, this is also non-linguistically possible. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Way of givenness. Demonstraviely: "Today", descriptively: "the day after today". Instead of phrase and language only capacity for different reaction. cf. >RDRDs/Brandom, >Capability, >Concepts, >Language use. I 118 Summary/Peacocke: what is determinative of a given demonstrative type, is the pattern of evidence or prior conditions so that judgments that contain tokens of this type, must be sensitive for it. The constitutive role that is associated with this type, must capture this complex pattern of evidential sensitivity. >Evidence, >Type/Token, >Roles, >Conceptual Role, >Causal Role. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Individuation | Searle | V 251 Individuation/Identification/Fregean sense/Searle: no manner of presentation (>way of givenness) is connected with a single predicate, because that is not an identifying description, e.g. Leo Peter and Gustav Lauben do not know that they are talking about the same person. Kripke: needs >essential properties to solve the problem. >Information processing/Psychology, >Computation, >Connectionism, >Model. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Intensions | Anscombe | Frank I 96 I/Intension/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here the "way of givenness" is unimportant. >Way of givenness. 97 The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.". His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as subject, then they are true if and only if the predicates of x are true. >Predication. AnscombeVsLogic/AnscombeVsKripke: for this reason, he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes". >I, Ego, Self, >Saul Kripke. But this is too superficial: if you are a speaker who says "I", you cannot find out what it is that says "I". For example, we do not look from which device the sound comes. >Self-identification, >Self-reference, >Reference. Thus, we must require our logicians to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I". I 98 Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no difference between "I" and "A". >Logic/Anscombe. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Intensions | Frege | Frege II 45 Intension/Extension: the thought is not the meaning (Fregean reference) of the sentence (but the content). For the terminology see also >Fregean Sense. ((s) The terms 'intension' and 'extension' come from Carnap and were not used by Frege himself). Sense/Frege: sense corresponds to the intension. >Way of givenness. Extension: the extension is the object. >Object, >Extension. Dummett I 18 Def "sense" of an expression/Frege: is the way in which its reference is given. Therefore we must first have the concept of the reference. But if we now have the concept of the reference before that of the sense, we cannot claim that the reference is a property of the sense, but only a property of the expression! This becomes clear in the Basic Laws, where Frege determines the interpretation of his symbolism through determinations which prescribe each expression its respective reference. Taken together, these determinations determine for each formula under which conditions it is true. The sense is to be mentioned later. Accordingly, the determinations would be incomprehensible if the concept of the reference to an expression had been derived. I 18 Frege then later explains the sense by referring to the determinations that regulate the reference. >Fregean sense, >Reference. Dummett I 48 Reference/Frege: theory of reference was there before the theory of "sense". "Sense" determines the reference. Husserl: reference equals "sense": The sense determines the relation (the "meaning") in the strong sense that it is - assuming the facts of the world - the factual sense of an expression that explains how it is given its factual "meaning" (relation). (Not only Evans' "weak" sense that no two expressions can have the same sense, but different "meanings" (reference). Thus, a theory of reference is not yet a theory of sense, but its indispensable basis. Not unlike Frege, Husserl takes the view that the sense of an expression is a constitutive element to which it owes its respective reference. >Sense/Husserl. Dummett I 48f Use/Frege/Dummett: the use gives the meaning. The meaning gives the reference (Frege). Meaning is not equal to reference: e.g. unicorn: the term is not meaningless, therefore one knows only that it does not refer to any object. I 48ff Use/Frege/Dummett: use provides meaning - sense provides reference (Frege). Meaning is different from reference: e.g. unicorn. >Non-existence, >Use, >Unicorn example. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Learning | Cresswell | II 62 Learning/Cresswell: a) by explicit definition, then what you have learned can be represented by a complex structure that reflects the definition b) Examples (ostension). >Definitions, >Ostensive definition, >Ostension. Problem: then a consequence might have been generated by different formula. >Indeterminacy, >Rule following, >Kripke's Wittgenstein. Common meaning: for this we suggest taking the formula itself, since we can not see in the head the other. >Other minds, cf. >Principle of Charity. II 63 N.B.: ostension: learning by examples, the function itself is learned, not a way of representation of this formula. >Way of givenness. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Meaning | Frege | Husted V 103 Def "Sense" (meaning) of the sentence: the sense of the sentence is its truth condition. II 41 Meaning: the meaning is what the sign signifies, e.g. the planet Venus, the extension. It is that what one wants to talk about. >Extension. II 42 Sense: the sense is the way of givenness, e.g. the meaning of "the intersection of b and c" is other than "a and b" (even though the point is identical). Significance is illuminated only one-sidedly by the sense. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Intension, >Sense. II 42 Example: “The celestial body that is farthest away from the Earth”. There is no doubt that these words have a meaning but it is uncertain if there is an object satisfiying it. >Reference. II 69 The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate) but always a subject. II 43 Meaning/sense/Frege: meaning and sense are not the same. The meaning of a word or name is a real object. Sense: is not based on a person like an idea, e.g. there is a sense of "par excellence". See also Fregean Sense, >Imagination. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Natural Kinds | Schiffer | I 37 Description theory/natural kind/twin earth/Schiffer: no solution: "the beings that are co-specific with such and such looking beings which I met". >Twin earth, >Description theory, >Identification, >Reference. Then "cat" refers to both. - That does not work (see below). Belief/Schiffer: belief must not be single digit, then it would not be indexed to the person. - (Twin earth: then both had the same belief anyway). >Beliefs. I 41 Natural kind/belief/Schiffer: Problem: the theories of Kripke/Putnam for natural kinds are unsuitable for belief predicates. Kripke: original term "dog": "this kind of thing" - (paradigmatic instances). >Natural kinds/Kripke, >Natural kinds/Putnam, >Twin earth/Putnam, >Belief properties. I 54 Natural kind/proposition/belief/Schiffer: E.g. Tanya believes that Gustav is a dog. Problem: the proposition cannot be the content of belief, because there is no representation of the role that represents the natural kind term "dog" here. >Proposition, >Belief content. 1. possibility: that-sentence with predicate, "that" refers to property (dog) - (Classic: they are introduced directly into the proposition). 2. Frege: the proposition does not contain the dog property, but a way of givenness, which is how Tanya imagines dog property (belief de re). >Way of givenness. Problem: then the that-sentence does not refer to the complete content of belief, but e.g. (∃m) (m is a manner of presentation of dog property & B (Tanya)). Then (3) cannot be the content of belief: (3) ‹Gustav, the property of being a dog› >That-clause. Natural kind: it may be that there is no non-pleonastic language-independent characteristic of being a dog. I 55 Natural kind/Wittgenstein/Putnam/Kripke: natural kinds are not to define by obsertion terms (or observable properties). Because we lack appropriate expressions for dog-like appearance and behavior. Correct: properties of acquaintance/Russell. >Acquaintance. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Noema | Dummett | I 36 Noema/Husserl/Dummett: Husserl generalizes the concept of meaning and sense until he arrives at his conception of Noema, making it impossible to turn to language. (A generalization of Frege's concept of meaning, however, is impossible). Sense of object/sense: Tradition: In the past, it has been argued that if the sense is the condition of the reference object, then if there is no object, there can be no corresponding condition and therefore no sense. >Way of Givenness. Frege/Dummett: The difficulty is caused by the fact that Frege strictly equates the >semantic value of a singular term and the object it is supposed to refer to. I 52 The slogan "No sense without semantic value" is bribing, but it can only be accepted at the price of admitting that a singular term without reference still has a semantic value, which then presumably consists in the mere fact of the absence of a reference. Husserl has no reservations in this respect. He generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized concept Husserl uses the term "Noema". Def Noema 1: The object of the act of consciousness is given by its noema. It is in the nature of noema that it is directed towards an object and this explains the intentionality of the act of consciousness. Every consciousness act must have a noema. He perceives by means of the noema, but he does not perceive it himself nor does he grasp it in any other way. Mere means: no direct perception of independent objects. I 53 Deception: A perception caused by sensory deception no longer poses a problem, because it is also no problem if a noema has no object corresponding to it. The characteristic of intentionality is just as important. Frege rarely refers to what we are aware of when we speak, because in his opinion this does not matter in terms of objective qualities. In the same spirit, Husserl asserts that we really perceive the objects of our perceptual acts, that this is not merely a way of speaking. The noema normally does not play the role of an object of the observer's consciousness at all. And certainly not his perceptions. >Noema/Husserl; cf. >Idealism/Dummett. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Opacity | Hintikka | II 57 Opacity/Frege/identity/opaque context/Hintikka: Frege was involved in the failure of the (substitutability in identity) ((s) that is, that the individuals may have different names) and not in the failure of the existential generalization. ((s) That is, the individuals may not exist.) >Existential generalization, >Substitution, >Substitutability. Hintikka: therefore we need different additional premises. Semantics of possible worlds: Substitutability in identity: here, for substitutability in identity, we need only the assumption that we can compare the referents of two different terms in every world. Existential generalization: here we must compare the reference of one and the same term in all worlds. Frege/Hintikka: it seems now that Frege could still be defended in a different way: namely, that we now quantify via world lines (as entities). ((s) This would meet Frege's Platonism.) II 58 World Lines/Hintikka: world lines are somehow "real". Are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"? HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world-bound individuals and world lines as individuals. World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". To use world lines is not to reify. Solution/Hintikka: we need world lines because without them it would not even make sense to ask whether a resident of a possible world is the same as that of another possible world ((s) cross-world identity). II 59 World Line/Hintikka: we use the world line instead of Frege's "way of giving". HintikkaVsFrege: his mistake was to reify the "way of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual. Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, we do not have to ask in this context "about what do we have to quantify"? >Quantification. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Perspective | Nozick | II 22 Perspective/Nozick: it is true of all perspectives that each perspective is particular. These relational facts are about one perspective but they are independent of each perspective. Cf. >Objectivity/Nagel. One can identify a point of view quite different from the way the world looks from it. >Point of view, >Truth, >Facts, >Relations, cf. >Way of givenness. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Possible World Semantics | Hintikka | II 43 Semantics of Possible Worlds/possible world semantics/non-existent objects/non-existence/possibility/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds should assume possible individuals as inhabitants not only of possible worlds, but even of the actual world. II 50 Semantics of Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: here there is no >systematic ambiguity, i.e. the expressions mean intensionally the same as extensionally. >Intensions, >Extensions. E.g. to know what John knows is to know the worlds that are compatible with his belief, and to know which ones are not. II 51 Extra premise: for this, one must be sure that an expression in different worlds picks out the same individual. Context: what the relevant worlds are, depends on the context. E.g. Ramses: here the case is clear. On the other hand: E.g. Herzl knew that Loris was a great poet. Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal. II 53 Meaning Function/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the difference of my approach to that of Frege is that I consider the problems locally, while Frege regards them globally. Fregean sense (= way of being given)/Hintikka: the Fregean sense must be regarded as defined for all possible worlds. >Fregean sense, >Way of givenness. On the other hand: Hintikka: if the Fregean sense is constructed as a meaning function, it must be regarded in my approach only as defined for the relevant alternatives. Frege: Frege uses the concept of the identity of the senses implicitly. And as a function of meaning the identity is only given if the mathematical function applies for all relevant arguments. Totality/Hintikka: this concept of the totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful. Solution/Hintikka: precisely the semantics of possible worlds helps to dispense with the totality of all possible worlds ((s) and to only consider the relevant alternatives, defined by the context). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: the Fregean sense was constructed as a quasi-object (object of setting, propositional object, thought object, object of belief), because they were assumed as entities in the actual world, however abstract they were. II 54 Meaning Function/HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses". Object of Knowledge/object of thought/Frege/Hintikka: Frege has never considered the problem, unlike e.g. Quine. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. II 57 Meaning Function/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: in order to be a solution, the meaning function must be a constant function, that is, it must pick out the same individuals in all the worlds. II 205 Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds needs no conception of possible worlds as complete cosmological worlds, but only "small worlds", rather like event progress or situations, I also speak of "scenarios". >Situations. Possible World/Hintikka: the expression possible world is misleading, if one considers them as complete worlds. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Reference | Anscombe | Frank I 87 Reference/Frege/Anscombe: there is no way back from the reference to the meaning. >Sense, >Meaning. Each object has many modes of givenness or description modes. >Way of givenness. Intension/"I"/Anscombe: because of the peculiarity of the construction it succeeds to determine an object, despite the theoretically many possibilities of the way of being given: for we do not want to assume "Smith does not realize the identity with Smith". >Intension. If we consider the reflexive in the ordinary sense, this would be possible. "I"/Special Reflexivum/Anscombe: the special reflexivum can only be explained from the point of view of the first person. >First person. Frege: we have not already understood the meaning when a person is told of what object a person will speak of when he says "I" whether he knows it or not. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. However, the use of "I" ensures that the speaker knows it, but we still have a right to ask what he knows! |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Relation-Theory | Schiffer | I 8 Relation Theory/Schiffer: "There is something that he believes" - can only be inferred with referential quantification (not with substitutional quantification) . Substitutional Quantification: is true if a substitution instance of "Elmer believes that S" is true. Referential Quantification: "..believes x" whereby an x must exist. Substitutional Quantification: allows no relation theory because the substitutional quantification is consistent with every representation of the logical form of substitution instances that make the quantification true. I 15 Relation Theory/Schiffer: Relation to sentences: Davidson (1969)(1): to the public language of the attributing. Carnap (1947)(2): to the public language of the believer. Loar: public language of the attributing, but the semantic attributes (which determine the content) are in the Tarski-style (non-public). -Then there is nothing about the role of expressions or use in population. >Language use, >Language community. Problem: then beliefs must be individuated by interpersonal functional states - that does not work with Tarski. >Truth definition/Tarski. 1. Donald Davidson (1969). "The individuation of events". In: In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel. pp. 216-34 2. Rudolf carnap (1947). Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press --- I 70 SchifferVsPropositionalism/VsRelation Theory with proposition as an object: if true, the proposition would include as content either dog property itself (this does not work because of shmog) or way of givenness of it. Way of givenness: We have no clue what it should be. >Way of givenness. I 73 Relation Theory/Schiffer: here for representation (= sentences) in mentalese (instead of propositions). >Sentences, >Propositions. Meaning in mentalese determines meaning in public language, not vice versa. (+) >Mentalese (Laguage of thought), >Everyday language. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Sense | Cresswell | II 28 Sense/Cresswell: Here a structure e.g. from individual references of the parts. "Meaning = structure". (Sensitivity of "that" on the parts of the complement sentence (after "that"); not only on the whole sentence because of the attribution of propositional attitudes that can be wrong when substituted. >Propositional attitudes, >Substitution. II 26 That has to do with Frege’s "way of givenness". >Way of givenness. II 77 Sense / Cresswell: consists in the structures that are formed from the meanings of the parts - contrary to that: Reference / Cresswell: is the result of the fact that the parts of an expression stand in relation to one another in the way of argument and function. Reference/(s): should be the simple whole. >Reference. Intension: also a simple entity. Attribution of propositional attitudes/Cresswell: should be sensitive to the structure (parts), not to the intension. >Intensions, >Attribution. II 86 Meaning (= structure) is not the same as reference. - Reference: = intension (= "whole"). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Sense | Evans | Frank I 485f Sense/Evans: Evans is in favour of these views: pro Frege, pro Oxford (everyday language) - while he ist against these views: VsPerry, VsCastaneda. Fregean sense/Evans: should be regarded as a way of thinking instead of a way of givenness. >Way of givenness, >Fregean sense. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Sense | Mates | I 99 Sense/meaning/Frege / Mates: Sense and meaning should not be confused because the compositionality applies to both ((s) seperately) : e.g. (1) morning star and evening star are the same (2) morning star and morning star are the same. (1) and (2) do not have the same meaning - E.g. a = a is not the same sense as a = b. >Identity, >Identity/Frege. N.B.: nevertheless m.s. and e.s. have the same meaning (reference). >Reference, >Meaning, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. Meaning/Frege: meaning of a statement: the truth value (object). >Truth values. Sense of a statement/Frege: thought, content, proposition. ((s) decisive place in the literature). >Thought, >Content, >Proposition. Truth value/MatesVsFrege: Truth values do not exist. - Vet Mates per Frege, without Frege's metaphysics. The sense (manner of presentation) uniquely determines the meaning (reference). >Way of givenness, cf. >Intension, >Extension. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Sense Data Theory | Millikan | I 302 Sense Data/contradiction/Millikan: a contradiction can only arise if one and the same judgment is applied several times. Object: the same object must have been identified in more than one way. That is, it must be possible that there is more than one intension of an object. >Identification/Millikan, >Intension/Millikan. Sense data/MillikanVsSense Data theory: sense data cannot be the object because a sense date cannot be given in several ways. ((s) There is always only one way of givenness of a sense date, otherwise it is about several sense data). Sense Data/Millikan: Every sense date presents itself only to one sense (e.g. touch, sense of smell). (s) i.e. it cannot be said that this soft object smells rotten or that it is the same object). Millikan: one needs a fully developed theory about law-like relationships between sense data. Otherwise you cannot test them at all! And therefore no concepts can be developed from them. And this would be contrary to the first condition that the concepts to be tested should only form small groups. I 312f Sense Data Theory/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be that neither an inner nor an outer language actually describes sense data, except that the language depends on previous concepts of external things that normally cause sense data. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Sense Data Theory | Peacocke | I 52 Sense-data / Peacocke: the sense-data theory has characteristic spatial terms such as square or oblong sense data, etc. - but they are not spatially on a representational level. >Description levels, >Levels/order. This distinction keeps us from the error to ask "are sensory data surfaces?" Cf. >Qualia. I 131 Sense-data/Russell/Peacocke: Russels sense data meet the singular-term positions in the sentence. - They are real extensional constituents. - With no way of presentation. >Extensions, >Intensions, >Way of givenness, >Singular terms. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Sentence Meaning | Frege | II 47 Sentence Meaning/Frege: the idea is not the meaning of the sentence (but the content). Different intentions do not change the meaning, but the sense of the sentence. >Meaning, >Sentences, >Thoughts, >Content. Newen I I21 Sentence Meaning/Frege: the sentence meaning has a truth value for compositionality, substitutivity and the principle of diversity (one of two sentences can be true the other can be wrong). Then the truthmaker equals the circumstances - but the meaning does not equal content. ((s) Truth-makers as a third instance). >Compositionality, >Truth value. Sentence meaning/Frege: the sentence meaning is the content. The sense of the word: is the way of givenness. Sense of proper names/Frege: "the F". >Way of givenness, >Subsententials. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Spirit | Husserl | Gadamer I 247 Spirit/Husserl/Gadamer: [It becomes clear] that with the topic of intentionality an increasingly radicalizing critique of the "objectivism" of previous philosophy - also of Dilthey(1) - began, which was to culminate in the claim of philosophy: "that intentional phenomenology for the first time made the spirit as a spirit a field of systematic experience and science and Gadamer I 248 thereby achieved the total conversion of the task of knowledge. The universality of the absolute spirit encompasses all being in an absolute historicity, which nature classifies itself as a mental entity"(2). >Intentionality. Gadamer: It is no coincidence that here the spirit is contrasted as the only absolute, i.e. irrelative of the relativity of everything that appears to him; indeed, Husserl himself acknowledges the continuity of his phenomenology with Kant's and Fichte's transcendental question: "It must be added, however, in fairness that the German idealism emanating from Kant was already passionately endeavored to overcome the already sensitive naivety" (sc. of objectivism)(3). HusserlVsPhilosophy of Consciousness/Psychology/Gadamer: This is (...) the consequence of his own criticism of objectivist psychology and the pseudo-Platonism of the philosophy of consciousness. This is completely clear after the publication of "Ideas II" (4). >Consciousness/Husserl, >Objectivism/Husserl, >Way of Givenness/Husserl. 1. Husserliana VI, 344. 2. Husserliana VI, 346. 3. Husserliana VI, 339 and VI, 271. 4. Husserliana Vol. IV, 1952. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Subjectivity | Husserl | Gadamer I 249 Subjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: Validity of being (German: "Seinsgeltung") now also possesses human subjectivity [in Husserl's phenomenology](1). It is therefore to be regarded just as much, i.e. it too is to be explored in the multiplicity of its modes of existence. Such an exploration of the ego as a phenomenon is not "inner perception" of a real ego, but it is also not a mere reconstruction of the i.e. relationship of the contents of consciousness to a transcendental ego pole (Natorp)(2) but is a highly differentiated subject of transcendental reflection. Cf. >Objectivism/Husserl, >Consciousness/Husserl. Way of Givenness: This reflection represents the growth of a new dimension of research compared to the mere fact of phenomena of objective consciousness, a fact in intentional experiences. For there is also a given fact that is not itself the object of intentional acts. Every experience has implied horizons of the before and after and finally merges with the continuum of the before and after present experiences to form the unity of the stream of experience. >Time Consciousness/Husserl. Gadamer I 251 Subjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: The fact that Husserl has that "performance" of transcendental subjectivity everywhere in mind simply corresponds to the task of phenomenological constitutional research. But it is characteristic of his actual intention that he no longer says consciousness, or even subjectivity, but "life". He simply wants to go back behind the actuality of the consciousness that means, yes, also behind the potentiality of the fellow-mine to the universality of a last, which alone is able to measure the universality of what has been accomplished, i.e. what is constituted in its validity. It is a fundamentally anonymous intentionality, i.e. one that is no longer performed by anyone by name, through which the all-encompassing world horizon is constituted. Husserl, consciously countering a concept of the world that encompasses the universe of that which can be objectified by the sciences, calls this phenomenological concept of the world "the life-world," i.e., the world "into" which we live in the natural setting, which does not as such ever become representational to us, but which represents the given ground of all experience. >Lifeworld/Husserl. Gadamer I 253 Subject/Husserl/Gadamer: "The radical view of the world is a systematic and pure inner view of the self in the outward subjectivity(3). It is like in the unity of a living organism, which we can well observe and dissect from the outside, but can only understand if we go back to its hidden roots...". Subject/Husserl: In this way, the subject's behavior in the world also has its comprehensibility not in the conscious experiences and their intentionality, but in the anonymous ones of life. >I, Ego, Self/Husserl. Subjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: (...) this is how one is led into the proximity of the speculative concept of life of German idealism. What Husserl is trying to say is that one must not think of subjectivity as an opposition to objectivity, because such a concept of subjectivity would itself be objectivistic. His transcendental phenomenology wants to be "correlation research" instead. But this says: the relation is the primary, and the "poles" into which it unfolds are "enclosed by itself"(4) just as the living encloses all its expressions of life in the uniformity of its organic being. HusserlVsHume: "The naivety of the speech of the experiencing, recognizing, the really concretely performing subjectivity leaves completely out of question, the naivety of the scientist Gadamer I 254 of nature, of the world in general, who is blind to the fact that all the truths he gains as objective ones, and the objective world itself, which in his formulas is substrate, is his own life structure that has become in him - is of course no longer possible, as soon as life comes into focus," (Husserl writes this with reference to Hume(5)). 1. Husserliana VI. 169. 2. Natorp, Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, 1888; Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, 1912. 3. Husserliana VI, p. 116. 4. Cf. C. Wolzogen, „Die autonome Relation. Zum Problem der Beziehung im Spätwerk Paul Natorps. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theorien der Relation“ 1984 and my review in Philos. Rdsch. 32 (1985), p. 1601. 5. Husserliana VI p. 99 |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Substance | Spinoza | Holz I 31 Substance/Spinoza: is with him unique according to its nature, infinite, and indivisible. Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: whoever starts from the thought prerequisite of the substantial unity of the world and the experience prerequisite of the qualitative difference of beings (of manifoldness) can conceive this manifoldness only as manifestations or aspects of the one substance, in which "all that one had taken for true, has perished." >Unity/Spinoza, >Appearance, >World, >Order, >World/Thinking. This, however, reveals the actual presupposition of thinking, the difference in the content of thought. Leibniz saw the danger. Holz I 32 Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in the unity". >Unity and multiplicity. If deduction is only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought. >Reduction, >Reductionism. Holz I 62 Identity Principle/objective cognition/Leibniz: The objective unity of the world can also be shown independently of my perception, it is evident in the way of givenness of every consciousness content in itself. (Everything appears as what it appears). >Identity, >Self-identity, >Whole, >Totality. Adequacy does not matter here. >Adequacy. "Tantum est quantum est, tale est quale est". Pre-predictive being a priori. Problem: then the phenomena are still mere moments of the one and only substance, as in Spinoza. Substance/Spinoza: no being is to be justified against the universe in its own being. Rather, the reduction of identical sentences would lead to an "ens absolute infinitum" in Spinoza, from which "it follows that there is only one substance and that it is infinite." However, this reduction can only come to a beginning with a waiver of the substantial existence of the many individuals. Holz I 63 VsSpinoza: if one accepts the existence of the individual, the problem is insoluble for Spinoza. He solves the problem, or it does not come into his field of view, because he conceives the essence of the human only as formed from certain modifications of the attributes of God. With this, the Cartesian doubt is covered up. The ego cogitans becomes the mere appearance, the annexation of the self-assured unity of God. Thus Spinoza returns to medieval realism. Thus the rationality of the factual cannot be justified. >Rationality, >Rationalism, >Ultimate justification, >Foundation, >Realism. Höffe I 232 Substance/Spinoza/Höffe: The only substance that exists, God, is cause of itself (causa sui); the different basic forms of reality are nothing else but attributes of God. This indwelling (immanence) of all things in God and God in all things amounts to a pantheism (All-God doctrine: God is everything and in everything). It excludes a transcendent concept of God that transcends the world and, although its system starts from a concept of God, it brings Spinoza the then almost fatal accusation of atheism(1). >Pantheism, >God. 1. Spinoza. Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, 1677 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| That-Clauses | Schiffer | I 7 That-clause/relational theory/Schiffer: tradition: a that-clause is a singular term. - E.g. That snow is white has a reference that can be true/false. Paratactic analysis/Davidson: "that", demonstrative, refers to an occurrence. SchifferVs: this leads to the relation theory - (it presupposes objects of belief). >Relation theory. Since there is an infinite number of relational predicates, these cannot appear as basic terms. >Compositionality. I 9 That-clause/Schiffer: a that-clause is no singular term but indirect and partial characterization of what Elmer believes. >Paul and Elmer) I 274 de dicto/Schiffer: reduction to de dicto is only possible if a way of givenness without reference to objects of which they are about, is possible. >Substitutional quantification, >Way of givenness. I 129 That-clause/belief/most authors/Schiffer: the that-clause does not refer to a belief. - That means to the neuronal state-token which is the belief. - But to entities with truth value and other content-determining characteristics. Problem: then we need (unlike propositions) an independent presentation of the contents of the neural state-Tokens. I 211 That-clause/Schiffer: Thesis: a that-clause does not refer. It is no refering expression. Problem: how should one explain: E.g. Paul and Elmar believe that ... so there is an attribute that they have in common. Nominalism: for nominalism, which denies any classes of properties, the language must not a have compositional semantics. >Compositionality. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Translation | Mates | I 93 Translation/formal language/Mates: a translation of everyday language in the artificial language is meaningless as long as the artificial language is not interpreted. >Interpretation, >Artificial language, >Formal language, >Formalization, >Natural language. "Minimum translation":a minimum translation translates true in true and false in false statements. >Truth preservation, >Truth transfer. I 102 Translation/meaning/sense/interpretation/Mates: to know whether something is a satisfactory translation (of a formal language), we need not only to know the meaning (reference), but also the sense - otherwise we can obtain various everyday language translations. Sense/Mates: cannot be stated in a list as meaning. >Sense. Meaning/Mates: meaning gives the non-logical constants truth conditions: E.g. 2 < 3 is true, if the smallest prime number is less than 3. >Meaning. Sense/Mates: sense provides the content: that the smallest ... is smaller. Reference/Mates: reference provides truth conditions: true, if ... >Truth conditions. Sense: content: that it is true. >Reference, >Content. I 110 Translation/variables/Mates: the translation is not affected by the substitution of the variables, but only by the substitution of the constants. >Variables, >Constants. I 111 Translation/summary/Mates: 1. meaningless without interpretation. (Assignment of objects to the individual constants) 2. If an interpretation is given, one can get a "standard translation" for every formal statement, and this by means of the definition of "true in interpretation I" - Problem: if the same interpretation is given in various ways (E.g. 2 = "smallest prime" or "sole even prime number") one can obtain several non-synonymous translations. >Way of givenness, >Intension. Two formal statements may be equivalent, without being equally good translations. >Equivalence. Conversely it is possible: that two statements are adequate but not equivalent - (only for ambiguity). >Adequacy, >Ambiguity. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Way of Givenness | Way of givenness, manner of presentation, philosophy: expression from G. Frege for distinguishing meaning (in Frege's sense of meaning that upon which a term refers - today "reference") and the sense (in Frege's use of the term, what we today call "meaning"). The givenness depends both on the circumstances and the individual language use. Carnap introduces the concept of "intension" for the way of givenness. See also intensions, extensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, improper speech, proper speech, improper sense, proper sense, meaning, reference. |
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| Way of Givenness | Frege | Dummett III 133 Sense/Frege/Dummett: sense is constituted by the way of givenness - it is not identical with it. Ad Frege II 40 Ways of Givenness/(s): ways of givenness are not a sign because identity does not say anything about (contingent) signs. >Identity. Frege I 128 Ways of Givenness/way of being given/Frege: e.g. "square root of 1": Concept -> Identity constitutes that one and the same object corresponds to two ways of givenness. There are not simply two (arbitrary) signs. Cf. >Intensions, >Equations, >Concept, >Object. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Way of Givenness | Husserl | Gadamer I 248 Way of Givenness/Husserl/Gadamer: According to Husserl's own statement(1) it was the a priori-correlation of experience and ways of givenness, which dominated his whole life-work since the logical investigations. Already in the fifth logical investigation he had worked out the peculiarity of intentional experiences and distinguished consciousness - as he made it a research topic, "as an intentional experience"(...) - from the real unit of consciousness of experiences and from their inner perception. >Experience/Husserl, >Consciousness/Husserl, >Introspection. Gadamer I 249 Validity of being now also possesses human subjectivity [in Husserl's phenomenology]. It is therefore to be regarded just as much, i.e. it too is to be explored in the diversity of its modes of existence. Such an exploration of the ego as a phenomenon is not "inner perception" of a real ego, but it is also not a mere reconstruction of the i.e. relationship of the contents of consciousness to a transcendental ego pole (Natorp)(2) but is a highly differentiated topic of transcendental reflection. Way of Givenness: This reflection represents the growth of a new dimension of research compared to the mere fact of phenomena of objective consciousness, a fact in intentional experiences. For there is also a given fact that is not itself the object of intentional acts. Every experience has implied horizons of the before and after and finally merges with the continuum of the before and after present experiences to form the unity of the stream of experience. >Time/Husserl, >Time-consciousness/Husserl. 1. Husserliana VI. 169. 2. Natorp, Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, 1888; Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, 1912. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Way of Givenness | Schiffer | I 53 Givenness/manner of presentation/way of givenness/propositional theory/Schiffer. Variant: instead of "Henry thinks that this girl is wise" (index word) (Em) m is a way of givenness this girl & B (Henry) Problem: that does not tell us which proposition Henry believes, but only that he believes any known feature in the propositional theory. >Propositions, >Beliefs, >Opacity, >Content, >Index words. I 277 Identity/way of presentation/Schiffer: Solution: you can simply accept conflicting beliefs ("it is a dog but not a shmog"). Superman/Clark Kent: Lois Lane believes that Kent is identical with himself. Problem: then you cannot accept for natural kind concepts without even concede it at the same time also for singular terms in sentences. Fido-Fido: explains why dogness and shmogness do not refer to the same proposition - (despite equality extension): because Tanya does not believe that shmogs are dogs. >arthritis/shmarthritis, > Externalism. Nathan SalmonVs all: Fido-Fido example "Fido" = Fido. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anscombe, E. | Chisholm Vs Anscombe, E. | I 40 I/Self/Identity/Proposition/Other philosophers: four recent attempts: 1) Anscombe: "I am this thing here" is a real proposition, but not a proposition of identity. It means: This thing here is the thing, the person of whose action this idea of an action is an idea, of whose movements this notion of movement is a notion, etc. I 42 ChisholmVsAnscombe: She tries to explain her use of "I" by the demonstrative "this". It is clear that she cannot explain my use of "I" with this. Therefore, she has no theory for indirect I 73 I/Anscombe: "I am this one" is a real proposition, but not a proposition of identity. Instead, it means: this thing here is the thing of whose action this idea of an action is an idea. ChisholmVsAnscombe: she tries to explain her use of "I" through the use of "this", I 74 but it is clear that she cannot explain my use of "I" with it. Peacocke I 150 Guaranteed reference/Peacocke: this idea can be found in connection with demonstrative thoughts. It now appears that neither the field of the identificationally basic nor that of the constitutive identificationally basic types exactly matches the class of guaranteed referring types. Def Guaranteed reference/Peacocke: E.g. whenever someone suspects themselves to be thinking a thought with a certain way of givenness, then there is indeed such a way of givenness and it refers. In this sense, some identificationally basic cases have no guaranteed reference. E.g. unrealized hallucination. Guaranteed reference is not sufficient for identificational basality (independence from identification): guaranteed reference: E.g. "my paternal grandfather" has a guaranteed reference for a normal human. E.g. a way of givenness of form "the oldest now living person and otherwise I." In both cases, reference is even guaranteed a priori! But from inference, not from identification. But these examples are not identification ally basic, nor is it sufficient for identification independence that a way of givenness type m is guaranteed to apply to an object, so that the subject then believes that it is a way of givenness type m! Not sufficient: as ability to recognize also passes the test ((s) but is dependent on identification). E.g. If someone hallucinates that Dummett is standing in front of them, this is still a thought about Dummett. Which object the thought picks out does not depend on the object meeting a certain description. Rather, it depends on certain complex relations with the thinker. Demonstrative thoughts/Peacocke: not all of these relations are independent from identification, and that needs to be explained by the theory of dG. Identificationally basic/Peacocke: does not imply that any substantial identity was definitely true in the case of an i.g. way of givenness. I 151 It is only about a way of knowledge that is not based on other beliefs. I/Guaranteed reference/Anscombe: (The First Person, p.57): "I" is an expression X which has a guaranteed reference in the following sense: not only that there is such a thing X, but also that what I suppose to be X actually is X."... the person of whose movements these movement ideas are ideas..." Self-identification/PeacockeVsAnscombe: you can identify someone else falsely with these conditions! E.g. Anscombe would allow the bishop to see a woman disguised as a bishop in the mirror, and falsely sees her as himself. (ChisholmVsAnscombe: she shows how she identifies herself, but not how I identify myself). |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Evans, G. | Peacocke Vs Evans, G. | I 169/170 Demonstratives/Evans: perceptually demonstrative ways of givenness are possible, because these conditions are fulfilled: in a normal perception situation, there is an information link between subject and object, and also the subject knows or is able to find out where the object is. If the subject has the general ability to know what propositions makes of the form "π = p" true for any π (where π is an identification of a public place without index words (in a non-indexical frame of reference)) if p is the notion of a place in its egocentric space. If it is also able to locate the object in its egocentric space, we can say that it has an idea of the object. Idea/Notion/Evans/Terminology/Intension/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: Evans "Idea" (notion) corresponds to my way of givenness "mode of presentation". Idea/Evans: Thesis: we can conceive the idea of an object a as consisting in its knowledge of what it is to be true for an arbitrary sentence of the form "δ = a". Peacocke: where "δ" is the area of the basic ideas of an object. Fundamental Idea/Evans: is what you have if you think of an object as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has. Peacocke: i.e. what distinguishes an object from all others. I.e. for material objects type and location. PeacockeVsEvans: we have already seen cases where the thinker was unable to locate the object in his egocentric space: E.g. the craters on the moon. I 171 E.g. apple in the mirror cabinet. But it still seems possible to think about it, for example, wonder where it is! It is true that it is possible to at least provide a rough direction in egocentric space, but that is hardly sufficient for the knowledge condition of Evans. In the case of the memory image, it is clearer that no localization in the current egocentric space is needed. pro Evans: there must be additional imaginable evidence, e.g. experience or tools for localization (if necessary, even space travel!). If that were not imaginable, we would have to assume that the subject was not able to think of the object in public space! pro Evans: an information link is not sufficient to think demonstratively about the object. VsEvans: but that is less than to demand that the thinker can locate the object at present. Weaker Requirement: Instead, a general ability of the subject can locate the object, if necessary, is sufficient. Evans: if you cannot locate an object, you can still think of it in the mixed demonstrative descriptive way of givenness: "that which causes my experience". But in normal cases this is a wrong description! Peacocke: it also seems to be wrong in the examples of the lunar craters, the apple in the mirror cabinet. PeacockeVsEvans: trange asymmetry: Idea/Evans: an idea a of a place in a self-centered space is an adequate idea of a place in the public space. Holistic/Evans: if an arbitrarily fundamental identification of a location is possible, it is holistic. (Varieties of reference, p. 162). Peacocke: this knowledge is grounded in a general ability to put a cognitive map of the objective spatial world over our own egocentric space. I 172 E.g. in some cases this will not be possible, for example, when you are kidnapped, or ended up in an unknown area, etc. Point: even in such cases, you can still use the demonstrative pronoun "here" (in reference to objects). I.e. the thoughts are still thoughts about public space! ((s) and the self-centered space). Idea/Demonstrative Way of Givenness/PeacockeVsEvans: so his theory does not demand any ability to give a public, non-egocentric individuation our thoughts to have thoughts about a place in the public space at all. Analogy/Peacocke: exactly analogous objections can be made in the case of demonstrative ways of givenness: E.g. Suppose a subject perceives an object of type F in the manner H. Then F is the token way of givenness. Then we can introduce: [W, Fs] for the perceptual "this F". Then there is exactly one proposition of the form "p = localization of [W, Fs] now", which is true, and the subject knows what it is for it that it is true for it. PeacockeVsEvans: why should we demand here, but not in the earlier example, that the subject also knows which p (or which in the earlier case) is mentioned in this one true proposition? This is particularly absurd in the case of the lost subject. PeacockeVsEvans: his theory allows that [W, Fs] is an adequate idea here, although the subject has no fundamental idea of the object. Peacocke: but if we insisted that it could have a fundamental idea if he had more evidence, then why is an analogous possibility not also sufficient for adequacy in terms of the egocentric space? I 173 There seem to be only two uniform positions: 1) Identification/Localization/Idea/Demonstratives/Liberal Position: sufficient for a genuine way of givenness or adequate ideas are the general ability of localization plus uniqueness of the current localization in the relevant space. 2) Strict position: this is neither sufficient for genuine ways of givenness nor for adequate ideas. PeacockeVs: this can hardly be represented as a unified theory: it means that, if you are lost, you cannot think about the objects that you see around you. That would also mean to preclude a priori that you as a kidnapped person can ask the question "Which city is this?". Demonstratives/Peacocke: Thesis: I represent the uniformly liberal position Demonstratives/Evans: Thesis: is liberal in terms of public space and strictly in terms of egocentric space! ad 1): does not deny the importance of fundamental ideas. If a subject is neither able to locate an object in the public nor in egocentric space ((s) E.g. he wakes up from anesthesia and hears a monaural sound), then it must still believe that this object has a fundamental identification. Otherwise it would have to assume that there is no object there. Anscombe: E.g. a subject sees two matchboxes through two holes which (are manipulated) so arranged that it sees only one box, then the subject does not know what it means for the sentence "this matchbox is F" to be true. The uniformly liberal view allows the subject to use demonstratives which depend on mental images, even if it has no idea where in the public space and when it has encountered the object. EvansVs: representatives of this position will say that the knowledge of the subject is at least partial, I 174 because this idea causally results from an encounter with the object. But that makes their position worse instead of better: for it completely twists the grammar and logic of the concept of knowing what it is for the subject that p is true. Ability/PeacockeVsEvans: but a capability can also consist in the experience of finding out the right causal chains in a given environment: the same goes for the localization of an object point seen in the mirror in egocentric space. PeacockeVsEvans: his distinction seems unreal: it may be simultaneously true that someone has a relation R to the object due to causal relations, and be true that the possibility of being in this relation R is a question of the abilities of the subject. E.g. (Evans) to recognize the ball: Peacocke: this is not a sensory motor skill, but rather the ability to draw certain conclusions, which however require an earlier encounter. This also applies to e.g. the cognitive map, which is placed over the egocentric space: PeacockeVsEvans: in both cases it does not follow that the presented object, remembered or perceived, is thought of explicitly in causal terms: the way of givenness is truly demonstrative. First Person/PeacockeVsEvans: the second major objection concerns thoughts of the first person: the different examples of immunity to misidentification, which contain the first person, roughly break down into two groups: a) here, immunity seems absolute: E.g. "I am in pain". I 175 b) Here, the immunity seems to depend on presuppositions about the world: if these assumptions are wrong, they open the possibility of picking out something wrong without stopping to use the word "I". These include: E.g. "I was on the ocean liner": memory image. E.g. "I sit at the desk": visual, kinesthetic, tactile perceptions. The distinction between a) and b) may be made by the constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states." Infallibility/Tradition/Evans: (absolutely immune judgments): the judgment to be a judgment of a specific content can be constituted by the fact that this judgement responds to this state. Peacocke pro. PeacockeVsEvans: Problem: can this infallibility be connected to the rest of Evans' theory? Because: I/Evans: Thesis: the reference of "I" may fail! Peacocke: how is that compatible with the absolute immunity of "I am in pain"? Conditionalisation: does not help: E.g. "if I exist, I am in pain" that cannot fulfill the purpose: the existence of the idea still needs the reference of "I". Similarly: E.g. "If my use of "I" refers, I am in pain": because "my use" must be explained in terms of the first person. Question: Can we use memory demonstratives which refer to previous use of first-person ways of givenness? E.g. "If those earlier uses of "I" speak, I am in pain." (Point: not "my uses"). PeacockeVs: that does not help: Descartes' evil demon could have suggested you the memories of someone else. (>Shoemaker: q-memories.) I 176 Constitutive Role/Brains in the Vat/BIV/EvansVsPeacocke: the constitutive role of [self] would not explain why the brains in the vat would be able to speak in a demonstrative way about their own experiences: Mental States/Evans: differ from all other states and objects in that they refer demonstratively to their owners. Pain is identified as an element of the objective order. Then someone can have no adequate idea of these mental states if he does not know to which person they happen. Peacocke: we can even concede thoughts about its pain to the brain in a vat, provided that it can give a fundamental identification of the person who has the pain. Peacocke: No, the nerves must be wired correctly. I.e. this is not true for the brains in the vat. So we can stick to the liberal point of view and at the constitutive role and the idea of a person. Also to the fact that the mental states are individuated on the person who has them. Individuation/Mental States/PeacockeVsEvans: not through localization (like with material objects), but through the person. I 177 E.g. Split-Brain Patient/Peacocke: here we can speak of different, but qualitatively equivalent experiences. From this could follow two centers of consciousness in a single brain. But: after the surgery we should not say that one of the two was the original and the other one was added later. E.g. olfactory sensation of the left and right nostril separate. Then there are actually separate causes for both experiences. ((s), but the same source.) Peacocke: it does not follow that in normal brains two consciousnesses work in harmony. Here, the sense of smell is caused by simultaneous input through both nostrils and is thus overdetermined. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 |
| Frege, G. | Dummett Vs Frege, G. | Brandom II 74 Frege (late): representation of independent reality DummettVsFrege: Falsely: property of sentences instead of transitions between them. Brandom II 173 Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: the disregards the specific nature of the sentences to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregean force). Dummett I 15 Frege’s basic idea: Extraction of the concept (in the sense of the definition of 1890) by decomposition of a complete thought. (Begriffsschrift)(1). I 51 DummettVsFrege: It is questionable, however, whether this term can be explained without referring to the concept of the sentence. One must, for example, not only identify a proper noun in a sentence, but also be able to replace it in this position. How to explain the "occurrence" of the meaning of a name in a thought without relying on the form of its linguistic expression, is not clear. Frege: The meaning of every partial expression should be the contribution of this subexpression for determining this condition. DummettVsFrege: So we must know, contrary to Frege’s official theory, what it means that a proposition is true, before we can know what it means that it expresses a thought; before we can know what it means that an expression makes sense, we need to know what it means that it has a reference. Tradition: It used to be argued: as long as the meaning is the way of givenness of the reference object, there can, if no object is present, be no corresponding way of givenness and therefore no meaning (Evans, McDowell). DummettVsFrege: The difficulty is triggered by the fact that Frege strictly equates the semantic value of a singular term and the object to which it is intended to refer. The slogan "Without semantic value no meaning" is impressive, but it can only be accepted at the price of admitting that a singular term without reference still has a semantic value which then presumably consists in the mere fact of the absence of a reference. Husserl has no doubts in this regard. He generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized term Husserl uses the term "noema". DummettVsFrege: That does not show that the thesis the meaning (thought, see above) was not a content of consciousness is wrong, but rather that its reasoning, namely the communicability and consequent objectivity do not quite apply. Dummett I 61 DummettVsFrege: For an incommunicable meaning which refers to a private sentiment, would, contrary to the sensation itself, not belong to the content of consciousness. DummettVsFrege: Independence from sensation is necessary for objectivity: E.g. color words, opaque surface, a color-blind person recognizes by this that others see the color. I 63. Frege: "Red" does not only refer to a physical property, but to a perceptible property (it appears as red to perople with normal vision). If we explained "appears red" with "is red", however, we are no longer able to do this the other way around. DummettVsFrege: The modified version by Frege is unsatisfactory, because it gives the word "red" a uniform reference, but attributes a different meaning to it, depending on the speaker. I 64 Intension/Frege: "parallel to the straight line" different from "same direction as the straight line", DummettVs: Here, one must know the concept of direction or not "whatever value" other sense than "value curve" DummettVs: Here, the concept of value curve must be known or not. special case of the Basic Law V from which Russell antinomy arises. I 79 Meaning: Contradictory in Frege: on the one hand priority of thought over language, on the other hand, it is not further explained. I 90 ++ - Language/Thinking/Perception I 93 + - DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to "interpretation". I 104 - Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activity) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema. I 106 Frege: Grasping of the Thought: directly through the consciousness, but not content of the consciousness - DummettVs: contradictory: Grasping is an ability, therefore background (both episodically and dispositionally) I 122 - DummettVs Equating the literal meaning with the thought module. I 124 + DummettVsFrege: all thoughts and ideas can be communicated! Because they only appear in a particular way - by this determination they are communicable I 128. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Frege, G. | Evans Vs Frege, G. | Frank I 485 I/Here/Now/This/Index Words/Evans: are closely related. One and the same explanation pattern applies with three properties: 1) Criteria-free identification: in a certain sense there is even no identification at all! But this can be understood a a "broader sense of identification". Problem: possible misunderstanding: identification criterion of singular term is the Fregean sense. A "criteria-less sense" would then appear as a conceptual contradiction. Solution/Evans: Fregean sense: should be understood as the particular way to think of an object designated by an expression. 2) Limited Accessibility: "I" is not accessible to anyone at any time. Fra I 486 You have to be at the place in question in order to truthfully say "here". The behavior of "I", "this", etc. corresponds to this. I/Thoughts/Understanding/EvansVsFrege: it’s probably impossible for me to "grasp" other people’s "I" thoughts, but that does not mean it is impossible to understand them! Communication/Evans: It is not absolutely necessary to think the thoughts of others in exactly the same form as they do themselves in order to understand them. Limited Accessibility/VsEvans: Question: Is it not possible to have "here" thoughts, no matter where you are? EvansVsVs: misunderstanding: Fregean thoughts are carriers of un-relativized, absolute truth values. Thus it is impossible that one and the same idea is sometimes true and sometimes wrong. It is therefore wrong to speak of a way of givenness expressed by "here" (s) "Here" is not an intention, "here" no intention Kaplan: "I": "rigid intension") Evans: There are as many kinds of the givenness of "here" as there are places. Difference: type/token. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Hintikka Vs Frege, G. | Cresswell I 148 Compositionality/Cresswell: It has long been known that it fails on the surface structure. (Cresswell 1973 p 77). HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: H. says that it is simply wrong. In saying that, he ignores the deep structure. And indeed you can regard the difference of the two readings of (39) (Everybody loves somebody) in the context of the game theory as changing the order in the choice of individuals. Then you could say that the only linguistic object is the surface structure. CresswellVsHintikka: but when it comes to that, his observations are not new. Compositionality/Cresswell: fails if we say that the two readings depend on the order in which we first process "and" then "or", or vice versa. Nevertheless, the Frege principle (= compositionality) is in turn applicable to (44) or (45). It is treated like this in Montague. (see below Annex IV: Game-theoretical semantics). I 149 HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: fails even with higher order quantification. CresswellVsHintikka: this is a mistake: firstly, no compositionality is effective in the 1st order translation of sentences like (29). But authors who use higher-order entities (Montague and Cresswell) do not see themselves as deniers of the Frege principle. Hintikka seems to acknowledge that. (1982 p 231). I 161. "is"/Frege/Russell: ambiguous in everyday language. HintikkaVsFrege/KulasVsFrege: (1983): not true! Cresswell: ditto, just that "normal semantics" is not obliged to Frege-Russell anyway. Hintikka II 45 (A) Knowledge/Knowledge Objects/Frege/Hintikka: His concern was what objects we have to assume in order to understand the logical behavior of the language, when it comes to knowledge. Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege’s knowledge objects are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects). Hintikka: For me, it is primarily about the individuals of which we speak in epistemic contexts; only secondarily, I wonder if we may call them "knowledge objects". Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: we can oppose the possible worlds semantics to his approach. (Hintikka pro possible worlds semantics). II 46 Idea: application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible World/Hintikka: the term is misleading, because too global. Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knower. We can also call them knowledge worlds. Set of All Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we can call it illegitimate. (FN 5). Knowledge Object/Hintikka: can be objects, people, artifacts, etc. Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege presumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for some kind of entities. They can be taken as Fregean knowledge objects. Identity/Substitutability/SI/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: SI is the thesis of the substitutability of identity ((s) only applies with limitation in intensional (opaque) contexts). II 47 E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this it cannot be concluded that Ramses knew that the morning star = the evening star (although MS = ES). II 48 Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context: Direct Context/Frege/Hintikka: extensional, transparent Indirect Context/Frege/Hintikka: intensional, opaque. E.g. contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "ext", "opaque", etc. not from Frege). Frege/Hintikka: according to his own image: (4) expression >sense >reference. ((s) I.e. according to Frege the intension determines the extension.) Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here, the picture is modified: (5) Expression (>) sense (> reference) Def Systematic Ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all our expressions are systematically ambiguous, i.e. they refer to different things, depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect ones (intensional, opaque). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: Fregean senses in Frege are separate entities in order to be able to work at all as references in intensional contexts. E.g. in order to be able to restore the inference in the example above (morning star/evening start) we do not need the identity of morning star and evening star, but the. identity of the Fregean sense of "morning star" and "evening star". II 49 Important argument: but Frege himself does not reinterpret the identity in the expression morning star = evening star in this way. He cannot express this fact, because there identity occurs in an extensional context and later in an intensional context. Identity/Frege/Hintikka: therefore we cannot say that Frege reinterprets our normal concept of identity. Problem: It is not even clear whether Frege can express the identity of the senses with an explicit sentence. For in his own formal language (in "Begriffsschrift"(1) and "Grundgesetze"(2)) there is no sentence that could do this. He says that himself in: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung": we can only refer to the meanings of our expressions by prefixing the prefix "the meaning of". But he never uses this himself. (B) Knowledge Objects/Possible World Approach/HintikkaVsFrege: Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that forces us to consider certain possibilities. These we call possible worlds. new: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) in addition to the references, but we look at the same references in different possible worlds. Morning Star/Evening Star/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: Solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now single out the same object, namely the planet in the real world. II 50 (C) Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: there is no systematic ambiguity here, i.e. the expressions mean the same thing intensionally as extensionally. E.g. Knowing what John knows means knowing those possible worlds which are compatible with his belief, and knowing which are not. II 51 Extra premise: for that it must be sure that an expression singles out the same individual in different possible worlds. Context: what the relevant possible worlds are depends on the context. E.g. Ramses: here, the case is clear, On the other hand: E.g. Herzl knew Loris is a great poet Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal. II 53 Meaning Function/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: the difference in my approach to that of Frege is that I consider problems locally, while Frege considers them globally. Fregean Sense/(= way of givenness) Hintikka: must be considered as defined for all possible worlds. On the other hand: Hintikka: if Fregean sense is construed as meaning function, it must be regarded as only defined for the relevant alternatives in my approach. Frege: precisely uses the concept of identity of senses implicitly. And as meaning function, identity is only given if the mathematical function works for all relevant arguments. Totality/Hintikka: this concept of totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful. Solution/Hintikka: it is precisely the possible worlds semantics that helps dispense with the totality of all possible worlds. ((s) And to consider only the relevant alternatives defined by the context). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: was virtually constructed as an object (attitude object propositional object, thought object, belief object). This is because they were assumed as entities in the real world (actual world), however abstract. II 54 Meaning Function/M. F./HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses". Knowledge Object/Thought Object/Frege/Hintikka: Frege, unlike E.g. Quine, has never considered the problem. Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: entitles us to move from a sentence S(b) with a singular term "b" to the existential statement (Ex) S(x). This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts. Transition from "any" to "some". E.g. epistemic context: (10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w) (11) (tentative conclusion) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x) II 55 Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails, because (11) has the strength of (12) (12) George IV knew who w is. EG/Fail/Solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that in intensional (opaque) contexts we are dealing with ideas of references. HintikkaVsFrege: Problem: then (11) would follow from (10) in any case ((s) and that’s just what is not desired). Because you’d have to assume that there is definitely some kind of sense under which George IV imagines an individual w. Problem: "w" singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. II 56 Possible Worlds Semantics/Solution/Hintikka: E.g. Suppose. (13) George knows that S(w) to (14) (Ex) George knows that S(x) where S(w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts. Then we need an additional condition. (15) (Ex) in all relevant possible worlds (w = x). This is, however, not a well-formed expression in our notation. We have to say what the relevant possible worlds are. Def Relevant Possible Worlds/Hintikka: are all those that are compatible with the knowledge of George. Thus, (15) is equivalent to (16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x). This is the additional premise. I.e. George knows who w is. (Knowing that, knowing who, knowing what). Knowing What/Logical Form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s) >single class, single quantity). E.g. knowing that "so and so has done it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who so and so is. ((s) i.e. however, that you know y!) Solution/Hintikka/(s): the set of possible worlds compatible with the knowledge) II 57 Meaning Function/M. F./Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: in order to be a solution here, the meaning function (see above) needs to be a constant function, i.e. it must single out the same individuals in all possible worlds. Frege/Identity/Opaque Context/Hintikka: Frege had to deal with the failure of the SI (substitutability in case of identity) ((s) i.e. the individuals might have a different name), not with the failure of the Existential Generalization (EG). ((s) I.e. the individuals might not exist). Hintikka: therefore, we need several additional premises. Possible Worlds Semantics: SI: here, for substitutability in case of identity, we only need on the assumption that the references of two different concepts in any possible world can be compared. Existential Generalization: here we have to compare the reference of one and the same concept in all possible worlds. Frege/Hintikka: now it seems that Frege could still be defended yet in a different way: namely, that we now quantify on world-lines (as entities). ((s) that would accomodate Frege’s Platonism). II 58 World Lines/Hintikka: are therefore somehow "real"! So are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"?. HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world bound individuals and world lines as individuals. World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that the world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". Using world lines does not mean reifying them. Solution/Hintikka: we need world-lines, because without them it would not even make sense to ask at all, whether a resident of a possible world is the same one as that of another possible world. ((s) cross world identity). II 59 World Line/Hintikka: we use it instead of Frege’s "way of givenness". HintikkaVsFrege: his error was to reify the "ways of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual world. Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, in this context we need not ask "about what we quantify". II 109 Frege Principle/FP/Compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside inwards, we can allow a violation of Frege’s principle. (I.e. the semantic roles of the constituents in the interior are context dependent). II 110 HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: meaning entities should not be created step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be understood, at least in some cases, as rules of semantic analysis. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 2. Gottlob Frege [1893–1903]: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle Wittgenstein I 71 Def Existence/Wittgenstein: predicate of higher order and is articulated only by the existence quantifier. (Frege ditto). I 72 Hintikka: many philosophers believe that this was only a technical implementation of the earlier idea that existence is not a predicate. HintikkaVsFrege: the inexpressibility of individual existence in Frege is one of the weakest points, however. You can even get by without the Fregean condition on a purely logical level. HintikkaVsFrege: contradiction in Frege: violates the principle of expressing existence solely through the quantifier, because the thesis of inexpressibility means that through any authorized individual constant existential assumptions are introduced in the logical language. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Husserl, E. | Peacocke Vs Husserl, E. | I 119 PeacockeVsHusserl: even here there is a confusion between the general and the particular: I/Husserl: (Logical studies, English 1970, p. 315f, retranslation) the word "I" identifies a number of people from case to case by changing meaning. I 120 Everyone has their own I presentation. That is what changes from person to person. Constitutive Role/Peacocke: 2) possible misunderstanding: the considerations regarding the constitutive role could suggest a "bundle theory of the self". But what I say is neutral with respect to a bundle theory. It is neutral, because it is part of a theory of thinking in a certain way about people and not about people as such or their nature and their individuation principles. Our approach to the constitutive role may explain why Cartesian thoughts that are arguably infallible definitely have a first person character. E.g. "I am in pain", "I have a perception of a tree", etc. Principle of Sensitivity/Peacocke: together with the individuated constitutive role: someone x is predisposed to judge that φ [x itself] in the presence of evidence that the person is with these conscious states . E.g. pain x is predisposed to judge that [x itself] is j in the presence of evidence* that the person with these conscious states, including pain, is φ. ((s) evidence* the second time) Peacocke: then you can also insert pain for φ. Point: the important thing here is the particularized constitutive role: I 121 We cannot say that a person who is in pain must be able to identify themselves through a description. The person does not have any evidence* in their state. Teh possession of the first person way of givenness of the constitutive role "the person who has these perceptions" can thus explain that you do not need a test for your own identity. Now/Peacocke: it applies again that you do not have to identify the time previously. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Kaplan, D. | Newen Vs Kaplan, D. | NS I 117 Index Words/Indicators/Direct Reference/Kaplan: Thesis: typical usage contexts: here. they must be treated according to an object theory (theory of direct reference) of meaning. Namely if they only have to fulfill the state of affairs adequacy (SA). NS I 118 E.g. (1) I am here today. Truth Conditions: are only given adequately here if the content of the sentence is recognized as true, but not necessary. a priori: the sentence is indeed a priori true, but not necessary! E.g. if Carina Silvester speaks the sentence in Bochum, it has the meaning that Carina is in Bochum that day, but Carina is not necessarily in Bochum. It is true because of the expression conditions. NS I 118 Index Words/Indicators/Kaplan: Thesis: indicators are referential expressions, i.e. the standard meaning is always the designated object. Newen/Schrenk: this is considered the common understanding after Kaplan. VsKaplan: Objection: we must not neglect the other types of adequacy. Cognitive adequacy and knowledge adequacy. E.g. Karl receives a threatening letter, "I will rob you someday". This is intuitively the contribution of "I" to the utterance content, not the person who wrote the letter, but the description associated by means of language competence. Then the content of "I" is: the writer of this incident. Here, knowledge adequacy is in the foreground. (Anonymous/Anonymity). Cognitive Adequacy: is paramount if our behavioral attitude is expressed. E.g. Ernst Mach after memory loss: "I'm hungry": This does not have the meaning of "The author of "Die Analyse der Empfindung" is hungry". Mach with amnesia would not have agreed to that. NS I 119 Likewise, it would be wrong to paraphrase. "Ernst Mach believes that Ernst Mach is hungry". EGO Mode/I/Terminology/Newen/Schrenk: some authors call this kind of immediate self-reference the EGO mode of givenness. (Immunity against misidentification). Point: this is about the subject of a thought and not about the speaker of an utterance. (He might be be irritated, e.g. by delay through headphones). Index Words/Indicators/Names/Newen/Schrenk: the situation is like with names: there are three modes of interpretation. The contribution of an indexical expression can be 1) the designated object 2) the description associated by means of language competence 3) cognitive way of givenness. Deictic expressions: applies for them accordingly. E.g. hallucination: here, the content is determined through language competence. Deixis/Cognitive Adequacy. The cognitive adequacy may also play a role: E.g. someone looks through two widely separated windows of his apartment at an extremely long ship, which is moored at the quay. He believes that there are two ships. "This is a Chinese and this is a Russian ship". NS I 120 The content of the statements can only reflect the cognitive situation if in each case the way of givenness of the ship is taken into account (front: Chinese lettering, rear: rusty stern). Index Words/Newen/Schrenk: the explanation interest chooses between the various explanations (interest, interpretation interest). Index Words/Names/Kaplan: according to his theory they are always referential expressions - i.e. the meaning is always the designated object. Then explanations must be shifted from the field of semantics to that of pragmatics (what the speaker means) in line with the knowledge adequacy (language competence) and cognitive adequacy. There is currently debate about whether this is legitimate. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Lewis, D. | Perry Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 170 Mental Content/Content/View/PerryVsLewis/Schwarz: some authors want to keep perspective out of the content (Perry 1977)(1): Thesis: locate perspective differences in the way of givenness: E.g. Fred in Kuala Lumpur, I in Berlin: our content is the same: that it rains on 12 August 2005 in Berlin, but the content is given differently which explains the different behavioral consequences. Def Givenness/Perry/Black: is the function that assigns to every situation the class of worlds in which it is rains at the place and time of the situation. LewisVsPerry: it makes no difference (1989b(2), 74, Fn 9). Content is simply the class of situations to which a true proposition is assigned. Perspective/Lewis: on the other hand, it is not possible to reconstruct the perspective proposition from Lewis' content. Perry: thus has an additional content component. Lewis: which is not needed with him. Perspective/Uncentered World/Perry/Schwarz: Perry has other tasks in mind: the uncentered content component should help with the semantics of beliefs and explain why Fred and I intuitively believe the same thing. LewisVsPerry: doubts that this is possible: semantics: when it comes to our intuitions about "meaning the same thing", they are more vague and complicated. E.g. there is a good sense in which Fred and I mean the same thing, if he believes that it rains where he is! E.g. "I wish it would rain" - "I wish the same thing." For this classes of possible situations are sufficient. 1. John Perry [1977]: “Frege on Demonstratives”. Philosophical Review, 86: 474–497 2. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. Stalnaker I 255 Def Belief/Conviction/Self//Stalnaker: having a conviction with a given property means to attribute this property to yourself. Belief/Lewis: (not based on the self): believe that φ (φ being a proposition) = attributing the property of living in a possible world φ to yourself. Self/Semantic Diagnostic/PerryVsLewis/Stalnaker: provides no content of a self-attribution, but distinguishes belief content from belief state. Relativized Proposition/Perry: classify believers: we have the same belief state in common if we both have the belief, e.g. "I am a philosopher." That corresponds set-centered possible worlds. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Nagel, Th. | Peacocke Vs Nagel, Th. | I 167 Nagel/Peacocke: (first Tanner Lecture, 1980) E.g. "I am TN" seems to express a real fact on the one hand, which cannot be described from a certain perspective of the world, ((s) to be more true than from another perspective.) I 168 on the other hand it seems to be impossible that irreducible facts of the first person exist. Nagel:~ "TN, like the rest of you, it turns out, not only as a single creature with a special perspective on the world from the position in its interior. Every other human being contains a very special kind of subject in the same way. The "additional fact" that I am TN is the fact that this impersonal conception of the world can close over itself? Through localization of the subject that forms it in a certain point of the world by perceiving it. This fact is linked to the perspective of TN. And because it is not an irreducible fact of the first person, it can be part of the real world! " PeacockeVsNagel: does he really state a fact of the real world here? There is an implicit indexicality in the sentence "locate the subject that forms it (the world)". It comes out more clearly here: Nagel: ~"when I have the philosophical thought: "I am TN", then I realize that the objective individual self, which is the subject of this centerless idea of a world, is located in the TN and at the same time sees the world through the perspective of TN. Idea/PeacockeVsNagel: ideas can be a) public types that can be shared by different people. Or they may b) correspond to the principle of "one thinker, one idea" (token), even if the same idea can come up on several occasions. Nagel: must use the latter concept, because nothing that could correspond to a subject is in the sense of the type. Peacocke: but in the sense of the token it seems to be true that the content is indexical. Namely, the person with this particular idea of TN (Peacocke: constitutive role). Admittedly, this is not a thought of the first person. Peacocke: but the motivation of Nagel that there can be no irreducible thoughts of the first person in the world seems to apply to all demonstrative ways of givenness. I 169 E.g. Suppose Nagel contemplates his objective idea of the world at a moment about and thinks "I am TN" Peacocke: that is potentially informative if it is epistemically possible that the person who is thinking is not TN. Nagel: the problem with "I'm TN" is not a pseudo-problem associated with a misunderstanding of the logic of index words. Def Character/Kaplan: ("On the Logic of Demonstratives"): the character of an expression is a function of contexts on contents and these include no indexical ways of givenness. PeacockeVsNagel: if we take this as the basis, it is not so surprising that the way of givenness of a fact - in contrast to the fact itself - should be irreducibly indexical. Nagel's point that we are able to step back from our standpoint and to form a more objective idea in which the position in turn is located, is of great philosophical interest. Nevertheless, it should be formulated with reference to the different ways in which we think about ourselves when we make such a separation. So if we rather have a different way of giveness than a different type of object, then we can give up the question: "Is this objective self mine?" For Nagel this question is only meaningless if were a mere facon de parler for "the person with this objective idea". |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Nozick, R. | Peacocke Vs Nozick, R. | I 133 Way of Givenness/Object/Peacocke: I have separated the theory of the way of givenness of an object from the theory about the nature of objects. This is in contrast to the approach of Robert Nozick: Philosophical Explanations, 1981, p 87th I 133/134 I/NozickVsPeacocke: Thesis: the I is designed and synthesized around the act of reflexive self-reference. This is the only way to explain why we when reflexively referring to ourselves, know that it is we ourselves who we refer to. Declaration/Peacocke: Nozick refers here to the fact that an epistemic fact can only be explained by appealing to a certain approach to nature of this object, and not to the way of givenness how we perceive the object. Or how the subject is reflected upon. Object/Intension/Explanation/Peacocke: Question: It is for every person a) a conditional that they know or is it b) a conditional which is only a consequence of its knowledge? The first case would be: a) I know: when I say "I", then the utterance of "I" refers to me b) When I say "I", then: I know that the utterance of "I" refers to me Peacocke: ad b): is not a real date that requires an explanation. It is not always true! E.g. I am in the same room with my twin brother and for one of us the vocal cords do not work without both of us knowing for whom... ad a): this seems to be based on two different beliefs: I 135 1) the originator of the statement u of 'I' = myself 2) Every utterance of "I" refers to its originator. Nozick/Problem: E.g. Oedipus: he knows: The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" = I and he also knows: Every utterance of "the murderer of Laius" refers to the murderer of Laius. but he does not believe in the identity of "the murderer..." = I. So he is not in the position to judge: The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" refers to me. I/PeacockVsNozick: so we have the contrast between first person and third person cases without having a theory of the "synthesized self" (Nozick), if we can explain the availability and the content of the premises in the first-person case without this theory. Nozick: what is it like for me to know that it was I who produced a particular statement? Peacocke: but that involves two different interpretations: 1) What is it like to know that and not only to believe it? This is no more problematic than the question whether it was I who blew out the candle. 2) What is the content of the thought: "I have made this statement"? I 136 This is again about evidence*: that "the person with such and such states" made the statement. Nozick: it is not sufficient that I know a token of the utterance "I made this statement" and speak German! Peacocke: it can be compared with the time problem: The time of the utterance of u "now" = now Every utterance of "now" refers to the time of the utterance PeacockeVsNozick: it does not seem that we need a theory of time, as "synthesized around acts of reference" in any (every?) language. Nozick's theory cannot explain what it claims to be explaining: because a his subject matter concerns that which can be known, while his theory is not a theory of ways of givenness. We cannot simply think of any object without thinking about it a certain way. Nozick's synthesized selves are simply construed as objects, though. Peacocke: can we reformulate Nozick's theory as approach to ways of givenness? Is "the originator of this statement" to be thought somehow in a first person way? (reflexive self-reference). 1) What is this act like in a complex way of givenness. It cannot be perceptual. Because that could be an informative (!) self-identification ((s) empirically, after confusion with the twin brother, and then not necessarily). Instead: Action-based: "the act, which was brought about by the attempt to speak". That is not informative indeed. But that brings Nozick's theory close to our theory of the constitutive role. I 137 Because such attempts are among the conscious states of the subject. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 |
| Perry, J. | Stalnaker Vs Perry, J. | II 21 Ascription/attribution/belief attribution//propositional knowledge/index words/Heimson/Stalnaker: generally two questions have to be distinguished: 1. What is the content of belief? 2. What is the nature of the relationship between the believer and the content? The crucial indexical element lies in the answer to the second question. Solution/calibration/Stalnaker: the possible situations must be "calibrated": that means time and place have to be specified. ((s) Thus, the sets of possible worlds (poss.w.) are restricted). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: Perry distinguishes belief state and belief content. Content/StalnakerVsPerry: but this one has a different concept of content. His term does not reflect adequately the informational content of convictions. II 147 StalnakerVsPerry/Perry/Stalnaker: Belief state/Perry/Stalnaker: this one distinguishes it from belief content (content) Informational content/content/StalnakerVsPerry: with this distinction the informational content is not displayed correctly. Index words/Perry/Stalnaker: are part of the information, not part of the means of representation. II 148 Belief object/information/StalnakerVsPerry: problem: if the index words are part of the information its belief objects cannot be the informational content (or information). E.g. Ortcutt/Lingens: although according to Perry the content of the proposition "You are Rudolf Lingens" and the expressed belief and the one of the proposition "I am Rudolf Lingens" are the same this common content can, however, not be identified with the information! Common content/content/Perry/Stalnaker: according to Perry the common content is namely "Lingens is Lingens". Problem: Lingens believed that already earlier ((s) even without knowing that he himself is Lingens). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: he believes it now in a new way. That means he is in a new belief state. ((s) Perry like Frege: way of givenness). Belief state/informational content/StalnakerVsPerry: belief states are too subjective to represent informational content because the relevant counterpart of Ortcutt is different to Lingens' belief state in which he is put by Ortcutt's information. Content/Perry: = belief object. Belief object/content/StalnakerVsPerry: Perry's belief objects are too extensional to capture the information which is delivered during communication. We need an intermediate concept: II 149 Solution/Stalnaker: proposition as intermediate concept between belief state and belief object: Proposition/Stalnaker: divides the set of possible worlds (poss.w.) (here: possible situations) into two subsets, the ones in which the proposition is true and the ones in which it is false. Belief object/Stalnaker: propositions as b.o. can reconcile the traditional doctrines (see above) with the examples for essential indexical belief. This is a more natural access than that of Perry and Lewis. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Russell, B. | Peacocke Vs Russell, B. | I 131 Acquaintance/Russell: objects of acquaintance: E.g. sense data. They are obvious to the subject. Sense Data/Russell: correspond to the positions of singular terms in a sentence. They are at the same time real constituents of the sentence. And without givenness at that! (Without intension). Purely extensional occurrence of objects in the sentence. PeacockeVsRussell: 1) that may mollify FregeVsRussell's criticism of his concept of proposition. But it does not justify Russell: because he did not refer to obviousness for the thinker. 2) physical objects that, according to Russell, "cause the sense data" are therefore demonstrative and descriptive in a mix. PeacockeVs: our approach, on the other hand, assumes that demonstrative ways of givenness are not descriptive. But Russell's mixed approach is not entirely irrelevant: if we replace "sense data" by "experience": PeacockeVsRussell: he confused a plausible determination of the the constitutive role with "content". I 180 Acquaintance/Russell: (B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, 1973, p. 32) "Each understandable sentence must be composed of constituents with which we are familiar." PeacockeVs: that got bad press. Problem: Excessive proximity to Humean empiricism. SainsburyVs: Russells ideas should be defended without the principle of acquaintance if possible. Peacocke: but if you free the principle of non-essential epistemological attachments, it is a correct and fundamental condition for the attribution of contents. Acquaintance/Russell: we are familiar with the sense data, some objects of immediate memory and with universals and complexes. Earlier: the thinker is also familiar with himself. Later: Vs. Complex/Russell: aRb. Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: he had a correct basic notion of acquaintance, but a false one of its extension (from the things that fall under it). The salient feature is the idea of relation. One is dealing with the object itself and not its deputy. I 182 Def Principle of Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: Thesis: Reconstruction, reformulated principle of acquaintance: The thinker is familiar with an object if there is a way of givenness (within its repertoire of concepts) that is ruled by the principle of sensitivity and he is in an appropriate current mental state, which he needs to think of the object under this way of givenness. For this, we need a three-digit relation between subject, object and type of the way of givenness The type of the way of givenness (as visual or aural perception) singles out the object. "Singling out" here is neutral in terms of whether the object is to be a "constituent of thoughts" or not. This preserves two features of Russell's concept: 1) acquaintance enables the subject to think about the object in a certain way because of the relationship that it has with it. 2) The concept of the mental state may preserve what Russell meant when he spoke of acquaintance as a relation of presentation. Constituent/Thoughts/Russell: he thought that objects occurred downright as parts of the thought. PeacockeVsRussell: we will interpret this as an object that indicates a type of a way of givenness (indexing). We do not allow an object to occur as part of a thought, just because it is the only component of the thought that corresponds to a singular term position in a sentence that expresses a thought. I 183 This is a Neo-Fregean theory, because an object can only exist as part of the thought by the particular way of its givenness (intension). (VsRussell: not literally part of the thought or sentence). I 195 Colors/Explanation/Peacocke: to avoid circularity, colors themselves are not included in the explanation of a response action, but only their physical bases. Different: E.g. 'John's favorite color': which objects have it, depends on what concepts φ are such that φ judges the subject, 'John's favorite color is φ' together with thoughts of the form 't is φ'. Analog: defined description: E.g. the 'richest man'. He is identified by the relational way of givenness in context with additional information: Complex/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: E.g. a subject has an experience token with two properties: 1) It may have been mentioned in the context with sensitivity for a specific demonstrative way of givenness of an object (e.g. audible tone). 2) At the same time it may be an experience token of a certain type. Then, to be recognized the two must coincide in the context I 196 with a sensitivity for a specific concept φ in the repertoire of the subject. VsAcquaintance/VsRussell/Peacocke: one can argue: E.g. Cicero died long ago E.g. arthritis is painful. We can attribute such beliefs when the subject understands the meanings of the concepts. Nevertheless, the readiness to judge that Cicero died long ago depends on a mental state, with regard to which there must be an evidence. What kind of a mental state should that be? It need not remember the occasion when it first heard the name 'Cicero'. But neither: 'F died long ago', where 'F' is a defined description. Name/Peacocke: semantic function: simply singling out a particular object. Understanding: if you can identify the reference of the name in one way or another. There is no specific way in which you have to think of the Roman orator to understand the name. VsAcquaintance/VsPeacocke: that may even endanger the reformulated principle: if the name only singles out the object, then the subject must have a relation to a thought which contains the object as a constituent. PeacockeVs: I dispute the last conditional. We must distinguish sharply between a) beliefs, where the that-sentence contains a name, and b) the presence of the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought. The latter corresponds to the relation 'Bel'. I 196/197 Def Relation 'Bel'/Terminology/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/Peacocke: a belief which contains the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought: E.g. not only 'NN died a long time ago', but propositional attitude. ((s) not only belief about someone or something, but about a particular object.) Relation Bel/Belief/Peacocke: three reasons for distinguishing beliefs: a) we want to exclude that someone can acquire a new belief simply by introducing a new name. (Only a description could do that). E.g. if we wanted to call the inventor of the wheel 'Helle': Trivialization: 1) it would be trivial that such a stipulation should be enough for the reference in a community. 2) Nor is it a question of us being able to give outsiders a theoretical description of the community language. You cannot bring about a relation Bel by linguistic stipulation. I 198 b) Pierre Example/Kripke/Peacocke: this type of problem arises in cases where the language is too poor for a theory of beliefs in this sense: if someone understands a sentence, it is not clear what thoughts he expresses with it. (>Understanding/Peacocke). Because the semantics only singles out the object, not the way of thinking about the object (intension). This is different with pure index words and certain descriptions. E.g. a person who says 'I'm hot now' expresses the thought: ^[self x]^[now t]. But that involves nothing that would be 'thinking of something under a name'! Pierre Example/Kripke/Solution: a complete description of Pierre's situation is possible (for outsiders) without embedding 'London' in belief contexts. Peacocke: at the level of 'Bel' (where the speaker himself is part of the belief) beliefs can be formulated so that proper names are used: 'He believes that NN is so and so'. c) Perception/Demonstratives/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: here, the way of givenness seems to have a wealth that does not need to be grasped completely, if someone uses demonstratives. The wealth of experience is covered by the relation Bel, however. But this way we are not making certain commitments: E.g. we do not need to regarded 'Cicero died long ago' as metalinguistic, but rather as meant quite literally. I 201 Logical Operators/Quantification/Logic/Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: our reconstructed principle of acquaintance implicitly includes the obligation to recognize entities that can only be preserved inferentially: E.g. uniqueness operators, other quantifiers, connections, also derived ones. This can even apply to logical constants and some truth functions and not only for ways of givenness of these functions. RussellVs: the principle of acquaintance is not applicable to logical constituents of thoughts. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Salmon, N. | Schiffer Vs Salmon, N. | I 277 "Fido"-Fido-Theory/meaning = reference/Nathan Salmon: (1986): Thesis: pro FFT: (Vs almost all other theorists on belief). I 278 Salmon: would argue that the that-sentences in (2) and (6) (dog/shmog) refer to the same proposition, because of the identity of doghood and shmoghood. He would argue that the that-sentences in E.g. Lois Lane does not recognize that Clark Kent is Superman. and Lois Lane does not recognize that Superman is Superman. refer to the same proposition, because of the identity of Clark Kent and Superman. Schiffer: and he would also say that the following two that-sentences refer to the same proposition. E.g. my statement I believe that I am a paragon of virtue. And (Pointing to a photo of me on which I do not recognize me): I do not believe that he is a paragon of virtue. The joint proposition should then be here: SchifferVsSalmon, Nathan: E.g. Assume the Superman story is real and we have a naive non-philosopher Floyd, who made the following statement: (A) Lois Lane does not know that Clark Kent can fly. Floyd: insists that (A) is true. And that he expressed his belief with his statement.. Salmon: would say that both are wrong! (A) can not be true, for Salmonella, because Clark = Superman. (A) is logically equivalent to (B) Lois Lane does not know that Superman can fly. and that is wrong. Salmon: the common singular proposition is: Statement/Salmon/Pointe: Floyd does not make the statement, because he does not believe it! Belief/Salmon/Schiffer: for Salmon belief is a binary relation between a believer and a proposition. But this would be (to Salmon!)to be explained by a three-digit belief relation BEL that exists between a believer, a proposition and a w.o.g. (Way of givenness): B(x,p) iff (Em) BEL (x,p,m). Solution/Salmon: x can believe p under a BT and do not believe it in another BT. ((s) This is the unanimous opinion and Frege's solution). Terminology/Salmon: calls the w.o.g. mostly "guise", "appearance" or "way of taking". SchifferVsSalmon: he does not give a representation of the third term, the w.o.g. (…+…). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Wright, Cr. | Peacocke Vs Wright, Cr. | I 102 Def Verification/Wright: (("Strict Finitism", 1982) the concept "is a phrase that can actually be verified": at first, we believe the truth of a proposition due to certain studies, later we question the belief. The basis on which we question it must accept the presupposed conditions as true in order to maintain the initial investigation procedure. Peacocke: this is similar to our condition of epistemic possibility. Difference: Wright's criterion also includes unobservable particles. The fact that the instrument is functioning properly is then one of the presupposed conditions of the investigation procedure. I 103 Wright: his approach also includes the possibility that past-sentences can actually be verified. It is presupposed that the memory is functioning properly, in accordance with the supposed correctly functioning perceptual apparatus. Peacocke: for me it's about concepts, not about propositions, and I use properties of demonstrative perception judgments. Memory/PeacockeVsWright: no way of givenness of objects (intension), which is made available by memory seems to be connected to the same strict observation concepts. The ability to form memory images is not required by the observation concepts! |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Self | Evans, G. | Fra I 485f Self/I/Evans: 1. no criteria, 2. limited access (not everyone, anytime) - 3. way of givenness is dependent on existence: I have to be at the place to say "here", but changing is possible ("new sense, old meaning"). I 488 "Self": thoughts are de re - (need information) -(VsHume?) Peacock I 175 Self/I/Evans: thesis: the reference of "I" can fail! Peacocke: how is this compatible with the absolute immunity of "I have pain"? |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Acquaintance | Peacocke, Chr. | I 182 Def principle of acquaintance / PeacockeVsRussell: Reconstruction, reformulated p.o.ac.: The thinker is acquainted with an object when there is (within his term repertoire) a way of givenness, which is dominated by the principle of sensitivity and it is in a suitable current psychological state, which he takes to the object under this way of givennes. For this we need a three-place relation between subject, object and type of givennes. |
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| Self | Peacocke, Chr. | I 138 Peacocke: Thesis: a) Barwise and Perry are right that a reference rule completely determined the meaning of "I" in English b) they are right that a way of givenness (intension) exists of the first person and is important for the understanding of "I". c) a) and b) are compatible, because in this case ("I") determines the reference rule that a way of givenness (intension) is expressed. |
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| Relation Theory | Schiffer, St. | I 49 Thesis: the "propositional" theory of belief as relation to propositions needs natural art concepts. (see below). I 54 Classical Propositional Position/Schiffer: Thesis: predicates in that-sentences simply refer to the properties and relations they express and introduce directly into the propositions. I 55 2. Possible position: Frege's view: Thesis: the proposition provides the whole content of belief, but does not contain dog-ness but a way of being given dog-ness that is not explicit in (2). But that is how Tanya imagines dog-ness. (Frege is concerned with belief de re of normal physical objects.) A representative of this view would deny that the that-sentence in (2) refers to the full content. According to him, (2) is best represented in this way: (Em)(m is a way of givenness of dog-ness & B (Tanya, )). I 93 Relation Theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: new thesis: a sentence S has its truth condition 1. by the bR of some of its parts and properties - 2. by certain causal relations to things (for the explanation of reference and denotation) - thus ultimately reliability determining for the truth conditions, because the combination of bR/causality plays a role in the maximization of reliability - this also explains the nature of reliability. |
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