| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Discourse | Habermas | III 40 Discourse/theoretical/practical/Habermas: I myself have a tendency to adopt a cognitivist position, according to which practical questions can basically be decided on an argumentative basis. However, this position can only be defended in a promising way if we do not hastily assimilate practical discourses, which have an internal reference and interpreted needs of the persons concerned, into theoretical discourses with their relation to the interpreted experiences of an observer. >Cognitivism. III 41 Arguments used to justify value standards do not meet the requirements of discourses. In the prototypical case they have the form of aesthetic criticism. (See also Culture/Habermas, >Argumentation. III 45 Theoretical discourse: cognitive-instrumental - it is about the truth of propositions and the effectiveness of teleological actions Practical discourse: moral-practical - it is about the correctness of actions Aesthetic critique: evaluative - it is about the appropriateness of value standards Therapeutic critique: expressive - it is about the truthfulness of expressions Explicative discourse: - this is about the comprehensibility or well-formedness of symbolic constructs. III 71 Definition Discourse/Habermas: I only speak of discourses when the meaning of the problematic claim to validity forces the participants conceptually to assume that a rational, motivated agreement could basically be achieved, whereby "basically" expresses the idealizing reservation: if the argumentation could only be led openly enough and continued for long enough.(1) >Discourse theory. 1. Das geht auf Ch. S. Peirce zurück. Vgl. dazu H. Scheit, Studien zur Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit, Habilitationsschrift Universität München, 1981. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Science | Medawar, P. | Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 S 37 Wissenschaft/Theorie/Medawar: These das Genre des Wissenschaftsartikels ist per se verfälschend, weil induktiv und funktional-argumentativ. Statt dessen: "chronologisch-autobiographischer Erzählstil". Di TrocchioVsKonstruktivismus (i. d. Wissenschaft): auch er kann die wissenschaftliche Fälschung nicht fassen: weil er von einem konsensuell hergestellten Wahrheitsbegriff ausgeht. Dann stellen Fälschungen keinen besonders konturierten Sonderfall dar. |
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