Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Emotions | Bentham | Corr I 56 Emotions/Bentham/ReisenzeinVsBentham/Reisenzein: Even radical hedonist theorists usually do not claim that humans are slaves to their momentary emotions but instead emphasize, for example, that people can decide to tolerate a current unpleasant feeling if they believe that this will spare them greater pain in the future (e.g., Bentham 1789/1970)(1). And if, as most contemporary motivation theorists believe, people are also motivated by other than hedonistic concerns (e.g., Reiss 2000)(2), possible reasons for emotion regulation multiply (see also, Parrott 1993(3); Tamir, Chiu and Gross 2007(4)). >Motivation/psychology, >J. Bentham, >Hedonism, >Behavior/psychology. 1. Bentham, J. 1789/1970. An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. London: Athlone Press 2. Reiss, S. 2000. Who am I: the 16 basic desires that motivate our actions and define our personality. New York: Tarcher Putnam 3. Parrott, W. G. 1993. Beyond hedonism: motives for inhibiting good moods and for maintaining bad moods, in D. M. Wegner and J. W. Pennebaker (eds.), Handbook of mental control, pp. 278–305. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 4. Tamir, M., Chiu, C.-Y. and Gross, J. E. 2007. Business or pleasure? Utilitarian versus hedonic considerations in emotion regulation, Emotion 7: 546–54 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Benth I J. Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation Mineola, NY 2007 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Ethics | Putnam | III 113f Ethics/concepts/Williams/Murdoch: ethical concepts are 1. porous: e.g. "good and right" are porous. More descriptive, less abstract: e.g."cruel", "chaste", and so on are more descriptive and less abstract. Murdoch: also descriptive components are interest-relative. VsNon-Cognitivism: his division into descriptive/prescriptive does not succeed because one cannot name the components, without even using a word like "cruel" (circular). >Noncognitivism, >Prescriptivism. Murdoch: the world is not analyzable into facts and values. Williams: pro, but we can transfer our concepts to each society. III 116 "Dense"/Williams: e.g. "chaste" can function both as a rating as well as a description. III 117 PutnamVsWilliams: it is absurd and still relativistic when "grass is green" is not to be the absolute truth (because I'm projecting colors like values). Values/Putnam: values are even worse off than colors, because after we figured out that we project them, we lose our ability to use them. >Values. III 128 PutnamVsWilliams: Williams is too complicated metaphysical. Definition ratings/Dewey: ratings arise from a critique of various problem-solving processes. >Dewey. --- V 190 Ethics/language/meaning/values/Putnam: e.g. Superbenthamian: approves the most cruel acts for "the good of the majority". After a while the language use in reference to "sincere" separates him from us. That does not mean that we and the superbenthamian agree about the facts and disagree with respect to the values. We live in different worlds. >Utilitarianism. V 208 PutnamVsBentham: we have a reason to prefer the poetry to the flea-hopping: the experience of great poetry and its aftermath. V 282 Ethics/PutnamVsBentham: (e.g. flea-hopping): there is no prejudice to prefer the poetry. The idea that values do not belong to the blocks in the world, and the idea that "value judgments" express "prejudices" are two sides of the same coin. PutnamVsSolipsism: solipsism is immoral, not everyone is trapped in a solipsistic hell, but we should participate in the discourse. >Solipsism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Preference Utilitarianism | Singer | I 13 Definition Preference Utilitarianism/P. Singer/SingerVsBentham/SingerVsMill/SingerVsSidgwick: my utilitarianism is not about the growth of happiness and the reduction of suffering, but about promoting the preferences of those involved. General Public/ethics/P. Singer: Preference Utiliarianism cannot be inferred from the universal aspects of ethics. Preference: the preferences of the individual must be weighed against the preferences of others and the community. I 14 Where do we get a theory from that governs this? We approach simple, pre-ethical choices. However, we cannot rely on intuitions because they can be inherited evolutionarily and therefore be unreliable in terms of what is right. >Preferences. Preferences: can be for different individuals at quite different levels. Someone who would like to be a poet may forgo other forms of happiness. This cannot be pursued further here. >Comparisons, >Comparability. I 80 Killing/Preference Utilitarianism/Animals/P. Singer: for the preference utilitarianism, killing a person is worse than killing another being (which could still be a member of the Homo Sapiens species!). The reason for this is that people are more orientated towards the future. Beings with no sense for the future have no preferences regarding them. Of course, such creatures can still fight their deaths like a fish on a hook. Preference Utilitarianism has no reason, however, to reject a more painless method of killing fish when it is available. The fight against pain in an instant does not prove that the fish would be able to compare different perspectives for the future. >Animals. I 81 This argument, however, only holds in connection with considerations of what is wrong with killing a person (with prospects for the future). I 81 Life/Preference Utilitarianism/P. Singer: does a person have the right to life according to preference utilitarianism? According to the preference utilitarianism a right cannot be offset against the preferences of others. Cf. >Utilitarian Liberalism. For Utilitarianism see Carlyle - Chapman - Dworkin - Gaus - Habermas - Hooker - Kant - David Lewis - Mill - Talcott Parsons - Rawls - Sen - Singer - Smart Counter concept to Utilitarianism: >Deontology. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Utilitarianism | Carlyle | Höffe I 348 Utilitarianism/CarlyleVsBentham/Carlyle/Höffe: [against Bentham's utilitarianism there was the accusation] that utilitarianism was an ethics for pleasure-seekers. The British writer and historian Thomas Carlyle had sharpened it to the objection that utilitarianism was a philosophy for pigs (pig philosophy). Bentham: According to Bentham's provocative aphorism that, with the same quality of pleasure, an undemanding child's play is as good as poetry, the qualitative differences between the various occasions and types of pleasure expressly do not count. >Utilitarianism/Mill, >VsUtilitarianism. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Utilitarianism | Mill | Höffe I 348 Utilitarianism/Mill/Höffe: Def Utilitarianism/Mill(1): (...) the view that the basis of morality is the greatest happiness, whereby happiness is to be understood in the concept of pleasure and the freedom from lust or suffering. Because "pleasure" means hédoné in Greek, it is a hedonism. >Hedonism. MillVsBentham: In comparison to Mill's model, Bentham, it is striking that the second part of his utilitarian principle "the greatest number", for which the "greatest happiness" is to be sought, is missing here. >Utilitarianism/Bentham, >J. Bentham. Freedom/MillVsBentham: For Mill as a passionate advocate of individual freedom, this deficit is hardly a coincidence. >Freedom. Later in the text the formula "happiness of all concerned" does appear, but without Bentham's double maximization: "greatest" happiness of the "greatest" number. Because of this deficit, Mill does not deal with Bentham's suggestion and his considerable difficulties in calculating the sought-after collective well-being with a simple procedure, a "hedonic calculus". MillVsBentham: 1) The first and most significant change, qualitative hedonism, counters the accusation made against Bentham that utilitarianism is an ethics for pleasure-seekers. The British writer and historian Thomas Carlyle had sharpened it to the objection that utilitarianism is a philosophy for pigs (pig philosophy). Bentham: According to Bentham's provocative aphorism that, with the same quality of pleasure, an undemanding child's play is as good as poetry, the qualitative differences between the various occasions and types of pleasure expressly do not count. Höffe I 349 Mill: Against this vulgarized hedonism, Mill argues with the pointed counter-thesis that it is better to be a discontented Socrates than a satisfied pig. He emphasizes the different rank of the pleasures one can enjoy and at the same time the priority of scientific, artistic and humanitarian activities. 2) (...) in trying to prove the utilitarian principle, Mill rightly rejects the possibility of direct proof. For true principles are, per se, first sentences that exactly therefore cannot be proved. >Theory/Mill. Solution/Mill: a) The core is the expression "desirable", which has two meanings. In an empirical-psychological sense it describes what people actually consider desirable and desirable, in a normative-ethical sense what they are supposed to assess. Naturalistic Misconclusions/HöffeVsMill: If one interprets Mill's so-called proof as a logical deduction of the ethical meaning of desirable from the empirical meaning, there is obviously a "being-should" misconception. VsVs: But since Mill in his Höffe I 350 system of logic, whose last chapter, clearly distinguishes between being and shall, the so called proof can be interpreted benevolently as well: An ethics open to experience understands what is desirable in the sense of those enlightened people who know the different pleasures and prefer those which are higher-ranking in human terms. ((s)Cf. >Preferential Utilitarianism). 3) Is justice compatible with utilitarianism? Mill here acknowledges the existence of a natural sense of justice, but does not consider this to be an original, but a derived sense. To defend this thesis, he distinguishes between different views of justice, such as the imperative to respect a person's legally guaranteed rights, to give everyone what he or she deserves, and the ideas of impartiality and equality. He then recognizes the traditional distinction between perfect (justice) and imperfect (charity) duties. Finally, he claims that having a right means having something that society should protect for no other reason than general utility. Common Goods/Mill/Höffe: In this argument lies either the thesis that there can be no conflict between the collective good, general utility, and the rights of an individual, or the assertion that in the case of conflict the collective good takes precedence over subjective rights such as basic and human rights. HöffeVsMill: Even if it serves the collective good, the right of an innocent person not to be punished, or the right of a suspect not to be tortured, must under no circumstances be violated. >Common Good. 1. J.St. Mill, Utilitarianism 1861 |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Utilitarianism | Spencer | Gaus I 413 Utilitarianism/Spencer/Weinstein: Spencer agreed with Sidgwick that established morality was the 'marvelous product of nature, the result of long centuries of growth' with modern liberal societies converging on the same array of utility- promoting moral rules. >H. Sidgwick, >Utilitarianism/Sidgwick. And he agreed with Mill, though not Sidgwick, that we have reformulated our most fundamental moral rules as stringent rights. Spencer was therefore as much a liberal utilitarian as Mill in so far as he combined a rights- constrained, maximizing theory of right with a hedonic conception of good. For Spencer, rights were indefeasible logical 'corollaries' of his principle of equal freedom, which stipulated that: 'Every man is free to do that which he will provided he infringes not the equal freedom ofany other man' (1978(1): I, 62). >J. St. Mill, >Utilitarianism/Mill. Gaus I 414 SpencerVsMill: General happiness was best promoted wherever basic liberal rights to life, personal integrity and property were unconditionally enforced, making Spencer's liberal utilitarianism more uncompromis- ing than Mill's. VsBentham: While Spencer and Mill acknowledged the extensive similarities between them, Spencer distanced himself markedly from Bentham, disparaging the latter's utilitarianism as merely 'empirical', or unconstrained, and therefore as morally inferior. Being 'empirical', Benthamism allegedly justified sacrificing individuals in the name of maximizing utility even marginally. >J. Bentham, >Utilitarianism/Bentham. Rational utilitarianism: By contrast, he characterized his own brand of utilitarianism as 'rational' precisely because it purported to derive basic rights from the principle of equal freedom and because these putative logical derivations were indefeasible. But Spencer exaggerates his differences with Bentham, if Rosen and Paul Kelly have interpreted Bentham correctly. >Rationality. 1. Spencer, Herbert (1978 [1879-93]) The Principles of Ethics, 2 vols. Indianapolis: Liberty. Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Spencer I Herbert Spencer The Man versus the State Indianapolis 2009 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Values | Bentham | Singer I 86 Values/Utilitarianism/Bentham: Thesis: Benefit, Pleasure, Advantage, Good or Happiness all result in the same thing, if it leads to maximization of pleasure or reduction of discomfort.(1) >Utility, >Utility theory, >The good, cf. >Utilitarianism. VsBentham/Peter Singer: some authors argue, something can be in my interest... I 87 ...whether it causes pleasure or less pain. >Interest. BenthamVsVs/P. Singer: to defend Bentham, we would have to accept pleasure and pain as objective values. To do this, however, we would have to determine the nature of these objective values and explain how we can know about them. >Pain. J. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), chap. 1 pars. II, V) |
Benth I J. Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation Mineola, NY 2007 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Utilitarism | Versus | Dennett I 700 Utilitarianism: Founder: Bentham. DennettVsBentham "greedy reductionist". A Skinner of his time. DennettVsutilitarianism. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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