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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Entailment | Cresswell | I 44
Entailment: consists in the interpretation - inference: in the underlying natural language - logical consequence/Cresswell: but, of course, there is even in intensional logic the concept of logical consequence and e.g. Montague has made use of it. For example, if p and q are propositional variables, then neither is a logical consequence of the other because it is always possible to attribute truth values to the variables so that p is true in a possible world, but q is not.
VsEntailment: it may be in many interpretations that the set of possible worlds, in which p is true, is entailed in the set of possible worlds, in which q is true. And in all these interpretations, applies: p entails q.Logic/some authors: thesis: logic is concerned primarily with what is true in all interpretations, not merely in one. CresswellVs: even if this is true, this cannot apply in an analysis of the natural language. It is also simply not true that logic deals with all interpretations. For example, the logical constants are only interpreted in one way and not in others - it must be ensured that the meaning postulates do not provide an analysis of what it means for an inference to be valid. ((s) Otherwise circular). --- Hughes I 265
Entailment/Ackermann/Hughes/Cresswell: from criticising paradoxes of strict implication: even weakest systems contain them. - This makes it impossible to interpret "strimp" as "follows from" or "follows logically from".
Solution: Entailment: as a calculus of logical continuity - Ackermann: "strict implication" - Belnap, Anderson: Entailment. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |

Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Belnap, Nuel | Cresswell Vs Belnap, Nuel | HCI 299
Paradoxes of implication/Hughes/Cresswell: are at worst harmless. In most cases, we wish to speak of entailment. VsEntailment/VsBelnap/VsAnderson: Their system E (see above) pays too high a price with the absence of the disjunctive syllogism (see below principle C). I 300 Problem: the mere construction of such an axiom system does not provide us with a clear notion of entailment. Paradoxes of implication/Hughes/Cresswell: are even desirable: we want to be able to say: "If you accept that, you can prove anything." I.e. in a contradictory system everything can be proven. aca |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |

Entailment | Cresswell Vs Entailment | Hughes I 267
Paradoxes of strict implication/Disjunctive syllogism/DS/Entailment/Some authors/Hughes/Cresswell: some consider the "paradoxes" to be legitimate and accept them as a price for being able to keep the disjunctive syllogism. VsEntailment: Consider the absence of the disjunctive syllogism even to be a reason for rejecting the entailment. |
M.J. Cresswell Hughes I G.E. Hughes M.J.Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 I Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 II Cresswell Structured Meanings Die Semantik propositionaler Einstellungen 1984 Cambridge Maß, MIT Press Bradford Books Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |