Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Brain/Brain State Rorty I 142
Science/Rorty: if science can not explain how the brain works, this will not threaten its "unity". E.g. Even if it turned out that neurons are distracted by unknown forces, that would not confirm Descartes. >Brain/Penrose, >Eccles/Popper.
I 269
We need not ontologically separate between nostalgia and neurons, to be sure that we are nostalgic.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Determinism Popper McGinn I 135
Freedom/domestication theory/indeterministical/McGinn: Thesis: only an acausal model could meet the freedom modality. If you say the actor was able to act otherwise, one must believe that a repeat would not lead to a decision that would be determined.
(Accordingly some are of the opinion, freedom must be rooted in quantum indeterminacy.) E.g.

Eccles/Popper: Thesis: Random events at the subatomic level in the brain are responsible.
See >Eccles/Popper.

McGinnVsEccles/McGinnVsPopper: desperate responses to problems of the first type: randomness on the deepest level is required. Then the actor is quasi a passive victim of quantum leaps.
Both types of explanation are not satisfactory, the assumed similarities are distortions.

Po I
Karl Popper
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959
German Edition:
Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Dualism Pauen Pauen I 35
Dualism/Pauen: two types of states that can also occur independently - interactionist dualism: mutual influence: Descartes (>Dualism/Descartes), >Eccles/Popper. - >Property dualism: certain neural processes have not only their physical characteristics but additionally also mental characteristics that are theoretically independent of the neural - Typical theory: computer analogy (>Computation), >Martians, etc.
I 60
Consciousness as an autonomous property.
I 38
Dualism/Pauen: 1. explanation for the uniformity of our experiences in light of the diversity of physical realizations (> Multiple realization). Integration performance of the free mind - 2. Explanation of >free will.
I 39
3. Pro dualism: VsMonism: Problem of qualitative varied experience by uniform activity of nerve cells
I 56
VsDualismus: has no concrete research subject.
I 44
Descartes/Pauen: the distinction of substances can be justified by the imaginability of such a distinction. The argument still plays an important role today: - Kripke uses it as the basis for its objection VsIdentifikation of mental and neural processes. (>Identity Theory).

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001


The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Determinism Eccles Vs Determinism Pauen I 51
Bewusstsein/Popper/Pauen: nicht Substanz, sondern Prozeß. VsPopper/Pauen: da es sich ausschließlich um ein nicht physisches Phänomen handelt, kommt es zum Konflikt mit dem Prinzip der kausalen Geschlossenheit.
Tatsächlich besteht Popper auf der Offenheit der physischen Welt.
Eccles/Popper: (1989): Lösung: psychophysische Interaktion wird als Steuerung aufgefaßt.
Damit scheint gemeint zu sein, dass der Geist nicht das Ausmaß der Aktivität bestimmt, aber die Richtung. (Energieerhaltungssatz).
Eccles/PopperVsDeterminismus: die Quantenmechanik verletzt ihn, und also die ganze Welt. (Vs: man muss die Unterscheidung Mikro/Makro aufrechterhalten).

