Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 80 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Hegel | Bubner I 182 Absolute Mind/Hegel: the eternal and self-contained idea operates as an absolute mind, creates and enjoys. (According to Aristotle, who distinguishes the self-thought as the highest activity of reason.) >Absolute Spirit. I 183 Absolute/HegelVsAristoteles: for him, the Absolute fits in with the categories of a self-uniting unity that seamlessly fits into systematic philosophies. He goes beyond this, in that he does not reserve the theory of goodness to a sub-domain of metaphysics. Thus, the doctrine of God means philosophizing in an encyclopaedically comprehensive dimension. There is no longer a supreme object. >Aristotle. HegelVsAristotle: Furthermore: parting with the teleology of nature. >Teleology, >Nature/Aristotle, >Nature. Instead: subjectivity principle. Heartbeat of the whole. The energeia, which permeates all things, is attributed to thought activities. I 184 Absoluteness/Hegel/Bubner: Absoluteness of the idea presents itself as the method of logic, and fulfills the condition of self-reference with this typically modern trick. >Self-reference, >Idea, >Logic/Hegel. Adorno XII 115 Absoluteness/Consciousness/Hegel/Adorno: by adopting an absolute identity of being and mind, Hegel tried to save the ontological proof of God. This assumption is actually the content of his philosophy. >Absolute spirit, >Proof of God. KantVsHegel: denies such an identity between what is and our consciousness. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Appearance | Leibniz | Holz I 128 In itself/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: their relationship with Leibniz is a dialectical one. It again corresponds exactly to the scheme of the "Overlapping General": The in-itself is the genre of itself (!), The in-itself, and its opposite, of the phenomenon. See also "the overarching general". I 129 This does not mean the fact that the phenomenon is always the appearance of an in-itself (which is the meaning of the word). KantVsLeibniz: for then the phenomenon could still be different from that whose appearance it is, and hence no knowledge of the object is possible. (This is how Kant sees the relationship). >Thing in itself/Kant. LeibnizVsKant: Leibniz insists that the phenomenon is the same as the in-itself, which manifests itself in the phenomenon. >Phenomena/Leibniz. The world does this in perception. This it how it duplicates itself in two respects. 1. As a whole, however, from a different perspective 2. It appears spatially as the dissociation of the various substances, 3. It appears as a temporal succession of different perceptions. The system of perceptions is "well-founded," because it is nothing but the self-restraining activity of the original power of the in-itself. The difference between the in-itself and the appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and principle of its difference. >Totality/Leibniz. --- I 130 Hence the phenomenon is not standing out from the in-itself, but a kind of the same, and as such something quite real. Appearance/world/Leibniz: the world always appears only insofar as it is expressed as being-such of a single monad. Phenomenality/Leibniz: the way in which the thing-to-be-expressed is contained in the expressed. Every expression is a phenomenon. It is well founded because, the in-itself, the phenomenon is identical with it and establishes it as a appearing in-itself. The phenomenon is not opposed to reality (VsKant), but precisely its specific mode of being in the process of universal representation. Therefore, all perceptions in all individual substances must correspond to one another. >Perception/Leibniz. --- I 131 Unity/Leibniz: only in this way can all the different monads perceive one and the same appearance. This is the "harmony universal" (universal harmony, see above) in process form, in which all appearances are linked, because they are appearances of the same in-itself. Phenomenon/Representation/Leibniz: that means, however, that all beings are phenomenal. (Just as it is at the same time in-itself). Since representation with Leibniz is a universal and general process, every being must be a phenomenon for every other being. >Unity/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Art | Gadamer | I 57 Art/GadamerVsKant/Gadamer: [Kant's] preference of natural beauty over artistic beauty is only the other side of the lack of natural beauty in a certain statement. >Beauty/Kant, >Nature/Kant. Conversely, the advantage of art over natural beauty can be seen in the fact that the language of art is a demanding language that is not free and indeterminate in its atmospheric interpretation but addresses us in a meaningful and definite way. And it is the wonderful and mysterious thing about art that this particular demand is not a shackle for our mind, but rather opens up the scope of freedom in the play of our powers of cognition. KantVsVs/Gadamer: Kant certainly does justice to this when he says(1) that art must be "seen as nature", i.e. it must please, without betraying the compulsion of rules. I 121 Art/Gadamer: The thesis is (...) that the being of art cannot be determined as the object of an aesthetic consciousness, because conversely the I 122 aesthetic behaviour is more than it knows about itself. It is a part of the process of being of representation and belongs to the game as a game in its essence. >Representation/Gadamer, >Play/Gadamer, >Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer. 1. I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1799, S. 179ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Art | Hegel | Gadamer I 54 Art/Hegel/Gadamer: In itself, the essence of all art is, as Hegel formulated it, that it "brings man before himself"(1). Other objects of nature - not only the human form - can also express moral ideas in artistic representation. All artistic representation, be it of landscape, be it of nature morte, or even every inspiring contemplation of nature has this effect. KantVsHegel/Gadamer: But in this respect Kant is right: the expression of the moral is then a borrowed one. Man, on the other hand, expresses these ideas in his own being, and because he is what he is. E.g., A tree that atrophies due to unfortunate growing conditions may seem miserable to us, but this misery is not an expression of the tree feeling miserable, and from the ideal of the tree, atrophy is not miserable. Miserable man, on the other hand, is miserable, measured by the human moral ideal itself (and not in such a way that we expect him to have an ideal of humanity that is not valid for him at all, by which he expressed misery for us without being miserable). HegelVsVs: Hegel understood this in his lectures Gadamer I 55 to aesthetics perfectly well, when he uses the expression of the moral as "Appearances of spirituality"(2). Gadamer: Thus the formalism of "dry pleasing" [trockenen Wohlgefallens"] leads to the decisive dissolution not only of rationalism in aesthetics, but of any universal (cosmological) theory of beauty in general. >Art/Kant, >Aesthetics/Hegel. 1. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, ed. Lasson, S. 57: "It is therefore the general need of the work of art to seek in the mind of man, by being a way of bringing before man what he is.« 2. Ebenda, S. 213. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Art | Kant | Gadamer I 52 Art/Beauty/Kant/Gadamer: Judging according to an ideal of beauty is (...), as Kant says, not merely a judgment of taste. Gadamer I 53 (...) to be pleasing as a work of art, something must be more than just tasteful and pleasing at the same time. Note: GadamerVsAdorno/GadamerVsJauß: Unfortunately, the Kantian analysis of taste judgement is still being misused for art theory, even by T. W. Adorno's Aesthetic Theory( (Schriften Band 7, S. 22ff.) or by H. R. Jauss (Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik. Frankfurt 1982, S. 29f.). When just now actual beauty seemed to exclude any fixation by concepts of purpose (>Beauty/Kant), then here, conversely, even a beautiful house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, etc. is said to have no ideal, "because these purposes are not sufficiently defined and fixed by their concept, consequently the usefulness is almost as free as with vague beauty". Only of the human form, precisely because it alone is capable of a beauty fixed by a concept of purpose, is there an ideal of beauty! This doctrine, established by Winckelmann and Lessing(1), gains a kind of key position in Kant's foundation of aesthetics. For it is precisely this thesis that shows how little a formal aesthetic of taste (arabesque aesthetics) corresponds to the Kantian idea. >Beauty/Kant. Gadamer I 55 Kant/Gadamer: It is precisely with this classicist distinction between the normal idea and the ideal of beauty that Kant destroys the basis from which the aesthetic of perfection finds its incomparably unique beauty in the perfect meaningfulness of all being. Only now can "art" become an autonomous phenomenon. Its task is no longer the representation of the ideals of nature - but the self-encounter of man in nature and the human-historical world. Kant's proof that the beautiful is pleasing without concept does not prevent us from being fully interested only in the beautiful that appeals to us in a meaningful way. It is precisely the recognition of the concept-lessness ["Begrifflosigkeit"] of taste that leads beyond the aesthetics of mere taste.(2) >Art/Hegel, >Interest/Art/Kant, >Artwork/Kant, >Nature/Kant. Gadamer I 58 Def Art/Kant/Gadamer: Kant's definition of art as the "beautiful idea of a thing" takes this into account, insofar as even the ugly is beautiful in the representation by art. GadamerVsKant: Nevertheless, the true essence of art comes out badly in its contrast to the beauty of nature. If the concept of a thing were only represented beautifully, then this would again only be a matter of a "school-suitable" representation and would only fulfil the indispensable condition of all beauty. KantVsVs: Art, especially according to Kant, is more than a "beautiful representation of a thing"; it is a representation of aesthetic ideas, i.e. of something that is beyond all concept. The concept of genius wants to formulate this insight of Kant. >Genius/Kant. 1. Lessing, Entwürfe zum Laokoon Nr. 20 b; in Lessings Sämtl. Schriften ed. Lach- mann, 1886ff., Bd. 14, S. 415. 2. Kant explicitly says that "the judgement according to an ideal of beauty is not a is merely the judgement of taste".(K. d. U. S. 61). Vgl. dazu meinen Aufsatz Gadamer, Die Stellung der Poesie im Hegel'schen System der Künste( Hegel-Studien 21, (1986). |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Artworks | Kant | Gadamer I 57 Artworks/Work of Art/Kant/Gadamer: difference to nature: With regard to the idea of an intelligible destiny of mankind, nature as beautiful nature gains a language that leads it to us.(1) Of course, the significance of art is also based on the fact that it appeals to us, that it presents man himself in his morally determined existence. But the products of art are only to appeal to us in this way - natural objects, on the other hand, are not to appeal to us in this way. It is precisely in this that the significant interest of natural beauty lies, that it is nevertheless able to make us aware of our moral destiny. >Interest/Kant. Art cannot convey to us this finding of the human being in unintentional reality. The fact that man meets himself in art is not a confirmation from another of his own self. GadamerVsKant: (...) [Kant] does not place the phenomenon of art below its appropriate standard. The advantage of natural beauty over artistic beauty is only the other side of the lack of a certain statement by natural beauty. Conversely, the advantage of art over natural beauty can be seen in the fact that the language of art is a demanding language that does not present itself freely and indefinitely to atmospheric interpretation, but addresses us in a meaningful and definite way. And it is the wonderful and mysterious thing about art that this particular claim is nevertheless not a shackle for our mind, but rather just opens up the scope of freedom in the play of our powers of cognition. KantVsVs: Kant does justice to this when he says(2) that art must be "regarded as nature", i.e. pleasing without betraying the compulsion of rules. Kant/Gadamer: We do not pay attention to the intentional correspondence of the portrayed person with known reality. We do not look at it to see who it resembles. We do not measure its sense of claim against a measure that is already well known to us, but on the contrary, this measure, which is "aesthetically extended" in an unlimited way, becomes "aesthetically extended".(3) Gadamer I 99 Artworks/Work of Art/Kant/Gadamer: If one is to take into account [the] criticism of the doctrine of unconscious productivity of the genius (>Artist/Gadamer), one is confronted anew with the problem which Kant had solved through the assignment of the transcendental function to the concept of genius. (>Genius/Kant, >Genius/Gadamer). What is a work of art, and how does it differ from a handcrafted product or even from a "concoction" (German: "Machwerk"), i.e. from something aesthetically inferior? For Kant and idealism the work of art defined itself as the work of genius. His distinction of being the perfectly successful and exemplary proved itself in that it offered pleasure and contemplation as well as an inexhaustible object of dwelling and interpretation. That the genius of creation corresponds to the genius of enjoyment can already be found in Kant's teaching of taste and genius, and even more explicitly in the teachings of K. Ph. Moritz and Goethe. >Taste/Kant, >Taste/Gadamer. 1. I.Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1799, § 42 2. Ebenda, S. 179f. 3. Ebenda. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Association | Hume | I 13 Association/Hume: association is a natural law. Ideas: the effect of the association of ideas has three forms: 1. general idea (similarity) 2. procedure/regularity (through idea of "substance" or "mode") 3. relation: an idea draws another to itself. Thereby ideas do not acquire new quality. >Ideas. I 126f Association/principle/Hume: problems: 1. Association only explains the form of thought, not the content. 2. Association does not explain the individual contents of the individual. Solution: the explanation lies in the circumstances of the perception - also substances, general ideas and modes require the circumstances. >Circumstances, >Perception, >Thoughts. I 137f Associations/KantVsHume/Deleuze: the "Law of Reproduction" (frequent consecutive ideas set a connection) assumes that the phenomena actually follow such a rule (Kant pro). There must be a reason a priori -> synthesis of the imagination (not of the senses!). >Imagination, >Senses, >a priori, >Principles., >Principles/Hume. KantVsHume: Hume's dualism (relations are outside of things ) forces him to grasp that as the accordance of subject with nature. But this cannot be a priori, otherwise it would remain unnoticed. I 154 Association/Hume: association cannot select. If the mind was only determined by principles, there would be no morality. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Beauty | Gadamer | I 481 Beauty/Gadamer: Philosophy: The concept of the beautiful, which in the eighteenth century had to share the central position within the aesthetic problem with that of the sublime and which was to be completely eliminated in the course of the nineteenth century by the aesthetic criticism of classicism, was, as is well known, once a universal metaphysical concept and had a function within metaphysics, i.e. the general doctrine of being, that was by no means limited to the aesthetic in the narrower sense. >Metaphysics, >Aesthetics, >Being. Hermeneutics/Gadamer: It will be shown that this old concept of beauty can also serve a comprehensive hermeneutics, as it has grown for us from the criticism of the methodologism of the intellectual world. >Hermeneutics. Etymology: The Greek word for the German "schön" is kalon. Admittedly, there are no complete equivalents in German, even if we use the mediating pulchrum. But Greek thought has exercised a certain determination on the history of meaning of the German word, so that essential moments of meaning are common to both words. With the addition "beautiful" we distinguish from what we call technology, i.e. from "mechanical" arts that produce useful things. It is similar with word combinations such as: beautiful morality, beautiful literature, beautifully intellectual/belletristic (German: "schöngeistig") and so on. In all these uses, the word is in a similar contrast to the Greek kalon to the term chresimon. Everything that does not belong to the necessities of life, but the how of life that concerns eu zen, i.e. everything that the Greeks understood by Paideia, is called kalon. The beautiful things are those whose value for themselves is obvious. One cannot ask about the purpose they serve. I 483 Nature/Beauty/Gadamer: As one can see, such a determination of beauty is a universal ontological one. Nature and art do not form any kind of contrast here, which of course means that the primacy of nature is undisputed, especially with regard to beauty. Art may perceive within the "gestalt" whole of the natural order recessed possibilities of artistic design and in this way perfect the beautiful nature of the order of being. But that does not mean at all that "beauty" is primarily to be found in art. As long as the order of being is understood as being divine itself or as God's creation - and the latter is valid up to the 18th century - also the exceptional case of art can only be understood within the horizon of this order of being. (...) it is only with the 19th century that the aesthetic problem (...) is transferred to the standpoint of art (...). (...) this [is] based on a metaphysical process (...). Such a transfer to the standpoint of art ontologically presupposes a shapelessly conceived mass of being or a mass of being governed by mechanical laws. The human artistic spirit, which forms useful things from mechanical construction, will ultimately understand all that is beautiful from the work of its own spirit. I 484 Order/Measurement/Rationality/Aesthetics/KantVsSubjectivism: As unsatisfactory as the development towards subjectivism initiated by Kant seemed to us in the newer aesthetic, Kant has convincingly demonstrated the untenability of aesthetic rationalism. >Aesthetics/Kant. GadamerVsKant: It is just not right to base the metaphysics of beauty solely on the ontology of measure and the teleological order of being, on which the classical appearance of rationalist rule aesthetics ultimately refers to. The metaphysics of the beautiful does not actually coincide with such an application of aesthetic rationalism. Rather, the decline to Plato reveals a quite different side to the phenomenon of the beautiful, and it is this side that interests us in our hermeneutical questioning. >Beauty/Plato. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Berkeley | Kant | Adorno XIII 57 Berkeley/KantVsBerkeley/Adorno: Kant (...) calls Berkeley, whom we would call a spiritualist, an idealist and speaks of dreamy idealism, because it is an idealism that simply contests the reality of the external world, while its own transcendental idealism as an attempt for the rescue of objectivity, precisely wants to be empirical realism. >Idealism/Kant, >Berkeley as an author. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Brain/Brain State | Churchland | II 484 Brain/Consciousness/Churchland: the brain will not produce consciousness until it has produced a representation of itself. ((s)> McGinn: Thesis: the brain produces a theory of the brain.) Churchland: ... representation of himself ... KantVsHume would have expressed it in this way. It needs a representation that produces something similar to a "point of view". |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Categorical Imperative | Rawls | I 251 Categorical Imperative/moral/Kant/Rawls: Kant begins by rationally choosing and rationally judging moral principles. I 254 Kant/SidgwickVsKant/Sidgwick/Rawls: Sidgwick writes that nothing in Kant's ethics is more striking than the idea that the human expresses his true self by acting according to the moral law. On the other hand, if he/she yields to certain needs, he/she acts according to the law of nature(1). >H. Sidgwick, >I. Kant, >Morals, >Ethics. I 255 Kant now fails to explain according to Sidgwick why the villain in his bad life does not express his selfhood as the saint does in his life. KantVsSidgwick/KantVsVs/Rawls: Kant should reply that any consistent action according to principles could be the result of a decision of the noumenal self, but that not every action of the phenomenal self reveals this as a free and equal rational being. RawlsVsKant: Kant has not shown that our action out of the moral law shows our nature in a recognizable way, as acting on contrary principles would not. Solution/Rawls: our assumption of the initial situation with the veil of non-knowledge corrects this deficiency: we only have to show that our chosen principles are applicable. We accept the initial situation as one considered by the noumenal self in Kant's sense. Qua noumenale they have the free choice between principles. At the same time they want to express their rationality in the lifeworld, i.e. their independence from contingent features of nature and society. If the argument from the contract theory is correct, only those principles define the moral law. >Contract theory/Rawls, >Principles/Rawls, >Lifeworld. I 256 Our desire to be righteous arises, in part, from the desire to express ourselves as free and equally rational beings. I think that is why Kant speaks of it as a cause of shame when we misbehave and not as a cause of guilt. >Emotion/Rawls. 1. Sidgwick, "The Kantian Conception of Free Will," Mind, vol.13, 1888, pp. 511-516. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Causality | Kant | Danto I 298 Causality/Kant/Danto: is not derived from experience - but the condition or form of experience - the idea of causality is not causality itself. >Ideas/Kant. --- Kant I 26 Causality/Kant: things themselves are not subject to the time condition, so not causality. - (Solution of the third cosmological antinomy: namely, the antinomy of causality of freedom (that belongs to the things themselves) and causality according to nature (in the phenomenal world)). KantVsHume: causality does not apply to things themselves. VsKant: he does not stick to it himself. Mind/Kant: the mind has its own causality: the "spontaneity of terms". >Spontaneity/Kant. --- I 32 Subjectivity arises not only from causality (of freedom) but from the spontaneity of the terms - therefore metaphysics begins in empirical science. >Subjectivity/Kant, >Metaphysics/Kant. --- Vaihinger I 280 Causality/Idea/God/Kant/Vaihinger: I only underlie the idea of such a (highest) being to see the phenomena as systematically linked to each other according to the analogy of a causal determination. --- Vollmer I 25 Causality/Kant: outside of causality we cannot experience. >Experience/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Clauses | Castaneda | Frank I 467 Subsentence/clause/beliefs sentence/ Frege: embedded phrases: not a separate reeference, they denote only the meaning of an object. >Denotation, >Reference, >Clauses/Frege, >Sense, >Fregean Sense, >Fregean meaning. KantVs: each sentence is implicitly embedded in "I think" (puts everything in indirect speech). >"I think"/Kant, >cogito. Then all objects are not part of the semantics of singular terms. >Singular terms. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Cogito | Kant | Danto I 179 KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. --- Bubner I 107 "I think"/Kant: forms the last performance of the synthesis, which cannot be derived further. Here, the action-character is most obvious. Self-consciousness produces the unity ipso actu in connection. >I think/Kant, >Thinking/Kant, >Self-consciousness/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Consciousness | McDowell | I 113 ff Confidence/Kant: "I think" that must be able to accompany all my ideas. Temporal continuity. But only formally, otherwise Cartesian. >I think/Kant, >cogito, >Cartesianism, >Dualism, cf. >Skepticism. I 113 ff Definition Person/Locke: "a thinking intelligent being in possession of reason and consideration, and able to consider itself as itself. Even in different places and times. >Person. I 126/27 Consciousness/Apperception/Criterion/KantVsLocke: his point (chapter on paralogism): the self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. The subject does not need to make an effort to focus its attention on one and the same thing. >Experience/McDowell, >Awareness/Chalmers. I 127 Consciousness/McDowell: to avoid Cartesianism we should not speak of the "flow of consciousness" (stream of consciousness), but of a lasting perspective on something that is itself outside of consciousness. I 128 "I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). >Given, >Reality, >Stream of consciousness/Husserl. I 129f McDowellVsKant: it is unsatisfactory if consciousness is to be only the continuity of one aspect, one perspective without a body. The notion of continuity cannot be conceived without the notion of the living thing - as little as digestion. But that is not to say that physical presence is always connected with a self-consciousness. Consciousness/Kant: only creatures with conceptual skills have self-consciousness. McDowell pro. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Contingency | Leibniz | Stegmüller IV 388 Contingency/Leibniz: Every thing is contingent - if another thing were different, it would not be thus - all things are causally connected. Causes/Leibniz: their number can be unlimited - there is not necessarily a temporal beginning. Sufficient reason: must then lie outside the world. >Inside/outside/Leibniz. Therefore there must be a necessary being. VsLeibniz: How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason? KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof of God is based on the implicit (disproved) ontological argument. >Proof of God's existence, >World/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Correctness | Brandom | I 24 ff Correctness/judgment/Kant/Brandom: normative, not governed by natural laws - contradictions not prohibited by natural laws. >Contradictions, >Judgments. I 48 KantVsDescartes: not correctness of representations, but of inferences is crucial. >Inference, >Representation. I 403 Definition correct: an inference from p to q is correct (in the sense of preserving the commitment) if the truth conditions of p are a subset of those of q. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Criteria | Kant | Danto I 24 Moral/criterion/Kant: there are no criteria for morally right action - because you could always act correctly from blind chance - nothing guarantees in the behavior itself, that it is morally. >Morals/Kant. --- Horwich I 77 Truth criterion/KantVsCriterion: the search for it is absurd - like to milk a bily goat and to keep a strainer underneath. - The agreement with the subject is given and presupposed here. Ramsey: there can be no truth criterion, because each object is distinguishable from any other object and thus has something that is true in it but not in any other object - therefore there can be no guarantee of the truth which is independent from the referred object. >Truth, >Truth definition. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Determinism | Dummett | I 149 KantVsDeterminism: action not by rules but by notions of rules. - Nevertheless: the move in a chess game has its meaning not from knowledge of rules, but from the rules themselves. >Rules. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Empiricism | Adorno | XIII 85 Experience/Empiricism/Adorno: In Locke, Berkeley, and Hume one finds a great deal about the experience, but the experience itself will hardly be encountered in this philosophy. >Experience/Locke, >Sensations/Berkeley, >Sensory impressions/Berkeley. >Experience/Hume. XIII 86 Philosophy has the problem that, as soon as it attempts to make its experiences valid, it always has only a concept of experience and not the content of experience. From this, it has made a virtue and derived from it that experience, because it can be expressed only in the concept of experience, is in itself only a concept, only a being. >Concepts/Adorno, >Concepts, >Essence. Content/Adorno: Paradoxically, the content of idealist philosophies such as in Hegel, but also Schelling, is much more effective than in empirical philosophies. >Content, >Content of truth/Adorno, >F.W.J. Schelling, >G.W.F. Hegel. XIII 155 Empiricism/Adorno: in contrast to rationalism, thinking, as it were, adds something. By adding itself from the outside to the given, the two pinciples (res cogitans and res extensa) are again immediate. >res cogitans, >R. Descartes, >Rationalism. Then all thinking without sense is just a mere idea. However, this approach also develops further and further from its own consequence in the sense of a progressive subjectivization. From Bacon's naively realistic empiricism, over Locke, as well as over Berkeley and Hume, a consistent empiricism gradually developed, in which, by a consistent recourse to the senses, nothing else is left to be valid as a legal source of knowledge than the immediate circumstances of my consciousness. From Bacon's naively realistic empiricism, Locke, as well as Berkeley and Hume, gradually developed into empiricism, in which, by consistently appealing to the senses, nothing else is left to be regarded as a source of knowledge than the immediate realities of my consciousness. >F. Bacon, >J. Locke, >G. Berkeley, >D. Hume. XIII 156 RationalismVsEmpiricism/EmpiricismVsRationalism/Adorno: the opposition between empiricism and rationalism is not so radically remote as is often imagined. Both are based on the scientific model of evidence. They are both residual theories of the truth, and thus always interrelate. >Truth/Locke. The moment of mastery of nature and finally self-control is the basis of both schools. >Nature/Locke, >Nature/Hume. XIII 157 Experience/Empiricism/Adorno: empiricism also treats experience always only as a principle, according to its most general categories, not at all according to its content. >Experience. XIII 158 Only the creator of empiricism, idealism, and in the most comprehensive measure Hegel have attempted to get the full mental experience under control. >Idealism, >Experience/Kant, >Experience/Hegel. KantVsEmpiricism/Adorno: There is absolutely no experience without thinking, otherwise it would stop by the mere discontinuity of the individual moments. The unity principle ((s) of subjectivity, reason, and mind) would then be completely omitted. >Empiricism/Kant, >Thinking/Kant. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Empiricism | Kant | Vollmer I 24 KantVsEmpiricism/Vollmer: unacceptable because then the concepts and principles of understanding would lack the necessity, they undoubtedly have. Experience/Kant: everyone has already ready structures. >Principles/Kant, >Unterstanding, >Concepts/Kant, >Experience/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Empiricism | Strawson | V 14 Empiricism/Strawson: empiricism always starts from isolated sensory impressions. Empiricism excludes terms. >Concept, >Generalization. KantVs "problematic idealism" >Problematic idealism. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Epistemology | Kant | Strawson V 14 Empiricism/Strawson: empiricism always starts from isolated sensory impressions - it excludes terms. >Sensory impressions. KantVs: that tis the "problematic idealism". >Idealism/Kant. --- Vollmer I 24 Copernican turn/Kant: the mind writes the laws - it does not find them. - That explains why knowledge and world fit to one another. >World/Thinking, >Knowledge/Kant, >Laws, >Natural laws, >Nature/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Existence | Field | I 80 Necessary existence/KantVs/Field: nothing can be negated with all its predicates, and nevertheless leave a contradiction. - (VsOntological proof of God). >Proofs of God's existence. Existence/Field: should not be part of the logic. - Therefore, mathematics cannot be reduced to logic. - Otherwise, too many properties would have to be assumed. >Infinity, >Properties. I 155 Semantic/syntactic/singular Term/Denotation/Ontology/FieldVsWright: it is not built into the syntax that, e.g. The singular term "4" denotes. - (i.e. that the number is an object). Just as little as "God". - So syntax cannot be the criterion for existence. >Syntax, >Semantics, >Proofs, >Criteria, >Singular terms. I 167 Existence/Ontology/FieldVsWright: existence does not follow from "explanation of the term", otherwise God's existence would follow from the explanation of the term "God". >Explanations. Term explanation is only conditionally: "if there is a God, he is omnipotent". Cf. >Omnipotence. Solution: the term-introducing theory must not be true - existence generalization. >Introduction, >Existential generalization. False: from self-identity no existence can be concluded, only in the reverse direction. >Identity, >Self-identity. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Facts | Brandom | I 466ff Def Deflationism: denies that content in concepts can be explained with truth conditions and compliance with the facts, properties and objects (VsCorrespondence theory). >Deflationism. Fact: "making true": misleading: it is not the fact that p makes true that p. >Truthmakers. I 469 E.g. It is not the fact that the Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea, which makes that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea. Facts: if facts are to be explained, the explanation does not need to refer back to something normative: The planetary orbits would also be elliptical without beings that set standards. --- Rorty VI 179 ff Whether a statement is true does not depend on whether somebody makes it. But our linguistic practices could not be what they are, if the facts were different. However, the non-linguistic facts could be essentially as they are, even if our linguistic practices were completely different. Form of thought. Definition Fact/Brandom, "something assertible" (neologism by Brandom: "claimable"). - There is the act of asserting and there is "the asserted" - facts are not the "true asserted" but the assertible. - Facts make assertions true. However, inferentially. RortyVsBrandom: It is as if I, like Moliere, refer to "the soporific power" as inferential in order to make it seem to be above suspicion. --- Brandom I 476 Fact/Brandom: no contrast between how things are and what we can say and think - Facts are (the content of) true assertions and thoughts - Wittgenstein: we don not stop opinionating when we are facing the facts. I 477 Wittgenstein: Facts are connected and structured by the objects and their properties. I 866 Negative Fact/Brandom: there is no mystery -> distinction between normative and non-normative expressions. - Also > conditional facts > modal facts - realm of facts and norms are not opposites - the normative is part of the factual. >Norms. --- Seel2 III 149 Def Fact/Brandom: Content of true assertions - Assertions/Brandom: obtain their content through the use of concepts in the context of the sentences uttered in each case. So the concept of fact can only be analysed together with the concept of assertion. However, this conceptual dependency is not genetic - the world is the epitome of all the facts, no matter when and with what success thoughts about the world are created. "There was a time when nobody used concepts, because there was no discursive practice - but there was never a time when there were no facts - Seel: therefore, neither concepts nor facts depend on the existence of thinking beings - at the same time, the theory of discursive practice appears to be a theory of the fundamental structure of the world - Seel: KantVsBrandom: Warns just of that - (in the case of Hegel in vain). KantVsBrandom/KantVsHegel: false: Conclusion from thinking to being. >Thinking, >Being. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Generality | Leibniz | Holz I 128 Cross-General/in itself/Leibniz/König /Holz: the "in itself" is class of itself and its opposite, the appearance. >Appearance/Leibniz. I 129 KantVs: then the phenomenon may be still different from what it is appearance - solution/Leibniz: the world guarantees by perception that appearance equals "in itself": 1. As a whole, but always under a different perspective 2. Spatially as a being separated of different perceptions 3. Time as a sequence of perceptions Pointe: the difference between in itself and appearance is the difference of the "in itself" itself. - The appearance is not lifted against the "in itself". I 130 World: expresses itself always as "Sosein" of a single Monad. - ((s) appearance, not the totality, this should include all monads). >Phenomena/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Hermeneutics | Schelling | Bubner I 87 Plato/Schelling/Bubner: the early Schelling himself related impartially Plato's cosmology of ideas to the reconciliation interests of early idealism between subjectivity and the world. >Ideas/Plato, >Plato, >Ideas, >Idealism, >Idealism as author, >Subjectivity, >World, >World/thinking. Plato/Idealism/Bubner: for reasons of economy in the introduction of new concepts, platonic ideas were also reformulated transcendental-philosophically. >Metaphysics, cf. >Conservativity. KantVsSchelling/Bubner: Here, in passing, Kant discovers the hermeneutical maxim that it applies to understand an author better than he understood himself. >Understanding, >Meaning change, >Theory change, cf. >Interpretation/Rorty. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Hypostasis | Jonas | Brocker I 618 Hypostasis/Objectification/Reification/Nature/Humanity/Action/Kant: According to Kant, "humanity" or "nature" are mere hypostases and as such cannot be a correlate of a human action (cf. Birnbacher (1)). Hypostasis/Kant: the act of reifying something that exists only in thought, as it were, under the hand ("subreption") and attributing to it, wrongly, the same quality as a real object: in his view, an illicit philosophical operation. Brocker: KantVsJonas: see Values/Jonas, Ethics/Jonas, Naturalistic Fallacy/Jonas. 1.Dieter Birnbacher, „Rezension zu Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“, in: Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 37, 1983, p. 145. Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Jonas I Hans Jonas Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Hypostasis | Kant | Brocker I 618 Hypostasis/Objectification/Reification/Nature/Humanity/Action/Kant: According to Kant, "humanity" or "nature" are mere hypostases and as such cannot be a correlate of a human action (cf. Birnbacher (1)). Hypostasis/Kant: the act of reifying something that exists only in thought, as it were, under the hand ("subreption") and attributing to it, wrongly, the same quality as a real object: in his view, an illicit philosophical operation. Brocker: KantVsJonas: see Values/Jonas, Ethics/Jonas, Naturalistic Fallacy/Jonas. 1. Dieter Birnbacher, „Rezension zu Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“, in: Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 37, 1983, S. 145. Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| I, Ego, Self | Kant | Horwich I 404 f I/knowledge/Kant: representations (according to Putnam): "empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: is the author "in the game", not the right author. - This is the transcendental ego (out of game). - Internal realism/PutnamVsKant: 1. authors in the plural (social). 2.Tthe ones in the story are real! PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: it would be "crazy" if these were only fictions because a fictional character cannot be a real author. But these are true stories. >Knowledge/Kant, >Skepticism. --- Stegmüller IV 322 I/Kant: "Empirical I": working as a cause and as effect - "Noumenal I": (metaphysical): superfluous, passive viewer - metaphysical I: addressee of the moral ought. --- Strawson V 146 I/subject/Hume/Strawson: is obliged to explain the idea of what "I" means - as anti-rationalist he must declare our fiction - KantVsHume: Kant does not need that, he needs empirical criteria for the subject's identity. >Subject/Kant. --- Bubner I 108 I/Kant/Bubner: there is not the I, to which representations adhere, but to speak of the different representations among themselves as mine means to create self-consciousness in the first place. >Self-consciousness/Kant. --- Adorno XIII 64 I/transcendental subject/KantVsHume/Adorno: precisely this I, which is denied by Hume per se, must in reality be presupposed to constitute something like experience. Kant, however, has seen that this transcendental subject, which is greatly independent of the content of experience, has in itself a dynamic which goes beyond experience. >I, Ego, Self/Hume, >Subject/Hume. Kant has expressed this in the fact that reason, by going beyond its empirical use, is necessarily involved in contradictions, because thinking cannot be arbitrarily stopped once it comes into play. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Idealism | Kant | Strawson V 211 Transcendental Idealism/StrawsonVsKant: non-empirical knowledge/Kant: geometric knowledge - but only when the analysis is complete. >Knowledge/Kant. StrawsonVs: this premise does not make more than the definition of the conditions to be explored - that means, they do not depend on the transcendental idealism. And if the premise is not dependent on him, then the evidence is not either - and thus also not the whole non-empirical knowledge. N.B.: it is not necessary to invoke the doctrine that what we perceive as objects, are no such objects in reality. V 213 Def Phenomenalistic Idealism: the claim that physical things are not independent of our perceptions. - Definition Problematic Idealism: claims that the assumption of external objects is only a conclusion from internal perception. - KantVs: this presupposes what is wrong, namely that bodies exist independently of our perception - what is wrong is the transcendental idealism. (KantVsTranscendental Idealism) V 222 Transcendental Idealism/Kant: claims it is an empiricist realism. Confidence must include an awareness of specific awareness-independent objects. StrawsonVsKant: this is certainly a dualistic realism - this dualism questions the "our". --- Stroud I 129f Def Dogmatic Idealism/Kant/Stroud: the thesis that there is no world besides mine - KantVs: that would be a statement about the world we want to investigate: that is absurd. Stroud I 130 Def Problematic Idealism: Thesis: that the independent world from us was unknowable. KantVs: that misinterprets our actual situation in the world. Cf. >Thing in itself/Kant. --- Adorno XIII 58 Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Adorno: Kant is a transcendental idealist in the sense that he believes that the judgments which we can make as valid judgments about the empirical world are constituted by the original forms of our consciousness, but that the world, so constituted once, as one already constituted, in which we live, is precisely the world which forms the object of our experiences; of its empirical reality, we must be convinced, because the forms of organization by which they are transcendental (...) must always refer to a material which itself is derived from experience. KantVsPlato/Adorno: there is a critique of (Platonic) ideas in this. Adorno: in this sense, he is one of the great executors of the overall nominalistic tradition of the modern Enlightenment. >Nominalism, >Enlightenment. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Identity | Locke | McDowell I 126/7 Consciousness/apperception/criterion/KantVsLocke: important for him (paralogism-chapter) is precisely that self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. >Apperception. Euchner I 53f Identity/person/personal identity/Locke: thesis: There is a difference between an arbitrary mass and a structured matter that makes life. We have to distinguish between substance and person, because these are different ideas. >Idea/Locke, >Substance/Locke, >Person/Locke. Def life/Locke: the substance of this trias. Def person/Locke: thinking, intelligent beings with reason, who may consider themselves e - (at different times). >Personal identity. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Judgments | Kant | Brandom I 516 Judgement/Kant: is the basic unit of consciousness. >Consciousness/Kant. --- Strawson V 64 Judgment/Kant: a valid judgment is independet from consciousness states - Strawson: then probably no experience without concepts - the deepest principle. - >Categories: unity of consciousness. Strawson V 63 Judgement/Kant: the same as to let fall objects under concepts. --- Bubner I 96 Judgment/Kant/Aristotle/Bubner: judgements are not like signs in direct relation to a particular world-givenness, but they represent something, or characterize something as something. They design a certain point of view on the world, which can be distinguished from other views. The judgment asserts that things behave as it is represented by the connection of two sentence elements. Cf. >Predication, >Statement, >Representation/Kant. But in this way, only separate things can be summarized! The unity thus arises from a specially accomplished connection. It is produced in the judgment and is therefore not a givenness of the world. This also explains the possibility of the falsehood of a sentence which is actually properly formed. Bubner I 100 Definition judgment/Kant/Bubner: is then called the particular idea, the content of which is the determinable relation of other representations, which in turn have a content which does not emerge from the formal connection alone. >Ideas/Kant. Bubner I 101 Judgment is, therefore, the mediate knowledge of an object, the representation of a representation of it. If, on the other hand, the content continually emerges from new representations, there would be a regress in judging. Solution: the relation of representations must itself become the object of an idea. Synthesis: is now the fact that this relationship can be specified, namely, that in the establishment of the relationship something own comes to consciousness, namely, the unity of the connected representations as such. That is the peculiar content of the judgment. Gadamer I 38 Urteilskraft/judgement/Kant/Gadamer: (...) where this term, as in Pietism or in the philosophy of the Scots (>Reid), means a polemical turn against metaphysics, it still remains in the line of its original critical function. In contrast, Kant's inclusion of this term is accentuated quite differently in the "Critique of Judgment"(1). Kant/Gadamer: The basic moral meaning of this term no longer has a systematic place with him. KantVsEmotivism/KantVsSensus communis: As is well known, he designed his moral philosophy almost in opposition to the doctrine of "moral feeling" developed in English philosophy. Thus the concept of sensus communis has been completely eliminated from moral philosophy by him. What appears with the unconditionality of a moral imperative cannot be based on a feeling, even if by this we do not mean the detail of feeling but the commonality of moral feeling. For the character of the imperative, which is suitable for morality, fundamentally excludes comparative reflection on others. The unconditionality of the moral commandment certainly does not mean that the moral consciousness should be rigid in judging others. Rather, it is morally imperative to abstract from the subjective private conditions of one's own judgement and to put oneself in the position of the other. >Morals/Kant. Gadamer I 39 Thus, for Kant, all that remains of the scope of what one might call sensual judgement is the aesthetic judgement of taste. Here one can speak of a real public spirit. As doubtful as it may be whether one may speak of knowledge in aesthetic taste, and so certainly not judge by concepts in aesthetic judgment it is clear that aesthetic taste is meant to be the imposition of a general mood, even if it is sensual and not conceptual. The true public spirit, then, says Kant, is taste. >Taste/ Kant. Gadamer I 44 It is (...) by no means the case that the power of judgement is productive only in the area of nature and art as a judgement of the beautiful and sublime, indeed one will not even say with Kant(2) that a productivity of judgment must be recognised there. Rather, the beauty in nature and art is to be supplemented by the whole vast sea of beauty which is spread out in the moral reality of man. Gadamer I 45 It is always obviously not only a matter of logical but also aesthetic judgement. The individual case in which the power of judgement is involved is never a mere case; it is not limited to being the particularity of a general law or concept. Rather, it is always an "individual case", and, typically, we say: a special case, a special case because it is not covered by the rule. Gadamer I 46 Humanities/aesthetics/ethics/Kant/Gadamer: If one now looks at the role Kant's critique of judgement plays within the history of the humanities, one will have to say that his transcendental-philosophical foundation of aesthetics was momentous on both sides and represents a turning point. It means the breaking off of a tradition, but at the same time the introduction of a new development. It restricted the concept of taste to the field in which it could claim independent and autonomous validity as a principle of its own power of judgement - and, conversely, thus restricted the concept of knowledge to the theoretical and practical use of reason. The transcendental intention that guided him found fulfillment in the limited phenomenon of judging the beautiful (and sublime) and referred the more general experiential concept of taste and the activity of aesthetic judgement in the field of law and custom from the center of philosophy. >Aesthetics/Kant. 1. Kritik der Urteilskraft, S 40. 2. Ebenda, S. VII. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Kant | Höffe | Höffe I 302 Kant/Höffe:. Critics of [Kant] (...) like to focus on some rightly objectionable views such as discrimination against both women and people without any property. Last but not least, Kant is criticized for his defence of the death penalty. Höffe: But the objectionable views do not arise easily from the main concern of legal and state theory, a justification of law and state that dispenses with all theological and empirical elements and operates solely on the basis of principles of a purely (legal) practical reason. Prehistory: Methodologically, Kant's legal and constitutional thinking belongs to modern natural law as critical rational law, i.e. to the tradition that leads from Hobbes via Spinoza, Pufendorf and Locke to Thomasius, Wolff and Achenwall. >Th. Hobbes, >B. Spinoza, >J. Locke. Höffe: The incriminated views do not even hit the core of Kant's political conviction, a living together in freedom determined by the a priori idea of law. Even less can they be justified by rational law. Höffe I 103 Political order: [Kant] (...) was the first of the Western philosophers to draft detailed principles of a globally valid legal and peace order consisting of the three dimensions of state law, international law, and world civil law. >International law, >Cosmopolitanism. KantVsUtilitarianism: In contrast to the empirical-social pragmatic theories of the later powerful utilitarianism, Kant represents a normative concept of law and state that gets by without empirical elements and is not oriented toward well-being. Rather, he will commit the coexistence of people to the claim of pure practical reason. This strict concept of reason includes an unrestricted "shall", a categorical legal imperative (...). >Utilitarianism, >Categorical imperative, >Principles, >Norms. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Kant | Sandel | Gaus I 111 Kant/Sandel/Gaus: Benn and Gewirth both seek a direct route from agency to liberal rights: if we understand the type of agents we are, we see that we must claim certain liberal rights and grant them to others. >Person/Benn, >Rights/Gewirth. KantVsGewirth/KantVs/Benn: in contrast, what is often called ‘Kantian liberalism’ seeks to establish liberal rights via a hypothetical contract, which then generates basic rights. SandelVsKant: In the words of Sandel, its most famous critic, according to ‘deontological’ or ‘Kantian liberalism’, ‘society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good’ (1982(1): 1–7). Respect/recognition: Because, on this view, each is a chooser of her own ends in life, respect for the person of others demands that we refrain from imposing our view of the good life on her. Only principles that can be justified to all respect the personhood of each. Respect, then, requires a certain mode of justification, according to which moral principles are acceptable to all free moral persons in a fair choice situation. Liberal principles are then generated via this mode of justification. Cf. >Reason/Scanlon. 1. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. Brocker I 670 Kant/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead fully relied on a theory of right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1975). See Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. See Liberalism/Sandel, Law/Kant, SandelVsRawls. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Kant | Sidgwick | Rawls I 254 Kant/SidgwickVsKant/Sidgwick/Rawls: Sidgwick writes that nothing in Kant's ethics is more striking than the idea that the human expresses his true self by acting according to moral law. >Morals, >Laws, >Principles. On the other hand, when he/she gives in to certain needs, he/she acts according to the law of nature.(1). >Natural laws. SidgwickVsKant/Rawls: according to Sidgwick, this idea collapses: it seems to him to be Kant's view that saints and villains have become what they are at their own free will (as a noumenal self) and at the same time are subject to the causal laws (as phenomenal self). >Free Will, >Causal laws. I 255 Kant now, after Sidgwick, fails to explain why the villain in his/her bad life does not express his/her being himself/herself as much as the saint does in his/her life. >Explanation, >Justification. KantVsSidgwick/KantVsVs/Rawls: Kant should reply that any consistent action according to principles could be the result of a decision of the noumenal self, but that not every action of the phenomenal self reveals this as a free and equal rational being. >Rationality, >Noumenal self, >Thing in itself. RawlsVsKant: Kant did not show that our actions under moral law show our nature in a recognizable way, as acting according to contrary principles would not do. >Manifestation. 1.H. Sidgwick, "The Kantian Conception of Free Will", Mind, vol. 13,1888, pp. 511-516. |
