Explanation/FraassenVsReichenbach: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the demand of hidden variables. ---
Explanation: if mere regularity makes a macroscopic theory poor, then the same happens to a microscopic one - coincidence: also coincidence can have an explanation. ---
Explanation/FraassenVsAugustinus: the fleeing of the mouse from the cat must not be explained by perception - but with Darwin: the fleeing mice survive. There is no account by reason. Analogously it applies that the successful sciences survive - without this having to be explained. ---
Theory/Explanation: For example, one could have two types of mechanics, one for physiologies and one for astronomers - problem: one cannot explain a complex phenomenon with this - e.g. man who is walking on the moon - if both theories have no common models, a new theory on lunar gravitation must be established - empirical adequacy: requires the integration of these "mini-theories". ---
Explanation: if we consider some kind of questions to be more important, this is no reason to believe that the theory that explains them is more probable - however, the social situation of the researcher plays a role in the evaluation of theories. ---
Explanation/Ernest Nagel: explanation is the organization and classification of our knowledge - FraassenVsFeyerabend: he misunderstood the fact: that this is a function of interests - FraassenVsFeyerabend: then one can stop to research if one believes, what one says - naive view of scientific security - then the scientists ought to swear by an oath that they are looking for explanations -FraassVsFeyerabend: in reality one must always doubt the adequacy. ---
Explanation/FraassenVsTradition: explanation does not have to be true! - a) "we have an explanation" (has to do with acceptance) - b) "the theory explains" (without acceptance) - e.g. Newton's theory was wrong nevertheless it explains much - ((s) then a theory cannot be a conjunction of sentences, for then no sentence may be false.) - Harman: Explanation leads to acceptance - explanation/Fraassen: something does not require that theory coincides with the world as a whole. ---
One cannot assert the truth of a theory before its explanatory power - Explanation: is not an additional property for empirical adequacy - e.g. "the computer computes" - no one would say "the hammer struck the nail". ---
Explanation/VsHempel/Morton Beckner: e.g. evolution is not deterministic - e.g. the giraffes's neck is not determined by dietary scarcity - only by the compatibility of genetic and natural selection mechanisms - Putnam: also Newton's explanation is no deduction, but a demonstration of compatibilities. ---
Definition Explanation/Friedman: S explains P iff P is a consequence S which is "relative" to K and S "reduces" or "unifies" the set of its own consequences relative to K. ---
Explanation: Problem: 1. Incompleteness: disease explains a rare secondary disease that is triggered by it - but not why this patient is affected - asymmetry: e.g. length of the shadow: is always in relation with a certain sun position. - Causation: only goes in one direction. ---
Why question: does not occur when the spectrum is explained by the atomic structure. ---
Explanation: has to do with "why" - to find prominent factors in the causal network - problem: the network as a whole does not explain typical cases - science, however, describes the network - ((s) therefore science does not equal an explanation. Explanation must at least say that there is a structure that can be described in principle - though never fully.) ---
Explanation: for evaluating a response to a why question as an explanation, it is not a matter of whether this is true - the evaluation uses only the part of the background information that provides the general theory about these phenomena plus additional information that does not include the facts to be explained - ((s) e.g. framework conditions). ---
Explanation/Description/Fractions: explanation and description do not differ in the information - but explanation: is a three-digit relation theory-fact-context - description: is two-digit: theory-fact - Explanation: is an applied science (not pure science). ---
Explanation/Thomas Aquinas/Fraassen: everything that is explained must be explained by something else. ---
The premises must contain more than the conclusion - in addition: generalization: e.g. that all magnets attract iron. ---
Explanation/Fraassen: only observable regularities require explanation.
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
|Disputed term/author/ism||Author Vs Author
|Augustine||Esfeld Vs Augustine||Esfeld I 106
sozialer Holismus/Esfeld: ist nicht logisch an Menschen gebunden. Bedeutung/Wittgenstein/PU,§ 1: VsAugustinus: man kann nicht sagen, daß jedem Wort oder jeder Überzeugung eine Bedeutung innewohnt. Bsp Zettel: "Fünf rote Äpfel".
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
|Correspondence Theory||Fraassen Vs Correspondence Theory||I 39
Science/Fraassen: Thesis: is a biological phenomenon: an activity of a type of organisms that facilitates their interaction with the environment. And that leads me to the fact that we need a completely different kind of explanation here. E.g. Augustinus: explains the fleeing of mouse before the cat by the fact that the mouse perceives the enemy.
VsAugustinus/VsKCorrespondence Theory/Animal: Problem: then it is again about the appropriateness ("adequacy") of the mouse’s thoughts about the order of nature.
Why-Questions/DarwinismVsWhy-Question: instead: the mice with the right strategies survive without justifying the reasons.
Science/Success/Explanation/Fraassen: Thesis: Similarly, I believe that the successful theories are those that survive. I.e. we do not need to explain why a theory is successful. It’s just not surprising.
Of course, you can also explain the survival of the mouse by the structure of its brain and its environment. Theories/Survival/Balmer/Fraassen: he would say the line spectrum of hydrogen survived as a successful hypothesis.
RealismVsAnti-Realism: it cannot assert either without admitting that both underlying theories are true.
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
|Reference||Allen, C.||Perler / Wild I 334
Reference / Language / Allen: Reference is a fundamental functional property of language WittgensteinVsAugustinus / PU: but not the only one! (Eg Block World).
Reference is older than other peculiarities of the language.
Reference / Allen: reference to behaviors is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more fundamental than reference to objects.