Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quietism | Wright | I 255 Def quietism/Wright Crispin: Quietism is the view that a significant metaphysical debate is impossible. >Metaphysics. One version has it that realistic and anti-realistic tendencies pursue the confused desire to get out of their own skin. >Realism, >Anti-realism. This is a wrong "divine point of view", from which the claim the objectivity of a linguistic practice can be examined. (This thesis is attributed to Wittgenstein, but this attribution again is disputed). >Objectivity, >Divine standpoint, >Relativism, >L. Wittgenstein. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kripke, S. A. | McDowell Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 119 Meaning / McDowell: we must not construct it in a "social-pragmatic" or "communitarian" way. (Wittgenstein has not). Otherwise it is not autonomous. Here, unbridled Platonism would be a penchant for the occult. Wittgenstein has not alleged that meaning would be nothing but as approval or rejection by the community. I 120 Kripke's Wittgenstein/McDowellVsKripke: concludes that there is nothing that constituted susceptibility to the claim the meaning poses; instead we need to understand the role of thought in our lives through our participation in the community. Quietism/Wittgenstein /McDowellVsKripke: doesn't notice Wittgenstein's quietism: attitude to accept problems as unsolvable. Rejection of a constructive or doctrinaire ambition. Wright I 264 McDowell's Wittgenstein: intends to open up an escape route out of the debate. Consequences of rules/Kripke: Wittgenstein: "Skeptical Paradox": negates any possibility that rules and meanings comprised real limitations. Wright: In the end remains only the attempt to stay above the water with Charybdis. McDowellVsKripke: error to understand the destruction of Scylla (Platonism, divine standpoint) as the logical core of the dispute over rules. In reality, the destruction is just a logical set. McDowell: Wittgenstein's concern was to show that both horns are based on an inflated conception of fact and objectivity. Kripke's Wittgenstein/Wright: McDowell does not do Kripke justice in every way. I 265 It is not clear whether the skeptical argument can be limited to the destruction of Scylla (divine standpoint, overstatement of rules). "Skeptical Paradox": Step 1: debate on any ostensive assertion. Ex that in the past with "+" I formally meant addition. Then I have the defend that against a skeptic. One should conclude that even if I lose this dispute, no conclusion about the reality of meanings, rules etc. would be so foreseeable. So the epistemology of assertions about meaning under the pressure of skepticism would not be more intelligible than the epistemology of the past or the material world or other minds (Fremdpsychisches) still are. But that would be a mistake! Tradition: insists on the fundamental inaccessibility of other minds (Fremdpsychisches). Hence the examination of Kripke's skeptic must take place under the conditions of cognitive idealization. Ex in the attempt to justify that with "+" I meant addition in the past, I am conceded the perfect playback of all aspects of my mental life. All the relevant facts would indeed be visible in my behavior and mental life, and therefore be tangible for me. If I still lose, that only shows that there are no such facts. It is then concluded that there are no facts with respect to what I mean in the present! And what anybody thinks in the present! And therefore no facts with respect to what any one expression means! (> Meaning/McDowell). I 266 Wright: In the argument no over-objectification of the essence of the rules occurs as a premise! The only assumption: that facts about my previous meanings must have occurred in my behavior. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Kripke, S. A. | Wright Vs Kripke, S. A. | Esfeld I 122 Inferentialism/I-You-Relationships/Brandom/Esfeld: Problem: even a community could be arbitrary. The fact of consent could be confused with the right of consent. This is sometimes put VsKripke. WrightVsKripke: formerly: the community itself is no authority. (No longer represented today). McDowellVsWright: whatever seems right to us is right! But that only means that we cannot talk about "right" here! Solution/Esfeld: I-You-Relationships: are symmetrical: I 123 this leaves room for the possibility that the community as a whole can err. Social Holism/Pettit: the human is dependent on the existence of other people in terms of thinking and rules. (And it is always about relationships of individual people to each other). VsCollectivism: which assumes that the community as a whole exerts an influence on its members. (>Method/Wright). I 124 Pettit: social holism is a contingent thesis about the actual practices of us humans. Esfeld: our reconstruction should apply to all possible worlds. Private following of rules/Pettit: has been left open by him! One can also continue to be a member of a community in isolation. Social Holism/Esfeld: does not imply that a person who becomes isolated no longer has any beliefs! I 125 Nevertheless, the concept of "correct" following is then no longer applicable. N.B.: once the customs of the community are internalized, one can argue that real feedback is no longer indispensable! I.e. there is a metaphysical possibility that the constituents of a holistic system are no longer ontologically dependent on other individuals! For example radical Robinson who spends his whole life in isolation: Kripke: is liberal about such a case. We could take it into our community and apply our criteria to it as well. (s) But also vice versa? I 126 EsfeldVsKripke: we cannot be so liberal here. It is also questionable whether the assertiveness conditions for rule sequences are really fulfilled. One can argue that Kripke's position includes direct or indirect interaction. Private Rule Following/Esfeld: neither the truth conditions nor the assertiveness conditions are fulfilled. Wright I 264 Kripke's Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/Rule Following/Kripke: in Wittgenstein: "Skeptical Paradox": destroys any possibility that rules and meanings include real limitations. Wright: in the end there is the attempt to stay afloat with the Charybdis. (Def "rule-skeptical Charybdis": view, according to which there are no objective requirements at all, which are produced by rules, but exclusively natural unrestricted human abilities. So no "general real objectivity".) I 265 Quietism/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Wright: is in any case committed to quietism: for unrealism (that there are no facts concerning any rules) must inflate to a comprehensive unrealism. I 266 Then there are no relevant facts in the matter anywhere. If there are no substantive facts about what sentences say, then there are also no facts about whether they are true or not. An unrealism of meaning must therefore entail an unrealism of truth. WrightVsKripke: that is however attackable: however, it is not an error of sublimation (raising to a higher level) of the rules. If anything is unprotected against the skeptical paradox, then it is a humanized platonism no less than the superobjectified version. McDowell's Skylla does not belong to the scene of Kripke's dialectic. It could only appear if the opponent is denied a point of view. Thus, the assertions in the first person would be presented as inferential but the fact is that the knowledge of earlier meanings is for the most part not inferential and has no clearly recognizable epistemology. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Platonism | McDowell Vs Platonism | I 121 McDowellVsPlatonism: every Platonism has the consequence that the standards are on the opposite side of the abyss. Wittgenstein’s quietism recognizes this as false problem. >Quietism. |
McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Quietism | Wright Vs Quietism | Rorty VI 44/45 WrightVsQuietism/Rorty: Davidson, Dewey: aversion to correspondence and representation. Rorty VI 56 Research/Wright/Rorty (Rorty: "metaphysical activism"): the truth in the sense of a desirable non-causal relationship between the linguistic and the non-linguistic is a goal of research. (DavidsonVs, VsQuietismus). Davidsonians: a) conventions only, b) even an infinite number of justifications would not be sufficient. VI 57 c) therefore, there is nothing that can be clearly identified as an 'objective of research'. Although the desire for justification is of course a motive of research. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Wittgenstein | Evans Vs Wittgenstein | Frank I 504 EvansVsIdealism: our conception of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand statements about ourselves that we cannot decide or even justify! ((s) "objective", given to ourselves "objectively"). Example "I have been breastfed". Example "I was unhappy on my first birthday" Example "I rolled around in my sleep last night" Example "I was dragged unconscious through the streets of Chicago" Example "I'm going to die" I.e. our thoughts about ourselves obey the generality clause. EvansVsWittgenstein: This idea is diametrically opposed to an idea by Wittgenstein: by asking us to consider psychological statements in the first person (Evans), because this enhances their similarity to the act of moaning in pain, i.e. exactly considering them to be unstructured responses to situations. Wittgenstein: was well aware that this would enable him not to think about certain issues. Frank I 515 Immunity/EvansVsWittgenstein: his E.g. "The wind tousles my hair" is precisely what leads to the widespread misconception Frank I 516 That immunity does not stretch to the self-attribution of physical phenomena. This is certainly the case. There is a way of knowing that the property of ξ’s hair of being tousled by the wind is currently instantiated. It does not make sense to ask: "The wind tousles someone’s hair, but is it mine?" ((s) Perhaps in this case it is?). EvansVsWittgenstein: does not acknowledge this fact sufficiently. Wittgenstein: the object use requires us to recognize a certain person (ourselves)) therefore, the possibility of error is "envisaged". EvansVsWittgenstein: 1) this can simply not be used correctly to weed out a category of statements that are identified only. Frank I 517 By means of the predicate contained therein, irrespective of the question of how to recognize that the predicate is instantiated. 2) The immunity against misidentification in this absolute sense cannot be invoked for mental self-attribution! E.g. "I see this and that" in cases where I have reason to believe that my tactile information could be misleading. E.g. "I feel a piece of cloth and see a number of outstretched hands in the mirror. Here it makes sense to say "Someone is touching the piece of cloth, but is it me"(Mental predicate) But what does that tell us? 3) Important: The influence of the relevant information on "I" thoughts is not based on a consideration or an identification, but is simply constitutive for the fact that we have an "I" image. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 Wright I 257 Quietism/Truth/Wright: (pro Wittgenstein): it is a metaphysical hypostasis of concepts such as truth and assertion if their applicability is enshrined as a substantial part of a realistic view of its content. Discourses as different as science and film critics, however, are simple tries to determine what is true and do not need any metaphysical relining. But that’s not the end of the matter, of course there are relevant differences between language games. Wright: The realism/Anti-realism debate still remains and the problem of cognitive coercion. I 258 EvansVsWittgenstein: Considerations to follow the rules are themselves only metaphysical defeatism. (More quietist than Wittgenstein himself). |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Wittgenstein | Wright Vs Wittgenstein | McDowell I 205 Crispin WrightVsWittgenstein: he is bound to a particular conception of meaning, but his quietism prevents him from fulfilling this obligation. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Wright, Cr. | McDowell Vs Wright, Cr. | I 205 Quietism/Wittgenstein/McDowell: not worrying, just the exoneration from the question of how things are absolute and independent of common ratification. McDowellVsWright: tmistakenly assume that Wittgenstein supplanted the questions of arithmetic. In fact, he only wants to drive out the "eerie feeling" associated with it. Ex The idea that from a certain point of the addition onwards, the accuracy is not dependent on the approval of the general public, could "look mysterious." |
McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| |||