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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Possible Worlds | Adams | Stalnaker I 32 Possible worlds/Robert Adams: if there are true propositions that speak of the existence of nonactual possible worlds, they must be able to be reduced to sentences in which only things from the actual world are mentioned which are not identical with non-actual possibilities. >Possible worlds, >Actuality, >Actual world, >Possibility, >Counterfactuals. StalnakerVsAdams: I do not see why this should be necessary. Possible worlds/Stalnaker: Two questions: 1. Are they really so obscure? I 33 2. Does the belief in possible worlds and the indexical analysis of actuality oblige us to extreme realism? Certainly not. >Centered worlds. World stories/world-story/Possible worlds/Robert Adams: Thesis: a world-story is a maximally consistent set of propositions. The concept of a possible world can be given in a contextual analysis in terms of world stories. Proposition/Truth/Adams/Stalnaker: a proposition is true in some or all possible worlds if it is an element of some or all of the world-stories. StalnakerVsAdams: in his approach, there are three undefined terms: Proposition, consistent, and contradictory. >Propositions, >Consistency, >Contradiction. Proposals/Adams/Stalnaker: proposals can be presented as language-independent, abstract objects. They have truth values. >Truth value, >Abstract objects. Consistency/Adams/Stalnaker: consistency is a property of sets of propositions. >Consistency. One can define them in terms of possible worlds in which all propositions are true. I 34 Two conditions for consistency: (W1) The set of all true propositions is consistent (W2) Each subset of a consistent set is consistent. Contradiction/Adams/Stalnaker: contradiction could be defined in terms of consistency: A and B are contradictory, iff. {A, B} is not consistent And for each consistent set of propositions Γ is either Γ U {A} or Γ U {B} consistent. The theory presupposes: (W3) Each proposition has a contradiction. Proposition/Adams/Stalnaker: this is a minimal theory of propositions. It does not impose any structure on propositions, except for what is needed for compatibility, implication, and equivalence. And to ensure that e.g. the right kind of implication is present. E.g. implication: Definition Implication/Proposition/Stalnaker: (here): A implies B iff. a set consisting of A and a contradiction of B is not consistent. (W1) and (W2) ensure that our implication has the right properties. Stalnaker I 36 Proposition/Possible World/Stalnaker: an analysis of propositions as worlds provides definitions of consistency, etc., in concepts of set-theoretical relations between sets of worlds. World Story Theory/Adams/Stalnaker: the theory of world stories is weaker because it leaves open questions that clarify the analysis of propositions as worlds. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. The following two theses are consequences of the possible-worlds-theory but not of the world-story theory: (W5) Seclusion condition: For any set of propositions G there is a proposition A such that G implies A and A implies every element of G. Stalnaker: i.e. that for any set of propositions there is a proposition which says that every proposition in the set is true. Proposition/Seclusion/Stalnaker: whatever propositions are, if there are any, there are also sets of them. And for any set of propositions, it is definitely true or false that all their elements are true. And of course this is a proposition. So I assume that the world-story theorist wants to add (W5) to his theory. (W6) Equivalent propositions are identical. Problem: the problems of (W6) are known. ((s)> hyperintensionalism/hyperintentionality: sentences that are true in the same worlds are indistinguishable, equivalence of "snow is white" to "grass is green", etc.). >Hyperintensionality, >Semantics of Possible Worlds. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Possible Worlds | Hintikka | II 74 Possible Worlds/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: problem: possible worlds seem to take the worlds and complete sets of possibilia as self-evident. Possible Worlds/Leibniz: thesis: there is a determined set of worlds among which God makes a selection. >Possible worlds/Leibniz. HintikkaVsLeibniz: that is extremely doubtful. Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we should rather call it world stories or scenarios. II 75 We can limit the set of worlds to those that are conceivable. Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: one can build a theory of questions and answers on the semantics of possible worlds. >Questions/Hintikka, >Answers/Hintikka. II 76 This is about what is possible in more than one world. For this, we must assume much more than is assumed in an extensional language. Reference/semantics of possible worlds: here it is not enough to accept only the referents which have our expressions in the actual world. II 196 Possible World/individual area/HintikkaVsKripke: one should not demand that the individuals must remain the same when changing from world to world. The talk of worlds is empty, if there are no possible experiences that could make them different. Possible Worlds/Hintikka: possible worlds should be best determined as by the connected possible totals of experience. And then separation cannot be ruled out. >Cross world identity, >Centered worlds. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Possible Worlds | Leibniz | Hintikka I 74 Possible Worlds/VsSemantic of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: Problem: it seems to make the worlds and complete sets of Possibilia absolute ((s) to assume them as self-evident). Possible worlds/Leibniz: Thesis: there is a fixed set of worlds from which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: this is extremely doubtful. Possible worlds/Hintikka: we should rather call it world stories or scenarios. I 75 We can limit the set of worlds to those that are conceivable. >Possible world/Hintikka, >Conceivability. --- Holz I 120 Possible worlds/Leibniz/Pape/Holz: is for Leibniz the negative background of a positive world. The background, by virtue of which the positivity of the one realized world first acquires its justification. Namely, in a comprehensive sense of a logical, ontological and moral justification! The force of the negation is stronger than that of the position. Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: a world is always the totality of everything real and possible, and this possible is the real possible (puissance) of which the real is a selected partial quantity. Possible worlds/LeibnizVsKripke: other possible worlds cannot be worlds of other possibilities (otherwise this (our) world (the actual world) would not be a world, but only a partial quantity). I 122 One must not multiply the world's things by several worlds, for there is no number that is not in this one world, or even in each of its parts. Cf. >Counterpart theory. To introduce another species of existing things is to misuse the concept of existence. World/Leibniz: not the sum of the parts, but their ordered connection. The world is the world law composing the individuals. Order/Leibniz: does not arise from the world, but the world itself is the order, the order is the world-creating one. Now however, due to the a priori necessary principles (see above) no other order than the existing one is to be thought of! Possible worlds/Leibniz: therefore, worlds, which are structurally different from ours, remain undefined in content and unthinkable. They would be mere shadow worlds. It is, however, impossible for a priori thinking to exclude the possibility of such differently ordered worlds. Leibniz: the conceivability of possible worlds is a necessary possibility of thinking. >Necessity/Leibniz, >Thinking/Leibniz. I 122/123 Solution/Leibniz: and these possible worlds would still be formally possible as actual non-worlds even if there were no world at all, but nothing. Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: as worlds, however, they are only possible when they are not nothing. This is due to the fact that the (definition) possible ontological cannot be determined otherwise than as force, which urges to utter. The nothingness of possibility, however, would not be conceivable because it would not be a possibility and thinking is always thinking of at least possible. (If necessary, the possible nothing!) Nothing/Leibniz: that there is nothing is then a possibility among other things. In the infinitesimal sense, the minimization of the possible or a world whose content tends toward zero, whose possibilities mutually cancel each other out. >Minimum/Leibniz. Cf. >Nothingness/Heidegger, >Nonexistence, >Impossible world. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Adams, R. | Stalnaker Vs Adams, R. | I 32 Possible Worlds/Poss.W./Robert Adams: if there are true sentences in which the existence of non-actual possible worlds is mentioned, it must be possible to reduce them to sentences in which only things from the actual world are mentioned that are not identical with non-actual possibilities. StalnakerVsAdams: I do not see why that should be necessary. World Stories/Possible Worlds/Robert Adams: Thesis: a world story is a maximum consistent quantity of propositions. The concept of a possible world can be given in a contextual analysis in terms of world stories. Proposition/Truth/Adams/Stalnaker: a proposition is true in some or all possible worlds if it is an element of some or all of the world stories. StalnakerVsAdams: in his approach, there are three undefined terms: Proposition, consistent and contradictory. Propositions/Adams/Stalnaker: can be language-independent, abstract objects. They have truth values. Consistency/Adams/Stalnaker: is a property of sets of propositions. They can be defined in terms of possible worlds in which all propositions are true. I 34 Two conditions for consistency: (W1) The set of all true propositions is consistent (W2) Every subset of a consistent set is consistent. Contradiction/Adams/Stalnaker: could be defined in terms of consistency: A and B are contradictory, iff {A,B} is not consistent and for each set of consistent propositions Γ either Γ U {A} or Γ U {B} is consistent. The theory assumes: (W3) Every proposition has a contradiction. Proposition/Adams/Stalnaker: this is a minimal theory of propositions. It does not impose any structure on the propositions except what is needed for the sake of compatibility, implication and equivalence. And to ensure, for example, that the right kind of implication exists. E.g. implication: Def Implication/Proposition/Stalnaker: (here): A implies B iff a set consisting of A and a contradiction of B is not consistent. (W1) and (W2) ensure that our implication has the right properties. This minimal theory is suited to support the view of Adams: Possibility/Robert Adams: Thesis: possibility is rather holistic than atomistic, in the sense that what is possible only exists as part of a possible completely determinate world. ((s) there are no isolated possibilities). Stalnaker: so far, our considerations do not imply that every consistent set of propositions is a subset of a world story. For the following (W4) does not follow from them, but must be added as an addition: (W4) Every consistent set is a subset of a maximum consistent set. I 36 Proposition/Possible World/Stalnaker: in contrast, an analysis of propositions as possible worlds provides definitions of consistency and so on in terms of set-theoretic relations between sets of possible worlds. World Stories Theory/Possible World/Adams/Stalnaker: the theory of the world stories is weaker, because it leaves open questions that are clarified by the analysis of propositions as possible worlds. The following two theses are consequences of the possible world theory, but not of the world stories theory: (W5) Closure Condition: For each set of propositions Γ there is a proposition A such that G implies A and A implies every element of G. Stalnaker: i.e. for each set of propositions, there is a proposition that says that every proposition in the set is true. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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