Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adverbs | Evans | II 211 Adverb/Evans: Standard adverbs: Example "breathless". Intensional adverbs: Example "good as King". Both receive the separation rule SR as valid - none involves functions of sets to subsets. Davidson: Separation rule: attribution of sets of events to adverbs and sets of n+1-tuples, of events and n-tuples of objects, to verbs. Problem: to find an appropriate separation rule for "good". II 220 Adverb/Evans: an adverb is assigned to a set of events: it really is a (single or multi-digit) predicate. E.g., "carefree": sentence adverb - "before": no sentence link. Definite Description/Evans: not a term. >Descriptions. BrandomVsEvans: a description is in fact a term. >Descriptions/Brandom. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Articles | Kamp | Cresswell I 175 Definite descriptions/Cresswell: so far we have only spoken about undefined descriptions! Undefined descriptions/Russell. Thesis: a man means "at least a man". Certain descriptions/Russell. Thesis: the man means "this particular man". Anaphora/HintikkaVsRussell: the tradition has no explanation for the anaphoric use of certain descriptions. Article/Cresswell: recent attempts to integrate the old linguistic idea into the traditional logic that the indefinite article introduces new objects in the speech while the definite article refers to already introduced entities. This corresponds to: Article/Kempson: (1975, 111)(1): thesis: definite/indefinite article should be distinguished not semantically but only pragmatically. Article/old/new/file change semantics/Heim/Cresswell: the distinction between old and new entities in connection with the article is also found in Heim (1983). I 176 There it leads to the file change semantics/Kamp/Heim: Thesis: as entities in the world the objects are not new, but only within the speech, therefore "files". (Files, "new in the files"). Definiton file/Heim/Cresswell: a file represents facts about objects for the speaker. >File change semantics, (1) Ruth M. Kempson (1975): Presupposition and the delimitation of semantics (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics, 15). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Attribution | Millikan | Ruth G. Millikan Verschiedene Arten von zweckgerichtetem Verhalten in Dominik Perler, Markus Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 II 212 Animal/Thinking/Belief/propositional content/Millikan: what would really be necessary would not be a translation into Englisch, but an explicit description of the different representation systems that animals actually use. There are numerous possibilities between the propositional thinking of the human and the absence of any thought. >World/thinking, >Language and thought, >Animal language, >Representation. --- Millikan I 219 Indefinite Description/Belief Attribution/Millikan: E.g.: "Ralph believes that someone is a spy": this is, of course, ambiguous. A) directly as indicative by its own type on the belief type that "someone is a spy". That is, Ralph says this in his inner. B) the dependent sentence "someone is a spy" can be read as a form of belief, with a gap. "___ is a spy". N.B.: in this reading, Ralph believes of someone that he is a spy ((s) de re). Moved function: this moves the "someone" to the outside of the sentence. "He": its moved function is referential in this context. >Reference, >de re, >de dicto. I 220 Both readings are about a relation between Ralph and a belief type. In case (b), this type is not completely determined. >The Ralph case/Quine. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Concepts | Schiffer | I 63 Def Individual concept/Naturally/Russell: "the P" that is the property of unambiguously having P - nothing else has it - may contain yourself and the present moment. >Individual concept. Definite description: the thing that is now R (relation) for me = reduction to thoughts de re. >Description, >Definite description. (EP) (Emily instantiates the P and the B (Ralph The proposition >Individuation, >Uniqueness, cf. >One. I 66 Problem/Schiffer: that is not sufficient for believing that something is a dog, because you can believe that something belongs to a biological genotype, without believing that it is a dog. >Elm Trees/Beech Trees. Wrong: "species of these things" - could be mammal, pet, male, spaniel etc. >Reference class. Complete content: is never of biological nature: it does not work with children. - E.g. shepherd dog is more wolf-like than a poodle. I 68 Not a metalingual individual concept: "What experts call a dog": 1) not manageable 2) no property that only dogs have. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Descriptions | Brandom | I 438 Description/pragmatism/Brandom: it does not describe anything if you call it true. >Pragmatism. I 444 Indefinite Descriptions/Russell: no singularly referring terms - Solution: quantifying paraphrase. >Quantification. New/Brandom: purely referencing function possible: they can initiate an anaphoric chain which can be continued with pronouns or specific descriptions. I 447/8 Description/Brandom: (indirectly defined): understood as pronoun, which contains a description of the anaphoric predecessor - E.g. computer: the same expression can be a value or an instruction (address of a value). >Pronouns. I 449 Pronoun-generating operator "refers to" - Example of mechanic, who was called "such a bonehead" by Hans, has failed. I 451 Differently: "... whom he had offended with such a bonehead ...". >Reference. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Descriptions | Cresswell | I 184 Description/Quantification/Cresswell: definite and indefinite descriptions are not quantifiers - the bond is in the depth structure. >Quantifiers, Deep structure, E.g. if you offer each boy a job, some boy will refuse it - "it" signals no variable bound by "a job", however quantification in depth. >Quantification. II 47f Theory of descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: according to Russell e.g. (24) BELIEVE (a, x) u x e . β . L) is possible, because "The planet which is called "Phosphorus"" can occur outside the range of the modal operator. >Scope, >Modal operator, >Names, >Morning star/Evening star, >Theory of descriptions/Russell. II 48 N.B: this allows us to talk about the thing that is actually called "Phosphorus" and ask what happens when it is not called like this. ((s) Out of reach of the modal operator: allows unambiguous reference to the thing). II 140 Theory of descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: Thesis: a particular description is in the same syntactic category as a quantifier, e.g. "Someone" problem: E.g. "Someone does not come" does not mean the same as "It is not the case that someone comes". >Someone/Geach. Solution/Russell: different ranges in modal and doxastic contexts - A) (narrow range) "the person next door lives next door" is logically equivalent with "exactly one person lives next door" and therefore it is in a sense necessarily true. B) (wide range) it is true that the person next door could also have lived somewhere else (so it is contingent). >Narrow/wide, >Exactly one, >Necessity, >Contingency. II 149 Theory of descriptions/Russell/Kripke/Cresswell: Kripke per Russell with regard to descriptions - not only with regard to names. >Descriptions/Kripke, >Names/Kripke. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Descriptions | Lewis | I (a) 10 Description/Lewis: it always is also about the meaning of the terms used. - Therefore, it is pointless to point out several differences. Description: a true sentence about things of any kind as such is not about those things by themselves, but about them together with the meaning of the expressions you use. It is therefore useless to point out various differences. In the case of >identity theory, we can explain these differences without denying the body/mind identity. Detailed descriptions lead to deviations due to the expressions used. IV 240 Definite Description/Lewis: necessary: something outstanding, relative prominence - not: uniqueness. - The prominence changes constantly during the conversation. Denotation by a definite description then depends on the score keeping. >Scorekeeping model. Alignment rule: Prominence of an object is affected by the course of the conversation. Boundaries/Lewis: it is easier to expand the boundaries than to narrow them. --- I (b) 26/27 Failed descriptions are not meaningless. (Putnam: the theoretical terms of a refuted theory are meaningless.) LewisVsPutnam: they are not, if they are similar failed descriptions. "The Mars moon" and "The Venus moon" name nothing here in our real world (in any normal way); but they are not meaningless, because we know very well what they denote in certain other possible worlds. >Senseless/ Sensible, >Possible world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Descriptions | Millikan | I 175 Description/Millikan: we are here to find out what the stabilization function of definite and indefinite descriptions is. >Terminology/Millikan. We have to go on our own. We cannot rely on the tradition of Russell-Trawson-Donnellan. Reference/MillikanVsStrawson: we must assume that it is not just speakers who are referring, but we must assume that the linguistic expressions themselves also refer. I 176 Indefinite description/real value/Millikan: The real value is determined by the rest of the sentence, not by the indefinite description itself. I 177 Reference: is something different than an image! Indefinite description: maps, but without referring! Inner name: it is not the task of an indefinite desription to be translated into an inner name. Their normal eigenfunction is to be translated into an inner description, which still contains a general expression. I 178 Indefinite description: an indefinite description as a whole, is not a referential term. Tradition: has assumed however e.g. "an Indian friend of mine gave me this". Here I think of Rakesh. MillikanVsTradition: this leads to confusion. I leave the referent open on purpose. Reference: it is certainly true that I intended Rakesh, so I will also refer to him. N.B.: if Rakesh asks me later: "Did you tell them about me?" The correct answer is "No!". Eigenfunction/Descripion/Millikan: the eigenunction is not here to be translated into an inner