Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 34 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acceptability | Habermas | III 400/401 Acceptability/communicative action/Habermas: a speech act should be called "acceptable" if it fulfils the conditions so that a listener can say "yes". These conditions cannot be fulfilled unilaterally, neither speaker nor listener relative. Rather, they are conditions for the intersubjective recognition of a linguistic claim, which constitutes a content-specified agreement on liabilities that are relevant for the consequences of the interaction. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act. Within the theory of communicative action we start from the special case that the speaker literally means his statements. I call this case the standard conditions. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. III 406 A speaker can rationally motivate a listener to accept if, due to an internal connection between validity, validity claim and redemption of the validity claim, he/she can guarantee to give convincing reasons, if necessary, which stand up to criticism of the validity claim. The binding force of illocutionary success does not then stem from the validity of what has been said, but from the coordination effect of the guarantee it offers to redeem the validity claim if necessary. This applies in cases where there is no claim to power but a validity claim. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Anti-Realism | Habermas | III 425 Anti-Realism/Dummett/Habermas: in many cases the knowledge of the truth conditions that make a statement come true is problematic. >Truth conditions, >Truth. Solution/Dummett: we must distinguish between truth conditions and claimability conditions. We must be able to indicate a procedure by which the truth of a statement could be established.(1) >Assertibility, >Assertibility conditions. Habermas: understanding then includes the ability to give reasons with which the claim that the truth conditions are fulfilled could be redeemed. The theory thus explains the meaning of a sentence only indirectly with the knowledge of the conditions of validity and directly with the knowledge of reasons for the redemption of a truth claim. Dummett/Habermas: the speaker could not carry out the verification monologically in order to avoid the transition from the semantic to the pragmatic level. >Verification, >Pragmatics, >Semantics. III 426 Problem: verification cannot be performed deductively according to final rules. The set of available reasons is described by internal relationships of a universe of linguistic structures that can only be measured by argument. In the end, the idea of verificationism must be completely abandoned. >Reasons, >Justification, >Explanation, >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. HabermasVsDummett: it would be more consistent not to commit oneself either to falsificationist or to verificationist ideas. >Falsification. Instead, the discursive redemption of claims of validity should be interpreted fallibilistically. What is important is that the speaker's illocutionary claim can be criticized. >Discourse, >Discourse theory. 1.M. Dummett, What is a Theory of Meaning? In: G. Evans, J. McDowell (Eds) Truth and Meaning, Oxford 1976, (EMD) S. 67ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Artists | Gadamer | I 91 Artist/artistry/Gadamer: What we call a work of art and experience aesthetically is based (...) on a performance of abstraction. By disregarding everything in which a work is rooted as its original context of life, all religious or profane functions in which it stood and in which it had its meaning, it becomes visible as the "pure work of art". >Artworks, >Abstraction, >Aesthetic Consciousness, >Aesthetic Difference. I 92 The "aesthetic distinction" which it operates as aesthetic consciousness also creates its own external existence. It proves its productivity by preparing its sites for simultaneity, the "universal library" in the field of literature, the museum, the standing theatre, the concert hall etc. I 93 Thus, through "aesthetic distinction", the work loses its place and the world to which it belongs by becoming part of the aesthetic consciousness. This corresponds on the other hand to the fact that the artist also loses his/her place in the world. Commissioned art: This can be seen in the discrediting of what is called commissioned art. In the age of public consciousness dominated by the art of experience, it is necessary to remember explicitly that creation out of free inspiration without a commission, a given theme and opportunity was once the exception in artistic creation (...). The free artist creates without a commission. He/She seems to be distinguished by the complete independence of his/her creative work, and thus he/she acquires socially the characteristic features of an outsider whose way of life is not measured by the standards of public morality. At the same time, however, the artist who is as "free as a bird or a fish" is burdened with a vocation that makes him/her an ambiguous figure. For an educational society that has fallen out of its religious traditions immediately expects more from art than corresponds to the aesthetic consciousness on the "standpoint of art". The romantic demand of a new mythology, as expressed by F. Schlegel, Schelling, Hölderlin and the young Hegel(1) but also, for example, in the artistic experiments and reflections of the painter Runge, gives the artist and his/her task in the world the consciousness of a new consecration. >Aesthetics/Hegel. I 94 This claim has since determined the tragedy of the artist in the world. For the redemption that the claim finds is always only a particular one. But in reality this means its refutation. The experimental search for new symbols or a new "saga" that unites all may indeed gather an audience around itself and create a community. But since every artist finds his/her community in this way, the particularity of such community formation only testifies to the decay that has taken place. It is only the universal form of aesthetic education that unites everyone. The actual process of education, i.e. the elevation to the generality, has here as it were disintegrated into itself. >Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer, cf. >Truth of Art/Gadamer. I 98 Artists/Art/Gadamer: In order to do justice to art, aesthetics must go beyond itself and reveal the "purity" of the aesthetic. With Kant, the concept of genius possessed the transcendental function by which the concept of art was founded. >Genius/Kant. Problem: But is the concept of genius really suitable for this? Even the consciousness of the artist of today seems to contradict this. A kind of twilight of genius has arrived. The idea of the somnambulistic unconsciousness with which the genius creates (...) seems to us today a false romance. A poet such as Paul Valéry set it against the standards of an artist and engineer such as Leonardo da Vinci, in whose only genius craftsmanship, mechanical invention and artistic I 99 genius were still indistinguishable.(2) >Genius/Gadamer. 1. Cf. Fr. Rosenzweig, Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus, 1917, S. 7. (Cf. for this the newer editions by R. Bubner in the Hegel-Studies, Beiheft 9 (1973), S. 261—65 and C. Jamme and H. Schneider, Mythologie der Vernunft, Frankfurt 1984, S. 11-14.) 1. Paul Valéry, Introduction ä la méthode de Léonard de Vinci et son annotation marginale, Variété I. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Confucianism | Weber | Habermas III 290 Confucianism/Taoism/Weber/Habermas: In his study about the economic ethics of the world religions Max Weber assesses Confucianism and Taoism solely from the point of view of ethical rationalization. Therefore he arrives at his well-known (and controversial) assessment of the low rationalization potential of these worldviews. >Rationalization, >Worldviews, >Religion, >Religious Belief. Weber: "The inner prerequisite of this ethics of unconditional world affirmation and adaptation to the world was the unbroken continuity of purely magical religiosity, beginning with the position of the emperor, whose personal qualification was responsible for the good behaviour of spirits, the occurence of rain (...), to the (...) cult of ancestral spirits (...)". (1) >Renaissance, cf. >Western Rationalism. J. NeedhamVsWeber/Habermas: thanks to the groundbreaking research of J. Needham (2) it is now known that the Chinese between the 1st century B.C. and the 15th century AD were apparently more successful than the West in the development of theoretical knowledge and its use for practical needs. It was only in the Renaissance that Europe took the clear lead in this field. Confucianism/Needham: contains the fundamentals of a world view capable of rationalization. With the concept of a concrete world order, the diversity of phenomena is systematically grasped and related to principles. However, the dominant redemption motives that exacerbate the dualism between the world of appearances and principles that transcend the world are missing. >Principles, >Appearance. III 292 Like the Greek philosophers, the Chinese educational class could not rely on an "academic" life devoted to contemplation and distanced from practice, on a bios theoretikos. >Ancient Philosophy. HabermasVsNeedham: I suspect that the Chinese traditions would be put in a different light if they were compared with classical Greek traditions, not primarily from the point of view of ethics but theory. In any case, it is not a matter of salvation paths, as is the case with conviction ethically redemption religions, but of ways of assuring the world. Cf. >Ethics of conviction. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I Tübingen, 1963, S. 515. 2. J. Needham, Wissenschaftlicher Universalismus, Frankfurt 1977. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Continuity | Ranke | Gadamer I 213 Continuity/History/Ranke/Gadamer: Ranke recognizes it as the most distinguished difference of the oriental and occidental system that in the Occident historical continuity forms the form of existence of culture(1). In this respect it is not arbitrary that the unity of world history is based on the unity of the occidental cultural world, to which occidental science in general and history as science in particular belong. Nor is it arbitrary that this Western culture is shaped by Christianity, which has its absolute moment in the uniqueness of the event of redemption. Ranke acknowledged something of this when he saw the reinstatement of man into the "immediacy to God" in the Christian religion, which he placed in a romantic way at the primeval beginning of all history(2). But (...) the fundamental meaning of this fact has not fully come to bear in the philosophical reflection of the historical view of the world (...). Continuity/Historism/Gadamer: So the empirical attitude of the historical school is not without philosophical preconditions either. What remains is the merit of the astute methodologist Droysen who removed it from its empirical disguise and recognised its fundamental significance. >Continuity/History/Droysen, >Interrelation/Ranke, >Unity/Ranke. 1. Ranke, Weltgeschichte IX, 1, 270f. 2. Vgl. Hinrichs, Ranke und die Geschichtstheologie der Goethezeit, S. 239f. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Determinism | Feynman | I 540 Determinism/Knowledge/Indeterminateness/Feynman: even if the world were consistently classically determined (QM did not apply), we could not predict the behavior of the individual particles: the smallest initial error quickly becomes a great uncertainty. If any precision is given, no matter how accurate, then you can specify a time that is long enough that our predictions are not valid for such a long time. For example, with an accuracy of 1 to a billion, it is not about millions of years, time only depends on the error logarithmically. We will lose all information after a very short time. >Initial conditions. It is therefore not fair to say that we should have realized from the freedom of the human mind that "quantum mechanics" would have meant the redemption from a mechanistic universe. >Quantum mechanics. Uncertainty Principle/Indeterminacy/Feynman: in practical terms it already existed in classical physics. >Uncertainty relation. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Deterrence | Social Psychology | Parisi I 141 Retribution/law/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Two prevalent normative theories of punishment in the legal literature are retribution (or "just deserts") and utilitarianism (specific or general deterrence, as well as incapacitation and rehabilitation) (Hart, 2008(1); Ten, 1987(2)). (...) only recently have researchers systematically investigated the psychological influence of deterrence and retribution motives on people's punishment judgments. >Utilitarianism, >Retribution. Psychology: The results indicate an interesting division: in the abstract, people explicitly endorse utilitarian goals (e.g. successful deterrence leading to crime reduction), but when presented with a specific scenario, they consistently choose to impose retributive punishments (Carlsmith, 2008)(3). Retribution: This evidence suggests that people are intuitive retributivists, making judgments based on intuitions about just deserts, though these intuitive judgments can sometimes be overridden by more reasoned considerations (see Carlsmith and Darley, 2008(4) for a review). Morality: At the same time, the reasoning process itself may be oriented toward retribution: when an array of different information is made available, participants are more likely to choose to obtain information about moral severity and other retributive factors, rather than information relevant to utilitarian aims (Carlsmith, 2006(5); Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson, 2002(6)). >Morals, >Morality. Consequentialism: Indeed, certain consequentialist moral decisions, despite being socially approved, give rise to the inference that the agent making or carrying out the decision is of inferior moral character (Uhlmann, Zhu, and Tannenbaum, 2013)(7). >Consequentialism. Example: e,.g., deciding to sacrifice one life to save multiple lives can lead to negative character inferences about the agent, even though the decision is regarded as morally correct (Uhlmann et al., 2013)(7). Restoration: Restorative justice goals are also intuitively appealing in some cases. In contrast with retribution, restorative justice aims to repair the harm that was caused through processes in which the offender, victim, and perhaps community members determine an appropriate reparative sanction (Bazemore, 1998(8); Braithwaite, 2002(9)). This justice goal is compatible with retribution; when given a choice, even for severe crimes, most participants choose a consequence with both retributive and restorative components over consequences that fulfill only one ofthose goals (Gromet and Darley, 2006)(10). >Justice, >Equality. 1. Hart, H. L. A. (2008). Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Ten, C. L. (1987). Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. Carlsmith, K. M. (2008). "On Justifying Punishment: The Discrepancy Between Words and Actions." Social Justice Research 21 (2): 119-137. doi:10.1007 /sl 1211-008-OOO-X. 4. Carlsmith, K. M. and J. M. Darley (2008). "Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice," in Mark P. Zanna, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 40, 193-236. San Diego: Academic Press. 5. Carlsmith, K. M. (2006). "The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Pun- ishment." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42(4): 43 7—451. doi: 10.1016/ j.jesp.2005.06.007. 6. Carlsmith, K. M., J. M. Darley, and P. H. Robinson (2002). "Why Do We Punish?: Deterrence and Just Desserts as Motives for Punishment." Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi:10.103 7/0022-3514.83.2.284. 7. Uhlmann, E. L., L. (Lei) Zhu, and D. Tannenbaum (2013). "When It Takes a Bad Person to Do the Right Thing." Cognition doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.10.005. 8. Bazemore, G. (1998). "Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption Communities, Victims, and Offender Reintegration." American Behavioral Scientist 41(6): 768-813. doi:10.1177/0002764298041006003. 9. Braithwaite, J. (2002). Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation. New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press. 10. Gromet, D. M. and J. M. Darley (2009). "Punishment and Beyond: Achieving Justice Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals." Law and society Review 43(1): 1-38. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Experimental Economics | Smith | Parisi I 78 Experimental economics/Vernon Smith/Sullivan/Holt: Smith’s approach to studying market equilibrium was to create a market for an artificial commodity. Buyers in Smith’s market valued the commodity because the rules of the experiment allowed them to redeem each “unit” of the commodity they bought for cash, earning the difference between an assigned redemption value and the negotiated price of each purchase. Sellers similarly valued trade because they earned the difference between the negotiated sales price and a cost number assigned to each unit of the commodity. These induced values allowed Smith to compare observed transactions to the Walrasian price that actually equated supply and demand in his market. >Equilibrium/Walras. The experiment was notable for showing that markets with good information about bids, asks, and sales prices would converge to the equilibrium prediction, even with small numbers of traders and no public information about others’ values and costs. Adaptations of the experimental approach to other settings quickly followed, eventually bleeding into the also-expanding literature of law and economics. >Law and economics/Sullivan/Holt, >Induced value theory/Economic theories. Parisi I 89 It has long been suggested that subjects in experiments can, in some circumstances, be adequately and appropriately incentivized by personal preferences over abstract outcomes such as winning a game (Smith, 1976(1), p. 277). Sullivan/Holt: The clear concern that many people express over the demise of characters in fictional stories and television shows - mapped to the outcomes of fictional litigants in mock disputes - may not be so different from the preferences actual jurors have over the “real,” but in many ways no less hypothetical, outcomes of the cases before them. Delicacy is required, however, as motivating subjects by way of context may simultaneously tend to bias subjects’ beliefs or perceived values in ways that invalidate or at least obscure theoretical predictions. On the other hand, such biases may be of limited concern if they are uncorrelated with treatment conditions of interest. >Jurisdiction/Experimental economics, >Risk perception/Economic theories, >Strategic voting/Experimental economics. 1. Smith, V. L. (1976). “Experimental economics: Induced value theory.” American Economic Review 66(2): 274–279. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Happiness | Augustine | Höffe I 102 Happiness/redemption/Augustinus/Höffe: The final salvation, the participation of human beings in extra- and supernatural happiness, depends on the unavailable and unpredictable grace of God. HöffeVsAugustine: On the other hand, the question arises whether an achievement of Christianity, the abolition of all ethnic limitation in favour of all people of good will, is not weakened here, because the ethnic limitation gives way to a selection of grace. >Recognition/Augustine. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Impartiality | Toulmin | Habermas III 60 Impartiality/Toulmin/Habermas: Toulmin does not want to pay the price of relativism for avoiding a priori rationality standards. It must not only count what the parties involved consider to be "rational". >Rationality, >Relativism, >Objectivity. However, Toulmin - like the Hegel of the "phenomenology" - does not want to assume arbitrarily, but wants to gain from the comprehending acquisition of the collective rational enterprise of the human race. HabermasVsToulmin: but as long as he does not clarify the general communicative prerequisites and procedures of cooperative search for truth... Habermas III 61 ...he cannot formally and pragmatically state what it means to take an impartial position as a participant in the argumentation. This "impartiality" cannot be read off from the structure of the arguments used, but can only be clarified on the basis of the conditions of discursive redemption of claims of validity. >Validity claims, >Disourse, >Discourse theory. Toulmin does not put the correct cuts between the random institutional forms of argumentation on the one hand and the forms of argumentation determined by internal structures on the other. Though Toulmin separates conflict and consensus models, these stand different from what he assumes, and do not stand side by side on equal terms. >Deliberative democracy. The honoring of compromises is not at all a strictly discursive honoring of claims of validity, but rather the coordination of interests that cannot be generalised on the basis of balanced positions of power. |
Toulmin I St. Toulmin The Uses of Argument Cambridge 2003 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Incarnation | Gadamer | I 422 Incarnation/Christianity/Language/Gadamer: There is (...) a thought which is not a Greek thought and which does better justice to the being of language, so that the language-forgetfulness of Western thinking cannot become a complete one. It is the Christian thought of incarnation. Cf. >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy. Incarnation is obviously not "Einkörperung" (English, literally: process of becoming subsumed into a body, embodimet). Neither the concept of the soul nor the concept of God, which are connected with such a "Einkörperung", correspond to the Christian concept of incarnation. The relationship between soul and body, as it is thought in these theories, such as in Platonic-Pythagorean philosophy, and corresponds to the religious idea of the transmigration of souls, sets rather the complete otherness of the soul in relation to the body. In all "Einkörperungen" it retains its being for itself, and the detachment from the body is regarded as purification, i.e. as restoration of its true and actual being. Also the appearance of the divine in human form, which makes the Greek religion so human has nothing to do with incarnation. God does not become a human there, but shows himself to man in human form, while at the same time retaining his superhuman form completely. In contrast to this, the incarnation of God, as taught by the Christian religion, includes the sacrifice that the Crucified One, as the Son of Man, takes upon himself, but that is to say, a mysteriously different relationship, the theological interpretation of which takes place in the doctrine of the Trinity. >Trinity/Gadamer. I 423 Gadamer: [The incarnation is closely connected with the] problem of the word. The interpretation of the mystery of the Trinity, probably the most important task facing the thinking of the Christian Middle Ages, is already in the Fathers and finally in the systematic development of Augustinism in the university scholasticism based on the human relationship between speaking and thinking. Dogmatics thus follows above all the prologue of John's Gospel, and as much as it is Greek means of thinking with which it tries to solve its own theological task, philosophical thinking gains through it a dimension closed to Greek thinking. When the word becomes flesh and only in this incarnation is the reality of the Spirit completed, the logos is thus freed from its spirituality, which at the same time signifies his cosmic potentiality. The uniqueness of the event of redemption brings about the entry of the historical being into Western thinking and also causes the phenomenon of language to emerge from its immersion in the ideality of the sense and to present itself to philosophical reflection. For unlike the Greek logos, the word is pure event (verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum)(1). >Word of God. Already the way, how in Patristics theological speculation about the mystery of the Incarnation is connected to Hellenistic thinking, is characteristic of the new dimension at which it aims. Thus, at the beginning, one tries to make use of the stoic concept of the inner and the outer logos (logos endiathetos - prophorikos)(2). This distinction was originally intended to distinguish the stoic world principle of the logos from the outwardness of mere repetition(3). For the Christian faith of revelation, the opposite direction now immediately becomes of positive importance. The analogy of the inner and outer word, the utterance of the word in the "vox", now gains exemplary value. >Word/Gadamer, >Word/Ancient Philosophy. 1. Thomas I. qu 34 2. In the following I refer to the teaching article "Verbe" in the Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique, as well as to Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinité. 3. Die Papageien: Sext. adv. math. V Ill, 275. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Individuation | Nietzsche | Pfotenhauer IV 8 Individuation/Nietzsche/Pfotenhauer: The process of individuation, the individual's rebellion against his fate, comes to rest in ecstatic reconciliation with nature. >Individual/Nietzsche, >Nature/Nietzsche. Pfotenhauer IV 36 Individuation/Music/Philosophy/Nietzsche: Nietzsche speaks of a "mysterious primordial one" of the "World Harmony" and the "higher commonality" into which he enters(1), who ecstatically forgets himself, who escapes the fate of the individual. Pfotenhauer: This thought of redemption in higher harmony is oriented towards music. Nietzsche himself speaks of a "profound metaphysics of music"(2) in analogy to Schopenhauer. The music in which the Dionysian state is in actual woe is the art philosophical red, in which becoming is stopped. >Music/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, KGW VI, 3, p. 26. 2. Ibid., Kap.5 p. 42. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 |
| Language | Christianity | Gadamer I 422 Language/Christianity/Gadamer: There is (...) a thought which is not a Greek thought and which does better justice to the existence of language (cf. >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy), so that the language-forgetfulness of Western thinking cannot become a complete one. It is the Christian thought of >incarnation. Incarnation is obviously not incarnation (German: "Einkörperung"). I 423 Gadamer: [The incarnation is closely connected with the] problem of the word. The interpretation of the mystery of the Trinity, probably the most important task facing the thinking of the Christian Middle Ages, is based on the human relationship between speaking and thinking, already in the Fathers and finally in the systematic development of Augustinism in the university scholasticism. Dogmatics thus follows above all the prologue of John's Gospel, and as much as it is a Greek means of thinking with which it tries to solve its own theological task, philosophical thinking gains through it a dimension closed to Greek thinking. When the word becomes flesh and only in this incarnation is the reality of the Spirit completed, the logos is thus freed from its spirituality, which at the same time signifies its cosmic potentiality. The uniqueness of the event of redemption brings about the entry of the historical being into Western thinking and also causes the phenomenon of language to emerge from its immersion in the ideality of the sense and to present itself to philosophical reflection. For unlike the Greek logos, the word is pure event (verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum)(1). Certainly, human language is only indirectly elevated to the object of contemplation. It is only in the counter-image of the human word that the theological problem of the word, of the verbum dei, namely the unity of God the Father and God the Son, is to emerge. But precisely this is for us the decisively important thing, that the mystery of this unity is reflected in the phenomenon of language. >Language/Gadamer, >Word/Ancient Philosophy. Thus, in the beginning, one tries to make use of the stoic concept of the inner and the outer logos (logos endiathetos - prophorikos)(2). This distinction was originally intended to distinguish the stoic world principle of the logos from the outwardness of mere repetition(3). For the Christian faith of revelation the opposite direction now immediately becomes of positive importance. The analogy of the inner and outer word, the utterance of the word in the "vox", now gains exemplary value. >Word/Gadamer, >Word/Ancient Philosophy, >Creation Myth/Gadamer. 1. Thomas I. qu 34 2. I refer in the following to the teaching article "Verbe" in the Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique, as well as to Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinité. 3. Die Papageien: Sext. adv. math. V Ill, 275. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Literature | Eco | I 32 Bible/Allegory/Middle Ages/Holy Scripture/Hermeneutics/Eco: the Holy Scripture could be interpreted in three different ways: E.g. Jacob in Egypt: It literally says in the Bible: the children of Israel leave Egypt. 1. Allegory interpretation: our redemption through Christ. 2. Moral interpretation: turning the soul of sorrow and misery into a state of grace. 3. Anagogical interpretation: exit of the holy soul from the bondage of this corruption to freedom of eternal glory. I 36 Novalis/Eco: Novalis exhibits pure evocative power of poetry as an art of indeterminate sense and imprecise meaning. I 37 Mallarmé: "It must be avoided that a single sense is imposed". I 200 Drama/Tragedy/Eco: Terminology: the deeper layers are called "action". Action: is unambiguous and inexhaustible. I 206 Literature/Art/Life/Eco: it is only natural that life is more like the Ulysses than the three musketeers. Nevertheless, we are all more inclined to perceive it in the categories of the three musketeers than in those of Ulysses. Or rather: I can only remember and judge life when I think of it as a traditional novel. I 258 Rhyme: rhyme first stimulates invention and pleasant sound structure,... I 259 ..later, the rhyme will make us a prisoner. The rhyme gives birth to the rhyming lexicon, which at first becomes the repertoire of words to be rhymed, but later becomes the repertoire of the already rhymed. > alienation. --- Eco I passim Openness/Literature: Eco speaks of complexity and inaccuracy of the relationships of the figures. --- I 290 Robbe Grillet/Nouveau novel: "The world is neither meaningful nor absurd: it is... around us, things are there. Its surface is clean and smooth, untouched, but without ambiguous shine and transparency. First the objects and gestures should prove their existence through their presence. Being here should prevail over any explanatory theory that wanted to lock it up. Sense and absurdity are not objective qualities. ((s) Robbe-GrilletVsEco.) I 282/283 CalvinoVsRobbe Grillet: Calvino warned against the flooding and disturbing presence of a "sea of objectivity". Talking about this sea in seemingly objective terms means a return of "objectivity" to a human universe. I 284 Robbe Grillet: Grillet would like to achieve a view, according to Eco, that is not distorted by an interest in things through his narrative technique. Robbe Grillet/Eco: against Grillet, one can perhaps interpret it this way: the narrator does not define things as alien and metaphysical entities in no relation to us. On the contrary, he determines a special kind of relationship between us and the things, a mode of "intentioning" the things that are unique to us. Instead of letting things be simple, he takes them to the area of a design operation that becomes a judgement on them. (This is not Robbe Grillet's own interpretation). I 285 EcoVsRobbe Grillet: Grillet is right when he thinks that the narrative structure must remain below the different interpretations. He is wrong when he believes that it is deprived of them because it is foreign to them. It is not foreign for them, but rather the sentence function of a number of situations in which we find ourselves set up in a language that had already spoken so much, that it is. I 286 Sartre: Sartre was confused that the representatives of the Nouveau novel side by side with him signed politically committed manifestos. I 290 Balzac: Marx and Engels: Mary and Engels acted reactionary and legitimistically; they basically had no interest in certain problems and agreed with the world in which they lived. Eco: Eco has, however, clarified their connections so clearly that he, at least in his work, did not remain their prisoner. I 291 Modern literature/Eco: modern literature can no longer analyze the world in such a way that it turns to a subject. Rather, it changes the disposition of a certain structural articulation of the subject. By turning articulation into a subject and dissolving the actual content of the work. --- II 148 Footnote Literature/rhyme/Jakobson/Eco: Jakobson masterfully analyses the rhyme as a relational factor, where the equivalence of the sound - projects onto the sequence as his constituent principle - inevitably implies semantic equivalence(1). (1) R. Jakobson, "Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics"; Style in Language, ed. T. A. Seboek, (1960). |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Money | Parsons | Habermas IV 395 Money/Medium/Parsons/Habermas: According to Parsons, money as a communication medium must have four groups of characteristics: 1. structural characteristics: Money has the properties of a code that can be used to transfer information. The money medium allows to generate and communicate symbolic expressions with a built-in preference structure. They can inform us about an offer and make us accept it. Here, however, acceptance must not be based on an affirmative statement on a criticizable claim to validity. Therefore, the media code only applies to a delimited class of standard situations. These are defined by interests. The action orientations of the participants are defined by a generalized value. The other (alter) can basically choose between two alternative positions. The sender (ego) can control these statements through offers. The actors are only oriented towards the consequences of actions. Habermas IV 396 By switching to media-controlled interactions, the actors gain new degrees of freedom. >Degrees of freedom/Parsons. Habermas IV 396 2. Quality characteristics: the medium must be of such quality,that if it is measured and sold in any kind of scale, it can be stored. Habermas IV 397 Medium/Parsons: is both measurement and storage of the value. While a linguistic utterance receives a measurable information value only in relation to the context-dependent information status of the sender ((s) sic, actually of the receiver), media must embody measurable value sets to which, irrespective of particular contexts, all participants can refer to as an objective quantity. 3. Structure of claim and redemption: Money is neither a good nor a production factor, it symbolizes amounts in value. But it has no intrinsic value as a medium. Habermas IV 398 While reasons are redeemed in communicative action, in the case of the money medium the nominal claims defined by the code, which are issued in exchange values, are redeemed in real use values. Difference to the language: this does not require any further authentication. By contrast, monetary assets need to be covered by deposited reserves, ultimately by institutional anchoring. This is necessary because money does not create trust simply by functioning as a medium. >Confidence/Habermas. Habermas IV 399 4. System-forming effect: Subsystems/Habermas: are indicators of a successful formation of subsystems: The crisis-like fluctuations in the quantitative ratio of the values embodied by the medium (here: money) and the real values represented by them (i.e. the dynamics of inflation and deflation) - The reflective upgrading of the medium, which makes capital markets possible, for example. >Subsystems/Habermas. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Music | Nietzsche | Pfotenhauer IV 36 Individuation/Music/Philosophy/Nietzsche: Nietzsche speaks of a "mysterious primordial one" of the "World Harmony" and the "higher commonality" into which the one enters(1), who ecstatically forgets himself, who escapes the fate of the individual. >World/Nietzsche. Pfotenhauer: "This thought of redemption in higher harmony is oriented towards music. Nietzsche himself speaks of a "profound metaphysics of music" (section 5, p. 42) in analogy to Schopenhauer. The music in which the Dionysian state is in actual woe is the philosophical place of art, in which the process of becoming is shut down. >Art/Nietzsche, >Schopenhauer. 1.F. Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, KGW VI, 3, p. 26. --- Danto III 80 Music/NietzscheVsWagner/Wagner/Nietzsche/Danto: Wagner could not live up to the high artistic demands of "The Birth of the Tragedy"(1). Nietzsche saw himself as a composer, just as Wagner saw himself as a philosopher. Danto III 81 Nietzsche has only heard a very small portion of Wagner's music, and if so, only passages from rehearsals. Danto III 84 NietzscheVsWagner/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer: they deny life, they slander it, so they are my antipodes. (Nietzsche versus Wagner (1888), "Wir Antipoden", KGW VI. 3, p. 423.). Humanity owes a lot of evil to these rapturous drunkards.(2) 1. F. Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, KGW VI, 3, p. 26 2. Ibid. Chap. 5, p. 42. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Nonfactualism | Boghossian | Wright I 267 Rules/Wittgenstein/Wright: whatever Wittgenstein's dialectics exactly achieve, in any case it enforces some kind of restriction for a realistic notion of rules and meaning. >Rules/Wittgenstein, >Rule following/Wittgenstein, >Meaning/Wittgenstein, >Meaning. I 268 And therefore also for truth, since truth is a function of meaning. I 269 Paul Boghossian: he has now presented an approach that could eliminate both concerns: I 270 Boghossian: we consider a non-factualism which is exclusively concerned with meaning (not truth): There is no property of the kind that a word means something, and consequently no such fact. >Facts, >Properties. Since the truth condition of a proposition is a function of its meaning, non-factualism necessarily implies a non-factualism with regard to the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. Then the following results: (5) For all S, P: "S has the truth condition P" is not truth conditional. According to quotation redemption: (4) For each S: "S" is not truth conditional. >Truth conditional semantics. "Fascinating Consequence"/Boghossian: of a non-factualism of the meaning: a global non-factualism. And precisely in this, a non-factualism differs from the meaning of non-factualism with respect to any other object. I 271 WrightVsBoghosian: many will protest against his implicit philosophy of truth, but nothing can be objected to the use of the word alone. Boghossian: Global Minimalism, Non-Factualism: regarding meaning, not truth: There is no property that a word means something, and consequently no fact, is a result of global nonfactualism, as opposed to all other nonfactualisms. Wright I 271 Realism/Wright: so far, the question has been asked which additional realism-relevant properties can make the truth predicate "substantive". We can now use "correctness" ("correct") for the minimum case. (Formal >correctness). The thesis of non-factualism can then be formulated in such a way that any discourse on meaning and related terms is at most capable of being correct, and does not qualify for more substantial properties. (i) It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition. As a minimalist, one has to accept this, since truth conditions attribute a semantic, i.e., substantive property, and this is denied by the proposition. >Semantic properties. Next: (ii) It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" is true. I 272 This follows from (i) since only one sentence with a truth condition can be true. Next: (iii) It is not the case that S has the truth condition that P This follows, according to Boghossian, "due to the quotation redemption properties of the truth predicate". >Truth predicate, >Disquotation, >Disquotationalism, >Deflationism. I 272ff Nonfactualism/Boghossian/Wright: > then every discourse can be at the most correct. (i) is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition" - WrightVs: can be reworded with quotation redemption (vi) is not the case that it is not the case that S has the truth condition that P has a truth condition - but denial of truth is not inconsistent with the correctness of the assertion, however, (i) is not correct if both truth and correctness are involved, the matrix for that truth predicate (Definition) does not have to be conservative: i.e. That the value of ""A"is true" becomes false or incorrect in all cases, except where A is attributed with the value true. ((s) Non-conservativity demands truth, not just correctness, >truth transfer. "Correct": truth predicate "correct" is for minimal discourses that can be true. Negation/Logic/Truth/Correctness/Correct: If both truth and correctness are involved, there is a distinction (> negation) between the: a) real, strict negation: it transforms each true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one, another negation form is: b) negation: it acts so that a true (or correct) proposition is constructed exactly when its argument does not reach any truth. >Negation/Boghossian. |
Bogh I Paul Boghossian Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Oxford 2007 Boghe I Peter Boghossian A manual for Creating Atheists Charlottesville 2013 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Power | Parsons | Habermas IV 400 Power/System Theory/Parsons/Habermas: within Parsons system theory, power is understood as a communication medium (the other three communication media in Parsons are money, influence and value retention). >Money/Parsons, Communication Media/Parsons. As a control medium, power represents the symbolic embodiment of value without itself having an intrinsic value. Power consists neither in effective performance nor in the use of physical force. Like money, the power medium reflects the structure of claim and redemption. Habermas IV 401 Claims: the nominal claims for readiness to follow up on binding decisions defined by the code can be settled in real values and covered by special reserves. According to Parsons, the "utility value" of the realization of collective goals corresponds to the "exchange value" of power. The disposition via coercive means is used as cover. (1) Code: is structured similarly in the case of power as in the medium of money: rulers and subjects of power belong to the same collective. After all, power interests are defined by mobilising performance potential for the achievement of collectively desired goals. The generalized value here is efficiency (in money it is benefit). The power code schematizes possible expressions as consent to or rejection of imperatives. Habermas IV 402 Value: the amount of value corresponding to the claim to readiness to comply is not as manipulable as the exchange value in the case of money. This is because there is no sign system available in the power medium as in the case of the money medium. Symbols of power such as uniforms, emblems or official seals are not comparable to the system of prices from a syntactic point of view. This leads to the problem of measurability. Power can be sold, but is not circulable like money. However, power can only take the form of a medium because it is not attached to certain rulers or contexts. However, power binds itself more symbiotically to persons and institutions than money does. Habermas IV 403 Power must be demonstrated from time to time, as it is not covered like a deposit in a bank. Overall, power cannot be calculated as well as money. Power/Money/Luhmann: in terms of system characteristics, the two media money and power behave partly in the opposite direction: while financing money, e.g. granting credit, usually increases the inherent complexity of the economic system, the complexity of the system is reduced in the event of an increase in power.(2) Habermas IV 404 Unlike money, power not only needs cover (through coercive means) and legal standardization (in the form of incumbency), but it also needs legitimation. >Legitimation, >Legitimacy 1.T Parsons, Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process, in: T. Parsons, Social Theory and Modern Society, NY 1967, S. 264ff 2.N. Luhmann, Zur Theorie symbolische generalisierter Kommunikationsmedien, in. ZfS 1974, S 236ff. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Proper Names | Brandom | I 614 Proper names/Name/Brandom: can only be understood in terms of the sortal associated with them - e.g. you can not just point to an equestrian statue and call "it" a "lump". It depends on whether you are referring to the statue, or the lump of clay. >Reference. I 805f Name/Reference/Kripke: if it is determined that the name is used "as usual", different beliefs cannot endanger the reference - BrandomVsKripke: the concept of reference should not be assumed in order to be able to inherit an expression anaphorically - Co-typicity does not guarantee coreference! - (not even for canonically pronominal "he", "it") - in the anaphoric chain, the quote redemption principle is not applicable - BrandomVsKripke: no paradox, but we can use names in a way that is excluded by the disquotation scheme - e.g. "Cicero" (Spy): not all need to belong to the same chain, but you also do not need quasi-names (such as quasi indexical expressions (>Castaneda)). I 807 Name/Frege/Brandom: according to Frege names are supposedly linked with property. - KripkeVs - Brandom: this is not Fregian: according to Frege, properties are part of the meaning (reference), and not of the sense - they are not immediately comprehensible. Brandom: conceptual contents expressed by names are opaque. >Opacity. I 811 Definition Names/Brandom: anaphoric chains of co-typical tokenings. >Anaphora. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Prosentential Theory | Brandom | I 436 Definition pro-sententional theory of truth/Camp/Grover/Belnap/Brandom: is the result if you consider "is true" to be a syncategorematic part of pro-sentences. Analogy to pronouns. Savings - has the same semantic content as its anaphoric predecessor - recognizes its predecessor - e.g. "She stopped." Predecessor: Maria stopped. E.g. "for all you can say is true: if the policeman said it, then it is true". Cf. >Anaphora, >Truth theory. Four Conditions for pro-sentences (analog to pronouns): 1) They must occupy all the grammatical positions (embedded and freestanding) 2) They are generic: every clause of statement may be the predecessor of a pro-sentence, e.g. He is standing, he is his F. 3) They can be used quantificatorily 4) The class of the admissible substituent determines the significance of the pro-sentence - the anaphora is a relation between Tokenings. "This is true" is a response to a Tokening of "I am hungry". - E.g. "everything he said is true" is not accessible for simpler redundancy and quote redemption approaches. I 438 Per: it can explain complicated sentences: E.g. "Something that Hans said is either true, or it was said by Fritz". Cf. >Everything he said... I 441 Prosentential Theory/Brandom: "refers to" is a pro-sentence forming operator. - E.g. "The one Kissinger referred to as "almost third-rated mind" understood as a pronoun whose anaphoric predecessor is a particular quote by Kissinger - nominalization of sentences - ((s) Instead of describing a sentence: the name of a sentence). >Quote/Quotation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Protestant Ethics | Weber | Habermas III 299 Protestant Ethics/Weber/Habermas: in traditional society, the cognitive potential created by the rationalized worldviews within which the disenchantment process takes place cannot yet become effective. It is only delivered in modern societies. This process means the modernisation of society.(1) >Rationality, >Rationalization, >Tradition, >Cultural Tradition, >Modernity, >Modernization, >Society. Habermas III 307 Profession/Protestantism/Weber: modern professional culture is precisely that implementation of ethics of conviction that ensures motivationally the procedural rationality of entrepreneurial action in a way that has consequences for the capitalist enterprise. >Ethics of conviction. Habermas III 308 Weber does not want to explain why the Catholic inhibitions against commercial profit-seeking have fallen, but what made the conversion possible. He discovered the corresponding teachings in Calvinism and around the Protestant sects. In religious community life he finds the institutions that ensured the socializing effectiveness of the teachings in the supporting layers of early capitalism.(2) >Institutions, >Religion. Habermas III 310 Profession/Weber/Habermas: professional work as a whole is ethically charged and dramatised. The sphere of the profession is released from traditional morality and becomes the sphere of procedural professional probation. This is connected with an ethics of conviction limited to individual graces, which eliminates the Catholic coexistence of monk, priest and lay ethics in favour of an elitist separation between virtuoso and mass religiosity. >Purpose rationality, >Value spheres. Consequences are the inner loneliness of the individual and the understanding of one's neighbor as another neutralized in strategic contexts of action. (3) Habermas III 311 Protestant ethics/Schluchter: the ethics of ascetic Protestantism puts the relationship of the individual to God above his relationships to people and gives these relationships a new meaning: they are no longer interpreted in piety terms.(4) Habermas: even the objectification of these relationships destroys the basis of legitimacy of piety. It degrades all traditional norms to mere conventions. However, this does not require the special objectification required for capitalist economic transactions and which allows segmentation of a legally organized area of strategic action. HabermasVsWeber: Weber denies such a possibility of development. Habermas III 312 This is because of the structural incompatibility of any consistently ethicized religion of redemption with the impersonal orders of a rationalized economy and objective politics. >Economy, >Politics. 1.Vgl. H.V. Gumbrecht, R. Reichardt, Th. Schleich (Hrg), Sozialgeschichte der Französischen Aufklärung, 2 Bde, München, 1981 2. M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Bd 2, Hamburg 1972, p. 232. 3. Schluchter, Die Entwicklung des okzidentalen Rationalismus, Tübingen 1979, p. 250f. 4. Schluchter ibid p. 251. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Public Sphere | Habermas | IV 509 Public sphere/Habermas: The political system ensures mass loyalty in both positive and negative ways; positive through the prospect of the redemption of welfare state programs, selective by excluding topics and contributions from public debate. This can be done through socio-structural filters, through the bureaucratic deformation of the structures of public communication or through manipulative control of communication flows. The interaction of these variables explains why the symbolic self-representation of the political elites in public can be largely decoupled from the real decision-making processes within the political system.(1) This corresponds to the segmentation of the voter role. IV 510 The election decision generally only has an influence on the recruitment of management personnel and its motives are beyond the reach of discursive decision-making. This amounts to a neutralization of the possibilities of political participation legally opened up by the citizenship role. >Political elections, >Electoral systems, >Democracy, >Society, >Discourse, >Discourse theory, >Deliberative democracy, >Politics. 1.M. Edelmann, The symbolic use of politics, Urbana 1964; D.O. Sears, R.R. Lau, T. R. Tyler, H. M. Allen, Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics, Am. Pol. Rev. 74, 1989, p. 670ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Brandom | I 800 Principle of disquotation: "P " should occur simultaneously inside and outside quotation marks. If a speaker agrees with "p", then he believes that p. I 801 BrandomVs: the combination of translation and disquotation (= type repetition) is not generally suitable as an analysis of the relation between the reported and the reporting token in indirect speech attributions. >Attribution, >Inderect speech. Three types of exceptions - ambiguities: 1st example: Cicero, Roman orator, or "Cicero" spy in World War II. The arrangement corresponds to the Paderewski case, but the double use of "Cicero" does not allow for any inconsistency or paradox. Paderewski is coreferent, the two "Cicero" is not. I 799 For example, someone hears from the pianist Paderewski, and thinks he is musical. Later he hears about a politician who was also prime minister of the Polish government in exile and does not consider him musical. (In reality it is both times Ignaz Paderewski). The parallel would not be that the inventor of the bifocal spectacles would not have invented the lightning rod, but that the inventor of the lightning rod would not have invented the lightning rod. I 801 Quote/indirect speech/Brandom: quote redemption = repetition of types - three types of exceptions - 1) "Cicero": spy: not co-referential with Roman orator, but no inconsistency or paradox because of double occurrence - 2) Paderewski: co-referential. I 803 3) Kripke's dilemma: only occurs under adequacy conditions: the speaker must be able to distinguish his case by "pure logic" or "semantic introspection". Brandom: why should we not rightly conclude that proper names are sometimes used in such a way that the principle of citation extinction is not applicable, because of the dual use of not only the "Cicero" type but also the "Paderewski" type? You can't find an answer. >Proper names, >Causal theory of names, >Description levels. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Retribution | Social Psychology | Parisi I 141 Retribution/law/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Two prevalent normative theories of punishment in the legal literature are retribution (or "just deserts") and utilitarianism (specific or general deterrence, as well as incapacitation and rehabilitation) (Hart, 2008(1); Ten, 1987(2)). (...) only recently have researchers systematically investigated the psychological influence of deterrence and retribution motives on people's punishment judgments. Psychology: The results indicate an interesting division: in the abstract, people explicitly endorse utilitarian goals (e.g. successful deterrence leading to crime reduction), but when presented with a specific scenario, they consistently choose to impose retributive punishments (Carlsmith, 2008)(3). >Utilitarianism. Retribution: This evidence suggests that people are intuitive retributivists, making judgments based on intuitions about just deserts, though these intuitive judgments can sometimes be overridden by more reasoned considerations (see Carlsmith and Darley, 2008(4) for a review). Morality: At the same time, the reasoning process itself may be oriented toward retribution: when an array of different information is made available, participants are more likely to choose to obtain information about moral severity and other retributive factors, rather than information relevant to utilitarian aims (Carlsmith, 2006(5); Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson, 2002(6)). >Morality. Consequentialism: Indeed, certain consequentialist moral decisions, despite being socially approved, give rise to the inference that the agent making or carrying out the decision is of inferior moral character (Uhlmann, Zhu, and Tannenbaum, 2013)(7). >Consequentialism. Example: e,.g., deciding to sacrifice one life to save multiple lives can lead to negative character inferences about the agent, even though the decision is regarded as morally correct (Uhlmann et al., 2013)(7). Restoration: Restorative justice goals are also intuitively appealing in some cases. In contrast with retribution, restorative justice aims to repair the harm that was caused through processes in which the offender, victim, and perhaps community members determine an appropriate reparative sanction (Bazemore, 1998;(8) Braithwaite, 2002(9)). This justice goal is compatible with retribution; when given a choice, even for severe crimes, most participants choose a consequence with both retributive and restorative components over consequences that fulfill only one ofthose goals (Gromet and Darley, 2006)(10). >Justice, >Equality. 1. Hart, H. L. A. (2008). Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Ten, C. L. (1987). Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. Carlsmith, K. M. (2008). "On Justifying Punishment: The Discrepancy Between Words and Actions." Social Justice Research 21 (2): 119-137. doi:10.1007 /sl 1211-008-OOO-X. 4. Carlsmith, K. M. and J. M. Darley (2008). "Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice," in Mark P. Zanna, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 40, 193-236. San Diego: Academic Press. 5. Carlsmith, K. M. (2006). "The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Pun- ishment." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42(4): 43 7—451. doi: 10.1016/ j.jesp.2005.06.007. 6. Carlsmith, K. M., J. M. Darley, and P. H. Robinson (2002). "Why Do We Punish?: Deterrence and Just Desserts as Motives for Punishment." Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi:10.103 7/0022-3514.83.2.284. 7. Uhlmann, E. L., L. (Lei) Zhu, and D. Tannenbaum (2013). "When It Takes a Bad Person to Do the Right Thing." Cognition doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.10.005. 8. Bazemore, G. (1998). "Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption Communities, Victims, and Offender Reintegration." American Behavioral Scientist 41(6): 768-813. doi:10.1177/0002764298041006003. 9. Braithwaite, J. (2002). Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation. New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press. 10. Gromet, D. M. and J. M. Darley (2009). "Punishment and Beyond: Achieving Justice Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals." Law and society Review 43(1): 1-38. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Terminology | Nietzsche | Ries II 11 Crisis/Nietzsche: is to be pushed forward to revaluate all values. Ries II 11 Amor fati/Nietzsche: the highest state a philosopher can attain: to think Dionysian in relation to existence. Ries II 13 Noon/Nietzsche: A mature old tree, embraced by the rich love of a vine and hidden from itself. At the moment of happiness, the course of time seems to stop. Ries II 16 Nietzsche: Seafaring passion for the "unknown", which lies in a direction "where all the suns of mankind have so far gone down". Ries II 17 Zarathustra/Nietzsche: Thesis: the meaning of life is love. Ries II 19 Happiness/Nietzsche: Zarathustra: the happiness of my existence, to express its puzzle form, I have already died as my father, as my mother I am still alive, and I am getting old. Ries II 20 Nietzsche/Biography: Nietzsche met Jacob Burckhardt. During the Franco-German war, he was a voluntary nurse for several months. Ries II 25 "Dark antiquity": The term comes from Jacob Burckhardt. (Not literally!). Ries II 28 Apollonian/Nietzsche: Symbol of the world as an apparition, in the sense of the Schopenhauer concept of imagination. Deceptive liberation from the terrible Dionysian knowledge of "primal pain". Apollonian/Nietzsche: Art medium Dionysian/Nietzsche: Wisdom Apollonian/Dionysian/Nietzsche: in the end, they both speak each other's language. There is no point in a world game circling in itself, which the will in eternal lust plays with itself. Ries II 29 Tragedy: Schopenhauer: Pathos as primal pain - Nietzsche primordial lust. Ries II 30 Nietzsche: Zarathustra: From the smile of Dionysus the Olympic gods were born, from his tears the human was created. Ries II 30 Pessimism/Nietzsche: "Beyond Good and Evil": a philosophy that dares to lower morality itself into the world of appearances, namely appearance as deception, illusion, delusion, error. Ries II 29/30 Nietzsche/Biography/Ries: by the "Birth of the Tragedy" he was scientifically dead as a philologist. Ries II 49 Human/All too human/Nietzsche: 2nd main piece: "The Wanderer and his Shadow": "Shadow philosophy"/Shadow/Nietzsche: in which the "objects" lose their physicality. Noon/Nietzsche: Whosoever had an active and stormy morning, whose soul is overwhelmed by a strange quietness around the noon of life... It is a death with awake eyes. Ries II 50 Jesus/Christianity/Nietzsche: Parable "The Prisoners" (The Gay Science): the son of the guard: I will save you, but only those of you who believe that I am the son (Jesus) of the prison guard. Ries II 55 Gay Science/Nietzsche: Science of the free spirit. Ries II 57 Eternal return/Nietzsche: (Zarathustra) the thought invaded Nietzsche in August 1881 at the lake of Silvaplana. Like when one day or at night a demon in your loneliest solitude stalked you and said: "You will have to live this life as you loved it and love it now, once more and countless times. And there will be nothing new about it, but every pain and every desire and every thought and sigh and all unspeakably small and big things of your life must come back to you and everything in the same order and also this spider and this moonlight between the trees... would you not bow down and grind your teeth and curse the demon who spoke like that? >Eternal return/Nietzsche. The question with everyone and everything: 'Do you want to do this again and again and countless times?' would lie as the heaviest weight on your actions!" Ries II 58/ 59 Zarathustra/Nietzsche: as a classic figure, reversal of history, "overcoming morality". Zarathustra, who once created the most fatal error of morality, himself - he is also the first to recognize him the heavyweight has given way from things. The whole divine horizon has been wiped away. Ries II 60/61 The last human/Nietzsche: Opposite image of the superhuman, vegetating at the end of civilization. The last man smells badly! Ries II 62 Three stages: past, present, future: Camel/Nietzsche: idealistic stage, obedience, theological absolutism "thou shalt". Löwe/Nietzsche: idealism turns against itself, against the thousand-years old "great dragon" of the "thou shalt" dominating it: "I will". Ries II 63 Kind/Nietzsche: but the freedom of this "I want" is still constituted by what it denies: morality, metaphysics, religion. Only the third stage brings the innocence of becoming beyond good and evil. >Morality/Nietzsche, >Metaphysics/Nietzsche, >Religion/Nietzsche. Ries II 64 Self-conquest/Nietzsche: Where I found something alive, I found the will to power... life itself spoke to me: I am what must always overcome itself. The will overcomes itself to its purest form: the will to power. Thus constant repetition, thereby circularity, thus return of the same always! Ries II 65 Dionysian/Nietzsche: Existence in Dionysian immediacy remains subject to appearances. Ries II 70 Redemption of the "higher humans": Figures/Equalities/Zarathustra/Nietzsche/Ries: Schopenhauer: Schopenhauer is caricatured by Nietzsche in the Zarathustra as the fortune teller of great fatigue. The two kings/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: 1. despiser of the false representation of the political 2. the Conscientious of the spirit (the scientist). The old Sorcerer/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: Richard Wagner. The old Pope/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the pious man mourning for the "dead God" and pious in this grief. The ugliest man/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: "the murderer of God", the great self-loathing and disgusted by humans. The voluntary beggar/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the selfless human. The shadow of Zarathustra: the free spirit. They are all as the "remnant of God" deeply desperate and failed. They all caricature themselves at the donkey festival. The always same Ries II A of the donkey as the Dionysian saying-yes to the whole of being. Ries II 71 Noon/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: through the "noon abyss" Zarathustra falls "into the well of eternity". The ship is no longer being praised for its departure into the unknown, but for its return to the "quietest bay". --- Danto III 207 Terminology/Blonde Beast/Nietzsche/Danto: the expression blonde beast has no direct reference to Germans or Aryans in Nietzsche. This passage refers to "Roman, Arabic, Germanic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings".(1) Most likely, the "Blonde Beast" is a literary topos for "Lion", the so-called King of the Animals. Danto III 218 Internalisation/Terminology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche calls internalisation the phenomenon that a drive still discharges when prohibited, but not against an external object, but rather an internal object, the person himself. This phenomenon plays a role in the further development of consciousness. (2) >Internalization. Danto III 219 Bad conscience: It is possible that people may remain in the state of mere self-aggression or mere self-loathing. That is what Nietzsche calls a guilty conscience. 1. Vgl. F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 289. 2. Ibid. p. 338 |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Theology | Benjamin | Bolz II 14 Theology/Politics/Benjamin: Theology and political thought form a totality that must be thought of as a juxtaposition of extremes. Bolz II 17 Benjamin is often called a witness of historical materialism, negative theology, and even of literary-scientific deconstructivism. >Historical materialism, >Deconstructivism. Bolz II 21 Secularization of theology (1st history-philosophical thesis: theology must seek protection in historical materialism). Bolz II 31 Theology/Benjamin: Exodus from the philosophy in the commentary. >Critique/Benjamin. Benjamin himself hides his metaphysical and theological motifs in his work. Typical formulas: "brush against the stroke" "cover and veiled". Secularization of theology for its salvation. Turn to a "pragmatic" communism. Salvation: salvation is not the goal of history, but its end. >Redemption, cf. >End of History. Bolz II 34 Theology/Benjamin: Because theocracy has no political meaning, the world politics of the political theologian must be nihilistic in order to promote its mental meaning.(1) >Nihilism. This is the scheme according to which Benjamin's studies on Baroque, Baudelaire and Surrealism also articulate a Gnostic protest. It is directed against the return of antiquity on the apex of modernity as it is predicted by Nietzsche in Max Weber's doctrine of Occidental Realism. >Procedural rationality/Weber, >Western Rationalism. Bolz II 35 Eye to eye with fascism, theology is forced into inversion If a free mankind is to seek happiness in the field of history, the dependent mankind must now take a foot in hopelessness. Foot ... not hope. Bolz II 36 Teaching is abolished critique, critique is inverse theology and religion is the "concrete totality of experience".(2) 1. W. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften. Unter Mitwirkung von Th. W. Adorno und Gershom Sholem herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann Schweppenhäuser Frankfurt/M. 1972-89. Bd II, S. 204 2. Ebenda. S. 170 |
Bo I N. Bolz Kurze Geschichte des Scheins München 1991 Bolz II Norbert Bolz Willem van Reijen Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| Toleration | Rousseau | Rawls I 215 Tolerance/Rousseau/Rawls: when reasons for limiting tolerance are given, they often violate the principle of freedom. For example, Rousseau thought that people would not consider it possible to live together in peace with others whom they considered condemned. For loving them would be tantamount to hating God who punishes them. Anyone who looks at others as damned would have to fight or convert them according to Rousseau. RawlsVsRousseau: Rousseau would not tolerate those religions which say that there is no redemption outside the church.(1) Rawls: but the consequences are not based on experience. An a priori psychological argument, however plausible, is not sufficient to give up tolerance. Justice, on the other hand, assumes that disturbances of public order or freedom are detected in community experience. >Social Contract, >Social Contract/Rousseau, >Freedom/Rousseau, >Community. 1. See Rousseau, The Social Contract, bk. IV, ch. VIII. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Trinity | Gadamer | I 423 Trinity/Language/Gadamer: The interpretation of the mystery of the Trinity, probably the most important task that was set to the thinking of the Christian Middle Ages, is based already with the Fathers and finally in the systematic development of Augustinism in higher scholasticism on the human relationship between speaking and thinking. Dogmatics thus follows above all the prologue of John's Gospel, and as much as it is Greek means of thinking with which it tries to solve its own theological task, philosophical thinking gains through it a dimension closed to Greek thinking. When the word becomes flesh and only in this incarnation is the reality of the Spirit completed, the logos is thus freed from his spirituality, which at the same time signifies his cosmic potentiality. The uniqueness of the event of redemption brings about the entry of the historical being into Western thinking and also causes the phenomenon of language to emerge from its immersion in the ideality of the sense and to present itself to philosophical reflection. For unlike the Greek logos, the word is pure event (verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum)(1). Certainly, human language is only indirectly elevated to the object of contemplation. It is only in the counter-image of the human word that the theological problem of the word, of the verbum dei, namely the unity of God the Father and God the Son, is to emerge. But precisely this is for us the decisively important thing, that the mystery of this unity is reflected in the phenomenon of language. >Language/Gadamer, >Word/Ancient Philosophy, >Creation Myth/Gadamer, >Word/Augustine. I 425 Word of God/Creation/Language: The mystery of the Trinity finds its mirror in the miracle of language in so far as the word which is true because it says how things are, is nothing in itself and does not want to be anything in itself: nihil de suo habens, sed totum de illa scientia de qua nascitur. It has its being in its manifestation. This is exactly what is true of the mystery of the Trinity. Here again it is not the earthly appearance of the Redeemer as such that is important, but rather his complete divinity, his equality of essence with God. The theological task is to think in this equality of essence nevertheless the independent personal existence of Christ. For this purpose the human relationship is offered, which becomes visible in the word of the Spirit, the verbum intellectus. It is more than a mere image, for the human relationship of thinking and speaking corresponds in all its imperfection to the divine relationship of the Trinity. The inner word of the Spirit is just as essential to thinking as the Son of God is to God the Father. I 427 Trinity/Gadamer: The process of thinking is (...) not a process of change Gadamer I 428 (motus), i.e. not a transition from potency to act, but an emergence ut actus ex actu: the word is not formed only after the knowledge is completed, scholastically spoken, after the information of the intellect by the species is completed, but it is the completion of the knowledge itself. In this respect, the word is at the same time as this formation (formatio) of the intellect. >Word/Thomas, >Word of God/Gadamer. Word/Language/Thinking/Gadamer: In this way it can be understood that the creation of the Word was understood as a true image of the Trinity. It is a matter of real generatio, and real birth, although here, of course, there is no receiving part next to a begetting one. But it is precisely this intellectual character of the production of the Word that is decisive for its theological model function. There is really something in common between the process of the divine persons and the process of thinking. Trinity/Gadamer: The mystery of the Trinity, which is to be illuminated by the analogy with the inner word, must ultimately remain incomprehensible from the point of view of human thinking. If in the divine word the whole of the divine spirit is pronounced, then the processual moment in this word means something for which basically every analogy lets us down. If the divine spirit, by recognizing itself, at the same time recognizes all that exists, then the Word of God is the Word of the spirit that sees and creates everything in an intuition. The process disappears in the actuality of the divine All-Wisdom. Creation, too, is not a real process, but only interprets the order of the world as a whole in a temporal scheme.(2) 1. Thomas I. qu 34 2. It is clear that the patristic and scholastic interpretation of Genesis to some extent repeats the discussion about the right interpretation of "Timaios" that was held between Plato's disciples. (Cf. my study of "idea and reality in Plato's "Timaios". (Meeting reports of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences, Philos.-histor. Class, 2nd Abh. Heidelberg 1974; now in vol. 6 of the Ges. Werke, pp. 242-270). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Truth | Quine | Rorty I 217 Quine: "Hund" is the German word for "dog" and "Robinson believes in God" this is not a truth type that expresses a "fact", something "actual". Instead the positivist distinction between conventional and empirically confirmed truth, Quine offers us a distinction between truth by virtue of convenience and truth by virtue of correspondence. Quine: truths about meaning, opinions and propositional truths are somehow not real truths - just as applied for the positivists that necessary truths are not really "about the world". >Description levels, >Positivism, >Beliefs, >Language, >Reality. --- Quine I 55 Truth: QuineVsPeirce: infinite confirmation is not ideal but always correctable - false analogy of the limit value of an approach to truth. I 117 Truth of categorical sentences depends on the object - Our special denoting apparatus - but stimulus meaning is similar for natives. >Stimulus meaning. Goodman’s individual calculus is translatable as syllogistic. I 232 Truth is not ambiguous, but universal: a true confession is as true as mathematical law - difference between laws and confessions - Even "existence" is not ambiguous. I 425/26 "Make true": takes facts as something concrete (VsDummett?). Truth: not confirmation through evidence - it could always be reinterpreted - Truth is immanent, there is nothing above it. >Immanence. Interpretation is always within a theory. >Theories, >Interpretation. --- II 55 f DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: No thing makes sentences true (make true) - Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to beliefs. --- Putnam II 205f Truth/Quine: is not a property - (where?) - But only recognizes immanent truth - within evolving theory - problem: how to escape solipsism? --- Quine VI 109 Truth/Meaning/Quine: 1) sentences themselves bear truth - 2) sentence meaning as truth bearer - Problem: sentence meaning is unclear - dependent on other sentences (circular) - truth value may depend on the situation and intention - i.e. better 1st sentence as the truth bearer - "Proposition": as sentence meaning only timeless sentences, the truth value must not change, even if unknown. VI 113 Truth is quote redemption. --- VII (b) 35ff Truth/Quine: based on two components: language and extralinguistic reality - but that does not mean that truth could be split into a linguistic and a fact component - (s) because it consists of both, it cannot be separated. --- VII (g) 134 Truth/Tarski/Quine: always only with reference to language - "is white iff" is just gibberish - i.e. a combination of letters that cannot be true. --- X 34 Truth/language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or signs in one language are equivalent with E.g. 55 - because of this relativity it makes sense to ascribe a truth value only to tokens of sentences. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Truth of Art | Idealism | Gadamer I 105 Truth of Art/idealism/Gadamer: if speculative idealism sought to overcome aesthetic subjectivism and agnosticism based on Kant by raising itself to the standpoint of infinite knowledge, then (...) such a gnostic self-redemption of finiteness implied the suspension of art into philosophy. >Art, >Artworks, >Aesthetics. GadamerVsIdealism: instead, we will have to fix the standpoint of the finite. >Subjectivism/Heidegger, >Truth of Art/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Truth Predicate | Quine | VI 115 Truth predicate/Quine: is transparent - Quote redemption does not explain the truth predicate, because no eliminability - due to the transparency still information about what it means that a sentence is true. - It is because of the laxity that paradoxes are avoided. --- X 31 Truth predicate/Quine: shows the reality right through the sentence. - It reminds us that, although sentences are mentioned, it is still reality what this is about. - ((s)> reverses semantic ascent.) X 32 ((s) Truth predicate/semantic ascent/Quine/(s): truth predicate quasi-reverses semantic ascent, because it ensures that one does not have to talk about language (in semantic ascent). Quine: it reminds us in the ascent that we’re taking about the world. - By calling the sentence true, we call the snow white. Truth predicate: reverses the quote marks. Sentence: just say it in order to assert it - then no quotation marks and no truth predicate. Truth predicate: necessary for generalizations about an infinite number of sentences: E.g. "All sentences of the form p or not p are true". Truth predicate: restores reference to the object, which was eliminated by the semantic ascent. >Reference, >Object. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Word of God | Gadamer | I 424 Word of God/Gadamer: When Augustine and scholasticism deal with the problem of verbum in order to obtain the conceptual means for the mystery of the Trinity, it is exclusively this inner word, the word of the heart and its relationship with the intelligentia, that they make the subject of discussion. >Trinity/Gadamer, >Language/Christianity, >Creation Myth/Gadamer. The greater miracle of language is not that the word becomes flesh and comes out in the outer being, but that what comes out and is expressed in utterance is always already word. That the word is with God, and that is from eternity, is the Church's teaching, which is victorious in the defence against subordinationism, and which also lets the problem of language enter completely into the inner being of thought. >Language/Christianity, >Word/Augustine. I 425 Gadamer: What kind of word is that which remains an inner conversation of thought and does not take on a sound form? Does that even exist? Does not all our thinking always follow the trajectories of a certain language, and do we not know too well that one must think in a language if one really wants to speak it? >Language and Thought/Gadamer, >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy. Even if we remember the freedom that our reason retains in the face of the language-bound nature of our thinking, be it through the fact that it invents and uses artificial sign languages, be it through the fact that it knows how to translate from one language into the other, a beginning that also presupposes an elevation of the language-bound nature towards the intended meaning, then, nevertheless, every such elevation is itself again (...) a linguistic one. The "language of reason" is not a language in itself. In view of the irrevocability of our linguistic dependence, what is the point of speaking of an "inner word" that is, as it were, spoken in the pure language of reason? Language of Reason/Word of God/Gadamer: What should this "inner word" be? It cannot simply be the Greek logos, the conversation that the soul has with itself. Rather the mere fact that "logos" is represented by both "ratio" and "verbum" is an indication that the phenomena of I 426 language in the scholastic treatment of Greek metaphysics will be more prominent than was the case with the Greeks themselves. >Word of God/Scholastics. I 430 Word of God/Unity/Multiplicity/Gadamer: The difference between the unity of the divine word and the multiplicity of human words does not exhaust the facts. Rather unity and multiplicity have a fundamentally dialectical relationship. The dialectic of this relationship dominates the whole essence of the word. Also I 431 from the divine word, the concept of multiplicity is not entirely remote. The divine word is indeed only one word that came into the world in the form of the Saviour, but if it remains a reality - and this is despite all the rejection of subordination, as we have seen - there is thus an essential relationship between the unity of the divine word and its appearance in the Church. Proclamation/Gadamer: The proclamation of salvation, the content of the Christian message, is itself an event in its own right in sacrament and preaching, and yet it only makes clear what happened in Christ's act of redemption. In this respect, it is a single word, of which, after all, it is repeatedly proclaimed in the sermon. Obviously, in its character as a message there is already the reference to the variety of its proclamation, the meaning of the word cannot be detached from the event of the proclamation. The character of the event belongs rather to the sense itself. Speech Action/Speech Act/Gadamer: It is like a curse, which apparently cannot be removed from the fact that it is spoken by someone and about someone. What can be understood about it is not an abstract logical sense of the statement, but the intertwining that happens within it(1). Proclamation: The same applies to the unity and multiplicity of the word proclaimed by the Church. Christ's death on the cross and resurrection is the content of the proclamation of salvation, which is preached in every sermon. The risen Christ and the Christ preached are one and the same. Modern Protestant theology in particular has developed the eschatological character of faith based on this dialectical relationship. Human Word/Gadamer: Conversely, in the human word the dialectical relation of the multiplicity of words to the unity of the word in its new light is revealed. >Word/Gadamer. 1. Hans Lipp's, "Untersuchungen zu einer hermeneutischen Logik"(1938), and Austin's, "How to do things with words", are excellent examples of this. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| World | Nietzsche | Ries II 17 World/Redemption/Nietzsche: Claim of a redemption of the world to the "dance floor for divine coincidences". --- Danto III 45 World/Values/Nietzsche/Danto: to describe the world as worthless does not necessarily mean to give it a low value within the framework of a value scheme (...), therefore, it does not have to make sense to give it a value at all. Values are not better applicable to the world than weight measurements on numbers. There is nothing that our beliefs can correspond to, not purpose or order, neither things nor facts. And so all our beliefs are wrong. Nietzsche regards this as the most extreme form of nihilism.(1) >Nihilism/Nietzsche. Danto III 46 According to Nietzsche's own experience, the knowledge that the world is without all form and meaning is intoxicating; and if this knowledge should suggest anything, then a "Dionysian saying yes to the world as it is, without deduction, exception and selection".(2) >Terminology/Nietzsche. Danto III 159 World/NietzscheVsHegel/Nietzsche/Danto: The world has no sensible figure besides the one we have given it. But then we do not represent any more sensible beings than the world itself is a reasonable place. This does not mean that we are irrational, but merely that the distinction between rationality and irrationality cannot be taken into account. That all truth is wrong, that knowledge equals ignorance - to say this and the like means nothing more than twisting and exaggerating words. That does not mean that we should flee from these pipe dreams. Danto III 274 World/Nietzsche/Danto: According to Nietzsche, the world is something we have done and always do. It has no other form or meaning than that which we impose on it. >World/thinking/Nietzsche, >Reality/Nietzsche. Nietzsche: The belief that the world that should be, really exists, is a belief of the unproductive who do not want to create a world, as it should be. They put it as existing, they search for means and ways to get to it. 'Will to Truth' - as powerlessness of the will to create.(3) ((s) See Putnam: "Why there isn't a ready-made world, Synthese Vol. 51, No. 2, Realism, Part I (May, 1982), pp. 141-167 ). 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 555. 2. Ibid. p. 834. 3. Ibid. p. 549. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| World Negation | Weber | Habermas III 283 World Negation/World Affirmation/Religion/Max Weber/Habermas: Max Weber distinguishes religions according to whether they motivate world affirmation or rejection of the world as a whole. "The world" is the name of the society and the surrounding nature of the believer. It is a question of whether or not it is basically evaluated positively or negatively, provided with an intrinsic value. >Religion, >Religious belief. Only through dualism, which characterizes the radical redemption religions, a negative attitude towards the world becomes possible. The corresponding world view must be of such a structure that the "world" is either regarded as historically transitory in relation to a Creator God, or is devalued as merely a phenomenal foreground in relation to the very essence of all things. In this case, as a reference point for the search for salvation, a reality behind the world is assumed that has itself sunk to a semblance. >Metaphysics, >Appearance, >Reality, >Belief. Habermas III 284 World denial: for them Weber offers a sociological explanation, namely the social conflicts that make the appearance of prophets possible. Religious worldviews: Weber differentiates according to the following criteria: Cosmocentric - theocentric Affirmative - negative. Judaism/Christianity: become the negative-theocentric Buddhism/Hinduism: become the negative- cosmocentric Confucianism/Taoism: are among the affirmative cosmocentric religions. >Judaism, >Christianity, >Confucianism. Habermas III 287 World Negation/Weber/Habermas: a negative attitude towards the world (see World Negation/Weber) is not in itself conducive to ethical rationalization of lifestyle. It only leads to an objectification of the world if it is combined with an active, world-affirmative lifestyle. >Rationalization. Habermas III 289 Weber distinguishes mystical religions that are world-negative, such as Hinduism, from ascetic religions that are world-affirmative: Judaism and Christianity. The latter ultimately aim at world domination through inner-worldly action. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Various Authors | Searle Vs Various Authors | III 26 Function/SearleVsWright, Larry: Larry Wright: Thesis: the function of X is Z means: 1. X exists because Z does it. 2. Z is a consequence (or result) from the fact that X exists. SearleVs: if this was correct it would eliminate the observer relativity of function. E.g. the heart has the function to pump blood because it pumps blood and the explanation for the existence of hearts in the evolution is that they actually pump blood. IV 188 Linguistics/John R. Ross: Performative (deletion-) analysis 1970 (1). (SearleVsRoss). IV 190 Deletion/Redemption: when an anaphoric pronoun precedes an emphatic reflexive, the former may be redeemed if it is dominated by the NP, with which it is in an anaphoric relationship. IV 191 Deep structure: If F but not G exists in the surface structure, there is a deep structure of S in which G exists, even if it is redeemed in the surface structure. SearleVs: No valid conclusion form. From the fact that F and G are normally present simply does not follow that where the one is the other must exist in the deep structure. Nevertheless, it is an extremely successful conclusion form. Why? It allows us a simpler representation of the data. IV 192 We only need one rule instead of two. Searle: But this impression is based on an unexamined assumption: Assumption: "The rules for the distribution of syntactic elements may mention only syntactic categories." Example (1) "Honestly, you are drunk" (2) "Probably it will rain." ("Honestly" does not seem to work here as sentence adverb. Here it has been asserted (1) it made both syntactically and semantically necessary to postulate an underlying verb of saying in the deep structure. E.g. But not in (3) "He has admitted his guilt honestly". There is nothing to be further specified. IV 193 SearleVsDeletion analysis: implausible conclusion: has as consequence that in an important proposition you could of "say" only comprehend an illocutionary act by saying that you performed it. Because the deep structure of each proposition contains an "explicit image represented performative verb". This is counter-intuitive. I think there is a much simpler explanation: IV 194 Speaker and listener have shared knowledge and rules for speech acts. This allows us to explain certain syntactical forms without accepting the deep structure. Pragmatist Analysis/Ross: further development: certain elements are present in the context of the speech act and syntactic processes can refer to them. IV 195 SearleVs: this hardly differs from the performative analysis. SearleVsRoss: Confusion of mention and use: he confuses the speaker with the "I" which refers to him, the listener with the "you", and the act with the verbs that they specify. IV 196 Of course, the formulation of the rules that mention the speaker, listener and acts will use these expressions. Ross makes this error because he is under the spell of assumption that the rules are allowed to only mention only syntactic elements. If we give this up, our alternative theory becomes more easy: 1. We use independently motivated semantic and "pragmatic" knowledge 2. We do not have to postulate redeemed syntactic elements. 1. John R. Ross, On Declarative Sentences, in: R. A Jacobs/P. S. Rosenbaum (Eds) Readings in English Transformational Grammar, Waltham Mass 1970 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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