Sidgwick I Henry Sidgwick Methods of Ethics 2017 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Knowledge | Kant | Stroud I 130 Knowledge/skepticism/KantVsDescartes: Who reads a proof needs to know at the end. Problem: this is only possible in the sciences, not in philosophy. KantVsTradition: Kant treats knowledge of the outer world always indirectly or inferentially. Solution/Kant: immediate perception / = consciousness of external things. That is a sufficient proof of their reality. - With inferential access skepticism would be inevitable. Per skepticism: forces to show that we have acquired our knowledge. KantVsMoore/Stroud: Moore does not show this. I 134 Skepticism/Kant: is refuted only by a proof of realism. >Reality/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Experience/Kant, >Realism/Kant, >Skepticism. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Law | Kant | Brocker I 670 Law/Justification/Kant: Kant's conception of the law is based on the assumption of a transcendental subject whose capacity for moral autonomy lies in the fact that it is not part of the world of appearances determined by natural laws and can therefore orient itself on the idea of generalizability, instead of acting on the basis of its tendencies, urges and desires. Transcendental Subject/Kant: has a purely formal character in that it neither pursues certain content purposes nor has preferences. Subjectivity/Kant: this subjectivity is free and yet individualized, as each transcendental subject relates purely to itself as a being of freedom. RawlsVsKant: Rawls tries to reformulate Kant without these "metaphysical" (more precisely transcendental philosophical) prerequisites. Brocker I 671 SandelVsRawls: Rawls's attempt fails because Rawls implicitly has to base his theory on a theory of the "self" that is not substantially different from Kant's theory. Kant's theory and deontological liberalism cannot be saved from the difficulties that the Kantian subject brings with it (1) Transcendental Subject/Rawls: Rawl's "veil of ignorance" in an assumed initial state of a society to be established, in which people do not know what role they will play later, is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's transcendental subject without metaphysical assumptions. See Veil of Ignorance/Rawls. 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. 14. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 304 Law/Ultimate Justification/Kant/Höffe: [Kant declares] metaphysical convictions themselves indispensable for a theory of law and state, if it wants to be philosophical. Höffe I 306 Kant divides his moral system, the metaphysics of morals, into two parts: the doctrine of law as the epitome of what humans owe one another, and the doctrine of virtue as the epitome of meritorious extra work. For both he represents a general law of moral rank. In contrast to the general law of virtue, the general law of rights does not depend on the inner motive force, which is why one must obey the law of rights, but not make obeying it the maxim of one's action. The external action is sufficient for morality of the right, provided that it is considered in relation to the external actions of other persons, that is, for Kant: other sane beings. What counts for the law is only the external cohabitation, which in moral terms must submit to a strictly general law: "Act outwardly in such a way that the free use of your arbitrariness with the freedom of everyone according to a general law could exist together"(1). Coercion/Law/Kant: To the mere concept of law, Kant shows conclusively, belongs a power of coercion. Here, in contrast to a philosophical anarchism, Kant denies the view that there should be any coercion between people. KantVsLocke: The morally permissible coercion does not, however, include the right to punish as in Locke's natural state; it is only the right to defend oneself against injustice. One may, for example, prevent a theft or retrieve the stolen goods, but one may neither injure the thief nor take more than what was stolen. >Property/Kant, >Rule of Law/Kant, >State/Kant. 1. I. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre § C |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Laws | Locke | Höffe I 246 Laws/Locke/Höffe: Locke(1) [investigates] in the (...) experiments on natural law(1) (...) how those normative principles can be recognized which are called physei dikaion by the Greeks and lex naturae by the Romans, i.e. "natural law". There was widespread agreement on their content in the 17th century. The aforementioned prohibition of damage (...) is considered a fundamental obligation. >Natural justice. How do we recognize the laws? Because of the agreement on content, Locke essentially only has to deal with the question of recognisability. In accordance with his basic epistemological thesis, he rejects the view that this is innate knowledge. Rather, he argues that there is an obligation that is perceptible across all geographical and historical peculiarities and applies to the whole of humanity. However, it is only recognised with the help of natural light, which is formed by sensory perception and deductive thinking (lumen naturale). ((s) KantVsLocke: The moral law is supernatural). Lumen naturale/Locke: Behind it, there is a wise and powerful world author whose existence Höffe I 247 one could deduce from the wonderful order of the world. Locke refers here to the so-called physico-theological proof of God, which concludes from the observation of an order inherent in the world that there is a Creator God. >Proofs of God. 1. J. Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Liberty | Rousseau | Rawls I 264 Liberty/Rousseau/Rawls: Rousseau distinguished between slavery and freedom as follows: to be governed by appetite alone is slavery, while obedience to a law imposed on oneself is freedom. (J. -J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, bk. I. ch. viii). KantVsRousseau/Rawls: Kant tried to give Rousseau's concept of the general will (volonté generale, Gemeinwille) a philosophical foundation. (See L. W. Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, Chicago, 1960, pp. 200,235f; E. Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe, Princeton, 1945, pp. 18-25,30-35,58f.) >Freedom, >General Will, >World/Kant, >State/Kant, >Society/Kant, >Rousseau/Kant, >Rule of Law/Kant, >Republic/Kant, >Power/Kant, >Politics/Kant, >Peace/Kant, >Human Rights/Kant, >Freedom/Kant, >Equal rights/Kant, >Contract theory/Kant, >Cosmopolitanism/Kant, |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Logic | Kant | Strawson V 64 Logic/Kant: logic does not contribute to the conditions the objects have to meet. - Logic uses terms, but not the content of knowledge. >Knowledge/Kant, >Content/Kant. General Logic: abstracts. Transcendental Logic: is confronted with a manifold of sensory input. >Experience/Kant. V 68 There cannot be a specific way in which we need to think about the objects of experience, in order to enable the thtruth-functional composition of statements - the ability of the composition cannot depend on our disposal of any other a priori concept of an object in general. StrawsonVsKant: "metaphysical deduction": is a failed attempt to derive the categories of logic. Strawson: the logic did not help Kant to get ahead. --- Bubner I 105 Logic/KantVsTadition: old: while conventional logic send the conceptual doctrine of the judgment doctrine based on it ahead,... New: ...the transcendental logic proceeds vice versa and orients the fundamental categories already on the synthesis performance of the judgments. I 106 The categorial pre-structuring by concepts a priori constitutes objects as objects and thus "makes them" the subject of possible epistemological judgments ((s) reflexive, critique). For example, the "black human" and "the human is black": in the first case merely thought of as black (problematic). In the second it was recognized as such! But both times it is the same understanding by the same actions! |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Matter | Kant | Danto III 266 Matter/Body/KantVsDescartes/Kant/Danto: Kant adhered to a dynamic theory of matter. He turned against Cartesian physics, according to which everything can be explained by the geometric properties of matter. The basic physical concept of the Cartesians was extension. Kant replied, not by extension would bodies take up space, but by intensity. >Matter/Descartes. Kant: Matter is the moveable, as long as it fills a space. Fulfilling a space means resisting all moving things, which through its movement is trying to penetrate into a certain space (...). The general principle of the dynamics of material nature is: that everything real of the objects of external sense, which that is not merely the determination of space, must be seen as a moving force; that is, whereby the so-called solid or the absolute impenetrability, as an empty concept, must be expelled from the natural sciences and be replaced by a force driving back.(1) Danto: Kant implicitly invoked this honor in his confusing discussion of intense magnitudes in the section 'Anticipations of Perception of First Criticism.(2) Danto: Mass is defined there by the intensity with which matter fills a given space. >Space/Kant. 1.I. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, in: Werke in 10 Bänden Ed. W. Weischedel, Special Edition, Vol. III, Darmstadt 1983) (second main piece: Erklärung 1, Lehrsatz 1; Allgemeine Anmerkung zur Dynamik). 2. Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Acitivity, Cambridge, 1963, pp. 232f). |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Moral Philosophy | Ancient Philosophy | Gadamer I 45 Moral Philosophy/Antique Philosophy/Gadamer: The emergence of the concept of taste in the 17th century (...) leads (...) into contexts of moral philosophy that go back to antiquity. It is this humanistic and thus ultimately Greek component that becomes effective within the moral philosophy determined by Christianity. Greek ethics - the ethics of measurements of the Pythagoreans and Plato, the ethics of the Mesotes created by Aristotle - is in a deep and comprehensive sense an ethics of good taste. Gadamer I 46 Such a thesis certainly sounds strange to our ears. Firstly, because the ideal normative element in the concept of taste is usually misunderstood and the relativistic-sceptical reasoning about the differences in taste is in our ears. Ethics/KantVs: Above all, however, we are determined by Kant's moral-philosophical achievement, which has purified ethics of all aesthetic and emotional moments. >Judgement/Kant. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Morals | Kant | Stegmüller IV 299 Morality/ethics/Kant: must necessarily apply. -> categorical imperative - as a hypothetical imperatives ("if you want that, do ...") they would be superfluous. Stegmüller IV 429 Moral/Kant/Stegmüller: is autonomous: the morally right thing is right in itself and mandatory - it can be detected by practical reason. - Every rational being is competent enough to give the moral commandments themself. - If there was divine reward, morality would be corrupted by self-interest. -> Rawls: the veil of ignorance. Stegmüller IV 430 God/practical reason/Kant: nevertheless, the moral asks us that we set ourselves the highest good for goal - therefore a cause different from nature must be demanded from nature. - The highest good is only possible in the world, if the highest cause of nature is assumed. Stegmüller IV 431 In addition, the immortality is necessary so that an infinite progress for the first element of the highest good is possible. MackieVsKant: this is a false transition from "should" to "should be possible." Stegmüller IV 433 MackieVsKant: The consistent recognition of the autonomy of moral should have brought him to a more stoic conception: that moral does not need any other bliss as the consciousness of righteousness itself. --- Strawson V 134 Moral/Kant: we need that to ensure that the limitations of knowledge do not strengthen the materialism and atheism. --- Vaihinger 306 Moral/Kant/Vaihinger: the theoretical reason forbids to accept a moral world order - the practical reason dictates that it is necessary to do good. --- Rawls I 251 Moral/Kant/Rawls: Kant begins with the rational choice of moral principles and their rational assessment. Rawls I 254 Kant/SidgwickVsKant/Sidgwick/Rawls: Sidgwick writes that nothing in Kant's ethics is more striking than the idea that man expresses his true self by acting according to moral law. On the other hand, when he gives in to certain needs, he acts according to the law of nature. (Sidgwick, "The Kantian Conception of Free Will", Mind, vol. 13,1888, pp. 511-516). Rawls I 255 Kant now, according to Sidgwick, fails to explain why the villain in his bad life does not express himself as much as the saint does in his life. KantVsSidgwick/KantVsVs/Rawls: Kant should reply that any consistent action according to principles could be the result of a decision of the noumenal self, but that not every action of the phenomenal self reveals this as a free and equal rational being. RawlsVsKant: Kant did not show that our actions under moral law show our nature in a recognizable way, as acting according to contrary principles would not do. Solution/Rawls: our assumption of the initial situation with the veil of ignorance resolves this deficiency: we only have to show that our principles to be chosen are applicable. We accept the initial situation as one that is seen by the noumenal self in Kant's sense. Qua noumenale they have the free choice between principles. At the same time, however, they want to express their rationality in the world around them, i. e. their independence from contingent characteristics of nature and society. If the argument from contract theory is correct (see Contract Theory/Rawls), precisely those principles define the moral law. Rawls I 256 Our desire to behave justly then arises partly from the desire to express ourselves as free and equally rational beings. I think that is why Kant speaks of it as a reason for shame when we behave incorrectly and not as a reason for guilt. Gadamer I 38 Moral law/"Sittengesetz"/Kant/Gadamer: The application of the moral law to the determination of will is a matter of judgement. But since it is a matter here of discernment under laws of pure practical reason, its task is precisely to protect against the "empiricism of practical reason, which merely places the practical concepts of good and evil in sequences of experience"(1). This is what the typology of pure practical reason does. In addition, there is certainly also for Kant the question of how the strict laws of pure practical reason can be introduced into the human mind. For this task he indeed relies on common human reason and wants to practice and form practical judgement (...). Gadamer I 39 But the fact that there can be a culture of moral feeling in this way does not really belong to moral philosophy, and in any case does not concern the foundations of it. For Kant demands that our determination of will should remain determined solely by the driving forces based on the self-legislation of pure practical reason. No mere commonality of feeling can form the basis for it, but only an "albeit dark, but certainly guiding practical act of reason", which is precisely the task of the critique of practical reason to enlighten and consolidate. 1. I. Kant. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1787, S. 124. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Naturalized Epistemology | Stroud | I 209 Skepticism/naturalized epistemology/Stroud: Skepticism gets more inevitable, the more we take the external (distanced) position and look at evidence. >Epistemology, >Empiricism, >Evidence. There is no independent information about the world - E.g. room with monitors. Cf. >Colour researcher Mary. Brains in a vat/Descartes/Kant: such a distinction between sensory experience and other knowledge would cut us off from the world. >Brains in a vat. I 211 QuineVs: only applies to the traditional epistemology theory. Solution: we must only avoid a "distanced" position. Cf. >Naturalism, >Naturalized Epistemology. QuineVsKant: so works the examination of general human knowledge. >Knowlede/Kant. I 211 Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - thus avoided interior/exterior problem. >Interior/exterior. I 214 QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge. >a priori, >a priori/Quine. I 250 Naturalized epistemology/knowledge/underdetermination/skepticism/ StroudVsQuine: naturalized epistemology: must explain: how distant events cause closer events? - How is our exuberant belief caused? But that would not explain them - (how the "gap" between data and knowledge is bridged.) >"Meager input"/Quine. Stroud: because it makes no sense to say that here there is a gap in a causal chain. - Then you cannot speak of underdetermination - that an event "underdetermines" another. -((s), there is no reason that would not be sufficient.) >Underdetermination/Quine. Underdetermination/Quine: E.g. truths about molecules are underdetermined by truths about everyday things. Gap/Stroud: Quine has to do with a gap, because he talkes about information ((s) content), not about mere events. >Knowledge/Quine. I 251 Input/Stroud: the individual input is not small - ((s) only as a mass term) - not small when it is conceived as an event - so we cannot speak of indeterminacy as events. >Indeterminacy, >Events. StroudVsQuine: Problem: if the input is too small, the transition to the over flowing output requires consciousness. >Consciousness. I 253 Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/StroudVsQuine: we cannot see all our beliefs as "projections". And we must not accept epistemic priority ((s) that sensations are closer to us than the external objects). >Beliefs, >Knowledge, >World/thinking, >Perception, >Evidence, >W.V.O. Quine. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Nature | Genz | II 198 Nature/Numbers/Genz: thesis: nature calculates itself! For example, 2 litres of water and 1 litre of water are 3 litres of water. ((s) KantVs) II 199 Quantum Mechanics/Genz: in quantum mechanics too, nature calculates when looking at quantities of individual cases rather than the individual cases. Nature/Genz: nature cannot calculate wrongly, though, because it provides us with the yardstick for correct calculation. For example, billiard balls: the mathematician uses an algorithm that assumes that the balls move evenly in a straight line. Which algorithm does nature use? >Algorithms. II 200 Computer: a computer has two methods available: a) local and b) global. a) local: divides the movement of the first ball into equally long sections and determines whether the other ball is nearby, in the last section it gives the other ball the speed of the first one and stops the first one. b) global: here, it is first calculated when the balls collide, then the locations are calculated as usual, but without asking for the distance of the other ball, and then it calculates them according to the values of the reversed speeds. Nature: even if nature does it like a computer, you still have to ask, how? II 201 N.B.: it depends on how effectively it calculates - whether matter immediately after the Big Bang would have been sufficient to build a computer that could have calculated the development of the universe. World as a Computer/computer model/Genz: this picture has replaced the mathematical view of the world for some. Their calculations are then logical equivalents to the calculations of a universal Turing machine. >Computer model, >Computation. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Perception | Kant | Strawson V 126 Perception/Kant/Strawson: between veridical and non-veridical perception we can only distinguish when the general conditions of objective determination of time (objective perception) have been met. >Time/Kant. V 169f Perception/Kant: it exists very well "in itself"! >Thing in itself/Kant. Problem: then the question of the beginning of the series is repeated. StrawsonVsKant: always talks of our perception. - But your perceptions are not given to me. Cf. >Intersubjectivity, >Experience/Kant. --- Stroud I 164 Perception/Kant/Stroud: he can only accept empirically direct perception of independent things, because he does not accept them transcendental. - Direct perception: only possible with dependent things . - E.g. representations. >Representation/Kant. KantVsTranscendental realism: this would also have to take independent things. - Problem: then we would have to denote our representations inadequate as these things. - StroudVsKant: I'm trapped in my subjectivity. - Thus the transcendental idealism can hardly be distinguished from skepticism. - StroudVsKant: according to him the best science (physics, etc.) is possible, but still dependent on our subjectivity. >Subjectivity/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Person | Kant | Strawson V 142 Person/personal identity/Descartes: (not physical!) - Our ordinary concept brings very well empirically applicable criteria for numerical identity of a subject with itself (concept!). But not by self-ascription - "I" is simply used without criteria. >Criteria/Kant. KantVsDescartes: the only criteria would be: "the same person", "the same soul" - that would be circular. >Circular reasoning, >Temporal identity. V 146 Kant: there is no inner intuition of the subject. >Subject/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Postcolonialism | Boehm | Postcolonialism/Omri BoehmVsPostcolonialism/ KantVsPostcolonialism/Assheuer: Those who - like many postcolonial studies - do not have an abstract idea of man, cannot even justify what is supposed to be concretely wrong with racism. According to Assheuer, Omri Boehm attributes this thesis to Kant. ((s)The term postcolonialism is not used by Kant.) Thomas Assheuer „Wahrheit für Alle“ in: Die Zeit 08. 09. 2022 |
Boehm I Omri Boehm Radikaler Universalismus Berlin 2022 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Descartes | Danto I 189 Ontological proof of God/Descartes/Danto: if God did not exist, he could be prevented only by something outside the existence - which contradicts the thesis that God is not limited by anything. I 191 In the case of God the understanding of the idea already leads to knowledge about his existence by itself - we cannot know what God is and doubt his existence. >Knowledge, >Existence, >Understanding, >Ideas, >Doubt, >God, >Definitions, >Definability. Danto I 193 Rationalism/ontological proof of God/Descartes/Danto: Rationalism > understanding = knowledge of existence Rationalism/Danto: 1st out of concepts 2nd starting from that conceive the nature and existence of the world. KantVsRationalism: existence is not a property. >Properties, >Predicate of existence, >Predication, >Rationalism. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Kant | Strawson V 194 Cosmological proof of God/StrawsonVsKant: Kant: if there is an unlimited being, it exists necessarily. Strawson: We cannot turn it the other way round: if it is necessary, it is unlimited. Ontological proof/Kant: from non-contradictory existence should follow necessary existence. KantVs: it is one thing to form an idea - it is another thing to declare that the idea ((s) concept) has an application. >Ideas/Kant, >Concepts/Kant, >Existence/Kant, >God/Kant, >Religious belief/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Proofs | Vollmer | I 234 Science/proof/physics/Kant/early/precritical: Newton's theory cannot be proven logically - that have seen KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff. >Provability, >Physics, >Proofs, >Natural laws, >G.W. Leibniz. But it also cannot be empirically verified - Kant had learned that from Hume. >I. Kant, >D. Hume. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Property | Kant | Höffe I 308 Property/Kant/Höffe: Kant (...) [declares] property to be an institution necessary to reason and therefore an indispensable component of every constitutional state. KantVsRoussau: in his Second Treatise, he declares all personal property (...) illegitimate and exclusively communal property, to be permissible. Cf. >Property/Rousseau, >Social Contract/Rousseau. Kant: Now the relevant pure practical reason knows only formal laws. Therefore it cannot divide the objects that freedom is allowed to use for itself into two groups, legitimate and illegitimate objects. It must either prohibit all objects or permit them all. Since an absolute prohibition abolishes external freedom, the pursuit of self-chosen purposes, e contrario follows: All objects must be allowed without any restriction as possible property titles. Possession of reason: (...) Possession in the legal understanding [is], in contrast to physical possession, the mere possession, not an empirical, but a pure relationship a priori, called "intelligible possession" (possession of reason) by Kant. Legal property does not consist in an empirically perceptible relationship, but in an intellectual relationship: [the stolen property is not property, deposited property is not masterless]. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Propositional Knowledge | Rorty | I 165 Propositional Knowledge/Insight/KantVsLocke/Rorty: Error: knowledge after the model of vision - confusion of the "succession of apprehensions with the apprehension of a succession": E.g. objects and properties take turns to perceive instead of the features typical of an object. False: to want to reduce "Knowing that" to the "knowledge of". - ((s)> Propositional Knowledge). Object/Kant: is always the result of a >synthesis. See also >apprehension, >Knowing how. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Punishment | Kant | Höffe I 312 Punishment/Kant/Höffe: Kant is (...) resolutely in favour of the "right of retaliation". KantVsResocialization Theory: With this, he criticizes the empirical-pragmatic theory of punishment that prevailed at the time, according to which criminal punishment was justified only by its benefit for society, the improvement of offenders and deterrence from possible criminal acts. Benefit for society: True to his rational argumentation, which at most grants a secondary right to the considerations of benefit, Kant demands that the first thing that must be done is justice. Deterrence Theory: While the deterrence theory humiliates its humanitarian appearance to the people Höffe I 313 as a means for society, thus robbing it of its inviolable human dignity, criminal law acquires the rank of a categorical imperative within the framework of a theory of reason. Def Criminal Law/Kant: Criminal law is the power of the executive, the "commander", to inflict "pain" on the subject "because of his crime". Retribution: Only the criminal may be punished and only because he has committed a crime. Other aspects such as deterrence, reparation and reintegration have only a secondary and subsidiary right. (...) [the measure of] retaliation [has] to be understood formally rather than materially (...). Benefit: The sentence must not be based on social considerations of benefit, it must correspond to the weight of the crime. >Society/Kant, >Law/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Qualities | Berkeley | Putnam II 167f Qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: Vs primary and secondary qualities. - Only Locke's "simple quality of sensation". Secondary qualities/Locke: perceptible only as an asset, in relation to us. >Qualities/Locke. KantVsLocke: this applies to everything, including primary qualities. - There is no reason to distinguish. >Qualities/Kant. Stegmüller IV 380 Primary qualities/BerkeleyVsLocke: certain values of primary qualities such as distance and speed are always only relative sizes! This shows that they exist "only in our minds". |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Rabbit-Duck-Head | Putnam | I (g) 178/9 Rabbit-Duck-Head/Wittgenstein: the rabbit-duck-head shows that the mental image is something other than the physical: while the physical picture can be seen in several aspects, this is not possible in case of the mental image. It can only clearly be a rabbit or a duck. The interpretation is incorporated in the mental image. The mental image is a construction. I (g) 179 Memory/KantVsHume: similar to Wittgenstein in relation to the rabbit-duck-head: the interpretation is incorporated. >Aspects, >Interpretation, >Intentionality. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Rationalism | Chisholm | II 36f RationalismVsBerkeley: we believe in the outside world from the beginning, no decision situation; similar to Hume, but very modest position. Methodology/Sciences: Strategy: better than maintaining a change -> belief in the uniformity of the world. II 39 Rationalism/Rutte: reason always appealed to already existing belief-majorities. Rason: strategy: attitude maintained when change is not attractive. This is also true for indecision. It is more attractive to maintain realism. On the other hand: Solipsism: maintaining is less attractive. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 II 76 KantVsRationalism: mere consistency shall impose existence - (s) existence: freedom from contradiction, but not vice versa guaranteed -> Field: consistency = logical possibility. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Realism | Kant | Strawson V 230 Realism/KantVsLeibniz assumes truths about independent objects. Kant: we may only speak of terms instead. >Thing in itself/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Knowledge/Kant; ((s) Cf. >Semantic ascent/Quine). Stroud I 134 Realism/Kant: a) metaphysical realism: that things exist independently of us in the room - b) epistemic realism: contains something about our approach to things. Thesis: Perception: is directly and unproblematic - hence knowledge of external things (the outside world) is possible. Scandal/Kant: that the realism was never proved before. Stroud I 135 Moores hands/Kant/Stroud: Kant cannot complain that Moore would assume things only by belief itself. >Moore's hands. Stroud I 136 It is not about lack of generality. ((s) The proof is quite general (s.o. chapter 3). Stroud I 162 Def Transcendental Realism/Kant: understands the external things as something separate from the senses - KantVs: that leads to the empiricist idealism. Problem: we are aware of our representations but do not know whether they corresponds with something that exists. >Representations/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Reason | Brandom | I 395 Reason/Brandom: we are rational beings exactly as far as our recognition of discursive determinations makes a difference for what we will do next. >Discourse, >Actions. I 399 Mind/Brandom: Thesis: we gain mutual recognition out of our ability to say "we". >Recognition. --- II 213 Definition mind/Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules - KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive. >Mind, >Understanding, >Rules, >Score keeping model. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Reason/Cause | Brandom | II 121 Reason/Hume/Brandom: must be accompanied by a desire to perform an action - KantVsHume: Desire (sensual inclination) can provide no basis for an action - in addition: recognition of an obligation. >Desire, >Actions, >Intentions, >Motives. II 122 Brandom: to have a reason is to be eligible to own practical commitment. II 123 Recognition of a commitment can cause and can be caused. >Score keeping. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Reductionism | Damasio | Churchland II 486 KantVsReductionism: The self will never be investigated, it is only to be thought of in the highly abstract conceptualization of "transcendental apperception." >Apperception. DamasioVsKant: we have a much safer foundation in our body with its skin, bones, muscles, joints, internal organs, etc. >Representation, >Body, >Consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Perception, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Knowing how, >Experiencing, >World/thinking, >Sensation, >Sensory impressions. |
Damasio I Antonio R. Damasio Descartes ’ Irrtum: Fühlen, Denken und das menschliche Gehirn München 2004 Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Relations | Hume | I 121/122 Relation/KantVsHume: relations are not external to ideas. HumeVsKant: each relation is external in their terms, e.g. equality is not a property of the figures themselves, e.g. neighboring and distant figures do not explain what neighborhood and distance is. Relation anticipates a synthesis. Space/time: space and time are in the mind only a composition, bearing relation through fiction. E.g. association: creates relation, but does not explain that distance is a relation. Cf. >Properties/Chisholm. >Association/Hume, >Mind/Hume. I 135 Relations/Hume: relations cannot be derived from experience, they are effects of association principles external to the things (atomism). KantVsHume: not externally. Kant: therefore, critical philosophy instead of empiricism. >KantVsHume. I 139 KantVsHume: relations are so far dependent on the nature of things, as things presuppose a synthesis as phenomena that result from the same source as the synthesis of relations. Therefore, the critical philosophy is not empiricism. There is an a priori, that means, the imagination is productive. >Imagination/Hume, >Imagination/Kant. I 145 Causality/Hume: causality is the only relation, from which something can be concluded. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Rules | Dummett | I 149 KantVsDeterminism: action not by rules but by notions of rules. On the other hand: a move in chess has a meaning not because of knowledge of rules, but from the rules themselves. >Description levels, >Levels (Order), cf. >Chess. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Science | Kant | Vollmer I 234 Science/proof/physics/Kant/early/precritical: Newton's theory cannot be logically proved. - That had KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff realized. >Leibniz, >Proof/Leibniz. But it cannot be empirically verified. That Kant had learned from Hume. >Hume, >Verification. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Skepticism | Kant | Stroud I 128 Skepticism/Kant: it remains a scandal of philosophy that the existence of things outside of us must be accepted solely on the basis of belief. KantVsDescartes: the relation between philosophical question and everyday knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. - ((s) But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct.) Stroud I 136 KantVsSkepticism: two stages: 1. prove external things (Moore has solved) - 2. show the general possibility of such evidence. Cf. >Moore's hands. Stroud I 138 Stroud: Problem: we do not have a specific text (sentence) with which Kant would formulate his realism and could prove it to Moore. Stroud I 142 Everyday knowledge is unproblematic, complete and does not have to be proved. Cf. >Certainty. Stroud I 140 Skepticism/KantVsSkepticism: the skepticism can never reach a conclusion because of the premises accepted by himself. Stroud I 147 KantVsDescartes: he does not go far enough and relies too heavily on "testimonies" - (documents, evidence). More important: the conditions of possibility. Davidson: Kant: no study of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects we assume around us. >Thing in itself/Kant. Solution/Kant: "Copernican revolution": idealism of all appearances. - "We only have direct consciousness of what belongs to us. Our perception depends on our capacity. Wrong: that our experience would be in accordance with the things, but vice versa. Stroud I 149 Things of the outer world/objects/world/reality/Kant/Stroud: all our perception, whether internal or external, and all "external objects of perception ... we have to regard them as representations of what we can be immediately conscious . - ((s) so the thing is the representation of our consciousness -> transcendental idealism - founds the a priori character of our knowledge of space and time (geometry). >Space/Kant, >Time/Kant, >Geometry/Kant. Therefore things cannot exist independently of our thoughts and experiences. Stroud I 163 StroudVsKant: that we need to be aware of our experiences is the return of the "epistemic priority" (from Descartes). |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Social Goods | Grotius | Höffe I 309 Public Goods/Community Goods/Grotius/Höffe: According to the teacher of international law Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and his powerful writing on the law of war and peace(1), the earth and its fruits are first of all the common property of mankind. Private property is created through a contractual transfer of certain parts of it. LockeVsGrotius: In contrast, Locke claims what Rousseau follows in the social contract: According to the model of agriculture and craftsmanship, property is acquired through work, with which the object is prepared according to needs. >J. Locke. KantVsGrotius: Kant agrees with Locke's view that primary ownership does not arise from contractual agreement, but from an original acquisition. He rejects the labour theory, however. The work presupposes a material that must already belong to someone, so that it does not establish an original legal title. >I. Kant. 1. H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, 1625, II, Chap. 2-3 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Social Goods | Kant | Höffe I 309 Public Goods/Community Goods/Kant/Höffe: According to the international law teacher Hugo Grotius (1583 - 1645) and his powerful treatise on the law of war and peace(1), the earth and its fruits are first and foremost a common property of mankind. Private property is created through a contractual transfer of certain parts of it. LockeVsGrotius: In contrast, Locke claims what Rousseau follows in the social contract: According to the model of agriculture and craftsmanship, property is acquired through work, with which the object is prepared according to needs. KantVsGrotius: Kant agrees with Locke's view that primary ownership does not arise from contractual agreement, but from an original acquisition. He rejects the labour theory, however. The work presupposes a material that must already belong to someone, so that it does not establish an original legal title. Real Estate/Population: Kant criticizes the widespread notion of originally ownerless land. In truth, the first buyer does not encounter no-man's land, but common property, i.e. not objects that are free of rights, Höffe I 310 but that are in the community of all co-owners. To the question of how private property can then come about, Kant answers: only unilaterally, as appropriation (occupation). VsKant: Critics see in this view the partisanship for a right of the fist. In truth, the very first appropriation is not the taking away of something from someone else, but the original appropriation of something that does not yet belong to any private person. Right of residence: Before all customary legal acts humans have the right to be there "where nature, or chance (without their will) has placed them"(2). >Society/Kant. 1. H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, 1625, II, Chap. 2-3 2. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre § 13 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Space | Kant | I 85 Space/relativism/rationalism/Leibniz: (according to Kant): only capability exists of the mutual relationship of the things in it. KantVsLeibniz: counter-example: incongruity of left and right hands or mirror image - an inversion does not restore the identity here. >Chirality. --- Strawson V 28 Space/Time/Kant: totality seems to impose a disjunction on us: either limited, there is one last element, or unlimited. Since the antinomies are not empirically decidable, it thus confirms that space and time only exist as phenomena, and not as things in themselves. >Antinomies/Kant. StrawsonVsKant: it is not clear if there is no empirical solution. V 48 Space/Time/Kant: not produced by things, but by the subjects - space and time are states of consciousness - state of consciousness: not of high importance, merely effects of things, not their states. >Subject/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Experience/Kant. V 49 Space does not arise from experience, but experience presupposes space. >Time/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| State (Polity) | Kant | Höffe I 311 State/Kant/Höffe: According to (...) Hobbes one seeks peace out of fear of death and the desire for happiness. KantVsHobbes: In Kant's strict rationale, these pragmatic motives have no space. The salvation of the state lies not in happiness but in the rational community of external freedom. Not because no more blood flows and peace therefore being charitable, is demanded by reason, but because under this condition alone the right dictated by reason becomes real. >Contract Theory/Kant, >Legislation/Kant, >Natural State/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Syntheticity | Chisholm | II 60 Synthetic: Existence/Kant: every existential judgment is synthetic according to Kant. Synthetic judgments a priori/Kant: make conditional existence assertion. (> Analogies of experience) - ChisholmVs. II 61 Synthetic a priori/Kant: E.g. the space is three-dimensional. - RiemannVs: refuted - synthetic a priori/Chisholm: depends on whether there are non-analytic propositions of the form All S are P. - E.g. Chisholm: All squares are form-bearing, all red is colored, nothing red is green. - But not clearly: two forms: a) all humans are mortal, b) all humans are descendants. II 62 Chisholm: form-identical with the analytical propositions - KantVsChisholm: form differs. II 72 Synthetic a priori/Chisholm/Sauer: Problem: no synthetic a priori if the definition of necessity is: p expresses a contradictory proposition which can be negated - false solution: to chose necessity as mere inclusion (understanding a includes understanding b), then contradiction: it would be possible that there is no or one possible worlds , so that non-p. - reason: E.g. "p" expresses an inclusion, then non-p is contradictory. II 73 Synthetic a priori/Chisholm/Sauer: E.g. (S) All red is colored: is not a logical truth because there are no red objects in every possible world (poss.w.). - analytic/Sauer: Problem: the same happens with the analysis: from the fact that (A) "all squares are rectangles" is analytic, would follow that this is true in every possible world, but not from the simple sentence "All squares are rectangles". - Problems: see below. II 74 If "all squares are rectangular" is true, then the property of the square exists. II 76 The doctrine of the synthetic a priori in Kant is VsEmpiricism. The doctrine of the analytic is VsRationalism: to reach the knowledge of objects by means of consistent thinking. - ((s) No existence follows from this.) Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Terminology | Kant | I 33 Supersensible/Supernatural/Kant: E.g. the moral law. I 38 The Unconditional/Kant: even unconditional condition ("Condition totality"). The system of all possibilities. Justification of a sentence by subsumption of something slightly below rules. I 39 1. The unconditioned of the categorical condition unit of presentation relation belongs to the representational subject. 2. The unconditioned of the hypothetical condition unit of presentation relation relates to the objects of perception. 3. The unconditioned of the disjunctive synthesis applies to objects of thought. I 41 Soul/Kant: the soul idea belongs to the idea of death. With it, the ego distances itself from its body - wrong: one cannot conclude from the I to the soul. - The logically underlying (subject) is made into a being-like (ontologically) underlying (substance). I 42 Pure apperception/Kant: actually comes only to God. - Direct, intellectual intuition. - Intelligible objects (for example, "I") - through mere apperception - human: in actions and internal determinations, which the human does not perceive through the senses. I 98 Apperception/KantVsHume: unity of apperception: I am making all ideas aware as my ideas. - So I stay in the unity of consciousness which can accompany all my ideas. - In addition, I have to keep in mind, how I add an idea to the other! Otherwise I will scatter myself. I 129/130 The Sublime/Kant: the sublime is moral beauty - it resembles moral obligation, that it initially inhibits the life forces and accumulates, in order to let them pour even stronger in a kind of emotion and to lead to moral action. - But I should exceed the nature morally, so it is about my superiority to nature. - Sublime/Burke: "in the sublime we encounter the harbingers of this king of the horrors of death". --- Adorno XII 177 Pure/Kant/Adorno: 1. all that is pure in the subject, is that which is thought of without admixture of empirical, without admixture of a sensual. 2. The pure will is that which is pure in the sense of the principle of reason, without getting dependent on any being which is itself not rationally understandingly. --- Adorno XIII 66 Constitution/Idealism/Kant/Adorno: the concept of constitution (...) is characterized in Kant by the fact that this mind or consciousness is not conceived as a part of the world, as a piece of existence, like every other existence. They should differ as a constituent from everything else. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Thing in itself | Kant | I 17 In itself/Kant: question: what is in itself, namely beyond me or without me, but that I behold myself as in itself? - So: what on me is in itself? --- Strawson V 33/34 Thing in itself/Kant/StrawsonVsKant: that things in themselves should not be in space and time, is making the whole doctrine incomprehensible. V 95 Thing in itself/Kant: must not meet the conditions of subjectivity itself - it has to meet only the appearance . Then the knowledge of things could be owed to more than a pre-stabilized harmony. - (KantVsLeibniz). >Subjectivity/Kant, >Reality/Leibniz, >Objects/Leibniz. V 168 Thing in itself/idealism/Kant: if we assume that things exist independently of our perceptions, then they must also exist independently of us (> Realism/Kant). - But Kant does not accept this! Kant: they exist only through our minds and sensuality. --- Adorno XIII 40 Thing in itself/VsKant/Adorno: it has been argued against Kant that if the things in themselves, and with this the causes of the phenomena, are wholly unknown, how can we then speak of them at all, and know about them. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Thinking | Danto | I 179 KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. >I think/Kant. It would completely miss the structure of thinking to say that the various assumptions are purely coincidentally associated in his mind. Cf. >Apperception, >Apprehension, >Thinking, >Subject, >I, Ego, Self. I 307 Pavlov: associations are only external, ideas are not necessarily comboined. >Association, >Ideas, >Representation. Consequently, there are the logical links in addition to what can be causally associated with it. >Logical connectives, >Causal relation. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Thinking | Kant | Danto V 2 KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. >cogito, >I think/Kant. --- Strawson V 61 Subject/thinking/Kant: there is a "way of thinking of an object in general" - Strawson:> Objectivity/Strawson, Objectivity/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Transcendentals | Kant | I 81f Transcendental Knowledge/Kant: ("knowledge a priori") conditions of possibility of knowledge - can be guaranteed only by mathematization of the given of intuitions. - Criterion for science. --- Strawson V 19ff Transcendental Analytics/Kant: 1. Experience: order 2. unit in the same order as required for the awareness (Thesis of the unity of consciousness) 3. experience of objects is distinguishable of experience of what about the case is, so that judgments are also possibly independent of the subjective experience (objectivity thesis) 4. objects are substantially spatially 5. a uniform spatiotemporal system is necessary 6. Physical objects: need certain principles of perseverance and causality (theses of analogies). >Experience/Kant, >Analogies/Kant, >Principles/Kant. V 74 f Transcendental Deduction/Kant/Strawson: premise: experience includes a manifold that is suitable for being united somehow in uniform judgments. >Judgment/Kant. V 75 StrawsonVs: the "pure" terms have no necessary application on the experience. V 134 Transcendental Ideas/Kant: 1. absolute unity of the subject, 2. the conditions of phenomena, 3. the conditions of objects. --- Stroud I 153 Transcendental/Kant/Stroud: transcendental are the things independent of us, albeit every sense impression is dependent on us. - Difference: transcendent: claims an otherworldly realm of experience - transcendental/Kant: is a theory, if it has to do with the general conditions of our knowledge of things independent of experience. - This is a condition of empirical knowledge at all. - These conditions cannot be known empirically themselves - (but a priori). - Experience/Kant: shows that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be different. --- Stroud I 162 Def transcendental realism/Kant: sees the external things as something seperated from the senses - KantVs: that leads to empirical idealism. Problem: we are aware of our representations, but do not know whether they correspond with something that exists. >Thing in itself/Kant. --- Adorno XIII 13 Transcendental/Kant/Adorno: in Kant, the concept of the transcendental is, in the first place, nothing other than the epitome of all the investigations which refer to synthetic judgments a priori. >Synthetic judgments a priori. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Understanding | McDowell | I 98f Understanding/McDowell: the distinction between two types of intelligibility distinguishes two kinds of terms, but not of objects. I 123 Natural laws/Nature/Understanding/Hume: Nature cannot be understood in terms of meaning, nor in terms of a law. >Nature/Hume. Natural laws/Nature/Understanding/KantVsHume: regains the comprehensibility of the natural laws, but not the comprehensibility of the meaning. >Nature/Kant, >Laws of nature/Kant, >Understanding/Kant. Nature is the domain of natural laws, and therefore without any meaning. The empirical world, however, is not outside the concepts. I 136 Natural laws/meaning: mandatory rules do not have to be known. Understanding/McDowell: must also play a role where it is a matter of grasping mere events without all meaning. Understanding/comprehensibility/modernity/today/McDowell: the field of comprehensibility is the realm of natural laws - albeit without meaning. We can, however, refuse to equate this area of comprehensibility with nature, and even more so with what is real. >Nature/McDowell. I 140 Experience/Content/Understanding/McDowell: Empirical content is only understandable in a context that allows us to make the direct rational control of the mind through the world itself insightful. >Experience/McDowell. It is impossible for a fact to exert an impression on a person that perceives. However, the image of openness to the world brings the idea of direct access to the facts. Only that we cannot be certain in any case that it is not a deception. --- II 55 Understanding/McDowell: understanding your own utterances: ability to know what a theoretical description of this ability would do - knowing truths conditions - not truth! - Even in sentences which are not decidable by means of evidence - but this does not mean that the truth condition for each sentence either exists or does not exist, even if we cannot say that it exists or does not exist. >Truth condition. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Utilitarianism | Kant | Moral/Kant/KantVsUtilitarianism: Kant considers it futile to base our moral judgments on speculation about the possible benefits - anyone who is seriously acting wants success - so he can not refuse responsibility for failure - which is why there is, for Kant, no contradiction between that of his newly established ethics of conviction and the later ethics of responsibility claimed by the utilitarianism.(1) >Morals/Kant, >Ethics/Kant. 1. Volker Gerhard. Die ZEIT 27.11.03 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Values | Weber | Habermas IV 430 Values/Weber/Habermas: Weber takes a sceptical view of values according to which a moral consciousness guided by principles can neither be philosophically explained nor socially stabilized without being embedded in a religious world view. >Values, >Norms, >Morals, >Ethics, >Religion. HabermasVsWeber/RawlsVsWeber/KantVsWeber/Habermas: this view cannot be maintained in view of the cognitivistic approaches from Kant to Rawls. >I. Kant, >J. Rawls. It is also empirically refuted by the spread of a humanistically enlightened consciousness since the days of the Enlightenment. >Enlightenment. ParsonsVsWeber/Habermas: Parsons secularization theory is more plausible. >Secularization/Parsons. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| World/Thinking | Brandom | Rorty VI 188 Rorty: Brandom: thought and speech give us a perspective access to a non-perspective world. (Goes beyond >Nietzsche, >Goodman, >Dewey). --- Brandom I 474 World/Thinking/Language/Fact/Brandom: words form a separate and largely independent realm within our world. 1) nonverbal facts could be the same, even if the verbal facts about the world were different. 2) signs could be the same, even if the non-verbal facts were quite different. Solution: our discursive practices are not so isolated from the world. - Important argument: the nonverbal facts may be the same, although our discursive practices were different, but not vice versa! Because the practices are not things like sounds or words that could be specified independent from the objects. --- II 63 Reality/Thought/World/Brandom: the difference is expressed in our use of words such from or about. >Use. --- Martin Seel Die ZEIT April 2001 World/Brandom: paragon of the facts, regardless of whether they are detected. There was a world without concepts, but there was never a world without facts - KantVsBrandom/Seel: Vs inference from thinking to being - although we cannot think it other than conceptually, it does not need to be constituted conceptually. >Facts. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atomism | Kant Vs Atomism | Esfeld I 224 Atom/Democritus: Introduces the ontology of atoms in empty space, so the room is not one of the things that exist in it: I 225 The empty space is non-being. The Being, the atoms can exist but only on the basis of the space, namely in the space. EsfeldVsDemokrit: Comes to the paradoxical conclusion that the non-existence just exist as well as the Being. KantVsAtomisten: The empty space of the atomists is an absurdity, something that is there, without there being anything real. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Berkeley, G. | Kant Vs Berkeley, G. | Putnam I 167 Kant/Putnam: Was basically the first to propose the separation of "internal" and "external" conception of truth. I 167/168 KantVsBerkeley: Totally unacceptable - "a scandal". Putnam: Kant derives from this the abolition of "similarity theory". BerkeleyVsLocke: Discarded both the primary and secondary qualities and only admitted what Locke would have called "simple" qualities of sensation. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Brandom, R. | Kant Vs Brandom, R. | Thinking/World/Kant: Warns against the conclusion from thinking on the being! (KantVsBrandom). That we cannot think differently of the conceptual world, does not mean that it would be conceptually ordered in itself. The Earth has always been round, but what always existed was not the fact but the earth with its round shape. Martin Seel in Die Zeit April 01. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Carnap, R. | Kant Vs Carnap, R. | Stroud I 173 Transcendental idealism/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: would say that he could not be wrong, because it is necessary in order to clarify any other meaningful questions empirically. CarnapVsKant: According to the verification principle this is but a "pseudo-theory", which cannot explain or guarantee anything. Meaning/Sense/CarnapVsKant: In order to make sense, we need to know the truth value of the propositions which contain the corresponding expressions. weaker: We must be able to give a reason why it is better to believe the truth of something then his falsehood. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Kant Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Chisholm II 62 Synthetically a priori/Chisholm: E.g. Everything square has a shape Everything red is coloured Nothing red is green the same shape as the analytical propositions. KantVsChisholm: different in form!. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Correspondence Theory | Putnam Vs Correspondence Theory | Field IV 409 Qualities/Primary/Secondary/KantVsLocke/Putnam/Field: (Putnam, V.W u G, p. 60 64): Thesis: Kant extended what Locke said about secondary qualities (SekQ) to primary qualities (primQ). E.g. Locke: Secondary qualities do not resemble our ideas directly. Field: many other authors have extended that also to primary qualities. (namely so, because the image theory is now dead). primary qualities: E.g. length, size, shape secondary qualities: E.g. color. IV 410 Putnam/Field: Putnam has much more in mind, however: he means that properties such as color are nothing else but the power to affect us in a certain way. The extension to primary qualities is then that even length, size, charge and mass are nothing but powers to affect us. Expansion of Locke/EwLPutnam/Field: Putnam goes even further in expanding the position of Locke: 1) he does not only want to apply it to properties of external objects, but also to properties of sensations. Vs: that might seem inconsistent: how can a property of sensations just be a force that evokes sensations? ((s) Circular). But that is not what Putnam means. He means powers that affect us. And that is coherent. 2) This position implies the assumption of a Noumenon ((Def Noumenon/Field: an object that can have no other properties but affecting an observer) for every phenomenal object. Phenomenon/Phenomenal Object/Putnam/Field: should read: object in our representation of the world. Problem: if electrons do not exist in the world (as Noumena), then they do not exist at all. The existence of our representation does not guarantee the existence of "phenomenal" electrons. EwL/Putnam: abandons this assumption altogether by not attributing the power to affect us to a "noumenon", e.g. that underlies a brown chair, but he attributes this power directly to the world. PutnamVsCorrespondence: But even if the world now has such powers, there need be no one to one correspondence between objects in the world (noumena) and objects in our representation (phenomena). Def phenomenon: object in our representation Def Noumenon: what is responsible in the world for that we experience the phenomenon. EwL/Field: we want to call this the "expanded Lockean view". Putnam offers it in two respects 1) as an interpretation of Kant 2) as the actual view of internal realism. (Field: = internalism). PutnamVsCorrespondence Theory: comes up to a rejection of the correspondence theory. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | Kant Vs Davidson, D. | McDowell I 124 Spontaneity/Davidson: characterized what effectively are the operations of the sentient nature, but they are not characterized as such. McDowellVsDavidson: dilemma: either: these operations are still in rational relations, or we must assume that they have no epistemological significance. Kant maintains that this choice is unacceptable. Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must also restructure the operations of our sensibility as such. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Descartes, R. | Brandom Vs Descartes, R. | Brandom I 40 BrandomVsDescartes: failed to show what it means to grasp or understand such contents as representations. He does not explain what makes a rabbit thought to a thought, which is about rabbits or anything at all. He also does not explain what it means that someone understands a thought as a thought. I 131 BrandomVsDescartes: has burdened the tradition of representation: the privileging of knowledge and therefore the successful representation against the understanding and the intended representation. For Descartes representational intention is "as if about" intrinsic and characteristic property of thoughts. He does not explain the importance of understanding. II 13 Kant and Descartes: mind primary, secondary language - BrandomVsKant and BrandomVsDescartes. II 17 BrandomVsDescartes: expression rather than representation (Sellars ditto). II 69 Content / representation / BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer. II 213 Mind / Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules. KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Descartes, R. | Carnap Vs Descartes, R. | VI 226 Ego/Carnap: is a class of elementary experiences. No bundle, because classes do not consist of their elements! CarnapVsDescartes: the existence of the ego is not a primordial fact of the given. From "cogito" does not follow "sum". Carnap: the ego does not belong to expression of the fundamental experience. But the "this experience". Thinking/RussellVsDescartes: "it thinks". (> Lichtenberg). ("Mind", p.18). Stroud I 196 KantVsDescartes/CarnapVsDescartes. Frame/Reference system/Carnap/Stroud: for Carnap there is no point of view from which one can judge a frame as adequate or inadequate. That would be an "external" question. Kant/Stroud: Kant's parallel to this is transcendental idealism: if things were independent of us, skepticism would be inevitable. Problem: the transcendental idealism should not be crossed with the verification principle. Is Carnap's own positive theory better off here? That is a question of its status. It pursues the same goal as Kant: to explain the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, but without going beyond the limits of comprehensibility. General/special/internal/external/generalization/Stroud: it would be necessary to explain how the general sceptical conclusion can be meaningless, even if the particular everyday empirical assertions are meaningful. This cannot simply be because one is general and the other particular. Descartes/Stroud: the particular is representative in its argument and can therefore be generalized. The uncertainty in the individual case is representative of all our knowledge. This is the strength of the argument. VerificationismVsGeneralization: he considers this generalization suspicious. CarnapVsSkepticism/CarnapVsDescartes: statements that make sense within a reference system cannot be applied to the reference system itself. Stroud: but this is the problem inside/outside and not a question of generality or special. StroudVsCarnap: so he has to show that movement from the inside out is impossible and not the generalization. But he needed an explanation why the traditional view of the relation between "internal" and "external" questions is wrong if he wants to avoid skepticism. ((s) Why Question). Special/VerificationismVsDescartes: Thesis: the single sentence of Descartes is meaningless from the beginning. (Because unverifiable). (StroudVsVs). I 207 StroudVsVerificationism: he must now show why this verdict does not apply to all individual (special) sentences of everyday life. Verificationism would otherwise have to assume that our whole language (everyday language) is meaningless! (Because it is not verifiable according to skeptical criteria). For example "I don't know if explanation is caused by sitting in a draught" or "The aircraft spotter doesn't know if the aircraft is an F" would be damned as senseless! If verificationism condemns certain sentences as meaningless only if they are uttered, for example, by Descartes or another skeptic, he would have to show that there is a deviant use on such occasions. Otherwise he could not even indicate what VsDescartes is supposed to have gone wrong with his utterance. ((s) utterance here = action, not sentence, which should be meaningless, neither true nor false). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Descartes, R. | Kant Vs Descartes, R. | Danto I 179 KantVsDescartes: The cogito, that "I think" is not an indubitable proposition, but something that accompanies every sentence you claim. KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanied thinking. Kant I 73 Existence/cogito/Kant: feeling of existence has no concept. Nothing can be proven here. VsDescartes: "I think, therefore I am," error: to infer from the concept to the existence of a thing. Field I 80 KantVsOntological proof of God’s existence/KantVsDescartes: (KdrV, B622,3 4): You can never assert the categorical (non-conditional) existence of something. Justification: Contradictions usually originate from the fact that one or more objects are postulated, and then assumptions that are mutually inconsistent: e.g. a triangle and it being quadrilateral. But there is no contradiction to deny the existence of a triangle! For we have not made any conflicting assumptions. ((s) by only assuming a triangle.) Kant: The same applies to the notion of an "absolutely necessary being": if we deny its existence, we deny it with all its predicates, but then no contradiction can arise. Nothing can be negated with all predicates and yet leave a contradiction. (s) So there is no necessary existence. Field: it can not be contradictory to deny the existence of numbers, because they have no mysterious force to leave a contradiction if they are not there. (s) Has the triangularity a mysterious force if there is no triangle? No, but that is a predicate without a carrier and not comparable here). Stegmüller IV 362 Proof of God’s existence / Kant Descartes: Four points (CPR A 594 p): 1. "If I pick up the predicate in an identical judgment and keep the subject, the result is a contradiction." I lift both together, there is no contradiction. E.g. I cannot lift the omnipotence if God is the same as omnipotence. But if I say God is not, neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates are given. IV 363 StegmüllerVsKant: One can ask why Kant is so sure that no negative existential proposition is self-contradictory and why therefore no existence statement of the form "there is an x" can be an analysis. 2. Kant (A 597): "You have already committed a contradiction when you brought into the concept of a thing, of which you only wanted to think its possibility,the notion of its existence". MackieVsKant: This is unfair! Kant’s argument is based on the idea that Descartes has an "an open mind" concerning the existence of God or not, hence something is read into the concept of existence. But Descartes does not pretend that he is open-minded regarding the response, he is rather completely sure regarding the existence. But then he does not postulate what needs to be proofed as proofed. 3. Kant (A 598): Analytic/Synthetic distinction: there can be no analytical statements about existence. (However, he does not justify this claim). IV 364 VsKant: Analytical judgments on existence are in arithmetic, e.g. there is a prime number between 10 to 20 Frege: All arithmetic truths are analytic. 4. Kant: The logic of existence statements reflect an incorrect grammar: the auxiliary verb "be" is ambiguous here when it is used as a means of predication and existence. (> Copula). MackieVsKant: Kant stops halfway: If to "exist" is not a predicate, then what is it? Existential quantifier: exists only since Frege. IV 365 MackieVsDescartes: That is a deadlier argument: the existential quantifier cannot be an attribute and cannot express perfection, which may possess a thing or not. E.g. therefore the Revenus resident cannot be refuted, which has no necessary perfection but only an artificial perfection. There is no distinction between natural and artificial perfection in the existential quantifier, there is now no distinction between natural and artificial perfection. Then Descartes’ argument about the distinction of natural/artificial, with God the only exception of a being no longer with natural perfection, is not valid anymore. DescartesVsFrege: his only rebuttal would be if he could prove that a "this tree" or "I" or "God exists" ((s) so (ix) Fx (iota operator, indicator statement) exists MackieVsDescartes / Stegmüller.: In any case, he has not done this. Strawson V 22 "Refutation of idealism"/ Kant Descartes: So that self-consciousness is possible, it must be at least possible to distinguish between consequences of our experiences on the one hand, and consequences of the objects of our experience which they show independently. For that, the items must be so designed that they exist in a stable framework. The necessary differences of temporal relations must be taken within the experience. We must therefore have a direct and non-deductive awareness of objects in space. "The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time the non-deductive consciousness of the existence of other things beside me." Terms / Kant: not any amount of terms is sufficient for us, there must be concepts of persistent and re-identified objects among them. V 23 StrawsonVsKant: In the analogies, he always tries to squeeze more out of the arguments than there actually is. Self-awareness/Consciousness/Kant/Strawson: The distinctions must be created in the concepts themselves, because there is no such thing as a pure perception of the reference system! V 103 KantVsDescartes: self-awareness is only possible through the perception of external objects. Substance, cause and community (or reciprocal interaction is a necessary condition for objective experience. And these concepts become only meaningful regarding external objects. Strawson: Kant relies here very little on his theories from the transcendental aesthetic as premises for its arguments in the analysis. Strawson V 140 Def Soul/Descartes/Strawson: All of us know by the mere fact of conscious awareness that he exists as a (Cartesian), thinking substance, e.g. that it is capable as an intangible, lasting, not composite individual subject of ideas and experiences as well as an existence in complete independence of a body or of matter. KantVsDescartes: Which infringes the principle of sense: there is no empirical application criteria for this claim. KantVsDescartes, KantVs rational psychology: Analysis of the origins of appearance: Mix-up of the unity of experiences and the experience of unity. V 143 KantVsDescartes: After all, it is the unity of consciousness, which we, if the semblance has us under control, take erroneously for awareness of a unified subject. V 145 Def rational psychology/(Descartes): Asserts that every person has immediate safety regarding the existence of his soul as an immaterial substance. KantVsDescartes: However,the only criteria for it would be "the same man, the same soul". Deathblow for rational psychology. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Determinism | Kant Vs Determinism | Dummett I 149 KantVsDeterminism: action not by rules but by notions of rules - contrary to that: chess: move has its meaning not because of the knowledge of rules, but from the rules themselves. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Empiricism | Hume Vs Empiricism | II 196 Empiricism/KantVsEmpiricism/LockeVsEmpiricism/HumeVsEmpiricism/Black: all three have recognized that exclusive reference to experience was bound to limit the possibility of known answers! Hume: sees the danger and wrote that libraries might burn for this later. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Fichte, J.G. | Kant Vs Fichte, J.G. | Frank I 239f KantVsFichte: Kant seems to have allowed loose forms of consciousness .. + ... a) On the one hand, Fichtean position: (weaker conclusion): the categories relate to items in, we thought of in experience, which are subordinated to self-awareness(s.c.). Castaneda: b) but he needs a stronger conclusion: consciousness of objects includes the application of the categories, whether it is a part of a s.c. or not. But for this he must pass from "I think that all my ideas must be able to accompany" to "... accompany". Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Hume, D. | Kant Vs Hume, D. | Kant I 27 KantVsHume: Causality: Limited to the range of experience. It does not apply to the domain of things themselves. Kant I 98 Hume: Imagination compounds are principally created by association. KantVsHume: Unity of apperception. I’m being conscious that all ideas are my ideas. Therefore, I stick to the unity of consciousness that accompany all my ideas. In addition, I need to bear in mind how I am adding an idea to another one, otherwise I will scatter myself. McDowell I 123 McDowell: Laws of nature/natural/understanding/KantVsHume: wins the intelligibility of natural laws again, but not the clarity of meaning. Nature is the realm of natural laws, and therefore of no importance. However, the empirical world is not outside the terms. Hume I 37 Moral/action/ethics/Hume: A in this way (avoiding wrong) created obligation is artificial however, contrary to the natural obligation arising from the natural interest as the driving force of every action. Moral obligation. It’s in my best interest to let the other have his property, provided that the other acts in the same vein towards me. (KantVsHume:> Categorical imperative). Hume I 122 KantVsHume: The latter erroneously presented mathematics as a system of analytic judgments. DeleuzeVsKant. Relation / HumeVsKant: Every relationship is external in its terms: the equality is not a property of the characters themselves, but only comes through comparison. Hume I 133 Associations / KantVsHume: Although it is merely an empirical law, according to which ideas, which often followed each other, thereby produce a link. This law of reproduction requires that the appearances themselves are indeed subjected to such a rule. Because without this our empirical imagination would never get to do something it is able to, so would lay like dead unknown wealth within us. If a word would be applied one time to this thing, another time to another one, no empirical synthesis of reproduction could happen. So there must be something that makes even this reproduction of phenomenons possible because it is the fact that it is the a priori reason of a necessary synthetic unity of itself. I 138 If we can now show that even our a priori purest intuitions do not provide knowledge, except if they contain such a connection that makes a continuous synthesis possible, this synthesis of imagination is also established on a priori principles prior to all experience. KantVsHume: His dualism forces him to understand the relationship between what is given and the subject as a match of the subject with nature. I 139 But if the given would not align itself and a priori, in accordance with those same principles, which the link of ideas also aligns itself, the subject would only notice this concordance by chance. Therefore, it must be reversed: The given is to refer to the subject, as a concordance of given and subject. Why? Because what is given is not a thing in itself, but an overall context of phenomena that can be only represented by an a priori synthesis. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Hume, D. | Strawson Vs Hume, D. | IV 157 Causality/StrawsonVsHume: he overlooks the very obvious fact that objects exert physical forces. (>Dennett: and they are observable). IV 160 Theory/Strawson: I do not want to draw a too sharp line between observation and theory. IV 162 Causality/Hume/Strawson: we can actually observe many actions and reactions without knowing what effects were actually working. IV 163 Regularity/causality/regularity/StrawsonVsHume: Regularity (happening according to rules) is time neutral. The regularity does not prohibit reversing the order. IV 165 KantVsHume: We learn a lot about rule-like sequences in the world by observing, but only because we already have the concept of causality. IV 166 Causality/Strawson: to understand it we are consciously or unconsciously using the model of our human behavior and experience, what forces we must exert ourselves and to what forces we are exposed to. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Hume, D. | Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. | Hacking I 68 Causality/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: For example we can see that the siren of Manchester howls every day at the same time, whereupon the workers of Leeds let the work rest for one hour. But no causation. Hacking I 70 CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are characteristics of the procedures with which we establish theories. (>Putnam). Hume I 131 Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to conceptions. (KantVs). VsHume: Critics accuse him of having "atomized" the given. Theory/DeleuzeVsVs: with this one believes to have pilloried a whole system. As if it were a quirk of Hume. What a philosopher says is presented as if it were done or wanted by him. I 132 What do you think you can explain? A theory must be understood from its conceptual basis. A philosophical theory is an unfolded question. Question and critique of the question are one. I 133 It is not about knowing whether things are one way or the other, but whether the question is a good question or not. Apron I 238 Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness or graduality of the broad term). Problem: not all laws unlimited in space-time are legal in the narrower sense. Universal, but not physically necessary: Example: "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometre". Universality: is therefore not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for lawfulness. For example, the universal statement "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if it is replaced by its contraposition: For example "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965, 341). Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality is a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. SchurzVs: that is wrong. Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universality is a necessary condition for lawfulness. ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than the claim that it is necessary.) BhaskarVsWeak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell Condition/lawlikeness: Natural laws or nomological predicates must not contain an analytical reference to certain individuals or spacetime points. This is much stronger than the universality condition. (stronger/weaker). Example "All emeralds are grue": is universal in space-time, but does not meet the Maxwell condition. ((s) Because observed emeralds are concrete individuals?). I 239 Natural Law/Law of Nature/Armstrong: are relations of implication between universals. Hence no reference to individuals. (1983) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): it represents a physical principle of symmetry: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry Principles/Principle/Principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! Maxwell Condition/Schurz: is too weak for lawlikeness: Example "No lump of gold..." also this universal statement fulfills them. Stegmüller IV 243 StegmüllerVsHume: usually proceeds unsystematically and mixes contingent properties of the world with random properties of humans. Ethics/Morality/Hume: 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. Moral/Ethics/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: wants to build all morality on human sympathy, altruism and charity. (>Positions). HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionary ideal. Ethics/Moral/Hume: 3. Human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. The human is vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Hume, D. | Vollmer Vs Hume, D. | I 103 Causality/VollmerVsHume: not a layperson, but also not a scientist feels comfortable with Hume's observation. Causality/Hume: attributes causality to an instinct that we have in common with animals. Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the law of causality does not seem to fail. I 105 Causality/Regularity/VsHume: For example, although day and night follow each other regularly, we do not say that day is the cause for night. VollmerVsHume: has no convincing argument for it! Vollmer: no energy transfer from day to night, so one cannot be the cause of the other! I 106 Causality/Energy transfer/VollmerVsHume: the frequency is not decisive, how else could we explain the expansion of the universe (which by definition is unique) by the Big Bang? Energy conservation is relevant for our ontological interpretation of causality, not frequency. It is essential for the possibility of an effective energy transfer. I 107 However, in principle there could also be causal processes in which only half of the released energy is transferred, while the other half disappears in violation of the conservation law! Conversely, the "cause" does not need to provide the total energy for the effect. (butterfly effect). Vollmer: small cause - big effect? - Yes, but without a minimum of energy transfer there is no effect, no causality. II 47 Natural Law/Law/General Sentence/Vollmer: three classes of true, general sentences: 1. Randomly true - for example all balls in this box are red 2. Lawfully true without energy transfer: E.g. duration of oscillation = 2π √ (pendulum length multiplied by acceleration due to gravity). 3. Causal laws (with energy transfer) E.g. heating leads to expansion This does not imply that this causal "necessity" gives causal assertions any unassailable status. Here, too, the hypothetical character of all our knowledge remains. Causality/VollmerVsHume: nevertheless, causal assertions say more than mere subsequent assertions: their empirical content is greater. This, of course, makes them easier to refute. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Idealism | Kant Vs Idealism | Stroud I 130 Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world, which is independent from us, is unknowable. Or that the latter is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world. Stroud I 142 Knowledge/KantVsMoore: the knowledge of everyday life must be shown "well-earned". But this is a philosophical task, not e.g. the problem if we are to believe a witness in court or the scientist. "Scandal"/Kant/Stroud: does not imply that the scientist or the person in daily life accepts the world only because of faith. Life/daily life/knowledge/Kant: Here knowledge does not have to be proved. It is complete and unproblematic. Knowledge/understanding/KantVsIdealism: but in order to understand our knowledge, the idealism must be rejected. Knowledge/How-is it-possible-question/Kant: if we think, "How’s that possible?", we are quickly turning to idealism. I 143 KantVsScepticism: he, however, gets into a predicament if he is needs to generally explain how our knowledge of the world is possible. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kant | Bubner Vs Kant | I 80 Kant: defended himself against contemporary transcendental philosophy with the essay "Von einem neuerdings erhobenenen vornehmenen Ton in der Philosophie" ((1796) KantVsJacobi). Kant invents a position for his polemics that deals "enthusiastically instead of critically" with philosophy. He attributes this enthusiasm to Plato. Opposite position: attributed to Aristotle. BubnerVsKant: both positions cannot be historically proven. Kant had very little knowledge of antiquity. I 88 KantVsPlato: the mathematician Plato is not a good metaphysicist. An unfathomable confusion of view and concept. "Intellectual view" erroneously brings together immediacy and discursivity. There was no explanation of how the two came together. "Undemocratic esotericism" is only understandable for members of a "club" > connection to the contemporary discussion about the French Revolution. Violates Rousseau's equality demands. I 89/90 BubnerVsKant: the accusation of confusion can only be upheld if one accepts the Kantian premises. In reality Plato's text is different: the Phaidon praises the "flight into the Logos" as a way out of the immediateism of the pre-Socratics, the "second best journey" renounces the unbroken gaze and seeks the mirror of things in the speeches. The synthetic construction of logic is the access to the world to which we must confine ourselves. Plato is by no means inferior to Kant in his contempt of the "noble tone". I 108 Synthesis/Kant: while the other syntheses find something else, which leads them by their doing to a unity ((s)so nevertheless??) which is again distinguished from it, the highest Synthesis has to do only with itself. Synthesis/VsKant: his followers have uncovered the weakness that there is no evidence for the highest point of this chain of thought. I/Fichte: action of the settling I I/Hegel: vitality of the mind in constant self-mediation. (As an absolute principle). I 109 "Intellectual View"/Bubner: the idea introduced by Kant's successors VsKant to bring together immediacy and reflexivity. BubnerVs: hermaphroditic. The anonymous author of the "Eldest System Program" follows this model. They demand from the philosopher the aesthetic talent that breaks down the barrier to art production. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Kant | Carnap Vs Kant | Newen I 112 CarnapVsKant: no synthetic judgements are a priori possible. Stroud I 171 Def Pseudo-Question/CarnapVsMetaphysics/CarnapVsKant/Stroud: are questions that cannot be answered because there is no possible sensory experience that decides the truth or falsity of the sentences in which certain expressions occur. ((s) e.g. metaphysical or transcendental expressions). Carnap: For example, two geographers want to find out whether a certain mountain in Africa is real or just a legend. I 172 a) If they find a mountain there that more or less corresponds to what was assumed, they can say that it is real, that it exists. Reality/Carnap: thus, they use an empirical, non-metaphysical concept of reality. (Carnap, Chicago 1958, 207). b) Assuming they were not only scientists, but also philosophers: one of them calls himself "2Realist", the other "Idealist": "Realist"/Carnap: will say that the mountain not only has the qualities (characteristics) that one has discovered in it, but it is also real, i.e. independent of our perception. "Idealist"/Carnap: denies that the mountain is independent of our perception. I.e. it is not real in the sense of the realist. Sciences/Empiricism/Carnap: here this divergence between the two cannot arise at all. (333f) But that does not mean that both theses are wrong. I 173 Transcendental idealism/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: would say that it could not be wrong because it is necessary to empirically clarify all other meaningful questions. CarnapVsKant: according to the verification principle, however, this is a "pseudo-theory" that cannot explain or guarantee anything. Sense/Sensible/CarnapVsKant: for something to be sensible, we need to know the truth value (WW) of the sentences that contain the corresponding expressions. Weaker: we must be able to give a reason why it is better to believe the truth of something than its falsity. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kant | Descartes Vs Kant | Stroud I 131 World/reality/Kant: the outer things we know of must have a "reality" that does not allow them to be opened up inferentially (A 371). Direct Perception/= Consciousness/Kant/Stroud: direct consciousness of things (of this kind) is then a sufficient proof of their reality! Stroud: thus we are in the everyday situation where the "external perception" (Kant) provides the immediate proof of something real in space. (A 375). DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is not in a position to do so. Stroud: it is not about which of the two gives the correct description of the situation. KantVsDescartes: his description cannot be correct. But he does not simply give a competing alternative. Rather, he defines conditions for access to knowledge. >Knowledge/Kant. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kant | Frege Vs Kant | I 30 HankelVsKant: the assumption of an infinite number of irrefutable original truths is inappropriate and paradoxical. (Frege pro Hankel) Axioms/FregeVsKant: should be immediately obvious. E.g. is it obvious that 135 664 + 37 863 = 173 527? And that is precisely what Kant cites for their synthetic nature! I 30 Frege: much more speaks against their unprovability. How should they be viewed other than by evidence, since they are not immediately obvious. I 41 Numbers/FregeVsKant: Kant wants to use the view of fingers and points, but that is precisely what is not possible here! A distinction between small and large numbers should not be necessary! FregeVsKant: "pure view" does not help! The things that are called views. Quantities, lengths, surface areas, volumes, angles, curves, masses, speeds I 42 Forces, light levels, currents, etc. In contrast, I cannot even admit the view of the number 100 000. The sense of the word number in logic is therefore a further advanced than that in the transcendental aesthetic. Numbers/Frege: the relationship with geometry should not be overestimated!. I 43 A geometric point is, considered by itself, is impossible to distinguish from another, individual numbers, on the other hand, are not impossible to distinguish! Each number has its peculiarity. I 120 FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:. I 121 He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts. IV 61 Negation/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. Then you would also have to distinguish affirmative and negative thoughts. This is quite unnecessary in logic. I 119 FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:. I 120 He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Kant: seems to think of adjunctive properties. But E.g. in the case of a continuous function of a really fruitful definition there is certainly a more intimate connection. I 121 The implications of mathematics enrich our knowledge, therefore, they should be called synthetic according to Kant, but they are certainly also analytical! They are included in the definitions as the plant in the seed, not like the beam in the house. Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts. Stepanians I 34 Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. Stepanians I 34 pPure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is not a sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses. Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. I 35 Numbers/KantVsFrege: are not given to us by view. I 36 Numbers/Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: purely logical definitions can be given for all arithmetical concepts. ((s) Therefore, it is a safer knowledge than the geometric one). Def Logicism/Frege/Stepanians: this is the view that was called "logicism". I.e. arithmetic is a part of logic. Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: is not synthetic but analytic. Newen I21 Discovery Context/Justification Context/Newen: the distinction has its roots in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. Def Analytical/Frege: is the justification of a sentence if only general logical laws and definitions are needed in the proof. I 22 Frege/FregeVsKant: all numerical formulas are analytical. Quine X 93 Analytic/FregeVsKant: (1884): the true propositions of arithmetic are all analytic. Quine: the logic that made this possible also contained the set theory. Tugendhat II 12 "Not"/Tugendhat: Error: considering the word "not" as a reflection of the "position". (Kant calls "being" a "position"). FregeVsKant: has shown that the negation always refers to the so-called propositional content and does not stand at the same level with the assertion-moment (position). The traditional opposition of negating and affirming judgments (Kant) is therefore untenable! |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Kant | Leibniz Vs Kant | Frege III 31 Numbers/LeibnizVsKant: Has claimed the provability of the numerical formulas. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4. Assuming that 4 indicates 3 and 1, one can prove it, in a way: Definitions: 1st 1 and 1 are 2, 2nd 2 and 1 are 3 3rd 3 and 1 are 4 Axiom: If a similar number is inserted, the equation remains. Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4 So by axiom: 2 + 2 = 4 Leibniz I 83 Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: Does not take part in the radical philosophy of subject. Like Spinoza prior to him and Hegel after him, he wanted to find a not subjective reason of being which can be expressed in truths of reason [vérités de raison] since Descartes' indispensable reflection on the subject. For this, two principles are sufficient. 1. Principle of contradiction 2. Principle of sufficient reason (can be traced back to the principle of contradiction). Additionally,since the principle of identity is perceived through the sensory perception, we can ascribe reason -which is presupposed in our thought (the logicality of reason)- to the principles of the objects themselves (so their ontic reality). as panlogically as Hegel's system. I 84 In the universe and its parts, logic is existing and embodied like this. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: This is why all relationships between realities - phenomenal as well as metaphysical ones- can be expressed in a logical form. Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: The world does not seem logical because the subject understands it in the logical form of his/her thought; rather, the logical form of thought is imperative because the world shows itself as being logically created. Leibniz: The world, however, does not show itself as world but as an additive series, i.e. an aggregate. I 128 Phenomenon/LeibnizVsKant: Kant's idea that it is separated from the being is not to be applied! Rather, the "mundus intelligibilis" forms the basis for the "mundus sensibilis". The latter is also not a duplication but a "translation". The phenomenal is the substantial itself but with the conditions of the imagination, for which spaciality and temporality are essential. In-itself [Ansich]/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: For Leibniz, its relation is dialectical. It corresponds in turn exactly to the schema of the "Übergreifendes Allgemeines": The in-itself [Ansich] is a category of itself (!), of the in-itself and its opposite, of the appearance. ((s) > „The overarching generality“, >Paradoxes). I 129 The fact that the appearance is always the appearance of a in-itself (which is the sense of the word) is not meant by it. KantVsLeibniz: Because the appearance could then still differ from the object, for which it is its appearance, and as such knowledge of the object would not be possible. (This is Kant's view of the relationship.) LeibnizVsKant: Insists that the appearance is the same as the in-itself which shows itself in the appearance. The world does so in the perception. As such, the world reproduces itself in two ways. 1. as a whole but each time under another perspective 2. the world appears spatially as the disunion of different substances, 3. the world appears temporally as succession of different perceptions. The system of perceptions is "well-founded" ["wohl begründet"] because it actually is the self-restricting activity of the initial force of the in-itself. The difference between the in-itself and appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and the principle of its difference. I 130 This is why the appearance is not unreal in comparison to the in-itself, but a sort of identical form, and as such quite real. Phenomenology/Leibniz: The way in which what needs to be expressed is comprised in the expressed. Everything that is expressed is a phenomenon.It is well-founded because the in-itself, by expressing itself, is the phenomenon. The in-itself is also identical to the phenomenon, and constitutes the latter implicitly [Ansichseiendes]. The phenomenon is not reality's opposite (Vs Kant), but actually its specific being which is currently creating its universal representation. This is why all perceptions in each substance need to correspond to each other. I 133 Motion/Leibniz: Something takes the place of something else. I 134 The "space" [Raum] is everything that encompasses all these places. For this, there is also no need to accept an "absolute reality" of the space. Space/Time/LeibnizVsKant: The epitome of possible relationships, not as forms of intuition, but as real ontological structures of the materially implicit relationships. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Kant | McDowell Vs Kant | I 69 Experience/Kant/McDowell: is for Kant, as I see it, not behind a border that surrounds the sphere of the conceptual. McDowellVsKant: (I 67-69+) the talk of transcendental conditions renders the responsibility of our actions problematic. Although empirically speaking there may be justifications, transcendentally speaking we can only claim excuses! Kant/McDowell: we should not look for psychological phenomenalism in Kant. Strawson dito. McDowellVsKant: his philosophy leads to the disregard of the independence of reality. I 69 Idealism: Kant's followers claimed that one must give up the supernatural to arrive at a consistent idealism. McDowellVsBorder of the conceptual: thesis: Hegel expresses exactly that what I want: "I'm thinking I am free because I am not in an Other. I 109/110 Second Nature/(s): internalized background of norms that have been taken from nature. Second Nature/McDowell: they cannot hover freely above the opportunities that belong to the normal human body. > Education/McDowell. I 111 Rationality/Kant: acting freely in its own sphere. ((S) This is the origin of most problems covered here). McDowell: Thesis: we must reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject and object). McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature. I 122 Reality/Kant: attributes spirit of independence to the empirical world. I 123 McDowellVsKant: thinks that the interests of religion and morality can be protected by recognizing the supernatural. Nature/Kant: equal to the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background. I 126 Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must structure the operations of our sensuality as such. McDowellVsKant: however, for him there remains only the resort to a transcendental realm. I 127 "I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). McDowellVsKant: it is not satisfactory, if the self-consciousness is only the continuity of a face. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Kant | Quine Vs Kant | Danto I 132 QuineVsKant, QuineVsAnalyticity: Kant’s conception of contradiction is quite unclear. It presupposes the notion of analyticity, instead of making it clear. Quine: Def contradiction "P and not-P." But: "Bachelors are no unmarried, adult men" is not formally contradictory! This was not recognized by Kant. Quine IV 407 Analyticity/QuineVsKant: talk of "containment" is a) metaphorical in terms of concepts. It is b) too narrow, because it is tailored to subject-predicate sentences. It is not readily applicable to relations: E.g. "If Hans is the father of Peter, then Peter is not the father of Hans." c) the indication that a proposition is analytic if its negation is contradictory does not help, since "contradictory" is just as much in need of explanation here. Analytical/Kant/Quine: Kant does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context! Quine VII (b) 20 Analyticity/Kant/Quine: derived from Hume's distinction between Relations of ideas and Relations of facts. Leibniz: distinguishing Truths of fact and Rational truths. (Of which we hear that their negation is supposed to be self-contradictory!) VII (b) 20/21 QuineVsKant: two shortcomings: 1) It is limited to statements of the subject-predicate form 2) It appeals to a concept of limitation, which moves on a metaphorical level. Analytic/Quine: but can be reformulated as a true by virtue of the meanings and regardless of the facts. Quine XI 72 Analytic/QuineVsLeibniz/Lauener: the concept of the possible world is itself in need of explanation. QuineVsKant: the self-contradiction we involve ourselves in, according to Kant, when denying analytic sentences is itself in need of explanation. Stroud I 210 Experience/Empirical/Sensation/Sensory/Reality/World/Kant/Stroud: this is what it looked like for Kant: a completely general distinction between what we experience through the senses and truths about the world would exclude us forever from knowledge. Stroud I 211 Stroud: perhaps these fatal consequences only exist within the traditional philosophical conception of the function of the epistemes. (>QuineVsTraditional Epistemology, QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge). Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: would then only apply to the distant position (outside the frame of reference)! But then we could avoid skepticism and maintain the general distinction between the empirically given ((SellarsVs!) and what is true or false about the outside world. All we would have to avoid, would be a "distant position" (outside the frame of reference). Stroud I 214 Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/Stroud: Kant distinguishes philosophy from everything else (>"prima philosophia"). QuineVsKant: there is no a priori knowledge here. Skepticism/Kant/Quine/Stroud: both accept the "Keptian Conditional" or the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If the skeptic was able to ask a meaningful question, the skeptical conclusion (that we know nothing) would be correct. Stroud I 215 Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: it is not clear whether Quine actually answers the skeptical question at all. Knowledge/Quine: asks how we obtain a theory of the world. This looks like a very general problem. Input/Quine: is "lean": E.g. reflections of light, bright/dark contrasts, temperature variations, etc. Output/Quine: in contrast, is extremely rich. This brings us to under-determination empiricism. We get an extremely sophisticated three-dimensional image and a history of the world only through the mediation of the surfaces of the objects and our nerve endings. Reality/World/Knowledge/Quine: the relation between input and output itself is the subject of an investigation, it is itself a natural phenomenon. Stroud I 248 Knowledge/Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: a completely general distinction between a) everything we learn through the senses on one side, and b) what is true or false about the world on the other side would forever exclude us from knowledge. (see above). StroudVsQuine: that is fatal for the project of naturalized epistemology. Because it excludes us from our own knowledge of the world and leaves us no independent reason to accept that any of our projections are true. Stroud I 249 QuineVsKant/QuineVsStroud: precisely this separation (differentiation) is a liberation of science. It shows us that all the information about external things I can get through the senses is limited to two-dimensional optical projections. Stroud: if this is really what "Science tells us" (NNK, 68), then how can the separation (differentiation) have the consequences that I draw from this? Would I not simply contradict scientific facts? StroudVsQuine: No: nothing I say implies that I cannot observe any person in interaction with their environment and isolate some events on its sensory surfaces from everything else. Important argument: we know - and he probably also knows - a lot of things that happen in the world beyond those events. He himself will also know little about the events that take place on his sensory surfaces. Important argument: these events (which do not directly impact his senses) should be considered as part of what causes his belief ((s) and possibly generates knowledge). Surely, without any sensory experience we would come to no belief about the world at all. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kant | Verschiedene Vs Kant | Kanitscheider I 434 KantVsNewton: Infinite unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: unimaginable, but conceptually comprehensible! Kanitscheider I 441 EllisVsKant: (antinomies): the expressions "earlier" and "later" can be related to states before a fixed time t0, without assuming that all these states really existed. Just as one can speak of a temperature of 0 K, even if one knows that this temperature cannot be reached. Kant I 28 VsKant/Causality: Of course, he does not adhere to this himself! His critique of reason is about more than possible experience (namely about metaphysics through freedom and thus about the absolute value of our existence). Here Kant's concept of causality shows itself to be completely unaffected by Hume. - Intelligent Cause. I 47 Mind: has its own causality: "spontaneity of concepts". (VsKant: untouched by Hume). Antinomy of Freedom: VsKant: a bluff: we cannot do it with objects, "it will only be possible with concepts and principles that we accept a priori." I 49 Freedom Antinomy: solution: third cosmological antinomy: theme: the third constitution of the world as a whole: event context. - VsKant: Imposition: the "acting subject", i.e. I, should take myself as an "example" for things! It is not in itself subject to the condition of time. Spontaneous beginning of events. I 53 Freedom/Kant: The freedom of the other would be uncertain. VsKant: A freedom that could be both mine and that of the other cannot be thought of in this way. - VsKant: he misappropriates the problem of identification with the other. (> intersubjectivity, subject/object). I 52 For Kant this was not a problem: for him the rescue was not in the world of appearances. Concept: Predicates only have to be consistent. I 66 SchulteVsKant: this only applies to objects for which it can always be decided, not to chaotic diversity. I 67 Predicate/Kant: Kant simply omits the negative predicates. I 68 I 69 MarxVsKant: Dissertation from 1841: Kant's reference to the worthlessness of imaginary thalers: the value of money itself consists only of imagination! On the contrary, Kant's example could have confirmed the ontological proof! Real thalers have the same existence as imagined gods". I 104 Only through this idea does reason a priori agree with nature at all. This prerequisite is the "expediency of nature" for our cognitive faculty. > Merely logical connection. - VsKant: actually relapse into "thinking in agreement". Die ZEIT 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink: Rawls) RawlsVsKant: religiously influenced Manichaeism. Because the "good ego" that lives in the intelligent world of understanding is threatened by the "evil ego" of the natural world of the senses, moral action must be anchored in the belief that it is God's will to realize the "supreme good" of existence in accordance with the ideal realm of purposes. Moral/HegelVsKant: in a well-ordered state with a functioning legal system, the individual does not have to be committed to morality, but acts voluntarily in accordance with the moral constitution of bourgeois society. Menne I 28 Kant: transcendental reasoning of logic. It must apply a priori. Kant: analytical judgement: so narrowly defined that even the largest part of mathematics and logic falls within the realm of synthetic judgement. MenneVsKant: if he wanted to justify logic from the twelve categories, this would be a circular conclusion. Vaihinger I 333 Thing in itself/F.A. LangeVsKant/Vaihinger: If the thing itself is fictitious, then also its distinction from the apparitions. ((s)Vs: the distinction is only mental, not empirical). Vollmer I XIV World View/Konrad LorenzVsKant: in no organism do we encounter a world view that would contradict what we humans believe from the outside world. Limit/Lorence: The comparison of the world views of different species helps us to expect and recognize the limitations of our own world view apparatus. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Me I A. Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