name for Rakesh. On the other hand: Natural sign: is causally dependent. And the identification was finally caused by Rakesh, who gave me the book. >Identification, >Reference. I 179 Causality/description/real value/Millikan: The causal connection of an intentional icon with its real value makes it possible for the listener to use it as a natural sign. >Causality, >Causal theory of knowledge. N.B.: thus a new inner name can be coined. ((s) Not an already existing inner name). Definition "natural referent"/indefinite description/Terminology/Millikan: any indefinite description has a real value in accordance with a normal explanation, the "natural referents". This also applies to stories (fiction). But this is not a public reference. Here, causality and mapping rules do not matter. >Fiction. Public referent/Millikan: a definite description or name can have (by chance) a public referent, without having a natural referent. Therefore an indefinite description can have a natural one without having a public one. I 181 Real value/definite descripion/Millikan: the real value of a definite description is determined by the rest of the sentence. E.g.: Which of my friends was it? The one who gave me the book. I 185 Description/Millikan. E.g. "my brother" is neither definite nor indefinite. I can use the description if I have one or more brothers. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Game-theoretical Semantics | Kamp | Cresswell I 179 Game-theoretical semantics/CresswellVsHintikka: Hintikka and Kulas (1985)(1) have not made any discoveries that would not have been made by Kamp (1983)(2) and Heim (1983)(3) as well. I 180 Example: (1) Everyone loves someone. This is about two different ranges. Λ-categorial language: (2) ((s) Everyone is so that someone is so that the former likes the latter, without quantification. > Lambda notation/Cresswell). and (3) <<λy, < everyone, <λx, 1. Hintikka J. & Kulas J. (1985): Definite Descriptions. In: Anaphora and Definite Descriptions. Synthese Language Library (Texts and Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy), Vol. 26. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5410-6_2. 2. Kamp, H. & Rohrer, C. (1983): Tense in texts. Meaning, use and interpretation of language 250, 269. 3. Heim, I. (1983): Formal Semantics - the Essential Readings. In: P. Portner & B. H. Partee (eds.), Blackwell. pp. 249-260. |
Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Introduction | Millikan | I 82 New words/novelty/introduction/Millikan: the newly introduced word has an eigenfunction which is derived not only from the speaker's intentions, but also from the public stabilization function of the introduction. As such, it has a public significance. I 144 Introduction/Conviction/Belief/Intentional Icon/Millikan: 1. People have mechanisms - "consistency testers" - who test the consistency of their sentences. 2. Syntactic forms are produced by programs that are tested themselves. Problem: we must show why a sentence should be an intentional icon. The key will be to find an eigenfunction... I 145 ...for each sentence used by the consistency testers as a standard. >Terminology/Millikan. Ad 1. Assume that a token is repeated and has survived, is recognized, and acquires an eigenfunction. The fact that it passes the text, helps to stabilize itself. If all aspects of a sentence are elements of families, the sentence as a whole must meet condition 1. Ad 2. the consistency-tester distinguishes between pairs of sentences that are a) contradictions, b) say the same, c) are neither contradictions, nor say the same. For this, the author has to recognize the sentences that say the same, and recognize negation as a negation. New words: must be new due to the phonetic structure. Tester: must be genetically programmed to invent new words. I 146 New words and testers are designed to fit together. New programs: are only good when they help to produce sentences according to rules that have reasons. The reasons must mention the conditions under which they often work, and they must also mention laws of nature that connect sentences with what is mapped. Information: in this way sentences must transport information. (> F. Dretske: Knowledge and the Flow of Information, 1981). Solution: the consistency tester does this by comparing sentences produced by other programs with a sentence S. If S performs an eigenfunction according to the same mapping function, the consistency tester adapts to the conditions in the world so that it can now test these other programs! N.B.: hence S is an intentional icon. I 183 Introduction/reference/definite description/inner name/Millikan: If you translate a description into an inner name, must it be one that already exists, or can it be coined newly? For the moment, it is enough to distinguish these two possibilities. Terminology/Millikan: we then speak of "old" and "new" referents. Inner name/definite description/Millikan: The inner name used by the listener for the definite description must be governed by a concept. >Description. I 184 E.g. I have a concept of the members of my family. ((s) "concept" instead of "idea"). I 186 Introduction/identifying/identification/description/Millikan: a description that (by chance) introduces a referent does not express this by itself. >Identification. Necessarily identifying: a necessarily identifying description, however, expresses that it is identifying. ((s) self-reference: is something else than expressing its own function in the execution). I 211 Introduction/novelty/new/Millikan: When we introduce a whole new expression with referencing quotes, we refer to a reproductively determined family. In addition, the new symbol should at least in part consist of already known elements or aspects. Otherwise, the token does not fall within any schema equal/different, which is necessary to recognize the progeny of this expression (tokens of the same type). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Leibniz Principle | Cresswell | I 127 Leibniz Principle/Identity/Cresswell: a) metaphysical (uncontroversial): indistinguishability b) linguistically: substitutability. >Indistinguishability, >Substitution. Problem: in the context of reference: are descriptions real qualifying words? >Reference, >Descriptions, >Designation. Indefinite description: no one believes that it is referring. Exception: Epsilon Operator/Hilbert: εxF (x): "an x such that F (x)". Indefinite description: here the Leibniz-Principle does not apply. ((s) Explanation: Example mathematics: √4: +2 or -2. These are not indistinguishable). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Natural Deduction | Wessel | I 201 Natural deduction/quantifier logic: here we have only definite descriptions; individual constants construed only as abbreviations for definite individual terms, not as a variable. >Variables, >Individual constants, >Descriptions, >Definite descriptions, >Singular terms. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Proper Names | Cresswell | I 174 Name/proper names/Cresswell: Names could also predicates! (1985a(1), 153) maybe Pedro means "is called "Pedro"". >Descriptions, >Predicates. II 44 Names/meaning/bearer/Cresswell: Problem: if the meanings of the name are the bearers, then "Quentin says that Hesperus is Phosphorus" should mean the same as "Quentin says Phosphorus is Phosphorus." (Attribution of propositional attitudes). >Propositional attitudes, >Morning star/evening star, >Identity. II 152 Name/VsDescription-Theory/Cresswell: e.g. a description "the thing that is called "Phosphorus"" singles out a whole class of things. - Therefore it is ambiguous. >Ambiguity, >Definite descriptions, >Phosphorus/Hesperus. 1. Cresswell, M.J. (1985a). Structured Meanings. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Reliability Theory | Millikan | I 252 Reliability/knowledge/thinking/Millikan: Thesis: to know what I think is to have a program in me that can carry out the correct acts of identification, of the referents of my current thought-token. Gradual: how good I am is gradual and depends on my dexterity and reliability. This helps me when I know a lot about the object. Thereby, repititions of the name of the thing are earlier acts of identification, and thus more intensions that facilitate my access to the thing. Problem: these intensions themselves must also be reliable. >Intension. I 253 Intension/Millikan: the intensions which I have of an object must also have had occasion to be applied. For example, "My great grandfather on my father's side a hundred generations before me" is a definite description, but hardly tangible as an intension. Therefore it may be that I do not know what object I think of. >Description. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Representation | Millikan | Ruth G. Millikan Verschiedene Arten von zweckgerichtetem Verhalten in Dominik Perler, Markus Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 II 208 Representation/Millikan: representations are very abstract models: e.g. English sentences as representations: significant changes (by substitution) in the sentences usually correspond to changes of the things of which the sentences are about. >Compositionality. Neural networks: probably abstract models represent "maps" or designs for the environment. >Picture theory. --- I 12 Representation/Millikan: sentences, thoughts, belief, convictions are representations. They are different from general intentionality. For example, bee dance: no representation. I 13 Representation: exercises its eigenfunction only if the referent is identified. I 140 Representation/Intentionality/Rationality/Millikan: Representation presupposes intentionality and does not explain it. Involvement in inferences is indeed part of what makes a desire to a representation, but is not part of what makes it intentional, intentionality and rationality are not two sides of a medal. I 199 No representation: e.g. "Cicero is Tullius" (identity): here, the word types "Cicero" and "Tullius" are not representative referents of tokens "Cicero" and "Tullius", but only protoreferents ((s) lowest types). Protoreferent/Millikan: Example 1. The word type "Cicero" is the protoreferent of "Cicero". 2. Cicero himself (the person) is also protoreferent of "Cicero", for "Cicero is Tullius" maps that "Tullius" names Cicero. I 200 Representation: but "Cicero" is not a representation (in an identity statement). The use of "A" in "A is B" is a parasitic use. Solution: the function of "A" is here not to be translated into an inner term, but to create a change in the concept which governs the use of the inner term into which "A" is usually translated. E.g. "The Lady is a vixen": Here "vixen" is not translated as "female fox". Shifted function: The representative referential function is shifted. I 224 Representation/Negation/Millikan: Thesis: negative representations have indeterminate meaning. ((s) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences). >Negation/Millikan. Millikan: as with indefinite descriptions, the real values are determined when they occur in true sentences, but they do not have to be identifiable for the listener to fulfill their eigenfunction. >Terminology/Millikan, >Description. I 331 Representation/Millikan: representation differs from image in that it should map according to certain rules. These rules are defined by the same history that turns the representations into representations. ((s) > naturalism/Millikan). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Sets | Millikan | I 181 Definition necessary identifying/quantity/containment/elements/definite description/Millikan: e.g. Superlative. N.B.: if there are several authors of e.g. Principia Mathematica it is wrong to speak of "the author of Principia Mathematica". E.g. Brutus was one of several murderers of Caesar. Wrong: "Brutus murdered Caesar" (!) - wrong: Brutus was the murderer of Caesar. Solution/Millikan: descriptions that attribute responsibility are necessary indentifying. ((s) They must not vary between singular and plural). >Description, >Identification. Necessary identifying/definite description/solution/Millikan: refer to parts of collectives, not to elements of sets. ((s) "to be murderer of Caesar" does not constitute a set, but a collective). E.g. from "Bill is one of John's sons" follows Bill is John's son. But: For example, "Brutus was one of Caesar's murderers" does not follow "Brutus was Caesar's murderer". ((s) being-son forms a set, being-murder does not). I 182 Superlative/definite description/unambiguous/Millikan: For example, if there are several largest, that are of the same size, it is wrong to say "everyone is the largest". >Ambiguity. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Verification | Millikan | I 297 Verification/Knowledge/Epistemology/Realism/Naturalism/Millikan: our problem of the recognition of identities is different from the ordinary recognition problem of the realists. With us, it is not about the existence of an inner test for the correct image of the world. We just need to show that there can be tests that... I 298 ...determine whether concepts, when applied under normal conditions, can produce mapped sentences. Correspondence/Coherence/Tradition/Millikan: for the tradition it must be coherence, if correspondence is not the right one. >Correspondence/Millican, >Correspondence theory/Millikan. Test/Millikan: E.g. the heart can only be tested together with kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/image/Millikan: we are only trying to understand how there can be a test that has historically been applied to human concepts in this world, and whose results are correlated with the world for reasons, which we can specify. Problem: we are more handicapped here than the realism. I 299 It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all. Holism/MillikanVsHolism: epistemic holism is wrong. >Holism/Millikan. Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if applied only to a small set of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts. >Adequacy/Millikan. I 312 Concept/Law/Theory/Test/Review/Millikan: if a term occurs in a law it is necessary,... I 313 ...to test it together with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain conclusion rules. Concept/Millikan: since concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean that the occurrence of sense data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). I 317 Theory/Review/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition: says that not only some, but most of our concepts are not of things we observe directly but from other things. Test/Logical Form/Millikan: if there is a thing A, that is identified by observing effects on B and C, is then the validity of the concepts of B and C together with the theory that traces back the observed effects on the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan: No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts governing B and C is tested when the concept governing A is tested and vice versa. This is not the case if A is a definite description, for example, the "first president of the USA", and it does not follow if the explicit intension of A represents something causally dependent. For example, "the mercury in the thermometer rose to the mark 70" as an intension for "the temperature was 70 degrees". I 318 Concept/Millikan: Concepts are abilities - the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: e.g. my ability to make a good cake is quite independent of my ability to smash eggs, even if I have to smash eggs to make the cake. >Concept/Millikan. I 320 Test/review/theory/Millikan: That a test works can often be known regardless of knowing how it works. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Antireductionism | Lewis Vs Antireductionism | Schwarz I 216 Possible Worlds/poss.w./meaning/conditional theory/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. objects can only be a possible world if there is a corresponding object for each mode a world could be. This is why possible worlds cannot be sets of common sentences since there is not enough of them. ((s) >Language has not enough sentences to express all the possibilities.) >Ersatz Worlds as sets of sentences. Possible World/LewisVsAnti-Reductionism/Schwarz: interestingly, he is also using the same argument against anti-reductionist theories for which possible worlds are basic metaphysical facts. The name "possible world in which donkeys are able to talk" can only be given to an object if it somehow represents talking donkeys. Schwarz I 217 Possible World/representation/Lewis/Schwarz: for Lewis, possible worlds are nothing else than 1:1 models. How can this work for irreducible abstract entities? This is why it remains open whether proposed candidates actually could be possible worlds (1986e, 184)(1). Problem: some basic entities do not fulfill those conditions (if reduction failed). Not even in Laws of Nature (LoN) and objective probabilities. Objective probability is characterized by the Principal Principle and therefore implies subjective probability. But why should I assume that an event is going to happen only because I learn that an irreducible element, which is logically independent from the event happening, possesses the value 0.9 (1994a,239)(2)?. This is why something should not be called "chance". Reference/Lewis: reference therefore represents a sort of theory of definite description of the reference. Thesis: terms such as "possible world", "meaning", "pain", "objective probability" are associated with roles which describe what they refer to. How those roles are defined is explained by Lewis in "How to define theoretical terms" (1970c)(3). >Theoretical Terms. 1. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 2. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 3. D. Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Attributes | Quine Vs Attributes | III 262 General Terms/Quine: are represented by predicate letters such as "F", "G", etc. (§ 12.22, where they were simply called "Termini"). Universality/Quine: is not ambiguity! Ex ambiguous: is the singular term "Miller"! It can refer to different people in different contexts. Similarly: Singular Term: "the basement", "the President" ((s) >indefinite description). General Term: "basement", "President". Concrete Term: "Cerberus", "Unicorn" Abstract Term: "7", "3 + 4", "piety" terms for numbers, classes, attributes. Concrete General Term: "man", "red house", "house". Abstract General Term/Quine: "prime", "zoological genus", "virtue", because every virtue and every number and every species is an abstract object. ((s) then "piety" is an abstract singular term). Attribute/Quine: I do not care much for them as entities that are supposed to be different from classes. III 263 Attributes: can be considered different, even if they apply to the same things. E.g. "having a heart", "having kindneys". Classes/QuineVsAttributes: classes are easier to identify and to distinguish. If we must distinguish, then: Attribute/Quine: e.g. "human nature": Name of an attribute. Class Name/Name of a Class/Quine: "humanity". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Naming | Cresswell, M.J. | I 31 Cresswell (1973) thesis: very few subject terms designate entities, even those as definite descriptions. E.g. (S 131 ff): "Fido" could be constructed as definite description. |
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| Description | Cresswell, M.J. | I 175 Certain Descriptions/Cresswell: so far we have only talked about indefinite ones! Indefinite Description/Russell: Thesis: a man means "at least a man". Certain Description/Russell: Thesis: the man means "this particular man". Anaphora/HintikkaVsRussell: tradition has no explanation for the anaphoric use of certain descriptions. Article/Cresswell: more recent attempts: to incorporate the old linguistic idea into traditional logic, that the indefinite article introduces new objects into speech, while the definite article refers to already introduced entities. This corresponds to: Article/Kempson: (1975, 111): Thesis: definite/indefinite articles should not be distinguished semantically, but only pragmatically. Old/new/article/file change semantics/Heim/Cresswell: the distinction between old and new entities in connection with the article can also be found in Heim (1983). I 176 There it leads to file change semantics/Kamp/Heim: Thesis: as entities in the world, the objects are not new, but only within the speech, hence "files". ("files", "new in the files"). Def File/Heim/Cresswell: represents facts about objects for the speaker. |
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