Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Norms | Williams | Putnam I 253 Norms/standards/values/Bernard Williams: Norms and values presuppose the perspective of "some social world" - on the other hand (according to Putnam) physics would offer an absolute metaphysical truth. PutnamVsWilliams: the talk of the "content" of a belief that would be "perspective", lacks any clear meaning. - That was water to the mill of deconstructivism. >Deconstructivism, >Perspective, >Aspects, >Metaphysics, >Truth, >Relativism, >Cultural relativism, >Reality, >World, >World/Thinking. |
WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Theology | Benjamin | Bolz II 14 Theology/Politics/Benjamin: Theology and political thought form a totality that must be thought of as a juxtaposition of extremes. Bolz II 17 Benjamin is often called a witness of historical materialism, negative theology, and even of literary-scientific deconstructivism. >Historical materialism, >Deconstructivism. Bolz II 21 Secularization of theology (1st history-philosophical thesis: theology must seek protection in historical materialism). Bolz II 31 Theology/Benjamin: Exodus from the philosophy in the commentary. >Critique/Benjamin. Benjamin himself hides his metaphysical and theological motifs in his work. Typical formulas: "brush against the stroke" "cover and veiled". Secularization of theology for its salvation. Turn to a "pragmatic" communism. Salvation: salvation is not the goal of history, but its end. >Redemption, cf. >End of History. Bolz II 34 Theology/Benjamin: Because theocracy has no political meaning, the world politics of the political theologian must be nihilistic in order to promote its mental meaning.(1) >Nihilism. This is the scheme according to which Benjamin's studies on Baroque, Baudelaire and Surrealism also articulate a Gnostic protest. It is directed against the return of antiquity on the apex of modernity as it is predicted by Nietzsche in Max Weber's doctrine of Occidental Realism. >Procedural rationality/Weber, >Western Rationalism. Bolz II 35 Eye to eye with fascism, theology is forced into inversion If a free mankind is to seek happiness in the field of history, the dependent mankind must now take a foot in hopelessness. Foot ... not hope. Bolz II 36 Teaching is abolished critique, critique is inverse theology and religion is the "concrete totality of experience".(2) 1. W. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften. Unter Mitwirkung von Th. W. Adorno und Gershom Sholem herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann Schweppenhäuser Frankfurt/M. 1972-89. Bd II, S. 204 2. Ebenda. S. 170 |
Bo I N. Bolz Kurze Geschichte des Scheins München 1991 Bolz II Norbert Bolz Willem van Reijen Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| Truth | Putnam | Rorty I 309 Concept of Truth/truth/Putnam/Rorty: the concept of truth has certain properties. Putnam: if a statement is true, then its logical consequences are also true, when two statements are true, then their conjunction is also true. If a statement is now true, then it is always true. >Logical omniscience. --- Putnam VI 394 Truth has to do with speaker-use (success), not with what is going on "in the head" (> verification degrees, confirmation degrees). >Use, >Convention, >Speaker meaning, >Confirmation, >Verification, >Graduals, >Confirmation degrees. Meaning/Putnam: meaning is also a function of the reference (not only in the head). Reference/Putnam: reference is determined by social practices and actual physical paradigms. --- Harman II 431 Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is a physicalist or phenomenalist (= reductionist) or cultural relativist. >Physicalism, >Reductionism, >Phenomenalism, >Cultural relativism, cf. >Deflationism. --- Horwich I 456 Truth/Putnam: if it was not a property, the truth conditions were everything you could know about them. Putnam: then our thoughts would not be thoughts. >Thoughts. (Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994.) --- Putnam III 96f Truth/deconstructivism/PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida: "The concept of truth itself is inconsistent but indispensable". PutnamVs: the failure of a large number of contradictory statements is something else than a failure of the concept of truth itself. Truth/Putnam: truth is not "what I would believe if I continue researching". Putnam: the philosophy of language got only troubled because they believed that they could clear out the normative. >Norms/Putnam. --- Putnam I (h) 204f Truth/PutnamVsRorty: when some ideas "pay out", then there is the question of the nature of this accuracy. >Truth/Rorty, cf. >Pragmatism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deconstructivism | Dennett Vs Deconstructivism | I 155 DNA / Biology: according to some authors the "gene-centered awareness", i.e. the extent to which the DNA determines the phenotype goes too far. DennettVs: that would be an overestimation of the rading mechnanism over the text, as in >deconstructivism. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Deconstructivism | Searle Vs Deconstructivism | Rorty VI 118 Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstructivism/Rorty: suppose I catch a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me, the carburetor is anyway only text and there was nothing to talk about except on the textuality of this text, then the communication has collapsed. RortyVsSearle: the deconstructionist intellectuals who with happiness found a job as an auto mechanic, it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins. >Deconstructivism. The Deconstructivism has not changed his life, as atheism the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the mental element. Rorty VI 120 Description/action/understanding/Searle: Our practices are incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with not realistic or non representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle). Searle: some propositions may not be questioned without considering the practices themselves in doubt. They are a condition of intelligibility. RortyVsSearle: rhetorical flourishes that will give the practice the appearance to maintain a huge thing, namely, the metaphysical reality. Rorty VI 120 RortyVsSearle: Hard realism leads to metaphysics. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Derrida, J. | Putnam Vs Derrida, J. | III 96 ff However, the typical representatives of relativism paradoxically believe they had made something like a metaphysical discovery. Deconstructivism/Derrida/Putnam: he completes step from relativism to nihillism. This concept of truth is incoherent and belongs to a "metaphysics of presence" (Derrida). Derrida, allegedly: "the concept of truth is inconsistent, but absolutely essential!" PutnamVsDerrida: What do you mean, every use of the word "true" contains a contradiction? III 97 The failure of a number of mutually exclusive philosophical explanations of the concept of truth is something completely different from the failure of the concept of truth itself! LL Wittgenstein: the failure of a number of philosophical analyses of certainty is something other than the failure of the normal concept of certainty. PutnamVsDerrida: but the collapse of a particular worldview is far from being a collapse of the concepts of representation and truth. Because if we equate this metaphysical tradition with our lives and our language, we would be giving metaphysics an entirely exaggerated importance. DerridaVsSaussure: approves this, he criticized Saussure only in that he did not go further and abandoned the concept of the character altogether. III 163 PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida overlooks here that Saussure's way of thinking was based on a utopian project. It had been hoped that a a stringent scientific explanation of the concept of meaning could be given. This hope has failed, but we are not forced to the absurd view that nobody could understand a language other than their own idiolect. Even Derrida himself does not go that far. He recognizes the indispensability of translations indeed. III 164 Solution/Putnam: the alternative to Saussure's view is that retaining the concept of "meaning equality", while realizing that it must not be interpreted in the sense of self-identity of objects called "meaning" or "significate". III 165 Can it be that Derrida makes the same mistake as Jerry Fodor? He does not even consider the possibility that the kind of "meaning equality" aimed at in translation could be an interest-relative (but still very real) relationship, which presupposes a normative judgment, i.e. a judgment about what is reasonable in the individual case. III 168 Derrida/Putnam: his attitude is much harder to pin down. (DerridaVsLogocentrism.) Derrida himself emphasizes that the logocentric quandary was no "pathology" for which he had a cure to offer. We must fall into this quandary by fate. >Logocentrism. By his leftist supporters Derrida has often been interpreted as if this justified even a consistent rejection of the idea of the rational justification. Forgery/Bernstein: "You cannot falsify just anything." Richard BernsteinVsDerrida: what do the texts by Derrida have about them that permits, or even demands this double interpretation? It is ultimately true that "not just anything can be falsified". III 171 PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida's quandary is one in which those fall who, albeit not wanting to be "irresponsible", also want to "problematize" the concepts of reason and truth by teaching that these concepts have failed. His steps amount to the fact that the concepts "rationale", "strong reason", "justification", etc. correspond to repressive practices more than anything. And this view is dangerous indeed, because it offers help and comfort to all sorts of left and right extremists. I (a) 22 PutnamVsDerrida: its criticism of "logocentrism" is not only wrong, but dangerous. I (k) 266 Deconstruction/PutnamVsDerrida: is right in that a certain philosophical tradition (for example, binary logic) is simply bankrupt. But identifying this tradition with our lives and our language is to give metaphysics a completely exaggerated importance. Meaning Equality/PutnamVsDerrida: is actually an interest-relative one! It contains a judgment about what is reasonable in each case. I (k) 273 PutnamVsDerrida: deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility. >Deconstructionism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Searle, J.R. | Rorty Vs Searle, J.R. | VI 109 Correspondence Theory/Searle: is of moral or social importance. RortyVsSearle: that amalgamates the philosophical with the non-philosophical meaning of the term "exact representation". >Correctness/Rorty. VI 110 SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to satisfy all competent bodies that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty). VI 118 Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstuctivism/Rorty: let us assume I happened upon a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me that the carburetor is only text anyway and there was nothing to talk about except the textuality of this text, then communication has collapsed. >Deconstructivism. RortyVsSearle: for the deconstructionist intellectuals who were lucky enough to find a spot as auto mechanics it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins. The deconstruction has not changed his life than atheism changed the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the spiritual element. Description/Action/Understanding/Searle: Our practices become incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with non-realistic or non-representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle). Searle: some sentences cannot be questioned without questioning the practices themselves. They are a condition of intelligibility. RortyVsSearle: rhetorical frills that are supposed to give practice the appearance of holding on to a huge thing, namely metaphysical reality. VI 121 Intrinsic/Extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: if this distinction is abolished, we can dispense with the idea of there being a difference between the pursuit of happiness and the pursuit of truth in nature or humanities. >Intrinsic, >extrinsic. VI 140 RortyVsSearle: our approach to the world is not the frame (Searle: background) which allows mapping (VsRepresentation). Language/Representation/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "getting along". (Taylor: "Handling"). Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation. VI 141 Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. VI 157 RortyVsSearle: we must separate two distinctions: physical/non-physical objects us/"the world" E.g. Sherlock Holmes, the number 17, the rules of chess: it is not a matter of them not having a "place in the world", but of us not expecting that our relevant beliefs will change by physics (as "cultural overall activity"). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Deconstrucivism | Quine, W.V.O. | II 267 Def deconstructivism / Putnam: no meaning can ever be expressed in more than one language, and no two languages can express the same meaning. |
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