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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deliberative Democracy | Dryzek | Gaus I 144 Deliberative democracy/Dryzek: Though democracy comes in many varieties, the dominant current in democratic theory is now a deliberative one. Indeed, it is accurate to say that around 1990 the theory of democracy took a deliberative turn. Thus different accounts of democracy can be appraised in terms of the content, strength, and significance of their relation to the deliberative turn - whether in support, opposition, capture, or qualification. With the deliberative turn, the core of democratic legitimacy became instead the right or ability of those subject to a public decision to participate in genuine deliberation (see Manin, 1987(1); Cohen, 1989(2); the term 'deliberative democracy' was first used by Bessette, 1980(3)). Gaus I 145 The deliberative turn in democratic theory occurred in the early 1990s. However, it does have antecedents, reaching back to Aristotle and the Athenian polis, and encompassing conservatives such as Edmund Burke (for whom deliberation connoted mature reflection as opposed to hasty action), as well as liberals such as John Stuart Mill and John Dewey (for a good history, see the introduction to Bohman and Rehg, 1997(4)). There are also continuities in emphasis with participatory democrats such as Carole Pateman (1970)(5) who were dissatisfied with the lack of opportunity for deep democratic experience in contemporary liberal democracies. >Participation/Pateman, >Democratic theory/Pateman. Benjamin Barber's (1984)(6) 'strong democracy' can be seen in retrospect as a bridge between participatory and deliberative democracy, given his emphasis on 'strong democratic talk'. >Participation/Barber, >Democratic theory/Barber. Authenticity: deliberation). The reflective aspect means that preferences, judgements and views that are taken as fixed in aggregative models are treated as amenable to change in deliberation. Authenticity is therefore a central concern: democratic control should ideally be substantive not symbolic, involving uncoerced communication among competent participants (...). The importance of the deliberative turn was confirmed in the 1990s by the announcements of the most important liberal theorist John Rawls, and critical theorist Jürgen Habermas, that they were deliberative democrats (Rawls, 1993(7); 1997(8): 771-2; Habermas, 1996(9)). Given the sheer number of democratic theorists who now sail under the deliberative flag, as well as the historically different schools of thought from which they come (conservatism, liberalism, and critical theory), there really ought to be substantial variety among deliberative democrats. But what is now striking is less the variety than the uniformity. The assimilation happened in three ways (see Dryzek, 2000(10): 10—17). First, a commitment to deliberative principles can be used to justify some (but not all) of the rights long cherished by liberals. Other theorists emphasize deliberation in courts rather than legislatures (for example, Rawls, 1993(7): 231). Gaus I 146 Liberalism/democracy: [e.g, in later Habermas] there is no recognition of any need to democratize the economy, the administrative state, or the legal system, all of which receive easy legitimacy. >Deliberative democracy/Habermas. Dryzek: However invigorating this assimilation of deliberative democracy might be for liberalism, it may be bad news for democracy. Some deliberative liberals are not especially democratic. Notably, Rawls in the end wants to entrust deliberation to experts in public reason such as Supreme Court justices, who only need to deliberate in the personal as opposed to the interactive sense of the word (see Goodin, 2000(11), for an explicit defence of personal as opposed to interactive deliberation). >Deliberative democracy/Rawls. VsDeliberative democracy: see >Democracy/Schumpeter. 1. Manin, Bernard (1987) 'On legitimacy and political deliberation'. Political Theory, 15: 338—68. 2. Cohen, Joshua (1989) 'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy'. In Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State. Oxford: Blackwell. 3. Bessette, Joseph M. (1980) 'Deliberative democracy: the majoritarian principle in republican government'. In Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Shambra, eds, How Democratic is the Constitution? Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 4. Bohman, James and William Rehg (1997) Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Pateman, Carole (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Barber, Benjamin (1984) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 7. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 8. Rawls, John (1997) 'The idea of public reason revisited'. University ofChicago Law Review, 94: 765-807. 9. Habermas, Jürgen (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 10. Dryzek, John S. (2000) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11. Goodin, Robert E. (2000) 'Democratic deliberation within'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29: 81—109. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Deliberative Democracy | Egalitarianism | Gaus I 147 Deliberative Democracy/Egalitarianism/Dryzek: (...) sceptical egalitarians, defend more traditional accounts of democracy against the deliberative turn. Cf. >Deliberative Democracy/Social Choice Theory, >Deliberative Democracy/Diversity Theories. ShapiroVsDeliberation: In Shapiro's pithy (1999)(1) terms, 'enough about deliberation, politics is about interest and power'. In this light, those interested in improving the quality of democracy should seek the equalization Gaus I 148 of power; here, issues of democracy become linked to distributive justice. Such sceptics can point to the rather embarrassing fact that deliberation cannot be a complete theory of democracy because its advocates do not specify how collective decisions get made (Saward, 2000)(2). Przeworski : if so, then deliberative democrats might have to retreat to more familiar aggregative mechanisms, and the deliberative/aggregative dichotomy is proven false, for then democracy is necessarily aggregative, and votes have to be taken (Przeworski, 1998(3): 140—2). GoodinVsDeliberative democracy: Goodin (2000)(4) points out that deliberation is an activity that can never realistically involve more than a handful of people. Saward: Saward (2000) believes that such considerations mean that egalitarians should therefore oppose deliberation's aristocratic leanings that would exclude those with non-deliberative preferences; far better, in this light, to extend democracy in more direct fashion (for example, by greater use of referenda). FishkinVsVs: Deliberative democrats can reply to the sceptics who charge that deliberation can only be an elite activity in several ways here. In Fishkin's (1995)(5) deliberative opinion polls, articipants for a deliberative forum are selected at random from the population, and complete a uestionnaire at the end of the process. Citizens' juries too are recruited by random selection, but conclude with a policy recommendation crafted and agreed upon by the jurors rather than a questionnaire (Smith and Wales, 2000)(6). Fishkin argues that a deliberative poll represents what public opinion would be if everyone could deliberate; the same might be said for citizens' juries. >Democracy/Fishkin. Dryzek: Alternatively, deliberative democrats could allow that deliberation can coexist with a variety of mechanisms for reaching binding decisions, be they voting in referenda, elections, or the legislature, the decisions of courts, consensus among stakeholders in an issue, or even administrative fiat. More radically, they might think about ways in which the deliberative contestation of discourses in the public sphere can generate collective outcomes not only in its indirect influence on public policy, but also via cultural change and paragovernmental action (Dryzek, 2000)(7). 1. Shapiro, Ian (1999) 'Enough of deliberation: politics is about interest and power'. In Stephen Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagæement. New York: Oxford University Press, 28-38. 2. Saward, Michael (2000) 'Less than meets the eye: democratic legitimacy and deliberative theory'. In Michael Saward, ed., Democratic Innovation: Deliberation, Association and Repesentation. London: Routledge, 66_77. 3. Przeworski, Adam (1998) 'Deliberation and ideological domination'. In Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 140—60. 4. Goodin, Robert E. (2000) 'Democratic deliberation within'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29: 81—109. 5. Fishkin, James (1995) The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 6. Smith, Graham and Corinne Wales (2000) 'Citizens' juries and deliberative democracy'. Political Studies, 48: 51-65. 7. Dryzek, John S. (2000) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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