Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Belnap, Nuel | Cresswell Vs Belnap, Nuel | HCI 299 Paradoxes of implication/Hughes/Cresswell: are at worst harmless. In most cases, we wish to speak of entailment. VsEntailment/VsBelnap/VsAnderson: Their system E (see above) pays too high a price with the absence of the disjunctive syllogism (see below principle C). I 300 Problem: the mere construction of such an axiom system does not provide us with a clear notion of entailment. Paradoxes of implication/Hughes/Cresswell: are even desirable: we want to be able to say: "If you accept that, you can prove anything." I.e. in a contradictory system everything can be proven. aca |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Belnap, Nuel | Brendel Vs Belnap, Nuel | I 89 Relevance Logic/Brendel: it is not explicitly about an alternative handling of contradictions. Problem: how the different formal semantics are to be interpreted philosophically for the relevance logic. VsAnderson/VsBelnap: Although its system R corresponds to certain association theoretical structures, it is controversial how these structures are to be interpreted as truth values. Solution/Dunn/Brendel: tetravalent semantics with additional "true-and-false" and "neither-true-nor-false". However, epistemically and not to be understood ontologically. It should explain that someone can have conflicting or incomplete information. DunnVsDialethism/Brendel: Dunn does not claim the existence of "true contradictions". (Dunn, 1986, 192f). "True-and- |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
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