Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 28 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chomsky | Psychological Theories | Slater I 191 Chomsky/psychological theories: Chomsky (1957(1) [argued] (…) for highly constrained innate biases that lead all natural languages to share a small number of universal properties. By implication, language acquisition does not require a protracted period of development during which the child is exposed to the idiosyncrasies of their native language. Rather, brief snippets of “surface” input serve to trigger one of a very few possible “hidden” structures, that then evolve into a system capable of generating an infinite variety of grammatically correct sentences in the particular native language to which the child is exposed. Psychology: while Chomsky never directly studied child language, psychological studies observed a multi-year period gradually increasing vocabulary and grammatical complexity. E.g., Eimas et al. (1971)(2). >Language development/Eimas. VsChomsky/ChomskyVsVs: When these language acquisition researchers noted the absence of evidence for innate linguistic skills, the explanation offered by those who espoused Chomsky’s nativist perspective was that children are beset by an impressive array of “production deficiencies” that mask their true underlying competence. VsProduction deficiencies see >Phonetics/psychological theories. Slater I 196 Chomsky: the argument for a special speech mode rested on two claims: (a) speech is perceived in a manner that is not shared with non-speech sounds, and (b) speech perception is fundamentally linguistic in nature, thereby arguing for an innate mechanism that is specific to humans. VsChomsky: Both of these claims were challenged by strong empirical data in the decade after Eimas et al. (1971(2)). First, Kuhl and Miller (1975(3), 1978(4)) showed that a non-human mammal (chinchilla) has CP (categorical perception) for VOT (voice onset time) including the very same synthetic speech sounds used in Eimas et al. >Phonetics/psychological theories, >Categorical perception. Moreover, Kuhl and Miller were able to develop a Slater I 197 method to obtain labeling data from the animals, and the manner in which chinchillas responded to VOT is virtually identical to human adults. Follow-up work by Kuhl and Padden (1982(5) tested rhesus monkeys and confirmed these findings with a species more similar to humans. Categorical perception: Thus, the presence of CP is not a sufficient argument for the operation of a linguistically relevant speech mode, since no one claims that chinchillas or monkeys achieve anything remotely like language, and certainly no ability to produce speech. Subsequent research by Kluender, Diehl, and Killeen (1987)(6) has shown that the fundamental properties of CP are not even unique to mammals (…). Cf. >Animal Language. Problem: CP (categorical perception) is not nearly as definitive as the claims made by Liberman and his colleagues (1957(7), 1961(8), 1967(9). See Pisoni and Lazarus (1974)(10), Miller (1997)(11). 1. Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. Mouton: The Hague. 2. Eimas, P. D., Siqueland, E. R.,Jusczyk, P., &Vigorito,J. (1971). Speech perception in infants. Science, 171, 303-306. 3. Kuhl, P. K., & Miller, J. D. (19 75). Speech perception by the chinchilla: Voiced-voiceless distinction in alveolar plosive consonants. Science, .190, 69—72. 4. Kuhl, P. K., & Miller, J. D. (19 78). Speech perception by the chinchilla: Identification functions for synthetic VOT stimuli. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 63, 905—917. 5. Kuhl, P. K., & Padden, D. M. (1982). Enhanced discriminability at the phonetic boundaries for the voicing feature in macaques. Perception and Psychophysics, 32, 542—550. 6. Kluender, K. R., Diehl, R. L., & Killeen, P. R. (1987). Japanese quail can learn phonetic categories. Science, 237, 1195—1197. 7. Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Hoffman, H. S., & Griffith, B.C. (1957). The discrimination of speech sounds within and across phoneme boundaries. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54, 358—368. 8. Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Kinney, J., & Lane, H. (1961). The discrimination of relative onset-time of the components of certain speech and non-speech patterns. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61,379—388. 9. Liberman, A. M., Cooper, F. S., Shankweiler, D. P., & Studdert-Kennedy, M. (1967). Perception of the speech code. Psychological Review, 74, 431—461. 10. Pisoni, D. B., & Lazarus, J. H. (1974). Categorical and non-categorical modes of speech perception along the voicing continuum. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 55, 328—333. 11. Miller, J. L. (1997). Internal structure of phonetic categories. Language and Cognitive Processes, 12, 865—869. Richard N. Aslin, “Language Development. Revisiting Eimas et al.‘s /ba/ and /pa/ Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Competence | Chomsky | I 307 Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: I do not claim that they consist in "knowing-that", that language is described by the rules of grammar. >Propositional knowledge, >Knowledge, >Knowing how, >Capabilities. Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: not a number of habits, no reference to the ability of the cyclist - instead the mastery of generative grammar - (non-formulated knowledge). - Less than the ability to speak a language. >Speaking. --- Searle VIII 404 Competence/performance/Chomsky: Thesis: performance is just the peak of the iceberg of competence. >Performance. Searle VIII 437 SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is wrong: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more like a theory of performance than one of competence - he does not see that ultimately competence is a performance competence - ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: suspects behaviorism behind it. SearleVs: not true, because speech act theory involves intention. >Speech act theory. Searle VIII 409 Chomsky: new: object of study is the language skills. old: random number of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. >Theories, >Explanation. Searle VIII 414 SearleVsChomsky: it is not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker. >Grammar, >Syntax, >Semantics. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Competence | Searle | VIII 404 Competence/performance/Chomsky: thesis: performance is just the tip of the iceberg of competence. VIII 437 SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is misled: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be rather a theory of performance than one of competence - r does not see that competence is ultimately performance competence. ChomskyVsSpeech Act Theory: Chomsky suspects behaviorism behind it. >Behaviorism. SearleVs: this is not true, because Speech Act Theory involves intention. >Speech act theory. VIII 409/10 Chomsky: new: the object of study is language skills - old: we have indiscriminate sets of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. VIII 414 SearleVsChomsky: it is not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker. >Transformational grammar. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Criteria | Chomsky | II 345 Criteria/mental states/Wittgenstein: mental states or the "inner workings of the mind" do not provide a criterion for the proper use of an expression. II 346 ChomskyVsWittgenstein: here it is not about a "real statement" e.g. if someone reads something, but about a legitimate claim - e.g. mirage: can provoke a legitimate (incorrect) assertion. >Assertions, >Assertibility conditions, >Justification. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Deep Structure | Chomsky | I 269f Surface Structure/Chomsky: Determination of a hierarchy of parts of sentences that belong to specific categories: noun phrase, verb phrase, adjective phrase, etc. E.g. John is certain that Bill will leave. John is certain to leave: - similar surface structure, different deep structure. >Surface structure. I 273 Surface Structure/Chomsky: Assumption: it contributes nothing to the meaning. The contribution an expression makes to the sentence is defined by the deep structure. >Compositionality. ChomskyVsAnalytic Philosophy: if different intensions were to change their meaning after substitution, there would have to be a corresponding difference in the deep structure, which is unlikely. >Substitution, >Meaning, >Intensions. I 276f Deep Structure/Chomsky: plays a role in the mental representation of sentences. >Representation. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Epistemology | Putnam | III 87 Interest/knowledge/epistemology/recognition/Putnam: recognition is driven by interests (ChomskyVs). VsChomsky: that does not mean that we are free to choose our interests or that interests were not open to criticism. Also reasonableness depends on the circumstances. The claim that a term is relative to interests does not mean that all interests were equally reasonable. >Interest. --- I (g) 200 Kripke/Putnam: Kripke assumes that we have something like "intellectual intuition". PutnamVsKripke: something that should correspond to a "transcendental correspondence"? |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Generative Grammar | Lyons | I 158 Generative Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Lyons: "generative" is often misunderstood: generative grammar does not have to be transformational grammar. Both are often confused, since Chomsky introduced the terms at the same time. Transformation: was already used by Harris before in the same way as later by Chomsky. Def Generative/Grammar/Lyons: 1. "projective" ("predictive"): this also determines potential sentences. Through a number of grammatical rules that describe a corpus of sentences by "projecting" this corpus onto a larger number of sentences. I 159 2. "Explicit" ("formal"): provides a decision procedure as to whether sentences or combinations of language elements are grammatical or not. (similar in mathematics: Example 2 n: gives even numbers). A structural description is also provided. I 161 This second meaning of "generative" requires the formalization of grammatical theory. ((s) Instead of a list of rules). >Distribution/Lyons, >Grammar, cf. >Universal grammar, >Transformational grammar, >Categorial grammar. Lyons I 237 Generative Grammar/ChomskyVsBloomfield/Lyons: Chomsky speaks of generation. Generative Method, >Generative Grammar. BloomfieldVsChomsky: Bloomfield speaks of analysis (classification). >L. Bloomfield, >N. Chomsky. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Grammar | Chomsky | Searle VIII 414 ChomskyVsStructuralism: phrase structure rules alone cannot resolve ambiguities. E.g. >Active/Passive. Solution/Chomsky: transformation rules, transformation phrase markers by permutation, insertion, eradication of elements in other phrase markers - then the syntax consists of two components: base and transformation. VIII 418 Deep structure/Chomsky: determines the meaning. >Meaning. Surface structure: determines the phonetic form (late works: sometimes the meaning). Syntax/Chomsky: is to be separated from semantics - (according to Searle): man is a syntactic creature, the brain is syntactic. >Syntax. VIII 421 SearleVsChomsky: from this it would follow that if one day we had syntactically modified forms, we would have no language anymore, but something else. VIII 421 Generative grammar/NeogrammariansVsChomsky: semantics crucial for the formation of syntactic structures. >Young turks, >Neogrammarians. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Grue | Chomsky | I 290 Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: Grueness is amarginal problem - the initial question is much too vague. - You can easily find a property of language "grue bleen" which is not a property of a "languange like German" - e.g. the predicate "being similar", only applied to objects rather than to qualia. Chomsky: there is no point in time t such that we can predict of objects that they will not be similar - they could be the similar if both were green - it is a property of natural languages that they behave more like German than like "grue bleen" - but language concepts such as "German" are too vague to satisfy Goodman’s criterion - we cannot explain why the learner does not acquire grue as basis for generalisation - that certainly follows from the sensory system. >Learning, >Language acquisition, >Induction. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Indeterminacy | Chomsky | II 325 Indeterminacy of translation/Quine/Chomsky: According to this theory all the suggestions for the translation should be able to be "compatible with the totality of speech disposition, but incompatible with each other." (Quine, 1960(1)) Chomsky: that is not possible because of the problems associated with the probability. The thesis when all probabilities are indistinguishable, both inside and outside of a language. Quine: circumvents the problem by starting not from the "totality of dispositions" but from the "stimulus meaning". II 325 Translation ambiguity, vagueness: ChomskyVsQuine: Disposition either in terms of stimulus, or in relation to the total corpus of the language: then all sentences are equally likely - (reference classes). >Reference classes, >Dispositions. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press, p. 27 |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Indeterminacy | Quine | Rorty I 227 McDowellVsQuine: If truth is underdetermined by the entirety of the observable, then it must be independent of it. This is absurd for verificationists, therefore one must not understand it realistically. This strategy would imply, however, that one includes biology, but excludes translation. ChomskyVsQuine: there is only one indeterminacy: the familiar underdeterminacy of each theory through all observations. ((s) You never know whether all the observations are taken into account, or are already done. Quine I 257 Indeterminate singular terms do not designate objects. An indefinite singular term must therefore stand in purely significant position: E.g. "The tax inspector is looking for someone" (position significant - "someone" is not significant). >Singular Terms/Quine. I 283 Indefinite singular term: disappears in quantification "something is an x such that", "everything is an x .." I 285 Beliefs and quotes can be understood as infinite different things (Indeterminacy). II 33 Inscrutability of reference: no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the spatiotemporal strand, which is filled by a dog" - it is only one statement about the used terminology and its translation, not about physical objects (representative function). Inscrutability: occurs in translation or permutation. >Translation/Quine. VI 69 Indeterminacy of translation/syntax/Quine: the ambiguity does not extend to the syntax - but on the referential apparatus: plural endings, equal signs, quantifiers - but these are not part of syntax. XII 60 Indeterminacy of translation/Quine: E.g. numbers of Neumann, Frege, Zermelo: each definition is correct, but they are all incompatible with one another. Solution: we invent set-theoretic models which must comply with the laws that fulfill the numbers in non-explicit meaning - Problem: you do not know if you talk about the terms or about the Goedel numbers (>shifted ostension). XII 62 Indeterminacy of translation/Native language/Quine: the indeterminacy of translation is also valid in a language: E.g. we may translate the "hopefully" of a particular speaker differently - principle of indulgence: justifies deviations from the homophonic translation, reproduction by the same phoneme order - compensation: can be made by corrections to the predicates - problem: we cannot ask: "are you really referring to Goedel numbers?" - Because the answer: "to numbers" lost its right to homophonic translation - ((s) because of the principle of indulgence). XII 97 Indeterminacy/translation/Gavagai/linguistics/Quine: the linguist always comes to an accurate translation, but only because he/she unconsciously makes arbitrary decisions - decisive: the holism: statements cannot be isolated. ((S) any differences can be compensated in other partial-translations.) |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Innateness | Locke | Höffe I 244 Innate/Locke/Höffe: Innate [for Locke] are merely abilities that enable the formation of ideas and principles, but only attain real knowledge through experience. Descartes/Höffe: However, even for Locke's opponent, Descartes, the possession of innate ideas consists in nothing other than the inner ability to evoke them. Höffe: There is probably a political reason why Locke so vehemently rejects innate ideas despite the small difference: According to Locke people are fallible, moreover they depend on mutual consideration which is why every dogmatism in the political-practical and every dogmatism in the theoretical field is fought. Locke does not doubt the truth of a theoretical principle such as the principle of contradiction, nor the validity of basic moral norms such as justice, the prohibition of damages or the commandment to observe contracts. Nevertheless, he vehemently opposes the view that they are devoid of any discussion, because then the competent authorities would be entitled to prevent relevant discussions. Instead, everyone should have the right to check prevailing opinions with his own intellect, for example, that the human is not inherently free by nature or that (absolute) monarchy is derived from divine law. Danto I 113 Imagination/innate/Locke: Thesis: Imagination is innate. - (ChomskyVs). - Simple ideas cannot be imagined. >Imagination/Kant, >Ideas/Locke, >Imagination. --- Euchner I 17 Ideas/LockeVs innate ideas: would they exist, cultures could not diverge this way. --- I 19 Spirit: blank blackboard. --- Arndt II 191 Innate ideas/tradition/Arndt: certain independence of ideas and language, recognition without language, representation. >Thought and language, >World/Thinking, >Representation, >Language/Locke. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Inscrutability of reference | Newen, A./Schrenk, M. | Newen I 76 Inscrutability/Gavagai/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1. inscrutability of reference: E.g. non-severed rabbit parts fulfil the same observation situations. - 2. inscrutability of translation: E.g. non-severed rabbit parts: can a) "be the same" b) "be part of the same thing". In each case in the foreign language. That is proceeding the inscrutability of reference - 3. underdetermination (if a theory) by the data: (corresponds to the translation inscrutability): there may be rival theories that fit to the same set of observations - VsQuine:. it never comes to radical translations because many aspects of the language are evolutionarily formalized in the brain and cannot vary greatly -. (ChomskyVsQuine) - Then there is only the 3. inscrutability. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Language | Chomsky | I 279ff Language/Chomsky: apart from its mental representation, it has no objective existence. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish here between "systems of beliefs" and "knowledge". >Belief, >Knowledge. --- II 319 Language/ChomskyVsQuine: must separate language and theory - otherwise, two speakers of the same language could have no disagreement. >Theory. II 330 Language/Chomsky/Quine: no frame of a tentative theory as in physics. - Several analytical hypotheses are not only possible but necessary. >Analytical hypotheses. ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the concepts of the language can be explained with physical dimensions. Aristotle: language is rather associated with actions. VsQuine: it is not evident that similarities can be localized in a room. - Principles, not "learned sentences". >Principles, >Similarity, >Reference. II 333 VsQuine: language cannot be dependent on "disposition for reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be essential. II 343 Perhaps language does not have to be taught. --- Graeser I 121f Language/ChomskyVsGrice: Question: should the main aspect really be communication? Searle: rather representation, but not as opposite. >Communication, >Representation. Meaning/VsGrice: most of the sentences of a language have never been uttered, so anyone can hardly ever have meant something by them. Meaning/VsGrice: we can only ever find out speaker meanings, because we know what the sentence means. - Students of Grice: Strawson and Searle. --- Münch III 320 Language/Chomsky/Holenstein: language is not a natural kind. >Natural kinds. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Language | Harman | Chomsky I 306 Language/Harman: because language is obviously not a "knowing-that", it must be a "knowing-how". >Knowledge, >Knowledge how, >Propositional knowledge, >Competence, >Performance, >Language acquisition. I 308 HarmanVsChomsky: the internal system for the selection of a grammar should be presented in a more fundamental language that would already have to be understood by the child. >Grammar, >VsChomsky. ChomskyVsVs: there is perhaps a more fundamental language, but the child does not have to speak it. The child has to learn the native language, but maybe it already actually masters a grammar. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Language | Quine | X 134 Language/Carnap/Quine: the language is presented as a deductive system Carnap - 1. Formation rules: Deliver the grammar and the lexicon so that they deliver the well formed formulas - 2. Transformation rules: these provide logical truths (including the mathematical, generally the analytical truths). >Logical Truth/Quine.# VI 17 Ontology/Language/Quine: as far as the assumption of a scientific theory can be called a linguistic matter, the assumption of an ontology can also be called a linguistic matter - but not more than this. >Ontology/Quine. VI 63 Language/Observation/Translation/Quine: most of our utterances are not correlated with stimuli at all, e.g. connectives etc. VI 64 The linguist can create an archive of uninterpreted sentences and dissect them. Recurring segments can be treated as words. (Analytical hypothesis). VI 65 Ultimately, we depend on very poor data material. We can expect successive statements to have something to do with each other. Later, the translator will be dependent on psychological hypotheses. What will the jungle inhabitants most likely believe to be true? What will they probably believe? VI 66 In this case, preference is given to recognizably rational translations. But to establish an alleged grammar and semantics of the natives would be nothing more than bad psychology. Instead one should assume that the psyche of the natives is largely like ours. VI 67 When the linguist discovers an error, he will wonder how far back it goes. VI 105 Language/QuineVsMentalism: The prerequisite of language is that people perceive that others perceive something. This, however, is the seduction to overstretch the mentalistic way of speaking. Mentalism. VII (b) 26 Definition/Quine: can serve two opposite purposes: 1. abbreviation and practical representation (short notation) 2. reverse: redundancy in grammar and vocabulary. Economical vocabulary leads to longer strings. Conversely, economical vocabulary simplifies the theoretical discourse about a language. Language/Quine: by habit these two types are fused together, one as part of the other: External language: is redundant in grammar and vocabulary and economical in terms of the length of strings. Partial language "primitive notation": is economical in grammar and vocabulary. VII (b) 27 Part and whole are connected by translation rules. We call these definitions. They are not assigned to one of the two languages, but connect them. But they are not arbitrary. They should show how primitive notations can serve all purposes. VII (d) 61 Language/Translation/Whorf/Cassirer/Quine: you cannot separate the language from the rest of the world. Differences in language will correspond to differences in life form. Therefore, it is not at all clear how to assume that words and syntax change from language to language while the content remains fixed. VII (d) 77 Introduction/Language/General Term/Quine: the use of general terms has probably arisen in the course of language development because similar stimuli cause similar reactions. Language would be impossible without general terms. In order to understand them, one must recognize the additional operator "class of" or "-ness" when introducing them. Failure to do so was probably the reason for accepting abstract entities. >General Terms/Quine. VII (d) 78 Science/Language/Quine: how much of our science is actually contributed by language, and how much is an original (real) reflection of reality? To answer this, we have to talk about both the world and the language! ((s) And that is already the answer!) Quine: and in order to talk about the world, we have to presuppose a certain conceptual scheme that belongs to our particular language. Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we were born into it, but we can change it bit by bit, like Neurath's ship. VII (d) 79 Language/Quine: its purpose is efficiency in communication and prediction. Elegance is even added as an end in itself. X 34/35 Truth/Language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or characters in one language are equivalent to "2 < 5" and in another to "2 > 5". When meaning changes over many years within a language, we think that they are two different languages. Because of this relativity, it makes sense to attribute a truth value only to tokens of sentences. Truth/World/Quine: the desire for an extra-linguistic basis for truth arises only if one ignores the fact that the truth predicate has precisely the purpose of linking the mention of linguistic forms with the interest in the objective world. X 42 Immanent/Language/Quine: are immanent in language: educational rules, grammatical categories, the concept of the word, or technically: the morpheme. ad X 62 Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (spoken about), the meta language is used to speak about the object language. X 87 Language/Grammar/Quine: the same language - the same infinite set of sentences can be created with different educational rules from different lexicons. Therefore, the concept (definition) of logical truth is not transcendent, but (language) immanent. (logical truth: is always related to a certain language, because of grammatical structure). >Logical Truth/Quine. Dependence on language and its grammatization. XI 114 Theory/Language/Quine/Lauener: we do not have to have an interpreted language in order to formulate a theory afterwards. This is the rejection of the isolated content of theoretical sentences. Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be considered purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) Such a system is not truthful). XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: a person's language and theory are different systems in any case, even if you would agree with Quine otherwise. XI 116 Quine: (ditto). Uncertainty of translation: because of it one cannot speak of a theory invariant to translations. Nor can one say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or conversely that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language. ((s) Because of the ontological statement that I cannot argue about ontology by telling the other that the things that exist in it do not exist in me, because then I contradict myself that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the fallacy that language contributes to the syntax but theory to the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: i.e. not that there is no contradiction between the two at all: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, this means that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction between language and theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language and theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. V 32 Def Language/Quine: is a "complex of dispositions to linguistic behaviour". V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be one way or the other, but words are out there where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve to transmit ideas! (> NominalismVsLocke). >Nominalism. Quine: it is probably true that when we learn a language we learn how to connect words with the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? V 89 Composition/language/animal/animal language/Quine: animals lack the ability to assemble expressions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Language Acquisition | Chomsky | I 281 Learning/Chomsky: a child learns as well Japanese as English - pointless to ask "which hypotheses it reduces" - there must be more than the ability to associate - structural grammar does not yield the structures that we have to postulate as generative grammar. >Grammar, >Generative grammar. I 283 Internal organization plays an important role for the perception, it determines an extremely restrictive initial scheme. I 285 VsGoodman: Learning a second language is not that different. >Learning. I 299 Learning/Chomsky: whether the evaluation function is learned or it is the basis for learning, is an empirical question. II 324 Language learning: behaviorist/Quine: Conditioning, association. ChomskyVsQuine: additionally principles , only by them infinitely many sentenes are explainable. ((s) For the question whether there are infinitely many possible sentences, see >Researchgate.) Upton I 74 Language acquistion/Chomsky/Upton: Chomsky (1979)(1) argues that there must therefore be an innate mechanism for language learning. He calls this the language acquisition device (LAD). LAD: Through the LAD the child is hard-wired to recognise the grammar of whatever language they are exposed to in infancy. This LAD matures over time, allowing the child to use increasingly complex language. VsChomsky/Upton: Contemporary theories of language development tend to be less extreme. Both sides have modified their position, so that nativists recognise that the environment has a role to play in language acquisition, and environmentalists accept that imitation and reinforcement are insufficient to explain the child’s entry into the complex world of language. >Language acquisition/Nativism, >Language acquisition/Bruner. 1. Chomsky, N (1979) Human language and other semiotic systems. Semiotica, 25: 31–44. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Language Evolution | Gärdenfors | I 71 Language Evolution/Evolution/Language/Gärdenfors: Thesis: in early forms of communication the communicative act itself was more important than its expressive form. (See H. Clark, 1992(1), Winter, 1998(2), Gärdenfors, 2010(3)). Therefore, the pragmatics of natural language is evolutionary seen the fundamental. Later, when the communication acts become more diverse and independent of the immediate context, the semantics is brought to the fore. Syntax is needed when the communication becomes even more conventional later: markers are used to establish uniqueness. Then syntax is used only for the most subtle aspects of communication. VsGärdenfors: this is in contrast to most contemporary authors in linguistics. ChomskyVsGärdenfors: for Chomsky's school syntax is at the beginning of the investigation, semantic features are added only when grammar is not enough. GärdenforsVsChomsky. I 72 Pragmatics/GärdenforsVsChomsky/Gärdenfors: For Chomsky, the pragmatics is only the waste basket for the remains: context, deixis, etc.). Gärdenfors: for a theory of the evolution of language, we must proceed differently: pragmatics before semantics before syntax. I 73 Language formation/Gärdenfors: just as the money was later added to the exchange economy and made it more efficient, the language was added to the existing communication among humans. Analogy/linguistic communication/monetary economy/Gärdenfors: one can extend the analogy: just as the money allows a stable price system, a relatively stable system of meanings is formed by language. Game theoretical explanation/analogy: just as prices, linguistic meanings are also equilibrium points in a system. (> Meeting of minds). I 78 Langauge Formation/Communication/Gärdenfors: Thesis: growing semantic complexity is achieved by extending the domains in the shared conceptual space. One can understand the linking of different domains as the creation of product spaces. ((s) Product space: Cartesian coordinate system, where one axis corresponds to a conceptual dimension.) This is how domains are combined. 1. Clark, H. (1992). Arenas of language use. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Winter, S. (1998). Expectations and linguistic meaning. Lund University Cognitive Studies 71. Lund: Lund University. 3. Gärdenfors, P. (2010). Evolution and semantics. In P.C. Horgan (ed.) Cambridge encyclopedia of the language sciences (pp. 748-750). Cambridge: Cambridge University. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Method | Chomsky | I 278 Method/theory/Chomsky: requirement: we must be able to describe what the person receives. - The percept itself is a construction of the first order. - Its properties are determined experiment. Grammar: Grammar is a construction of the second-order. For this one must abstract from the other factors involved in the use and understanding of language and refer to internalized knowledge of the speaker. VsBehaviorism: excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and "what is learned" from the outset. >Behaviorism. I 297ff Method/theory: PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered through routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not that impressive. ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact this refers to competence and not to performance - routine does not matter here, but the inherent correlation between sound and meaning. >Ambiguity. I 303 Chomsky: my universal grammar is not a "theory of language acquisition", but one element of it. - My thesis is an "all-at-once" proposal and does not try to capture the interplay between the tentative hypotheses constructed by the child and new data interpreted with them. >Grammar, >Hypotheses. --- II 316 Method/theory/Chomsky: "association", "reinforcement", "random mutation ": hide our ignorance. ((s) Something dissimilar may also be associated.) II 321 Method/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty. - If reinforcement is needed for learning, it means that learning cannot happen without data. Cf. >Psychological theories on reinforcement and reinforcement sensitivity, >Learning. II 323 Language Learning/ChomskyVsQuine: he does not explain it: if only association and conditioning, then the result is merely a finite language. >Language acquisition. II 324 VsQuine: concept of probability of a sentence is empty: the fact that I utter a particular German sentence is as unlikely as a particular Japanese sentence from me. >Probability. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Omniscience | Hintikka | II XV Logical Omniscience/Hintikka: thesis: logical omniscience is only a supposed problem. ChomskyVsHintikka: Hintikka has given the alleged paradox as the reason for his rejection of any model-theoretical semantics for propositional attitudes. HintikkaVsChomsky: Chomsky's problem has been solved long ago. --- II 21 Omniscience/solution/Hintikka: we must allow individuals to not exist in every possible world. Otherwise, all world lines would have to be ad libitum extendable, then everyone would have to know what an individual would be in any world (in whatever disguise), namely on the basis of the form of knowledge + indirect W-question. II 23 Logical Omniscience/epistemic logic/model theory/Hintikka: problem: suppose (S1 > S2). That is, all S1 models are S2 models. Then all the epistemic alternatives in which S1 is true are those in which S2 is true. Problem: it follows that for each knowing person b and every scenario applies: (3.1) {b} KS1> {b} K S2. That is, one must also know all the logical consequences of one's knowledge. This has led some to reject model theory. Model Theory/HintikkaVsVs: model theory follows only if one cannot avoid omniscience, and one can avoid it. >Model theory. Solution: one can find a subset of logical consequences (S1 > S2) for which (3.1) applies. (i) This subset can be restricted syntactically. The number of free individual symbols together with the number of layers of quantifiers limit the number of individuals that can be considered in a set S (or in an argument). Solution: this number (parameter) should not be greater than the one in S1 or S2 at any point in the argument. Problem: there is no simple axiomatic-deductive system for this. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Rules | Lyons | I 157 Rules/Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion: ChomskyVsGrammatical rules: Thesis: The grammatical structure of the language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is "intuitively" (unconsciously) mastered by the native speaker. (ChomskyVsRules due to the consequence of "uncertainty of grammar"/ChomskyVsUncertainty of grammar). Lyons: the differences in opinion here are exaggerated. Not all grammar is uncertain. I 219 Phrase structure grammar/Constituent grammar/Rules/Chomsky/Lyons: Each rule brackets the constituents that form the construction defined by it and also describes them. >Constituent grammar, >Phrase structure grammar. Layers: (of the structure) are determined by the order in which the rules are applied. Def Initial symbol/Terminology/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Example ∑ for sentence ((s) stands farthest left or above a branch). Grammar: produces a chain of symbols by applying the rules. >Lexicon. Def End Symbol/Grammar/Lyons: specifies the class of elements of the lexicon e.g. adjective. Def End chain/terminal string/grammar/terminology/Lyons: consists of end symbols. I 220 Sentence/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: occurs when we replace the end symbols from the end chain with an element of the lexical class they describe. Its constituent structure is fully determined by the replacement rules that create the end chain. >Terminology/Lyons. I 220 Replacement rules/Grammar/Alternative rules/Extension/Chomsky/Lyons: to distinguish transitive and intransitive verbs, we introduce: (1) ∑ > NP + Vp (2a) VP > V intr + Adv 2b) VP > V tr + Adv (3) Np > A + N. I 221 If we introduce the option between (2a) and (2b), we must change the word classification in the lexicon: V intr = [{ran, etc.} V ir = {love, kill, etc.}. >Word classes. Grammar/problem: it is still unsatisfactory: 1. It still produces illegal sentences such as Poor John kill old women ((s) no special form for 3rd person singular). Solution: we must consider the congruence between the "subject" and the verb. >Congruence/Lyons. 3 (we leave that out here). 2. as it stands now, we can only produce sentences with five words like "Old men love young women" or sentences with four words like "Poor John ran away". The following sentences are not possible: e.g. John ran away, e.g. Men love young women, e.g. Old men love women, e.g. Old men love young women passionately. Optional Rule/Extension/Grammar/Replacement Rules/Lyons: For example: we extend rules (3) by making two rules out of one: (3) NP > N (4) N > A + N We say that (3) is obligatory, but (4) optional. New: then we also get: e.g. John ran away, e.g. Men love young women, e.g. Old men love women etc. All these sentences are subtypes of the sentence type. ∑(NP + VP). This means that their structures are identical at a certain level of analysis. Family Tree/Structure Tree: Example (I) John ran away (II) Poor John ran away (III) Men love women (IV) Old men love women (V) Men love young women, (VI) Old men love young women I 223 Rules/Replacement Rules/Order/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: the priority of a certain order of rules over another can significantly change the result of the grammar. optional: e.g. (1) ∑ > NP + VP (2a) VP > V intr + Adv 2b) VP > V tr + Adv (3) Np > A + N. (4) N > T + N (5) N > Adj + N Rules (4) and (5) are optional. New: therefore the grammar now generates men, the men, good men, and the good men. Order: if (5) should come before (4), there would be e.g. good the men. Order: also that of (3) is essential: if it were in front (2b), it would have to be repeated afterwards to guarantee the extension for the complex resulting from VP > V tr + NP. The sequence can therefore prevent inadmissible sentences and reduce the scope of the rule corpus. Order: Assumed, (6) N > N + and + N If (6) operates before (5), we get for example (old men) and women and men and (old women) If (6) operates after (5), we get for example old (men and women). I 224 Semantically, it is the same, despite the different brackets. Def Recursive Rules/recursive/Recursion/Lyons: allow infinitely repeated application (only in infinite cases they are called recursive). Example (6b) N > N + and + N + and + N (6c) N > N + and + N + and + N + and + N (6d) … E.g. This is how you can tell stories: e.g. He came in and he sat down and he said that ...and he... Recursion/Grammar/Lyons: a "realistic" model of grammar I 225 will be designed in such a way that there are more examples of recursive structures with two constituents than with three, more with three than with four, etc. ((s) the simplest forms should be the most likely ones). >Constituent Structure Grammar. Probability/Grammar/Correctness/Lyons: the probability of an occurrence must not be confused with its correctness. Coordination/Recursive rules/Grammar/Lyons: Problem: Coordination using a recursive rule: ambiguity by different possible brackets e.g. Tom and Dick and Harry, (Tom and Dick) and Harry, Tom and (Dick and Harry). Dilemma: a) Intuition: recursive rules do not indicate what the intuitively perceived structural description is. b) and yet recursive rules are necessary. I 227 Formation rules/phrase structure rules/constituent structure grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Spelling/Terminology: PSG - phrase structure grammar. PS rules - Phrase structure rules. a) Formation rules = phrase structure rules b) Transformation rules: specify how the end chains are transformed into real sentences. I 249 Context Dependence/Rules/Economy/Lyons: the rule growth to cover all other congruence ratios would be small. >Context/Lyons. On the other hand, it would be significant in context-independent grammar. Here, context-dependent grammars are more economical. Correctness/Lyons: both types of grammars formalize the congruence ratios correctly. >Correctness/Lyons. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Semantics | Searle | I 236 Chinese room: semantics is not intrinsic to the syntax. >Syntax. VI 205 Semantics/speech act theory/Searle: speech act theory is not an appendage, but encompasses everything that used to be called semantics and pragmatics. >Pragmatics, >speech act theory. VII 100 Semantics/pragmatics/Searle: I have never found the distinction between pragmatics and semantics useful, as it requires a specific theory in the philosophy of language. VII 102 Language/Searle: without a coherent general theory of syntax and semantics, we have no way of distinguishing between features of utterances that are derived from particular words and features that are derived from other facts, e.g. from speech or syntactic syntax. VIII 419 Generative semantics/"Young Turks": thesis: according to this opinion (of Chomsky's students) there is no boundary between syntax and semantics and therefore no such entities as syntactic deep structures. ChomskyVs: syntax should be studied separately from semantics. (This is the heritage of structuralism). Searle: deep philosophical view: for Chomsky the human being is a syntactic living being, the brain is syntactically structured. The semantic function does not determine the form of syntax. Form is only casually related to function. VIII 420 Generative semantics/"Young Turks"VsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is semantics. Even terms like "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! Example: "He called him a Republican and insulted him". >Generative grammar. VIII 422 Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a sentence. Searle: if generative semantics is right and there are no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes even more interesting; we can then systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection here!) >Young turks. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Surface Structure | Chomsky | I 269F Surface Structure/Chomsky: finding a hierarchy of phrases that belong to certain categories: noun phrase, verb phrase, adjective phrase, etc. E.g. John is certain Bill wants to leave - John is certain to leave: similar surface structure, different deep structure. >Deep structure. I 273 Surface Structure/Chomsky: Assumption: it contributes nothing to the meaning - what contribution a term makes to the sentence, is adjusted by the deep structure >compositionality. ChomskyVsAnalytic Philosophy: if different intensions after substitution should change the meaning, there would have to be a corresponding difference in the deep structure, which is unlikely. >Analytic Philosophy, >Linguistic turn. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Synonymy | Chomsky | II 335 Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: false idealization: not "equality in the terms" causes synonymous expressions - not assertibility conditions (circumstances) but it is about distinguishing between langue and parole, between competence and performance. >Circumstances, >Assertibility conditions, >Assertibility, >Langue, >Parole. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Transformational Grammar | Chomsky | Chomsky I 271 Chomsky: thesis: in any language, surface structures are produced by "grammatical transformation" from "deep structures". Def transformation: Representation of an indexed bracket on an indexed bracket, e.g. [S[NPJohn][VP is [AP Certain] [VP ...] Deep structure: even an indexed bracket. - The large class of deep structure is specified by basic rules. Deep structure: subject and predicate may be exchanged. - Deep structures are limited in their variance. Chomsky I 296 Transformation/Grammar/ChomskyVsPutnam: Transformations are not rules but operations - (for creating surface structures from deep structures). --- Strawson VI 395 Transformational grammar Vs traditional grammar: it is supposed to be too unsystematic, no explanation with the traditional concepts "verb" , "noun", "object" is possible - transformational grammer Vs formal logic. Strawson VI 397 Grammar/Strawson: Grammar must distinguish between essential and non-essential connections. --- Lyons I 269 Generalized Transformation/Chomsky/Lyons: up to now we only had one end chain as input in the transformational component. However, the system also allows the combination of two or more end chains (by concatenating chain pairs = by means of optional generalized transformations, these are also called Def transformations with double base/double-based/Chomsky/Lyons: if two or more end chains serve as input for the transformation. = "generalized transformation"). Transformation/Chomsky/Lyons: here there are two classes: a) Embedding rules b) Conjunction rules. Tradition/Lyons: this does not quite correspond to the traditional distinction between complex sentence and compound sentence. Surface texture/Lyons: e.g. flying planes has the same surface texture as e.g. supersonic planes (adjective + noun). Deep structure: e.g. flying plane has a transformational relationship to the deep structure of e.g. plane fly and to planes are flying. Grammar: thus it generates a matrix string of the form NP - be - A) and a constituent string of the form NP - V intr. Embeding/embedding rules/Chomsky/Lyons: were merely suggested in "Syntactic Structures" (N. Chomsky, 1957(1)). The important thing is that an embedded structure... Lyons I 270 ...is the transformation of a chain which could also be the underlying structure of an entire sentence, but which functions as a constituent of another sentence. It is a sentence in another sentence. The P-marker of the matrix sentences dominated by S therefore contains another S, which is dominated by the corresponding symbol with regard to the function of the constituent sentence in the overall structure. Def clause/Terminology/Linguistics/Lyons: Subset Def phrase/Terminology/Linguistics/Lyons: Complex of words. Conjunction transformation: on the other hand, also connects sentences within a larger sentence. In this case, however, no sentence is subordinated, but both retain their sentence status. The P-marker for the larger sentence will therefore contain two (or more) co-ordinated ∑ below the uppermost ∑. Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: does not actually connect sentences, but rather the underlying structures of the sentences. >Structures/Chomsky, >Grammar, cf. >Universal grammar, >Generative grammar. 1.N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, Berlin, New York 1957 |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Transformational Grammar | Lyons | I 157 Rules/Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion: ChomskyVsGrammatical rules: Thesis: The grammatical structure of the language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is "intuitively" (unconsciously) mastered by the native speaker. (ChomskyVsRules due to the consequence of "uncertainty of grammar"/ChomskyVsUncertainty of grammar). Lyons: the differences here are exaggerated. Not all grammar is indefinite. I 252 Transformational grammar/transformational/Lyons: any grammar that claims to provide an analysis of deep and surface structure is a transformational grammar. I 252 Ambiguity/transformational/Gammar/Lyons: there are many more types here, in addition to the various parentheses. E.g. amor dei: the love of God: a) from God, b) to God. Subjective or objective genitive. I 253 Chomsky: famous example: Flying planes can be dangerous a) Planes can be dangerous b) Flying can be dangerous. Tradition: would explain this by the difference between participle and gerund: Def Participle/Lyons: is a word derived from a verb and used as an adjective. Def Gerund/Lyons: is a word derived from a verb and used as a noun. Solution: a) Flying planes are dangerous b) Flying planes is dangerous. I 254 Lexeme/Lyons: a certain word (here in the abstract sense) can be verbal in a sentence and nominal in a transformationally related sentence. (Participle/Gerund). Solution/Transformation/Lyons: then we can say that for example the syntagma Flying planes is derived by a rule that transforms the structure underlying the sentence Flying planes can be dangerous. I 256 Subject/Object/Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Lyons: e.g. John eats the apples, John is eating: then The eating of the apples has an object meaning. Problem: whether s also has a subject meaning depends on whether a sentence like The apples are eating can be generated. ((s) Grammatical, not semantic!). Solution: whether it works then depends on whether the noun apple and the verb eat can be subclassified in the lexicon (by grammatical features) in such a way that the grammatical rules allow the assignment of a feature (e.g. inanimate) to a noun as subject of the verb class to which eat belongs to or not. I 258 Active/Passive/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: although subject and object are reversed, identity or similarity prevails between the two corresponding sentences in the deep structure. But this is also the prerequisite that the interchange of subject and object can be determined at all. Problem: there is disagreement as to whether there is dissimilation or not. For example, assuming that the shooting of the hunters is not ambiguous. Problem: then we would still require the grammar to establish relations a) between the shooting of the hunters and the transitive theorem NP1 shoot the hunters as well as b) between the hunters shooting and the intransitive the hunters shoot. I 270 Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: does not actually connect sentences, but the structures on which the sentences are based. Conjunction transformation: connects sentences within a larger sentence. However, no sentence is subordinate but both retain their sentence status. The P-marker for the larger sentence will therefore contain two (or more) ∑ coordinated with each other at the topmost ∑. >Terminology/Lyons. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Underdetermination | Chomsky | II 337 Underdetermination/Indeterminacy/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine: each hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting. >Hypotheses, >Underdetermination/Quine. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Underdetermination | Rorty | I 227 Underdetermination/data/McDowellVsQuine: if truth is underdetermined by the totality of the observable, then it must be independent of them. - But then one would have to include biology, while we exclude translation. Cf. >ChomskyVsQuine >Theories/Quine. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Artificial Intelligence | Chomsky Vs Artificial Intelligence | Dennett I 540 Language / ChomskyVsArtificial Intelligence: the child shall later only switch whether it is learning Chinese or English, but it is not a "general problem solver". Even "slow" children "learn" jspeak well! They do not "learn" it, just as birds do not learn their feathers. I 541 Dennett per Chomsky. But if he s right, the phenomena of language are much more difficult to explore. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Behaviorism | Chomsky Vs Behaviorism | Dantos2 I 268 Rotating figuresVsBehaviorism > Mental representation (inner r.)Vsintrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism) - FodorVsBehaviorism Chomsky I 278 ChomskyVsBehaviorism: has proven to be quite unfruitful. It excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and of "what is learnt" from the start. II 351 ChomskyVsBehaviorism: is just as if you were to call physics the "science of reading scales". Searle VIII 404 ChomskyVsBehaviorism: fundamental confusion between data and object of investigation. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Behaviorism | Fodor Vs Behaviorism | Danto I 268 Rotary FiguresVsBehaviorism > Mental Representation (inner r) VsIntrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism), FodorVsBehaviorism. Fodor/Lepore IV 56 VsBehaviorism/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. assuming "dog" and "shmog" are two words with which speakers react to exactly the same stimuli, namely dogs. Then for e.g. Skinner would follow that "dog" and "shmog" are synonymous. Then, the following sentence would be analytical in the language of the speaker: "Whatever is a dog, is a shmog." QuineVs: there are neither synonyms nor analytic sentences! IV 57 So Skinner’s semantics must be wrong. VsVs: it is namely a priori! Even worse: all the semantics must be wrong, a priori, because this nihilistic theory will say that there are no semantic properties at all. Fodor/Lepore: what went wrong this time? We have taken literally, that Quine has not shown in Two Dogmas (TD) (and also has not argued) that there are no semantic facts and no analytic truths. Meaning/Fodor/Lepore: what we rather concede is that if meaning is to have any sense at all, then it cannot be reconstructed by reference to the sentences to which the speaker agrees. Meaning/Two Dogmas/TD/Quine: meaning cannot be reduced to the inferences to which one is willing to agree. Reason: what inferences you agree to only depends on how you see the world, i.e. what you intend your words to mean. ((s)> interest, intention, meaning). Important argument: it is impossible to detect which of his/her views the speaker accepts a priori! So there are no analytic sentences. IV 195 Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the reversed spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong (and also functionalism: Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). You might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. ((s) You could always describe them without knowing what feelings are present in the other.) |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Bloomfield, L. | Chomsky Vs Bloomfield, L. | Lyons I 237 ChomskyVsBloomfield: speaks of creation. Generative method > generative grammar. BloomfieldVsChomsky: speaks of analysis (classification). generative grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: sets limits to the classification. E.g. longlegs/Bloomfield: are exocentric so that they can occur both as singular as well as plural. However, this shows that these forms are no constructions. They must rather be registered in the lexicon as not further analyzable entities. Distribution: of E.g. longlegs is different from that of long legs. BloomfieldVsChomsky: this cannot be accounted for with a productive formation rule. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Chomsky, N. | Harman Vs Chomsky, N. | I 306 Competence/Performance/ChomskyVsHarman: competence as "knowledge that language is described by the rules of grammar". And that "grammar specifies this competence". ChomskyVsHarman: I have not only never asserted this, but also repeatedly rejected it publicly. It would be absurd if the speaker had to know the rules explicitly. Knowledge/Language/Harman: a) knowing that b) knowing how. Since language is obviously not "knowing that", it must be "knowing how". The speaker knows "how he has to understand other speakers." Analogous to the ability of the cyclist. I 307 ChomskyVsHarman: he uses "competence" very different than me. I see no relation to the "ability of the cyclist", not a "set of habits," or something like that. I 308 HarmanVsChomsky: the internalized system (that limits the choice of grammars) must be represented in a more fundamental language, and the child must have understood the latter already, before it can apply this schematism a) this leads to a circle: If you said that the child mastered the "more fundamental language" "directly", without having learned it, then why do you not also say that it mastered the actual language "directly" without learning it. Or: b) Regress: If, however, you said that it has to learn the more fundamental language first, then the question is how this fundamental language is learned itself. ChomskyVsHarman: even if you assume that the schematism must be represented at an "innate language", it does not follow what Harman sees: the child may need to master the "more fundamental language", but it does not have to "speak and understand" it. We just have to assume that it can make use of it. ad a): the assumption that the child masters its native language without learning it is wrong. It is not born with perfect knowledge of German. On the other hand, nothing speaks against the assumption that it is born with perfect knowledge of a universal grammar. HarmanVsChomsky: in a model, conclusions from the given data on a grammar can only be made, if detailed information on a theory of performance is included in the model. Chomsky: interesting, but not necessary. I 310 Empiricism/Theory/HarmanVsChomsky: calls Chomsky’s strategy "inventive empiricism", a doctrine that uses "induction principles". Such "inventive empiricism" is certainly not to be refuted, "no matter how the linguistic data look". ChomskyVsHarman: empiricism is not so important. I’m interested in the question of whether there are "ideas and principles of various kinds" which "determine the form of the knowledge acquired in a largely defined and highly organized manner" (rationalist variant) or whether on the other hand "the structure of the appropriation mechanism is limited to simple and peripheral processing mechanisms..." (empiricist variant). It is historically justified and makes heuristic sense to distinguish that. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Chomsky, N. | Putnam Vs Chomsky, N. | Chomsky I 293 PutnamVsChomsky: Putnam assumes for phonetics in the universal grammar, that it only has a single list of sounds. This did not require a sophisticated explanatory hypothesis. Only "memory span and powers of recollection". "No upright behaviorist would deny that these are innate properties." ChomskyVsPutnam: but there have been set up very strong empirical hypotheses about the selection of the universal distinctive features, none of which seems to be explained on the basis of restrictions of memory. Chomsky I 298 PutnamVsChomsky: Thesis: instead of an innate schematism, "general multipurpose strategies" could be assumed. This innate base would have to be the same for the acquisition of any knowledge, so that there is nothing special about language acquisition. Chomsky I 299 ChomskyVsPutnam: with that he is no longer entitled to assume something is innate. Furthermore, it only shifts the problem. PutnamVsChomsky: the evaluation functions proposed in the universal grammar "the kind of facts is constituted which tries to explain the theory of learning, but not the required explanation itself". ChomskyVsPutnam: E.g. no one would say that the genetic basis for the development of arms instead of wings was "the kind of fact that attempts to explain the theory of learning". Rather, they are the basis for an explanation of other facts of human behavior. Whether the evaluation function is learned or is the basis of learning, is an empirical question. PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered by routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not very impressive. ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact that refers to competence and not to performance (actual practice). What the grammar explains is why e.g. in "criticism of students" "student" can be understood as subject or object, whereas e.g. "grain" in "the growing of the grain" can only be subject. The question of routine does not matter here. Chomsky I 300 Innate Ideas/ChomskyVsPutnam: the innate representation of universal grammar indeed solves the problem of learning (at least partly) if it is really true that this is the basis for language acquisition, which may very well be the case! Putnam III 87 Putnam/Chomsky: Putnam proposes: correctness in linguistics is what the currently available data best explain about the behavior of the speaker under a current interest. What is true today, will be false tomorrow. PutnamVsChomsky: I never said that what is right today, will be wrong tomorrow. Putnam: Chomsky's hidden main theses: 1) the we are free to choose our interests at will, 2) that interests themselves are not subject to normative criticism. E.g. Hans' heart attack lies in the defiance of medical recommendations. Other explanation: high blood pressure. It may be, in fact, that on one day one fact is more in the interests of the speaker, and the next day another one. III 88 PutnamVsChomsky: 1) we cannot just pick and choose our interests. 2) It sometimes happens that the relevance of a particular interest is disputed. How can it be, however, that some interests are more reasonable than others? Reasonableness is supposed to depend on different conditions in different contexts. There is no general answer. III 88/89 The assertion that a concept is interest relative does not come out at the same as the thesis, all interests are equally reasonable. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Chomsky, N. | Searle Vs Chomsky, N. | SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique. Dennett I 555 Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value. There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries). Searle I 273 SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism. By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased. IV 9 SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate. IV 204 Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files. VIII 411 Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning. VIII 412 For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar) 2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative) 3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),. Also structuralism has phrase structure rules. VIII 414 It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules. VIII 420 Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man. VIII 421 If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication. The essence of language is its structure. E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure. Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else! Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him". ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology. VIII 422 Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition. Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!). VIII 426 Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words! Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not. Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes! VIII 429 Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma: a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use). b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate! SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker. The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination. VIII 432 The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular. E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition! b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion. VIII 433 ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings? Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc. Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones. VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages. SearleVs: the same dilemma: a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements. VIII 434 SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list. Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional. Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act. VIII 436 Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role. VIII 437 Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act. 1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Chomsky, N. | Hintikka Vs Chomsky, N. | II XV Logical Omniscience/Hintikka: Thesis: is only an alleged problem. ChomskyVsHintikka: he has quoted the alleged paradox as a reason for his rejection of any model-theoretical semantics for propositional attitudes. HintikkaVsChomsky: his problem has already been solved long ago. (Essay 5) |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Descartes, R. | Locke Vs Descartes, R. | I 27 Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not! 2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible. 3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present. ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning). Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception. I 45 Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different. Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia). Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up! VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies. I 52 Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought. Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have I 53 given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet. LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below). I 54 Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis, I 55 it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form. That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach). Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view. II 189 Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge. II 190 Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke). II 195 Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Goodman, N. | Chomsky Vs Goodman, N. | I 287 Language learning/language acquisition/Goodman: Second language is not problematic because the acquisition of the first language is the acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system". ChomskyVsGoodman: that could have some weight if it could be shown. (For example, for the distinction of surface structure and depth structure). But we have no empirical evidence. --- I 288 ChomskyVsGoodman: Acquisition of first and second language: Fallacy: If we learn the second language easier by means of explanations from the first language, we would have had to acquire a language before the first language in order to acquire the first language (which is particularly easy). (Regress). Goodman: Acquisition of the first language is acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system" and therefore corresponds to the acquisition of the second language. Chomsky's: the primary symbolic systems that he has in mind are rudimentary and cannot be used in the same way as a first language in acquiring the second language. GoodmanVsChomsky: his theses cannot be checked because we do not have examples of "bad languages". --- I 289 ChomskyVsGoodman: There are dozens of books in which features of a universal grammar are formulated and their empirical consequences are examined, whereby each such property specifies "bad" languages. --- I 290 Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: affects more of a border problem. The initial question is too vague. You can easily find a property, even a fairly general one, of the language "grue bleen", which is not the property of a "language like German". E.g. Chomsky: the predicate "be equal" (Structure of Appearance) applies only to objects instead of to Qualia. Now the language grue bleen has the peculiar property: "If an object A before t and an object B after t are examined, and if both are determined to be grue (or bleen), then we know that they are not like each other. But there is no such t that we could predict of these objects that they will not be equal. They could just as well be equal if both are grue (or bleen). Chomsky: it is undoubtedly a general property of natural languages that they behave more like German than "gruebleen". Thus, there is no difficulty in establishing a distinction between such languages as grue bleen and such as German. This would not suffice Goodman, of course, because one could still construct more refined examples. As long as it is only about vague terms like "like German" or "like Gruebleen", Goodman's requirement is impossible to fulfill. --- I 291 ChomskyVsGoodman: It may be relevant to induction, but not to linguistics, just as little as for any other science, such for the question of why embryos get arms and no wings within a given framework of conditions. ((s) is irrelevant because once conceptual, once empirical.) Chomsky: with this we cannot explain at all why the learner does not acquire grue as a generalization basis. Undoubtedly this follows from certain properties of the sensory system. Congenital ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: it does not seem incomprehensible to me that any aspect of the "final state" of an organism or automaton is also an aspect of its "initial state". And this before any interaction with his environment! --- I 292 Innate ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: in his essay, Goodman at least once admits that the mind contains ideas in some sense. Then it is obviously not incomprehensible that some of these ideas are "implanted as an original equipment" to the mind. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Lewis, D. | Chomsky Vs Lewis, D. | Black I 200 Language/Semantics/Convention/Psychology/Lewis/Schwarz: the psychology behind the intentions and expectations does not interest Lewis. ChomskyVsLewis: denies the mechanism LewisVsVs: that is wrongly attributed to him. In the present state of neurophysiology, he considers it idle to speculate about it. It would also be possible that beings without internal grammar use the German language, or that different speakers of the German have different internal grammars. Therefore, we should not focus on cognitive implementation. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Locke, J. | Chomsky Vs Locke, J. | Danto2 I 114 Locke: the imagination is innate. (ChomskyVs) we cannot imagine simple ideas. --- Chomsky I 284 ChomskyVsLocke: his arguments cannot cooperate with the dispositional nature of the congenital structure. That is why they pass the point. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Chomsky Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 319 Language/Quine: interweaving of sentences. Theory/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: Quine himself must even presuppose that both are separated here: he certainly does not believe that two monolingual speakers of the same language can have no differences of opinion. ((s) If language and theory were identical, one could not argue, since even according to Quine the theories must have a certain unity. Chomsky: otherwise, according to Quine, every dispute would be completely irrational, as between two speakers of different languages. II 320 Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of present dispositions to verbal behavior, in which speakers of the same language have necessarily corresponded to one another." (W + O, 27) Language/ChomskyVsQuine: then our disposition would have to be explained to a certain verbal behavior by a certain system. This is certainly not the case. II 321 Reinforcement/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty. If reinforcement is needed to learn, this means that learning cannot go without data. This is even more emptier than with Skinner, who, unlike Quine, does not even require that intensifying stimuli influence. It is sufficient here that the reinforcement is merely imagined. II 324 Language learning: behavioristic/Quine: conditioning, association ChomskyVsQuine: additional principles, only so endlessly many sentences explainable. Probability/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: the concept of the "probability of a sentence" is completely useless and empty: II 325 Translation indeterminacy, indeterminacy: ChomskyVsQuine: disposition either with regard to stimulus, or with regard to the total body of the language: then all sentences are equally probable (reference classes). II 326 Logical truth/Quine: is derived by him by conditioning mechanisms that associate certain sentence pairs with each other, II 327 so that our knowledge of the logical relations can be represented as a finite system of linked propositions. ChomskyVsQuine: it remains unclear how we distinguish logical from causal relations. Truth functions/Quine: allow a radical translation without "non verifiable analytical hypotheses", so they can be directly learned from the empirical data material (W + O § 13) ChomskyVsQuine: his readiness to settle these things within the framework of the radical translation may show that he is ready to regard logic as an innate experience-independent basis for learning. Then it is, however, arbitrary to accept this framework as innate, and not much else that can be described or imagined. II 328 ChomskyVsQuine: his narrowly conceived Humean frame (Chomsky pro) with the language as a finite (!?) interweaving of sentences is incompatible with various triusms, which Quine certainly would accept. II 329 Analytical hypothesis/stimulus meaning/Quine: stimulus meaning invloves, in contrast to the analytical hypothesis only "normal inductive uncertainty". Since the corresponding sentences can contain truth functions, they lead to "normal induction". This is not yet a "theory construction" as in the case of analytical hypotheses. ChomskyVsQuine: the distinction is not clear because the normal induction also occurs within the radical translation. II 330 ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the terms of the language can be explained with physical dimensions. Aristotle: more connected with actions. VsQuine: not evident that similarities are localizable in space. Principles, not "learned sentences". II 333 VsQuine: cannot depend on "disposition to reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be too authoritive. II 343 Language may not be taught at all. II 335 Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: (he had suggested that synonymy "roughly speaking" exists in approximate equality of situations, and approximately equal effect). Chomsky: there is not even an approximate equality in the conditions that are likely to produce synonymous utterances. ChomskyVsQuine: Synonymy can thus not be characterized by means of conditions of use (conditions of assertion) or effects on the listener. It is essential to distinguish between langue and parole, between competence and performance. It is about meaningful idealization, Quine's idealization is meaningless. II 337 Translation indeterminacy/ChomskyVsQuine: the reason for the thesis is, in a psychological context, an implausible and rather contentless empirical assertion, namely, which innate qualities the mind contributes to language acquisition. In an epistemic-theoretical context, Quine's thesis is merely a version of the well-known skeptical arguments, which can equally well be applied to physics or others. II 337 Inconsistency/indeterminacy/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: any hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting. --- Quine V 32 Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of dispositions to linguistic behavior". ((s) that could be called circular, because "linguistic" occurs. Vs: then it should be expressed by the fact that there is not yet a language besides