Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arbitrariness | Field | I 24 Identity/Identification/Field: in many areas, there is the problem of the continuous arbitrariness of identifications. - In mathematics, however, it is stronger than with physical objects. I 181 Solution: Intensity relations between pairs or triples, etc. of points. Advantage: that avoids attributing intensities to points and thus an arbitrary choice of a numerical scale for intensities. III 32 Addition/Multiplication: not possible in Hilbert's geometry. - (Only with arbitrary zero and arbitrary 1) Solution: intervals instead of points. II 310 Non-Classical Degrees of Belief/Uncertainty/Field: E.g. that every "decision" about the power of the continuum is arbitrary is a good reason to not assume classical degrees of belief. - (Moderate non-classical logic: That some instances of the sentence cannot be asserted by the excluded third party). III 31 Figure/Points/Field: no Platonist will identify real numbers with points on a physical line. - That would be too arbitrary ("what line?"). - What should be zero - what is supposed to be 1? III 32 f Hilbert/Geometry/Axioms/Field: multiplication of intervals: not possible, because for that we would need an arbitrary "standard interval". Solution: Comparing products of intervals. Generalization/Field: is then possible on products of spacetime intervals with scalar intervals. ((s) E.g. temperature difference, pressure difference). Field: therefore, spacetime points must not be regarded as real numbers. III 48 FieldVsTensor: is arbitrarily chosen. Solution/Field: simultaneity. III 65 Def Equally Divided Region/Equally Split/Evenly Divided Evenly/Equidistance/Field: (all distances within the region equal: R: is a spacetime region all of whose points lie on a single line, and that for each point x of R the strict st-between (between in relation to spacetime) two points of R lies, there are points y and z of R, such that a) is exactly one point of R strictly st-between y and z, and that is x, and -b) xy P-Cong xz (Cong = congruent). ((s) This avoids any arbitrary (length) units - E.g. "fewer" points in the corresponding interval or "the same number", but not between temperature and space units. Field: But definitely in mixed products are possible.Then: "the mixed product... is smaller than the mixed product..." Equidistance in each separate region: scalar/spatio-temporal. III 79 Arbitrariness/Arbitrary/Scales Types/Scalar/Mass Density/Field: mass density is a very special scalar field which, due to its logarithmic structure, is "less arbitrary" than the scale for the gravitational potential. >Objectivity, >Logarithm. Logarithmic structures are less arbitrary. Mass density: needs more fundamental concepts than other scalar fields. Scalar field: E.g. height. >Field theory. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Cosmological Constant | Kanitscheider | I 151 Einstein universe/Kanitscheider: The Einstein universe starts from a strong, not directly testable initial assumption, with the conviction that locally testable statements can be derived from it. Spherical geometry according to the basic idea of general relativity (GR). Equal distribution of matter, assumption of an "ideal fluid". Especially the low relative velocity of the stars among each other was the reason to approach a global density T00 = ρ despite the tremendously complex matter distribution. Metric: simple static metric of the three-sphere with the constant radius R: I 152 (1) ds² = dt² + R²[dr² + sin²r(dϑ² + sin² ϑdφ²)] If we now look at the sections ϑ,φ = const, so you get a cylinder which the coordinate r goes around from 0 to π and the time t extends along the mantle without restriction into the future and past. Problem: This does not satisfy the field equations of gravity. Einstein had to introduce the cosmological constant λ. The field equation had to be extended with the term λ x gμν. The extension is compatible with the conservation law. In this model, space is spherical, finite and unbounded, while time is open and unaffected by curvature! World without center and without edge, in which spatially everything is finite (volume, number of galaxies, the longest paths). Thus, the otherwise complicated field equations were reduced to simple algebraic relations between the quantities λ, ρ and R. R/notation: Radius of curvature of the world. Cosmological constant λ: associated with the radius of curvature R of the world: λ = 1/R². Also with the matter density ρ: λ = 4πGρ/c². This leads to a value of λ = 10-57 cm -2. For the cylinder world with a radius R of 3 x 1010 light years. Cosmological constant/Kanitscheider: physically it is bound to the stability of a static world with constant density. Then one can ask, what prevents the large masses to agglomerate. Cosmologically, λ > 0 now provides a weak repulsive force! However, Eddington proved that this is not consistent with respect to weak fluctuations. I 154 Cosmological constant/field equations/Kanitscheider: Left side: geometric, here the cosmological constant can mean λ curvature. Right side: " material side": here λ can be negative density. The cosmological constant often gets the meaning of the energy density of the vacuum in the context of quantum field theory. It represents in a certain way a restoration of the universal time destroyed by the SR. I 158 Cosmological constant/Kanitscheider: should ensure the complete dependence of the inertial field gμν on all matter and prevent the field equations from admitting solutions for empty space. It was clear, of course, that the Minkowski spacetime (1) ds² = dt² + R²[dr² + sin²r(dϑ² + sin² ϑdφ²)] as the simplest empty world of Relativity Theory is in any case a strict solution. >Minkowski space. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Fields | Field | III 35 Fields/H. Field: space-time points as causal agents. - According to Platonism the behavior of space without matter is to describe by electromagnetic properties (non-empty). >Field theory, >Empty space, >Platonism, cf. >Relationism, >Substantivalism, >Absoluteness/Field. Empty space/field: empty space would be without space time points: useless. >Senseless. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Forces | Bigelow | I 282 Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Lit: Bigelow, Ellis Pargetter 1988)(1) Thesis: forces are relations and a subspecies of causal relations. Here: stronger thesis all causes supervene on forces. Forces are higher-level relations between structures that involve individual events and their properties. Forces/tradition: intermediary between causes and effects. >Supervenience, >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Levels, >Events, >Forces/Tradition. Mediator between causes and effects. >Cause, >Effect. Mediation/middle position/intermediate position/BigelowVsTradition/ HumeVsTradition: Problem: Regress: if F is used as an intermediary between C and E, why is there not another mediator between F and E? Requirement for this argument is however: the assumption that C, E, and F are entities of the same type. Wrong solution: to assume that forces are "immediate causes". For this would again require immediate causes. >Regress. Wrong solution: to construct forces as dispositional properties: either dispositions of an object for changes or a field for any effects. Disposition/Bigelow/Pargetter: is not itself part of a causal chain. So we cannot close a gap in the chain with it. Therefore there is no threat of regression here. Nevertheless, dispositions simply do not have the right ontological category for forces. We can give a complete causal explanation without mentioning dispositions. For the causation is given by the physical basis of dispositions. >Ontology. I 283 Disposition/Bigelow/Pargetter: supervenes, but does not participate in the causal process. But they can be there if they are not active, while forces cannot do that. Forces: take part in the causal process. If they are not active, they do not exist - unlike dispositions. >Instantiation. Forces/Ellis/Bigelow/Pargetter (1988)(1): Thesis: they constitute causal relations. They are not themselves causes, but a relation between cause and effect. As a commonality between quite different phenomena. They should also show the commonality of laws, even if they are formulated very differently. Law/Forces/Ellis/Bigelow/Pargetter: inversely, similarly constructed laws may involve quite different forces, e.g. the proportion of the inversed square. New/Bigelow/Pargetter: recently, we no longer identify an instance of a causal relation with a single force (see below). New: different fundamental forces join forces to form fundamental causes. We keep the other arguments: Forces and fundamental causes must be relations of a higher level between events, for, as a relation of first level, they would make a Humean world impossible. Property complex/Bigelow/Pargetter: they are what is put into relation by forces. Each has as a constituent a number of properties and relations of 1st level. All will also be there in a Humean world. Only in the actual world there are the cohesive forces, and these are external relations. >Humean world. I 284 Actual world/Bigelow/Pargetter: even in our world there may be other instances of these property complexes which are not in these causal relations. This is due to the local nature of the causal relations. >Actual world. Camps: forces: realistic view: Bigelow/Pargetter, Ellis 1988(1): either the components or the resulting forces are real (not both, otherwise double causation). Vs: Cartwright 1980(3), 1983(4)) >N. Cartwright. Forces/Ellis/Bigelow/Pargetter: either, the components of forces are real or the resulting forces are real. For example, there may be a resultant force of 0, because forces neutralize if they deviate from 0. Problem: the components and the resulting forces cannot all be real, otherwise we would have overdetermination or double causation. >Overdetermination. Realistic view: must be decided from case to case whether it sees the components or the resulting forces as real. For example, we must sometimes assume different relative strengths of components to explain a resulting force. Reality/Bigelow/Pargetter: the reality of the components is sometimes forced upon us by our considerations. For example, three protons, shielded from interference from the outside, one in the middle of a line between the other two. The predicted movement of the outer towards the outside will involve forces that exist between the two outer as well as between them and that in the middle. Nevertheless, the principle of force and opposing force (here: action and reaction) demands that the middle proton is exposed to counter forces, which together cause it to remain at rest. I 285 On the other hand. For example, in a situation, a particle can only move perpendicular to a real force. Solution: we assume two fictitious forces, which are perpendicular to each other. This is imposed on us in the situation. The choice is arbitrary, as is orthogonality. And not all can be real, for otherwise we would have overdetermination. In this situation, the resulting force is real, not the components. Causal Relation/Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: since sometimes the resulting force must be assumed as real, sometimes the components (depending on the physical situation) the causal relation should be explained as a relation of higher level between aggregates of forces. >Causal relation. Forces/quantum mechanics/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the quantum mechanics one does not use forces. For example, one does not say that a photon exerts a force on an electron. >Quantum mechanics. Bigelow/Pargetter: however, we treat these cases as analogous because they appear to us to be similar enough. (See Heathcote 1989)(2). Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: also in the relation between field and particle, we allow ourselves to speak of forces and causation. >Fields. I 286 But we rather speak of interaction between two fields as between field and particle. Quantum mechanics/Bigelow/Pargetter: "Interactions" are the legitimate heirs of the traditional "forces". Field/VsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: there are also cases where a field does not interact with a particle, but is nevertheless produced. This seems to contradict our theory. If a field is formed from a particle, one cannot speak of forces. An electric particle exerts no force on its own electric field. Nevertheless, it precisely causes this field. BigelowVsVs: this is not a case of causation. The argument presupposes a separation of particle and field, which is not accepted by anybody. There is rather a unity. The field is part of the "essence" of the particle. This needs, however, to be examined in the light of further scientific development. >Essence, >Spacetime, >Space curvature. 1. Bigelow, J. Ellis, B., and Pargetter, R. (1988). Forces. Philosophy of Science 55. pp. 614-30. 2. Heathcote, A. (1989). A theory of causality: Causality = Interaction (as defined by quantum field theory). Erkenntnis 31 pp.77-108. 3. Cartwright, N. (1980). Do the laws of physics state facts? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61, pp.343-77. 4. Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Objectivity | Field | I 272f Def Objectivity/Mathematics/Gyro/Putnam/Field: objectivity should consist in that we believe only the true axioms. Problem: the axioms also refer to the ontology. >Axioms, >Ontology. I 274 Objectivity does not have to be explained in terms of the truth of the axioms - this is not possible in the associated modal propositions. >Modalities, >Propositions. I 277 Objectivity/mathematics/set theory/Field: even if we accept "ε" as fixed, the platonic (!) view does not have to assume that the truths are objectively determinated. - Because there are other totalities over which the quantifiers can go in a set theory. >Platonism, >Quantifiers, >Set theory. Putnam: further: there is no reason to keep "ε" fixed. FieldVsPutnam: confusion of the view that the reference is fixed (e.g. causally) with the view that it is defined by a description theory that contains the word "cause". II 316 Objectivity/truth/Mathematics/Field: Thesis: even if there are no mathematical objects, why should it not be the case that there is exactly one value of n for which An - modally interpreted - is objectively true? II 316 Mathematical objectivity/Field: for it we do not need to accept the existence of mathematical objects if we presuppose the objectivity of logic. - But objectively correct are only sentences of mathematics which can be proved from the axioms. >Provability, >Correctness. II 319 Mathematical concepts are not causally connected with their predicates. E.g. For each choice of a power of the continuum, we can find properties and relations for our set theoretical concepts (here: vocabulary) that make this choice true and another choice wrong. Cf. >Truthmakers. II 320 The defense of axioms is enough to make mathematics (without objects) objective, but only with the broad notion of consistency: that a system is consistent if not every sentence is a consequence of it. II 340 Objectivity/quantity theory/element relation/Field: to determine the specific extension of "e" and "quantity" we also need the physical applications - also for "finity". --- III 79 Arbitrariness/arbitrary/scalar types/scalar field/mass density/Field: mass density is a very special scalar field which is, because of its logarithmic structure, less arbitrary than the scale for the gravitational potential - ((s) > objectivity, > logarithm.) Logarithmic structures are less arbitrary. Mass density: needs more basic concepts than other scalar fields. Scalar field: E.g. height. >Field theory. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Platonism | Field | I 8 Platonism/Field: his only argument is the applicability of mathematics. >Mathematics/Field, >Mathematical entities. I 14 FieldVsPlatonism: Platonism has to answer the fictionalist in his language - it cannot rely on it's "initial plausibility". I 152 Def Priority Thesis/PT/Crispin Wright: Thesis: the priority of the syntactic over the ontological categories. Platonism/Wright: that allows Frege to be a Platonist. >Numbers/Frege, >Gottlob Frege. Def Gödelian Platonism/Crispin Wright: in addition: the thesis that mathematical knowledge must be explained by a quasi-perceptual relation. FregeVsGödel. WrightVsGödel: we do not need that. I 153 Def weak Priority Thesis/PT: that each syntactic singular term also works automatically in a semantical way as a singular term. l 159 Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: In which sense is a Platonist statement (e.g. "direction 1 = direction 2") and a nominalistic statement equivalent (c1 is parallel to c2)? Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a sequence of the first. >Nominalism. I 186 Def Moderate Platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. - Then there are probably also relations between numbers and objects. - Moderate Platonism: these relations are conventions, derived from physical relations. Def Heavy Duty Platonism/HDP/Field: takes relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact. l 189 Strong moderation condition/(Field (pro): it is possible to formulate physical laws without relation between objects and numbers. I 192 Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. FieldVs: instead only between objects. --- II 332 Platonism/Mathematics/VsStructuralism/Field: isomorphic mathematical fields do not need to be indistinguishable. >Field theory. II 334 Quinish Platonism/Field: as a basic concept a certain concept of quantity, from which all other mathematical objects are constructed. So natural numbers and real numbers would actually be sets. III 31 Number/Points/Field: no Platonist will identify real numbers with points on a physical line. - That would be too arbitrary ( "What line?") - What should be zero point - What should be 1? III 90 Platonistic/Field: are terms such as e.g. gradient, Laplace Equation, etc. III 96 1st order Platonism/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no 2nd order logic - Problem: but he needs these (because of the power quantifiers). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Principles | Genz | II 29 Irrevocability/principle/Genz: evolution explains why some principles seem irrevocable to us without being so. II 118 Understanding/principle/principles/Genz: a deeper understanding is achieved if one can show that a theory can be derived from principles. >Understanding, >Theories, >Derivation, >Derivability. Theory of Relativity/Einstein/Genz: Einstein has done this for the three theories of relativity. >Relativity theory. II 181 Principles/Genz: natural laws or laws of nature can be traced back to principles. >Natural laws. II 182 Principle/principles/explanation/Genz: final objective: is the explanation by principles. God is not a mathematician - but sticks to principles. Principle/Genz: for example, it could be that a successful physical theory defines a measured value which is clearly defined by the theory, but from its definition it follows that it cannot be calculated. >Measurements, >Definitions. II 228 Principle/laws/science/physics/mathematics/relativity theory/Genz: the relativity theories can be founded retrospectively by principles. Einstein himself found it. The most important principle of the general theory of relativity: Definition equivalence principle/Genz: the equivalence principle says that there is an indistinguishability of gravity and acceleration. >Equivalence principle. II 229 1. Principle for the derivation of the Special Theory of Relativity: light is - unlike sound - no vibration of a medium, resulting in the principle of the independence of the speed of light from the movement of the source (based on the physics of electricity and magnetism). 2. Principle for the derivation of special relativity: the laws of nature shall apply to all observers who move in the same direction with constant and equal speed. (Can be traced back to Galileo). >Special Relativity. II 231 Principles/universe/nature/Euan Squires/Genz: thesis: in the universe, principles apply that can be seen and formulated without mathematics. Mathematical laws of nature: are then nothing else but formalizations of these principles by more precise means. Explanation: however, it is the principles themselves that enable explanation and understanding. >Explanations. Description/measure/measurement/Relativity Theory/Squires/Genz: the General Relativity Theory declares it indispensable that we can describe the universe independently of the choice of variables for space and time. Here mathematics is even excluded! Principles/Elementary Particle Theory/Particle Theory/Standard Model/Genz: the standard model follows from the principle that observers can choose their conventions independently of each other without changing the laws at different locations and at different times: the same natural laws should apply everywhere. Framework: in which this demand is formulated: is the relativistic quantum field theory. However, this is mathematical in itself. >Reference systems. II 232 Principles/Genz: thesis: the laws of nature follow from simple, non-mathematical principles. For example, the Dirac equation has been found mathematically, but it is a realization of laws whose form is determined by non-mathematical principles such as symmetry. Mathematics/Genz: mathematics is like a servant here who separates equations that do not satisfy the principles. Principle/Genz: what principles allow seems to be realized, no matter whether it is mathematically simple or not. For example Hadrons: that Hadrons meet the requirements of group SU (3) seemed to follow first from a mathematical principle. Today it is known that hadrons are made up of quarks. II 233 Principle/Genz: for the purpose of application, it may be necessary to formulate a principle mathematically. For understanding, however, we need the non-mathematical principles. Progress/Genz: one can even say that in physics they are accompanied by the substitution of mathematical principles with non-mathematical principles. For example Plato tried to explain the structure of the cosmos with five regular bodies. Kepler recorded this, and later they were replaced by the assumption of random initial conditions. For example, spectrum of the hydrogen atom: was calculated exactly by a formula. Later this was understood by Bohr's atomic model. II 234 Principle/Newton/force/Genz: for example, the force exerted by one body on another is proportional to the reciprocal of the square of the distance between the bodies. That is mathematical. Newton himself could not base this assumption on principles. Only Einstein was able to do that. Principles of quantum mechanics: see >Quantum mechanics/Genz. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Quantum Field Theory | |||
| Quantum Field Theory | Kanitscheider | I 172 Quantum field theory/Kanitscheider: here one works, if one assumes curved space-time, with an approximation, where the metric field is not quantized itself, but is used as classical space-time background arena, i.e. the reaction of the matter fields on the space-time is neglected. But this already reveals that the interaction between matter fields and geometry produces particles from the vacuum! >Quantum mechanics, >Relativity theory, >Gravitation/Einstein, >Space-time/Einstein. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Relationism | Field | I 171 Def Relationism: Thesis: no empty space exists. Def Substantivalism/Field: Thesis: empty space exists. Part-relation: exists in both. >Space, >Absoluteness, >Motion, >Spacetime points. I 181 Relationism/Field: makes field theory impossible - because it excludes empty space. I 182 Putnam: Relationism can take the field as an enormous (because of the infinity of the physical forces) object. - Then for each region one part of it. - FieldVs: this trivializes the relativism. I 183 Field theory/FT/Substantivalism/Field: for the substantivalism the field is not a gigantic object, but no entity at all. Field theory: is for the substantivalism only the attribution of causal predicates to regions. I 216 Problem of Quantities/FieldVsRelationism: the only way to show that there is a (narrow) spatial relation, is to assume that the double distance itself is a spatial relation. But relationism cannot do this because it wants to define it first, and cannot presuppose it as defined. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Substantivalism | Field | I 13 Def substantivalism/Field: asserts that literal speech about space can be taken at face value, even without physical objects. Then it is also useful to say that the space is empty. >Space, >Empty Space, >Relationism. I 14 FieldVsSubstantivalism: is forced to answer a relationist in his own terms. I 47 Substantivalism/Field: (the thesis that there are empty spacetime regions). Space time regions are known as causally active: e.g. field theories such as classical electromagnetism or the general relativity theory or quantum field theory. Resnik: we should not ask "What properties of the spacetime points ..?" but "What is the structure of space-time?" FieldVsResnik: that's wrong. The theory of the electromagnetic field is also that of the properties of the parts of the space time that are not occupied by objects. I 171 Definition Substantivalism/Field: Thesis: empty space exists. - Definition Relationism: Thesis: there is no empty space. Part-of-relation: exists in both. >Part-of-relation. I 181 Substantivalism/Field: favors the field theory. >Field theory. I 184 Substantivalism/Newton pro: E.g. bucket experiment: shows that we need the concept of absolute acceleration and the one of the equality of place over time - (space that exists through time). --- III 34f Field pro substantivalism: there is empty space time. - Spacetimepoints are entities in their own right. - Field: that is compatible with the nominalism. - VsRelationism: this cannot accept Hilbert's axioms. VsRelationism: cannot accept physical fields. - Platonism: assumes at fields spacetime points with properties. - VsRelationism: this one cannot do it. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Coherence Theory | Cartwright Vs Coherence Theory | I 8 Theory/CartwrightVsTradition/CartwrightVsCoherence: we should instead focus on the causal role that the theories attribute to the remarkable theoretical entities (e.g. quantum field theory). Forecast/Prediction/Success/Cartwright: is no help when it comes to saying whether the theory is true or not. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Field, H. | Verschiedene Vs Field, H. | Field I 51 Infinity/Physics/Essay 4: even without "part of" relation we do not really need the finity operator for physics. VsField: many have accused me of needing every extension of 1st level logic. But this is not the case. I 52 I rather assume that the nominalization program has not yet been advanced far enough to be able to say what the best logical basis is. Ultimately, we are going to choose only a few natural means that go beyond the 1st level logic, preferably those that the Platonist would also need. But we can only experience this by trial and error. I 73 Indispensability Argument/Logic/VsField: if mE may be dispensable in science, they are not in logic! And we need logic in science. Logical Sequence Relation/Consequence/Field: is normally defined in terms of model theory: (Models are mE, semantic: a model is true or not true.) Even if one formulates them in a proven theoretical way ("there is a derivation", syntactically, or provable in a system) one needs mE or abstract objects: arbitrary sign sequences of symbol tokens and their arbitrary sequences. I 77 VsField: some have objected that only if we accept a Tarski Theory of truth do we need mE in mathematics. FieldVsVs: this led to the misunderstanding that without Tarskian truth mathematics would have no epistemic problems. Mathematics/Field: indeed implies mE itself, (only, we do not always need mathematics) without the help of the concept of truth, e.g. that there are prime numbers > 1000. I 138 Logic of Part-of-Relation/Field: has no complete evidence procedure. VsField: how can subsequent relations be useful then? Field: sure, the means by which we can know that something follows from something else are codifiable in an evidentiary procedure, and that seems to imply that no appeal to anything stronger than a proof can be of practical use. FieldVsVs: but you do not need to take any epistemic approach to more than a countable part of it. I 182 Field Theory/FT/Relationalism/Substantivalism/Some AuthorsVsField: justify the relevance of field theories for the dispute between S/R just the other way round: for them, FT make it easy to justify a relationalist view: (Putnam, 1981, Malament 1982): they postulate as a field with a single huge (because of the infinity of physical forces) and a corresponding part of it for each region. Variant: the field does not exist in all places! But all points in the field are not zero. FieldVsPutnam: I do not think you can do without regions. Field II 351 Indeterminacy/Undecidability/Set Theory/Number Theory/Field: Thesis: not only in the set theory but also in the number theory many undecidable sets do not have a certain truth value. Many VsField: 1. truth and reference are basically disquotational. Disquotational View/Field: is sometimes seen as eliminating indeterminacy for our present language. FieldVsVs: that is not the case :>Chapter 10 showed that. VsField: Even if there is indeterminacy in our current language also for disquotationalism, the arguments for it are less convincing from this perspective. For example, the question of the power of the continuum ((s)) is undecidable for us, but the answer could (from an objectivist point of view (FieldVs)) have a certain truth value. Uncertainty/Set Theory/Number Theory/Field: Recently some well-known philosophers have produced arguments for the impossibility of any kind of uncertainty in set theory and number theory that have nothing to do with disquotationalism: two variants: 1. Assuming that set theory and number theory are in full logic of the 2nd level (i.e. 2nd level logic, which is understood model theoretically, with the requirement that any legitimate interpretation) Def "full" in the sense that the 2nd level quantifiers go over all subsets of the 1st level quantifier range. 2. Let us assume that number theory and the set theory are formulated in a variant of the full logic of the 2nd level, which we could call "full schematic logic of level 1". II 354 Full schematic logic 1st Level/LavineVsField: denies that it is a partial theory of (non-schematic!) logic of the 2nd level. Field: we now better forget the 2nd level logic in favour of full schematic theories. We stay in the number theory to avoid complications. We assume that the certainty of the number theory is not in question, except for the use of full schemata. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| General Relat. Th. | Field, Hartry | III 64 Field theory: the theory of general relativity, we can obtain more general affine structures. |
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