| Kant | Mackie Vs Kant | Stegmüller IV 319 KantVsDeterminism: freedom is a prerequisite of our moral thinking. MackieVsKant: this yields the prerequisite of a metaphysical objectivism. IV 320 VsDeterminism: undermines the possibility of moral judgement in general! One cannot have a conviction and at the same time assume that it is causally determined! VsVs: this reasoning is simply wrong: the determinacy does not undermine the correctness of the judgement! Determinism/Stegmüller: today we know too little to decide whether it is true or false. But if it were true, would it undermine our moral thinking? Terminology: Def Incompatibility Thesis/morality/Stegmüller: if determinism were true, there would be no moral thinking. Responsibility, duty, benevolence etc. became meaningless. Stegmüller IV 171 Mackie/VsKant: the categorical imperative is not of objective validity! There must be at least one premise that is not truth-apt, but expresses the fact that a decision has been made. Stegmüller IV 323 Self/MackieVsKant: supposed to act on the basis of rational arguments. Problem: how is that possible if the self is not causally connected to its acts by its reasons for action? How can actions belong to the self and yet be only random events? The theorist of incompatibility would have to construct an analogon to causality and deny its causal character at the same time. metaphysical Self/Kant/Stegmüller: essential for Kant, because it is the addressee of the moral ought. MackieVsKant: as a subjectivist he does not even need to introduce the metaphysical self. Stegmüller IV 431 God/immortality/morality/MackieVsKant: (i) has an ambivalent position: on the one hand primacy of practical reason whose claims are to be adopted by theoretical reason. On the other hand he asks if our knowledge is truly broadened by that. Kant: "Certainly, but only in a practical sense." Mackie: this revokes everything. Two possible interpretations: 1. Kant wants to say that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul can be proven as facts, 2. not as facts, but as the necessary conditions for our consciousness as a rational being. IV 432 MackieVsKant: greatest weakness: 1. the transition from "we should seek to promote the highest good" to "that must be still possible". Ought/Kant: elsewhere he had tried to show that the "Ought" presupposes a correspondent "Can." (Where?). But that had been about the obediance of the moral law. MackieVsKant: the analogy to the summum bonum does not make sense. But that be granted. 2. then, the thesis that we should seek to promote the highest good includes that we can seek to promote it. To conclude therefrom the possibility of a full realization is ineligible. Moral/MackieVsKant: Kant cannot even assert that the possible realization were a necessary condition for moral thinking. IV 433 MackieVsKant: the tension between his theism on the one hand and his emphasis on the autonomy of morality on the other is irresolvable. KantVsPopular notion: neither our knowledge of God and his will nor this will itself are a rationale of the moral law, but only reason! Therefore, "self-legislation" of practical reason. MackieVsKant: yet, Kant speaks misleadingly of "laws of the Supreme Being". But God himself is just another rational being! MackieVsKant: the correspondence of morality and happiness is still represented in an unconscious thinking in terms of reward and punishment. The consistent recognition of the autonomy of morality should have brought him towards more of a Stoic conception: that morality requires no other happiness than the awareness of righteousness itself (possibly Hume, Marc Aurel, Adam Smith).. Morality/God/Kant: Kant seems to have been aware of this difficulty. In his Metaphysics of Morals he anticipates the argument of conscience by J. H. Newman. Also, he oscillates between the idea of God as a purely intellectual construction (e.g. Adam Smith's ideal observer) and the assumption of a real existence. V 437 MackieVsMoral proofs of God: there are better explanations for action than for the existence of a divine person. Practical decisions must be based on convictions about facts and not vice versa! Whatever we are inclined to view as a rational act is no evidence of what is actually the case. IV 438 MackieVsKant: problem with his moral argument: if a particular practical principle presupposes certain factual allegations, then the reason, as pure as it may be, cannot claim to have demonstrated the validity of this practical principle, if it did not prove the validity of the relevant factual allegations independently. IV 461 Freedom/determinism/morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: other kinds of freedom are fully compatible with determinism (e.g. freedom of neurotic compulsion)! IV 462 Will/Kant: (Metaphysics of Morals): "is a kind of causality of living beings, as long as they are reasonable, and freedom would be the property of this causality, since it can take effect independent of external determining causes." "external causes": reward, punishment, but also desires and inclinations! Autonomy/Kant/Stegmüller: here, consistency with its own ideal of reason is an end in itself. MackieVsKant: misapprehension: he probably even thought himself to have characterized the contra-causal free will, but in fact he distinguished between external causes and the autonomous efficacy of the will. And that is something completely different! IV 463 autonomous activity: completely compatible with two assumptions: 1. that there are sufficient preliminary causes for the will to have a certain strength. 2. that, whatever such a will does, is dependent on the character of the person and his*her strength of will. Will/capriciousness(Willkür)/Kant/Stegmüller: later he differentiates the two: the latter is the only one that posses contra-causal freedom; it is the free will in its usual sense. Freedom/Kant: (late) he moves completely towards autonomy (autonomous legality of the will). Vs: but that is not a solution to our problem. Judgement/conviction/Kant/Stegmüller: (Metaphysics of Morals): it is not possible to render a judgement in the theoretical (speuculative) realm or to express a genuine conviction, while at the same time admitting to having been externally induced to do so. IV 464 Judgement/conviction/MackieVsKant: whoever makes a rational judgement cannot interpret it in a way that it was reached incorrectly. However, there is no problem in seriously holding a rational conviction and at the same time acknowledging that it has been reached in an appropriate manner. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Kant | Stroud Vs Kant | I 145 Def Reality/Real/(Kant: "whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws is real". (A 376)). I 146 StroudVsKant: but he does not go into detail how we can distinguish reality from appearance in individual cases where the question might arise. I 159 Skepticism/transcendental/StroudVsKant: does he really refute skepticism with his transcendental philosophy? Is it a better answer than others? 1. We can only understand his answer if we understand and accept his transcendental approach. We must then also accept his idealism. I 160 Understanding/Stroud: we should do best when we observe people and their behavior (>Behaviorism). But that would be an empirical study. It would be about language, language behaviour and language acquisition. StroudVsKant: we understand his argument only if we understand his concept of a priori knowledge. And this investigation presupposes that we accept transcendental idealism. That seems circular! (Circle): to understand idealism again, we must understand the particular nature of the investigation that makes idealism transcendental. I 161 2. StroudVsKant: (this would even be Kantian reasons VsKant): according to Kant, thoughts are only possible if they are applied to what categories can be applied to. But this is only possible within the framework of possible experiences. The concepts must be able to have an empirical application. ((s) So they must be learned in empiricism). StroudVsKant: then how is it possible that we can have (transcendental) thoughts at all that are not determined by empirical conditions? a) empirically: For example, if expressions such as "directly perceive" and "independently of us" are given in everyday empirical use, then we see ((s) according to Kant!) that the sentence "We perceive independent things directly" is true. Empirically understood this simply means: e.g. without mirrors or screens. b) transcendental: other language use: here the sentence "we perceive independent things directly" does not express truth. ((s) Beware, Stroud does not say that he is wrong according to Kant). StroudVsKant: with the transcendental meaning we thus move away from everyday language. KantVsStroud: would reply that this use must be understandable for us, otherwise knowledge about the world would not be possible. I 162 StroudVsKant: this leads to two problems: 1. Suppose we accepted Kant's transcendentalism: Question: why would the rejection of idealism at the transcendental level be more attractive than accepting it at the empirical level? Why does Kant reject empirical idealism? ((s) "Condition"/empirical/(s): a condition cannot be understood empirically. But their fulfilment > Fact. But one cannot see that a fact is supposed to fulfil something.) Solution: making a corresponding sentence true. (But this sentence must be expressed first). StroudVsKant: if the argument is that our knowledge would otherwise be limited to the things we know are dependent on us, why should we then seek "refuge" in the view that our knowledge is limited to things we have recognized as (transcendently spoken) dependent on us? Skepticism/StroudVsKant: is so painful precisely because it does not allow knowledge of independent things. Why should Kant's solution be less painful just because it is transcendental? Empirical Idealism/KantVsStroud: cannot be true. 2. Question about the strength of the guarantee that Kant's transcendentalism exists: This corresponds to the question why Kant rejects transcendental realism. KantVsTranscendental Realism: would not be a correct explanation of our knowledge because - if it were true - we could never directly perceive things independent of ourselves and therefore could never be certain of their existence. Transcendental realism thus opens the way for empirical idealism by perceiving external things as something separate from the senses. Problem: we can then be aware of our representations, but we do not know if something existing corresponds to them! StroudVsKant: he rejects these attitudes for the only reason for which transcendental explanations can be rejected at all: that they provide no explanation, how is it possible that we know something? StroudVsKant: why does he think that empirical idealism paves the way for transcendental realism? Probably because he believes that the only things we can directly perceive are the things that depend on us. And he does not assume this as an empirical thesis, but only as a transcendental one. The sentence "everything we perceive is dependent on us" is true when understood transcendently. Kant/Stroud: probably he assumes this because he does not understand how perception is possible without the perception of a "representation" or something "in us". StroudVsKant: this is how the thesis of the "epistemic priority" appears here again: I 164 shifted from the empirical to the transcendental level. Perception/Kant/Stroud: he can only accept direct perception of independent things empirically spoken because he does not accept them transcendently spoken. StroudVsKant: important: that this is the only point he rejects. Kant: if we treat external things as things in themselves, it is impossible to understand how we can arrive at knowledge. StroudVsKant: Suppose Kant were right that transcendental realism leaves our knowledge of external things unexplained. Question: why is that alone sufficient to make our theory wrong, transcendentally speaking? Couldn't it simply be transcendentally true that things cannot be known? Kant/Stroud: would say no, as he understands "transcendental" as following: transcendental knowledge is part of the explanation of our knowledge. Direct Perception/Kant: is only possible of dependent things (representations etc.). Transcendental Realism/Kant/Stroud: would then have to say that there are also independent things. Namely, those that correspond to these representations. But then we would be forced to conclude that all our representations (sensory experiences) would be inadequate to establish the reality of these things. (A 369). The outer things would then be separate from the things we are aware of. StroudVsKant: the only problem of transcendental realism is that it prevents our explanation of "how knowledge is possible". I 165 Problem: then there is no independent way to determine his truth or falsehood. The only test of his acceptability is whether he makes an explanation possible. Transcendental Aesthetics/Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Stroud: Transcendental idealism is integrated into transcendental aesthetics: (A 378), independent of these consequences. StroudVsKant: but it is not bound differently than transcendental or a priori as an a priori condition of an investigation of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. And this is the only way how a transcendental theory can be founded at all: that it is the only possible explanation of our synthetically a priori possible knowledge in geometry and arithmetic. Skepticism/StroudVsKant: so there is no independent possibility to justify a transcendental theory. ((s) than that it is the only explanation for something else). Then one has to ask whether skepticism has been refuted at all. I 166 Skepticism/StroudVsKant: there are at least two ways in which an explanation of our knowledge of the outer world can fail: If skepticism were true; Kant claims to have at least empirically refuted this, but only by putting in place a transcendental version of the same description. Understanding/StroudVsKant: if we understand transcendentalism (transcendental use of our words) at all, this use is not satisfactory. It still represents knowledge as limited to what I understand to be dependent on me. I am once again a prisoner of my subjectivity. Transcendental Idealism/StroudVsKant: is ultimately difficult to distinguish from skepticism. I.e. not that it is the same as empirical idealism, but that it is unsatisfactory as an explanation, namely on the empirical level! I 167 Transcendental Idealism/KantVsStroud/KantVsDescartes: Kant would say: "I won't lose anything if I accept it". My knowledge is not limited to the things that are empirically dependent or are only empirically subjective. I am theoretically able to deliver the best physics, chemistry and other sciences. I am in a better position than Descartes. StroudVsKant: but then, according to Kant, all our scientific knowledge is still subjective or dependent on our human sensitivity. I 168 Knowledge/Explanation/StroudVsKant: but we could also do without an explanation in another way: not because skepticism was true (and thus nothing could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be conclusively posed! (>Carnap, see below). Kant/Stroud: N.B.: pleads in a way for a limited ("deflationary") view that corresponds to this critique. ((s) deflationary here: not aimed at the most comprehensive framework, see below). KantVsDescartes: if its question could be asked coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate. StroudVsKant: but he does not explain what Descartes was concerned about. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kant | Vollmer Vs Kant | I 25 VollmerVsKant: today people no longer believe that its categories are necessary. Also the laws of nature do not have the general and necessary validity! I 84 Theory/Vollmer: goes further than our mesocosm: But many philosophers do not understand that: VsKant, VsAnalytic Philosphy: Everyday language VsPositivism VsPhenomenalism: e.g. Mach: Sensory perception is everything. VsOperationalism: every term must be defined in mesocosmic operational terms. Vollmer: nevertheless, we cannot avoid connecting every object, every structure of empirical science with human (i.e. mesocosmic) experiences. I 103 Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the causal law does not seem to fail. Causality/VollmerVsKant: what Kant describes is at best a normal adult cultural person. Evolutionary epistemology: Biology instead of synthetic a priori - is only mesocosmically appropriate. I 173 Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: he does not see that the field of his traditional epistemology is much too narrow. He does not notice the difference between mesocosmic and theoretical knowledge. He cannot answer the following questions: How are our categories created? Why do we have these forms of viewing and categories? Why are we bound to these a priori judgements and not to others? Kant gives wrong solutions for the following problems: Should we accept the idea of organismic evolution? Why can we understand each other? How is intersubjective knowledge possible? Can the categories be proved complete? (Vollmer: No!) Can they be scientifically justified? I 193 Synthetic judgments a priori/VollmerVsKant: up to today, nobody has supplied a single copy of such judgments. Although they seem logically possible. I 196 Deduction/Categories/Kant/Vollmer: one has to realize that Kant's "deduction" is not even intended to give a justification for special categories. He only shows how they are used. Categories/Kant/Vollmer: as terms they cannot be true or false (true/false). For each category, however, there is a principle of mind which, due to its transcendental character, provides a law of nature. Therefore, a discussion (and possible justification) of the categories can be replaced by one of the corresponding laws. I 197 Principles of the pure mind/Kant/Vollmer: four groups: 1. Axioms of View - applicability of Euclidean geometry to a. Objects, b. states, and c. Processes. 2. Anticipations of Perception a. Consistency of space, b. Consistency of time, c. Consistency of physical processes 3. Analogies of Experience a. Persistence of the substance, b. universal causality, c. universal interaction of the substances. 4. Postulates of empirical thinking at all (here not principles, but definitions). I 199 VollmerVsKant: he does not show anywhere that its reconstruction is the only possible one. His representation of Newton's physics is probably not appropriate. Physics/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Matter: he considers matter infinitely divisible (NewtonVs). Principle of inertia: he did not understand it, he mistakenly thinks that every change of state requires an external cause. Uniform motion, however, needs no cause! Mistakenly thought, bullets only reached their highest speed some time after leaving the barrel. (Principle of inertia Vs). Has never mastered infinitesimal calculation. Never fully understood the nature of the experimental method and underestimated the role of experience. I 202 Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: with animals intersubjectivity should be impossible. It should be impossible to communicate with chimpanzees. Worse still: we should not understand each other. Because according to Kant, there is no reason why the cognitive structures of other people should be identical to mine. Reason: For Kant, recognition and knowledge are bound to and limited to the transcendental cognitive structures of each individual. Therefore, it could also be completely idiosyncratic. Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: fortunately they exist on Earth. The transcendental philosopher can register this as a fact. He cannot explain them. VollmerVsKant: For Kant, the origin of intersubjectivity remains mysterious, inexplicable, a surprising empirical fact. Vollmer: Intersubjectivity is of course explained by the EE. EE/Vollmer: Our view of space is three-dimensional because space is. It is temporally directed because it is real processes. (PutnamVs). I 208 Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: obviously we have to distinguish between two levels of knowledge: 1. Perception and experience are oriented towards evolutionary success and therefore sufficiently correct. 2. Scientific knowledge is not oriented towards evolutionary success. Kant does not make this distinction. I 210 VollmerVsKant: from the fact that every factual finding is tested with mesocosmic means, he erroneously concludes that it is also limited to the mesocosm. I 304 Thing in itself/measuring/Vollmer: we measure the length of a body with some scale, but we still speak of the length of the body. (sic: reference to "thing in itself" by Vollmer). I 305 Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: although our knowledge is never absolutely certain, it differs considerably from knowledge about phenomena. I 306 Although many things may be unknown, there is no motive to postulate an unrecognisable reality behind the world. I 307 VollmerVsKant: the "naked reality" cannot be seen by us, but it can be recognized! II 48 Def Nature/Kant: the existence of things, if it is determined according to general laws. Nature/VollmerVsKant: unnecessarily narrow and petitio principii: because the generality of the categories thereby becomes an analytical consequence of this definition. (Circular). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Kant Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Descartes I 139 Descartes/Holz: Hegel pro: Move back of thinking from the world to God himself. God is ambiguous according to him. Spinoza: continues radically Descartes but drops the substance of the manifold. Leibniz: comes back to pluralism (dialectic unity/plurality) - KantVsLeibniz: Only "logic of illusion": (per Descartes, but mediated by Hume’s skepticism) Hegel: ties back to Leibniz’s dialectic. Descartes I 142 KantVsLeibniz: This is only a "logic of illusion". Kant I 34 Critique of Pure Reason: VsLeibniz, VsWolff: Against "school philosophy". Starting point: Freedom notion of academic philosophy: contradiction: freedom (as soul and God) ought to be unthinkable, although they were made the subject of metaphysical teachings. I 85 Room/Leibniz: (according to Kant): Is only by virtue of the mutual relationship of the things in it. KantVsLeibniz: counterexample: Mismatch between left and right hands or mirror image. An inversion will not restore the identity. Strawson V 227 Body/idealism/realism/Kant: we do not have an external scale or an external system, in which concepts, we can give an esoteric (obvious for the initiated) meaning of the question if such objects really exist. V 228 KantVsLeibniz: Vs pre-established harmony: we have no knowledge of the "real causes" of our perceptions. But we need it in order to decide whether those objects, which create our perceptions, really exist. V 228 Terms/sense principle/Kant: Only when concepts are applied to objects of possible experience they really hold a meaning. V 229 Due to the transcendental idealism we are now, however, obligated to create the objects,which exist in themselves, independently in the design of objects in general obligation objects as they exist in themselves, independently of our perception. But: V 230 KantVsMetaphysics/KantVsLeibniz: these alleged truths about objects independent of time and space. ("intelligible" objects). Kant: that is only consistent with the assumption that one speaks not of objects themselves, but of concepts. I 234 Justification/Vollmer: is not even necessary. What should make us look for a justification? Kant/early/precritical: Newton’s theory cannot be proven logically. The KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff had realized this. But Newton’s theory can also not be empirically verified. This, Kant had learned from Hume. This is then in contradiction to the assumed "absolute truth" and "logical provability" of Newtonian theory. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Stegmüller IV 388 Contingency/Leibniz: every thing is contingent, which is why it would not be so if another thing were different. All things are causally connected. The world is the totality of these things, which is why the world as a whole is also contingent! World/Leibniz: it may well be that the series of causes is unlimited. Leibniz does not necessarily assume a temporal beginning! Sufficient Reason/Leibniz: must then lie outside the world! It must be something else than the world! IV 389 He must be a necessary being. VsLeibniz: 1. How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason? 2. Can there be a necessary being that has a sufficient reason in itself? If the second question is answered negatively, the totality has no sufficient reason! KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof is implicitly based on the (refuted) ontological proof. (See KantVsDescartes). IV 390 Existence/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: the view that the concept of existence is completely absorbed in the existence quantifier is controversial! Existence/Contingency/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: we could understand necessary existence as negation of contingency. Problem: 1. the premise that the world as a whole is contingent (it would not exist if something else had been different) would have to be dropped: even if every part of the world is contingent, there is nothing to suggest that the world as a whole would not exist unless (sic?) something else was or would have been different. The conclusion from the contingency of each part to the contingency of the whole is inadmissible. Alternative 2: Contingency: something is contingent even if it could not exist. IV 392 This must be combined with the above remark that it would not be logically impossible that the claimed necessary being could not exist either. But this is incomprehensible. Sufficient Reason/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): how do we know that everything must have a sufficient reason? So far nobody has been able to show a necessity a priori for this. That would not have any plausibility either: 1. It is true that we are always looking for symmetries, but there is no guarantee that we will always find them. 2. We are always within our world, extrapolations are not allowed! Even if now everything within the world had a sufficient reason, we would have no right to conclude on a sufficient reason outside the world. Common argument: things must be comprehensible through and through. MackieVs: that is not true at all! IV 393 We have no reason to believe that the universe is oriented toward our intellectual needs. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Locke, J. | Kant Vs Locke, J. | McDowell I 126/127 Consciousness/apperception/criterion/KantVsLocke: wit with him (paralogism-chapter): it is precisely that self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity! The subject does not need to make an effort to focus attention on one and the same thing! Putnam I 168 Kant Locke/Putnam: we should read Kant in such a way that he proposes what Locke said about the secondary qualities is valid for all objects, even for primary and simple objects. There is no reason to distinguish between them. All are secondary, that is, the object is such that its effect affects us in a particular way. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Locke, J. | Verschiedene Vs Locke, J. | VsLocke Locke I 26/27 Knowledge/VsLocke: Problem: the ideas have to be fixed in words, but that does not mean recognizing yet, because the words have to be processed into statements. Locke, however, develops his idea analysis first in isolation. (Thereby lengthy repetitions arise). Locke I 42 VsLocke/VsSensualism: the critique of Locke always misses a clarification of the necessary preconditions of human knowledge in the subject itself. This is caught by Locke's introduction of reason at the end of the essay. Locke I 66 Ethics/Locke: the suspension force is of utmost importance for Locke's ethics: the "Angel" around which the freedom of rational beings revolves. Thus the possibility of a free decision for the morally good is to be justified. (Despite hedonism). VsLocke: this is not contradictory, but not very plausible. It has been criticized time and again that the motive of moral decision is not the independent value of the morally good, but the benefit determined according to desire/displeasure. Locke never clarified this despite the pressure of his contemporaries. Locke I 169 Sensualism/VsLocke: an old tradition of Locke-Criticism considers sensualism naive. (LeibnizVsLocke, KantVsLocke). Locke: Thesis: "Nothing is in the mind that was not in the senses before". LeibnizVsLocke: "except the mind itself!". Curl I 170 KantVsLocke: there are a priori forms of perception that enable us to have experiences in the first place. Language/Knowledge/VsLocke: (today): Locke misjudges the irreducible linguistic foundations of empirical perception. But in his thinking the correction is already applied in order to also include abstract and general ideas under the empirically given, from which every reconstruction of knowledge must already start. (L. Krüger). Economy/EuchnerVsLocke: Contradiction: Locke's mercantilism and its simultaneous praise of world trade. Locke I 188 Knowledge/Reality/KreimendahlVsLocke: restricts possible statements of reality to the realm of ideas and the "nominal" entities formed by them. In doing so, he questions his own empirical program. On the one hand it is correct that there can be no knowledge without mediation of ideas, which in their complex form are human art products, while on the other hand he claims that the source of all ideas is experience (circular). Experience/Locke: the combination of sensory experience and reflection ("inner experience"). Gravity/Locke: "Hoop and Ribbon" (Euchner: that was more naive than it should have been at the time). Locke II 187 Complex ideas/Locke: e.g. friend: from simple ideas: human, love, willingness, action, happiness, which in turn can be traced back to even simpler ideas. LambertVsLocke: he did not recognize the necessary connections of the terms. ArndtVsLambert: Locke was not interested in an axiomatic system. He was interested in separating the realm of "real knowledge" (mathematics) from the empirical, in which the complex idea is based solely on the observable factual co-existence of qualities. In empiricism, no necessary connection can be observed! Locke I 62 Law of Nature/EuchnerVsDoctrine of the Law of Nature: Locke does not treat it systematically, otherwise he would have had to deal with the following problems: the world as an order of creation, to the legal order of political structures under the aspects of natural and human law, as well as the the legal position of the individual, to the question of how the unrevealed and written down natural law can be recognized with the help of reason, and to the question of how the unrevealed and written down natural law can be recognized with the help of reason. Reasons why the principles of natural law and morality are recognised as binding and followed. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Plato | Kant Vs Plato | Bubner I 86 KantVsSchlosser: (KantVsPlato): The decline of apriorism has been expanded to unbridled theory claims. I 88 KantVsPlato: The mathematician Plato is not suitable to be a metaphysician. Unrealized Mistake between intuition and concept. "Intellectual intuition" brings immediacy and discursivity erroneously together. There is no clarification on how to get the two together. "Undemocratic esotericism" only natural for members of a "club"> connection to the contemporary discussion about the French Revolution. Violates Rousseau’s demands for equality. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Kant Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Danto2 I 133 KantVsQuine: synthetic judgments a priori can be seen prior to any exploration of the world. By this he linked the mere possibility at all to doing philosophy. Because it is not an empirical science. E.g. That bachelors are unmarried only expresses what is included in the term. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Rationalism | Kant Vs Rationalism | Danto I 193 Rationalism: starting from our concepts attempts to initially imagine the existence and nature of the real world. By applying pure, irrefutable reasoning, he tries to determine how the world should be. KantVsRationalism: shows the mistake: Existence is not a property, therefore no essential feature. Fundamental error: to treat the predicate "exists" as if it was something like "blue" or "round". Kant I 39 KantVsConventional philosophy: Areas of expertise: "rational psychology," "rational cosmology" and "rational theology". Kant: "sophistical conclusions": deceptive because something given is subsumed under mere idea to give them objective reality. But all that is there is conditional: 1. an imaginative I 2. the indefinite world of experience 3. the fact that everything is in necessary order. Chisholm II 76 analytical judgment/Kant: a judgment in which the "mind is concerned only with what is already thought of in concepts" (CPR, B 314) Sauer: So in his truth, independent of the existence. KantVsRationalism: illusion: to foist a transcendental possibility of things from the logical possibility of the concept. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Redundancy Theory | Kant Vs Redundancy Theory | Metz II 486 KantVsReductionism: The self will never be explored, it can only be thought of in the most abstract concepts of "transcendental apperception". DamasioVsKant: We have a more secure foundation in our body with its skin, its bones, its muscles, the joints, the internal organs, etc. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Russell, B. | Tugendhat Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 22 Identification/Individualization/Tugendhat: the subjective and the objective localization are equally original. TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time not only particularly important, but the only possibility of identification. Like Strawson: sortal predicates must be added. (Taking out of the situation, recognition, countability). All singular terms refer to the lowest level of identification. "This F is G", verifiable. (KantVs). TugendhatVsRussell: although the existential statement "there is exactly one F here and now" is still implied here, it is no longer a general statement as with Russell: "among all objects there is one..." but localization. Only with localizing expressions we have singular terms whose reference can no longer fail. Therefore, they no longer imply existential statements! Thus they resemble Russell's logical proper names. Difference: they no longer stand in an isolated assignment to the object, but in a space-time order. Tugendhat I 378 Existential Statements/Tugendhat: contrary to appearances not statements about individual things but always general statements. In principle, the talk of existence always assumes that one speaks of all objects, and therefore one could not even say (VsRussell) of a single object that it exists. I 383 TugendhatVsRussell: but here it's not about a relation at all, specification takes place against the background of all objects. Russell has already seen that correctly with regard to singular terms, but with his logical proper names he was wrong anyway, precisely because he denied them the reference to that background of a peculiar generality. III 214 TugendhatVsRussell: neither the reaction of a living being nor the triggering sign can be true or false, because here there is no assumption that something is so or so, consequently no error is possible. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Sartre, J.P. | Kant Vs Sartre, J.P. | Kant I 17 Sartre: designed: to destroy itself in order to create the being and to establish the being-in-itself at the same time, which escapes its own contingency. KantVsSartre: God and the unconditional were not contradictory ideas. Only not perceivable. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Skepticism | Kant Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 129 Skepticism/knowledge/KantVsDescartes: The relation between the philosophical question and our everyday or scientific knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. ((s) (see below): But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct). Descartes/Stroud: for him the skepticism is inevitable! Kant: would agree. That is why he developed another concept. "Scandal"/Kant: that a theory has never been developed in the history of philosophy that avoids skepticism. Knowledge/theory/Kant/Stroud: there are conditions to be met by any theory of knowledge: the theory must not be deny that there are external things. Suppose there were no external world, then Descartes’ skepticism would loose its sting! Then there would be no limit to my knowledge that I know nothing about the things except me, because there would be nothing after all. I 130 Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world which is independent from us is unknowable. Or that the world is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world. Knowledge/Kant/Stroud: whoever reads the proof, must know at the end that the example is a goldfinch or actually three typographical errors. Stroud: these are not really high standards. It seems that every access to knowledge needs to meet this standard. Problem: virtually no philosophical theory satisfies this condition! KantVsDescartes: (end of the 1. Meditation) does not meet this condition. KantVsSkepticism: therefore, any inferential approach must be avoided to avoid it. World/reality/Kant: the external things which we know need to have a "reality"((s) a particular property?) which does not allow to be inferred . (A 371). ((s) Kant here similar to Hume: direct perception of things)). immediate perception/= Awareness/Kant/Stroud: there is then a sufficient proof of the things’ (of this kind)reality! ((s)> proof of existence). (A 371). Stroud: so that we are in a daily situation where the (Kant), "external perception [provides] ... the direct evidence of something real in space". (A 375). DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is actually not capable. Stroud: But this is not a matter which one of both gives the correct description of the situation. KantVsDescartes: its description cannot be correct. But he is not just giving a competing alternative. He rather gives conditions for the access to knowledge. I 132 At least such theories must take account of the traditional skepticism. E.g. if Descartes was right, we could not know anything about the outside world. That is the reason why Kant does not allow to infer knowledge of external things. Otherwise, skepticism is inevitable. Stroud: So it requires precisely the kind of knowledge that Moore gives! I 140 Def "Epistemic Priority"/terminology/Stroud: you could call Descartes’ thesis that sensory experience, perception, representations (which Descartes calls Ideas’) are epistemically placed before the perceived objects. I 141 Stroud: that means that epistemically subordinated things cannot be known without epistemically antecedent things being known. And not the other way around. That means that the latter are less knowable, so the outer world is less knowable than our sensory experiences. KantVsDescartes/KantVsEpistemic priority: this view needs to be rejected since it cannot explain how knowledge is actually possible! Perception/KantVsDescartes: we perceive things directly, without conclusion. Stroud: we understand Kant only when we understand Descartes. Realism/KantVsSkepticism/KantVsDescartes: these considerations which involve him are those which lead to the epistemic priority (priority of sensations (or "ideas") before the objects). I 142 We need to understand this in order to understand Kant’s version of realism. (VsMoores simple realism). That means the realism which explains how it is possible that we know something of the world? (Conditions of the possibility of knowledge). I 146 Knowledge/KantVsSkeptizismus/Stroud: when external perception (experience) is the condition for inner experience, and when external experience is immediate then we can know (in general) that there is an external reality which corresponds to our sensory experiences (sensations). I 147 Then there may be deception in individual cases, but no general skeptical questioning. KantVsSkeptizismus/KantVsDescartes: cannot be extended to all, it can only appear in individual cases. Perception/KantVsDescartes: N.B. if one could assume the skepticism at any rate, one would have to assume that our perception has come about not directly but indirectly, inferentially (via conclusion). KantVsDescartes: this does not go far enough and relies too heavily on the "testimonies" of our everyday expressions. I 148 Descartes should have examined the conditions that actually make experience possible. KantVsSkepticism: even the "inner experience" of Descartes are possible only if he firstly has outer experiences. Therefore, the skeptical conclusion violates the conditions of experience in general. Descartes position itself is impossible: no examination of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects, which we believe exist around us. Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: Kant accepts at least the conditional force ((s)e.g. the premises) of the traditional skepticism. KantVsDescates: But he rejects the skeptical conclusion: they contradict every adequate philosophical theory of knowledge. Solution/Kant: what we know touches the phenomena. KantVsSkepticism/Stroud: The antecedent of the skeptical conclusion can only be true if the consequent is false. Knowledge/world/KantVsMoore/Stroud: Thus, he has a different understanding of the relationship between philosophical study of knowledge and the knowledge in daily life. I 159 Science/reality/everyday/knowledge/KantVsDescartes/Stroud: our everyday and scientific knowledge is invulnerable to skepticism. KantVsMoore: But there is no conclusion of our perceptions of knowledge about unrelated things. I 168 Knowledge/explanation/StroudVsKant: But we could not need an explanation: not because skepticism were true (and therefore there would be nothing that could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be provided conclusively! (> Skepticism/Carnap). Kant/Stroud: Important argument: advocates in a manner for a limited ("deflationary") perspective, which corresponds to this criticism. ((s) "deflationary": here: not directed at the most comprehensive framework). KantVsDescartes: when his question could be provided coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate. StroudVsKant: this does then not explain what Descartes was concerned about. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Substance | Kant Vs Substance | Danto I 254 Substance/Danto: ... each of these teachings is completely useless if you give up the substance itself. The idea that any underlying I-do-not-know-what holds the world together, that keeps things from flying apart into fragments. But it’s almost breathtaking to observe how little happened when you gave up the substance. KantVsSubstance/Danto: Proposed to no longer understand the substance as an objective necessity but as an inner necessity of thinking. NietzscheVsSubstance/Danto: Substance is only fiction. The question of what characterizes the spirit was still absolutely not explained by the substance. A question that only then could follow, which would also exclude the function of the mind, that a mental state of affair can be physical. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Tradition | Kant Vs Tradition | Bubner I 105 Logic/KantVsTradition: ancient way: While the conventional logic prefaces the concept theory of the theory of judgment, which is build on it, the new way is: the transcendental logic proceeds reversely and already orientates the fundamental categories towards the synthesis power of the judgments. I 106 Categorical prestructuring by a priori concepts constituted objects as objects and "makes" them to be topic of possible knowledge judgments. ((s) reflexive, criticism). E.g. the "black man" and "the man is black": In the first example, he is merely thought as black (this is problematic). In the second instance, he is recognized as such! In both cases, however, it is the same mind by the same actions. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Various Authors | Kant Vs Various Authors | I 21 KantVsphilosophical consolation: A different life is invented. Kant (Metaphysics of Morals): Result of a lie: (even if it happens in good faith): Statements will find absolutely no faith anymore, therefore all rights, which are based on contracts, disappear. This is why the lie does not need the addition that it needs to harm others. KantVsPufendorf: It harms already by making the source of law unusable. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Various Authors | Kanitscheider Vs Various Authors | Kanitscheider I 433 Infinity/Material Existence/Physics: some models require physical infinity: the hyperbolic world of general relativity theory (AR), the steady astate theory (SST). Infinity/Mathematics/Physics: Gauss: is skeptical about actual infinite quantities. LucretiusVsArchimedes: is infinity mere possibility of an object to traverse new space-time points? (remains a discussion until today). Bolzano: the objective existence of infinite sets cannot fail due to the impossibility of imagining every single object. I 434 NewtonVsDescartes: not "indefinite" but actual infinite space! KantVsNewton: the infinite is unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: not imaginable, but conceptually comprehensible! Riemann: Differentiation infinite/unlimited (new!). Solution for the problem of the "beyond space". Three-ball (S³) conceptually analytically easy to handle. I 435 Sets/infinity: here the sentence: "The whole is larger than the parts" is no longer applicable. (But extensional determination is also not necessary, intensional is enough). Space: Question: Can an open infinite space contain more than Aleph 0 objects of finite size? Solution: "densest packing" of spatially convex cells: this set cannot be larger than countable. Thus no a priori obstacle that the number of galaxies in an unlimited Riemann space of non-ending volume is the smallest transfinite cardinal number. II 102 Measurement/Consciousness/Observer/Quantum Mechanics/QM: Psychological Interpretation: Fritz London and Edmund Bauer, 1939 >New Age Movement. II 103 Thesis: the observer constitutes the new physical objectivity through his consciousness, namely the rotation of the vector in the Hilbert space. 1. KanitscheiderVsBauer: Problem: then there is no definite single state of matter without the intervention of a psyche. 2. KanitscheiderVsBauer: on the one hand consciousness is included in the quantum-mechanical laws, on the other hand it should possess special properties within the observer, namely those which transfer the combined system of object, apparatus and observer without external impulse from the hybrid superposition state into the single state in which the partial elements are decoupled. 3. KanitscheiderVsBauer: strange that the Schrödinger equation, the most fundamental law of quantum mechanics, should not be applicable to consciousness. 4. KanitscheiderVsBauer: also doubt whether the consciousness can really be in the superposition of different completely equal soul states. (Bauer had adopted his thesis from Erich Becher's interactionalistic body soul dualism II 104). I 423 Space Curvature/Empirical Measurement/Schwarzschild/Kanitscheider: Schwarzschild: Distortion of the triangle formed by the Earth's orbit parallax. Although the curvature factors are not known, one can conclude that if the space is hyperbolic (K < 0), the parallax of very distant stars must be positive. I 424 If you now observe stars with a vanishing parallax, the measurement accuracy provides an upper limit for the value of negative curvature. If the space is spherical - the parallax must be negative. Schwarzschild: in the hyperbolic case, the radius of curvature should be at least 64 light years, in the elliptical at least 1600 light-years. KanitscheiderVsSchwarzschild: such theory-independent experiments are today rightly regarded as hopeless. I 296 Time Travels/Kanitscheider: VsTime Machine/VsWells: H.G. Wells makes the mistake that he lets the traveler ascend and descend the world line of the earth on the same earthly space point. Exactly this leads to the conceptual impossibility of forward and backward movement in time. Time Travel/General Relativity Theory/Kanitscheider: this changes when matter comes into play. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Atomism | Hume, D. | I 131 Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to the ideas. (KantVs). |
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| Kant | Stroud I 129 Def dogmatic idealism / Kant / Stroud: the thesis that there is no world except me. KantVs: that would be a statement about the world that we want to investigate: which is absurd. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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| Kant | Stroud I 130 Def problematic idealism / Kant / Stroud: thesis: that the world independent of us is unknowable. Or that it was doubtful or not reliable as other things that we know. This can all be problematic. (B274) KantVs idealism misinterpreted our actual situation in the world. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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| Kant | Stroud I 148 Kant’s Copernican Revolution/Copernican Turn / KantVsSkepticism/Kant: the only way out: the "ideality of all phenomena" (A 378): We only have direct consciousness of that, which belongs to us. What we perceive, in this sense must depend on our ability (sensitivity, sentience). |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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| Kant | Field I 79 Def Logicism / Field: is the thesis that mathematics is part of logic. This is VsKant: who denies that mathematics is analytic, because the calculations are synthetic. And for the calculations we need the numbers as entities. LogicismVsKant - KantVsLogicism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Kant | Stroud I 140 KantVsSkepticism / Stroud: He wants to prove that the skeptics can never arrive at his conclusion due to the premises, which he accepted. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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