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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Everyday Language | Fodor | II 126 Anomalies/deviation/irregularities/intuition/everyday language/Fodor/FodorVsCavell: it is not about explaining anomalies by intuitions. Instead: specifying the relevant similarity means exactly determining the rules of creation (>Rules). --- III 234 Everyday language/distinction/perception/use/FodorVsCavell: it is not true that we have different words for each perceived difference, e.g. for shapes, colors, sizes, sounds, etc. Then, from the absence of certain words does not follow that we do not perceive the corresponding difference ((s)> Whorf) Fodor: then, when requesting a distinction, you cannot fall back on the actual use of language. > FodorVsUse Theory: here, you need philosophy, not empiricism. >Empiricism, >Use theory, >Meaning, >Language Behavior, >Colour, >Form. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Cavell, St. | Fodor Vs Cavell, St. | III 222 Voluntary/CavellVsRyle: thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense. III 224 FodorVsCavell: fallacy: Cavell overlooks the difference between what a native speaker says (when speaking) and what a native speaker says about what he/she and others say (metalinguistic comments). However, the latter need not be true for the linguist to begin his/her investigation. Cavell has not shown that an empirical description is possible only if the metalinguistic assertions are true. If the linguist wanted to separate true findings from false ones before starting with the description of the language, he/she would have to know a whole lot about the language before he/she begins with his/her work. If you cordon off empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant, you make a distinction without a difference. Distinction without difference/Fodor: e.g. differentiating empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant ist distinction without reference. III 225 Cavell: empirical are e.g. statements of native speakers about the phonology of the language, but not statements about syntax and semantics. FodorVsCavell: 1) this is inconsistent: conversely, every argument that shows that the native speaker is privileged to findings about syntax and semantics would equally show that he/she is privileged to such about the phonology. That would be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument, because then the native speaker could never err about pronunciation. 2) Even if CavellVsRyle was right, that would not show that Ryle’s error is not empirical. Language/empiricism/Cavell: his position is very extreme. Since he refers to the findings of native speakers as the truths of transcendental logic, he actually excludes the relevance of empirical confirmation! FodorVsCavell: he overlooks the fact that there are infinitely many findings that require empirical confirmation: e.g. "My name is not Stanley Cavell"... etc. FodorVsCavell: 1) error: the assumption that we could only question the findings in a sensible way if there is a specific reason to believe they might be wrong. This makes credulity a virtue and philosophy a vice. III 230 FodorVsCavell: 2) admittedly: it would be extraordinary to request reasons if we were often mistaken about what we say. Fodor: but if we are only sometimes mistaken, then it is always appropriate to demand reasons! From Cavell’s view it follows, however, that even if our lives depended on it, it would not be appropriate to question the findings! FodorVsCavell: 3) It is a wrong assumption that what we say about our language is rarely wrong. He overlooks his own distinction between type I and type II findings. He is certainly right that we do not often err about type I. Fodor: but we can often be mistaken with respect to type II findings: they are a kind of theory, an abstract representation of context properties (see above III 220 Type I Findings: "We say...... but we do not say...." ((s) use findings) Type II Findings: The addition of type I findings by explanations. Type III Findings: Generalizations). III 232 FodorVsCavell: e.g. baker/professor: can be understood in two ways: a) what type of information does the professor require? (Fodor: that would be non-empirical information. But Cavell is not asking for them. b) Cavell asks: if we already know that the language use of the baker is idiosyncratic, does then follow that the professor has no right to his "we" findings?. Cavell: No, that does not follow. Fodor: but you should bear in mind that this is irrelevant to the resolution of conflict between native speakers! FodorVsCavell: Cavell is right: the existence of different language use does not exclude the "we" findings. But he says the right thing for the wrong reasons: the finding of the professor is one about the standard use. There could be no generalizations at all if deviating use could not be tolerated in certain dimensions. III 233 FodorVsCavell: it looks philosophically more impressive if you say: "your deviating language use shields your view at reality," as if it merely restricted the possibilities of expression. But even that is not necessarily the case if someone uses two non-interchangeable words synonymously. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Cavell, St. | Putnam Vs Cavell, St. | V 150/15 Stanley Cavell: (Lit: "Must we mean what we say?"): We could develop a philosophy of "normal language" that would not be limited to the public and "criterial" verification if we were able to develop a conception in which the standards themselves could not be detected by ordinary empirical studies. Such standards could be found through a kind of "self-insight", comparable to insights which are obtained in therapy or through the transcendental insight of phenomenology. Putnam: like Cavell: my knowledge regarding the mother tongue is not "external" inductive knowledge (e.g. I can know without further evidence what the correct plural form of certain nouns is) but, PutnamVsCavell: this privileged access does not extend to generalizations about correct and incorrect. Self-insight is not immune to criticism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Cavell, St. | Stroud Vs Cavell, St. | I 260 Skepticism/Cavell/Stroud: pro Cavell: he shows a solution in the right generality. I 261 CavellVsSkepticism/Stroud: no statement that the traditional epistemologist can produce is representative of our epistemic situation towards the world in general that he aspires to. The judgment of the epistemologist or the skeptic is always particulate. It cannot be generalized. Stroud: Cavell must show that the philosopher (skeptic, epistemologist) must construct the meaning of each particular assertion wrongly in order to pretend his generalization. StroudVsCavell: is it true that e.g. Descartes does not make a "concrete" assertion at all? The very general fact that the various linguistic actions (speech acts?) such as assertions, questions, etc. all have their own conditions of expression is not sufficient to justify Cavell's point. We need to know what the conditions are to claim something to show that they are not fulfilled in the cases the philosopher is considering. And it is also not enough just for assertions, it must be shown that the conditions for not saying or thinking anything in any way that could fulfill the philosopher's purposes, I 262 could be fulfilled here. Problem: but what are "all" possible ways to say something? It seems that there would have to be only one specific (single, particular) instance of knowledge that we would all regard as knowledge. For example, he imagines (or finds himself in the situation) sitting by the fireplace. He wonders if he knows and how he knows that he is sitting there. Even if he makes no assertion here, it looks as if he (StroudVsCavell) could still ask if he knows if he is sitting there at that moment and discovers a basis for any such knowledge, and can then assess the reliability of that basis. StroudVsCavell: he could then come to the conclusion that he does not know, although he even has made no (knowledge) assertion! If that is true, he does not seem to need a concrete assertion (context) to evaluate his position in this situation. Stroud: This is how I describe Descartes' project as an attempt to test his knowledge. Stroud: with this he wants to check the reliability of everything he has claimed since his youth. It then does not seem essential that he makes or has made a certain assertion at a certain point in time. I can still ask how I would know if I knew. I 263 StroudVsCavell: I, for example, read a detective novel and find that - without making an assertion - I assumed that something particular would be impossible. And that I have no reliable basis for this assumption, that it might be possible, although I never explicitly said that. I can then subsequently assess the position I was in and find it inadequate. ((s) According to Cavell this would not be possible, because he demands an explicit assertion beforehand, which clearly defines the context.) Still: Stroud pro Cavell: I think he's right that the traditional epistemologist needs conditions of expression for every concrete case that makes a generalization impossible. StroudVsCavell: I just want to show that you do not have to show that no statement has been made. StroudVsSkepticism: if it looks like he can estimate his position, even without making a certain assertion, the diagnosis should concentrate on showing that any assessment of his position that the philosopher makes cannot have the meaning that he thinks it has. That is the crucial point. I 264 Generality: what general conclusion does the skeptical philosopher seek and why can it not be given? StroudVsCavell: it is not sufficient to say that he is seeking a general conclusion, because it is not true that the investigation of an individual case does not allow a general conclusion about human knowledge: for example, I learn that historians know something about apples in Sicily in the 4th century BC. This shows that someone has knowledge about Sicily and this is a general statement about human knowledge. For example, that no one knows the causes of cancer is also such a general statement about knowledge. VsMoore: if he does not make a general statement about human knowledge, as the traditional epistemologist seeks, it is not due to a lack of generality! It is expressed in exactly the same general terms as the philosopher would use. Solution/Stroud: we must introduce a distinction between two uses of the same words. >Thompson Clarke: "Representativeness" (Skepticism/Clarke) (...