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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asymmetry | Chalmers | I 101 Asymmetry/epistemic asymmetry/Chalmers: if we had all the physical facts about the world, the existence of consciousness would not follow from them. >Facts, >Consciousness. I 102 The fact that there is consciousness at all comes first-hand from my experience in the first person, not from any external observation. All that could be inferred from the known physical and biological facts is that there are people who claim to have a consciousness. Eliminativism/Chalmers: is an irrational position for us only because of our own personal experience. Epistemic asymmetry/Chalmers: is that we have insights about our consciousness only from our own consciousness. This asymmetry does not apply to other economies, other lives, etc. Reason: these are supervening logically on the physical. >Supervenience, >Epistemology. Consciousness: If it were logically supervenient on the physical, the epistemic asymmetry would not exist. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Beliefs | Schiffer | I 273 Def subdoxastic/Stich: (1978): a subdoxastic state is not a religious state, but an information-bearing state. You are unconscious and inferentially insulated from beliefs. >Unconsious, >Belief state, >Beliefs, >Inference. E.g. if there is a transformational grammar, then the states they would represent would be subdoxastic. Schiffer thesis: language processing is done through a series of internal subdoxastic states. 1. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Beliefs and subdoxastic states. In: Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518 --- I 26 Belief/Schiffer: problem: such a psychological theory does not create the meaning of beliefs. - Solution: functionalist reduction. >Psycho functionalism. Ultimately: "Bel = def 1st element of an ordered pair of functions that satisfies T (f,g) "... ((s) from which the theory says that it is belief) ...) - ((s) "Loar-style"). >Meaning theory/Loar. I 28 Schiffer: It is already presupposed that one forms beliefs and desires as functions of propositions on (sets of) internal Z-types. >Functional role/Schiffer. The criterion that a Z-token is n a belief, that p is, that n is a token of a Z-type which has the functional role, that correlates the definition of bel T with p. I 150 Belief property/SchifferVs: if belief properties existed, they would not be irreducible (absurd). - ((s) It is already proven for Schiffer that there is a neural proposition for E.g. stepping back from a car.) This is the cause - then we have a mental proposition in addition. This is then not supported by any counterfactual conditional. Counterfactual conditional/(s): indicates whether something is superfluous - or whether it is then sufficient as an explanation. >Counterfactual conditionals. I 155 Belief properties/Schiffer: presumed they existed (language-independent), then they should be simple (non-assembled), i.e. no function of other things. Vs: E.g. the proposition, to love Thatcher is composed of love and Thatcher - but belief is no such relation (see above). Problem: if belief properties are semantically simple, then there is an infinite number of them. - Then language learning is impossible. >Language acquisition, >Learning. I 163 Belief predicates: less problematic than belief properties: irreducibility out of conceptual role. >Conceptual role. E.g. Ava would not have stepped back if she did not have the belief property that a car is coming. Conceptually and ontologically independent of the singular term "The EC of the belief that a car comes" This is a benign predicate-dualism (in terms of conceptual roles). It has no causal power. Pleonastic: Ava stepped back because she had the belief property... I 164 Belief/(s): Where, Ava believes that a car is coming, she believes this in every possible world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual world. Problem: that cannot be proven - but is probably true. Then ultimately, she stepped back, because she was in the neural state... SchifferVsEliminativism/SchifferVsChurchland: the eliminativism should then have the result that nobody believes anything. >Eliminativism, >Reductionism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Elimination | Churchland | Schiffer I 159 Eliminativism/Churchland/Schiffer: (Paul Churchland 1981)(1): his eliminativism is quite different from that of Quine: Here the irreducibility of intentional vocabulary is denied. Folk Psychology/Churchland: is a functional theory. Belief is a functional state, with a functional role but future neuroscience will show that no inner states have these roles and therefore the folk psychology is wrong. Schiffer: this is a completely different route to eliminativism than that belief cannot be realized physically because our intentional vocabulary was irreducible. I 164 ... SchifferVsChurchland: his eliminativism would then have the consequence that no one believes anything. 1. Churchland, Paul (1981). "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes". Journal of Philosophy. 78 (2, February): 67–90. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Reduction | Schiffer | I 158 Reduction/Schiffer: ... no more should be required than that theoretical terms are physically realized. >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities. But realization does not imply reducibility. Schiffer pro Brentano: in favour of irreducibility of the intentional vocabulary. >Intentionality, >Intentions. I 159 Eliminativism/Churchland: is quite different: intentional vocabulary is not reducible - but folk psychology (functional theory) will turn out to be wrong. >Folk psychology. SchifferVsChurchland: why should irreducibility imply unrealizability? >Patricia Churchland, >Paul Churchland. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Reductionism | Reductionism, philosophy: reductionism is a collective term for attempts, to either trace back statements in a subject area to statements from a sub-area of this subject area or equating statements of a subject area with statements of another subject area. The main point here is the justification of such transfers. Reductionism in the narrower sense is the thesis that reduction is possible. Typical reductionisms exist in the domain of the philosophy of mind. See also holism, eliminativism, materialism, physicalism, functionalism. |
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| Theories | Chalmers | I 165 Conscious Experience/Consciousness/Theories/Chalmers: three types of theories: A. Consciousness supervenes logically on the physical, for functional and eliminative reasons. I 166 B. Consciousness does not supervene logically, there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal, but nevertheless materialism is true. C. VsMaterialism and Vs Logical Supervenience. >Materialism, >Supervenience, >Physical/psychic. A. Variants: Eliminativism, Behaviorism, Reductive Functionalism. Cf. >Colour researcher Mary/Frank Jackson, >Elimination, >Behaviorism, >Reductionism, >Functionalism. 1. Physical and functional twins of us without conscious experiences are inconceivable. >Zombies. 2. Mary does not learn anything new when she sees red for the first time. 3. Everything about consciousness can be explained functionally. Representative: Armstrong (1968)(1), Dennett (1991)(2), Lewis (1966)(3), Ryle (1949)(4). Variants: Dretske (1995)(5), Rey (1982)(6), Rosenthal (1996)(7), Smart (1959)(8), White (1986)(9), Wilkes (1984)(10), B: Variants: Nonreductive Materialism. The only non-contradictory variant assumes strong metaphysical necessity as decisive. >Metaphysical necessity. 1. Zombies and inverted spectra are conceivable, but metaphysically impossible. >Conceivability. 2. Mary learns something new when she sees red, but this can be explained with an analysis in the Loar style ((s) semantically). >B. Loar. 3. Consciousness, cannot be explained reductively, but is nevertheless physical. Representatives, not explicit, but approximate: Levine (1983 (11), 1993(12)), Loar (1990)(13). Others who adopt physicalism without logical supervenience: Byrne (1993)(14), Flanagan (1992)(15), Hill (1991)(16), Horgan (1984b)(17), Lycan (1995)(18), Papineau (1993)(19), Tye (1995)(20) van Gulick (1992)(21). C. Different Variations of Property Dualism. Materialism is assumed to be false, certain phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties are assumed to be irreducible. 1. Zombies and inverted spectra are logically and metaphysically possible. 2. Mary learns something new, namely non-physical facts. 3. Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but it can be explained non-reductively by additional natural laws. Representatives: Campbell (1970)(22), Honderich (1981)(23), Jackson (1982)(24), H. Robinson (1982)(26), W. Robinson (1988), Sprigge (1994)(27). I 167 The ultimate choice is between the theories of the A type and the rest. I 213 Theory/Chalmers: even if consciousness cannot be explained reductively, there can be a non-reductionist theory of consciousness. Such a theory will be similar to the theories that physics gives us about motion, space, and time. The existence of these entities is not derived from something more basic. Instead, laws are stated about them. >Laws, >Laws of nature. I 216 First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc. >First person, >Solipsism, >Panpsychism. I 218 If we could only figure out which theory of consciousness is better than its competitors, we would have already gained a lot. >Consciousness/Chalmers. 1. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London 1968 2. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991 3. D. Lewis, An argument for the identity theory, Journal of Philosophy 63, 1966: pp.17-25 4. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Oondon 1949 5. F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge 1995 6. G. Rey, A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness. In. R. Davidson, S. Schwartz and D Shapiro (Eds) Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Vol 3 New York 1982 7. D. M. Rosenthal, A theory of consciousness. In: N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (Eds) The Natur of Consciousness, Cambridge 1996 8. J. C. Smart, Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68, 1959: pp.141-56 9. S. L. White, Curse of the qualia. Synthese 68, 1986: pp. 333-68 10. K. V. Wilkes, Is consciousness important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35, 1984: pp. 223-43 11. J. Levine, Materialism and qualia. The explanatory gap. PhPacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, 1983: pp.354-61 12. J. Levine, On leaving out what it's like. In: M. Davies and G. Humphreys (Eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Oxford 1993. 13. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 14. A. Byrne, The emergent mind, Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 1993 15. O. Flanagan, Consciousness reconsidered. Cambridge 1992 16. C. S. Hill, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge 1991 17. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 18. W. G. Lycan, A limited defense of phenomenal information. In: T. Metzingwr (ed), Conscious Experience, Paderborn 1995. 19. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 20. M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge 1995 21. R. van Gulick, Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraint. IN: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 22. K. K. Campbell, Body and Mind, New York 1970 23. T. Hoderich, Psychological law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24, 1981: pp. 277-303 24. F. Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1993: pp. 127-36 25. H, Robinson, Matter and Sense, Cambridge 1982 26. W. S. Robinson, Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and Its Causal Conditions, Philadelphia 1988 27. T. L. S. Sprigge, Final causes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45, 1971: pp. 149-70 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eliminativism | Shoemaker Vs Eliminativism | Stalnaker I 227 Utility theory/utility/scale/calibration/von Neumann/Morgenstern/Stalnaker: E.g. someone prefers duck before salmon and salmon before oatmeal A > B > C. Refinement of the scale: one asks the person whether he prefers to have B or prefers to have a 50/50 lottery ticket for A v C. Does he select B, it means that B moves closer to the left on his scale, closer to A. This can be repeated for the things at stake in the lottery and thus ever further refinements can be concluded. General: preferences between the lottery tickets define numerical values for the utility But the scale is a conventional: every linear transformation of this scale provides an equivalent, that represents the same facts about the subjective preferences. Question: does it make sense to compare preferences interpersonally? I 228 Utility/Stalnaker: but here it is not about felt pleasure (as a "quality experience"). The numeric values do not represent facts about relations between people. Analogy/Stalnaker: the position VsInterpersonal comparisons is analogous to the question whether grams would be greater or smaller than kilometers. Pointe: that we cannot say this is not because there were facts that were hidden from us. qualitative/intentional/Stalnaker: if we oppose intentional to phenomenal (qualitative) states, it is clear that utility belongs to the intentional side. Utility/analogy/Stalnaker: the question whether one can compare utility interpersonally is complicated and interesting. It is also about whether it is more likely that apply it to social groups. I 229 Utility theory/von Neumann/Morgenstern//Stalnaker: should not be regarded as eliminativistical. According to it there are really facts about the preferences of those represented by the numbers but because the zero point and the units are arbitrary, interpersonal compare have no sense. StalnakerVsShomaker: I am afraid he takes the side of common sense VsFrege because he assumes that Frege is an eliminativist. ShoemakerVsEliminativism. Qualia/secondary qualities/Shoemaker: thesis: we need qualia for facts about our experiences and for secondary qualities. StalnakerVsShoemaker: a purely relational approach is capable of this as well. RelationismVsQualia. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Eliminativism | Bigelow Vs Eliminativism | I 326 BigelowVsEliminativism: some biological functions would also have to exist if we were not here and having an interest in them. There are also functions in which we are not interested at all. Some effects in which we are interested have nothing to do with the function. This also applies to some examples from psychology and physics. I 327 BigelowVsEliminativism: he cannot explain the difference between E.g. "It is the function of rain to produce a rainbow" and E.g. "The function of the teeth is to crush food". (Lit. Nagel 1961 S. 401-28). |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Physicalism | Schiffer Vs Physicalism | I XVIII VsPhysicalism: (8th hypothesis) cannot be correct: E.g. if it is a fact that I believe that worms do not have noses, then that is not represented in non-Mentalese and non-intentionalistic vocabulary. Problem: what can you do? we accept Eliminativism: Thesis: We have no belief with meaning or words with meaning. Or Mentalism: Thesis: belief objects as internal entities (QuineVsMentalismus: Z "Sargasso Sea above which somebody slides obliviously). (> Dualism) . Nominalism/solution/Schiffer: we need to accept none of them: but we deny that the existence of language-independent, objective characteristics of belief. That means Belief/nominalism/Schiffer: denies that the characteristics of belief are to believe "this and that" or to be a belief that this and that is the case, and he also denies the facts. Nominalism/Schiffer: allows then to include both: ontological physicalism: there are no extra-linguistic irreducible psychological entities and the Def Sentential Dualism: that there are true but irreducible belief-ascribing propositions. Schiffer: pro. Here the token token physicalism (6th hypothesis) is tentatively accepted. >Kripke: Paradox of rule following, >Kripkes Wittgenstein, (1982). I 144 SchifferVsPhysicalism: it must be wrong, because thesis: if there is true attributions of belief, they cannot be shown without Mentalese or intentional vocabulary. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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