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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mill | Feinberg | Gaus I 109 Mill/Feinberg/Gaus: The classic work on the harm principle, and more generally on this Millian approach to political justice, is Joel Feinberg’s masterful four-volume The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (1984–90)(1). (1) Precisely what is a harm (1984)(1)? (2) Does Millian morality allow coercion to prevent acts that, while not harmful to others, are offensive to some (1985)(1)? (3) When individuals are unable to make fully voluntary choices, can coercion then be employed to stop them from harming themselves (1986)(1)? And (4) are there any conditions under which liberals justify coercion that Gaus I 110 do not fall into one of the above categories (1990)(1)? Feinberg convincingly shows that, when carefully examined, Mill’s radical proposal – that only harm to others can justify social interference – is implausible, but nevertheless is plausibly construed as the core of a liberal social morality (see further Gaus, 1999(2): Part II). Morality/Feinberg: As Feinberg points out, moralities based on the harm principle are liberal in so far as there is a presumption of liberty: if a person’s action does not constitute a harm to others, then she has the right to act as she sees fit (1984(1): 9). Moreover, fundamental to the harm principle is the principle that where there is consent, there is no harm: thus one may consent to acts that set back one’s interests (such as taking drugs); not only does one have the right to harm oneself, but the dealer does not harm you if you have given informed consent to the purchase. VsFeinberg: However, critics of the harm principle (e.g. de Jasay, 1991)(3) have argued that it is a poor grounding for liberal principles as the concept of harm is so malleable: it can be interpreted to encompass the prevention of psychological and culture harms (see e.g. Kernohan(4), 1997), thus justifying extensive and intrusive coercive interventions. >Actions/Benn. 1. Feinberg 1984-90 - Feinberg, Joel (1984) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. I, Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1985) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. II, Offense to Others. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1986) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. III, Harm to Self. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1990) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. IV, Harmless Wrongdoing. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Gaus, Gerald F. (1999) Social Philosophy. Armonk, NY: Sharpe. 3. De Jasay, Anthony (1991) Choice, Contract and Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 4. Kernohan, Andrew (1997) Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Morality | Feinberg | Gaus I 110 Morality/Feinberg/Gaus: As Feinberg points out, moralities based on the harm principle are liberal in so far as there is a presumption of liberty: if a person’s action does not constitute a harm to others, then she has the right to act as she sees fit (1984(1): 9). >Mill/Feinberg. Moreover, fundamental to the harm principle is the principle that where there is consent, there is no harm: thus one may consent to acts that set back one’s interests (such as taking drugs); not only does one have the right to harm oneself, but the dealer does not harm you if you have given informed consent to the purchase. VsFeinberg: However, critics of the harm principle (e.g. de Jasay, 1991)(2) have argued that it is a poor grounding for liberal principles as the concept of harm is so malleable: it can be interpreted to encompass the prevention of psychological and culture harms (see e.g. Kernohan, 1997)(3), thus justifying extensive and intrusive coercive interventions. Moreover, the requirement that the agent give ‘informed consent’ and that her self-harming acts are ‘voluntary’ opens the way to paternalistic interventions (Kleinig, 1983)(4). >Actions/Benn. 1. Feinberg 1984-90 - Feinberg, Joel (1984) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. I, Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1985) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. II, Offense to Others. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1986) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. III, Harm to Self. New York: Oxford University Press. - Feinberg, Joel (1990) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. IV, Harmless Wrongdoing. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. De Jasay, Anthony (1991) Choice, Contract and Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 3. Kernohan, Andrew (1997) Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Kleinig, John (1983) Paternalism. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenhead. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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