+...) |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Cavell, St. | Vendler Vs Cavell, St. | Vendler I 245 CavellVsLinguistics: these bring empirical and therefore contingent results while those of philosophy are not empirical, and therefore are not supported by (empirical linguistic results). VendlerVsCavell: that is an outrageous argument. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Descartes, R. | Cavell Vs Descartes, R. | Stroud I 258 Meaning/to mean/Knowledge/Cavell: For example "saying nothing at all" is a possibility that a philosopher does not know what he means. There is nothing to mean here. (Cavell, The Claim by Reason, Oxf. 1979, 210). CavellVsEpistemology: says surprisingly little. Assertion/Cavell/Stroud: is an action. But not every (speech) action is an assertion. Even if a well-formed sentence is produced! This also applies to questions etc. Conditions of utterance/Cavell: every type of utterance (type of speech action) has its conditions. If these conditions are not fulfilled, there is no assertion (utterance) at all. And this applies to traditional epistemology: it does not fulfill the conditions of utterance. Def "Basis"/Terminology/Cavell/Stroud: is a sentence that makes a special claim (supports). CavellVsDescartes: one should assume that his basis is the claim to want to know if he is sitting by the fireplace, with a piece of paper in his hand. N.B.: but this example is not to be understood as a case in which someone investigates a specific claim to knowledge (assertion of knowledge). I 259 CavellVsEpistemology, traditional: here there are no concrete claims of knowledge at all. For example, we are asked to imagine that sitting by the fireplace is not the same as imagining that we have claimed to know that we are sitting by the fireplace. The case of skepticism is not an assertion context. We cannot answer the question, although we have the feeling that we should answer it. But this is not about something being overlooked. One must really be able to imagine that an assertion was made, and that is not the case here. ((s) Otherwise, for example, two people would be in a divided situation and one would ask whether the other also perceives the fireplace). Cavell/Stroud: without a set claim to knowledge (knowledge assertion) the investigation would not even look similar to our everyday methods. Knowledge Claim/CavellVsDescartes: to imagine that a knowledge claim would have been made in Descartes' example, one would have to imagine a context in which the claim was made. Then one needs additional conditions for the context. N.B.: these conditions would first make the judgement possible in the particular case, and this would then again not be transferable to other cases. The (skeptical) judgment would not be representative. CavellVsSkepticism/CavellVsEpistemology: Dilemma: a) it must be a concrete statement if the procedure of the investigation is to be coherent at all, but if it is concrete, it cannot be general. b) Without the generality, it cannot be skeptical. Skepticism/Cavell/Stroud: pro Cavell: he shows a solution in the right generality. I 261 CavellVsSkepticism/Stroud: no statement that the traditional epistemologist can produce is representative of our epistemic situation towards the world in general that he aspires to. The judgment of the epistemologist or the skeptic is always particulate. It cannot be generalized. Stroud: Cavell must show that the philosopher (skeptic, epistemologist) must construe the meaning of each particular assertion wrongly in order to pretend his generalization. ( > StroudVsCavell...+...). |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Linguistics | Cavell Vs Linguistics | Vendler I 243 Linguistics/Vendler: what does it have to contribute: nothing but hope so far. I 244 But the linguistics of syntax is better off. Since the meaning of a word is also (not only) a function of its syntactic limitations, the syntax can also contribute something. I 245 Argument/Vendler: no argument can do anything against a fact but against a good argument there is no refutable fact! CavellVsLinguistics: these bring empirical and therefore contingent results while those of philosophy are not empirical and are therefore not supported by empirical linguistic results. VendlerVsCavell: that is an outrageous argument. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Ordinary Language | Fodor Vs Ordinary Language | II 123 FodorVsOrdinary Language: this forces the philosopher of everyday language to seek ever more refuge in intuition. II 124 In particular, he will claim to intuitively recognize anomalies and say that a philosophical problem is solved when anomalies are recognized. (Cavell claims that!). FodorVsCavell: Contradiction: so he means that in philosophical practice it is important not to use words incorrectly and at the same time he means that with the help of intuitions he can decide when a word is used incorrectly. While it may be intuitively clear when a word is anomalous, for philosophical purposes it is not enough to know that it is anomalous, it can be anomalous for many reasons, some of which are not flawed! For example, if the metaphysician is accused of misusing language, he will rightly answer: "So what?". Moreover, we cannot expect a theory of meaning to evaluate every utterance that an untrained theoretical speaker calls anomalous in the same way by the theory. II 125 Rather, the theory should only determine semantic violations. II 126 FodorVsIntuitions: decisions about anomalies cannot be extrapolated in any way if they are based only on intuitions. Then we have no theory at all, only overstrained intuitions. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary LanguageVsFodor: could counter that we ignored the principle of treating similar cases with similar methods. FodorVsVs: this misses the point: specifying the relevant similarity just means determining exactly the generation rules. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 |