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Eccles, J.C. Pauen Vs Eccles, J.C. Pauen I 52
Def Psychons/Eccles: the smallest elements of mental states. Their activity only changes the probability of the release of transmitters. Therefore no conflict with energy conservation. Solution: quantum-mechanical deviations. (>Consciousness/Penrose). Eccles/Pauen: with this he approaches substance dualism again! Psychons are not properties, but independent entities that instantiate consciousness.
Only dualism can ensure the free will (like Popper).
Eccles/Popper: Thesis: the self-conscious mind is busy actively modifying brain events in accordance with its interests.
Def Attachment Problem/Pauen: in view of the diversity of neuronal activity, the consistency of the first-person perspective can be explained only by the intervention of a conscious mind, but not by the neuronal activities.
I 53
Attachment Problem/Pauen: there are now concrete neuro-biological proposals for a solution. Attachment Problem/Eccles: brings empirical evidence: Libet. "Ability of self-conscious mind" to perform "temporal tricks".
Mind/Consciousness/Brain/Experiment/Benjamin Libet/Pauen: e.g. weak skin stimuli are only registered after 0.5 sec, but are dated back to the time when they actually occurred.
Mind/Brain/Experiment/Kornhuber: even in the complete absence of physical stimuli neuronal activity can be caused solely by mental processes.
EcclesVsMaterialism/EcclesVsIdentity Theory: unscientific superstition.
PauenVsEccles: it is unclear whether the undisputed effects of the ideal world 3 on the physical world 1 can only be explained under the assumption of the existence of autonomous mental processes.
E.g. If a glass breaks while a soprano singer is practicing, this explanation is inadmissible in any case!
I 54
E.g. congresses have undisputed physical procedures, but they can all be explained intra-physically. E.g. the energy balance in the congress center. The mere discovery of a new method does not bring the scientists together. Only if acts of will were found that cannot be explained neurobiologically, the position of the monists would be shaken.
I 55
VsEccles: he claims to possess such evidence, but the experiments by Libet and Kornhuber do not yield that: the results could only be evaluated as products of autonomous mental acts if physical causes can be excluded, and the experiments did not show that in the least. Since the brain has the ability to maintain activity for long periods even without external stimuli, also seemingly "spontaneous" reactions can be explained neurobiologically.
M.Pauen
I Michael Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes, Frankfurt (Fischer) 2001
Identity Theory Popper Vs Identity Theory Vollmer II 96
Eccles/PopperVsIdentity Theory: it is incompatible with the theory of evolution. If evolutionary advantages are realized already in the physical givenness, the "internal aspect" of consciousness, of the psychical world is no longer needed. Because if the physical structures already have this benefit, then the advantage would also exist if the structures did not have this inner aspect. (>Epiphenomenalism); more entries for >Eccles/Popper.

Po I
Karl Popper
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959
German Edition:
Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Popper, K. McGinn Vs Popper, K. I 137
Popper/Eccles: hold that freedom must be rooted in quantum mechanical indeterminacy. Ex Eccles/Popper: random events on the subatomic level in the brain are responsible. McGinnVs b): (Eccles/Popper): desperate response to problems of the first type: randomness on the deepest level is required. Then the actor is a quasi passive victim of quantum leaps. Both types of explanation are not satisfactory, the assumed similarities are distortions.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Popper, K. Vollmer Vs Popper, K. II 84
VsInteractionism/VsEccles: where does the interaction take place? Eccles: in the "liaison areas" VollmerVsEccles: this is of course only a shift: where are the "liaison areas" located? How does the interaction come about?
Eccles/Popper: (monism) Thesis: the self-confident mind is active in reading from the multitude of active centers at the highest level of brain activity...directing its attention to these centers and integrating its selection so that even the most fleeting experiences are brought together into one unit. The self-confident mind also works by changing the spatiotemporal pattern of neuronal processes ...the searchlight offers an analogy. A scanning device, a probe...
II 85
VollmerVsEccles/VollmerVsPopper: nothing is gained by vague analogies. Nor does he make any suggestion as to how his hypotheses should be tested. What he thinks is new is the independent activity of the mind, the search for uniform interpretation. But that is exactly what we want to explain! This is reminiscent of the
e.g. explanation of the telegraph principle: "It's like a dachshund: if you pinch at the back, it barks at the front". "And what about wireless telegraphy?" "Just like that, but without the dachshund."
I 74
Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: does not describe the evolution of knowledge (like Popper) but our abilities.
I 75
VollmerVsPopper: his theory of world 3 and his body soul dualism are not compatible with the evolutionary epistemology.
I 278
LewontinVsPopper: a theory that does not make forecasts can be testable, and thus empirical! VollmerVsPopper: it could be shown that selection theory makes verifiable predictions!
Popper has long since withdrawn his criticism of the theory of evolution!

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Repres.-Materialism. Eccles J./Popper, K. Danto I 282
Repräsentations-Materialismus/RM/Eccles/Popper/Danto: These die Auffassung, dass niemand weiß, wie die Einwirkung eines körperlosen Geistes zu beweisen ist. Bestenfalls kann man für ihre Wahrscheinlichkeit plädieren. Repräsentation können Klangwellen, Tinte, usw. sein. These der RM behauptet allen Ernstes, dass es im Universum 2 Arten von Materie gibt, repräsentationale und nichtrepräsentationale. Metaphysik: derzufolge gewisse Teile der Welt sich anschicken, die Welt zu repräsentieren, was natürlich auch einschließt, das diese Teile nicht nur die Welt, sondern ebenfalls die Tatsache repräsentieren, dass sie es tun.
Repräsentationswesen: wir und die Tiere erleuchten schlagartig die Welt und sich selber. (>Teilhard).

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005