the behavior.) Disposition/ChomskyVsQuine: such a complex can presumably be presented as a set of probabilities to make an utterance under certain circumstances. Vs: the concept of probability fails here: the probability with which I utter a certain English sentence cannot be distinguished from the probability with which I express a particular Japanese sentence. QuineVsChomsky: one should not forget that dispositions have their conditions. --- V 33 We find this through the procedure of question and consent. --- Quine XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: the language of a person and their theory are in any case different systems, even if one would agree with Quine otherwise. --- XI 116 Quine: (dito). Indeterminacy of the translation: because of it one cannot speak of an invariant theory opposite translations. Nor can we say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or vice versa, that different theories (even contradictory ones) can be expressed in one language. ((s)> Because of the ontological conclusion that I cannot argue about ontology, by telling the other that the things that exist with him are not there, because I then make the self-contradiction that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the error that the language contributes the syntax, the theory but the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: that does not mean that there is no contradiction between the two: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, it means then that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction language/theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language/theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Structuralism | Chomsky Vs Structuralism | Searle VIII 409 ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. Old: object of investigation: an arbitrary set of sentences. Classifications, corresponding discovery procedures. New: object of investigation: the basic language knowledge of the speaker. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Tradition | Chomsky Vs Tradition | Lyons I 136 Grammar/Modern/Lyons: is often referred to as "formal" today in contrast to the traditional "content-related" grammar. ((s) stock: Lyons pro formal grammar, partial VsChomsky). --- I 137 Interposition: some grammarians assume that there are extralinguistic categories independent of the random facts of existing languages. Jespersen: Thesis: there are universal grammatical categories (tradition). For example, "parts of speech", "tense", "mode", etc.). (see below, the question is whether there is any at all). Formal grammar/Lyons: does not exclude that there are no such universal grammatical categories. The structure of each language should be described individually. --- Quine X 38 ChomskyVsTradition/Quine: Trees of educational rules are not enough, you also need grammatical transformation. Some compositions can best be understood by looking back and forth between different trees of the educational rules. Transformations allow this lateral movement. Quine: this is superfluous for the artificial expressions of logic. --- Searle VIII 407 ChomskyVsTradition: most famous example "John is easy to leave" - "John is eager to leave". The (structuralist) tradition treats both sentences as grammatically equal. However, the VP(Verb Phrase) and NP(Noun Phrase) are grouped differently. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Tradition | Lyons, J. Vs Tradition | Lyons I 137 Grammar/Jespersen/Tradition/Lyons: there are universal grammatical categories ("parts of speech"), tense, mode, etc... Formal GrammarVsTradition: each language should be described individually. I 150 Def Grammatical Classes: Example verb, noun, etc. - Example word classes: man, dog, banana, runs, eats, sees - problem: the differentiation is too rough - solution/tradition: subclasses (e.g. a {man, linguist, scientist,...}, b {monkey, horse, dog...}) to avoid "the monkey sees the meaning". I 167 VsTradition/ChomskyVsTradition: not the grammar, but the lexicon excludes that! - Chomsky: nevertheless grammar is not indefinite. I 140 Universals/Chomsky: 1. Substantive Universals/Chomsky/Lyons: (not "substantial"): if one introduces a set of distinctive features, a subset of which is combined differently in the phonological systems of each language, then the distinctive features are the substantive universals. 2. Formal Universals/Chomsky/Lyons: any condition for the functioning of the phonological rules or the combinations of the phonological units according to the rules. For example, the postulate of one-dimensionality. VsTradition: the universal categories there can neither be described as formal nor as substantive, since the rules of traditional grammar have not been explicitly formalized. I 140 Tradition/Chomsky: was defined first and foremost by "nouns". I 150 Def Grammatical classes/Tradition/Lyons/VsTradition: Grammatical Classes: Nouns, verb, adjective, etc. Problem: the tradition mixed two points of view: 1. here it is asked about the conditions that should be decisive for the assignment of a word to a certain grammatical class. For example, "Does the word "men" belong to X or Y? This is practically always determined by the distribution of the word. (Tradition ditto). 2. has to do with the naming of classes (if their "class content" has already been determined on a formal basis): e.g. "Is X rightly called the class of the nominal? Formal grammar: here every description is equally good, you do not have to call something "adjective"! "Universal": here word classes such as "verb", "noun" etc. are taken as content-related. (tradition). Formal: (modern grammar): here we assume that the classes were created based on the distribution, and could have been named differently. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Various Authors | Chomsky Vs Various Authors | Lyons I 157 Rules/grammar/transformational grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion, ChomskyVsGrammatical rules: Thesis: the grammatical structure of language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is mastered by the speaker of the mother tongue "intuitively" (unconsciously). (ChomskyVsRules: because of the consistency of the "indeterminacy of grammar"/ChomskyVsIndeterminacy of grammar). Lyons: the differences of opinion are exaggerated here. Not the whole grammar is indeterminate. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Whorf, B. | Dennett Vs Whorf, B. | Newen/Schrenk I 147 World/Language/Reality/Structure/Newen/Schrenk: if we hold on to realism, we must say that some languages represent reality better than others which have a completely different structure. Newen/Schrenk I 148 Sapir-Whorf Thesis/Newen/Schrenk: can already be found in Wilhelm von Humboldt. (Literature: 11-3a, Vol IV, p 27). Thesis: Speakers with different vocabulary and above all different grammar must think very differently about the world than others. E.g. Hopi language: only has words for "son" and "daughter". Problem: "uncle" and "grandfather" can only be characterized indirectly. It looks as if both are not distinguished with respect to their relationship. Newen/Schrenk I 149 DennettVsWhorf/Evolution TheoryVsWhorf/ChomskyVsWhorf/PinkerVsWhorf: the ability of language use is realized through specific areas of the brain that have been formed by evolution and are therefore genetically encoded and thus common to all humans. FodorVsWhorf: Language is already anchored in the brain. Newen/Schrenk: Problem: It may still be that we read structure into the world (idealism) instead of discovering it. But then it is unlikely that people of different cultures do it in very different ways, since the relevant biological equipment is common to all if them. Language/Reality/World/Newen/Schrenk: if the language capacity in the brain has evolved through adaptation to an environment, it is also possible that the structure of the world has left its footprints in the language. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Wittgenstein | Chomsky Vs Wittgenstein | II 344 ChomskyVsWittgenstein: he speaks of "the different processes, to expect someone to tea". Chomsky: there is no point in talking about "processes of expectation". II 345 Criteria/mental states/Wittgenstein: mental states or the "internal functions of the mind" do not provide a criterion for the correct use of an expression. II 346 ChomskyVsWittgenstein: but this is not about a "correct claim". E.g. whether someone is reading, but about a legitimate claim. II 349 ChomskyVsWittgenstein: this often leads to the brink of the deepest and most interesting problems, in order then to stand still and to assert that the philosopher cannot go further here. II 350 We need more than mere description (descriptive linguistics or philosophy): otherwise the important question is forgotten, for which the data is actually data. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Darwinism | Versus | Dennett I 543 ChomskyVsSkinner, ChomskyVsArtificial Intelligence, ChomskyVsDarwin |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rules | Chomsky, N. | I 272 Chomsky thesis: then one could suggest that a language contains rules that relate depth structures to representations from universal semantics. (Analogous to phonology). Lyons I 157 Rules/Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion: ChomskyVsGrammatical Rules: thesis: the grammatical structure of the language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is dominated "intuitively" (unconsciously) by the native speaker. (ChomskyVsRules due to the consequence of "Indetermination of Grammar"/ChomskyVsIndetermination of Grammar). Lyons: the differences of opinion are exaggerated here. Not all grammar is indefinite. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Indetermination | Chomsky, N. | I 325 Indetermination of Translation/Quine/Chomsky: according to this thesis "all proposals for translation should be compatible with the totality of the speech disposition, but incompatible with each other". (Q+O, 27). Chomsky: this is not possible because of the problems related to probability. The thesis when all probabilities are indistinguishable, both inside and outside a language. Quine: bypasses the problem by starting not from the "totality of dispositions" but from the "stimulus meaning". I 337 Indetermination of Translation/ChomskyVsQuine: the thesis, in a psychological context, amounts to an implausible and rather meaningless empirical assertion, namely which innate qualities the mind contributes to language acquisition. In an epistemological context, Quine's thesis is merely a version of the known sceptical arguments that can be applied just as well to physics or otherwise. It is quite certain that serious hypotheses "go beyond the data". If this was not the case, they would be uninteresting as hypotheses! |
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| Innate | Locke, J. | Danto I 113 Imagination / congenital / Locke: the imagination is innate. (ChomskyVs). One can not imagine simple ideas. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
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