Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Causality | Russell | McDowell I 96 Causality/natural laws/Russell: proposed to replace the idea of causation by the idea of a law-governed process. Simons I 345 RussellVsCausality: (1913)(1) instead functional dependency system: due to many factors (reciprocal position, etc.) change of the actual forces can be in constant simultaneous change of several factors - there are hardly any chains of cause and effect. >Effect, >Cause, >Motion, >Change. 1.Russell, Bertrand Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript. Routledge 1984. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
Experiments | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 19 Experiments/Developmental psychology/Upton: Dependent variable (DV): the variable of interest. It can be measured when the researcher sets up two or more situations in which this variable can be compared. Independent variable (IV): the conditions can vary only in terms of the variable whose effect is being tested. Causal relationship: in order to test the predicted causal relationship, all other factors that may affect the DV have to be controlled. ((s) For problems in relation to causality and causal explanations see >Causality/Philosophical theories; >Causal explanation/Philosophical theories. Between-group design: compares groups under different conditions. Participants would then be allocated to one of the two study groups using either random sampling or a matched design. With random sampling it is assumed that there is no systematic difference between the two groups. Within-group design: all participants experience the same conditions. This method avoids the need to assume that the different groups are equivalent because everyone experiences everything. VsWithin-group design: Problem: limitations. The researcher has to ensure that the results are not due to participant fatigue or practice when they experience the second condition. Counterbalancing/Solution: One way to control for this is to have half of the group experience the conditions in one order and the other half experience them in the reverse order. This is known as counterbalancing. VsCounterbalancing: Problem: Using a within-group comparison is not always possible. For example, how would we know if it was the [first condition] that had influenced the [resulting] patterns if all [participants] experienced both conditions? VsCausality approach: Problem: One possibility is that the researcher’s choice of factors to control was wrong. There may be other variables that had an influence on the results but were overlooked. Confounding variable: overlooked. If one of these systematically biases the results it is called a confounding variable. This could prevent the researcher from obtaining valid results. Upton I 20 Correlational studies: look for a relationship between variables rather than seeking to establish cause and effect. ((s) These studies use existing empirical material.) |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
Positivism | Hacking | I 77 Def Positivism/Hacking: 1st Verification, 2nd observation, 3rd VsCausality, 4th VsExplanation (just brings phenomena in an order that does not explain why.), 5th VsTheoretical Entities, 6th VsMetaphysics (leaves nothing that is not verifiable). >Verification, >Observation, >Causality, >Explanations, >Theoretical entities, >Metaphysics. I 80 PopperVs the label "positivist", VsSense Data - not VsMetaphysics: non-verifiable sentences are acceptable as a first step. That was later refuted by Popper. >K. Popper, >Sense data. I 80 Empiricism: empiricism is concerned with measuring (theoretical entities exist). >Empiricism, >Measurements. Positivism: positivism is concerned with seeing, feeling, smelling, hearing, tasting (theoretical entities do not exist). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Causal Theory | Russell Vs Causal Theory | Simons I 345 RussellVsCausality: (1913) instead functional dependency system: due to many factors (reciprocal position, etc.) which change the actual forces, it is hardly possible with constant simultaneous change of several factors to establish chains of cause and effect. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |