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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ceteris paribus | Bigelow | I 222 Ceteris paribus/BigelowVsCeteris paribus/Qualification/Qualified Act/Exceptions/Bigelow/Pargetter: Variant: "if no other disturbances exist": 1. Problem: what threatens to turn a law into a tautology, which ultimately reads: "Things move so and so, unless they do not." >Tautologies. 2. Problem: The scope of a "qualified" law threatens to become so narrow that nothing more falls into that law. >Range. On the other hand, it will be said that a law has no positive authority at all if it is strictly understood. >Laws/Cartwright. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: one can solve the riddle by understanding how laws contain modalities. >Modalities, >Laws/Bigelow. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| ceteris paribus | Schiffer Vs ceteris paribus | I 287 ceteris paribus/SchifferVsceteris paribus-condition: it is simply nonsense to speak of p.c., if at all it is not clear what these "other things" should be or what it is for them "to be "equal". I 160 E.g. the baseball hits the window and "ceteris paribus" it would break. This leads to completions that let the phrase seamlessly pass into laws. The interesting question is why anybody would expect a completion here. Probably because the commonsense explanations for belief would otherwise not be valid. Blame it on the covering laws by Hempel. SchifferVscovering law/SchifferVsHempel/SchifferVsFolk psychology: 2. reason, why the folk psychology is wrong that the covering laws are wrong. E.g. Al is flying to Key West, Bob asks why and Carla explains that he wants to visit his sister there. covering law: Carla knows a general psychological law and a conjunction of individual facts which make up a complete explanans and contain the fact that is to be explained. Schiffer: it is clear that Carla does not need to know it! And certainly not as a child. This also does not need to be polished with "probabilisations" or "maximum specification"(Hempel 1965). Or by subdoxatic representation of complete laws. We don’t need any of this. I 161 For sure Carla does not know any "probalistic completion". There is also no reason to assume that the whole story contains the terms "belief" and "desire"! But that does not mean that one should conclude that there is no belief and desires! "because"/explanation/Schiffer: E.g. Carla. Al went to Key West, because he wants to visit his sister. This true statement works in these circumstances as a declaration because of interests and assumptions that Bob had when he asked. Still one could wonder if such "because"-statements are analyzable. Probably no analysis has ever been given. That does not mean, however, that nothing has been said. Solution: Counterfactual conditional: Al would not have gone, if he had not had the desire... etc. "because"/Schiffer: I especially doubt that the knowing of such "because" facts is calling for law-like generalizations. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Various Authors | Bigelow Vs Various Authors | I 222 Ceteris paribus/BigelowVsCeteris paribus assumption/Qualification/Qualified law/Exceptions/Bigelow/Pargetter: Variant: "if there are no other disturbances": 1) Problem: this threatens to let a law become a tautology, which ultimately reads: "Things move in this and that way, unless they do not." 2) Problem: The range of a "qualified" law threatens to become so narrow that nothing is included by it anymore. On the other hand it will be said that a law has no positive instances at all if one interprets it strictly. ((s)> Cartwright). Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the mystery can be solved by understanding how laws contain modalities. Def Laws/law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about possibilia. I 204 Property theory/World properties/Terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: contradictory predicates: do not correspond to any properties. E.g. round and square. I 210 Accessibility: such possible worlds are then not accessible for one another. One is nomically impossible from the standpoint of the other. VsProperty theory/VsWorld-properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is faced with the accusation of circularity, but we hope to resolve the objection. I 53 Determinables/Determinates/Johnson: stand in close logical relations: having a D-ate (determinate) entails having the corresponding D-able (determinable). I 54 But not vice versa! Having a D-able does not require possession of a certain D-ate! But it does require possession of some D-ate from the area. BigelowVsJohnson, World properties: but this could not explain the asymmetry. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: 2nd order properties. Problem: our theory is still incomplete!. Problem: explaining why quantities are gradual. And this is not about whether objects are the same and different at the same time. New: The problem that we can also still say exactly E.g. how much they differ. Or E.g. that two masses are more similar than two others. Plato: Plato solves this with participation. Bigelow/Pargetter: we try a different solution. Bigelow I 234 Natural necessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Bigelow/Pargetter: Dramatic turn Vs Natural necessity! Also later Wittgenstein. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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