| Ordinary Language | Positivism Vs Ordinary Language | Fodor II 118 PositivismusVsOrdinary Language/PositivismVsOxford: the philosophy of ordinary language has no system. A representation of natural language, which does not specify its formal structure, cannot comprehend the production principles for the syntactic and semantic properties. II 123 FodorVsOrdinary Language: that forces the philosophers of ordinary language to seek refuge more and more with the intuitions. II 124 In particular, he will claim to detect anomalies intuitively and to say that a philosophical problem is solved if anomalies are detected. (Cavell asserts that!). FodorVsCavell: Contradiction: so he thinks that in philosophical practice it is important not to use words wrongly, and at the same time he thinks that he can decide with the help of intuition when a word is misused. Even though it may be clear intuitively when a word is abnormal, it is not enough for philosophical purposes to know that it is abnormal, it may be abnormal for many reasons, some of which are not faulty! E.g. If you accuse a metaphysicist that he uses language wrongly, he will answer rightly: "So what?" Moreover, we cannot demand of a theory of meaning that any expression which is called abnormal by a theoretically untrained speaker is also evaluated as such by the theory. II 125 The theory should rather only determine semantic violations. II 126 FodorVsIntuitions: decisions about unusualness (anomalies) cannot be extrapolated in any way if they are based only on intuitions. Then we have no theory, but only overstretched intuitions. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary LanguageVsFodor: could counter that we have ignored the principle of treating similar cases with similar methods. FodorVsVs: that is beside the point: specifying relevant similarity means precisely to accurately determine the production rules. III 222 Ordinary Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I Statement: "We say..., but we do not say...." ((s) use statements) Type II Statement: The supplementation of type I statements with explanations. Type III Statement: Generalizations. Austin: E.g. we can make a voluntary gift. (Statement about the world). Cavell: conceives this as "substantive mode" for "We say: 'The gift was made voluntarily'". (Statement about the language). Voluntary/RyleVsAustin: expresses that there is something suspicious about the act. We should not have performed the act. Cavell Thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense. III 223 Expressions of native speakers are no findings about what you can say in a language, they are the source of utterances. ((s) data). Also without empiricism we are entitled to any Type I statement that we need to support a Type II statement. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Skepticism | Cavell, St. | Stroud I 257 Def "Basis"/Terminology/Cavell/Stroud: is a sentence that makes a special claim. Basis/Terminology/CavellVs: Thesis: In the case of Descartes, the basis is not completely natural. This is the key to diagnosis. CavellVsSkepticism: Thesis: "The skeptic does not do what he thinks he is doing". This does not mean, however, that he distorts the meanings of the terms used. (see AustinVsMoore above). I 258 N.B.: the point here is that the way of saying something is essential to what is meant (Conceptual Role, 208) I 258 Use Theory/Cavell: The thesis is based on individual situations. I 258f Skepticism/CavellVsSkepticism: the skeptic does not do what he believes he is doing. He says nothing! - Then he cannot mean anything either. - Traditional epistemology: it says surprisingly little - it claims no knowledge! Def Basis/Cavell: a sentence that produces a special claim. CavellVsDescartes: did not make a claim either. - Difference: to imagine sitting by the fireplace, and to imagine claiming to know this. So the solution method cannot even look similar to our everyday methods. - Assertion: requires context that is not generally transferable. The sceptical judgement would not be representative. I 261 The judgement of the epistemologist or skeptic is always particular. I 261 StroudVsCavell: I can see that I have made a condition that is not met. Then this calls my knowledge into question, without me having previously put this forward in a claim to knowledge ("basis"). Nevertheless: like Cavell: StroudVsEpistemology: needs each time a concrete knowledge claim, which makes a general answer impossible. I 263 Stroud pro Cavell: I think he is right, thesis: that the traditional epistemologist needs conditions of expression for every concrete case, which make a generalization impossible. StroudVsCavell: I just want to show that you don't have to show that no assertion has been made. |
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